FOOTNOTES

The companions of Socrates.

50.It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, that we trace even in outline the positive teaching of Socrates. The severe self-repression with which he controlled his senses was exercised by him no less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape of irony (εἰρωνεία), that is, the continual withholding of his personal convictions, and obstetrics (μαιευτική), the readiness to assist others in bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus he was a great educator rather than a great teacher. For whilst he held that virtue alone was worthy of investigation, and that virtue was essentially wisdom, he professed to be entirely at a loss where to find this wisdom for himself; he left it to his pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus whilst men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened to his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. Of the various suggestions which Socrates threw out, without committing himself to any one, his pupils took up each in turn and endeavoured to construct out of it a system[79]. These systems were in the sharpest possible contrast one with another, but they have certain points in common. All the teachers retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards their common master; each was convinced that he alone possessed the secret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from the physical speculations of which the ripe fruit was already being gathered in by the Atomists. The portal of knowledge was to all of them the right use of the reasoning power; the shrine itself was the discipline of virtue, the attainment of happiness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such were the Socraticschools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply divided into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century had yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again established its importance.

The Cynics.

51.Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to the Stoic system. Of these the Cynic school, founded byAntisthenesof Athens (circ. 440-365B.C.) and developed byDiogenesof Sinope, is its immediate precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the moral earnestness[80]and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates; and for this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the master’s favourite pupil. The lives both of these men and of their successors were marked by simplicity and self-abnegation, and they devoted themselves with true missionary zeal to the reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of the figure of Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still lives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the picture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not without an element of idealization and hero-worship) shews us the man as he appeared to his own disciples.

The breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the track of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many, but the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82]; and he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83]. Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider the civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it as the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return to a ‘natural’ life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage unspoilt byeducation. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has been well described as ‘the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek world[85].’

Cynic intuitionism.

52.The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its attack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself. Socrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was equally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the exercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists; horses they could see, but not ‘horsiness.’ In their ethics they held to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that ‘virtue is knowledge,’ ‘virtue can be taught’ and ‘no one willingly sins’; and they laid special stress on the ‘sufficiency’ (αὐτάρκεια) of virtue, which to produce happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except a Socratic strength of character (Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς)[87]. But in reality they identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with knowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific investigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical school which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at the present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all. In practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that of ‘liberty,’ the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that which seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the conventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made at all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just or unjust, reckless or farseeing.

Limits of Cynism.

53.Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics; a doctrine which exercises a widespread influence because of its extreme simplicity, which is extraordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which it is appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothingis more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism; the Cynics were virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. In their willing self-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the example set by Buddhist monks, but they were probably much inferior to them in the appreciation of natural beauty and the simple pleasures of life. As compared with their master Socrates, they lacked his genial presence, literary taste, and kindly tolerance; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the type of Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride in their country, their birth, and their literary studies[88].

Xenophon.

54.The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective use of literature to disseminate their views; but in the works ofXenophonof Athens (440-circ. 350B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost exactly from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal friend of Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for intellectual subtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military adventure, and his interpretation of Socratic teaching entirely relieved him of any scruples which patriotism might have imposed upon him in this direction, leaving him free at one time to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another to join with the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen. From adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took part in person) and of the life of Cyrus the Great have an interest which in no way depends upon their accuracy. The account which he gives of Socrates in hisMemorabilia(ἀπομνημονεύματα) is not always to be depended upon; it is at the best a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher; but it is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other sources, and is of special interest to us because of the great influence it exercised over Latin literature.

The Cyrenaics.

55.In the opposite directionAristippusof Cyrene shared the sympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt his moral earnestness or his zeal for the good of others. He refused altogether the earnest appeal of Socratesthat he should take part in politics. ‘It seems to me,’ he says, ‘to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do to find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with this, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens with all that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts if he is not successful.’ Aristippus revolted altogether from the ascetic form in which the Cynics represented his master’s teaching, and held that the wise man, by self-restraint and liberal training, attained to the truest pleasure, and that such pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as his followers were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of Epicurus; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage between Stoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict between the Cynics and the Cyrenaics.

The Megarians.

56.The school ofEuclidesof Megara swerved suddenly from these ethical interests and devoted itself mainly to the problems of dialectic. From the Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine of the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and which it identified with the One God proclaimed by Xenophanes and his followers of the Eleatic school. To the Megaric school we are therefore chiefly indebted for the assertion of the philosophical principle of monism; the same school drew the necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in any real sense existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived an interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly occupied with the solution of fallacies: amongst the followers of this school we first meet with the puzzles of ‘the heap’ (Sorites), ‘the liar’ (Pseudomenos), and others upon which in later times Chrysippus and other Stoics sharpened their wits[89].Diodorusthe Megarian set out certain propositions with regard to the relation of the possible and the necessary which are of critical importance in connexion with the problem of free-will[90]. FinallyStilpo, who taught in Athens about 320B.C., and who made a violent attack upon Plato’s theory of ideas, adopted an ethicalstandpoint not unlike that of the Cynics[91], and counted amongst his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed amongst his contemporaries a boundless reputation; princes and peoples vied in doing him honour[92]; but we have scarcely any record of his teaching, and know him almost exclusively as one who contributed to form the mind of Zeno.

Advance of Philosophy.

57.With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not concerned; the consideration of Plato and Aristotle and their respective followers we must leave to another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow from being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is gathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of city and class. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as regards its subject-matter and its principles. But its range is now becoming better defined, and in the period that is approaching we shall find determined attempts to reach a comprehensive solution of the problems presented to enquiring minds.

FOOTNOTES[1]‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West’ Lightfoot,Philippians, p. 274.[2]Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’Greek Thinkers(transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’sReligious teachers of Greece(Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).[3]‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it’ Hom.Od.6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also Adam,Religious Teachers, p. 31.[4]‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the purpose of Zeus’Od.5, 103.[5]Il.24, 308;Od.14, 404.[6]ib.6, 188.[7]Od.8, 170.[8]ib.4, 237.[9]ib.20, 75.[10]ib.14, 84.[11]ib.17, 485.[12]See below, §325.[13]So already Socrates understood it; Xen.Mem.i 3, 7.[14]Hesiod,Works and Days, 252-255; and see below, §254.[15]ib.289-292, quoted Xen.Mem.ii 1, 20.[16]For instance, to Adam,Religious Teachers, Lect.V; Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, bk. i, ch. ii.[17]Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).[18]Adam, p. 114.[19]Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, i pp. 46-48.[20]ib.48-56.[21]ib.56-59.[22]The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible; so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language.[23]See below, §§71,195.[24]Gomperz, i 127.[25]This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204.[26]Xen. apud Euseb.Praep. ev.xiii 13.[27]Xenophanes apud Sext.math.ix 193.[28]Id. apud Arist.Rhet.ii 23.[29]On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.[30]‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have wit’ Heracl.Fr.4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).[31]‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’Fr.16B, 40D.[32]‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private understanding’Fr.92B, 2D.[33]‘All things move and nothing remains’ PlatoCrat.402A.[34]‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess that all things are one’Fr.1B, 50D.[35]‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with goods and goods with gold’Fr.22B, 90D; ‘neither God nor man created this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has been and shall be an ever-living fire’Fr.20B, 30D.[36]‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’Fr.26B, 66D.[37]‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls revive and live’ Sext.Pyrrh. inst., iii 230 (Fr.78B, 88D).[38]‘This Word is always existent’Fr.2B, 1D.[39]ib.[40]‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all things are steered through all’Fr.19B, 41D.[41]‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep’Fr.2B, 1D.[42]Fr.91B, 114D.[43]Adam, pp. 217-222.[44]Gomperz, i p. 63.[45]See Gladisch,Herakleitos und Zoroaster; Ueberweg,Grundriss, p. 39; above, §13.[45a]Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).[45b]Clem.Strom.i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65, 75).[46]Agam.155-161, 167-171.[47]Gomperz, ii p. 13.[48]‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th centuryB.C.’ Gomperz, i p. 414.[49]See below, §§124,130, and131.[50]Gomperz, i p. 428.[51]Xen.Mem.ii 1, 21 to 34.[52]Gomperz, i p. 430.[53]See below, §89.[54]Gomperz, i p. 433.[55]ib.p. 437.[56]Arist.Phys.viii 1; and see below, §173.[56a]Xen.Mem.i 1, 18.[57]Plato,Apol.p. 32.[58]Plato,Crito, p. 44 sqq.[59]Gomperz, ii p. 48.[60]Cic.Ac.i 4, 15;Tusc. disp.v 4, 10.[61]Sen.Ep.71, 7.[62]Xen.Mem.iii 7.[63]Xen.Mem.iv 6, 1; Epict.Disc.i 7, 11.[64]Xen.Mem.iv 5, 12; Arist.Met.xiii 4.[65]Xen.Mem.iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in connexion with achievements in poetry and art.[66]Plato,Phaedo, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.[67]Xen.Mem.i 4, 4.[68]ib.i 4, 2.[69]ib.i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic.N. D.ii 6, 18.[70]ib.i 1, 19.[71]ib.[72]Plato,Alc.ii 143A.[73]Xen.Mem.iii 9, 4 and 5.[74]ib.[75]οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see PlatoProt.p. 345D,Apol.p. 25, Xen.Mem.iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.[76]In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical. It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or ‘divinations.’[77]Mem.i 1, 1.[78]Grote,History of Greece, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school;Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 94-97.[79]‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic.de Orat.iii 16, 61.[80]παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L. vi 2.[81]‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’ Cic.N. D.i 13, 32.[82]οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex.Protrept.p. 46C.[83]Epict.Disc.iii 22, 91.[84]See below, §303.[85]Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book,Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats(Halle 1851).[86]ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L. vi 103.[87]ib.vi 11.[88]See Plato,Theaet.155E,Soph.251B; Aristotle,Met.vii 3, 7.[89]See below, §163.[90]See below, §§220and221.[91]‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen.Ep.9, 3.[92]Gomperz, ii p. 196.

[1]‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West’ Lightfoot,Philippians, p. 274.

[1]‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West’ Lightfoot,Philippians, p. 274.

[2]Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’Greek Thinkers(transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’sReligious teachers of Greece(Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).

[2]Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’Greek Thinkers(transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’sReligious teachers of Greece(Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).

[3]‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it’ Hom.Od.6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also Adam,Religious Teachers, p. 31.

[3]‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it’ Hom.Od.6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also Adam,Religious Teachers, p. 31.

[4]‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the purpose of Zeus’Od.5, 103.

[4]‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the purpose of Zeus’Od.5, 103.

[5]Il.24, 308;Od.14, 404.

[5]Il.24, 308;Od.14, 404.

[6]ib.6, 188.

[6]ib.6, 188.

[7]Od.8, 170.

[7]Od.8, 170.

[8]ib.4, 237.

[8]ib.4, 237.

[9]ib.20, 75.

[9]ib.20, 75.

[10]ib.14, 84.

[10]ib.14, 84.

[11]ib.17, 485.

[11]ib.17, 485.

[12]See below, §325.

[12]See below, §325.

[13]So already Socrates understood it; Xen.Mem.i 3, 7.

[13]So already Socrates understood it; Xen.Mem.i 3, 7.

[14]Hesiod,Works and Days, 252-255; and see below, §254.

[14]Hesiod,Works and Days, 252-255; and see below, §254.

[15]ib.289-292, quoted Xen.Mem.ii 1, 20.

[15]ib.289-292, quoted Xen.Mem.ii 1, 20.

[16]For instance, to Adam,Religious Teachers, Lect.V; Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, bk. i, ch. ii.

[16]For instance, to Adam,Religious Teachers, Lect.V; Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, bk. i, ch. ii.

[17]Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).

[17]Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).

[18]Adam, p. 114.

[18]Adam, p. 114.

[19]Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, i pp. 46-48.

[19]Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, i pp. 46-48.

[20]ib.48-56.

[20]ib.48-56.

[21]ib.56-59.

[21]ib.56-59.

[22]The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible; so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language.

[22]The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible; so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language.

[23]See below, §§71,195.

[23]See below, §§71,195.

[24]Gomperz, i 127.

[24]Gomperz, i 127.

[25]This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204.

[25]This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204.

[26]Xen. apud Euseb.Praep. ev.xiii 13.

[26]Xen. apud Euseb.Praep. ev.xiii 13.

[27]Xenophanes apud Sext.math.ix 193.

[27]Xenophanes apud Sext.math.ix 193.

[28]Id. apud Arist.Rhet.ii 23.

[28]Id. apud Arist.Rhet.ii 23.

[29]On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.

[29]On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.

[30]‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have wit’ Heracl.Fr.4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).

[30]‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have wit’ Heracl.Fr.4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).

[31]‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’Fr.16B, 40D.

[31]‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’Fr.16B, 40D.

[32]‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private understanding’Fr.92B, 2D.

[32]‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private understanding’Fr.92B, 2D.

[33]‘All things move and nothing remains’ PlatoCrat.402A.

[33]‘All things move and nothing remains’ PlatoCrat.402A.

[34]‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess that all things are one’Fr.1B, 50D.

[34]‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess that all things are one’Fr.1B, 50D.

[35]‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with goods and goods with gold’Fr.22B, 90D; ‘neither God nor man created this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has been and shall be an ever-living fire’Fr.20B, 30D.

[35]‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with goods and goods with gold’Fr.22B, 90D; ‘neither God nor man created this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has been and shall be an ever-living fire’Fr.20B, 30D.

[36]‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’Fr.26B, 66D.

[36]‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’Fr.26B, 66D.

[37]‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls revive and live’ Sext.Pyrrh. inst., iii 230 (Fr.78B, 88D).

[37]‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls revive and live’ Sext.Pyrrh. inst., iii 230 (Fr.78B, 88D).

[38]‘This Word is always existent’Fr.2B, 1D.

[38]‘This Word is always existent’Fr.2B, 1D.

[39]ib.

[39]ib.

[40]‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all things are steered through all’Fr.19B, 41D.

[40]‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all things are steered through all’Fr.19B, 41D.

[41]‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep’Fr.2B, 1D.

[41]‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep’Fr.2B, 1D.

[42]Fr.91B, 114D.

[42]Fr.91B, 114D.

[43]Adam, pp. 217-222.

[43]Adam, pp. 217-222.

[44]Gomperz, i p. 63.

[44]Gomperz, i p. 63.

[45]See Gladisch,Herakleitos und Zoroaster; Ueberweg,Grundriss, p. 39; above, §13.

[45]See Gladisch,Herakleitos und Zoroaster; Ueberweg,Grundriss, p. 39; above, §13.

[45a]Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).

[45a]Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).

[45b]Clem.Strom.i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65, 75).

[45b]Clem.Strom.i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65, 75).

[46]Agam.155-161, 167-171.

[46]Agam.155-161, 167-171.

[47]Gomperz, ii p. 13.

[47]Gomperz, ii p. 13.

[48]‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th centuryB.C.’ Gomperz, i p. 414.

[48]‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th centuryB.C.’ Gomperz, i p. 414.

[49]See below, §§124,130, and131.

[49]See below, §§124,130, and131.

[50]Gomperz, i p. 428.

[50]Gomperz, i p. 428.

[51]Xen.Mem.ii 1, 21 to 34.

[51]Xen.Mem.ii 1, 21 to 34.

[52]Gomperz, i p. 430.

[52]Gomperz, i p. 430.

[53]See below, §89.

[53]See below, §89.

[54]Gomperz, i p. 433.

[54]Gomperz, i p. 433.

[55]ib.p. 437.

[55]ib.p. 437.

[56]Arist.Phys.viii 1; and see below, §173.

[56]Arist.Phys.viii 1; and see below, §173.

[56a]Xen.Mem.i 1, 18.

[56a]Xen.Mem.i 1, 18.

[57]Plato,Apol.p. 32.

[57]Plato,Apol.p. 32.

[58]Plato,Crito, p. 44 sqq.

[58]Plato,Crito, p. 44 sqq.

[59]Gomperz, ii p. 48.

[59]Gomperz, ii p. 48.

[60]Cic.Ac.i 4, 15;Tusc. disp.v 4, 10.

[60]Cic.Ac.i 4, 15;Tusc. disp.v 4, 10.

[61]Sen.Ep.71, 7.

[61]Sen.Ep.71, 7.

[62]Xen.Mem.iii 7.

[62]Xen.Mem.iii 7.

[63]Xen.Mem.iv 6, 1; Epict.Disc.i 7, 11.

[63]Xen.Mem.iv 6, 1; Epict.Disc.i 7, 11.

[64]Xen.Mem.iv 5, 12; Arist.Met.xiii 4.

[64]Xen.Mem.iv 5, 12; Arist.Met.xiii 4.

[65]Xen.Mem.iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in connexion with achievements in poetry and art.

[65]Xen.Mem.iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in connexion with achievements in poetry and art.

[66]Plato,Phaedo, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.

[66]Plato,Phaedo, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.

[67]Xen.Mem.i 4, 4.

[67]Xen.Mem.i 4, 4.

[68]ib.i 4, 2.

[68]ib.i 4, 2.

[69]ib.i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic.N. D.ii 6, 18.

[69]ib.i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic.N. D.ii 6, 18.

[70]ib.i 1, 19.

[70]ib.i 1, 19.

[71]ib.

[71]ib.

[72]Plato,Alc.ii 143A.

[72]Plato,Alc.ii 143A.

[73]Xen.Mem.iii 9, 4 and 5.

[73]Xen.Mem.iii 9, 4 and 5.

[74]ib.

[74]ib.

[75]οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see PlatoProt.p. 345D,Apol.p. 25, Xen.Mem.iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.

[75]οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see PlatoProt.p. 345D,Apol.p. 25, Xen.Mem.iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.

[76]In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical. It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or ‘divinations.’

[76]In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical. It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or ‘divinations.’

[77]Mem.i 1, 1.

[77]Mem.i 1, 1.

[78]Grote,History of Greece, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school;Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 94-97.

[78]Grote,History of Greece, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school;Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 94-97.

[79]‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic.de Orat.iii 16, 61.

[79]‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic.de Orat.iii 16, 61.

[80]παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L. vi 2.

[80]παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L. vi 2.

[81]‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’ Cic.N. D.i 13, 32.

[81]‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’ Cic.N. D.i 13, 32.

[82]οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex.Protrept.p. 46C.

[82]οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex.Protrept.p. 46C.

[83]Epict.Disc.iii 22, 91.

[83]Epict.Disc.iii 22, 91.

[84]See below, §303.

[84]See below, §303.

[85]Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book,Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats(Halle 1851).

[85]Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book,Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats(Halle 1851).

[86]ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L. vi 103.

[86]ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L. vi 103.

[87]ib.vi 11.

[87]ib.vi 11.

[88]See Plato,Theaet.155E,Soph.251B; Aristotle,Met.vii 3, 7.

[88]See Plato,Theaet.155E,Soph.251B; Aristotle,Met.vii 3, 7.

[89]See below, §163.

[89]See below, §163.

[90]See below, §§220and221.

[90]See below, §§220and221.

[91]‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen.Ep.9, 3.

[91]‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen.Ep.9, 3.

[92]Gomperz, ii p. 196.

[92]Gomperz, ii p. 196.

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