FOOTNOTES

Advantages sought.

351.The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are interpreted, do not exhaust the field of daily duties. All objects that are ‘advantages’ (προηγμένα) areprima faciesuch that the good man aims at securing them; although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego them. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, ‘art,’ and ‘progress’ are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; as advantages of the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good digestion, good proportions, and beauty; whilst external advantages are wealth, reputation, noble birth, and the like[115]. In all the details there is a lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst the teachers. According to Seneca, men may reasonably wish for tallness[116], and there is a kind of beauty (not dependent on youth) of which women may be proud without blame[117]. Fine clothes make no one the better man, but a certain degree ofneatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage[118]. For nobility the Stoics have little regard; all men are derived through an equal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue is the true nobility[119]. Good name (δόξα,gloria) is commonly reckoned amongst ‘advantages’[120]; but Chrysippus and Diogenes are said to have taught that a good man need not move a finger for the sake of reputation, unless some advantage can be obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we are told) by the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that they reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as an advantage, and they even considered it natural that a man should think of posthumous reputation[121]. The general feeling of the school seems to be that the approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim; its place is taken by the approval of ‘conscience.’ This term, which originally expressed the burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman period modified in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded to a man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the world disapproves his acts: this self-approval is closely akin to peace of mind[122].

Wealth.

352.On no subject would it be easier to find apparently contradictory views amongst Stoic writers than on that of wealth. To decry wealth and praise poverty is to some extent a commonplace with all the philosophical schools; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent apractice[123]that his hearers found some inconsistency between his words and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich man. But the position of the school is clear. ‘Riches are not a good’ is a Stoic paradox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and by every teacher[124]; but nevertheless they are an ‘advantage,’ and thus are rightly aimed at by the good man[125]. To the wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of the republican period especially, the maintenance of the family property (res familiaris) was a duty of high importance; and the wasting of it in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed[126]. The Stoic view was sufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epicurus or one of his followers: ‘he who feels the need of wealth least, can make the best use of it[127].’ Although Panaetius did not write a special chapter on the acquisition and use of wealth[128], yet his views on the latter point are made sufficiently plain in his treatment of the virtue of Justice[129]. The justification of wealth lies in the intention to use it well, and this was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes[130]. As to its acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us to the high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the capital[131].

Liberty.

353.Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous place in the Stoic philosophy we must reckon ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία,libertas). In one sense liberty is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born citizen in contrast to the slave; this liberty differs but little from the virtue of Greatness of Soul already described[132], and in its full meaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess[133]. But in another sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes defined as ‘the power of living as you wish[134],’ and as such eagerly desired by the slave; more often perhaps it is conceived as ‘the right of saying what you please[135].’ In this sense liberty is equivalent to the παῤῥησία which was the watchword of the democracy of Athens, and was the equally cherished privilege of the nobility of Rome[136]; in a slightly different sense it was the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take a middle position; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a precious privilege[137], and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice life or position for its sake[138], there are not wanting voices to remind us that it is unreasonable to speak out one’s mind without regard to persons or circumstances[139], that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be provoked[140], and that the most terrible of all oppressors is the soul that has lost its self-control[141].

Disadvantages.

354.Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with natural laws, so it refuses disadvantages in accordance with a disinclination (ἔκκλισις,alienatio),which is equally natural and right so long as it is controlled by reason[142]. Since to every advantage there is opposed a corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily to refuse the other; and the doctrine of ‘reasonable refusal’ is that of reasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore be sufficient to give a formal statement of the theory. Disadvantages, or things that have negative value (ἀπαξία), may be subdivided according as they are disadvantages in themselves, as an ungainly figure; or as they bring about other disadvantages, as shortness of ready money; or for both reasons, as bad memory or ill-health[143]. They may also be subdivided into three classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or things external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn vulgarity or dulness of wit; of the body, ill-health, and dulness of the organs of sensation; of external things, poverty, loss of children, and the contempt of our neighbours[144].

Healthy affections.

355.Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (διαθέσεις) of the soul, rooted in firm principles in which the wise man never wavers, but to which none else can attain, some other name is required to describe those more passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in contrast with the evil ‘affections’ or perturbations of the soul which will be discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this direction with the three ‘good affections’ (εὐπάθειαι,constantiae,sapientis affectiones). Here a new use of terms is introduced. Strictly speaking an ‘affection’ is an evil state of soul; but as we have no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, the use of the word ‘affection’ is extended in this direction[145]. Each of these ‘good affections’ is introduced to us in contrast with a perturbation to which it bears a superficial resemblance. Thus contrasted with Fear is ‘Caution’ (εὐλάβεια,cautio), which is right avoidance, and is entirely consistent with Couragerightly understood. Subdivisions of Caution are (i) ‘Shame’ (αἰδώς,verecundia), the avoidance of deserved blame, and (ii) ‘Sanctity’ (ἁγνεία) the avoidance of offences against the gods[146]. Contrasted with Greed is ‘Readiness’ (βούλησις,voluntas), the reasonable stretching out after future advantages[147]; contrasted with Hilarity is Joy (χαρά,gaudium), the reasonable appreciation of present advantages[148]. Both Readiness and Joy are entirely consistent with Soberness rightly understood. To the perturbation of Grief no good affection is named as bearing any resemblance; but we need not for that reason question but that the wise man may entertain some quiet form of sympathy for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows which fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal bereavement[149].

The ‘good affections’ are possessed by the wise man only[150]; but not all wise men possess them, nor any at all times[151]. On the other hand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so that on this ground the good citizen enters into competition with the wise man on not altogether uneven terms[152]. The whole doctrine of ‘good affections’ may be conceived as an answer to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of feeling[153]; for the much derided ‘apathy’ of the school is substituted the doctrine of ‘eupathy.’ Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of a frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of Musonius and Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning of ‘eupathy’ in its various applications.

The ethical motive.

356.We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties in its main features, and this sketch will be made more complete in many particulars in the course of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question here suggests itself—what compelling force has this system? what motive is supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning out his life? To this question the ancient philosophers did not directly address themselves; nevertheless their answers are implied in their teaching as a whole. Thus the Stoics would doubtless reply, first, that daily duties are prescribed to us by reason[154]; not perhaps always by reason in its highest sense, to which we must not appeal in every individual action, but at least by the spirit of reasonableness (εὐλογιστία). Secondly, that the common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, recommends them; they are, as we have seen from the beginning, things that it comes in our way to do, that every good citizen and good man will be sure to do. As to future rewards and punishments, though these are not excluded by Stoicism, they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living. But the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental picture of the wise man, the vision of that which is ‘absolutely good.’ Critics may urge: ‘it is a picture that never has been or will be realized in men’s lives, a vision of that which is very far off and which you will never see or touch.’ This the Stoics hardly care to deny, but the difficulty does not disturb them. The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope of attainment is cherished by all but the worst[155]. We have spoken of the ‘ordinary man,’ or, as the Stoics put it, of ‘us who are not wise men.’ But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary man in the system, but only for the ‘probationer’ (προκόπτων,proficiens). It remains for us to trace the upward path from daily duty to virtue, along which every good man is endeavouring to advance.

Progress.

357.The doctrine of progress (προκοπή,progressio) is not peculiar to Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an essential feature of it[156]. Critics may indeed dispute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice attained; but the Stoic must hold fast to the ethical principles that ‘virtue can be taught[157]’ and that ‘virtue is an art[158].’ Every man has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue[159], which varies in degree according to his natural disposition of soul[160]; on this foundation every man builds by concurrent learning and practice[161]. The child is greatly helped if he possesses the trait of ‘modesty’ (αἰδώς,verecundia), which is essentially a readiness to defer to others and to learn from those who are older and wiser[162]; though later it may turn to ‘false shame,’ which is a hindrance[163]. He will then learn to understand and perform his daily duties; and as his character ripens, this performance will daily become easier and more pleasurable to him[164], more certain and more steady in itself. And now daily duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties perfected (τέλειον καθῆκον,perfectum officium), and complete in every point[165]. In order to rise to this higher standard the good man must first perform his duty in all particulars[166]; he must doso with regularity and in harmony with the order of nature[167]; he will then need only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability to pass into the ranks of the wise[168].

Conversion.

358.The stages of progress are variously expounded by Stoic writers[169]; but on one principle all are agreed. Progress is not a half-way stage between vice and virtue, as the Peripatetics teach[170]; it is a long preparation, to be followed by a change sudden and complete (μεταβολή,conversio)[171]. The final step, by which a foolish man becomes in an instant wise, is different in kind to all that have gone before. This position is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that ‘the good is not constituted by addition[172],’ and is enforced by various illustrations. The probationer is like a man who has long been under water; little by little he rises to the surface, but all in a moment he finds himself able to breathe. He is like a puppy in whom the organ of sight has been for days past developing; all at once he gains the power of vision[173]. Just so when progress reaches the end there dawns upon the eyes of the soul the complete and dazzling vision of the good, of which till now only shadows and reflections have been perceived. For a moment he is wise, but does not even yet realizehis own wisdom; then again in a moment he passes on to the complete fruition of happiness[174].

Duty.

359.Thus from the lowlier conception of ‘daily duties’ we have again climbed upwards to the supreme ethical end, to absolute goodness, which is Virtue in her full royalty and the Universal Law (κοινὸς νόμος) as it appeals to the individual man. In this connexion the ideal is familiar in modern times under the name of Duty. The ancient Stoics perhaps never quite reached to any such complete formulation of their ethical theory in a single word; but their general meaning is perfectly expressed by it. Just as the Socratic paradoxes mark the quarrel of philosophy with outworn ideas expressed in conventional language, so its reconciliation with the general opinion is marked by those newly-coined terms such as ‘conscience’ and ‘affection’ which are now familiar household words. We cannot indeed demonstrate that ‘Duty exists,’ any more than we can that deity or providence exists; but we may well say that without it ethical discussion would in our own day be hardly possible. The following stanzas from Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty,’ based upon a Stoic text[175], may be a useful reminder, not only of the dominant position of this conception in modern thought, but also of the continued tendency of the human mind to express its supreme convictions in anthropomorphic language.

‘Stern daughter of the Voice of God!O Duty! if that name thou loveWho art a light to guide, a rodTo check the erring, and reprove:Thou who art victory and lawWhen empty terrors overawe:From vain temptations dost set free;And calm’st the weary strife of frail humanity!Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wearThe Godhead’s most benignant grace;Nor know we anything so fairAs is the smile upon thy face:Flowers laugh before thee on thy bedsAnd fragrance in thy footing treads:Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.To humbler functions, awful Power!I call thee: I myself commendUnto thy guidance from this hour;O let my weakness have an end!Give unto me, made lowly wise,The spirit of self-sacrifice;The confidence of Reason give;And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’[176]

‘Stern daughter of the Voice of God!

O Duty! if that name thou love

Who art a light to guide, a rod

To check the erring, and reprove:

Thou who art victory and law

When empty terrors overawe:

From vain temptations dost set free;

And calm’st the weary strife of frail humanity!

Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wearThe Godhead’s most benignant grace;Nor know we anything so fairAs is the smile upon thy face:Flowers laugh before thee on thy bedsAnd fragrance in thy footing treads:Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.

Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear

The Godhead’s most benignant grace;

Nor know we anything so fair

As is the smile upon thy face:

Flowers laugh before thee on thy beds

And fragrance in thy footing treads:

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;

And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.

To humbler functions, awful Power!I call thee: I myself commendUnto thy guidance from this hour;O let my weakness have an end!Give unto me, made lowly wise,The spirit of self-sacrifice;The confidence of Reason give;And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’[176]

To humbler functions, awful Power!

I call thee: I myself commend

Unto thy guidance from this hour;

O let my weakness have an end!

Give unto me, made lowly wise,

The spirit of self-sacrifice;

The confidence of Reason give;

And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’[176]

FOOTNOTES[1]The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect translation; in discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak instead of ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’ duties.[2]κατωνομάσθαι δ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘κατά τινας ἥκειν’ τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης Diog. L. vii 108.[3]‘est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 59.[4]Stob. ii 7, 8.[5]Diog. L. vii 107.[6]Stob. ii 7, 8.[7]τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι Stob. as above; ‘[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud esse’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 59.[8]See below, §§357,358.[9]Diog. L. vii 4.[10]ib.175.[11]‘omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae’ Cic.Fin.iii 6, 22.[12]‘Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat’ib.iv 16, 45.[13]καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν Diog. L. vii 107; ‘est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit’ Cic.Fin.iii 17, 58; ‘ratio [non] debet agere quidquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere’Off.i 29, 101; ‘huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos certissimam rerum comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea ire, qua ducit verisimilitudo, omne hac via procedit officium’ Sen.Ben.iv 33, 2; and see above, §159.[14]See above, §110.[15]‘quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum sed initium boni’ Sen.Ep.124, 7.[16]See above, §306.[17]‘placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status, diligenda’ Cic.Fin.iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a complete life is illustrated by the desire to avoid the loss of a limb or deformity,ib.17. ‘Universally (be not deceived) every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest’ Epict.Disc.ii 22, 15.[18]‘commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt’ Cic.Off.i 4, 11.[19]ib.[20]ib.12.[21]Cic.Off.i 4, 13.[22]ib.[23]ib.14.[24]‘formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides; quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae’ib.5, 14.[25]‘in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam: quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur’Fin.iii 5, 17. Yet Cicero, still writing as a Stoic, can say: ‘[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu’Off.i 30, 105. See below, §§346,347.[26]See below, §§343,344.[27]‘in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt’ Cic.Off.iii 3, 13; ‘vivitur cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt simulacra virtutis’ib.i 15, 46; ‘est autem quaedam animi sanitas, quae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum turbatio mentis aufertur’Tusc. disp.iv 13, 30.[28]Diog. L. vii 92; ‘in duas partes virtus dividitur, in contemplationem veri et actionem’ Sen.Ep.94, 45.[29]ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας (leg. τέχνας Hirz. ii 482) εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.[30]For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii 262-293; we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca: fortitudo, fides, temperantia, humanitas, simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et parsimonia, clementia,Ep.88, 29 and 30.[31]Plut.virt. mor.2;de fort.2;Sto. rep.vii 1.[32]Thus φρόνησις became ἐπιστήμη ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7 5 b 1, cf. Alex. Aph.de fato37 (Arnim iii 283).[33]‘omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur’ Cic.Off.i 6, 19; ‘natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni’ Sen.Dial.viii 5, 1.[34]‘quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum, ad virtutem nihil. quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant’Ep.88, 20.[35]‘sine hac arte (sc. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse’ Cic.Fin.iii 21, 72.[36]‘qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione’ib.22, 73.[37]‘ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant’ib.21, 72.[38]‘ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a sordidis; deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus a corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta deterior’ Sen.N. Q.iii Praef. 18.[39]‘quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri investigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est’ Cic.Off.i 6, 19.[40]‘est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium ... in res conferunt non necessarias’ib.6, 18.[41]A. Gellius,N. A.xiv 4, 4.[42]Cic.Off.i 7, 21 and 22.[43]ib.13, 41.[44]‘principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui’ Cic.Off.i 17, 58.[45]‘I ought not to be free from affections (ἀπαθής) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen’ Epict.Disc.iii 2, 4; ‘Duties are usually measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards him’Manual30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply corresponding duties on the other side; ‘invicem ista, quantum exigunt, praestant, et parem desiderant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difficilis est’ Sen.Ben.ii 18, 2.[46]‘[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit’Ep.85, 28; ‘quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est, inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 24, 53.[47]‘quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget, liberi honores opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta vestibula, clara nobilis aut formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et mobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique adparatus sunt; nihil horum dono datur; collaticiis et ad dominos redituris instrumentis scena adornatur’ Sen.Dial.vi 10, 1; ‘victrix fortunae sapientia’ Juv.Sat.xiii 20.[48]‘cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam omnes eorum impetus deficient’ Sen.Dial.ii 4, 1.[49]‘levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum’Ep.24, 14.[50]‘inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum est, non respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo’ib.78, 19.[51]‘mors optimum inventum naturae’Dial.vi 20, 1; ‘fortem posce animum, mortis terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat | naturae’ Juv.Sat.x 357-9.[52]‘caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo’ Sen.Dial.vi 20, 3; ‘nullo nos invida tanto | armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod patet’ SiliusPun.xi 186-8; ‘adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio eius nihil timendum sit’ Sen.Ep.24, 11.[53]‘[mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros, quos in amorem sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat’ib.36, 8.[54]So Heraclitus had said ‘unus dies par omni est’ib.12, 7; ‘ut prorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem: quoniam mora non fit beatior vita, sed longior’Ben.v 17, 6.[55]‘si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere, si mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac ruenti’Ep.58, 35.[56]‘melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nec enim omnia, quaedam | pro vita facienda putant’ Juv.Sat.xv 106 to 108.[57]Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good reasons for voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking up a banquet. As the guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as the arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers breaking in and using violent language, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being eaten up, or (v) the company being drunk; so the wise man will depart, because of (i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him violence, (iii) disease hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v) madness, which is the drunkenness of the soul. See Arnim iii 768.[58]Notably in the case of Cato.[59]‘in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 60.[60]‘perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus’ib.iii 18, 61.[61]He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen.Mem.iv 4, 4.[62]‘Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem detraxeris gloriae’ Sen.Ep.13, 14.[63]‘ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi’ib.24, 25; ‘quid ergo? non multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed plus momenti apud me habent qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et admittunt illam, non adtrahunt’ib.30, 15.[64]ib.24, 25.[65]ib.117, 22.[66]Epict.Disc.i 9, 16.[67]‘probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate’ Cic.Off.i 19, 62.[68]ib.21, 71.[69]ib.26, 92.[70]ib.23, 80.[71]‘Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid impedierit’ Sen.Dial.viii 3, 2.[72]See above, §§89,90.[73]See above, §91.[74]‘efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque neque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant’ Cic.Off.i 29, 102.[75]‘hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latinedecorumpotest; Graece enim πρέπον dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari’ib.i 27, 93.[76]Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; ‘ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritudo; sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur’Tusc. disp.iv 13, 31.[77]‘id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali’Off.i 27, 96.[78]‘adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum’ib.28, 99; ‘to order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters’ English Church Catechism.[79]Cic.Off.i 29, 104.[80]‘id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium’ib.31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all the arts that subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most truly liberal:ib.42, 150 and 151.[81]ib.34, 122-124.[82]‘venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem’ib.36, 130. In the same spirit Epictetus says ‘we ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes’Disc.i 16, 14.[83]Cic.Off.i 35, 127.[84]‘nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis’ib.i 35, 128; ‘Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit: alii nullo modo’Fin.iii 20, 68.[85]‘habes scholam Stoicam, ὁ σοφὸς εὐθυῤῥημονήσει. ego servo et servabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te scripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici’Fam.ix 22, 5. See also above, §318.[86]‘rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam illum matelam sumpsisse’ Sen.Ben.iii 26, 2.[87]Dial.vi 20, 3.[88]σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.[89]τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπουib.7, 5 b 2.[90]μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην was the expression of Antisthenes, see Diog. L. vi 3; ‘voluptas est ... res humilis, membrorum turpium aut vilium ministerio veniens’ Sen.Ben.vii 2, 2.[91]‘intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse’ Cic.Off.i 29, 103.[92]See above, §319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson’s view (on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended πόνος to be the προηγμένον, and ἡδονή the ἀποπροηγμένον; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised the value of πόνος (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really difficult question. ‘Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all “pleasure” is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller’sSocratics, p. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that which is the result and after-effect of πόνος. In other words, it may be argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat.Phileb.44B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected. Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that ἡδονή was προηγμένον, his remark can only have applied to the ἀπονία-ἡδονή; and such certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut.Sto. rep.30, 2).’ In the passage here referred to from Plutarch ἀπονία takes the place of ἡδονή as a προηγμένον; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51. See further §§347,371.[93]ἡδονή as an advantage is contrasted with πόνος (suffering) as a disadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.[94]Cic.Fin.ii 21, 69.[95]Κλεάνθης μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ Sext.math.xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).[96]Arnim iii 136, 155.[97]‘sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem animi’ Cic.Fin.iii 1, 1; ‘quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari velit?’ Sen.Dial.vii 5, 4; ‘quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?’ib.4, 4.[98]‘voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono’ Cic.Leg.i 11, 31; ‘[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit’Off.iii 33, 120; ‘voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio’ Sen.Ep.116, 3; ‘[virtus voluptatem] non praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur’Dial.vii 9, 1. That this view was held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a); see also above, notes 92 and 93.[99]Eth. N.x 7.[100]ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν Diog. L. vii 114 (of Chrysippus); ‘hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt; sublationem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui’ Cic.Fin.ii 4, 13; ‘vitium esse voluptatem credimus’ Sen.Ep.59, 1.[101]‘quam [perturbationem] Stoici ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero translates with more fulness bylaetitia gestiensornimia;Tusc. disp.iv 6, 13.[102]Παναίτιος δὲ [ἡδονήν φησί] τινα μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν Sext.math.xi 73 (Arnim iii 155).[103]See below, §§371,402,403. On the whole subject see further Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 110 to 112.[104]‘Antipater Tyrius, Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus, praeterit[am] censet a Panaetio valetudinis curationem. valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis tuendi causa, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent’ Cic.Off.ii 24, 86.[105]‘hanc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum indulgeatis, quantum bonae valetudini satis est ... cibus famem sedet, potio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit adversus infesta corporis’ Sen.Ep.8, 5; and so Musonius, below, §381.[106]Epict.Disc.iii 22 and 26.[107]See above, §304.[108]Diog. L. vii 129; ‘Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 34, 72.[109]ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον Diog. L. vii 130; ‘[Stoici] amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt’ Cic. as above. The ἐπιβολή orconatusis a variety of the ὁρμή orappetitio, Hirzel p. 390.[110]Not of course new in any absolute sense; in the country at least such relations must always have been common.[111]Diog. L. vi 96-98.[112]See above, §300, and §306, note 29; and below, §§431,439,444, and446.[113]‘in consensu vidui caelibatus nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit’ Sen.Ben.i 9, 4.[114]Stob. iv 22, 25; and see further, §§406,407.[115]Diog. L. vii 106.[116]‘non contemnet se sapiens, etiamsi fuerit minimae staturae; esse tamen se procerum volet’ Sen.Dial.vii 22, 2.[117]‘unicum tibi ornamentum pulcherrima et nulli obnoxia aetati forma’ib.xii 16, 4.[118]‘contra naturam est, faciles odisse munditias’ Sen.Ep.5, 4; ‘non splendeat toga, ne sordeat quidem’ib.5, 3.[119]‘unus omnium parens mundus est: ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur’Ben.iii 28, 2; ‘[philosophia] stemma non inspicit ... animus facit nobilem’Ep.44, 1 and 5.[120]Diog. L. vii 106; Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51.[121]‘de bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc quam dixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt’ib.17, 57. Cicero and Seneca were both keenly sensitive to the judgment of posterity: ‘paucis natus est, qui populum aetatis suae cogitat: multa annorum milia, multa populorum supervenient: ad illa respice. etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit, venient qui sine offensa sine gratia iudicent’ Sen.Ep.79, 17.[122]‘pacem demus animo, quam dabit ... intenta mens ad unius honesti cupiditatem. conscientiae satis fiat; nil in famam laboremus’Dial.v 41, 2.[123]‘multis ad philosophandum obstitere divitiae; paupertas expedita est, secura est’Ep.17, 3; ‘transeamus ad patrimonia, maximam humanarum aerumnarum materiam’Dial.ix 8, 1.[124]‘Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona. divitiae autem ... nihil horum faciunt; ergo non sunt [bonum]’Ep.87, 35.[125]‘divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum et habendas esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor’Dial.vii 24, 5; ‘[sapiens] non amat divitias, sed mavult. maiorem virtuti suae materiem subministrari vult’ib.21, 4.[126]‘largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit’ Cic.Off.ii 15, 52; ‘mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat an servare nesciat’ Sen.Ep.120, 8.[127]‘is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget’ib.14, 17.[128]Cic.Off.ii 24, 86.[129]See above, §337.[130]‘Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de Officiis scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere “sapientis esse, nihil contra mores leges instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis propinquis amicis, maximeque reipublicae. singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis”’ Cic.Off.iii 15, 63.[131]‘toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, commodius a quibusdam optimis viris, ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur’ib.ii 25, 90; and see further, §408.[132]See above, §342.[133]τὴν μὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, ... δι’ ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον ἐλεύθερον Stob. ii 7, 11 i.[134]‘quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis’ Cic.Par.5, 34.[135]‘asperitas agrestis | vult libertas dici mera’ Hor.Ep.i 18, 6 and 8.[136]Juv.Sat.i 151-153.[137]‘non potest gratis constare libertas; hanc si magno aestimas, omnia parvo aestimanda sunt’ Sen.Ep.104, 34, where the reference is to ‘libertas’ in both senses.[138]‘nec civis erat, qui libera posset | verba animi proferre, et vitam impendere vero’ Juv.Sat.iv 90 and 91.[139]οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὁντινοῦν λεκτέον ἃ φρονοῦμεν Muson. apud Stob. iii 40, 9 (Hense, p. 754, 6).[140]‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit; immo declinabit, non aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen.Ep.14, 7.[141]‘Can we abolish the acropolis that is in us, and cast out the tyrant within us, whom we have daily over us?’ Epict.Disc.iv 1, 86.[142]Χρύσιππός φησι μαίνεσθαι τοὺς ... τὴν ἀπονίαν ἐν μηδενὶ ποιουμένους Plut.Sto. rep.30, 2; ‘in aliis satis esse causae [Stoici voluerunt] quamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut ... in doloris vacuitate’ Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51.[143]Stob. ii 7, 7 b; Cic.Fin.iii 17, 56.[144]Stob. as above.[145]For a similar change in the meaning of the word ‘conscience’ see above, §351; the new use of this word as of the word ‘affection’ is that now commonly understood in ethical discussion.[146]Diog. L. vii 116; ‘declinatio [malorum] si cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 6, 13.[147]‘eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem: quam sic definiunt—voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat’ib.6, 12.[148]‘cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur’ib.6, 13.[149]See below, §§374,379.[150]‘scio gaudium nisi sapienti non contingere. est enim animi elatio suis bonis verisque fidentis’ Sen.Ep.59, 1 and 2; ‘sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum’ib.27, 3.[151]χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ φρόνιμον περιπάτησιν [λέγουσιν] οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν οὔτε αἰεί Stob. ii 7, 5 c.[152]‘in huius gaudii possessione esse te volo’ Sen.Ep.23, 4.[153]‘ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum, sicut iudicio Panaetii, inprobata abiectaque est’ A. GelliusN. A.xii 5, 10.[154]τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν Galenplac. Hipp. et Plat.iv 2, p. 368 K.[155]‘negat [Zenon] Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa, qua tyrannum Dionysium. huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae; illi propter spem vivere’ Cic.Fin.iv 20, 56.[156]See above, §§289,324.[157]For the Socratic paradox ‘virtue can be taught,’ see above, §46, also Diog. L. vii 91; ‘nemo est casu bonus. discenda virtus est’ Sen.Ep.123, 16.[158]Arnim iii 214.[159]‘omnibus natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum’ Sen.Ep.108, 8.[160]The emphasis occasionally laid on εὐφυΐα (bona indoles) reflects aristocratic and Platonic influences, see Pearson, pp. 205, 206; ‘those who have a good natural disposition (οἱ εὐφυεῖς), even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason’ Epict.Disc.iii 6, 9.[161]‘Modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him; actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him’ib.ii 9, 11; ‘What then is progress? if any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will (προαίρεσις) to exercise it and to improve it by labour’ib.i 4, 18.[162]Cic.de Off.i 28, 99 (§343above); ‘verecundiam, bonum in adulescente signum’ Sen.Ep.11, 1.[163]‘[obstitit] verecundia, quae multorum profectus silentio pressit’Dial.vi 24, 2; cf.Ep.40, 14.[164]‘paulatim voluptati sunt quae necessitate coeperunt’Dial.i 4, 15.[165]Stob. ii 7, 8, 8 a, and 11 a; Cic.Off.i 3, 8 and iii 3, 14.[166]ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος], προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει Stob. iv (Flor.) 103, 22 M (Arnim iii 510).[167]‘primum est officium, ut se conservet in naturae statu; deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint; ... deinde ea [selectio] perpetua; tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae; in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici’ Cic.Fin.iii 6, 20.[168]ἐπιγίγνεσθαι [τῷ προκόπτοντι] τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσι Stob. as above; ‘illud, quod ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas et recta ire te via credas’ Sen.Dial.ix 2, 2. Epictetus uses the technical term ἀμεταπτωσία ‘unchangeable firmness of mind’Disc.iii 2, 8.[169]See especially Seneca,Epp.75 and 95.[170]Diog. L. vii 127.[171]τὴν δὲ μεταστροφὴν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ ἐκ μεταβολῆς φασὶ γίνεσθαι, μεταβαλλούσης τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν Clem. Al.Strom.iv 6, 28 (Arnim iii 221).[172]Cic.Fin.iii 14, 45; and see above, §322.[173]‘ut qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat ut videat, plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus; item, qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis aditum, nihilominus in miseria est, quam ille qui nihil processit’ Cic.Fin.iii 14, 48.[174]As to the man who is ‘wise without knowing it’ (διαλεληθὼς σοφός) see Arnim iii 539 to 542, and Plut.Sto. rep.19, 3 and 4.[175]‘iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus, ut non tantum recte facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset’ Sen.Ep.120, 10.[176]Written in 1805.

[1]The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect translation; in discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak instead of ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’ duties.

[2]κατωνομάσθαι δ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘κατά τινας ἥκειν’ τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης Diog. L. vii 108.

[3]‘est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 59.

[4]Stob. ii 7, 8.

[5]Diog. L. vii 107.

[6]Stob. ii 7, 8.

[7]τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι Stob. as above; ‘[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud esse’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 59.

[8]See below, §§357,358.

[9]Diog. L. vii 4.

[10]ib.175.

[11]‘omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae’ Cic.Fin.iii 6, 22.

[12]‘Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat’ib.iv 16, 45.

[13]καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν Diog. L. vii 107; ‘est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit’ Cic.Fin.iii 17, 58; ‘ratio [non] debet agere quidquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere’Off.i 29, 101; ‘huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos certissimam rerum comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea ire, qua ducit verisimilitudo, omne hac via procedit officium’ Sen.Ben.iv 33, 2; and see above, §159.

[14]See above, §110.

[15]‘quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum sed initium boni’ Sen.Ep.124, 7.

[16]See above, §306.

[17]‘placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status, diligenda’ Cic.Fin.iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a complete life is illustrated by the desire to avoid the loss of a limb or deformity,ib.17. ‘Universally (be not deceived) every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest’ Epict.Disc.ii 22, 15.

[18]‘commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt’ Cic.Off.i 4, 11.

[19]ib.

[20]ib.12.

[21]Cic.Off.i 4, 13.

[22]ib.

[23]ib.14.

[24]‘formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides; quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae’ib.5, 14.

[25]‘in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam: quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur’Fin.iii 5, 17. Yet Cicero, still writing as a Stoic, can say: ‘[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu’Off.i 30, 105. See below, §§346,347.

[26]See below, §§343,344.

[27]‘in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt’ Cic.Off.iii 3, 13; ‘vivitur cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt simulacra virtutis’ib.i 15, 46; ‘est autem quaedam animi sanitas, quae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum turbatio mentis aufertur’Tusc. disp.iv 13, 30.

[28]Diog. L. vii 92; ‘in duas partes virtus dividitur, in contemplationem veri et actionem’ Sen.Ep.94, 45.

[29]ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας (leg. τέχνας Hirz. ii 482) εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.

[30]For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii 262-293; we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca: fortitudo, fides, temperantia, humanitas, simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et parsimonia, clementia,Ep.88, 29 and 30.

[31]Plut.virt. mor.2;de fort.2;Sto. rep.vii 1.

[32]Thus φρόνησις became ἐπιστήμη ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7 5 b 1, cf. Alex. Aph.de fato37 (Arnim iii 283).

[33]‘omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur’ Cic.Off.i 6, 19; ‘natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni’ Sen.Dial.viii 5, 1.

[34]‘quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum, ad virtutem nihil. quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant’Ep.88, 20.

[35]‘sine hac arte (sc. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse’ Cic.Fin.iii 21, 72.

[36]‘qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione’ib.22, 73.

[37]‘ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant’ib.21, 72.

[38]‘ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a sordidis; deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus a corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta deterior’ Sen.N. Q.iii Praef. 18.

[39]‘quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri investigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est’ Cic.Off.i 6, 19.

[40]‘est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium ... in res conferunt non necessarias’ib.6, 18.

[41]A. Gellius,N. A.xiv 4, 4.

[42]Cic.Off.i 7, 21 and 22.

[43]ib.13, 41.

[44]‘principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui’ Cic.Off.i 17, 58.

[45]‘I ought not to be free from affections (ἀπαθής) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen’ Epict.Disc.iii 2, 4; ‘Duties are usually measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards him’Manual30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply corresponding duties on the other side; ‘invicem ista, quantum exigunt, praestant, et parem desiderant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difficilis est’ Sen.Ben.ii 18, 2.

[46]‘[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit’Ep.85, 28; ‘quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est, inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 24, 53.

[47]‘quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget, liberi honores opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta vestibula, clara nobilis aut formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et mobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique adparatus sunt; nihil horum dono datur; collaticiis et ad dominos redituris instrumentis scena adornatur’ Sen.Dial.vi 10, 1; ‘victrix fortunae sapientia’ Juv.Sat.xiii 20.

[48]‘cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam omnes eorum impetus deficient’ Sen.Dial.ii 4, 1.

[49]‘levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum’Ep.24, 14.

[50]‘inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum est, non respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo’ib.78, 19.

[51]‘mors optimum inventum naturae’Dial.vi 20, 1; ‘fortem posce animum, mortis terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat | naturae’ Juv.Sat.x 357-9.

[52]‘caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo’ Sen.Dial.vi 20, 3; ‘nullo nos invida tanto | armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod patet’ SiliusPun.xi 186-8; ‘adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio eius nihil timendum sit’ Sen.Ep.24, 11.

[53]‘[mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros, quos in amorem sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat’ib.36, 8.

[54]So Heraclitus had said ‘unus dies par omni est’ib.12, 7; ‘ut prorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem: quoniam mora non fit beatior vita, sed longior’Ben.v 17, 6.

[55]‘si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere, si mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac ruenti’Ep.58, 35.

[56]‘melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nec enim omnia, quaedam | pro vita facienda putant’ Juv.Sat.xv 106 to 108.

[57]Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good reasons for voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking up a banquet. As the guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as the arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers breaking in and using violent language, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being eaten up, or (v) the company being drunk; so the wise man will depart, because of (i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him violence, (iii) disease hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v) madness, which is the drunkenness of the soul. See Arnim iii 768.

[58]Notably in the case of Cato.

[59]‘in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 60.

[60]‘perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus’ib.iii 18, 61.

[61]He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen.Mem.iv 4, 4.

[62]‘Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem detraxeris gloriae’ Sen.Ep.13, 14.

[63]‘ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi’ib.24, 25; ‘quid ergo? non multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed plus momenti apud me habent qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et admittunt illam, non adtrahunt’ib.30, 15.

[64]ib.24, 25.

[65]ib.117, 22.

[66]Epict.Disc.i 9, 16.

[67]‘probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate’ Cic.Off.i 19, 62.

[68]ib.21, 71.

[69]ib.26, 92.

[70]ib.23, 80.

[71]‘Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid impedierit’ Sen.Dial.viii 3, 2.

[72]See above, §§89,90.

[73]See above, §91.

[74]‘efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque neque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant’ Cic.Off.i 29, 102.

[75]‘hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latinedecorumpotest; Graece enim πρέπον dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari’ib.i 27, 93.

[76]Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; ‘ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritudo; sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur’Tusc. disp.iv 13, 31.

[77]‘id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali’Off.i 27, 96.

[78]‘adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum’ib.28, 99; ‘to order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters’ English Church Catechism.

[79]Cic.Off.i 29, 104.

[80]‘id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium’ib.31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all the arts that subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most truly liberal:ib.42, 150 and 151.

[81]ib.34, 122-124.

[82]‘venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem’ib.36, 130. In the same spirit Epictetus says ‘we ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes’Disc.i 16, 14.

[83]Cic.Off.i 35, 127.

[84]‘nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis’ib.i 35, 128; ‘Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit: alii nullo modo’Fin.iii 20, 68.

[85]‘habes scholam Stoicam, ὁ σοφὸς εὐθυῤῥημονήσει. ego servo et servabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te scripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici’Fam.ix 22, 5. See also above, §318.

[86]‘rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam illum matelam sumpsisse’ Sen.Ben.iii 26, 2.

[87]Dial.vi 20, 3.

[88]σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.

[89]τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπουib.7, 5 b 2.

[90]μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην was the expression of Antisthenes, see Diog. L. vi 3; ‘voluptas est ... res humilis, membrorum turpium aut vilium ministerio veniens’ Sen.Ben.vii 2, 2.

[91]‘intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse’ Cic.Off.i 29, 103.

[92]See above, §319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson’s view (on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended πόνος to be the προηγμένον, and ἡδονή the ἀποπροηγμένον; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised the value of πόνος (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really difficult question. ‘Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all “pleasure” is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller’sSocratics, p. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that which is the result and after-effect of πόνος. In other words, it may be argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat.Phileb.44B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected. Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that ἡδονή was προηγμένον, his remark can only have applied to the ἀπονία-ἡδονή; and such certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut.Sto. rep.30, 2).’ In the passage here referred to from Plutarch ἀπονία takes the place of ἡδονή as a προηγμένον; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51. See further §§347,371.

[93]ἡδονή as an advantage is contrasted with πόνος (suffering) as a disadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.

[94]Cic.Fin.ii 21, 69.

[95]Κλεάνθης μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ Sext.math.xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).

[96]Arnim iii 136, 155.

[97]‘sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem animi’ Cic.Fin.iii 1, 1; ‘quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari velit?’ Sen.Dial.vii 5, 4; ‘quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?’ib.4, 4.

[98]‘voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono’ Cic.Leg.i 11, 31; ‘[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit’Off.iii 33, 120; ‘voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio’ Sen.Ep.116, 3; ‘[virtus voluptatem] non praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur’Dial.vii 9, 1. That this view was held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a); see also above, notes 92 and 93.

[99]Eth. N.x 7.

[100]ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν Diog. L. vii 114 (of Chrysippus); ‘hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt; sublationem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui’ Cic.Fin.ii 4, 13; ‘vitium esse voluptatem credimus’ Sen.Ep.59, 1.

[101]‘quam [perturbationem] Stoici ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero translates with more fulness bylaetitia gestiensornimia;Tusc. disp.iv 6, 13.

[102]Παναίτιος δὲ [ἡδονήν φησί] τινα μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν Sext.math.xi 73 (Arnim iii 155).

[103]See below, §§371,402,403. On the whole subject see further Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 110 to 112.

[104]‘Antipater Tyrius, Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus, praeterit[am] censet a Panaetio valetudinis curationem. valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis tuendi causa, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent’ Cic.Off.ii 24, 86.

[105]‘hanc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum indulgeatis, quantum bonae valetudini satis est ... cibus famem sedet, potio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit adversus infesta corporis’ Sen.Ep.8, 5; and so Musonius, below, §381.

[106]Epict.Disc.iii 22 and 26.

[107]See above, §304.

[108]Diog. L. vii 129; ‘Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 34, 72.

[109]ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον Diog. L. vii 130; ‘[Stoici] amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt’ Cic. as above. The ἐπιβολή orconatusis a variety of the ὁρμή orappetitio, Hirzel p. 390.

[110]Not of course new in any absolute sense; in the country at least such relations must always have been common.

[111]Diog. L. vi 96-98.

[112]See above, §300, and §306, note 29; and below, §§431,439,444, and446.

[113]‘in consensu vidui caelibatus nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit’ Sen.Ben.i 9, 4.

[114]Stob. iv 22, 25; and see further, §§406,407.

[115]Diog. L. vii 106.

[116]‘non contemnet se sapiens, etiamsi fuerit minimae staturae; esse tamen se procerum volet’ Sen.Dial.vii 22, 2.

[117]‘unicum tibi ornamentum pulcherrima et nulli obnoxia aetati forma’ib.xii 16, 4.

[118]‘contra naturam est, faciles odisse munditias’ Sen.Ep.5, 4; ‘non splendeat toga, ne sordeat quidem’ib.5, 3.

[119]‘unus omnium parens mundus est: ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur’Ben.iii 28, 2; ‘[philosophia] stemma non inspicit ... animus facit nobilem’Ep.44, 1 and 5.

[120]Diog. L. vii 106; Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51.

[121]‘de bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc quam dixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt’ib.17, 57. Cicero and Seneca were both keenly sensitive to the judgment of posterity: ‘paucis natus est, qui populum aetatis suae cogitat: multa annorum milia, multa populorum supervenient: ad illa respice. etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit, venient qui sine offensa sine gratia iudicent’ Sen.Ep.79, 17.

[122]‘pacem demus animo, quam dabit ... intenta mens ad unius honesti cupiditatem. conscientiae satis fiat; nil in famam laboremus’Dial.v 41, 2.

[123]‘multis ad philosophandum obstitere divitiae; paupertas expedita est, secura est’Ep.17, 3; ‘transeamus ad patrimonia, maximam humanarum aerumnarum materiam’Dial.ix 8, 1.

[124]‘Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona. divitiae autem ... nihil horum faciunt; ergo non sunt [bonum]’Ep.87, 35.

[125]‘divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum et habendas esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor’Dial.vii 24, 5; ‘[sapiens] non amat divitias, sed mavult. maiorem virtuti suae materiem subministrari vult’ib.21, 4.

[126]‘largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit’ Cic.Off.ii 15, 52; ‘mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat an servare nesciat’ Sen.Ep.120, 8.

[127]‘is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget’ib.14, 17.

[128]Cic.Off.ii 24, 86.

[129]See above, §337.

[130]‘Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de Officiis scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere “sapientis esse, nihil contra mores leges instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis propinquis amicis, maximeque reipublicae. singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis”’ Cic.Off.iii 15, 63.

[131]‘toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, commodius a quibusdam optimis viris, ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur’ib.ii 25, 90; and see further, §408.

[132]See above, §342.

[133]τὴν μὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, ... δι’ ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον ἐλεύθερον Stob. ii 7, 11 i.

[134]‘quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis’ Cic.Par.5, 34.

[135]‘asperitas agrestis | vult libertas dici mera’ Hor.Ep.i 18, 6 and 8.

[136]Juv.Sat.i 151-153.

[137]‘non potest gratis constare libertas; hanc si magno aestimas, omnia parvo aestimanda sunt’ Sen.Ep.104, 34, where the reference is to ‘libertas’ in both senses.

[138]‘nec civis erat, qui libera posset | verba animi proferre, et vitam impendere vero’ Juv.Sat.iv 90 and 91.

[139]οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὁντινοῦν λεκτέον ἃ φρονοῦμεν Muson. apud Stob. iii 40, 9 (Hense, p. 754, 6).

[140]‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit; immo declinabit, non aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen.Ep.14, 7.

[141]‘Can we abolish the acropolis that is in us, and cast out the tyrant within us, whom we have daily over us?’ Epict.Disc.iv 1, 86.

[142]Χρύσιππός φησι μαίνεσθαι τοὺς ... τὴν ἀπονίαν ἐν μηδενὶ ποιουμένους Plut.Sto. rep.30, 2; ‘in aliis satis esse causae [Stoici voluerunt] quamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut ... in doloris vacuitate’ Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51.

[143]Stob. ii 7, 7 b; Cic.Fin.iii 17, 56.

[144]Stob. as above.

[145]For a similar change in the meaning of the word ‘conscience’ see above, §351; the new use of this word as of the word ‘affection’ is that now commonly understood in ethical discussion.

[146]Diog. L. vii 116; ‘declinatio [malorum] si cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 6, 13.

[147]‘eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem: quam sic definiunt—voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat’ib.6, 12.

[148]‘cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur’ib.6, 13.

[149]See below, §§374,379.

[150]‘scio gaudium nisi sapienti non contingere. est enim animi elatio suis bonis verisque fidentis’ Sen.Ep.59, 1 and 2; ‘sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum’ib.27, 3.

[151]χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ φρόνιμον περιπάτησιν [λέγουσιν] οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν οὔτε αἰεί Stob. ii 7, 5 c.

[152]‘in huius gaudii possessione esse te volo’ Sen.Ep.23, 4.

[153]‘ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum, sicut iudicio Panaetii, inprobata abiectaque est’ A. GelliusN. A.xii 5, 10.

[154]τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν Galenplac. Hipp. et Plat.iv 2, p. 368 K.

[155]‘negat [Zenon] Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa, qua tyrannum Dionysium. huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae; illi propter spem vivere’ Cic.Fin.iv 20, 56.

[156]See above, §§289,324.

[157]For the Socratic paradox ‘virtue can be taught,’ see above, §46, also Diog. L. vii 91; ‘nemo est casu bonus. discenda virtus est’ Sen.Ep.123, 16.

[158]Arnim iii 214.

[159]‘omnibus natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum’ Sen.Ep.108, 8.

[160]The emphasis occasionally laid on εὐφυΐα (bona indoles) reflects aristocratic and Platonic influences, see Pearson, pp. 205, 206; ‘those who have a good natural disposition (οἱ εὐφυεῖς), even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason’ Epict.Disc.iii 6, 9.

[161]‘Modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him; actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him’ib.ii 9, 11; ‘What then is progress? if any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will (προαίρεσις) to exercise it and to improve it by labour’ib.i 4, 18.

[162]Cic.de Off.i 28, 99 (§343above); ‘verecundiam, bonum in adulescente signum’ Sen.Ep.11, 1.

[163]‘[obstitit] verecundia, quae multorum profectus silentio pressit’Dial.vi 24, 2; cf.Ep.40, 14.

[164]‘paulatim voluptati sunt quae necessitate coeperunt’Dial.i 4, 15.

[165]Stob. ii 7, 8, 8 a, and 11 a; Cic.Off.i 3, 8 and iii 3, 14.

[166]ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος], προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει Stob. iv (Flor.) 103, 22 M (Arnim iii 510).

[167]‘primum est officium, ut se conservet in naturae statu; deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint; ... deinde ea [selectio] perpetua; tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae; in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici’ Cic.Fin.iii 6, 20.

[168]ἐπιγίγνεσθαι [τῷ προκόπτοντι] τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσι Stob. as above; ‘illud, quod ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas et recta ire te via credas’ Sen.Dial.ix 2, 2. Epictetus uses the technical term ἀμεταπτωσία ‘unchangeable firmness of mind’Disc.iii 2, 8.

[169]See especially Seneca,Epp.75 and 95.

[170]Diog. L. vii 127.

[171]τὴν δὲ μεταστροφὴν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ ἐκ μεταβολῆς φασὶ γίνεσθαι, μεταβαλλούσης τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν Clem. Al.Strom.iv 6, 28 (Arnim iii 221).

[172]Cic.Fin.iii 14, 45; and see above, §322.

[173]‘ut qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat ut videat, plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus; item, qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis aditum, nihilominus in miseria est, quam ille qui nihil processit’ Cic.Fin.iii 14, 48.

[174]As to the man who is ‘wise without knowing it’ (διαλεληθὼς σοφός) see Arnim iii 539 to 542, and Plut.Sto. rep.19, 3 and 4.

[175]‘iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus, ut non tantum recte facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset’ Sen.Ep.120, 10.

[176]Written in 1805.

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