FOOTNOTES

Chastity.

384.Thus little by little there emerged the ideal of a strict chastity, to the principle of which not even the marriage relation should form an exception[119]. Every falling off from this ideal is sin or transgression[120]; and it is especially true in this matter that each act of weakness leaves its trace on the character, and that he who yields becomes a feebler man[121]. The Socratic paradox, that the wise man willbe a lover[122], is consistently maintained by the Stoics; but the practical limitations of this doctrine are well illustrated by the following striking passage from the lectures of the Stoic Musonius:—

‘Men who do not wish to be licentious and bad should consider that sexual relations are only lawful in marriage, and for the begetting of children; such as aim at mere pleasure are lawless, even in marriage. Even apart from adultery and unnatural relations, all sexual connexions are disgraceful; for what sober-minded man would think of consorting with a courtesan, or with a free woman outside marriage? and least of all would he do so with his own slave. The lawlessness and foulness of such connexions is a disgrace to all who form them; as we may see that any man who is capable of a blush does his utmost to conceal them. Yet one argues: “in this case a man does no injustice; he does not wrong his neighbour or deprive him of the hope of lawful issue.” I might reply that every one who sins injures himself, for he makes himself a worse and less honourable man. But at any rate he who gives way to foul pleasure and enjoys himself like a hog is an intemperate man; and not least he who consorts with his own slave-girl, a thing for which some people find excuse. To all this there is a simple answer; how would such a man approve of a mistress consorting with her own man-servant? Yet I presume he does not think men inferior to women, or less able to restrain their desires. If then men claim the supremacy over women, they must show themselves superior in self-control. To conclude; sexual connexion between a master and his female slave is nothing but licentiousness[123].’

‘Bear and forbear.’

385.Thus our detailed study of the four perturbations has led us to lay little stress on Fear and Greed, the weaknesses of the heroic period when men’s minds were actively turned to the future, and to concentrate our attention on Grief and Hilarity, the two moods in which life’s troubles and temptations are wrongly met with as they arrive. As we follow the history of Stoic philosophy through the times of the Roman principate, we find that this tendency to lay stress on the training of the passive character increases: till Epictetus tells us that of all the vices far the worst are ‘lack of endurance’ (intolerantia), which is the developed form of Grief, and ‘lack of restraint’ (incontinentia), which is the persistent inclinationtowards Hilarity[124]. Hence the cure for vice is summed up by him in the golden word, ‘bear and forbear[125]’; that is, practise Courage and cast off Grief, practise Soberness and keep Hilarity far from you. ‘A good rule,’ a Peripatetic would reply, ‘for women and slaves.’

Avoidance of temptation.

386.This negative attitude is most strongly marked in Epictetus in connexion with the dangers of sexual passion. Thus his short advice to all young men with regard to the attractions of women is ‘Flee at once[126]’; and even in this his advice was countenanced in advance by the more tolerant Seneca[127]. It would appear from both writers that the battle between the sexes had become unequal at this period, so often is the picture drawn of the promising and well-educated youth literally and hopelessly enslaved by a mistress presumably without birth, education, or honour[128]. It causes us some surprise to find that the distinction between heavenly and earthly love[129]is not brought in as a corrective of the latter. Only in a general way the suggestion is made that seductive attractions should be driven out by virtuous ideals:

‘Do not be hurried away by the appearance, but say: “Appearances, wait for me a little; let me see who you are and what you are about; let me put you to the test.” And do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have.... This is the true athlete.... Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is thecombat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness. Remember God; call on him as a helper and protector[130].’

Gradations of vice.

387.From the study of the separate evils we revert to the general theory of Vice. And here we must recall the point that so far as vice is weakness or ill-health of the soul, it admits of gradations, which may conveniently be stated as three, namely (i) rufflings of the soul; (ii) commotions, infections, or illnesses; (iii) diseases or vices proper[131]. It is not quite easy to classify the rufflings or first slight disturbances of the soul (prima agitatio animi) under the four perturbations; but the bodily indications of them seem to be more marked in the weaknesses of the active or heroic character, namely Fear and Greed. Thus in the direction of Fear we meet with hair standing on end—pallor of complexion—trembling limbs—palpitation, and dizziness, all of which are bodily indications that fear is not far off; in the direction of Anger (a form of Greed) we meet with heightened colour, flashing eyes, and gnashing teeth[132]. In the direction of Grief we meet with tears and sighs, and in that of Hilarity the automatic sexual movements, amongst which we must perhaps include blushing.

Rufflings.

388.It does not appear that the early Stoic masters occupied themselves much with the gradations of vice; although a text can be taken from Zeno for a discourse on this subject. Neither does the earnest and cynically-minded Epictetus care to dwell on such details. On the other hand Seneca lays the greatest possible stress on the doctrine that ‘rufflings’ are not inconsistent with virtue. For this two arguments are available, which are perhaps not quite consistent. First, the bodily indications are beyond the controlof the mind; they are necessary consequences of the union of body and soul, that is, of our mortal condition[133]. Secondly, the ‘rufflings’ correspond to the mind-pictures presented to the soul in thought, and therefore are neither moral nor immoral until the soul has given its assent to them[134]. From either point of view we arrive at a result congenial to this philosopher. The wise man is, in fact, subject to slight touches of such feelings as grief and fear[135]; he is a man, not a stone. Secondly, the sovereignty of the will remains unimpaired; give the mind but time to collect its forces, and it will restrain these feelings within their proper limits[136]. The doctrine is in reality, though not in form, a concession to the Peripatetic standpoint; it provides also a convenient means of defence against the mockers who observe that professors of philosophy often exhibit the outward signs of moral weakness.

‘Commotions.’

389.If the soul gives way to any unreasoning impulse, it makes a false judgment and suffers relaxation of its tone: there takes place a ‘commotion’ or ‘perturbation’ (πάθος,affectus,perturbatio), which is a moral evil[137]. The Greek word πάθος admits of two interpretations; it may mean a passive state or a disease; we here use it in the milder sense. By an ‘emotion’ we mean that the soul is uprootedfrom its foundation, and begins as it were to toss on the sea; by ‘affection’ that it is seized or infected by some unwholesome condition[138]; by ‘perturbation’ that it has ceased to be an orderly whole, and is falling into confusion. When we regard these words in their true sense, and shake off the associations they carry with them in English, it is clear that all of them denote moral evils; nevertheless they cannot rightly be called ‘diseases’ of the soul[139]. The evils and weaknesses which have been discussed are commonly displayed in ‘commotions’ or ‘perturbations,’ and are normally equivalent to them.

Diseases of the soul.

390.The soul by giving way to perturbations becomes worse; it acquires habits of weakness in particular directions. This weakness from a passing disposition (ἕξις) changes into a permanent disposition or habit (διάθεσις), and this is in the full sense a ‘disease’ of the soul[140]. These diseases or vices are, strictly speaking, four in number[141]: but the Stoics run into great detail as regards their titles and subdivisions. Diseases in the ordinary sense (ἀρρωστήματα) display restlessness and want of self-control; such are ambition, avarice, greediness, drunkenness, running after women[142], passionate temper, obstinacy, and anxiety. An opposite class of maladies consists of unreasonable dislikes (κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα,offensiones); such are inhospitality, misogynism, and quarrelling with the world in general[143].

Men are good or bad.

391.The study of vice in its various forms and gradations leaves untouched the main positions of Stoic ethics, including the Socratic paradoxes. Men are of two classes only, the wise and the foolish, the good and the bad[144]. This bold dualism the Stoics hold in common with the Persians[145]; and though it is on the one hand tempered so as to meet the common opinion that most men are of middling character, and on the other hand subordinated to the monistic principle that good shall in the end prevail, it remains the key-stone of this department of philosophy. Virtue is a right state of mind; everything that falls short of it is therefore a wrong state of mind. Virtue and vice lie in the inward disposition, not in the outward act[146]; and one who has crossed the line is equally out of bounds whatever the distance to which he has travelled on the far side[147]. Each man has therefore an all-important choice to make. The great Stoic teachers were filled with a yearning after righteousness and reconciliation with the divine purpose and a disgust and horror of the condition of the man who is at variance with his Creator, his neighbour, and himself[148]. These convictions they encased as usual in paradoxes and syllogisms.

All sins are equal.

392.That ‘the affections must be extirpated[149]’ ceases to be a paradox, as soon as we have defined affections as states of mind contrary to reason, and have made room for the ‘reasonable affections’ of caution, good will, and joy[150]. That ‘all sins are equal[151]’ remains still, as of old, astumbling block[152]. Yet this Socratic paradox has a simple interpretation; it is a protest against the light-heartedness which tolerates ‘petty’ acts of wrongdoing, and is indifferent to the evil habits of mind thus acquired[153]. Two of the Stoic teachers of the transition period, Heraclides of Tarsus and Athenodorus, are said to have abandoned the paradox[154], and all Stoics were ready to admit that sins are ‘unlike’[155]. But, as usual, the main body held firmly to a doctrine in which they had discovered a real practical value. Just the same principle is expressed by other paradoxes, as that ‘he who has one vice has all, though he may not be equally inclined to all[156]’; and again that ‘he who is not wise is a fool and a madman[157].’

Sin is curable.

393.In spite of the parallelism of virtue and vice the latter is destined to subordination, not only in the history of the universe, but also in the individual man. Even if sins are equal, vice as ill health of the soul has degrees. The first ‘rufflings’ of the soul are, as we have seen, not to be reckoned as real evils; its ‘perturbations’ give the hope of a coming calm; and grievous though its ‘diseases’ are, we have no suggestion of incurable sin, or of the hopeless offender. Even he who has most fallen retains the germs of virtue, and these may again ripen under a proper discipline[158].

Stoic austerity.

394.The attitude of the Stoic school towards sin and weakness exposed it, as we have seen, to constant criticism and ridicule. To some extent this was due to the profession of philosophy in itself: for every such profession implied some claim to clearer knowledge and more consistent action than that of the crowd[159]. But the Stoics also sought to be ‘austere’ with regard to social pleasures, and thus it seemed that they neither offered others a share in their own happiness nor sympathetically partook in that of others[160]; whilst at the same time they claimed exemption from the weaknesses and failings of their neighbours. We have seen both Seneca and Epictetus anxious to meet criticism on these points by laying stress on those touches of natural feeling in which wise and foolish alike share. But in addressing the members of the sect their tone is very different; they hold out, as a prize worth the winning, the prospect of attaining to that calm and unchanging disposition of mind which has for ever left behind the flutterings of fear and greed, of grief and hilarity, and which is attuned to reason alone[161]. Epictetus indeed often expresses elation and pride upon this theme:

‘I will show the sinews of a philosopher. What are these? A desire (ὄρεξις) never disappointed, an aversion (ἔκκλισις) which never meets with that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit (ὁρμή), a diligent purpose (πρόθεσις), an assent which is not rash. These you shall see[162].’‘Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations and free from everything. When a man has this peace (not proclaimed by Caesar, for how should he be able to proclaim it?) but by God through reason, is he not content when he reflects—Now no evil can happen to me[163]?’

‘Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations and free from everything. When a man has this peace (not proclaimed by Caesar, for how should he be able to proclaim it?) but by God through reason, is he not content when he reflects—Now no evil can happen to me[163]?’

FOOTNOTES[1]‘est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic.Par.iii 20.[2]‘Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful?... Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things’ Epict.Disc.ii 17, 10 and 11.[3]‘omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures; aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 35; ‘est igitur aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ... laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis; ... metus opinio impendentis mali, ... libido opinio venturi boni’Tusc. disp.iv 7, 14; ‘hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque’ Verg.Aen.vi 733. See also Diog. L. vii 110 and Stob. ii 7, 10 b.[4]Χρύσιππος ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κενὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τής ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη GalenHipp. et Plat.v i, p. 429 K; cf.ib.iv p. 387 K (Arnim i 461).[5]In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one of the virtues; they are ἀφροσύνη (insipientia), ἀδικία (iniustitia), δειλία (ignavia) and ἀκολασία (intemperantia); and each of these is rooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that he who has one vice has all (Stob. ii 7, 11 k, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth).[6]This view is summed up in the phrase that ‘the perturbations are κακά, but not κακίαι’ (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the principle that only vice and what is akin to vice is evil. The Roman writers realized the difficulty in the use of words: ‘morbi autem et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 13, 29 and 30.[7]‘utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est; nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant’ Sen.Ep.116, 1; ‘vacandum omni est animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia’ Cic.Off.i 20, 69; ‘contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est’ Sen.Dial.x 10, 1.[8]ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται ὀργήib.10 b.[9]Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: ‘ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest’ Cic.Off.i 38, 136.[10]‘[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nec quicquam sine illa magnificum in bello fortitudo gerit’ Sen.Dial.iii 7, 1.[11]‘“non potest” inquit “fieri” Theophrastus, “ut non vir bonus irascatur malis”’ib.14, 1; ‘“quid ergo?” inquit “vir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?”’ib.12, 1.[12]‘stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis’ Sen.Dial.v 3, 1.[13]‘abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo’ib.iii 12, 6.[14]‘haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent non habentur’ib.17, 1.[15]‘adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio’ib.17, 5.[16]‘corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine ira’ib.15, 1.[17]‘[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem’ib.11, 5.[18]‘nec [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio ... ira enim perturbat artem’ib.iv 14, 2 and 3.[19]ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία [τοῦ] τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ‘ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius, a quo te inique putes laesum’ Sen.Dial.iii 2, 4.[20]‘ira furor brevis est’ Hor.Ep.i 2, 62; ‘quidam ex sapientibus viris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam’ Sen.Dial.iii 1, 2.[21]ib.4.[22]‘non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus’ib.12, 4.[23]‘nec in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in occurrentia obiter furit’ib.v 1, 3.[24]‘nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante’ib.iv 1, 4; ‘nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est’ib.3, 4.[25]ib.3-5.[26]‘maximum remedium irae mora est’ib.29, 1; ‘Keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 12.[27]‘pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam laedunt’ Sen.Dial.v 28, 4; ‘contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself’ Bacon,Essay57.[28]‘eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur’ Sen.Dial.12, 3.[29]‘quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum’ib.iv 36, 1.[30]See below, §403.[31]‘percussit te: recede. referiendo enim et occasionem saepius feriendi dabis et excusationem’ib.34, 5.[32]‘quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt. quaedam altae gravesque sunt et introrsus versae’ib.iii 4, 3.[33]‘inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam enim sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam frequentes’ Sen.Dial.2 and 3.[34]Defined as ‘atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis’ or ‘inclinatio animi ad asperiora’ Sen.Clem.ii 4, 1 and 3.[35]ib.i 12, 1.[36]‘domini crudeles tota civitate commonstrantur invisique et detestabiles sunt’ib.18, 3.[37]‘ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus’ib.24, 3.[38]‘tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum crudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat’ib.25, 3.[39]ib.22, 1.[40]‘puta tutam esse crudelitatem; quale eius regnum est?’ib.26, 2.[41]‘optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est’Ben.vii 20, 3.[42]λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ Stob. ii 7, 10 b; ‘est aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 7, 14.[43]See above, §114.[44]Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75.[45]‘nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris quoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit’ Sen.Ep.107, 4; and see further, §339.[46]‘id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam malorum potentiam animus patientia pervenit’ Sen.Dial.i 4, 13.[47]Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however complicated by the ambiguity of the Greek word πόνος, which corresponds equally todolorandlaborin Latin; see Cic.Tusc. disp.ii 15, 35.[48]‘tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis quam ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine gemitu velut aliena corpora exsaniari patiuntur’ib.xii 3, 1.[49]‘scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho’Ep.13, 5.[50]‘magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae putaverant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur’ib.76, 34.[51]‘quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam’ Hor.Ep.i 1, 43.[52]‘virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus; | nec sumit aut ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae’ Hor.C.iii 2, 17-20.[53]‘Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied: ‘because, if a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods; if a good politician, to his fellow-citizens’ Stob. iv 4, 29.[54]‘si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam, quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit’ Sen.Dial.viii 8, 3.[55]‘si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe’Ep.19, 1.[56]‘mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et quietis impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima’ib.xii 6, 6.[57]‘ratio et prudentia curas | ... aufert; | caelum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt’ Hor.Ep.i 11, 25-27.[58]Sen.Dial.ix 12-15.[59]‘inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil ipsos habere quod agant’ib.2, 10.[60]‘incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope superabilem, mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti’N. Q.v 18, 6 and 7; ‘non eadem est his et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli’ib.16; ‘quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui persuasum est ut navigarem?’Ep.53, 1.[61]N. Q.v 18, 10.[62]‘magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita consumitur’ Sen.N. Q.16.[63]‘misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis’Clem.ii 5, 1.[64]‘anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur, quae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent’ib.[65]Epict.Disc.iii 3, 17.[66]‘cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva mineris | falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant homines’ Hor.Sat.i 3, 121-124; ‘scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium ... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est’ Sen.Clem.ii 5, 2 and 3.[67]See below, §409.[68]‘non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret’ Sen.Clem.ii 6, 3.[69]Epict.Disc.i 11.[70]‘ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui sustinet, quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum propinquorumque extrema hora deseritur’ Sen.N. Q.iii 18, 6.[71]Dial.ii 17, 1.[72]‘[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces concisas. sic inimicorum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat’ Sen.Dial.ii 17, 3; ‘nemo risum praebuit qui ex se cepit’ib.2.[73]‘cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet’Ep.63, 3.[74]Cicero wrote a treatise ‘de Consolatione’ based on this work, but only a few fragments remain. Plutarch’s ‘Consolation’ for Apollonius was drawn from the same source (Schmekel, p. 150).[75]Cic.Fam.iv 5.[76]‘denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis consueris praecipere et dare consilium’ib.5, 5.[77]‘maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se passi sunt omnes omnesque passuri’ Sen.Dial.xi 1, 4. On the other side ‘malevoli solatii est turba miserorum’ib.vi 12, 5; ‘[cogita] fratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere’ib.xi 5, 4.[78]ib.8, 2.[79]ib.9, 3; ‘inter felices currit animas’ib.vi 5, 1.[80]ib.xi 9, 4; ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ib.vi 19, 6. See also above, §§298,299.[81]Sen.Dial.vi 3 to 5; above, §123.[82]‘If you are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed’ Epict.Manual3 (after Anaxagoras).[83]Disc.iv 1, 101.[84]‘Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored’Manual11.[85]Disc.iii 24, 27.[86]‘illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed cui ista firmitas animi continget?’ Sen.Ep.63, 1.[87]‘inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suorum iisdem oculis, quibus ipsos, videre’ Sen.Ep.99, 15; cf.Dial.xii 1, 2.[88]‘cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis necessitas exprimit’Ep.99, 18.[89]‘nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus effuderit, non esse tradendum animum dolori’ib.27.[90]‘at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit’Dial.vi 7, 1.[91]‘fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor’ib.1, 7.[92]‘non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est’ib.[93]‘obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens’ Sen.Dial.ix 2, 11.[94]‘difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor castigatorque minorum’ Hor.A. P.173, 174.[95]‘idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; malos esse nos, malos fuisse, invitus adiciam et futuros esse’ Sen.Ben.i 10, 3; ‘cupidi omnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes’ib.v 17, 3.[96]‘non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt’ib.[97]‘satius est humana vitia placide accipere’ib.ix 15, 5; ‘omnia vulgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur’ib.2.[98]‘generi humano venia tribuenda est’ib.iv 10, 2.[99]‘hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota’Ben.i 10, 1.[100]Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37.[101]‘ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras. alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi ex fastidio pax est’ Sen.Ep.89, 22. Another form of luxury is in the eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold: ‘quemadmodum nihil illis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes boletos demittunt’N. Q.iv 13, 10.[102]See above, §83, note 82.[103]See above, §324, note 155.[104]καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μὲν [τὸν σοφόν], οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ Diog. L. vii 118. This was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson inJourn. Phil.xxx pp. 221 sqq.[105]‘nonnunquam et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat nos, sed ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet’ Sen.Dial.ix 17, 8; see furtherEp.83, 14 and 15.[106]‘nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam’Ep.83, 18; ‘omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet. plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona voluntate prohibitis abstinent’ib.83, 19.[107]See above, §126.[108]Sen.Ep.110, 14 and 18.[109]Xen.Mem.ii 1, 5.[110]‘si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae feritatem eius emolliant, libens offeram’ Sen.Ben.vii 20, 3. The furthering of the amour of Nero with Acte was a practical application of this theory: ‘tradit Cluvius ... Senecam contra muliebres illecebras subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam’ Tac.Ann.xiv 2, 2.[111]‘non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe enim frugalior haec iuventus quam illa est’ Sen.Ep.97, 9.[112]See above, §306, note 27.[113]‘As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage; but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures’ Epict.Manual33, 8.[114]τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. §317.[115]‘eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset: “de sapiente” inquit “videbimus; mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi”’ Sen.Ep.116, 5; ‘Did you never love any person, a young girl, slave or free?... have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? What then is slavery?’ Epict.Disc.iv 1, 15 and 17.[116]‘magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta’ Sen.Dial.ii 6, 7.[117]Hor.Sat.i 2, 116-119.[118]See above, §318, note 104.[119]‘Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer’ Epict.Disc.i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were already practised in Seneca’s time; ‘vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam omni umore interdixere corporibus’Dial.iv 12, 4.[120]‘lapsa est libido in muliere ignota ... peccavit vero nihilominus, si quidem est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic.Par.iii 1, 20.[121]‘When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also increased your incontinence’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 6.[122]καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων Diog. L. vii 129.[123]Stob. iii 6, 23.[124]‘idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus’ A. Gellius,N. A.xvii 19, 5.[125]‘verba haec duo dicebat: ἀνέχου et ἀπέχουib.6.[126]‘At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy’ Epict.Disc.iii 12, 12.[127]‘id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime profugiamus’ Sen.Ep.51, 5; ‘ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis’ib.69, 3.[128]Epict.Disc.iv 1, 15-21.[129]See above, §349.[130]Epict.Disc.ii 18, 24-29.[131]The terms ‘ruffling’ (levis motus), and ‘commotions’ (emotiones) or ‘perturbations’ (perturbationes) are metaphors taken from the disturbance of a calm sea; the remaining terms properly describe bodily ill-health. The English words ‘emotions,’ ‘affections’ have almost entirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer suitable as translations. The substitution of ‘commotion’ for ‘emotion’ has already been adopted by Maudsley,Pathology of the Human Mind.[132]‘ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba subfunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes’ Sen.Dial.iv 2, 1; ‘erubescunt pudici etiam loqui de pudicitia’ Cic.Leg.i 19, 50. See also the following notes.[133]‘si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem humoris obsceni altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus’ Sen.Dial.iv 3, 2; ‘est primus motus non voluntarius quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio’ib.4, 1.[134]‘prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species’ib.3, 5.[135]‘[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis carebit’ib.iii 16, 7; ‘scio inveniri quosdam, qui negent doliturum esse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in eiusmodi casum incidisse’ib.xi 18, 5; ‘nullo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est’ib.xii 16, 1.[136]‘nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit’ib.i 2, 2; ‘invicti esse possumus, inconcussi non possumus’N. Q.ii 59, 3.[137]‘adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi’Dial.iv 3, 1; ‘[Zeno] perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 39; perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia levitatis’Fin.iii 10, 35.[138]‘neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur adfectus, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur’ Sen.Dial.iii 8, 2.[139]‘perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad omnia. quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? sed illi dicunt πάθος. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 35.[140]ὅταν εἰς μόνιμον ἀφίκηται διάθεσιν ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀνομάζεται νόσημα Gal.loc. aff.i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429); on the other hand a νόσημα is called ἕξις Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘adfectus sunt motus animi improbabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere morbum’ Sen.Ep.75, 12; ‘morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius haec animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt’ib.11.[141]For the technical terms see above, §362, note 6.[142]Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 11, 25.[143]εἶναι δέ τινα [νοσήματα] κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita, et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 11, 27.[144]ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων Stob. ii 7, 11 g.[145]See above, §8.[146]See above, §317.[147]‘cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet’ Cic.Parad.iii 20.[148]Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who writes ‘the Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school, could have no real consciousness of sin’Philippians, p. 290. It may however be admitted that the feelings we ascribe to the Stoics are more forcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius and Epictetus than by Seneca.[149]See above, §362, note 7.[150]See above, §355.[151]ἀρέσκει τε αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων Diog. L. vii 120.[152]‘omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit’ Cic.Mur.29, 61.[153]‘parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt’ Cic.Par.iii 20; ‘facilius est excludere perniciosa quam regere’ Sen.Dial.iii 7, 2; ‘optimum est ipsis repugnare seminibus’ib.8, 1; ‘si das aliquid iuris tristitiae timori cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate’Ep.85, 11.[154]Diog. L. vii 121.[155]ἶσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ’ ὅμοια Stob. ii 7, 11 l.[156]‘stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est; alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur ...’ Sen.Ben.iv 27, 1; ‘omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet vitium unum, omnia habet’ib.v 15, 1.[157]‘intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iii 5, 10.[158]πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους Cleanthes ap. Stob. ii 7, 5 b 8; ‘in pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam in malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio’ Sen.Ben.vii 19, 5; ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, modo deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia’ib.v 25, 6.[159]‘satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur, invidiosum est’Ep.5, 2.[160]αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρ’ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι Diog. L. vii 117.[161]‘[sapiens] nec cupit nec timet beneficio rationis’ Sen.Dial.vii 5, 1; ‘erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus’ib.ii 9, 3.[162]Epict.Disc.ii 8, 29.[163]ib.iii 13, 11 to 13.

[1]‘est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic.Par.iii 20.

[2]‘Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful?... Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things’ Epict.Disc.ii 17, 10 and 11.

[3]‘omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures; aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 35; ‘est igitur aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ... laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis; ... metus opinio impendentis mali, ... libido opinio venturi boni’Tusc. disp.iv 7, 14; ‘hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque’ Verg.Aen.vi 733. See also Diog. L. vii 110 and Stob. ii 7, 10 b.

[4]Χρύσιππος ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κενὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τής ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη GalenHipp. et Plat.v i, p. 429 K; cf.ib.iv p. 387 K (Arnim i 461).

[5]In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one of the virtues; they are ἀφροσύνη (insipientia), ἀδικία (iniustitia), δειλία (ignavia) and ἀκολασία (intemperantia); and each of these is rooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that he who has one vice has all (Stob. ii 7, 11 k, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth).

[6]This view is summed up in the phrase that ‘the perturbations are κακά, but not κακίαι’ (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the principle that only vice and what is akin to vice is evil. The Roman writers realized the difficulty in the use of words: ‘morbi autem et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 13, 29 and 30.

[7]‘utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est; nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant’ Sen.Ep.116, 1; ‘vacandum omni est animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia’ Cic.Off.i 20, 69; ‘contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est’ Sen.Dial.x 10, 1.

[8]ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται ὀργήib.10 b.

[9]Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: ‘ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest’ Cic.Off.i 38, 136.

[10]‘[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nec quicquam sine illa magnificum in bello fortitudo gerit’ Sen.Dial.iii 7, 1.

[11]‘“non potest” inquit “fieri” Theophrastus, “ut non vir bonus irascatur malis”’ib.14, 1; ‘“quid ergo?” inquit “vir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?”’ib.12, 1.

[12]‘stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis’ Sen.Dial.v 3, 1.

[13]‘abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo’ib.iii 12, 6.

[14]‘haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent non habentur’ib.17, 1.

[15]‘adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio’ib.17, 5.

[16]‘corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine ira’ib.15, 1.

[17]‘[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem’ib.11, 5.

[18]‘nec [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio ... ira enim perturbat artem’ib.iv 14, 2 and 3.

[19]ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία [τοῦ] τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ‘ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius, a quo te inique putes laesum’ Sen.Dial.iii 2, 4.

[20]‘ira furor brevis est’ Hor.Ep.i 2, 62; ‘quidam ex sapientibus viris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam’ Sen.Dial.iii 1, 2.

[21]ib.4.

[22]‘non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus’ib.12, 4.

[23]‘nec in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in occurrentia obiter furit’ib.v 1, 3.

[24]‘nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante’ib.iv 1, 4; ‘nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est’ib.3, 4.

[25]ib.3-5.

[26]‘maximum remedium irae mora est’ib.29, 1; ‘Keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 12.

[27]‘pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam laedunt’ Sen.Dial.v 28, 4; ‘contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself’ Bacon,Essay57.

[28]‘eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur’ Sen.Dial.12, 3.

[29]‘quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum’ib.iv 36, 1.

[30]See below, §403.

[31]‘percussit te: recede. referiendo enim et occasionem saepius feriendi dabis et excusationem’ib.34, 5.

[32]‘quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt. quaedam altae gravesque sunt et introrsus versae’ib.iii 4, 3.

[33]‘inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam enim sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam frequentes’ Sen.Dial.2 and 3.

[34]Defined as ‘atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis’ or ‘inclinatio animi ad asperiora’ Sen.Clem.ii 4, 1 and 3.

[35]ib.i 12, 1.

[36]‘domini crudeles tota civitate commonstrantur invisique et detestabiles sunt’ib.18, 3.

[37]‘ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus’ib.24, 3.

[38]‘tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum crudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat’ib.25, 3.

[39]ib.22, 1.

[40]‘puta tutam esse crudelitatem; quale eius regnum est?’ib.26, 2.

[41]‘optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est’Ben.vii 20, 3.

[42]λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ Stob. ii 7, 10 b; ‘est aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 7, 14.

[43]See above, §114.

[44]Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75.

[45]‘nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris quoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit’ Sen.Ep.107, 4; and see further, §339.

[46]‘id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam malorum potentiam animus patientia pervenit’ Sen.Dial.i 4, 13.

[47]Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however complicated by the ambiguity of the Greek word πόνος, which corresponds equally todolorandlaborin Latin; see Cic.Tusc. disp.ii 15, 35.

[48]‘tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis quam ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine gemitu velut aliena corpora exsaniari patiuntur’ib.xii 3, 1.

[49]‘scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho’Ep.13, 5.

[50]‘magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae putaverant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur’ib.76, 34.

[51]‘quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam’ Hor.Ep.i 1, 43.

[52]‘virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus; | nec sumit aut ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae’ Hor.C.iii 2, 17-20.

[53]‘Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied: ‘because, if a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods; if a good politician, to his fellow-citizens’ Stob. iv 4, 29.

[54]‘si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam, quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit’ Sen.Dial.viii 8, 3.

[55]‘si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe’Ep.19, 1.

[56]‘mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et quietis impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima’ib.xii 6, 6.

[57]‘ratio et prudentia curas | ... aufert; | caelum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt’ Hor.Ep.i 11, 25-27.

[58]Sen.Dial.ix 12-15.

[59]‘inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil ipsos habere quod agant’ib.2, 10.

[60]‘incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope superabilem, mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti’N. Q.v 18, 6 and 7; ‘non eadem est his et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli’ib.16; ‘quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui persuasum est ut navigarem?’Ep.53, 1.

[61]N. Q.v 18, 10.

[62]‘magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita consumitur’ Sen.N. Q.16.

[63]‘misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis’Clem.ii 5, 1.

[64]‘anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur, quae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent’ib.

[65]Epict.Disc.iii 3, 17.

[66]‘cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva mineris | falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant homines’ Hor.Sat.i 3, 121-124; ‘scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium ... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est’ Sen.Clem.ii 5, 2 and 3.

[67]See below, §409.

[68]‘non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret’ Sen.Clem.ii 6, 3.

[69]Epict.Disc.i 11.

[70]‘ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui sustinet, quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum propinquorumque extrema hora deseritur’ Sen.N. Q.iii 18, 6.

[71]Dial.ii 17, 1.

[72]‘[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces concisas. sic inimicorum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat’ Sen.Dial.ii 17, 3; ‘nemo risum praebuit qui ex se cepit’ib.2.

[73]‘cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet’Ep.63, 3.

[74]Cicero wrote a treatise ‘de Consolatione’ based on this work, but only a few fragments remain. Plutarch’s ‘Consolation’ for Apollonius was drawn from the same source (Schmekel, p. 150).

[75]Cic.Fam.iv 5.

[76]‘denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis consueris praecipere et dare consilium’ib.5, 5.

[77]‘maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se passi sunt omnes omnesque passuri’ Sen.Dial.xi 1, 4. On the other side ‘malevoli solatii est turba miserorum’ib.vi 12, 5; ‘[cogita] fratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere’ib.xi 5, 4.

[78]ib.8, 2.

[79]ib.9, 3; ‘inter felices currit animas’ib.vi 5, 1.

[80]ib.xi 9, 4; ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ib.vi 19, 6. See also above, §§298,299.

[81]Sen.Dial.vi 3 to 5; above, §123.

[82]‘If you are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed’ Epict.Manual3 (after Anaxagoras).

[83]Disc.iv 1, 101.

[84]‘Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored’Manual11.

[85]Disc.iii 24, 27.

[86]‘illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed cui ista firmitas animi continget?’ Sen.Ep.63, 1.

[87]‘inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suorum iisdem oculis, quibus ipsos, videre’ Sen.Ep.99, 15; cf.Dial.xii 1, 2.

[88]‘cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis necessitas exprimit’Ep.99, 18.

[89]‘nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus effuderit, non esse tradendum animum dolori’ib.27.

[90]‘at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit’Dial.vi 7, 1.

[91]‘fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor’ib.1, 7.

[92]‘non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est’ib.

[93]‘obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens’ Sen.Dial.ix 2, 11.

[94]‘difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor castigatorque minorum’ Hor.A. P.173, 174.

[95]‘idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; malos esse nos, malos fuisse, invitus adiciam et futuros esse’ Sen.Ben.i 10, 3; ‘cupidi omnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes’ib.v 17, 3.

[96]‘non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt’ib.

[97]‘satius est humana vitia placide accipere’ib.ix 15, 5; ‘omnia vulgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur’ib.2.

[98]‘generi humano venia tribuenda est’ib.iv 10, 2.

[99]‘hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota’Ben.i 10, 1.

[100]Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37.

[101]‘ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras. alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi ex fastidio pax est’ Sen.Ep.89, 22. Another form of luxury is in the eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold: ‘quemadmodum nihil illis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes boletos demittunt’N. Q.iv 13, 10.

[102]See above, §83, note 82.

[103]See above, §324, note 155.

[104]καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μὲν [τὸν σοφόν], οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ Diog. L. vii 118. This was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson inJourn. Phil.xxx pp. 221 sqq.

[105]‘nonnunquam et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat nos, sed ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet’ Sen.Dial.ix 17, 8; see furtherEp.83, 14 and 15.

[106]‘nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam’Ep.83, 18; ‘omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet. plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona voluntate prohibitis abstinent’ib.83, 19.

[107]See above, §126.

[108]Sen.Ep.110, 14 and 18.

[109]Xen.Mem.ii 1, 5.

[110]‘si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae feritatem eius emolliant, libens offeram’ Sen.Ben.vii 20, 3. The furthering of the amour of Nero with Acte was a practical application of this theory: ‘tradit Cluvius ... Senecam contra muliebres illecebras subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam’ Tac.Ann.xiv 2, 2.

[111]‘non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe enim frugalior haec iuventus quam illa est’ Sen.Ep.97, 9.

[112]See above, §306, note 27.

[113]‘As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage; but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures’ Epict.Manual33, 8.

[114]τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. §317.

[115]‘eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset: “de sapiente” inquit “videbimus; mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi”’ Sen.Ep.116, 5; ‘Did you never love any person, a young girl, slave or free?... have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? What then is slavery?’ Epict.Disc.iv 1, 15 and 17.

[116]‘magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta’ Sen.Dial.ii 6, 7.

[117]Hor.Sat.i 2, 116-119.

[118]See above, §318, note 104.

[119]‘Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer’ Epict.Disc.i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were already practised in Seneca’s time; ‘vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam omni umore interdixere corporibus’Dial.iv 12, 4.

[120]‘lapsa est libido in muliere ignota ... peccavit vero nihilominus, si quidem est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic.Par.iii 1, 20.

[121]‘When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also increased your incontinence’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 6.

[122]καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων Diog. L. vii 129.

[123]Stob. iii 6, 23.

[124]‘idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus’ A. Gellius,N. A.xvii 19, 5.

[125]‘verba haec duo dicebat: ἀνέχου et ἀπέχουib.6.

[126]‘At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy’ Epict.Disc.iii 12, 12.

[127]‘id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime profugiamus’ Sen.Ep.51, 5; ‘ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis’ib.69, 3.

[128]Epict.Disc.iv 1, 15-21.

[129]See above, §349.

[130]Epict.Disc.ii 18, 24-29.

[131]The terms ‘ruffling’ (levis motus), and ‘commotions’ (emotiones) or ‘perturbations’ (perturbationes) are metaphors taken from the disturbance of a calm sea; the remaining terms properly describe bodily ill-health. The English words ‘emotions,’ ‘affections’ have almost entirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer suitable as translations. The substitution of ‘commotion’ for ‘emotion’ has already been adopted by Maudsley,Pathology of the Human Mind.

[132]‘ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba subfunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes’ Sen.Dial.iv 2, 1; ‘erubescunt pudici etiam loqui de pudicitia’ Cic.Leg.i 19, 50. See also the following notes.

[133]‘si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem humoris obsceni altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus’ Sen.Dial.iv 3, 2; ‘est primus motus non voluntarius quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio’ib.4, 1.

[134]‘prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species’ib.3, 5.

[135]‘[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis carebit’ib.iii 16, 7; ‘scio inveniri quosdam, qui negent doliturum esse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in eiusmodi casum incidisse’ib.xi 18, 5; ‘nullo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est’ib.xii 16, 1.

[136]‘nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit’ib.i 2, 2; ‘invicti esse possumus, inconcussi non possumus’N. Q.ii 59, 3.

[137]‘adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi’Dial.iv 3, 1; ‘[Zeno] perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 39; perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia levitatis’Fin.iii 10, 35.

[138]‘neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur adfectus, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur’ Sen.Dial.iii 8, 2.

[139]‘perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad omnia. quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? sed illi dicunt πάθος. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 35.

[140]ὅταν εἰς μόνιμον ἀφίκηται διάθεσιν ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀνομάζεται νόσημα Gal.loc. aff.i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429); on the other hand a νόσημα is called ἕξις Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘adfectus sunt motus animi improbabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere morbum’ Sen.Ep.75, 12; ‘morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius haec animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt’ib.11.

[141]For the technical terms see above, §362, note 6.

[142]Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 11, 25.

[143]εἶναι δέ τινα [νοσήματα] κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita, et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 11, 27.

[144]ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων Stob. ii 7, 11 g.

[145]See above, §8.

[146]See above, §317.

[147]‘cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet’ Cic.Parad.iii 20.

[148]Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who writes ‘the Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school, could have no real consciousness of sin’Philippians, p. 290. It may however be admitted that the feelings we ascribe to the Stoics are more forcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius and Epictetus than by Seneca.

[149]See above, §362, note 7.

[150]See above, §355.

[151]ἀρέσκει τε αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων Diog. L. vii 120.

[152]‘omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit’ Cic.Mur.29, 61.

[153]‘parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt’ Cic.Par.iii 20; ‘facilius est excludere perniciosa quam regere’ Sen.Dial.iii 7, 2; ‘optimum est ipsis repugnare seminibus’ib.8, 1; ‘si das aliquid iuris tristitiae timori cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate’Ep.85, 11.

[154]Diog. L. vii 121.

[155]ἶσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ’ ὅμοια Stob. ii 7, 11 l.

[156]‘stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est; alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur ...’ Sen.Ben.iv 27, 1; ‘omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet vitium unum, omnia habet’ib.v 15, 1.

[157]‘intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iii 5, 10.

[158]πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους Cleanthes ap. Stob. ii 7, 5 b 8; ‘in pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam in malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio’ Sen.Ben.vii 19, 5; ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, modo deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia’ib.v 25, 6.

[159]‘satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur, invidiosum est’Ep.5, 2.

[160]αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρ’ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι Diog. L. vii 117.

[161]‘[sapiens] nec cupit nec timet beneficio rationis’ Sen.Dial.vii 5, 1; ‘erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus’ib.ii 9, 3.

[162]Epict.Disc.ii 8, 29.

[163]ib.iii 13, 11 to 13.

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