FOOTNOTES

Propositions and Syllogisms.

162.Words in combination form statements, questions, wishes, syllogisms, and so forth[110]; there is therefore no clear line drawn between what we call syntax and logic respectively. Whenever we have a complete combination of words expressing that which must either be false or true, as ‘Hannibal was a Carthaginian,’ ‘Scipio destroyed Numantia,’ we call it a ‘statement’ or ‘proposition’ (ἀξίωμα)[111]; for phrases of all kinds we have the more general term ‘phrase’ (λεκτόν,id quod dicitur)[112]. Of special interest isthe conditional sentence (συνημμένον), which has two parts, the conditional clause (ἡγούμενον) and the contingent clause (λῆγον). The conditional or leading clause always contains a sign (σημεῖον), by means of which we reach proof: thus in saying ‘if it is day, it is light’ we mean that ‘day’ is a sign of light. Proof is ‘speech on every subject gathering what is less clear from that which is more clear[113].’ Its most important form is the syllogism, of which Chrysippus recognises five forms:

All these matters admit of endless qualifications, subdivisions, and developments, and were therefore serviceable to those Stoics who were before all things makers of books[115]. Examples of Stoic syllogisms have been given above[116].

Fallacies.

163.Closely connected with the theory of the syllogism is the enticing subject of the ‘resolution of fallacies’ (σοφισμάτων λύσις), which the Megarians had brought within the range of philosophy. To this subject the Stoics gave much attention[117]. The most famous fallacy is that of the ‘heap’ (σωρίτης,acervus); ‘if two are few, so are three; if three, then four; and so forth.’ In this Chrysippus took a special interest[118]; his reply was to keep still[119]. Another is the ‘liar’ (ψευδόμενος,mentiens); ‘when a man says “I lie,” does he lie or not? if he lies, he speaks the truth; if he speaks the truth, he lies[120].’ On this subject Chrysippus wrote a treatise, whichEpictetus thought not worth reading[121]. Seneca gives us examples of other fallacies, which also are verbal quibbles[122]. Of an altogether different kind are those problems in which the question of determinism as opposed to moral choice is involved. Such is the ‘reaper,’ which maintains ‘either you will reap or you will not reap; it is not correct to say “perhaps you will reap.”’ Such again is the ‘master-argument’ of Diodorus the Megarian, directly aimed against every moral philosophy[123]. These difficulties we shall discuss later as touching the supreme problems which are presented to the human reason[124].

Definition.

164.The scientific study of syllogisms and fallacies promises at first sight to be a guide to truth and a way of escape from error, but experience shews it nevertheless to be barren. It has however an advantage in securing a careful statement of teaching, and for this purpose was much used by Zeno and Chrysippus. The later members of the school realized that this advantage could be more simply gained by the practice of careful definition (ὅρος,definitio). Antipater thus defined definition itself: ‘definition is an expression which elaborates in detail without falling short or going too far[125].’ He and all other Stoics of his time gave numerous definitions of the most important terms used in the system, such as God, fate, providence, the supreme good, virtue, and so forth; and these are of great value in giving precision to their doctrine.

Style.

165.In considering Style we first notice the distinction between dialectic in the narrower sense, in which statements are made in the shortest and most precise form, and rhetoric, in which they are expanded at length[126]. Zeno compared one to the closed fist, the other to the open palm[127]. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote upon rhetoric,and it appears to have become a tradition to ridicule their teaching, chiefly on the ground of the novel terms which the Stoics introduced, as προηγμένα, κοσμόπολις[128]. But it is exactly in these new-fangled words that we observe one of the chief aims of the Stoic theory of style, namely the use of words which precisely and exclusively correspond to the objects described (κυριολογία,proprietas verborum), and which therefore lead up to transparent clearness of speech (σαφήνεια,pellucida oratio)[129]. To this clearness the study of grammar is contributory; ‘barbarisms’ (faults in spelling and pronunciation) must be avoided, with proper help from the doctrines of ‘anomaly’ and ‘analogy’; for the Stoics learnt in time that neither of these is exclusively true. Equally important is the avoidance of ‘solecisms,’ or faults in syntax. In this way a pure use of language (Ἑλληνισμός,Latinitas) is attained; this is largely based upon the example of older writers, such as Homer in Greek, and Cato the elder in Latin[130], but not to such an extent as to employ words not commonly intelligible. But little more is needed; the Stoic will say what he has to say with ‘brevity’ (συντομία,brevitas); the graces of style will be represented by ‘becomingness’ (πρέπον,decorum) and ‘neatness’ (κατασκευή), the latter including euphony. These virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well, which is neither more nor less than speaking truthfully[131]; for the Stoic needs only to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to amuse him or to excite his emotions[132]. Style has three varieties, according as it is employed in the council, in the law-courts, or in praise of goodness and good men[133]; in the last there was nodoubt greater room allowed for that expansiveness of speech which the Stoics specially designated as ‘rhetoric.’

The Stoic orator.

166.The ‘Stoic style’ was a severe intellectual and moral discipline. The speaker was called upon under all circumstances to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing from his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their religious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of decency; he could add no word which would touch their sympathies or kindle their indignation in the direction he himself might wish. He had always before his eyes the example of Socrates’ defence before the Athenian jury and its result. The Stoic appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and rather rugged speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the circumstances demanded[134]. Even the Stoics of the transition period, in spite of their Academic leanings and their literary acquirements, made this impression at Rome. Diogenes, who had himself done much to elaborate the theory of style, was noted as a quiet and self-restrained speaker[135]. The influence of Panaetius may be traced in his friend Lucilius, who in his book on style is never tired of ridiculing the artifices of rhetoricians. Then followed a succession of these reserved speakers, which we shall trace in another chapter, leading up to Cato of Utica, by far the best-known and the most ridiculed of them all[136].

It is not easy to form a fair judgment of the merits of the Stoic style. It must be admitted that the works of Chrysippus are not readable; but on the other hand Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus were all writers or speakers of great attractiveness[137].

Paradox.

167.In connexion with style we may call attention to the important function of paradoxes (παράδοξα,inopinata), that is, propositions contrary to commonopinion. Since all philosophies conflict with common opinion, they must necessarily include many paradoxes[138]. The chief Stoic paradoxes are those which were borrowed directly from the Cynic school, and indirectly from the teaching of Socrates[139]: and Cicero devotes a special work to their defence. He includes the following: (i) that only what is honourable is good; (ii) that virtue is sufficient for happiness; (iii) that right actions and offences are equal; (iv) that all foolish men are mad; (v) that the wise man alone is free and every foolish man a slave; (vi) that the wise man alone is rich. These of course include the very pith and marrow of Stoic ethics; and the form is calculated to arrest the attention of the crowd and to challenge defiantly its cherished opinions. The Stoics of literary taste and social position usually shew some distaste for paradoxes, and prefer to state their teaching in ways more obviously reasonable. But it should hardly be necessary to explain that no paradox is complete in itself, but each needs to be interpreted according to the principles of the school which propounds it. In proportion as the doctrines of any school win general recognition, its paradoxes tend to find ready acceptance, and may ultimately become truisms[140].

The treatment of myths as allegories[141]may also be considered as the use of a kind of paradox; this we shall find it most convenient to discuss in connexion with Stoic views upon the nature of the gods.

Dangers of logic.

168.The study of logic is at first sight dismal and repulsive; when progress has been made in it, it seems illuminating; in the end it becomes so alluring, that the would-be philosopher may easily be lost for ever in its mazes[142]. The early Stoics had pressed this discipline upontheir pupils; those of the Roman period, themselves (with the exception of Epictetus) weak dialecticians, never cease to warn their hearers against its fascinations. So Seneca tells us that many logical inquiries have nothing to do with real life[143]; and that the older Stoics had wasted much time over them[144]; Epictetus complains that his hearers never get beyond the resolving of syllogisms[145], and M. Aurelius thanks the gods that he never wasted his time in this way[146].

Stoic and Academic logic.

169.It was a favourite contention of Cicero, adopted from his teacher Antiochus, that the Stoic dialectic was no original system, but only a modification of the views of the old Academy[147]. Such a conclusion seems partly due to the fact that the Stoics of his own time had largely borrowed from the Academic system in detail; and partly to the overlooking by Antiochus of an essential difference of spirit between the two schools. Plato is speculative, Zeno positive; Plato plays with a dozen theories, Zeno consistently adheres to one. Plato ranks the mind high, Zeno the will; Plato bases his system on the general concept, Zeno on the individual person or object. It would seem that no contrast could be more complete. Nor does Zeno’s theory agree with that of Epicurus. Both indeed are positive teachers, and hold that the senses are messengers of truth. But here Epicurus stops, whilst Zeno goes on. We have to understand rightly the functions and limitations of the senses, or we shall quickly glide into error; we have also to learn that the senses are but servants, and that the mind rules them as a monarch by divine right, coordinating the messagesthey bring, shaping them according to its own creative capacity, even adding to them from the material it has derived from its source. The Stoic theory is in fact a bold survey of the results of the reflection of the human mind upon its own operations; it has, as we might expect, many gaps, a good deal of overlapping description, and some inconsistencies. To sceptical objections it is of course unable to give answers which are logically satisfactory; but its general position proved acceptable to men who sought in philosophy a guide to practical life.

Questions of temperament.

170.In the approximation between Stoicism and the Academy which characterizes the first centuryB.C., the Stoic logic obtained in the end the upper hand; and the logic of the so-called ‘old Academy’ founded by Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless the objections urged against it by Cicero represent not only his reason but also his sentiments. The positive system appears at its best in the education of children; and even at the present day the theory of knowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools is substantially that of the Stoics. It leads to careful observation, earnest inquiry, and resolute choice; and thus lays the foundation of solidity of character. But it must be admitted that it also works in the direction of a certain roughness and harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded man lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, which he is bound to regard as both foolish and wicked; but he is also blind to that whole side of the universe which cannot be reduced to syllogistic shape. Thus we may account for the indifference or hostility with which most Stoics regarded both literature and art[148]. The Academic, on the other hand, even if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both sides of every question, was saved by his critical powers from extremeassertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate appreciation of the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the formal differences of the two schools there lies a difference of character. We have long since learnt that the fundamental questions between the two schools are incapable of solution by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate the one without condemning the other. In practical life each theory has its appropriate sphere; but the Romans were hardly in the wrong when in matters of doubt they leaned towards the Stoic side.

FOOTNOTES[1]‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic.Fin.iv 2, 4.[2]Sext.math.vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).[3]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon.ad Anal.pr. f. 4a; Stein,Psychologieii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.[4]Epict.Disc.i 17, 6.[5]Diog. L. vii 40.[6]ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.[7]τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict.Disc.iv 8, 12.[8]‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug.Civ. De.viii 7.[9]Zeller,Stoicsetc., p. 66.[10]See below, §§164,165.[11]‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt funditus’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 31.[12]See above, §93.[13]Epict.Disc.ii 11, 13.[14]‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc.in Tim.266 (Arnim ii 863).[15]Cic.Ac.ii 7, 19.[16]Arnim ii 458.[17]‘mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and sensation as automatic.[18]αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τό τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις ... καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται Diog. L. vii 52.[19]Cleanthes called it ‘imprint’ (τύπωσις); Chrysippus, lest the word imprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ‘alteration’ (ἀλλοίωσις) Sext.math.vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); ‘visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem’ Cic.de Fato19, 43.[20]Sext.math.vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); ‘ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 19.[21]‘idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius’ib.[22]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς Aët.plac.iv 9, 4; ‘[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 19.[23]‘sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.” animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus’ib.7, 21.[24]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς Aët.plac.iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); ‘Zeno nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]’ Cic.N. D.i 25, 70.[25]φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· ... καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὑτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς αὐτήν Aët.plac.iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the φαντασία is technically called the φανταστόν, but also ὑπάρχον Sext.math.vii 426.[26]διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς Aëtiusplac.iv 12, 4.[27]ib.12, 5.[28]φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους Diog. L. vii 50.[29]‘visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 41; cf. §105.[30]On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged; see above, §84.[31]‘necesse est animum perspicuis cedere’ Cic.Ac.ii 12, 38.[32]‘perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet’ib.14, 45.[33]‘adsensio nostra erit in potestate’ Cic.Fat.19, 43; ‘adsensio non [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ib.18, 42; ‘[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 40.[34]διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσον, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut.Sto. rep.47, 10.[35]‘opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 7, 15; ‘opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 41; so Sext.math.vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).[36]Epict.Disc.i 21, 2.[37]ib.i 18, 1; Sext.math.vii 416.[38]ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem.nat. hom.vii p. 175 M (Stein,Psych.ii 135).[39]Cicero’s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps the object: ‘[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno] comprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 41. See further Stein,Psych.ii 174, and R. D. Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, p. 71.[40]This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato’sTimaeus: ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτως ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. Emp.math.vii 93. See also below, §266.[41]‘comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 42.[42]Diog. L. vii 51; ‘quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus!’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 20.[43]μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν Sext.math.vii 373 (Arnim i 64); ‘[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30.[44]‘quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam subducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit’ Sen.Ben.iii 2, 3.[45]So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext.math.vii 231.[46]ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν Aët.plac.iv 11, 2.[47]Diog. L. vii 52.[48]The details of this list are variously given: e.g. ‘cum rerum notiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 33.[49]Diog. L. vii 52.[50]‘homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt’ Cic.Off.i 4, 11.[51]So Zeller,Stoicsetc., p. 79.[52]ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται Aët.plac.iv 11, 1. The metaphor of thetabula rasacan be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining impressions. See Stein,Psych.ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.[53]τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν ... οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, καθάπερ αἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων Diog. L. vii 51.[54]οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν Aët.plac.i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.[55]πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως Sext.math.viii 56 (Arnim ii 88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.[56]‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30.[57]Cic.N. D.i 17, 44.[58]ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54; ‘notionem appello quam Graeci tum ἔννοιαν tum πρόληψιν; ea est insita et praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens’ Cic.Top.7, 31; ‘nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest’Ac.ii 7, 21. See also Aët.plac.iv 11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must not be called πρόληψις.[59]‘There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named common sense (κοινὸς νοῦς)’ Epict.Disc.iii 6, 8. See also below, §158.[60]‘We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things conformably with nature’ Epict.Disc.i 2, 6.[61]See Cic.Top.above, note 58.[62]Diog. L. x 33.[63]‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two terms see Prof. Reid’s note.[64]See notes to the next section.[65]‘rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit [qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae’ Cic.Leg.i 9, 26; ‘quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur’ib.i 10, 30; ‘As to good and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them?’ Epict.Disc.ii 11, 3.[66]ὁ δὲ λόγος ... ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα Aët.plac.iv 11, 4; περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦib.v 23, 1.[67]ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται ... λόγῳ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους Diog. L. vii 52; ‘collatione rationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 33; ‘nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his collegimus esse et animi robur’ Sen.Ep.120, 4; ‘de bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum’ib.66, 35.[68]φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν Diog. L. vii 53.[69]For the classification as a sensation see above, §146.[70]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τήνδε (sc. Aristotelis) τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ‘ἐντὸς ἁφὴν’ προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα Aët.plac.iv 8, 7; ‘quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut doloris aut voluptatis?’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken for the perception of an external object, is an ‘empty twitching’: φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν· ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλεῖται Sext.math.vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, p. 110.[71]‘visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur, quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur’ Cic.Ac.ii 15, 47.[72]Arnim ii 93 and 95; ‘ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 22; ‘ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis’N. D.ii 59, 148.[73]Arnim ii 95.[74]πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται Epict.Disc.i 22, 1.[75]εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see also Wachsmuth’s crit. note).[76]‘scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus’ Cic.Ac.ii 8, 23; ‘quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat’ib.i 11, 41; ‘quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus’ib.ii 37, 119.[77]See above, §77.[78]Plut.comm. not.47, 4.[79]Sext.math.vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); ‘scientiam, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem’ Cic.Ac.ii 47, 145.[80]Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.[81]See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, §84.[82]‘omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa cogitatione informantur, ... sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per insaniam. nam ab omnibus eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... itaque,simul ut experrectisumus [ex somno], visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea quae in foro gessimus’ Cic.Ac.ii 17, 51.[83]‘[ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam’ib.ii 32, 103; ‘dicunt [Academici] hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri’ib.11, 33.[84]κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος Diog. L. vii 54. This view is attributed to Zeno himself: ‘visum [Zeno ita definiit] ex eo,quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum’ Cic.Ac.ii 24, 77.[85]οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα Sext.math.vii 253.[86]φαντασία πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη Sext.math.vii 181. Such was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344).[87]Diog. L. vii 54 (see §80, note 68).[88]‘posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere’ Cic.Ac.ii 21, 67.[89]Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, p. 70.[90]‘multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esseinter aliahoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est ... neminem invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere bonum’ Sen.Ep.117, 6.[91]‘opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat’ Cic.N. D.ii 2, 5.[92]Diog. L. vii 177.[93]οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν Plut.comm. not.27, 9.[94]ἐκεῖνον [τὸν Ἀντίπατρον] ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον, εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρεσιλογίαςib.27, 15.[95]‘iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam verisimile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere ... non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio’ Cic.Off.ii 14, 51.[96]‘visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus’ Sen.N. Q.i 2, 3.[97]To himself, v 33.[98]See above, §§146,147.[99]‘sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem’ Cic.Ac.ii 17, 53.[100]Epict.Disc.i 27, 17.[101]The distinction between ‘name’ and ‘class-name’ was due to Chrysippus: see Sandys,Classical Scholarship, i p. 144.[102]Diog. L. vii 58.[103]For these and further particulars see Sandys,Classical Scholarship, i ch. ix; R. Schmidt,Stoicorum Grammatica, pp. 18 sqq.[104]‘Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo, qui reliquit περὶ ἀνωμαλίαςIIIlibros, contra analogiam atque Aristarchum est nixus’ VarroL. L.ix 1 (Arnim ii 151).[105]Orig.cont. Celsumi 24 (Arnim ii 146).[106]Varr.L. L.vi 11 (Arnim ii 163).[107]See Zeller,Stoicsetc., p. 73, n. 2; Aristotle’s distinction is between τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγον and τὸν ἔξω λόγον.[108]‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’ A. Gellius,N. A.v 15, 6.[109]‘hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut loqui; ... sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari, verba non esse verba’ VarroL. L.vi 56 (Arnim ii 143).[110]Diog. L. vii 63 to 78.[111]Varro translates this by ‘proloquium’ (Gell.N. A.xvi 8, 8), Cicero provisionally by ‘pronuntiatum’ (Tusc. disp.i 7, 14).[112]A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase ‘complete in itself’ (λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές) A. GelliusN. A.xvi 8, 4.[113]Diog. L. vii 45.[114]ib.80 and 81.[115]‘ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur’ Cic.Top.14, 57.[116]§83.[117]ἔλυε δὲ [Ζήνων] σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς Plut.Sto. rep.8, 2.[118]‘inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi’ Pers.Sat.vi 80.[119]‘placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere’ Cic.Ac.ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext.math.vii 416.[120]‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?’ Cic.Ac.ii 29, 95.[121]Epict.Disc.ii 17, 34.[122]‘mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit ... o pueriles ineptias!’ Sen.Ep.48, 6 and 7; ‘quod non perdidisti, habes; cornua autem non perdidisti; cornua ergo habes’ib.49, 8.[123]Epict.Disc.ii 19, 1 sqq.[124]See below, §§220,221.[125]Diog. L. vii 60.[126]‘omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικήν, illam ῥητορικήν placuit vocari’ Sen.Ep.89, 17.[127]Cic.Orator32, 113.[128]‘scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam; sed sic, ut si quis obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo modo loquantur; nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata’ Cic.Fin.iv 3, 7.[129]Diog. L. vii 59.[130]‘uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi’ Front. et Aur.Ep.ii 13.[131]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν Anon.ad Herm. Rhet. Gr.vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue; ‘[Stoicis] hanc habeo gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt’ Cic.de Or.iii 18, 65.[132]‘fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate pelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret, et voluptatem audientium petere ... vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur’ Quint.Inst. or.v Prooem.[133]Diog. L. vii 42.[134]‘orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum; sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum, attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo possit’ Cic.de Or.iii 18, 66.[135]‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius,N. A.vi 14, 10.[136]See below, chap. xvi.[137]See Smiley,Latinitasand Ἑλληνισμός.[138]‘Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason’ Epict.Disc.iv 1, 173; ‘where is the wonder if in philosophy many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?’ib.i 25, 33.[139]‘ista παράδοξα quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica’ Cic.Parad.Prooem. 4.[140]‘nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile’ Cic.Parad.Prooem. 3; ‘Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam mirabile quam prima facie videtur, adprobabo’ Sen.Ep.87, 1.[141]Zeller,Stoicsetc., pp. 354-370.[142]A. Gellius,N. A.xvi 8, 16 and 17.[143]‘quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra vitam iacent’ Sen.Ben.vi 1, 1.[144]‘multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae disputationes, quae acumen inritum exercent’Ep.45, 5.[145]‘We terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism’ Epict.Disc.iv 4, 14.[146]‘Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring over essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculation’ M. AureliusTo himselfi 17.[147]‘verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam [Stoicorum rationem]’ Cic.Ac.i 12, 43.[148]‘tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur, simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter nos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et statuas insanimus, carius inepti? illos reperti in litore calculi leves delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum’ Sen.Ep.115, 8. This tone is clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates. A modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation: ‘all the nastiness and stupidity which you call science and art’ (Count Leo Tolstoy in theWestminster Gazette, Sept. 3, 1910).

[1]‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic.Fin.iv 2, 4.

[2]Sext.math.vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).

[3]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon.ad Anal.pr. f. 4a; Stein,Psychologieii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.

[4]Epict.Disc.i 17, 6.

[5]Diog. L. vii 40.

[6]ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.

[7]τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict.Disc.iv 8, 12.

[8]‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug.Civ. De.viii 7.

[9]Zeller,Stoicsetc., p. 66.

[10]See below, §§164,165.

[11]‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt funditus’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 31.

[12]See above, §93.

[13]Epict.Disc.ii 11, 13.

[14]‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc.in Tim.266 (Arnim ii 863).

[15]Cic.Ac.ii 7, 19.

[16]Arnim ii 458.

[17]‘mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and sensation as automatic.

[18]αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τό τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις ... καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται Diog. L. vii 52.

[19]Cleanthes called it ‘imprint’ (τύπωσις); Chrysippus, lest the word imprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ‘alteration’ (ἀλλοίωσις) Sext.math.vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); ‘visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem’ Cic.de Fato19, 43.

[20]Sext.math.vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); ‘ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 19.

[21]‘idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius’ib.

[22]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς Aët.plac.iv 9, 4; ‘[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 19.

[23]‘sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.” animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus’ib.7, 21.

[24]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς Aët.plac.iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); ‘Zeno nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]’ Cic.N. D.i 25, 70.

[25]φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· ... καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὑτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς αὐτήν Aët.plac.iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the φαντασία is technically called the φανταστόν, but also ὑπάρχον Sext.math.vii 426.

[26]διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς Aëtiusplac.iv 12, 4.

[27]ib.12, 5.

[28]φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους Diog. L. vii 50.

[29]‘visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 41; cf. §105.

[30]On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged; see above, §84.

[31]‘necesse est animum perspicuis cedere’ Cic.Ac.ii 12, 38.

[32]‘perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet’ib.14, 45.

[33]‘adsensio nostra erit in potestate’ Cic.Fat.19, 43; ‘adsensio non [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ib.18, 42; ‘[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 40.

[34]διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσον, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut.Sto. rep.47, 10.

[35]‘opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 7, 15; ‘opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 41; so Sext.math.vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).

[36]Epict.Disc.i 21, 2.

[37]ib.i 18, 1; Sext.math.vii 416.

[38]ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem.nat. hom.vii p. 175 M (Stein,Psych.ii 135).

[39]Cicero’s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps the object: ‘[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno] comprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 41. See further Stein,Psych.ii 174, and R. D. Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, p. 71.

[40]This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato’sTimaeus: ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτως ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. Emp.math.vii 93. See also below, §266.

[41]‘comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret’ Cic.Ac.i 11, 42.

[42]Diog. L. vii 51; ‘quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus!’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 20.

[43]μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν Sext.math.vii 373 (Arnim i 64); ‘[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30.

[44]‘quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam subducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit’ Sen.Ben.iii 2, 3.

[45]So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext.math.vii 231.

[46]ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν Aët.plac.iv 11, 2.

[47]Diog. L. vii 52.

[48]The details of this list are variously given: e.g. ‘cum rerum notiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 33.

[49]Diog. L. vii 52.

[50]‘homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt’ Cic.Off.i 4, 11.

[51]So Zeller,Stoicsetc., p. 79.

[52]ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται Aët.plac.iv 11, 1. The metaphor of thetabula rasacan be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining impressions. See Stein,Psych.ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.

[53]τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν ... οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, καθάπερ αἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων Diog. L. vii 51.

[54]οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν Aët.plac.i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.

[55]πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως Sext.math.viii 56 (Arnim ii 88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.

[56]‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30.

[57]Cic.N. D.i 17, 44.

[58]ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54; ‘notionem appello quam Graeci tum ἔννοιαν tum πρόληψιν; ea est insita et praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens’ Cic.Top.7, 31; ‘nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest’Ac.ii 7, 21. See also Aët.plac.iv 11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must not be called πρόληψις.

[59]‘There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named common sense (κοινὸς νοῦς)’ Epict.Disc.iii 6, 8. See also below, §158.

[60]‘We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things conformably with nature’ Epict.Disc.i 2, 6.

[61]See Cic.Top.above, note 58.

[62]Diog. L. x 33.

[63]‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant’ Cic.Ac.ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two terms see Prof. Reid’s note.

[64]See notes to the next section.

[65]‘rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit [qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae’ Cic.Leg.i 9, 26; ‘quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur’ib.i 10, 30; ‘As to good and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them?’ Epict.Disc.ii 11, 3.

[66]ὁ δὲ λόγος ... ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα Aët.plac.iv 11, 4; περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦib.v 23, 1.

[67]ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται ... λόγῳ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους Diog. L. vii 52; ‘collatione rationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 33; ‘nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his collegimus esse et animi robur’ Sen.Ep.120, 4; ‘de bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum’ib.66, 35.

[68]φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν Diog. L. vii 53.

[69]For the classification as a sensation see above, §146.

[70]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τήνδε (sc. Aristotelis) τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ‘ἐντὸς ἁφὴν’ προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα Aët.plac.iv 8, 7; ‘quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut doloris aut voluptatis?’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken for the perception of an external object, is an ‘empty twitching’: φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν· ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλεῖται Sext.math.vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, p. 110.

[71]‘visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur, quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur’ Cic.Ac.ii 15, 47.

[72]Arnim ii 93 and 95; ‘ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?’ Cic.Ac.ii 7, 22; ‘ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis’N. D.ii 59, 148.

[73]Arnim ii 95.

[74]πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται Epict.Disc.i 22, 1.

[75]εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see also Wachsmuth’s crit. note).

[76]‘scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus’ Cic.Ac.ii 8, 23; ‘quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat’ib.i 11, 41; ‘quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus’ib.ii 37, 119.

[77]See above, §77.

[78]Plut.comm. not.47, 4.

[79]Sext.math.vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); ‘scientiam, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem’ Cic.Ac.ii 47, 145.

[80]Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.

[81]See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, §84.

[82]‘omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa cogitatione informantur, ... sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per insaniam. nam ab omnibus eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... itaque,simul ut experrectisumus [ex somno], visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea quae in foro gessimus’ Cic.Ac.ii 17, 51.

[83]‘[ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam’ib.ii 32, 103; ‘dicunt [Academici] hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri’ib.11, 33.

[84]κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος Diog. L. vii 54. This view is attributed to Zeno himself: ‘visum [Zeno ita definiit] ex eo,quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum’ Cic.Ac.ii 24, 77.

[85]οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα Sext.math.vii 253.

[86]φαντασία πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη Sext.math.vii 181. Such was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344).

[87]Diog. L. vii 54 (see §80, note 68).

[88]‘posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere’ Cic.Ac.ii 21, 67.

[89]Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks,Stoic and Epicurean, p. 70.

[90]‘multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esseinter aliahoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est ... neminem invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere bonum’ Sen.Ep.117, 6.

[91]‘opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat’ Cic.N. D.ii 2, 5.

[92]Diog. L. vii 177.

[93]οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν Plut.comm. not.27, 9.

[94]ἐκεῖνον [τὸν Ἀντίπατρον] ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον, εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρεσιλογίαςib.27, 15.

[95]‘iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam verisimile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere ... non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio’ Cic.Off.ii 14, 51.

[96]‘visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus’ Sen.N. Q.i 2, 3.

[97]To himself, v 33.

[98]See above, §§146,147.

[99]‘sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem’ Cic.Ac.ii 17, 53.

[100]Epict.Disc.i 27, 17.

[101]The distinction between ‘name’ and ‘class-name’ was due to Chrysippus: see Sandys,Classical Scholarship, i p. 144.

[102]Diog. L. vii 58.

[103]For these and further particulars see Sandys,Classical Scholarship, i ch. ix; R. Schmidt,Stoicorum Grammatica, pp. 18 sqq.

[104]‘Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo, qui reliquit περὶ ἀνωμαλίαςIIIlibros, contra analogiam atque Aristarchum est nixus’ VarroL. L.ix 1 (Arnim ii 151).

[105]Orig.cont. Celsumi 24 (Arnim ii 146).

[106]Varr.L. L.vi 11 (Arnim ii 163).

[107]See Zeller,Stoicsetc., p. 73, n. 2; Aristotle’s distinction is between τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγον and τὸν ἔξω λόγον.

[108]‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’ A. Gellius,N. A.v 15, 6.

[109]‘hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut loqui; ... sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari, verba non esse verba’ VarroL. L.vi 56 (Arnim ii 143).

[110]Diog. L. vii 63 to 78.

[111]Varro translates this by ‘proloquium’ (Gell.N. A.xvi 8, 8), Cicero provisionally by ‘pronuntiatum’ (Tusc. disp.i 7, 14).

[112]A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase ‘complete in itself’ (λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές) A. GelliusN. A.xvi 8, 4.

[113]Diog. L. vii 45.

[114]ib.80 and 81.

[115]‘ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur’ Cic.Top.14, 57.

[116]§83.

[117]ἔλυε δὲ [Ζήνων] σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς Plut.Sto. rep.8, 2.

[118]‘inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi’ Pers.Sat.vi 80.

[119]‘placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere’ Cic.Ac.ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext.math.vii 416.

[120]‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?’ Cic.Ac.ii 29, 95.

[121]Epict.Disc.ii 17, 34.

[122]‘mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit ... o pueriles ineptias!’ Sen.Ep.48, 6 and 7; ‘quod non perdidisti, habes; cornua autem non perdidisti; cornua ergo habes’ib.49, 8.

[123]Epict.Disc.ii 19, 1 sqq.

[124]See below, §§220,221.

[125]Diog. L. vii 60.

[126]‘omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικήν, illam ῥητορικήν placuit vocari’ Sen.Ep.89, 17.

[127]Cic.Orator32, 113.

[128]‘scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam; sed sic, ut si quis obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo modo loquantur; nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata’ Cic.Fin.iv 3, 7.

[129]Diog. L. vii 59.

[130]‘uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi’ Front. et Aur.Ep.ii 13.

[131]οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν Anon.ad Herm. Rhet. Gr.vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue; ‘[Stoicis] hanc habeo gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt’ Cic.de Or.iii 18, 65.

[132]‘fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate pelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret, et voluptatem audientium petere ... vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur’ Quint.Inst. or.v Prooem.

[133]Diog. L. vii 42.

[134]‘orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum; sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum, attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo possit’ Cic.de Or.iii 18, 66.

[135]‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius,N. A.vi 14, 10.

[136]See below, chap. xvi.

[137]See Smiley,Latinitasand Ἑλληνισμός.

[138]‘Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason’ Epict.Disc.iv 1, 173; ‘where is the wonder if in philosophy many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?’ib.i 25, 33.

[139]‘ista παράδοξα quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica’ Cic.Parad.Prooem. 4.

[140]‘nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile’ Cic.Parad.Prooem. 3; ‘Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam mirabile quam prima facie videtur, adprobabo’ Sen.Ep.87, 1.

[141]Zeller,Stoicsetc., pp. 354-370.

[142]A. Gellius,N. A.xvi 8, 16 and 17.

[143]‘quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra vitam iacent’ Sen.Ben.vi 1, 1.

[144]‘multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae disputationes, quae acumen inritum exercent’Ep.45, 5.

[145]‘We terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism’ Epict.Disc.iv 4, 14.

[146]‘Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring over essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculation’ M. AureliusTo himselfi 17.

[147]‘verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam [Stoicorum rationem]’ Cic.Ac.i 12, 43.

[148]‘tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur, simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter nos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et statuas insanimus, carius inepti? illos reperti in litore calculi leves delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum’ Sen.Ep.115, 8. This tone is clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates. A modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation: ‘all the nastiness and stupidity which you call science and art’ (Count Leo Tolstoy in theWestminster Gazette, Sept. 3, 1910).

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