Chapter 5

TABLE 3.—DISPOSITION OF CASH CONTRIBUTED FOR THE RELIEF OF SAN FRANCISCO THROUGH THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, TO JUNE 1, 1909[44]

[44]For detailed account of receipts and disbursements see Sixth Annual Report, American National Red Cross, 1910, pp. 60-152.

The statement shows that of the $3,115,496.25 donated through the American National Red Cross up to June 1, 1909, $2,920,005.00 had been remitted to San Francisco. The balance received but not remitted was therefore $195,491.25,[45]of which $97,073.35 was disbursed directly by the Red Cross. It will be seen that this balance equals the difference between the total amount donated for the relief of San Francisco and the amount of the cash donations received to June 1, 1909.

[45]Subsequent to June 1, 1909, the sum of $100,545.65 was forwarded to San Francisco, this sum comprising the $98,417.90 above mentioned, together with a portion of the accrued interest and a delayed contribution.

Food was of course the first necessity, and out of the need to supply it grew the whole machinery of relief. Before the noon of Thursday, April 19, the Citizens’ Committee had appointed a sub-committee on relief of the hungry, with Rabbi Voorsanger as chairman, to furnish food for the entire population, which for a time fell into a series of long bread lines. In these lines rich and poor, Italian, German, Swedish, Chinese, and native fared alike. The only question was one of need. From the mayor and the military officers down to the humblest families in the Potrero, there was a good-humored acquiescence in the hardships of the situation, and an optimism that was inspiring. Supplies in sufficient quantities were rushed to the city, and the danger of suffering from lack of food was averted.

The sub-committee began the distribution of food April 20. It at once called on the army to furnish an officer, two companies of infantry, and a troop of cavalry to guard rather than to distribute what supplies had become available. It took steps to get flour from points around the bay and studied the situation as to the bakeries, some of the largest of which had been burned or damaged. Repairs were being made to some of those damaged, and a daily output of 50,000 loaves of bread was shortly to be expected.

The ruling was made that after the committee on relief of the hungry had received the quantity of bread it needed, the bakers might sell the remainder at not more than 10 cents a loaf, in quantities of not more than five loaves to one person. The committee was furthermore authorized by the Citizens’ Committee to levy on all supplies wherever found. The following notes show the general trend of the work during the first week.

All classes joined the bread lineSoldiers gave aid and protectionRelieving the Hungry

All classes joined the bread line

Soldiers gave aid and protection

Relieving the Hungry

On Friday, April 20, while the fire was still spreading, the general distribution was begun. About 25 wagons were impressed which were used in the distribution of the provisions seized by order of the committee. Refugees were standing in line at the Golden Gate Park Lodge; the Young Men’s Hebrew Association, Page and Stanyan Streets; St. Mary’s Cathedral, Van Ness Avenue and O’Farrell Street; at Jefferson and Columbia Squares,and at the corners of Fifth and Mission Streets and 24th and Douglas Streets, where food stations had already been established by the citizens. The committee made use of these for its own distribution, choosing the Young Men’s Hebrew Association as its base for general distribution.

The bakeries that day furnished 35,000 loaves of bread. The chief difficulty lay in transporting to the city the supplies that were available—5,000 tons of flour at Vallejo and many carloads of donated goods at Oakland.

On Saturday, April 21, the day the fire was brought under control, the city was reported to be divided into districts. Five bakeries were in operation and a committee from Fresno appeared before the Citizens’ Committee to announce that it had brought six carloads of supplies. Committees from some nearby communities put themselves under the direction of the Citizens’ Committee, but the general efficiency of the distribution was lowered by the fact that still other out of town committees undertook to make independent distributions.

On Sunday, April 22, arrangements had been made to have bread baked in the towns of the Santa Clara Valley. It was found necessary to carry into effect the committee ruling to prevent alleged exorbitant retail charges for bread.

On Monday, April 23, there was an abundance of supplies for present use and an over-supply of milk.

On Tuesday, April 24, there was a shortage of sugar and coffee. Sixty food stations had been established. No stores were found on investigation to be charging exorbitant prices for food, but some of the refugees were trying to get more than their share of food. Confusion was still being caused by the work of the independent relief committees.

When two days later the committee on relief of the hungry made its final report to the Finance Committee there had been established 128 stations and sub-stations, a warehouse in the Moulder School, Page and Gough Streets, and a branch warehouse at Spear and Howard Streets. It had had printed a card for the use of the applicant at the food station and had determined that rations, except in cases of emergency, should be issued to each person at intervals of three days. Every card carried astatement of the amount of food required by a person for a day, as follows:

Fresh beef, 11⁄4lbs. or bacon or ham,3⁄4lb.Salt fish,3⁄4lb. [Probably as a substitute for meat and not in addition to it.]Fresh or canned vegetables, 1 lb.Flour, 18 oz., or bread, 22 oz.Rice,1⁄8lb. or beans,1⁄4lb.Sugar,1⁄10lb.Coffee,1⁄10lb.

Fresh beef, 11⁄4lbs. or bacon or ham,3⁄4lb.

Salt fish,3⁄4lb. [Probably as a substitute for meat and not in addition to it.]

Fresh or canned vegetables, 1 lb.

Flour, 18 oz., or bread, 22 oz.

Rice,1⁄8lb. or beans,1⁄4lb.

Sugar,1⁄10lb.

Coffee,1⁄10lb.

Special diet,—eggs, butter, milk, fruit,—was also issued.

This ration was more liberal than that adopted by the army.[46]

[46]SeeAppendix I,p. 379ff. This General Orders No. 18, is an important document to be read in connection with any facts given about the army methods.

During the trial week the distribution of food was made to the refugees either from the stations or at the various camps or shelters. Though a fixed ration was agreed on there could be no certainty of delivery, as the quantity and variety of the food supply was indeterminate. The committee in making its report could give only an approximate estimate of the goods it had seized. It anticipated that claims would be made against it as well as against the United States army, the state militia, the police department, and the various volunteer organizations which had without authorization seized goods.

It arranged to pay the bakeries at a rate of 5 cents a loaf for the 255,630 loaves of bread which had been supplied by them to the committee, part of the payment to be made in flour, and to pay the Milk Dealers’ Association at a rate of not more than 20 cents a gallon for milk supplied by it. The committee had employed between three and four hundred men and as many trucks to transport supplies, but it did not know the extent of its obligation for the use of the latter.

During the first week after the disaster there was a growing inclination to turn to the army for the direction of the relief work. Though the army in common with every other body of persons had suffered serious losses, its efficiency as an organization could not be impaired even though the extent of the aid it could immediately give were lessened.

To the military reservations which lay outside the burned district refugees immediately fled in numbers, and on April 19, the day the committee on relief of the hungry began its work, Major Krauthoff issued from a depot established by him in the Presidio such food as could be spared from the Presidio itself and from Forts Mason and Miley. The great army warehouses, which had stored $2,000,000 worth of supplies, were burned, but along with the committee on relief of the hungry the army began to confiscate supplies for use on the reservations. It also purchased from the posts in the Departments of California and the Columbia 900,000 rations, the first shipment of which arrived on April 21. On that same day a steamer from Stockton put in at Fort Mason with donations of provisions and blankets. These were immediately distributed among 20,000 refugees.

The committee on relief of the hungry had not been given full authority nor had its powers been defined. It had no machinery adequate for the handling of a great bulk of supplies, and it was hindered by the crossing of efforts on the part of unauthorized agencies.

The Finance Committee, as has been said inChapter I, was the committee of power, and might have assumed responsibility for perfecting an adequate relief organization, but as it realized that its efforts could not be as quickly effective as those of the army, it, as well as the mayor, called on the army to assume control of the relief work. General Greely consented and on April 29 took charge of the food issues and gradually put the work under the direction of 64 officers and 500 enlisted men.

Major C. A. Devol, depot quartermaster, who took over the tremendous task of unloading cars and boats and transporting supplies to and from warehouses,[47]quickly introduced order and economy into the work. Major C. R. Krauthoff, in charge of the commissary department, was also able soon to reduce to an efficient routine his work of receiving donated supplies, of purchasing, selling, and storing supplies, and of issuing properly balanced rations.

[47]SeeAppendix I,p. 383ff. See alsoPart I,pp. 8and30.

In the report made in July, 1906, to the War Department, Colonel Febiger, who from April 29 had charge of the organizationof relief stations, and later became chief of the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations, which had been established by the army to facilitate the relief work, said that on taking charge he had found, after a most thorough investigation, no instance of extreme suffering from lack of food or shelter, but many instances of repeating, so that the number of rations issued was in excess of the needs of the population. With no accepted general organization bringing about the co-ordinating of relief, there was of necessity an exaggerated estimate of the needy.

General Greely, who during his Arctic explorations had learned what extreme suffering from hunger and cold meant, had the city canvassed on May 13 in order to find any case of destitution which might have been overlooked. All of his inspectors, with 30 officers in addition to the officers directly connected with the relief work, were ordered to make a special effort to learn of persons in absolute need of food and decent clothing or of bed and shelter. The result was that but two such cases were reported.

During the early days orders were issued forbidding all householders to light fires in their houses. Cooking, in consequence, was done in the street over open fires or on rusty stoves which belched smoke out of short sections of pipe. In those days only candles were permitted for light and they had to be extinguished at 8 p.m.

As stated inChapter I,[48]the northern part of the city was, for purposes of policing, put under military control the third day after the disaster. Later, for purposes of relief, the city was divided into seven sections, whose boundaries were made coterminous with those of the army districts. On May 8, each section was supplied by the army with an officer who made regular reports to the headquarters of the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations, and with a physician who was responsible for sanitation and for diet prescriptions. Nine depots and sub-depots were open for storage of food supplies.

[48]SeePart I,pp. 11-12.

Preparing meals in the streetA row of street kitchensFires in Houses were Prohibited

Preparing meals in the street

A row of street kitchens

Fires in Houses were Prohibited

To give some idea of the character and origin of the relief stations a table of the relief stations of Civil Section VI is given:

TABLE 4.—CHARACTER OF LOCATION, ORIGIN, AND DATES OF OPENING AND CLOSING OF RELIEF STATIONS OF CIVIL SECTION VI

[49]Approximate.

There is no information to show that any one of these sub-stations had been established by the committee on relief of the hungry. As may be borne in mind, the number of stations in use on April 26 was reported by the committee on relief of the hungry to be 128; three days later, on taking charge, the army reported 177; early in May the number dropped, as is shown byTable 5, to 112.

TABLE 5.—RELIEF STATIONS IN THE SEVEN CIVIL SECTIONS ON MAY 3 AND ON JUNE 3, 1906

Dr. Devine as representative of the American National Red Cross had appointed a civil chairman to be responsible for the receiving and investigation of applications. After May 1, the responsibility for the distribution of supplies was divided at each section between the military officer and the civil chairman. The civil chairman determined who should receive relief and the military officer made the necessary requisition on the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations.

The records of relief distribution are incomplete and there is no means of determining accurately from week to week the number of persons who received food, clothing, and other supplies, medical care and shelter. The most complete records[50]are furnished by the official camps. Colonel Febiger in his July report, alreadyquoted, says that “313,145 persons were on May 2 estimatedto be receiving rations, though this number should probably be reduced to 300,000 to make allowance for repeaters.” General Greely made estimate that the number of cases of fraudulent repeating was not more than 3 per cent of the whole.

[50]For report sheet forms seeAppendix II,pp. 430and431.

TABLE 6.—DAILY ISSUES OF RATIONS FROM APRIL 19 TO MAY 12, 1906

Care has been taken to verify the estimate of the issues, which has called for some reduction of the totals as given in earlier reports. This accounts for the slight discrepancy between Colonel Febiger’s figure for May 2 and that given in the table.

The reason for the large increase in numbers in the bread line in the days immediately after the disaster is that householders had by then exhausted their private stock and could not make purchases, as most of the goods in retail stores had been confiscated; nor could food be prepared in private houses until chimneys had on inspection been found safe. From a week to two or three months, according to the location and the activity of the inspection, the fire prohibition held. In towns across the bay people with money in bank had difficulty in securing food because the banks were temporarily closed and the retail stores could not determine when they would be able to replenish their stock.

As the number in the bread line in the early part of May represented two-thirds of the population of a city that had been raised to a high degree of prosperity by the industry and thrift of its citizens, there would have been rapid decrease in the number of applicants for rations even had there been no concerted plan to reduce numbers. Pressure was brought from without, however, which, as is shown in the following paragraph, did accelerate the citizens’ return as a body to the normal means of making provision for creature needs.

In order that the smaller traders might be encouraged to resume business and the funds be reserved in a great measure to give permanent relief, the representatives of the army and the American National Red Cross co-operated during late April and early May in a strenuous effort to lessen the number supplied with rations. The attractiveness of the free food issues was diminished by reducing the ration items to meat, bread, and vegetables for all applicants in sound health except such as were living in the camps under military control. The number of the stations was rapidly reduced, as shown byTable 5. After the middle of May, except in cases of invalidism, rations were issued but three times a week, and an offer was made of a final issue of a month’s rations to any one who would accept that in place of the regular allowances. These measures served to concentrate in the permanent camps those refugees who were to continue as charges on the relief administration. The work of concentration was hindered, however, by the numerous private relief stations throughout the city which could be persuaded only gradually to send their patrons to the public relief stations. An Associated Charities worker who knew well the people in one large section of the city went through the tents with a soldier and demanded the return of extra bacon, canned goods, and potatoes, which had been laid in by thrifty refugees who had made use of both public and private food stations.

The Red Cross began within the first week of the disaster a general registration of the refugees. As substantially every one in the city was at that time dependent on the relief stations for food, the natural way of getting access to the refugees was through the distribution of rations. Carl C. Plehn, professor of financein the University of California, whose experience as director of the census of the Philippine Islands suggested special fitness for the work, undertook to prepare a plan, organize the force, and superintend the work of a registration bureau. The force consisted of some 200 volunteers from among the public school teachers, an intelligent and capable, even though inexperienced, group of enumerators. Their regular employment stopped on April 18, but their salaries were paid to the end of the school year. Though the service given was very unequal and largely unsatisfactory, if judged by the standard of a census bureau or a charity organization society, it is doubtful whether at the time so high an average of efficiency could have been obtained in any other way.

On April 27 Professor Plehn submitted a tentative plan for the registration. By May 7 the cards[51]and instructions had been printed, a force of 175 persons was in the field, and the work was well under way. Ten days later 20,000 cards had been filled out and the canvass was practically completed as far as it could then be carried.

[51]SeeAppendix II,pp. 425and426.

After excluding duplicates as far as they could be detected, the 19,438 cards, which represented the same number of families or household parties, distributed the 84,703 persons included among the seven sections as follows:

TABLE 7.—FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS REGISTERED IN THE SEVEN CIVIL SECTIONS, MAY, 1906

The 84,703 individuals were 28,319 men, 32,650 women, 22,795 children, and 939 persons who were entered under the heading, “Aged, etc.”[52]

[52]This classification was adopted for the purpose of determining the number of rations required by the family, and for that reason the dividing line between children and adults was placed at twelve years, the allowance for a child under twelve being placed at half the standard ration. “Men” and “Women” meant respectively the number of males and females twelve years of age and over, who were not aged and infirm. The heading, “Aged, etc.” (see card,Appendix II,p. 425), was an unfortunate one for statistical purposes, especially as on some of the cards it was printed “Ages, etc.” It was intended to be used, as the instructions to the enumerator clearly stated, for recording the “number of persons so old, sick, or crippled, as to be presumably unable to support themselves by labor.” This information would have had much practical value, but the cards show plainly that the ambiguity of the heading on the card was not corrected in the enumerators’ minds (as such ambiguity can rarely be corrected) by the careful explanation in the instructions. In many cases, when an entry was made under it, it was the ages of the children; in other cases it was apparently the number of adults in the party who were not immediate members of the family. The figures which have been tabulated are only of significance as recording so many additional adults. They do not indicate the proportion of aged and infirm, or the amount of physical disability among the refugees.

The information recorded on the registration cards varies in completeness and value on account of the great diversity in carefulness and capability among the persons who collected it. Many of the cards were filled out intelligently and conscientiously; many are wholly unsatisfactory. Taken together, however, they give a rough picture of that quarter or third, whichever it may have been, of the city’s population which was still, in the middle of May, dependent on the general distribution of food for its daily supplies; and they reflect to some extent the dislocations that were brought about by the disaster, in residence, occupation, and circumstances.

It was not the primary object of the registration to furnish material for a description of the refugees, but to establish a uniform system of food distribution which should prevent waste by cutting out repeaters, apportioning the number of rations to the size of the family, and cutting off persons as they reached a position where they no longer needed to be dependent. Other purposes were also in mind. At the beginning, in fact, the efforts seem to have been made to provide a record of the persons who received relief, for historical purposes and for aid in determining their future needs. It was also hoped that the registration could be made of practical value to the state laborcommissioner, in the free employment bureau[53]which had been opened. In part for this last reason, information was asked about former occupation and former employer, union membership, and present employment.

[53]A free employment bureau at Hearst School in charge of State Labor Commissioner Stafford closed its office May 29, 1906, after four weeks’ work, during which time employment was found for over 1,100 men and 93 women. See 12th Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1905-06. For brief mention of the work of the employment bureau seeCharities and the Commons, June 2, 1906, p. 304.

The bread line, Mission DistrictRelief station, Mission DistrictDistribution of Relief Supplies

The bread line, Mission District

Relief station, Mission District

Distribution of Relief Supplies

The registration was made at the relief stations, the cards being filled out when applicants came for rations. If the applicant did not live within the boundaries of the section served by the station to which he had come he was referred to the proper station. When the applicant had been registered he was given a food card[54]bearing a serial number, good for ten days, which stated conspicuously, so that the attendants could see, even before he reached the counter, the number of rations to which his family was entitled, and showed uncanceled the dates on which the card would be honored. The food card number was entered on the registration card, which was kept at the relief station. Each time rations were drawn the date for which they were drawn was canceled on the card. After the registration had been completed at any station no rations were issued except on presentation of a food card.

[54]A reproduction of the card is shown inAppendix II,p. 427.

By this system abuses were controlled: no one could draw supplies from two or more stations, nor two or three times on the same day from the same station, nor for more persons than he represented; able-bodied men, for whom by this time there was abundant opportunity of employment, could be cut off; and at the expiration of the ten-day period the merits of the case could be reviewed before granting a renewal of the food card.

It was through its success in establishing a uniform and workable system of food distribution that the first registration was most valuable. It did not prove to be of much service in aiding applicants to find employment, in giving a record of the entire work of relief, or in furnishing a basis for the rehabilitation work. That it failed in realizing all that was hoped from it in these directions was due partly to changes in the labor situation, which soon made efforts to supply employment superfluous;partly to some ambiguity and lack of definiteness in the headings on the card, and the omission of some essential items; but chiefly to the many omissions on the part of the enumerators, the lack of uniformity in their interpretation of the headings on the card, and the large amount of carelessness they exhibited in recording the information that was secured. The inexperience of the enumerators in investigation, the immense difficulty of supervising them adequately when the automobile and the wagon were the only means of transportation between the far-scattered stations, and the necessity for getting the whole work done as speedily as possible, so that there was no time for correcting mistakes or training investigators, are the simple explanations of these defects.

If all the circumstances are taken into consideration—the number of persons affected by the disaster, the extent of the territory to be covered, the difficulty of getting about, the confusion which still existed among the many elements of the relief organization, and the inexperience in relief work of those who made the registration, both university professors and public school teachers—the results obtained were surprisingly satisfactory. The registration would have justified itself if it had done nothing more than systematize the food distribution and contribute toward the reduction of the bread lines. This it undoubtedly did.

An indication of the effectiveness of the first registration, as may be seen inTable 11,[55]is the sudden drop in the number of persons who received rations after May 12, a decrease of 21 per cent on that day against an average daily decrease for the five preceding days of slightly over 7 per cent. The marked drop of May 16 is, however, in part due to the stimulation to self-help caused by putting into effect the order that rations should be issued only three times a week. The general use of the food card was an important factor in bringing about the reduction; another, the rapid increase in the number of persons gaining self-support. One special use to which the so-called first registration was put was to determine who should receive special diet. The diet included meat, fresh milk, butter and eggs, vegetables, and fruit, and was prepared for the sick, the aged, and for mothers with infants. The method of its distribution varied in the different sections and from time totime, but the policy was to subject its distribution to more direct control from the central office than the ordinary rations. Issues of special diet were not finally discontinued until October 1, a few days before the closing of the last kitchen.

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