IIIQUESTIONS OF FINANCE

[91]The establishment of a field hospital in Golden Gate Park is a good instance of the great care that was taken to be prepared for whatever emergency might arise.

The physicians and nurses who came immediately after the disaster to San Francisco to offer their services could not be utilized, as the demand for medical and nursing service was not greater than could be supplied by local physicians and nurses. A party of fourteen nurses that came from Seattle soon after the disaster reported for duty at five o’clock one afternoon. “Have you return transportation?” asked the chairman of the committee that received them. “Yes,” was the answer. “Well, there is a train which starts for Seattle tomorrow morning at nine o’clock,” was the laconic order.

In this incident we see the need of a clearing house of information to be established as one of the very first agencies in a large work of relief. It would in this case have prevented the sending of unnecessary nurses and physicians and would have saved expense. More important, however, would have been its service in standardizing the methods of record keeping and in preventing overlapping of work of the various departments.[92]

[92]SeeSome Lessons of the Relief Survey,p. 369ff.

There was immediate need of medical supplies to replace the stock destroyed by fire. But the sub-committees on drugs and medical supplies and on care of the sick and wounded, appointed by the Citizens’ Committee, could find little to do in those early days after the disaster, as the army practically took charge of the distribution of the medical supplies and was using the California Red Cross as its agent. This branch of the Red Cross not only cared for some of the sick directly, but did much more important work in collecting information as to the needs of the sick and as to the condition of the hospitals throughout the city.

The Finance Committee, acting early in May on the advice of Colonel Torney, established 26 free dispensaries which were supplied by the army with drugs and other medical supplies. It was careful not to compete with retail trade, so closed any dispensary near which a retail drug store was later opened. The Finance Committee also appointed early in May a committee on hospitals and authorized it to make payments to designated hospitals for the care of destitute patients. The hospitals which were to receive payments from the relief funds were at first named by the board of health, later by the Finance Committee itself, which made selection of six hospitals. An executive officer, a physician, was appointed to pass on the eligibility of the patients who applied for free care and to determine the time of discharge of each from the hospital.

In July this executive officer, whose title was that of supervisor of accredited hospitals, served under direction of the Executive Commission; but after August 1 he was subject to the Corporation, an arrangement which held until July 1, 1908, when the Bureau of Hospitals of the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation was closed. The Associated Charities was then given authority by the Corporation to send destitute patients directly to the hospitals. The Corporation reimbursed the hospitals for care given. The hospitals selected to receive patients whose care was paid for from the funds were changed from time to time.

The value of the compensation to hospitals was at first equivalent to $13 or $14 a week for each patient. On July 18 the Executive Commission had fixed the maximum rate of $2.00 per day without supplies. This was to cover cost of operations and attendance. It had remained in force until the Bureau of Hospitals was closed.

The Bureau’s records, which are inadequate in some respects, show that the highest number of hospital cases for one week, 276, was reached during the period of the typhoid epidemic. Later reports show an average of about 212 patients per week from August, 1906, to September, 1907. Of the patients sent to hospitals through the Bureau 10 per cent were children, 35 per cent men, and 55 per cent women.

The financial report of the Corporation shows that the total cost for the care of the sick to May 29, 1909, was $344,165.07.In addition, food, medical supplies, and furnishings were given to hospitals to the value of $97,670.16. Of the $344,165.07, there was expended previous to August 1, 1906, $107,396.43. The sum of $278,070.76 was paid directly to hospitals for the care of patients, on presentation of vouchers, while the balance of $66,094.31, though not paid directly to the hospitals, was expended in various ways for the benefit of the hospital patients. Between August 1, 1906, and June 1, 1909, $231,110.46 was paid directly to hospitals for the care of patients. This latter sum, less $1,960.25 which cannot be distributed, represents 134,373 days of hospital care at an average cost of $1.71 per patient per day. The average rates of the different hospitals varied from $1.07 to $2.00.

Although the rates paid by the relief funds were often less than the actual cost to the hospitals of caring for patients in normal times, it was to the advantage of the hospitals to care for the sick, many of whom they would have had to take in any case. The volume of business helped to lower the per capita cost of maintenance. It was also an incentive to the directors to increase their facilities and to private benefactors to give money toward their support.

The Japanese asked for very little relief, in part because many had difficulty in speaking English, but more generally because all were aware of the anti-Japanese feeling of a small but aggressive part of the community; this in spite of the fact that Japan contributed directly to the local committee and through the American National Red Cross nearly a quarter of a million dollars.

On April 20, independent relief associations were formed by Japanese residents in San Francisco and Oakland, but on the same day they wisely united under the name Japanese Relief Association to care for practically all their fellow countrymen.

Tanks for Sterilizing Water, Lobos Square Camp

The Japanese Relief Association estimated the number of their countrymen made destitute by the fire to be over 10,000, which is about 3 per cent of the total number of persons made dependent for short or long periods of time. On July 6, 1906, not over 100 Japanese were receiving assistance from the Relief andRed Cross Funds. Of these about 50 were receiving shelter only, in Lafayette Square, and 50 were receiving help at relief stations. That is, the Japanese constituted not more than one-half of 1 per cent of the bread line and about a quarter of 1 per cent of the population of the official camps. Even at the beginning the number receiving help from the Relief and Red Cross Funds was probably not much greater. The Relief Survey estimates that the total value of relief of all kinds furnished by the army and the Finance Committee to Japanese did not exceed $3,000. Among the 30,000 or more persons who applied for rehabilitation, there was not one Japanese. Their own relief association, assisted by Japanese throughout the state, within ten days after the disaster sent between 7,000 and 8,000 of them to places outside of San Francisco. On July 6 some of these had returned and the number of Japanese refugees then in the city was estimated by the association to be 4,000, two hundred of whom it was supplying with provisions.

China contributed $40,000 to the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds for the general work of relief.

There is not much information available about the Chinese. They probably received altogether more food than the Japanese and they certainly received more in the way of shelter, yet the total value of all aid given them was relatively insignificant. Like the Japanese, and for the same reasons, they did not ask for much. At the beginning a separate camp was established for them,—Number 3, in the Presidio reservation. The population of this camp on May 8, 1906, was 186. Later, when cottages were built in Portsmouth Square, on the border of Chinatown, 37 out of the 153 cottages were assigned to Chinese. Not over 140 applications for rehabilitation were made by Chinese. About half of the number were assisted at an average expenditure of about $70. Nearly all these cases were brought to the notice of the Committee by social workers, as only a few Chinese applied voluntarily for relief. Ten thousand dollars is a liberal estimate of the value of relief given to the Chinese.

Theword “claim” as used in the relief accounting was applied to anything from a time check for a day’s work to a ten thousand dollar demand for goods seized, a usage that arose from the fact that for the first few days, when there was no available cash, many obligations were incurred that were a proper charge on the relief funds though not authorized by the Finance Committee.

Some claims were made by those who suffered a change of sentiment toward contributing relief. During the hours of urgent need men donated their goods, workmen gave their labor, and professional men, their services, who when later they saw the size of the relief funds could not resist the insidious craving to have a share of the big whole. There is the instance of men belonging to one of the building trades who did work for which they expected no pay but later were not satisfied to take the $4.00 a day offered as payment by the Finance Committee. They demanded $6.00 because other men were receiving that amount for a day’s work. Business houses within and without the city evinced the same spirit.

Day by day the flood of claims swelled. Claimants and their attorneys laid siege to the Finance Committee and tried by bribes and threats of lawsuits to collect their claims. A large force of clerks and a special committee were kept hard at work trying to learn the merits of the claims. The Finance Committee itself day after day was compelled, instead of discussing necessary relief measures, to give the greater part of its sessions to the hearing or to the discussion of these claims.[93]

[93]See Sixth Annual Report American National Red Cross, 1910, p. 160.

The circumstances of seizure had varied. Often when the fire was almost upon a store somebody would assume authority and break it open to give the stock to the people. In such a case the stock would have been destroyed by fire and there was no justice in the claim for seizure except where the owner as a consequence lost insurance. Irresponsible individuals who had no connection with relief committees had seized goods and impressed vehicles. Those who suffered loss through such lawless acts were unfortunate, but they had no real claim to reimbursement from the relief funds.

The same may be said of the individuals, the business houses, and the transportation companies whose goods were stolen, not seized, from freight cars and warehouses. Many claims for regrettable losses which might have been legitimate if brought against state, city, or person, were unjust when brought against the relief funds. Fraudulent attempts were also made to collect from the relief funds for losses that had no connection with the relief work and for losses that had never occurred. It was a perplexing problem to deal with these thousands of claims, the difficulties of which were increased by the insistence of those with the least valid claims.

The last report of the Department of Bills and Demands dated March 16, 1907, gives the following figures:

TABLE 27.—DISPOSAL OF CLAIMS ACTED UPON BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BILLS AND DEMANDS, TO MARCH 16, 1907

TABLE 28.—PAYMENTS UPON CLAIMS ACTED UPON BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BILLS AND DEMANDS, TO MARCH 16, 1907

After March 16, 1907, a few long pending and new claims were paid. Some law suits had been settled, and a few were still pending against the Corporation when this report was prepared.

It thus appears that the trustees of the relief funds paid over a million and a half dollars for expenditures, many of which they had not authorized and were unable to control. They tried to pay only such part of the claims as represented supplies and service used in relief work. Just claims were cut down as a rule, so that a comparatively small number of claims were paid in full.

In deciding the merits of claims the supervising and judicial committees appointed sub-committees of experienced men to supplement their own technical knowledge. Many claims for liquor destroyed by soldiers and citizens were presented, but the Finance Committee decided to pay no liquor claims. The enormous disbursements for automobile service and for transportation of supplies were made chiefly in payment of emergency claims. Claims of various sorts were paid by the War Department out of the Congressional appropriation of $2,500,000. Other claims were paid by the state. As the Relief Corporation could get no information about such claims it is possible that there were duplicate payments.

The accounting system of the Relief and Red Cross Funds has been criticized because it did not readily yield information as to the amounts expended for various purposes, and because it was complicated. The first seems a fair criticism, for contributors tofunds and the public in general are more interested in the cost of various forms of relief than in the state of the appropriations. The system of appropriations to the departments for different purposes was based on carefully prepared budgets. It was good for controlling expenditures and for keeping a check on departments and bureaus. For those not directly connected with the work, additional information in simple form might easily have been given. The intricacy of the accounting, however, seems justified by the results. It was devised to make the handling of the money as secure as possible. So far as the local auditors and the auditor of the War Department have been able to discover there was only one transaction that looked like misappropriation of money. About $1,000 received by a camp employe from certain authorized sales was for a short time kept back. The apparent shortage, easily detected by the accounting department, was made good.

Considering the extraordinary conditions under which the work was organized, such a showing is remarkable. When men undertake the thankless task of handling a large relief fund, if they have a keen sense of responsibility and a realization of the difficulties ahead they will wish to disburse the fund through a system which is as safe as possible. It is worth while for them not only to prevent misappropriation but even the appearance of it. The employes of such a committee will find satisfaction, when accused of graft and stealing,—an accusation suffered many times by the San Francisco workers,—in showing their accusers just how the money is guarded and that it is impossible for them to steal. A system that insures such security is worth the extra cost.

As a result, primarily, of the publication of sensational stories in the press of the country, the plans of the Corporation were at times seriously embarrassed by the withholding of funds by eastern committees and by the possible danger of those funds being dispensed by independent agencies.

The studies in rehabilitation show that the suspension of grants on August 20, 1906, the period of arrested progress, had a serious effect upon the rehabilitation work. It caused a changeof relief policy so that families given grants in one period were treated differently from those in another. It meant for many families a long wait from August 20 to the middle of October when the embargo was lifted. The Corporation had worked out a wise, comprehensive program on the basis of estimated income and then suddenly had to question whether the income might not be $3,000,000 less. Inevitably every department suffered from uncertainty and hesitation. The results of such an intolerable condition were more clearly perceived in rehabilitation than in the other work, but what the withholding of funds meant in reduced efficiency would be hard to estimate.

The two most important funds, those of Massachusetts and the New York Chamber of Commerce,[94]were eventually transferred, the latter with the restriction that it be used for business rehabilitation. Only a number of small funds were permanently held, but the harm was done. The warning should be heeded in future disasters. It is possible for a relief committee, when its work is hardest, to be tied up because of a few newspaper stories which may or may not have foundation in fact.

[94]Action of the New York Chamber of Commerce taken October 2, 1906, and transmitted in the form of a resolution to the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds.—The resolution provided for the transfer of $500,000 to the Corporation “to be devoted by said Corporation for the purposes and uses of making grants of money or its equivalent, to individual sufferers from the disaster for purposes of rehabilitation, in such sums and by such methods as its Rehabilitation Committee may approve; and that no part of it should be used for the payment of any pending claims or obligations incurred prior to such transfer of funds, or for the maintenance of camps, or for ordinary emergent relief, or for the erection of barracks or cottages, or for the maintenance of persons therein, it being assumed that the contribution already made from this fund ($267,500) and the sum subscribed in other ways will enable the Corporation to accomplish these necessary and worthy objects.”

The investigator sent by the Massachusetts committee because of the newspaper stories, after investigation cordially endorsed the work of the Relief Corporation and made but few criticisms.

What is the remedy? It cannot be too plainly stated that there must be only one relief committee or corporation.[95]There must be no division of responsibility for distribution. If there must be reform it must be within the relief corporation itself. If one of the eastern committees in command of large funds hadset up its own agency in San Francisco, it would have been guilty of improper trusteeship. That much is evident. The suggestion has been made that the committees in charge of the larger funds should each have had a representative on the Finance Committee. Mr. Bicknell, for instance, came first to San Francisco as the representative of the Chicago Commercial Association and the Mayor’s committee funds. But such representation would not include the smaller fund committees. A more inclusive plan is desirable. The gradual strengthening of the American National Red Cross seems to point the way. The Red Cross should become so fully recognized as the national agency for all disaster funds that it should eventually, in any given case, receive all funds not sent directly to a local committee. Its relation to local committees will be strengthened and it can be relied upon to suggest and whenever necessary push changes in relief measures. In San Francisco and each subsequent disaster of any proportions, the American National Red Cross has been represented by its expert agents. Its strength has been materially increased by the appointment of a permanent director. The withholding of funds once subscribed for a particular disaster should become an impossibility as the status of the national agent is recognized.

[95]See Sixth Annual Report American National Red Cross, 1910, p. 156. See also section on The Incorporation of the Funds,Part I,p. 25ff. of this volume.

We have alluded to one form of restriction, that of requiring that a specified fund be used for a specified form of rehabilitation. Such restriction must of course be accepted after an effort has been made, and has failed, to persuade the forwarding committee to lift the restriction. But restrictions upon relief in kind are doubly dangerous and ill-advised. In the San Francisco disaster the “flour” episode gives an apt illustration. Certain forms of food were donated in quantities in excess of the needs. These were flour, potatoes, and condensed milk, all three of them valuable forms of food in an emergency. The potatoes, as it was the end of the season, did not keep well in large masses and the refugees, living in tents or in basements or attics, had little room for storage. Besides, the universal practice in San Francisco and the vicinity where fresh vegetables can be bought the year round, is to buy in small quantities from day to day or week to week and not store in the fall for winter use. The Finance Committee, unable to dispose of the potatoes to refugees, decided to sell thesurplus stock. The sale does not appear to have been made, perhaps because they were unsaleable. At any rate large quantities spoiled and had to be thrown away.

It was natural to think that condensed and evaporated milk would be necessities of prime importance. They were valuable, but on account of local conditions were not needed in great quantities. The supply of milk from the ranches outside the city was not much diminished by the earthquake. By confiscation and by arrangement with dealers an abundant supply of fresh milk was secured for distribution to the refugees.

Many committees throughout the country sent flour as the most useful form of food. It came so fast that for lack of warehouses in which to store it (practically all city warehouses having been burned) part of it was put aboard three transports and in the army warehouses, and finally a vast quantity was stacked up in the open air. The transports were not adapted to preserving flour in good condition so they could not long be used as storehouses. The Finance Committee, confronted by the problem of finding storage for the vast supply received, and knowing that it was several times as much as could be reasonably distributed, decided on May 17 to sell 4,000,000 pounds. This was vigorously objected to by the Minneapolis committee which had sent 15 per cent of the 16,000,000 pounds received. It insisted that its flour should be distributed,—the very flour sent, not flour purchased later with cash from the sale of Minneapolis flour. This episode led to newspaper publicity and protests. The lesson is, that restrictions upon relief in kind are unsatisfactory and embarrassing and should always be placed upon a discretionary basis. The Minneapolis committee claimed that title to its flour had been transferred to the destitute of San Francisco, not to the Red Cross or to the Finance Committee, who were apparently to be considered solely as the servants of distribution. The position is an impossible one in which to place a self-respecting committee.

Many donors of money gave specific directions as to the use to which they wished it put. There was the man who sent $1.00 with a request to hand it to some worthy sufferer and let him report to the donor; and there was the refugee who, after hehad found employment elsewhere, sent a small sum, more than enough to pay for the three days’ rations he had received in the bread line, with the request that the balance be given to a soldier who had been kind to him. Jewelers sent money for jewelers, artists for artists, teachers for teachers, physicians for physicians, the people of one town for their fellow townsmen in San Francisco.

Money was also sent to individuals connected with the relief funds to be applied to specific purposes. Fortunately, there were enough unrestricted funds available to assist all classes and carry out the intent of all donors. It was not necessary to open a special account for each of these trusts.

No actual restriction as to the purpose of expenditure, imposed either by donors directly or by the custodians of large funds, was in itself onerous to the relief authorities, but the circumstances attendant upon the remittance of restricted funds caused more or less embarrassment during nearly the whole period of the relief work.

Part IIREHABILITATION

Inthe beginning of the Relief Survey it has been shown how, with what seemed to be an instinctive insistence, the trend of the work was toward the formulation of a definite rehabilitation policy. The principle, one might say axiom, which determined the character of this policy was that help should be extended with reference to needs and not with reference to losses. It was not easy to hold to the relief principle in the face of a sentiment by no means weak nor voiceless that each sufferer was entitled to an equal share of the funds. That the Rehabilitation Committee did consistently act on this principle during the periods of its activity was a marked achievement—an achievement that may be counted to the good, not only for the relief of San Francisco sufferers but for sufferers from subsequent disasters.

When the Rehabilitation Committee began its work at the beginning of July, 1906,[96]it could not know what amount of money would be available for the purposes of its work. It knew that $1,500,000 had been suggested as the amount and 15,000 as the number of families to be rehabilitated. It held many conferences to consider the possibility of obtaining even the roughest sort of census of the families who would require assistance.

[96]SeePart I,p. 21.

No solution was furnished by the population of the various camps because even if their total population had been known, it would not have given a clue to the number of families who were living with relatives or friends or as tenants in the overcrowded quarters. Unlike the ordinary relief society, the Committee could not estimate the total actual needs of its prospective applicants.Therefore it had to fix definite limitations for grants[97]to those who first applied so that later applicants, with needs equally great, might not suffer injustice.

[97]A classification of grants was in use which had been adopted by the Red Cross Special Bureau. The headings of this classification were “Tools,” “Household Re-establishment,” “Business Enterprise,” “Special Relief,” “Transportation.” Special Relief was used to describe a miscellaneous group of grants, and to prevent its being confused with the later Bureau of Special Relief (seePart II,p. 145), it will hereafter in this study be designated “General Relief.”

With these considerations in mind the Committee at its first meeting moved to limit the vast bulk of grants to sums of $500 or less. The decision was that a grant that did not exceed $200 could be approved by one member of the Committee, that grants of from $200 to $500 should require the signatures of two members, and that grants of more than $500 should require the action of the entire Committee. During the first few months the number of separate grants of $500 or over, exclusive of housing grants, was but 121, the general assumption in the Committee room and among the rehabilitation workers being that the number of families to receive over $500 should be small.

Eventually, of the 20,241 families assisted by the Committee, 647 families received as much as $500 each.[98]It was not realized at the beginning that in a great number of instances there would be re-openings and new applications leading to the granting of new forms of rehabilitation; that, for example, a family would be helped first to re-establish itself in business and later to build a house. Supplementary grants that increased the total allowance to a family to more than $500 were not passed upon by the Committee as a whole, though at several meetings the question of requiring the Committee to act as a whole on the issuance of a series of grants in excess of $500 to an applicant was informally discussed. No official action, however, followed the discussions. Before the middle of July the Committee sent to the newspapers and to others interested, a circular in which was outlined its general purpose. In this its aim was shown to be not to determine the size of grants by the extent of losses, but to help those to re-establishthemselves who were unable, even upon a contracted basis, to do so without assistance.

[98]The difference between these figures and the figures given inTable 45onpage 165is due to the fact that successive grants of the same nature to a single applicant were, in making some compilations, treated as a single grant, and in making others, as successive grants.

The wisdom of limiting the size of grants may be questioned by some, but there is no doubt of its paramount importance in giving a rough basis for work at a time when it was impossible to estimate the number of families that would require assistance. It is hard to conceive of the setting of any other standard than this. Without it the possibilities for confusion and injustice were unusually large. The decision was reached not only from motives of prudence but also from the Committee’s sense of responsibility in dealing with such large amounts of money as would undoubtedly be placed in its hands. That the feeling of personal responsibility was large was made evident by other actions of the Committee.[99]

[99]Under somewhat similar circumstances the Chicago Fire Commission practically limited special relief expenditures to $200 per grant. See Report of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society of Disbursements of Contributions for the Sufferers by the Chicago Fire (1874), p. 199.

After the Department of Camps and Warehouses was created on August 1, 1906, the Rehabilitation Committee[100]finally adopted its own policy with reference to families living in the camps, a policy which as has been seen[101]had been gradually taking shape during July. The whole question of the rehabilitation of camp families had been considered at a lunch given before his departure east by Dr. Devine to the members of the Committee and the staff. The conclusions of this informal conference did not take official form, but they may be accepted as marking the first step in the formulation of the policy. They were: That the camps should provide for the immediate needs of their inmates; that no stated sum could be set aside for the ultimate use of those who were expected to become permanent charges; and that no family living in a camp should be given rehabilitation aid until it had presented a definite plan for rehabilitation. It was felt that the effect upon applicants would be great if once they understood that it was useless for them to come to the Committee without definite and concrete plans.The subject of setting aside a sum for the use of the residue came up again in the latter part of August when Mr. Dohrmann, in making his estimates of the future disposition of funds, again and again called attention to the need of reserving large sums to re-establish camp families.

[100]Now a part of the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation, which included also the Bureau of Special Relief, Bureau of Hospitals, etc.[101]SeePart I,p. 19ff.

[100]Now a part of the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation, which included also the Bureau of Special Relief, Bureau of Hospitals, etc.

[101]SeePart I,p. 19ff.

By August 1 the issuing of rations had been discontinued. The Department of Camps and Warehouses had taken over the bulk of the work of the short-lived Executive Commission, and the Rehabilitation Committee had been made responsible, under the gradual centralization of all relief, for the granting of all aid other than shelter and the relief-giving incidental to camp life. The Rehabilitation Committee was, however, in accordance with the policy it had adopted, steadying the number of applications made to it by camp families, by requiring an applicant to give proof that he had an assured dwelling before his request for household aid was considered. The immediate necessity was to define the relations between the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation and the Department of Camps and Warehouses. On August 6, 1906, the chairman of the latter department, Rudolph Spreckels, met with the Rehabilitation Committee, and after prolonged consideration the following definite agreement was reached:

The Department of Camps and Warehouses agreed:

1. To provide necessary food, clothing, and tent equipment to residents of camps.2. To refer to the Rehabilitation Committee only such applicants as were believed to be prepared to leave the tents and to become undoubtedly self-supporting.3. To make within the limits of the camp all investigations necessary to determine the current needs of the refugees.4. To inform the Rehabilitation Committee of any applicant who had shown a readiness to leave the camp and to be rehabilitated.

1. To provide necessary food, clothing, and tent equipment to residents of camps.

2. To refer to the Rehabilitation Committee only such applicants as were believed to be prepared to leave the tents and to become undoubtedly self-supporting.

3. To make within the limits of the camp all investigations necessary to determine the current needs of the refugees.

4. To inform the Rehabilitation Committee of any applicant who had shown a readiness to leave the camp and to be rehabilitated.

The Rehabilitation Committee on its part agreed:

1. To follow the notification of an applicant’s readiness to leave a camp by an investigation of its own and to take such action as the inquiry would warrant.2. To assume responsibility for supplying all relief outside of the camps, this full responsibility to be assumed not later than the end of August.

1. To follow the notification of an applicant’s readiness to leave a camp by an investigation of its own and to take such action as the inquiry would warrant.

2. To assume responsibility for supplying all relief outside of the camps, this full responsibility to be assumed not later than the end of August.

Camp No. 25, Richmond District, opened November 20, 1906Camp No. 29, Mission Park, opened November 19, 1906Two Cottage Camps

Camp No. 25, Richmond District, opened November 20, 1906

Camp No. 29, Mission Park, opened November 19, 1906

Two Cottage Camps

The responsibility of the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation for relief outside the camps remained absolute, with the exception of the housing aid given by the Department of Lands and Buildings. Mr. Bicknell was appointed to carry out the plan so far as it related to the Rehabilitation Committee, to which he later presented his plan for the establishment of a Bureau of Special Relief under the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation. This new bureau, which is described elsewhere,[102]gave aid in kind; the Rehabilitation Committee gave emergency aid in cash.

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