This last reference, which is to Lord Stanley of Alderley, is of importance. He was a very old and close friend of mine, but we had hitherto differed about Egypt, and on this ground. He had been many years before, in the time of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Attaché to our Embassy at Constantinople, and had imbibed there the extreme philo-Turkish views then in fashion with Englishmen. In 1860, while travelling in theEast Indies, he had become a Mohammedan, and I had first made his acquaintance in a rather singular way. I was on my way in the autumn of that year from Athens and Constantinople to England, and was travelling up the Danube when there came on board our steamer at one of the Roumanian ports the family of an ex-hospodar, and with them an Englishman of no very distinguished appearance, and of rather plain, brusque manners, whom I took to be their tutor or secretary. As our journey lasted several days, I made friends with my fellow traveller, and found him interesting from his great knowledge of the East, but he did not tell me his name. On our arrival, however, at Vienna, he proposed to go with me to the Embassy, and I then discovered who he was, and we travelled on together to Munich, where his younger brother, Lyulph Stanley, a Balliol undergraduate, was learning German, and in this way I became acquainted little by little with all his family. I came to know him very well, and I take this opportunity of saying that, though he was undoubtedly eccentric in his ideas, he remained through life one of the sincerest and least selfish men I have known. As a Moslem he was entirely in earnest, and in many ways he sympathized with my views, but he would not hear of my preference of the Arabs to the Turks, whom he considered the natural leaders of Islam. In London he was always in close relations with the Ottoman Embassy, and his view of the position as between the Sultan and Arabi—the Dervish mission was already in the air—has on this account considerable historical value.
"June 4.—Sunday at Crabbet. The first day for weeks I have not thought about Egypt. I consider the whole matter settled now, and have played tennis all the afternoon with a light heart. The Wentworths, Noels, Frank Lascelles, Henry Cowper, Molony, and others came down from London. Lovely weather.
"June 5.—To London again.... Lady Gregory tells me they are displeased now with Colvin—consider him not suited to his place in Egypt—this from Lord Northbrook. Lord Granville has sent to consult him (Sir William Gregory)." Lady Gregory, be it noted, had remained more staunch than had her husband to the National cause; and later they both rendered once more important services to Arabi, especially at the time of his trial. The London newspapers at this timewere beginning to take a more intelligent interest in Egyptian affairs, most of them having sent special correspondents to Cairo or Alexandria, among them the "Daily Telegraph," whose correspondent became a strong Arabist.
"June 6.—The 'Daily News' is already preparing itself for a renewal of thestatus quo ante ultimatum, and the other papers seem likely to follow suit,—all but the 'Times' and 'Pall Mall," just the two papers which had the truth preached to them and which rejected it. English opinion, however, is hardly now a straw in the balance.... I had another long talk with Lascelles, and hope that I have more or less converted him. In the evening I rode with Bertram Currie, who offers to wager Arabi will have been extinguished in a fortnight." (N. B.—Bertram was the elder brother of Philip Currie, a banker, and strong practical supporter of Gladstone, with whom he was personally intimate. His opinion, no doubt, reflects that of Downing Street at the moment.)
"June 7.—Lady Gregory came in and gave me news. She tells me that Lord Granville told her husband that all their hopes now rested on Dervish's mission from Constantinople. 'Dervish,' Lord Granville said, 'is quite unscrupulous, and he will get rid of Arabi one way or other.' I suppose this means by bribing;[18]indeed, Lord Granville seems to have said as much, but it may also mean by 'coffee.' I do not, however, fear the latter. The Sultan's object will be to get Arabi to Constantinople, not to kill, but to keep him as a hostage. I am anxious all the same Sabunji should arrive. I cannot help fancying they may try and prevent his landing, knowing his connection with me. A note has come from him written in the train, with additions to our code of signals which are rather amusing.... Later saw Gregory, who confirms all his wife told me of his interview with Granville. He thinks Colvin and Malet must be recalled.... Pembroke writes to John Pollen that the Foreign Office is unbounded in its anger against me. Never mind.... I met Austin Lee, Dilke's secretary, at the Club, and he asked me the latest news from Egypt. I said, 'I hear you are sending a barrel of salt to put on Arabi'stail.' 'No,' he answered with some readiness, 'the salt is to pickle him.' ... Rode in the evening with Cyril Flower (who had married a Rothschild) advised him to sell his Egyptian Bonds.... Dined with Bertram, whom I found much more humane. He believes in Gladstone, and the eventual independence of Ireland. 'Only,' he says, 'Gladstone has the misfortune of being a generation before his age. We shall all believe in attending to our own affairs in another twenty years.'
"Frederic Harrison has written to protest in the 'Pall Mall' against intervention in Egypt." This was a powerful article headed "Money, Sir, Money," which was followed by other letters. I have always regretted that I had not earlier become acquainted with the writer, the soundest and most courageous man on foreign policy then in the Liberal Party, and by far their most vigorous pamphleteer. Had we met a month or two before, I feel sure that he might have prevented the war, for though not in Parliament, he wielded great influence. The misfortune of the public position that Spring was that there was not a single man of great intellectual weight in the party, Harrison excepted, free from official bondage.... "Party at Lady Salisbury's. Talked with Miltown, who was rather angry, I thought, at my handiwork in Egypt, and not quite polite about my telegrams. Also with old Strathnairn, who would like 'to go out with 10,000 men and hang Arabi.' Also with Osman and Kiamil Pashas, the Khedive's cousins, though not about politics.... The Sultan's Commission has arrived in Egypt.
"June 8.—A telegram from Sabunji at Alexandria announcing his arrival. Now I feel relieved from anxiety. He says the Turkish Commission has gone to Cairo.... Harry Brand refuses to come to my lawn-tennis party at Crabbet till he sees how things go at Cairo. I fear he has much of his money in Egypt and will lose it.
"June 9.—There is another letter from Frederic Harrison in the 'Pall Mall.' Wrote to propose to show him my correspondence with Gladstone. Saw the Gregorys. The Commission is hailed with a great flourish of trumpets at Cairo, but we fancy this is only to herald a compromise. Sabunji telegraphs that Arabi has declared publicly he will resist thelanding of Turkish troops. He is still at Alexandria, which disquiets me. He ought to be in Cairo. Dined at Wentworth House to meet Sir Bartle Frere, a soft-spoken, intelligent man.
"June 10.—Luncheon with Mr. and Mrs. Green, very superior and sympathetic about Egypt." (N. B.—This was Green the historian. He was already in failing health. I have a clear recollection of his emotional sympathy with me and with the cause I was pleading. His loss to an honest understanding of statesmanship was a great one.) "I am anxious about things there for the first time for a fortnight. The evening papers announced that Dervish has won—bought over—a part of the army and has proclaimed himself Commander-in-Chief, summoning Arabi to submit. Unless he stands firm now all is lost. After much consideration I have sent the following telegram to Sabunji: '7 p. m. Arrest Commission. Fear not but God.' This partly in cipher. My trouble is lest Sabunji should not have gone to Cairo. Or why does he not telegraph? Can he have come to grief?... Dinner at Lyulph Stanley's where, besides others, we met Bright. I found him most humane about Egypt, and spoke a few words with him, I hope, in season. I spoke my mind pretty freely. It is now a question of boldness on the part of the National Party. I fancy Dervish's orders have been to test this, and, if he finds them determined, to support them. He will crush them, if he can, through the Circassians. But I trust they may crush him, or at any rate frighten him. The Sultan dares not put them down by force.
"June 11, Sunday.—By early train to Crabbet. I was very nervous looking into the papers lest somecoupe de mainshould have been made. But the 'Observer' shows that nothing has yet happened. There are the same stories of Dervish's swagger to the Ulema and the officers. But that is nothing.... At 2 o'clock the Princes Osman and Kiamil and their cousin —— and their alem Aarif Bey and an English bear-leader, one Lemprière, came down to see our horses. While we were showing them these a telegram came in cipher from Sabunji as follows: 'Cairo, 12 p. m., June 10. I have just had an interview with Arabi. He is supported by the Parliament, the University, and the Army, all except Sultan Pasha and the Sheykh el Islam. The nation is decided to depose the Khedive. The Porte dislikes the proposals of Europe. Arabi insists there will be no peace while Malet and Colvin are here. Arabi will resist a Turkish invasion. He will not go to Constantinople. Sheykh Aleysh has been made head of the Azhar. The Porte has decided to depose the Khedive. Malet has urged the proposals of Europe on the Commission. Abdallah Nadim at a public meeting of 10,000 spoke against these proposals and against the Khedive.' If the Khedive's cousins whom we were entertaining could have read it, it would have spoiled their appetites. We have talked the matter over and are going to telegraph them to proclaim a republic in case they depose Tewfik. I am relieved of all anxiety now that I know Sabunji is with them."
In what I here say of Princes Osman and Kiamil I do them less than justice. They had no love for Tewfik, their father Mustafa having been driven out of Egypt and despoiled of much of his possessions by Ismaïl, and they also had a considerable amount of patriotism. At least they gave proof of it during the war when they were among Arabi's strongest adherents. Their sister, Nazli Hanum, did much to help us at the time of the trial. Aarif Bey was a young man of great ability, a Kurd by birth but with Arab blood, well educated and of high distinction. He afterwards became Secretary to Mukhtar Pasha at Cairo, and edited a literary newspaper, but lost himself in intrigues of all kinds and has disappeared. The fourth person on this occasion was a Europeanized Turk and member of the Sultan's household, but his name in my diary is not recorded. We talked Eastern politics, though not Egyptian, freely at dinner, politics of a Pan-Islamic kind which included the hope that France as well as England would sooner or later be driven out of North Africa.
I may here insert a letter I wrote to Sabunji on the 9th, and one I received from him of the same date as his telegram just given.
"10, James Street,June 9, 1882."Your telegram announcing your landing in Egypt relieved me of much anxiety. I hope by this time you are at Cairo and in communication with our friends. I think they cannot do better just now than keep on the best possible terms with the Commissioners. Only I would have them beware of trusting them. I know that great hopes are placed by the enemies of Egypt on Dervish as a man quite unscrupulous in his mode of dealing with rebels. Every effort will be made to get Arabi to go to Constantinople. But this he must not do. They will try to bribe him and persuade him that his going will be for the good of the country. He must not be deluded. It is possible even they may try to arrest or poison him, though I do not think that likely. When, however, they see he stands firm and has got the country with him, they will not quarrel with him. My strong advice to him is that he should make his submission at once to Mohammed Tewfik as the Sultan's viceroy, on condition of retaining his place as Minister of War. If he does this the English and French Governments will have no just cause of quarrel with him; and the European Conference, if it assembles, will not sanction their further intervention. I am sure that our Government will not insist on their Ultimatum as regards Arabi leaving the country. But they and the French are bound to support Tewfik as nominal sovereign of Egypt. It would be very dangerous at the present moment for Arabi to quarrel either with Tewfik or the Sultan. Only let him hold his ground as practical ruler of the country.... People are very angry here with me, but I do not care, so long as Egypt gets her liberty."
"10, James Street,June 9, 1882.
"Your telegram announcing your landing in Egypt relieved me of much anxiety. I hope by this time you are at Cairo and in communication with our friends. I think they cannot do better just now than keep on the best possible terms with the Commissioners. Only I would have them beware of trusting them. I know that great hopes are placed by the enemies of Egypt on Dervish as a man quite unscrupulous in his mode of dealing with rebels. Every effort will be made to get Arabi to go to Constantinople. But this he must not do. They will try to bribe him and persuade him that his going will be for the good of the country. He must not be deluded. It is possible even they may try to arrest or poison him, though I do not think that likely. When, however, they see he stands firm and has got the country with him, they will not quarrel with him. My strong advice to him is that he should make his submission at once to Mohammed Tewfik as the Sultan's viceroy, on condition of retaining his place as Minister of War. If he does this the English and French Governments will have no just cause of quarrel with him; and the European Conference, if it assembles, will not sanction their further intervention. I am sure that our Government will not insist on their Ultimatum as regards Arabi leaving the country. But they and the French are bound to support Tewfik as nominal sovereign of Egypt. It would be very dangerous at the present moment for Arabi to quarrel either with Tewfik or the Sultan. Only let him hold his ground as practical ruler of the country.... People are very angry here with me, but I do not care, so long as Egypt gets her liberty."
I give a letter, somewhat condensed, which was written to me by Sabunji from Cairo on the day of the Alexandrian riot, but before news of it had reached him.
"Cairo,June 11, 1882."On my arrival I called on Arabi Pasha, Mahmud Sami and others who are of the party. They received me with enthusiasm and inquired after you. Mohammed Abdu informed me that he had been told you had been advised by some influential people not to come to Cairo. Arabi overwhelmed me with joy when he saw me. A week before my arrival he addressed a large audience and read them a letter I had written, in which I dwelt upon the necessity of perfect union among themselves...."The situation at present stands thus: In my telegram I told you how we had talked of all that had happened fromthe discovery of the Circassian plot down to the present date. Now Sheykh Aleysh, the great holy man of the Azhar, has issued afetwain which he states that the present Khedive, having attempted to sell his country to the foreigners by following the advice of the European Consuls, is no more worthy of ruling over the Moslems of Egypt. He must therefore be deposed. All the Sheykhs of the Azhar, who consider Sheykh Aleysh as their spiritual head, have accepted thefetwa.... Sheykh Mohammed Khodeyr of the Azhar went with twenty-two Notables to meet Dervish Pasha, and presented him a petition signed by 10,000 persons in which they requested him to reject the proposals of the Powers and depose the Khedive. There are fourteen moudiriehs in Egypt. Only three mudirs are personally opposed to Arabi. The Copt and Arab element of the fellahin unanimously supports him.... Embabeh (Sheykh el Islam), being afraid of both the Khedive and the National Party, keeps aloof, and avoids politics under plea of ill-health. Arabi told me 'he will never yield either to Europe or Turkey. Let them send European, Turkish, or Indian troops, as long as I breathe I will defend my country; and when we are all dead they will possess a ruined country, and we shall have the glory of having died for our native land. Nor is this all. A religious war will succeed the political one, and the responsibility of this will fall on those who provoke it.' He is determined to resist and will not go to Constantinople; Arabi is now supported by the majority of the nation. Nine only of the Deputies are against him. Sultan Pasha has deserted him and joined the Khedive, being frightened by Malet and the arrival of the fleet. He and the Khedive are now looked upon by all the Arab element as traitors.... Deputations from all the provinces came to Dervish requesting the deposition of the Khedive, a fact which it is impossible to explain on the supposition that Arabi compelled them.... Ninety thousand persons have signed petitions to Dervish to reject the proposals of Europe and keep Arabi in office."All the Azhar Sheykhs except Embabeh, el Abbasi, and the Sheykh el Saadat are supporting Arabi, also Abd-el-rahman Bahrawi. Nadim held a large meeting of about 10,000 persons in Alexandria, and spoke against the proposals of Europe, and proved the unfitness of the Khedive to reign. Hebrought proofs from the Koran, the Hadith, and modern history to prove his case and persuade his hearers. Arabi also in an animated speech denounced all the misdeeds of the reigning dynasty from Mohammed Ali down to Tewfik. I have spoken to Abdu, Nadim, and others about soliciting letters and signatures from Notables, Ulema, fellahin, merchants, and others, to be sent to you to prove the reality of the National movement. They agree to get the documents in ten days and I shall send them to you."I have found out that we formed an erroneous idea of Mahmud Pasha Sami. I have had many conversations with him and have got information about him even from his opponents. I find he is one of those who first planned the National movement as long ago as in Ismaïl's time. He suffered a great deal for his liberalism yet stuck to his principles. Several of the leaders of the party, Nadim, Abdu, and even Arabi, confess that they owe their power to his help and constancy. He was tempted by Ismaïl to give up the party, but he refused all money. He spends all his income in doing good to the party, and his house is like a caravanserai. His private life is that of a philosopher, spending little on himself and satisfied with his lot and all that comes. He is not an ignorant man. He is well versed in Arabic literature, better than Arabi, and if he is hated by the Turks it is a proof of his patriotism. He is going to write a letter to Lord Granville to prove the existence of a real National Party in Egypt, and to avow their friendship to England, which they look upon as the champion of liberty, and as a nation which has always taken by the hand people who were struggling for their freedom. I suggested that similar letters from Arabi and Embabeh to Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone would be of use, and I promised to translate the letters and send them to their destination."When it was rumoured that the Sultan intended sending Dervish to urge Arabi to accept the Powers' Ultimatum, Nadim went to Alexandria and held a meeting of about 10,000 persons and spoke for two hours against the Note and suggested that every one in the Assembly should protest against it. Nadim, the new Oracle of Delphi, was cordially obeyed. When the men returned home they taught their wives and children to join them in protesting against the Note. In fact,when Dervish landed, the children were heard shouting in the streets 'el leyha, el leyha,' 'the note, the note,' and from the windows the women called out, 'marfudha, marfudha,' 'reject it, reject it.' Dervish took a lesson from this and changed his colours...."Embabeh, who for a few days showed himself hostile to the National Party for having openly sanctioned the deposition of the Khedive, yesterday made peace with them. But Sultan Pasha has disappointed every one. He has joined the Khedive blindly, frightened by the thought of an European intervention, and being assured by Malet that Arabi would not be suffered to remain in office. Thus the poor old fellow fell into the same snare with Sherif. He is no longer popular, and has got nothing for his change of policy."Another curious event took place yesterday. When Dervish summoned the Ulema to consult about the best measures to be taken for an honourable peace, two of the Ulema only took the Khedive's part. All the rest pleaded the National cause. Dervish was vexed and dissolved the Assembly, decorating the two dissenting Sheykhs, Bahrawi and Abyari. When the result was published in the papers it created a revolutionary movement in the Azhar. I was present at several of the meetings of the Ulema and other persons, and there was general indignation. The Koran and the Hadith were freely quoted, showing the unfitness of Tewfik to rule over a Mussulman community. They were not satisfied, however, with private meetings, but in my presence insisted upon holding a public meeting in the Azhar to protest against the insult inflicted on them. Accordingly the meeting was held in the Azhar Mosque, in the very place where the prayers are made; and Nadim was ordered by the Ulema to address the Assembly, which exceeded four thousand persons. The effect produced by Nadim's oration I have no time to describe. You have seen Nadim and know how eagerly people hear him and how excited they get by his eloquence."
"Cairo,June 11, 1882.
"On my arrival I called on Arabi Pasha, Mahmud Sami and others who are of the party. They received me with enthusiasm and inquired after you. Mohammed Abdu informed me that he had been told you had been advised by some influential people not to come to Cairo. Arabi overwhelmed me with joy when he saw me. A week before my arrival he addressed a large audience and read them a letter I had written, in which I dwelt upon the necessity of perfect union among themselves....
"The situation at present stands thus: In my telegram I told you how we had talked of all that had happened fromthe discovery of the Circassian plot down to the present date. Now Sheykh Aleysh, the great holy man of the Azhar, has issued afetwain which he states that the present Khedive, having attempted to sell his country to the foreigners by following the advice of the European Consuls, is no more worthy of ruling over the Moslems of Egypt. He must therefore be deposed. All the Sheykhs of the Azhar, who consider Sheykh Aleysh as their spiritual head, have accepted thefetwa.... Sheykh Mohammed Khodeyr of the Azhar went with twenty-two Notables to meet Dervish Pasha, and presented him a petition signed by 10,000 persons in which they requested him to reject the proposals of the Powers and depose the Khedive. There are fourteen moudiriehs in Egypt. Only three mudirs are personally opposed to Arabi. The Copt and Arab element of the fellahin unanimously supports him.... Embabeh (Sheykh el Islam), being afraid of both the Khedive and the National Party, keeps aloof, and avoids politics under plea of ill-health. Arabi told me 'he will never yield either to Europe or Turkey. Let them send European, Turkish, or Indian troops, as long as I breathe I will defend my country; and when we are all dead they will possess a ruined country, and we shall have the glory of having died for our native land. Nor is this all. A religious war will succeed the political one, and the responsibility of this will fall on those who provoke it.' He is determined to resist and will not go to Constantinople; Arabi is now supported by the majority of the nation. Nine only of the Deputies are against him. Sultan Pasha has deserted him and joined the Khedive, being frightened by Malet and the arrival of the fleet. He and the Khedive are now looked upon by all the Arab element as traitors.... Deputations from all the provinces came to Dervish requesting the deposition of the Khedive, a fact which it is impossible to explain on the supposition that Arabi compelled them.... Ninety thousand persons have signed petitions to Dervish to reject the proposals of Europe and keep Arabi in office.
"All the Azhar Sheykhs except Embabeh, el Abbasi, and the Sheykh el Saadat are supporting Arabi, also Abd-el-rahman Bahrawi. Nadim held a large meeting of about 10,000 persons in Alexandria, and spoke against the proposals of Europe, and proved the unfitness of the Khedive to reign. Hebrought proofs from the Koran, the Hadith, and modern history to prove his case and persuade his hearers. Arabi also in an animated speech denounced all the misdeeds of the reigning dynasty from Mohammed Ali down to Tewfik. I have spoken to Abdu, Nadim, and others about soliciting letters and signatures from Notables, Ulema, fellahin, merchants, and others, to be sent to you to prove the reality of the National movement. They agree to get the documents in ten days and I shall send them to you.
"I have found out that we formed an erroneous idea of Mahmud Pasha Sami. I have had many conversations with him and have got information about him even from his opponents. I find he is one of those who first planned the National movement as long ago as in Ismaïl's time. He suffered a great deal for his liberalism yet stuck to his principles. Several of the leaders of the party, Nadim, Abdu, and even Arabi, confess that they owe their power to his help and constancy. He was tempted by Ismaïl to give up the party, but he refused all money. He spends all his income in doing good to the party, and his house is like a caravanserai. His private life is that of a philosopher, spending little on himself and satisfied with his lot and all that comes. He is not an ignorant man. He is well versed in Arabic literature, better than Arabi, and if he is hated by the Turks it is a proof of his patriotism. He is going to write a letter to Lord Granville to prove the existence of a real National Party in Egypt, and to avow their friendship to England, which they look upon as the champion of liberty, and as a nation which has always taken by the hand people who were struggling for their freedom. I suggested that similar letters from Arabi and Embabeh to Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone would be of use, and I promised to translate the letters and send them to their destination.
"When it was rumoured that the Sultan intended sending Dervish to urge Arabi to accept the Powers' Ultimatum, Nadim went to Alexandria and held a meeting of about 10,000 persons and spoke for two hours against the Note and suggested that every one in the Assembly should protest against it. Nadim, the new Oracle of Delphi, was cordially obeyed. When the men returned home they taught their wives and children to join them in protesting against the Note. In fact,when Dervish landed, the children were heard shouting in the streets 'el leyha, el leyha,' 'the note, the note,' and from the windows the women called out, 'marfudha, marfudha,' 'reject it, reject it.' Dervish took a lesson from this and changed his colours....
"Embabeh, who for a few days showed himself hostile to the National Party for having openly sanctioned the deposition of the Khedive, yesterday made peace with them. But Sultan Pasha has disappointed every one. He has joined the Khedive blindly, frightened by the thought of an European intervention, and being assured by Malet that Arabi would not be suffered to remain in office. Thus the poor old fellow fell into the same snare with Sherif. He is no longer popular, and has got nothing for his change of policy.
"Another curious event took place yesterday. When Dervish summoned the Ulema to consult about the best measures to be taken for an honourable peace, two of the Ulema only took the Khedive's part. All the rest pleaded the National cause. Dervish was vexed and dissolved the Assembly, decorating the two dissenting Sheykhs, Bahrawi and Abyari. When the result was published in the papers it created a revolutionary movement in the Azhar. I was present at several of the meetings of the Ulema and other persons, and there was general indignation. The Koran and the Hadith were freely quoted, showing the unfitness of Tewfik to rule over a Mussulman community. They were not satisfied, however, with private meetings, but in my presence insisted upon holding a public meeting in the Azhar to protest against the insult inflicted on them. Accordingly the meeting was held in the Azhar Mosque, in the very place where the prayers are made; and Nadim was ordered by the Ulema to address the Assembly, which exceeded four thousand persons. The effect produced by Nadim's oration I have no time to describe. You have seen Nadim and know how eagerly people hear him and how excited they get by his eloquence."
FOOTNOTES:[16]The "Pall Mall" of 28th May, has the following: "Cairo, 27th May, Omar Pasha Lutfi, Sherif Pasha, Ragheb Pasha, and Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Notables, assembled at noon to-day at the Ismaïlia Palace.... The Presidency of the Council will probably be held by Sherif Pasha or Omar Pasha Lutfi.... Omar Pasha Lutfi will be Minister of War."[17]Arabi was probably deterred from taking open action against Omar Lutfi, in part by the strong solidarity there is among Moslems in all quarrels with non-Moslems, in part by his suspicion of the Khedive's complicity, which at first was a suspicion only. He was extremely loath to quarrel with Tewfik at that moment, as he had just been reconciled to him, and only a few days before had sworn to protect his life as he would his own. He preferred therefore, in his language at the time, to attribute the chief blame to Cookson and Sinadino, who truly on their side were not without blame. This will be seen in Sabunji's letters and other documents concerning the riot printed in theAppendix.[18]My diary of 1888 records: "Dec. 22, Cairo. To breakfast with Zebehr Pasha.... He spoke highly of Arabi, and said that he had been present at a conversation, between him and Dervish Pasha, in which Dervish had offered Arabi E£250 a month if he would go to Constantinople. But Arabi had said that, even if he were willing, there were 10,000 men would stand between him and the sea."
[16]The "Pall Mall" of 28th May, has the following: "Cairo, 27th May, Omar Pasha Lutfi, Sherif Pasha, Ragheb Pasha, and Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Notables, assembled at noon to-day at the Ismaïlia Palace.... The Presidency of the Council will probably be held by Sherif Pasha or Omar Pasha Lutfi.... Omar Pasha Lutfi will be Minister of War."
[16]The "Pall Mall" of 28th May, has the following: "Cairo, 27th May, Omar Pasha Lutfi, Sherif Pasha, Ragheb Pasha, and Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Notables, assembled at noon to-day at the Ismaïlia Palace.... The Presidency of the Council will probably be held by Sherif Pasha or Omar Pasha Lutfi.... Omar Pasha Lutfi will be Minister of War."
[17]Arabi was probably deterred from taking open action against Omar Lutfi, in part by the strong solidarity there is among Moslems in all quarrels with non-Moslems, in part by his suspicion of the Khedive's complicity, which at first was a suspicion only. He was extremely loath to quarrel with Tewfik at that moment, as he had just been reconciled to him, and only a few days before had sworn to protect his life as he would his own. He preferred therefore, in his language at the time, to attribute the chief blame to Cookson and Sinadino, who truly on their side were not without blame. This will be seen in Sabunji's letters and other documents concerning the riot printed in theAppendix.
[17]Arabi was probably deterred from taking open action against Omar Lutfi, in part by the strong solidarity there is among Moslems in all quarrels with non-Moslems, in part by his suspicion of the Khedive's complicity, which at first was a suspicion only. He was extremely loath to quarrel with Tewfik at that moment, as he had just been reconciled to him, and only a few days before had sworn to protect his life as he would his own. He preferred therefore, in his language at the time, to attribute the chief blame to Cookson and Sinadino, who truly on their side were not without blame. This will be seen in Sabunji's letters and other documents concerning the riot printed in theAppendix.
[18]My diary of 1888 records: "Dec. 22, Cairo. To breakfast with Zebehr Pasha.... He spoke highly of Arabi, and said that he had been present at a conversation, between him and Dervish Pasha, in which Dervish had offered Arabi E£250 a month if he would go to Constantinople. But Arabi had said that, even if he were willing, there were 10,000 men would stand between him and the sea."
[18]My diary of 1888 records: "Dec. 22, Cairo. To breakfast with Zebehr Pasha.... He spoke highly of Arabi, and said that he had been present at a conversation, between him and Dervish Pasha, in which Dervish had offered Arabi E£250 a month if he would go to Constantinople. But Arabi had said that, even if he were willing, there were 10,000 men would stand between him and the sea."
Such was the state of feeling in the inner circle of the Nationalists at Cairo when the Alexandrian riot occurred. The next day I went up to London in high spirits, carrying with me Sabunji's telegram of the 10th to show to Hamilton. The news of the riot met me at the station.
"June 12.—... Another scare. Riots at Alexandria, Cookson hurt, an officer of the Superb killed, and fifty or sixty Europeans. This has caused great excitement. I am not sure whether it will be for Arabi's advantage or not. It will show he is master of the situation; unless, indeed, it be a trap laid for him by Dervish to get him to go to Alexandria where he might arrest him.... I went to Eddy Hamilton and told him I was now in possession of indisputable knowledge that Arabi commanded the country, also that Tewfik was in great danger of being deposed by the feeling of the country, and that, if they did not want a violent solution of the difficulty, they had better come speedily to terms with him. He promised to repeat all I said to Gladstone. It is evident to me now that they would catch at any compromise which should leave Tewfik on the throne.
"Went down to the House of Commons. Harry Brand asked his father, the Speaker, for a ticket of entrance for the 'rebel Blunt,' and he said, 'he does not deserve one,' but gave it. Dilke answered various questions about Egypt, assuming that Dervish and the Khedive were having it all their own way. This has rather frightened me, for there is a report that Arabi has gone down with Dervish to Alexandria (this proved untrue), and I fear treachery. Sabunji, too, has sent a new telegram as follows: 'I have just seen Arabi. Your message delivered. All quiet. Abdallah Nadim addressed four thousand persons at the Azhar, attacking the Turkish Commissionand the Khedive. The Commission has withdrawn the proposals of Europe, and I hope for peace. The Circassians are intriguing. The Sheykh el Islam has rejoined, Sultan Pasha has not. The riot is nothing.' To this we composed an answer coming down in the train, and sent it from Three Bridges: 'Dervish means mischief, bribery, perhaps murder. Call a public meeting under Nadim and Abdu and the Azhar University, a hundred thousand persons. Let them insist on Dervish's departure. If this is refused let him be arrested by the police and sent away. Make terms with the Khedive. Be careful the Consuls are not molested. Let Nadim be the mover in action. Arabi and the army must stand aloof.' I am far from easy in my mind.
"Had a long conversation before leaving London with Frederic Harrison, who has written again on Egypt to the 'Pall Mall.' I have shown him my letters to Gladstone. He will be of valuable assistance.... Just as we were leaving James Street Lady Malet rushed in wildly, demanding of me the truth of what I had been doing in Egypt. I told her pretty nearly. She said my honour was at stake in clearing myself of the charge of intriguing against my country. She besought me, too, to calm down things there; and I promised to send a message to Arabi not to touch a hair of her son's head. I shall write by to-morrow's mail, and in the meanwhile my telegram will suffice. I do not think he runs the slightest danger. Poor Lady Malet! I am very sorry for her. She told me people said I had been in a conspiracy with Gladstone against her son's policy in Egypt. I assured her that Gladstone was guiltless of my telegrams, and that I accepted the full responsibility of all I had done. She made me promise to come and see her; but—such are the miseries of political life—she looks upon me as Edward's murderer.
"June 13.—I was very nervous all night, expecting to hear that Arabi had been arrested or murdered. But the papers show him to be quite master of the situation. The Khedive is forming a new Ministry, in which Arabi is to be Minister of War as ever. I trust, therefore, he has followed my advice about making terms with Tewfik. Now they have only to get Dervish away, and all will go smoothly."
So thought the majority of the London papers, the "PallMall" almost alone dissenting from this view of a peaceful solution having been arrived at, and its comments, prompted by the Foreign Office, show the animus of our officials and their determination there should not be peace on any terms which should leave the Nationalists in power. Morley thus writes: "It would be difficult to make a greater mistake than that into which the 'Times' has fallen this morning, when it mistakes the temporary and provisional arrangement, entered into by the Khedive, the Consuls-General, Dervish, and Arabi for the preservation of order, for the final settlement of the Egyptian difficulty. The excitement in Egypt is so great that Europeans are in danger of their lives. The only restraining force in the country that can hold the mob in awe is the army, and the army is in the hands of Arabi. For the moment, then, Arabi must be made use of to prevent massacre. But because Dervish holds Arabi responsible with his head for the preservation of order, it no more follows that he has abandoned the intention to re-establish thestatus quothan that England and France have come to terms with Arabi because they insisted he should use his troops to suppress the rioting in Alexandria." We were, however, taken in in England, just as Arabi was taken in at Cairo, by the treacherous truce Malet and Colvin had agreed to, and did not suspect its hollowness. Arabi on that occasion gave his word of honour to Tewfik that, come what might, he would defend his life like his own, and this promise the Khedive, who had nothing but treachery towards him in his heart, accepted and abused to the end.
To continue my journal of that day I find: "Button told me yesterday that Rothschild had offered Arabi £4,000 (one hundred thousand francs) a year for life if he would leave Egypt.[19]... As we went up to London they gave us the following telegram: 'Cairo, June 12th, 11 a. m. I have just seen Arabi, he sends you his salaams. He thinks the European proposals have disappeared and peace is concluded. Arabi master of the situation. Dervish gone. Khedive went to Alexandria. Arabi led him by the arm to the station. National Party triumphant. I worked hard but have triumphed.'... I have been between laughing and crying ever since. I went at once to Downing Street, and told Eddy Hamilton and Horace Seymour what had happened. They seemed to think that now, even at the eleventh hour, Gladstone might acknowledge his errors, or rather Malet's errors, and make peace with Arabi. Button thinks this possible too. But the Foreign Office will harden its heart.... Dined at home and went to a party at the Admiralty. Found the Gregorys and Sir Frederick Goldsmid there, and had some conversation on Egypt with Lord Northbrook. I spoke my mind to him pretty freely. I said, 'It depends entirely upon you now whether there is bloodshed in Egypt or not.'
"June 14.—I am quite worn out. Mrs. Howard, whom I met in the Park, said I looked altered. And in fact I have not had Egypt, sleeping or waking, out of my head since the crisis began.... I spent the morning and breakfasted with Goldsmid, who is going this evening on a special mission to Constantinople, and primed him well with my views, showing him all my Gladstone correspondence." (N. B.—This General Goldsmid was afterwards employed as chief of the Intelligence Department by Wolseley in his campaign. He was a soft-spoken man, whom I had known the year before at Cairo.)... "Had luncheon with Lascelles, who seems to agree with my views about Egypt." (There was some thought, I believe, at that time at the Foreign Office of his being sent out to Cairo to replace Malet, as he already knew Egypt; and on a mission of conciliation he would have done well. Only, unfortunately, none such was decided on.)... "There is confirmation of Sabunji's news in to-day's 'Daily Telegraph.' The other papers look upon the Khedive's and Dervish's flight as caused by their desire to restore order at Alexandria. They say Dervish will put himself at the head of 12,000 men who have been massed there and march against Arabi, who is now alone at Cairo(!).I have telegraphed to Arabi: 'Praise God for victory and peace.'"
This was the last point at which it seemed to me possible that the long game I had been playing against Colvin could be won and war averted. Henceforth it was a losing battle, though I fought it out to the end. The determining cause with Gladstone, in whom alone salvation lay, was, I believe, about this date when certain industrial towns of the North of England protested against the dilatory character of the Government treatment of the Egyptian case, on the ground that the long continuance of the crisis there was injuring trade. This was used upon him as a means of coercion by Chamberlain, egged on by Dilke, in the Cabinet.
"June 15.—I am anxious about the state of things at Alexandria, but suppose Arabi can depend upon his men. There is a general stampede there and at Cairo. Malet, I am thankful to say, has left Cairo. Dervish still hangs on at Alexandria. He and the Khedive have gone to Ras-el-Tin Palace, where they are under the guns of the fleet.... Another telegram from Sabunji as follows: 'The Khedive's departure has aroused suspicion. Agitation. Activity in army preparations. Nadim, Abdu and the army openly defy the Porte. Arabi is moderate and vigilant. A plot to murder Nadim. There is danger of serious disturbance on European side. Dervish declines retiring till the fleet is withdrawn. Recall Malet for God's sake. All curse and will murder him if he continues.' I went at once to Eddy Hamilton and implored him to get Malet ordered on board ship" (this was done) "and afterwards sent him (Hamilton) a letter warning the Government not to count on Turkish troops. We then sent an answer to Sabunji: 'Turkish Commissioner demands troops from Constantinople. They are not likely to be sent. But prepare. Keep order at all costs. Another riot would be fatal. Malet leaves soon. Patience.'... Dined at Lord De la Warr's.... On coming home found the telegraph to Cairo interrupted, by the flight, I suppose, of the Eastern Telegraph clerks. This alarms me a little.
"June 16.—Went to see Button, who is very hopeful. But I am losing my faith in Gladstone and think the English Government means mischief. I gave my Gladstone correspondenceyesterday to Kegan Paul to put in print, so as to have it ready in case of the worst.... My telegram has gone after all.... In low spirits. Another telegram from Sabunji: 'New Commissioner with unknown instructions arrived. Nation and army in counsel daily to devise defensive plans. They distrust the double Commission. Inform me of Gladstone's policy and of Lord Granville's. Arabi is firm. All the journals closed except the "Wattan" and the "Official Journal." Panic among foreigners. The Khedive has thanked Arabi for keeping order. All is quiet. Nadim has been stopped from calling public meetings.'
"Yesterday when I saw Eddy he told me I had better not return to Downing Street as my visits there were remarked on, but to write him any news I might receive. Now I have written him yet another letter to try and find out what Gladstone's policy really is. Eddy's answer, however, is very unsatisfactory. There is a sensational announcement in the 'St. James's Gazette' of British troops ordered to Egypt. Home to Crabbet in a very nervous state. I see that a hurried meeting of the Cabinet was called yesterday in Mr. Gladstone's private room. Can this ordering of troops have been the consequence? I cannot help thinking they mean to push on an intervention. The French, however, have apparently made their peace with Arabi."
Not the French only, but the other European Powers, especially Germany and Austria, were at that moment in a mood to come to terms with him and to sacrifice Tewfik, for the preservation of order's sake. The "Pall Mall Gazette" of 16th June says: "The German Powers are supposed to advocate an arrangement with Arabi on the basis of Tewfik's abdication in favour of his son with a regency.... There are many points in its favour, though 'the solemn obligations of England and France' may make it impossible for them to do otherwise than stand by the man who has implicitly followed their counsels—especially those of the English Representative—it is perfectly conceivable that the practical failure of Tewfik, personal as well as political, may have impressed the other Powers with the expediency of by and by finding some more capable substitute." Compare, too, Malet's despatch of June 14: "The Agents of Austria and Germany have telegraphed to their Governments that the effect of any armed intervention, not excepting Turkish, will place the lives of their countrymen in danger. They consider the political question as a secondary matter compared with the security of their fellow subjects. With this object they are in favour of leaving the matter entirely in the hands of the Porte, and they believe that the only means of avoiding the most serious calamities is the departure from Alexandria of the fleet and myself." Poor Malet at this date, I have heard, spoke to his friends of his professional career as ruined. All depended for him and Colvin on bringing on hostilities.
"June 17.—Very troubled night. But there is no confirmation of the news about the troops in to-day's papers; and the day is so fine, I feel again light-hearted. The Sultan dares not interfere. That is proved. The French have made their terms with Arabi, and it is hinted that Germany and Austria are doing likewise. So England does not matter.
"The following is our party at Crabbet: Ebrington, Lymington, Granny Farquhar, Eddy Hamilton, Dallas (of the Foreign Office), Nigel Kingscote (junior), Button Bourke, and Walter Seymour. News of despatch of troops contradicted. All seems going well. We have agreed to talk nothing about Egypt. But we cannot help it.
"June 18.—Sunday, Waterloo day, and never did England look more foolish. I got a telegram at breakfast announcing a new Ministry under Ragheb and Arabi, evidently consented to by the German Powers and Turkey. We are consequently singing Hallelujahs."
Here I may as well insert three more of Sabunji's letters, which he wrote in these last days. They throw a valuable light on what was passing in the Nationalist mind at Cairo:
"Cairo,June 14, 1882."I called to-day on Arabi Pasha just a few minutes after he received your telegram. We talked for about an hour and a half. I asked him why this panic in the country if he and the Khedive had already come to terms. He said: 'As far as I am concerned I believe the Khedive would be sincere in his dealing with me, if left alone and far from Sir E. Malet's advice. He has by this time become convinced that there is nobody in his Government who could control the country and preserve peace except the man whom European statesmen despise, AhmedArabi. The Khedive has now made peace with me, and in the presence of the Representatives of the six European Powers and of Dervish Pasha, has asked me to take on myself the responsibility of public safety. I have accepted his order, and pledged my word and sworn to defend his life and the lives of all who inhabit Egypt, of every creed and nation; and, as long as I live and my jurisdiction is not interfered with, I will keep my word. But, if this peace is looked upon by others as a fictitious and fraudulent peace, that is the Khedive's lookout. For myself, I am sincere in my dealing with all who deal honestly and sincerely with me; but with those who deal dishonestly I pay them with their own coin, and with the fraudulent I am doubly fraudulent. Time and Ismaïl, in spite of us, have trained us to Turkish deceit. As we make use of the arms, guns and ammunition they left us, so we make use of their deceit,when the Turks force us to do so. We will not be the aggressors, but we will resist all who attempt to attack us. We are a sincere nation, and grateful to those who take us by the hand and help us to reform our country. We wish for nothing except reforms' (he uttered that with emphasis). 'But those who would cheat us will find us the very roots of fraud,sudar el ghish. Europe, and especially England, looks upon us as barbarians. They can crush us, they say, in twenty-four hours. Well, if they are willing, let them try it, but they will lose their 80 millions of public debt and the 20 millions the fellahin privately owe to the bankers. The first shot fired will release us from these engagements; and the nation on this account wishes nothing more than war.'"I hear much the same language from every one. Great preparations are going on. Vast stores of rifles and ammunition have been found, laid up by Ismaïl when he intended to make himself independent of the Porte. These they will make good use of. But I tell them I hope there will be no occasion. They say they can resist for years, for God has blessed them with a crop this summer twice as great as in ordinary fertile years."I sounded Arabi about Halim. I found him to prefer Halim to Tewfik, but he says that if Tewfik will only free himself from Malet's influence all will go well. Malet, he says, has been misled by Colvin, and has done immense harm to hisown country, as well as Egypt, by their misrepresentation of facts."June 17.—Last night I went to Shereï Pasha's, where Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Abd-el-Aal, Ali Fehmi, Nadim, Hajrasi and many others were being entertained at dinner. After they had dined and we were smoking and talking politics, an officer came in with a letter from an English lady asking protection, as she had been advised to leave Cairo. I was begged to write her an answer at once to assure her there was no danger, and that if there should be trouble Arabi would protect her life as his own. Arabi has become a hero with many of the European ladies, whom I have heard praising him for the protection he has given. When he drives through the town all rush to the windows and balconies. I make converts to the National Party, all I can, among the Europeans I meet."June 18.—Yesterday at noon, on Ragheb being telegraphed as Prime Minister, I went to see Arabi, who read me a telegram just received from the Khedive requesting him to co-operate with Ragheb as Minister of War. After coffee had been served he wrote a telegram of thanks to the Khedive and handed it to me. It was very politely worded. A few minutes afterwards he said: 'Let us go for a drive through the town to inspire confidence in the minds of the people.' He and Ali Fehmi drove in one carriage, and I and Nadim in the other. We went through Faggala, preceded by heralds. We alighted at Embabeh's house (the Sheykh el Islam's), and Arabi said, 'Come in, I will introduce you to our Pope.' On entering the reception room Arabi took off his boots, and turning to me said, 'We consider this place as the holy abode of our Sheykh.' Accordingly I did the same. On entering, the Sheykh, who was sitting on a low divan, rose and advanced a few paces towards Arabi, who saluted him and kissed his hands. I only shook hands with him, and he invited us to take seats. There were several of the Azhar Sheykhs with him, among them the son of Arusi. At first they talked about the situation and the new Ministry. Then the conversation turned on Embabeh's dealings with the Khedive during the late events. From all I saw I conclude that the report of a coolness having taken place between Embabeh and Arabi was not true. While Embabeh was concluding his narrative coffee was served, and Arabi introduced meformally to him, and explained that I was a friend of Mr. Blunt. Embabeh then explained to me all about the telegram. He had written the answer, he said, with his own hand, thinking the telegram addressed to him; but he had never apologized to the Khedive about it. He believes Sir E. Malet heard of it originally through Sultan Pasha, or some of the Khedive's adherents."Next Arabi showed Embabeh a proclamation he had made guaranteeing the lives and properties of all the inhabitants of Egypt, whatever their creed or nation, and Arabi begged him to write a similar one, showing, as Sheykh el Islam, that the Mohammedan religion, far from allowing, forbids Moslems to hurt Christians, Jews, or others, and commands the faithful to protect them. Embabeh agreed to this, and, in my presence and that of the other four Sheykhs, prayed God to help him to succeed in reforming the country. He also promised to help him in fostering peace between Mohammedans and others, inasmuch as all were brothers notwithstanding the diversity of creeds."We then went on to Artin Bey's, where also we were entertained with great honour, and afterwards drove through the Clot Bey Road, the Mouski, and other parts of the town, while the people stood on both sides saying, 'May God exalt you.'"At the end of the drive Arabi told me he was invited to dine with Seyd Hassan Akkad, and took me with him, with all the pashas, officers, sheykhs, and Ulemas. Our host's large house was crowded; Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Ahmed Pasha, Abdu, Nadim, and I were in the principal sitting-room, where we recited poetry, making or composing elegies and satires, and amusing ourselves at Ragheb's expense. Arabi composed a satire, Abdu two, Nadim made four, and Sami two. At dinner I sat by Arabi. The courses were about thirty different Arab dishes, besides the European and Eastern cakes, sweetmeats and fruit."After dinner we talked freely about politics, and about different plans and forms of government. The republican form was preferred; and Mahmud Sami, who displayed great knowledge and ingenuity, endeavoured to show the advantage of a republican government for Egypt. He said: 'From the beginning of our movement we aimed at turning Egypt into a small republic like Switzerland—and then Syria would have joined—and then Hejaz would have followed us. But we found some of the Ulema were not quite prepared for it and were behind our time. Nevertheless we shall endeavour to make Egypt a republic before we die. We all hope to see the "Saturnia regna" once more.'"June 19.—Abdu, Nadim, Sami, and I were talking the night before last about the peaceful means to be taken to tide over the Egyptian difficulty. Abdu said that he has made up his mind to get together all the documents he has in his possession, with others concerning Egyptian affairs, and go to England and depose them himself before Mr. Gladstone and the English Parliament. He would take also with him a worthy person as representative of the leading merchants of the land; and another who would represent the liberal fellahin. Mahmud Sami approved the idea, and said he also wished he could go to Europe on such a mission, and Abdu is already preparing for the journey. So is Nadim and Seyyid Hassan Moussa el Akkad, the leading Arab merchant of Cairo, a man of considerable wealth, influence, and patriotism."Ragheb is made Prime Minister, but his policy being Turkish nobody is pleased with him except the Circassians. People suspect some Ottoman intrigue in the matter and are very uneasy. I am trying to calm their minds and tell them to keep quiet."The last events have increased the hatred in the Arab heart against the Turks, Circassians, and the Sultan himself. I heard Sami and Abdu and Nadim curse the Sultans and all the Turkish generation from Genjis Khan to Holagu and down to Abdul Hamid. They are preparing the nation for a republican form of government. A large party is already formed and disposed;crescit eundo. They will seize upon the first occasion which presents itself. They expect the armed intervention of Turkish troops with pleasure in this last crisis. It would have been the signal for a complete independence from the Porte. But the cunning Turk saw the danger and abstained. Nadim told me yesterday, while we were coming from Shubra, that he must, before he dies, crush down the Sultan's throne. —— said: 'This is my aim too—may God help us to succeed.'"I must tell you that I have been received here with such honour, respect, and politeness as I never could dream of. Allthe pashas, colonels, sheykhs, merchants receive me with open arms, and lavish upon me their kindness and hearty thanks. We have arranged with Nadim to give a dinner party to all the leaders of the National Party in your honour, and to thank you for the help given them in their struggle."
"Cairo,June 14, 1882.
"I called to-day on Arabi Pasha just a few minutes after he received your telegram. We talked for about an hour and a half. I asked him why this panic in the country if he and the Khedive had already come to terms. He said: 'As far as I am concerned I believe the Khedive would be sincere in his dealing with me, if left alone and far from Sir E. Malet's advice. He has by this time become convinced that there is nobody in his Government who could control the country and preserve peace except the man whom European statesmen despise, AhmedArabi. The Khedive has now made peace with me, and in the presence of the Representatives of the six European Powers and of Dervish Pasha, has asked me to take on myself the responsibility of public safety. I have accepted his order, and pledged my word and sworn to defend his life and the lives of all who inhabit Egypt, of every creed and nation; and, as long as I live and my jurisdiction is not interfered with, I will keep my word. But, if this peace is looked upon by others as a fictitious and fraudulent peace, that is the Khedive's lookout. For myself, I am sincere in my dealing with all who deal honestly and sincerely with me; but with those who deal dishonestly I pay them with their own coin, and with the fraudulent I am doubly fraudulent. Time and Ismaïl, in spite of us, have trained us to Turkish deceit. As we make use of the arms, guns and ammunition they left us, so we make use of their deceit,when the Turks force us to do so. We will not be the aggressors, but we will resist all who attempt to attack us. We are a sincere nation, and grateful to those who take us by the hand and help us to reform our country. We wish for nothing except reforms' (he uttered that with emphasis). 'But those who would cheat us will find us the very roots of fraud,sudar el ghish. Europe, and especially England, looks upon us as barbarians. They can crush us, they say, in twenty-four hours. Well, if they are willing, let them try it, but they will lose their 80 millions of public debt and the 20 millions the fellahin privately owe to the bankers. The first shot fired will release us from these engagements; and the nation on this account wishes nothing more than war.'
"I hear much the same language from every one. Great preparations are going on. Vast stores of rifles and ammunition have been found, laid up by Ismaïl when he intended to make himself independent of the Porte. These they will make good use of. But I tell them I hope there will be no occasion. They say they can resist for years, for God has blessed them with a crop this summer twice as great as in ordinary fertile years.
"I sounded Arabi about Halim. I found him to prefer Halim to Tewfik, but he says that if Tewfik will only free himself from Malet's influence all will go well. Malet, he says, has been misled by Colvin, and has done immense harm to hisown country, as well as Egypt, by their misrepresentation of facts.
"June 17.—Last night I went to Shereï Pasha's, where Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Abd-el-Aal, Ali Fehmi, Nadim, Hajrasi and many others were being entertained at dinner. After they had dined and we were smoking and talking politics, an officer came in with a letter from an English lady asking protection, as she had been advised to leave Cairo. I was begged to write her an answer at once to assure her there was no danger, and that if there should be trouble Arabi would protect her life as his own. Arabi has become a hero with many of the European ladies, whom I have heard praising him for the protection he has given. When he drives through the town all rush to the windows and balconies. I make converts to the National Party, all I can, among the Europeans I meet.
"June 18.—Yesterday at noon, on Ragheb being telegraphed as Prime Minister, I went to see Arabi, who read me a telegram just received from the Khedive requesting him to co-operate with Ragheb as Minister of War. After coffee had been served he wrote a telegram of thanks to the Khedive and handed it to me. It was very politely worded. A few minutes afterwards he said: 'Let us go for a drive through the town to inspire confidence in the minds of the people.' He and Ali Fehmi drove in one carriage, and I and Nadim in the other. We went through Faggala, preceded by heralds. We alighted at Embabeh's house (the Sheykh el Islam's), and Arabi said, 'Come in, I will introduce you to our Pope.' On entering the reception room Arabi took off his boots, and turning to me said, 'We consider this place as the holy abode of our Sheykh.' Accordingly I did the same. On entering, the Sheykh, who was sitting on a low divan, rose and advanced a few paces towards Arabi, who saluted him and kissed his hands. I only shook hands with him, and he invited us to take seats. There were several of the Azhar Sheykhs with him, among them the son of Arusi. At first they talked about the situation and the new Ministry. Then the conversation turned on Embabeh's dealings with the Khedive during the late events. From all I saw I conclude that the report of a coolness having taken place between Embabeh and Arabi was not true. While Embabeh was concluding his narrative coffee was served, and Arabi introduced meformally to him, and explained that I was a friend of Mr. Blunt. Embabeh then explained to me all about the telegram. He had written the answer, he said, with his own hand, thinking the telegram addressed to him; but he had never apologized to the Khedive about it. He believes Sir E. Malet heard of it originally through Sultan Pasha, or some of the Khedive's adherents.
"Next Arabi showed Embabeh a proclamation he had made guaranteeing the lives and properties of all the inhabitants of Egypt, whatever their creed or nation, and Arabi begged him to write a similar one, showing, as Sheykh el Islam, that the Mohammedan religion, far from allowing, forbids Moslems to hurt Christians, Jews, or others, and commands the faithful to protect them. Embabeh agreed to this, and, in my presence and that of the other four Sheykhs, prayed God to help him to succeed in reforming the country. He also promised to help him in fostering peace between Mohammedans and others, inasmuch as all were brothers notwithstanding the diversity of creeds.
"We then went on to Artin Bey's, where also we were entertained with great honour, and afterwards drove through the Clot Bey Road, the Mouski, and other parts of the town, while the people stood on both sides saying, 'May God exalt you.'
"At the end of the drive Arabi told me he was invited to dine with Seyd Hassan Akkad, and took me with him, with all the pashas, officers, sheykhs, and Ulemas. Our host's large house was crowded; Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Ahmed Pasha, Abdu, Nadim, and I were in the principal sitting-room, where we recited poetry, making or composing elegies and satires, and amusing ourselves at Ragheb's expense. Arabi composed a satire, Abdu two, Nadim made four, and Sami two. At dinner I sat by Arabi. The courses were about thirty different Arab dishes, besides the European and Eastern cakes, sweetmeats and fruit.
"After dinner we talked freely about politics, and about different plans and forms of government. The republican form was preferred; and Mahmud Sami, who displayed great knowledge and ingenuity, endeavoured to show the advantage of a republican government for Egypt. He said: 'From the beginning of our movement we aimed at turning Egypt into a small republic like Switzerland—and then Syria would have joined—and then Hejaz would have followed us. But we found some of the Ulema were not quite prepared for it and were behind our time. Nevertheless we shall endeavour to make Egypt a republic before we die. We all hope to see the "Saturnia regna" once more.'
"June 19.—Abdu, Nadim, Sami, and I were talking the night before last about the peaceful means to be taken to tide over the Egyptian difficulty. Abdu said that he has made up his mind to get together all the documents he has in his possession, with others concerning Egyptian affairs, and go to England and depose them himself before Mr. Gladstone and the English Parliament. He would take also with him a worthy person as representative of the leading merchants of the land; and another who would represent the liberal fellahin. Mahmud Sami approved the idea, and said he also wished he could go to Europe on such a mission, and Abdu is already preparing for the journey. So is Nadim and Seyyid Hassan Moussa el Akkad, the leading Arab merchant of Cairo, a man of considerable wealth, influence, and patriotism.
"Ragheb is made Prime Minister, but his policy being Turkish nobody is pleased with him except the Circassians. People suspect some Ottoman intrigue in the matter and are very uneasy. I am trying to calm their minds and tell them to keep quiet.
"The last events have increased the hatred in the Arab heart against the Turks, Circassians, and the Sultan himself. I heard Sami and Abdu and Nadim curse the Sultans and all the Turkish generation from Genjis Khan to Holagu and down to Abdul Hamid. They are preparing the nation for a republican form of government. A large party is already formed and disposed;crescit eundo. They will seize upon the first occasion which presents itself. They expect the armed intervention of Turkish troops with pleasure in this last crisis. It would have been the signal for a complete independence from the Porte. But the cunning Turk saw the danger and abstained. Nadim told me yesterday, while we were coming from Shubra, that he must, before he dies, crush down the Sultan's throne. —— said: 'This is my aim too—may God help us to succeed.'
"I must tell you that I have been received here with such honour, respect, and politeness as I never could dream of. Allthe pashas, colonels, sheykhs, merchants receive me with open arms, and lavish upon me their kindness and hearty thanks. We have arranged with Nadim to give a dinner party to all the leaders of the National Party in your honour, and to thank you for the help given them in their struggle."
"Cairo,June 22."Last night I went to Mahmud Sami's house, where I met all our friends and the Pashas and many other of the leaders. We talked politics all night, and I communicated to them the contents of your letters received to-day by Brindisi. I also gave them a summary of the English newspapers you and Lady Anne had sent me. Afterwards I presented to Mahmud Sami, in the presence of Nadim, a petition on the part of the National Party, in which they ask Mr. Gladstone to send to Egypt a Consul who understands the affairs of their country. Sami approved the petition and said they will have it signed when Arabi Pasha comes back to Cairo and present it to Mr. Gladstone through you. At the end of thesoiréeI was informed that Sir E. Malet has for the fourth time urged Tewfik to arrest Abdu, Nadim, Mahmud Sami, and myself."June 23.—As soon as Ragheb Pasha was confirmed by the Khedive as Prime Minister, his first act and order was to call me to Alexandria with Nadim. On Monday night the Under-Secretary sent his carriage to my hotel with his man, who informed me that Hassan Pasha Daramalli wished to see me, and had sent his carriage. I went with Nadim, not trusting myself to go alone. When we got there we were received courteously, and afterwards he informed me that Ragheb Pasha had charged him with a message that he wished me to go and meet him at Alexandria at the Divan of the Administration. I replied 'very well,' and Nadim said he, too, would go with me. And so we left the house with the firm intention of having nothing to do with Ragheb."Thus at the very time I was telegraphing to you, 'for God's sake save Malet or he will be murdered by fanatics,' he was urging the Khedive to arrest me. Often, when hot-headed young Egyptians were discussing Malet and Colvin's death, I endeavoured to convince them of their folly, and that no possible good result could come of it to the National cause."June 24.—Mahmud Pasha Fellaki, who had deserted theNational cause on account of his not having received a place in Mahmud Sami's Ministry, has now been reconciled and has received from Arabi the post of Minister of Public Works."
"Cairo,June 22.
"Last night I went to Mahmud Sami's house, where I met all our friends and the Pashas and many other of the leaders. We talked politics all night, and I communicated to them the contents of your letters received to-day by Brindisi. I also gave them a summary of the English newspapers you and Lady Anne had sent me. Afterwards I presented to Mahmud Sami, in the presence of Nadim, a petition on the part of the National Party, in which they ask Mr. Gladstone to send to Egypt a Consul who understands the affairs of their country. Sami approved the petition and said they will have it signed when Arabi Pasha comes back to Cairo and present it to Mr. Gladstone through you. At the end of thesoiréeI was informed that Sir E. Malet has for the fourth time urged Tewfik to arrest Abdu, Nadim, Mahmud Sami, and myself.
"June 23.—As soon as Ragheb Pasha was confirmed by the Khedive as Prime Minister, his first act and order was to call me to Alexandria with Nadim. On Monday night the Under-Secretary sent his carriage to my hotel with his man, who informed me that Hassan Pasha Daramalli wished to see me, and had sent his carriage. I went with Nadim, not trusting myself to go alone. When we got there we were received courteously, and afterwards he informed me that Ragheb Pasha had charged him with a message that he wished me to go and meet him at Alexandria at the Divan of the Administration. I replied 'very well,' and Nadim said he, too, would go with me. And so we left the house with the firm intention of having nothing to do with Ragheb.
"Thus at the very time I was telegraphing to you, 'for God's sake save Malet or he will be murdered by fanatics,' he was urging the Khedive to arrest me. Often, when hot-headed young Egyptians were discussing Malet and Colvin's death, I endeavoured to convince them of their folly, and that no possible good result could come of it to the National cause.
"June 24.—Mahmud Pasha Fellaki, who had deserted theNational cause on account of his not having received a place in Mahmud Sami's Ministry, has now been reconciled and has received from Arabi the post of Minister of Public Works."
(Sabunji then describes the crisis preceding Mahmud Sami's resignation, Arabi's appeal to the Sultan, Dervish's mission and Osman Bey's mission, and how they flattered Abdul Hamid with professions of zeal for the Caliphate.) "As to their real convictions, however, they care for Abdul Hamid as much as they would care for a man in the moon. They would make use of him as long as he can be useful to them and until they are strong enough to declare themselves an independent republic. This has been the basis of their program from the beginning. But they have prudently chosen to proceed by degrees. Mahmud Pasha Sami assured me in Nadim and Abdu's presence that before they die they must declare themselves independent of the Porte, and Egypt a republic. Nadim's efforts are employed to instill this idea in the minds of the young generation. Since I came here I and Nadim have been together night and day. We sit talking and devising plans till one or two every morning. We mix in every society. Sheykhs, Ulemas, Notables, merchants, and officers receive us with open arms, and we talk to them of your endeavours and of the service which you have rendered to the National cause. They all long to see you and present you with their hearty thanks. Indeed, people so good and sincerely kind deserve every attention and help."
I am not able to fix an exact date to the moment when Gladstone finally hardened his heart against the Egyptians and resolved on military operations—he persuaded himself that it would not be war—but it must have been some time between the 20th June and the end of the month. The considerations that seem to have decided him were, first, of course, parliamentary ones. His Whig followers were on the point of a revolt, and Chamberlain was pressing him with tales of the impatience of the provinces. The diplomatic defeat of the Foreign Office was becoming too plain to be concealed. Granville, with his little maxims of procrastination and using a threat as if it were a blow, had "dawdled it out" in Egypt till England had become the laughing-stock of Europe. On the Stock Exchange things were looking badly and trade was suffering from the long crisis.What were called the "resources of civilization," that is to say, lying, treachery and fraud, had been tried by the Foreign Office to more than their extreme limit, and one and all had proved absolutely of no use against the Nationalist obstinacy. Arabi had been ordered by all the majesty of England to leave Egypt, and he had not gone. On the contrary he had gained an immense reputation throughout the Mohammedan East at England's expense. It seemed to many that there would be a Pan-Islamic revolt in India. England, as I had said on Waterloo day, had never looked so foolish. Serious officials were alarmed at this, and all the jingoism of the Empire, asleep since Disraeli's parliamentary defeat in 1880, was suddenly awake and crying for blood. Mr. Gladstone hardened his heart and let his conscience go, not, I think, by any deliberate decision saying that this or that should be done, but simply by leaving it to the "departments," and to the "men on the spot," that is to say, the Admiralty, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and Colvin (for Malet had been withdrawn) to work out a solution their own way. We had won our diplomatic game against the Foreign Office too thoroughly. It was to be the turn now of England's fighting forces.
"June 19.—A Stock Exchange scare of Bright and Chamberlain having resigned" (a scare which showed the ignorance of the public as to Chamberlain's position, classing him still with Bright).
"June 20.—A more reasonable article in the 'Daily News.' Frederic Harrison strongly advises me to write Gladstone a public letter and have it printed. He is prepared to answer for its effect in the provinces. I have accordingly begun one.
"June 21.—Finished my letter and took it to the Howards for approval. He (George Howard) made me modify some sentences, so as not to compromise Gladstone personally. She warmly approved. Frank Lascelles was there. I then arranged with Button to publish it tomorrow, or Friday at latest, and sent it in to Gladstone.
"June 22.—To Button early. We think they mean mischief after all. Harry Brand writes that if the French hold out on the Note the Government mean to act in Egypt, notwithstanding Germany. I doubt, however, if France is prepared for this. I shall follow up my letter (to Gladstone) with other letters, ifnecessary. I am certain that if England lands troops anywhere in Egypt, the Sultan will proclaim a Jehad and that the Mussulmans will rise in India. Things are in a pretty pass."
My letter to Gladstone appeared in the "Times" on the following day, 23rd June, the very day the Conference met at Constantinople. It created a great sensation. It stands thus:
"June 21st, 1882."Sir,"The gravity of the present situation in Egypt, and the interests of honour and advantage to the English nation which are there engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the subject of the diplomatic steps which have led to this imbroglio, and to put on record certain facts which, in the case of any new departure taken by the Powers at the approaching Conference, should not be lost sight of."You are aware, sir, that during the past winter I was engaged as mediator in a variety of unofficial but important negotiations carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin on the one hand, and the chiefs of the National Egyptian party on the other, negotiations in which I engaged my personal honour to the loyalty of Her Majesty's agents; also that I have been in close communication with those chiefs since my return to England, and that I am consequently in a position to speak with certainty and authority as to the character and intentions of the popular movement in Egypt. You know, moreover, that I have from time to time warned Her Majesty's Government of the danger they were running from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have repeatedly urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid understanding with those in whose hands the guidance of the movement lay. Finally, you know that in the interests of right and justice, and in accordance with a promise made by me to the Egyptians, I have counselled them to the best of my ability in the recent crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to come to that settlement of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik, at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon myself a great responsibility, but one which, I think, the event has already justified."The main points in the past which I would state are these:"1. In the month of December last I assisted the NationalParty to publish a program of their views, which was just and liberal, and to which they have since rigidly adhered. At this time, and down to the publication of the Dual Note of the 8th of January, the Egyptians had no quarrel whatever with England or the English. Neither had they any real quarrel with the Khedive or the Control, trusting in these to permit the development of political liberty in their country in the direction of Parliamentary and constitutional self-government. Their aim was, and is, the resumption by Egypt of her position as a nation, the redemption of her debt, and the reform of justice. They trusted then, as now, to the army, which was and is their servant, to secure them these rights, and to their Parliament to secure them these ends; and they were prepared to advance gradually, and with moderation, in the path they had traced."2. The Dual Note, drawn up by M. Gambetta with the view of making England a partner of his anti-Mussulman policy and understood by the Egyptians as the first step in a policy analogous to that recently pursued in Tunis, changed this confidence into a sentiment of profound distrust. Instead of awing them, it precipitated their action. It caused them to insist upon the resignation of Sherif Pasha, whom they suspected of the design to betray them, and to assist with the Khedive in summoning a Nationalist Ministry to office. This insistence, though represented by the English journals as the work of the army, was, in fact, the work of the nation through their representatives the Notables. Of this I can furnish ample evidence."3. The unexpected fall of M. Gambetta prevented the execution of the threat of armed intervention implied by the Dual Note. Nevertheless, a plan of indirect intervention was persisted in. The English and French Controllers-General protested against the Constitution granted by the Khedive on the 6th of February, and the English and French Governments carefully withheld their assent to it, signifying only that the Article, giving to the Egyptian Parliament the right of voting that half of the Budget which was not affected to the payment of the Debt, was an infringement of international engagements. Their argument for this, based on certain firmans of the Porte, and certain decrees of the Khedive, has been constantly denied by the Egyptians."4. Acting, it must be presumed, in accordance with theirinstructions, the English agents at Cairo have for the past three months set themselves steadily to work to bring about a revolution counter to the will of the people and the liberties granted to them by the Viceroy. The English Controller-General, though a paid agent of the Egyptian Government, has not scrupled to take part in this; and the English Resident Minister has spared no pains to create a quarrel between the Khedive and his Ministers. The Controller-General, sitting in council with the Ministers as their official adviser, has withheld his advice, counting, it would seem, on the mistakes likely to be made by men new to office, and noting these in silence. The English press correspondents, hitherto held in check by the Resident, have been permitted full license in the dissemination of news injurious to the Ministry, and known to be false. I will venture to recall to you some of the scares reported at this time and disseminated through Europe—the scare of banditti in the Delta; the scare of the Bedouin rising; the scare of revolt in the Soudan; the scare of an Abyssinian war; the scare of huge military expenditure; the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes, of the resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of the irrigation works, of danger to the Suez Canal; the scare of Arabi Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismaïl, of Halim, and of the Sultan."For some of these a very slight foundation may have existed in fact; for most there was no foundation whatsoever."On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville, by Arabi Pasha's request, on this subject, and pointed out to him the danger caused to peace in Egypt through the attitude of the English agents urging that a Commission should be sent to Cairo to examine into Egyptian grievances."In the month of April advantage was taken by the English and French Consuls-General of the discovery of a plot to assassinate the National Ministry, and traced by these to an agent of Ismaïl Pasha's, to induce the Khedive to put himself in open opposition to his Ministers. Those implicated in the plot and condemned to banishment were men of position, Turks and Circassians, and as such of the same race and society with the Khedive and he was unwilling to ratify their sentence, and suffered himself to be persuaded to refuse his signature. This led to the rupture which the previous diplomatic action of theConsuls-General had prepared. A summons was then sent by Mahmud Sami Pasha to the Deputies to come to Cairo and decide between the Ministers and the Khedive, and the Deputies came. Sultan Pasha, however, through jealousy, refused to preside at any formal sitting; and advantage was again taken of the circumstance by the Consuls-General to encourage all who were in opposition to the National Party to rally round the Khedive. A section of the rich Egyptians, fearing disturbance, sided with the Circassians, and the Consuls-General, deceived by appearances, ventured acoup de main. Anultimatum, dictated by them, was sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the resignation of the Ministry and Arabi Pasha's departure from the country. The step for an instant seemed to have succeeded, for the Ministry resigned. It became, however, immediately apparent that the feeling of the country had been miscalculated by our diplomacy, and Arabi, by the manifest will of the nation, returned next day to power."I cannot understand that the action of our Consul-General in this matter was justified by any principle of Liberal policy; it has certainly not been justified by success."6. When the Fleet was ordered to Alexandria, I endeavoured to convey a warning, as my private opinion, based upon all I had witnessed last winter of the temper of the Egyptian people, that the presence of English men-of-war at that moment in the port of Alexandria, especially if their crews should be allowed on any pretence to land, would be exceedingly likely to provoke a serious disturbance and it was my intention to go myself to Egypt to do what I could towards mitigating what I feared would be the results."7. About the same time the English Government consented to the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo. It was supposed that the authority of the Sultan was so great in Egypt that obedience would be shown to whatever orders his representative might bring, or that, at any rate, little opposition would be offered. In any case, the Porte was authorized to act in its own way. Dervish Pasha was sent; and it is lamentable to record that the English Foreign Office at that time seems to have counted mainly on the fact that he was a man notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have reason to know that what was expected of him was, that heshould summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople; that, failing this, he should have recourse to bribery; and that in the extreme resort, he should arrest or shoot the Minister of War as a mutineer with his own hand. Whether these were really Dervish Pasha's instructions or intentions I will not argue. The Porte seems to have been as little prepared as Her Majesty's Government were for the strength of the National feeling in Egypt; and only the union and courage shown by the people would seem to have convinced the Sultan that methods such as those formerly used by Dervish against the Albanians would here be out of place. Humaner counsels have in any case prevailed, and peace has been recommended between the Khedive and his people."Such, sir, is shortly the history of England's diplomatic action in Egypt during the past six months. It is one of the most deplorable our Foreign Office has to record. The future, however, in some measure remains to us, though, when the Conference assembles, England's will be only one of many voices raised in the settlement. It is not for me to suggest the words which should there be spoken; but I will venture to express my conviction that if Her Majesty's representative then comes forward with an honest confession of the mistakes made, and a declaration of England's sympathy with Egyptian freedom, England will regain her lost ground. In spite of the just anger of the Egyptians at the unworthy tricks which have been played upon them by our Foreign Office, they believe that a more generous feeling exists in the body of the English nation, which would not suffer so vast a public wrong to be committed as the subjugation of their country for a misunderstood interest in Egyptian finance and in the Suez Canal. They have, over and over again, assured me, and I know that they speak truly, that their only aim is peace, independence, and economy; and that the Suez Canal cannot be better protected for England, as for the rest of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian people into the comity of nations. Only let the hand of friendship be held out to them freely, and at once, and we shall still earn their gratitude."I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,"Wilfrid Scawen Blunt."
"June 21st, 1882.
"Sir,
"The gravity of the present situation in Egypt, and the interests of honour and advantage to the English nation which are there engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the subject of the diplomatic steps which have led to this imbroglio, and to put on record certain facts which, in the case of any new departure taken by the Powers at the approaching Conference, should not be lost sight of.
"You are aware, sir, that during the past winter I was engaged as mediator in a variety of unofficial but important negotiations carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin on the one hand, and the chiefs of the National Egyptian party on the other, negotiations in which I engaged my personal honour to the loyalty of Her Majesty's agents; also that I have been in close communication with those chiefs since my return to England, and that I am consequently in a position to speak with certainty and authority as to the character and intentions of the popular movement in Egypt. You know, moreover, that I have from time to time warned Her Majesty's Government of the danger they were running from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have repeatedly urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid understanding with those in whose hands the guidance of the movement lay. Finally, you know that in the interests of right and justice, and in accordance with a promise made by me to the Egyptians, I have counselled them to the best of my ability in the recent crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to come to that settlement of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik, at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon myself a great responsibility, but one which, I think, the event has already justified.
"The main points in the past which I would state are these:
"1. In the month of December last I assisted the NationalParty to publish a program of their views, which was just and liberal, and to which they have since rigidly adhered. At this time, and down to the publication of the Dual Note of the 8th of January, the Egyptians had no quarrel whatever with England or the English. Neither had they any real quarrel with the Khedive or the Control, trusting in these to permit the development of political liberty in their country in the direction of Parliamentary and constitutional self-government. Their aim was, and is, the resumption by Egypt of her position as a nation, the redemption of her debt, and the reform of justice. They trusted then, as now, to the army, which was and is their servant, to secure them these rights, and to their Parliament to secure them these ends; and they were prepared to advance gradually, and with moderation, in the path they had traced.
"2. The Dual Note, drawn up by M. Gambetta with the view of making England a partner of his anti-Mussulman policy and understood by the Egyptians as the first step in a policy analogous to that recently pursued in Tunis, changed this confidence into a sentiment of profound distrust. Instead of awing them, it precipitated their action. It caused them to insist upon the resignation of Sherif Pasha, whom they suspected of the design to betray them, and to assist with the Khedive in summoning a Nationalist Ministry to office. This insistence, though represented by the English journals as the work of the army, was, in fact, the work of the nation through their representatives the Notables. Of this I can furnish ample evidence.
"3. The unexpected fall of M. Gambetta prevented the execution of the threat of armed intervention implied by the Dual Note. Nevertheless, a plan of indirect intervention was persisted in. The English and French Controllers-General protested against the Constitution granted by the Khedive on the 6th of February, and the English and French Governments carefully withheld their assent to it, signifying only that the Article, giving to the Egyptian Parliament the right of voting that half of the Budget which was not affected to the payment of the Debt, was an infringement of international engagements. Their argument for this, based on certain firmans of the Porte, and certain decrees of the Khedive, has been constantly denied by the Egyptians.
"4. Acting, it must be presumed, in accordance with theirinstructions, the English agents at Cairo have for the past three months set themselves steadily to work to bring about a revolution counter to the will of the people and the liberties granted to them by the Viceroy. The English Controller-General, though a paid agent of the Egyptian Government, has not scrupled to take part in this; and the English Resident Minister has spared no pains to create a quarrel between the Khedive and his Ministers. The Controller-General, sitting in council with the Ministers as their official adviser, has withheld his advice, counting, it would seem, on the mistakes likely to be made by men new to office, and noting these in silence. The English press correspondents, hitherto held in check by the Resident, have been permitted full license in the dissemination of news injurious to the Ministry, and known to be false. I will venture to recall to you some of the scares reported at this time and disseminated through Europe—the scare of banditti in the Delta; the scare of the Bedouin rising; the scare of revolt in the Soudan; the scare of an Abyssinian war; the scare of huge military expenditure; the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes, of the resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of the irrigation works, of danger to the Suez Canal; the scare of Arabi Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismaïl, of Halim, and of the Sultan.
"For some of these a very slight foundation may have existed in fact; for most there was no foundation whatsoever.
"On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville, by Arabi Pasha's request, on this subject, and pointed out to him the danger caused to peace in Egypt through the attitude of the English agents urging that a Commission should be sent to Cairo to examine into Egyptian grievances.
"In the month of April advantage was taken by the English and French Consuls-General of the discovery of a plot to assassinate the National Ministry, and traced by these to an agent of Ismaïl Pasha's, to induce the Khedive to put himself in open opposition to his Ministers. Those implicated in the plot and condemned to banishment were men of position, Turks and Circassians, and as such of the same race and society with the Khedive and he was unwilling to ratify their sentence, and suffered himself to be persuaded to refuse his signature. This led to the rupture which the previous diplomatic action of theConsuls-General had prepared. A summons was then sent by Mahmud Sami Pasha to the Deputies to come to Cairo and decide between the Ministers and the Khedive, and the Deputies came. Sultan Pasha, however, through jealousy, refused to preside at any formal sitting; and advantage was again taken of the circumstance by the Consuls-General to encourage all who were in opposition to the National Party to rally round the Khedive. A section of the rich Egyptians, fearing disturbance, sided with the Circassians, and the Consuls-General, deceived by appearances, ventured acoup de main. Anultimatum, dictated by them, was sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the resignation of the Ministry and Arabi Pasha's departure from the country. The step for an instant seemed to have succeeded, for the Ministry resigned. It became, however, immediately apparent that the feeling of the country had been miscalculated by our diplomacy, and Arabi, by the manifest will of the nation, returned next day to power.
"I cannot understand that the action of our Consul-General in this matter was justified by any principle of Liberal policy; it has certainly not been justified by success.
"6. When the Fleet was ordered to Alexandria, I endeavoured to convey a warning, as my private opinion, based upon all I had witnessed last winter of the temper of the Egyptian people, that the presence of English men-of-war at that moment in the port of Alexandria, especially if their crews should be allowed on any pretence to land, would be exceedingly likely to provoke a serious disturbance and it was my intention to go myself to Egypt to do what I could towards mitigating what I feared would be the results.
"7. About the same time the English Government consented to the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo. It was supposed that the authority of the Sultan was so great in Egypt that obedience would be shown to whatever orders his representative might bring, or that, at any rate, little opposition would be offered. In any case, the Porte was authorized to act in its own way. Dervish Pasha was sent; and it is lamentable to record that the English Foreign Office at that time seems to have counted mainly on the fact that he was a man notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have reason to know that what was expected of him was, that heshould summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople; that, failing this, he should have recourse to bribery; and that in the extreme resort, he should arrest or shoot the Minister of War as a mutineer with his own hand. Whether these were really Dervish Pasha's instructions or intentions I will not argue. The Porte seems to have been as little prepared as Her Majesty's Government were for the strength of the National feeling in Egypt; and only the union and courage shown by the people would seem to have convinced the Sultan that methods such as those formerly used by Dervish against the Albanians would here be out of place. Humaner counsels have in any case prevailed, and peace has been recommended between the Khedive and his people.
"Such, sir, is shortly the history of England's diplomatic action in Egypt during the past six months. It is one of the most deplorable our Foreign Office has to record. The future, however, in some measure remains to us, though, when the Conference assembles, England's will be only one of many voices raised in the settlement. It is not for me to suggest the words which should there be spoken; but I will venture to express my conviction that if Her Majesty's representative then comes forward with an honest confession of the mistakes made, and a declaration of England's sympathy with Egyptian freedom, England will regain her lost ground. In spite of the just anger of the Egyptians at the unworthy tricks which have been played upon them by our Foreign Office, they believe that a more generous feeling exists in the body of the English nation, which would not suffer so vast a public wrong to be committed as the subjugation of their country for a misunderstood interest in Egyptian finance and in the Suez Canal. They have, over and over again, assured me, and I know that they speak truly, that their only aim is peace, independence, and economy; and that the Suez Canal cannot be better protected for England, as for the rest of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian people into the comity of nations. Only let the hand of friendship be held out to them freely, and at once, and we shall still earn their gratitude.
"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,"Wilfrid Scawen Blunt."