Chapter 12

of wealthThe saintly givers; such their kingly trust.

of wealthThe saintly givers; such their kingly trust.

of wealthThe saintly givers; such their kingly trust.

of wealth

The saintly givers; such their kingly trust.

Observe that to do so is kingly. For there are, as among men, so among daemons, degrees of excellence, and in some subsists still some slight, faint, almost excremental remnant of passion and absence of reason; in others this is strong and hard todo away, its traces and symbols being in many places preserved and sporadically found in sacrifices and rites and tales of wonder.|C|

XIV. ‘Now as to the mystic rites, in which the most evident and transparent indication may be had of the truth about daemons, “peace be upon my lips”, as Herodotus[153]says. Feasts and sacrifices, days sinister and gloomy, so to call them, when are meals of raw flesh, and rendings and fastings and beaten breasts, and in many places unholy spells over the sacrifices:

Whoopings wild, and cries of frenzy, necks together tossed in air,[154]

Whoopings wild, and cries of frenzy, necks together tossed in air,[154]

Whoopings wild, and cries of frenzy, necks together tossed in air,[154]

Whoopings wild, and cries of frenzy, necks together tossed in air,[154]

all these, I would say, belong to no God, but are modes of appeasement and soothing to avert bad daemons. The human sacrifices which used to be performed were neither asked for nor accepted by Gods, we cannot believe it; yet kings and|D|captains would not have endured to give up their own children by way of initiating the rites, or to cut their throats, without a purpose; it was to soothe and satisfy the heavy displeasure of beings cruel and hard to be moved, or in some cases their frantic low passions, worthy of tyrants, when bodily approach was impossible or not desired. As Hercules besieged the town of Oechalia for the sake of a maiden, so strong and violent daemons, requiring in vain a human soul still enveloped in the body, bring pestilences to cities and sterility of land, and stir up wars and seditions, until they succeed in getting that on which their affection is set. Some have fared otherwise;|E|thus in a long stay in Crete I came to know of an absurd festival observed there: the headless form of a man is shown, and you are told that this was Molus, father of Meriones, who assaulted a maiden and was found without a head.

XV. ‘Now all the crimes of violence, all the wanderings of Gods, all tales of hiding, banishment, servitude, which are|F|said or sung in myth or hymn, are adventures which happenednot to Gods but to daemons, and are recorded to show their excellence or power; Aeschylus[155]was wrong when he wrote

Apollo pure, the God exil’d from heav’n,

Apollo pure, the God exil’d from heav’n,

Apollo pure, the God exil’d from heav’n,

Apollo pure, the God exil’d from heav’n,

and so was the Admetus in Sophocles[156]wrong:

Mine was the cock who called him to the mill.

Mine was the cock who called him to the mill.

Mine was the cock who called him to the mill.

Mine was the cock who called him to the mill.

Widest of the truth of all are the theologians of Delphi, who, thinking that a battle once took place here between the God and a serpent for the possession of the oracle, allow poets and speech-writers contending in the theatres to tell these stories,|418|expressly belying their own most sacred rites.’ Philippus, the historian, who chanced to be present, here expressed surprise, and asked: ‘What rites such competitors belied?’ ‘Those relating to the oracle,’ was the reply, ‘whereby the city, admitting to initiation those from here to Tempe has now banished all Greeks dwelling beyond Thermopylae.[157]For the booth set up afresh every nine years near the court of the temple is not like any den or serpent’s haunt, but is an imitation of the dwelling of a tyrant or king. And the assault made upon it in silence through what they call “Dolon’s Way”, by|B|which the Aeolidae bring the boy, both of whose parents are living, with lighted torches, put fire to the booth, overturn the table, and then flee through the gates of the temple without turning back; and lastly the wanderings of the boy and his servile offices, and the purification rites at Tempe, all convey a suspicion of some great crime of shocking audacity. For it is quite absurd, my friend, that Apollo, after killing a beast, should flee to the extremities of Greece in quest of purification, and then should pour libations there and do all which men do to|C|appease and soften the wrath of daemons (fiends and avengers as they are called, because they pursue the memories of oldunforgotten stains). The story which I once heard about that flight and removal is strangely absurd and surprising; but if there be any truth in it, let us never believe that what passed about the oracle in these old times was any trifling or ordinary matter. However, fearing to seem to do what Empedocles describes:

Stringing sundry myths, nor ever keeping to a single path,

Stringing sundry myths, nor ever keeping to a single path,

Stringing sundry myths, nor ever keeping to a single path,

Stringing sundry myths, nor ever keeping to a single path,

I will ask you to allow me to affix the proper conclusion to my first tale, for we have just reached it. Many have said it before|D|us; let us dare to say it now. When the daemons who have to do with oracles and prophecies fail, all such things fail too, and lose their force if the daemons flee or shift their place; then, if they return after an interval, the things speak aloud, like instruments of music when those who can play them are present to play.’

XVI. When Cleombrotus had finished, Heracleon spoke: ‘There is no profane or uninitiated person present, no one who holds views about the Gods discordant with our own; but let us keep jealous watch on ourselves, Philippus, lest without our own knowledge we assume strange and even monstrous|E|hypotheses.’ ‘Well said,’ answered Philippus, ‘but what shocks you specially in what Cleombrotus is advancing?’ ‘That the oracles should be administered,’ said Heracleon, ‘not by Gods, who may well be quit of earthly concerns, but by daemons, assistants of the God, seems to me a not unfair assumption; but then to pluck, I had almost said by the handful, out of the verses of Empedocles, sins, infatuations, and God-inflicted wanderings, and to fasten them upon these daemons, and to suppose that in the end they die like men, this I do think a somewhat bold and barbarian view.’ Here Cleombrotus|F|asked Philippus who and whence the young man was, and, after learning his name and city, said: ‘No, Heracleon, it is by no means “without our own knowledge” that we have reachedstrange propositions; but in discussing great matters it is not possible to attain what is probable in opinion without starting from great premisses. But you, though you do not know it yourself, are taking back what you grant. You allow that there are daemons; but when you require that they should not be faulty|419|nor yet mortal, it is no longer daemons that you retain. For in what do they differ from Gods if as to their being they are immortal, and as to virtue are passionless and impeccable?’

XVII. As Heracleon remained silent and in deep thought, he went on: ‘Faulty daemons come to us not from Empedocles only, but from Plato and Xenocrates and Chrysippus; yes, and Democritus,[158]when he prays to meet “fair-falling phantoms”, shows that he knew of others which were disagreeable, with definitely vicious intentions and impulses. As to death in such beings, I have heard a story from a man who was no fool or|B|romancer. Some of you have heard Aemilianus the orator; Epitherses was his father, my fellow-townsman and teacher in grammar. He said that he was once on a voyage to Italy, and embarked on board a ship carrying cargo and many passengers. It was already evening when the breeze died down off the Echinades Islands; and the ship drifted till it was near Paxi. Most on board were awake, and many still drinking after supper. Suddenly a voice was heard from the island of Paxi; some one was calling Thamus in a loud voice, so that they all wondered.|C|Thamus was an Egyptian pilot, not even known by name to many of the passengers. Twice he was called, and remained silent; the third time he paid attention to the caller, who raised his voice and said: “When you reach the Palodes, tell them that Great Pan is dead.” Hearing this, Epitherses said, all were in consternation, and began discussing with one another whether “it were better to do as was ordered, or to refuse to meddle and to let it be. They decided in the end that, if there werea breeze, Thamus should sail past quietly, but if there should be calm about the place, he should hail, and report. When he was off the Palodes, as there was neither wind nor wave,|D|Thamus at the helm looked to land and repeated the words he had heard: “Great Pan is dead.” He had no sooner done this than a great groaning was heard, proceeding not from one but from many, mingled with cries of wonder. As there were many present, the story was soon spread in Rome, and Thamus was sent for by Tiberius Caesar, who so entirely credited the story, that he caused inquiry to be made about Pan. The scholars, of whom there were many round him, conjectured that he was the son born of Hermes and Penelope.’[159](Philippus|E|was able to produce several witnesses from the company who had heard the old Aemilianus.)

XVIII. Demetrius told us that, among the islands near Britain, many were deserted and lay scattered (Sporades), some of them bearing the names of daemons and demigods. He himself, by the Emperor’s command, made a voyage of inquiry and observation to the nearest of the deserted islands, which had a few inhabitants, all sacred persons and never molested by the Britons. Just after his arrival, there was a great confusion in the atmosphere, many portents from the sky with gusts of wind and fiery blasts. When these calmed|F|down, the islanders said that ‘one of the mightier ones has ceased to be.’ For as a lamp when lighted, so they explained, has no unpleasant effect, but when extinguished is disagreeable to many people, so it is with great souls: their kindling into life is easy and free from pain; their extinction and death often breed winds and tempests, ‘such as you see now’, and infect the air with pestilence and sickness. They added that there is one island in particular where Cronus is a prisoner, being guarded in his sleep by Briareus; for sleep has been devised to bea chain to bind him, and there are many daemons about him as satellites and attendants.[160]

XIX. Cleombrotus spoke next: ‘I have stories of the same|420|kind which I might tell; but it is enough for our hypothesis that there is nothing which actually contradicts it or makes such things impossible. Yet we know’, he continued, ‘that the Stoics not only hold the view which I am advancing with|B|reference to daemons, but also recognize one out of the great multitude of Gods who is eternal and immortal; the others, they think, have come into being, and will perish. From the flouts and laughter of the Epicureans, which they venture to employ against Providence also, calling it a mere myth, we have nothing to fear. We maintain that their “Infinity” is a myth; so many worlds, not one of which is governed by divine reason, all produced spontaneously, and so subsisting. If it be permissible to laugh in speaking of Philosophy, we may laugh at the dumb, blind, soulless images which they shepherd during countless cycles of years, to reappear and anon return in all directions, some issuing from bodies still living, some|C|from those long ago burned or rotted. Thus they drag into physiology cyphers and shadows; yet if one asserts that daemons exist not in physical nature only, but as matter of theory, able to remain in being for long periods of time, they show irritation.’

XX. When these views had been stated, Ammonius spoke: ‘I think’, he said, ‘the dictum of Theophrastus was right. For what prevents our accepting a view which is dignified and highly philosophical? To disallow it is to reject many things possible but incapable of positive proof; to allow it is not[161]necessarily to import many which are impossible and|D|baseless. However, the only argument which I have heard theEpicureans employ against the daemons as introduced by Empedocles, that, if they are faulty and liable to sins, they cannot be blessed beings and long-lived, because vice implies much blindness and a liability to destructive accidents, is a foolish one. For, on this showing, Epicurus will be a worse man than Gorgias the sophist, and Metrodorus than Alexis the writer of comedies. For Alexis lived twice as long as Metrodorus, and Gorgias more than a third as long again as Epicurus. It is in another sense that we call virtue strong and|E|vice weak, not with regard to the duration or dissolution of body. Look at the lower animals: many which are sluggish in limb and dull in spirit, loose or disorderly in habits, live longer terms than the sensible and ingenious. Hence the Epicureans do wrong in ascribing the immortality of God to the caution and resistance which he opposes to destructive forces. No, the immunity from suffering and death should be laid in the nature of the blessed being, and should imply no trouble on his part. Perhaps, however, it is inconsiderate to argue against persons not present. It is now for Cleombrotus to resume his|F|argument lately interrupted, about the migration and exile of the daemons.’

XXI. Then Cleombrotus: ‘Very well; I shall be surprised, however, if it does not appear to you much stranger than what we have already said. Yet its basis lies in Nature, and Plato struck the note, not stating his view in plain terms, but as an obscure theory, cautiously throwing out a hint in enigmatical form; for all which even he has been met with a great outcry|421|from the other philosophers. Now since we are here with a bowl in our midst of mingled myths and theories—and where should a man meet with kinder listeners before whom to try theories as foreign coins are tried?—I do not hesitate to give you the benefit of the story of a certain outlandish man. It was after many wanderings and after paying heavy search fees, that I found him at last with difficulty, and enjoyed his conversationand kindly welcome. It was near the Red Sea, where once every year he associated with men, spending the rest of his time, as he used to say, with nomad nymphs and deities. He was the handsomest man I ever saw, and kept free from sickness|B|of any sort, treating himself once a month with the medicinal and bitter fruit of a grass. He was practised in the use of many tongues; to me he would mostly use a Doric, which was very nearly a song. While he was speaking, there was a fragrance in all the place from the sweet breath passing out of his mouth. His general learning and information were with him all the time; but one day in every year he was inspired with prophecy, and would then go down to the sea and foretell the future; potentates and secretaries of kings would come to visit him and then go away. He used to refer prophecy to daemons;|C|he paid the greatest attention to Delphi, and there were none of the stories told of Dionysus, or of the rites performed here, of which he had not heard. But he would say that all those stories belonged to mighty sufferings of daemons, and among them this of the Python; only that his slayer was not exiled for nine years nor to Tempe, but was turned out into another universe, returning thence after nine revolutions of the Great Year, purified and “Phoebus” indeed, to resume possession of the oracle, which had been guarded in the meanwhile by Themis. That the stories of the Typhons and Titans were|D|similar; there had been battles of daemons against daemons, followed by banishment of the defeated or expiation of offenders by a God, for instance, Typhon is said to have sinned against Osiris, and Cronus against Uranus; deities whose honours have become dim or been altogether forgotten since they were removed to another universe. Thus I hear that the Solymi, who dwell near the Lycians, hold Cronus in special honour; but when he had slain their princes, Arsalus, Dryus, and Trosobius, he was banished and removed (whither theycannot say). So he passed out of account, but Arsalus and his fellows are called “stern Gods”, and the Lycians publicly|E|and in private make execrations in their names. Many stories like these may be had out of theological collections.’ ‘But if we call certain daemons by the recognized names of Gods,’ the stranger said, ‘it should be no wonder, for to whatever God each has been assigned, to share his power and honour, after him he likes to be called; even as among ourselves one is “of Zeus”, one “of Athena”, one “of Apollo,” one “of Dionysus”, one “of Hermes”; only some have by accident been rightly called, most have received names quite inappropriate,|F|misapplied names of Gods.’

XXII. Here Cleombrotus paused. All present found his story a marvellous one, but Heracleon asked how it bore upon Plato, and in what sense he had given the note. ‘You perfectly remember’, said Cleombrotus, ‘that he rejected, on the face of it, an infinity of worlds, but felt a difficulty as to|422|a limited number, and was ready to go up to five,[162]thus conceding probability to those who assume one world for each element, but himself keeping to one. This appears to be peculiar to Plato, the other philosophers[163]regarding with horror any plurality, because, if you do not limit matter to one world, when you pass outside unity you arrive at once at an unlimited and perplexing infinity.’ ‘But did your stranger’, I asked, ‘limit the number of worlds as Plato does, or did you neglect to find this out when you were with him?’ ‘Was it|B|likely,’ said Cleombrotus, ‘when he graciously put himself at my disposal? On these points, if on nothing else, I was, of course, an attentive and eager listener. What he said was that there is not an infinite number of worlds, nor yet one, nor yet five, but one hundred and eighty-three, arranged in a triangle with sixty worlds in each side. Of the three left over, each isplaced at one angle. Each world keeps a light touch on its neighbours while they revolve as in a dance. The area inside the triangle is the common hearth of all, and is called the “Plain of Truth”, and within it the formulae, and ideas, and patterns,|C|of things which have been and things which are, lie undisturbed. Eternity is around them, and from it, like a stream drawn off from it, Time passes to the worlds. Once in ten thousand years human souls, if they have lived good lives, are allowed to see and inspect this sight; and the best of the initiations performed here are a dream of that review and that initiation. In our philosophical discourses we are working on the memory of the fair things which are seen there, or else our discourse is vain. This’, he said, ‘is the tale I heard from him; he spoke as a man does in the mystery of an initiation, and offered no demonstration or evidence.’

XXIII. I turned to Demetrius: ‘How’, I said, ‘do the|D|lines about the Suitors run, where they wondered to see Ulysses handling the bow?’ When he had remembered them, ‘Just’, I said, ‘what it comes into my head to say about your stranger:

Surely the rogue some pilfering expert is[164]

Surely the rogue some pilfering expert is[164]

Surely the rogue some pilfering expert is[164]

Surely the rogue some pilfering expert is[164]

in doctrines and theories from everywhere. He had travelled widely in letters, and he was no Barbarian, but a Greek steeped deeply in Greek learning. The number of his worlds proves it against him, for it is not Egyptian nor yet Indian, but Dorian of Sicily, and comes from a man of Himera named Petron.|E|His own pamphlet I never read and I do not know whether it is extant; but Hippys of Rhegium, mentioned by Phanias of Eresus, records it as his view or theory that there are one hundred and eighty-three worlds all in touch with one another “by elements”, whatever that may mean; he gives no further explanation or proof of any sort.’ ‘What proof could there be’, broke in Demetrius, ‘in matters of that sort,where Plato, without a word to make it reasonable or likely, simply laid down his theory?’ ‘And yet’, said Heracleon,|F|‘we hear you grammarians referring the view to Homer,[165]on the ground that he distributes the whole into five worlds, Heaven, Water, Air, Earth, Olympus. Two of these he leaves “common”, namely, Earth with all the lower portion of the whole, Olympus with all the upper. The three in the middle have been allotted to the three Gods. So also Plato,[166]apparently assigning to the different aspects of the whole the bodily forms|423|and figures which are the most beautiful and the first, spoke of five worlds, one each for earth, water, air, fire, but kept for last that which includes the others, the world of the Dodecahedron, an expansible and versatile body, and assigned to it the figure which suits the psychical periods and movements.’ Demetrius said: ‘Why not let sleeping Homers lie for the present? We have had enough of myths. But as to Plato, he is very far from calling the five different aspects of the world five worlds; and, where he is combating those who assume an infinite number, states his own opinion that this is the only one, and is the sole creation of God and beloved by him, brought into being|B|out of the corporeal whole, entire, complete, and self-sufficing. Hence it may appear strange that he should himself state the truth, yet supply to others the fundamental principle of a view which is improbable and irrational. To give up the defence of a single world was in a sort to grant the assumption of the infinity of the whole. To make the definite number of worlds five, neither more nor less, was quite against reason and removed from all probability. Unless’, he added, turning to me, ‘you have anything to say?’ ‘It seems to me’, I said, ‘to come to this, that you have now dropped our discussion about oracles, as concluded, and are taking up a fresh one of equal|C|importance.’ ‘We have not dropped the old one,’ said Demetrius, ‘only we do not decline the new when it fastens on us. Forwe do not mean to linger upon it, only to touch on it sufficiently to ask how far it is probable; then we will return to the original subject.’

XXIV. ‘In the first place then,’ I said, ‘the reasons which prevent the making of an infinite number of worlds do not prevent the making of more worlds than one. It is possible that both prophecy and a Providence may find place in several worlds, and that the intrusion of Chance may be very small, while most things, and those the greatest, observe order in|D|their origin and their transition, none of which suppositions is consistent with Infinity. In the next place, it is most consonant with reason that God should not have made the world a sole creation and left it to itself. For, being perfectly good, he is lacking in no virtue, least of all in the virtues of Justice and Friendliness, for these are most beautiful and becoming Gods. Now it is the nature of God to have nothing which is idle or without use. Therefore there are other Gods and worlds outside, towards which he exercises the social virtues; for Justice, or Gratitude, or Benevolence, cannot be exercised towards himself or any part of himself, it must be towards|E|others. So it is not likely that this world should toss about in the infinite void without friends, without neighbours, without communication; since we see Nature herself wrapping up individuals in classes and species, as though in jars or seed-vessels. There is nothing in the whole list of things which has not some common formula, nor can anything be called by a distinctive name which does not possess, generically or individually, certain qualities.[167]But the world is not spoken of as possessing generic qualities; it has qualities then as an individual, which distinguish it from others akin to and resembling itself. For|F|if there is not in the world such a thing as one man, one horse,one star, one God, one daemon, what is to prevent there being in Nature not one world, but several? If any one says that Nature has one earth and one sea, he fails to see the obvious fact of similar parts. For we divide earth into parts, all with one common name, and sea likewise. But a part of the world is no longer a world; it is composed of parts naturally different.

XXV. ‘Again, the chief fear which has led some to use|424|up the whole of matter on our world, that nothing may be left outside to disturb its coherence by resistance or thrusts, is a needless one. For suppose several worlds, to each of which is apportioned its own being, and matter definitely measured and limited, then nothing will be left outside without place or formation, like an extruded remnant, to put pressure from without. For the law which has control of the matter allotted to each world will not allow anything to be thrust out and wander to strike upon another world, or anything from another to strike its own, because Nature admits neither quantity without limit, nor movement without law and arrangement.|B|Or, even if any stream be drawn off and pass from worlds to other worlds, it must needs be homogeneous and kindly, mingling itself mildly with all, as the stars when they blend their rays. And the worlds themselves must have delight, as they gaze on one another in friendliness, and must also provide for the Gods in each, who are many and good, times of intercourse and common cheerfulness. There is nothing impossible in all this, no fairy tale and no paradox; unless, mark me, the views of Aristotle[168]are to bring it into suspicion on physical grounds. For if each body has its own place, as he says it has, earth must necessarily move towards the centre|C|from every side, and the water rest upon it, underlying the lighter elements because of its weight. If, then, there are many worlds, the result will be that earth is in many places abovefire and air, and in many below them; and the same with air and water too, which will be here in natural places, there in unnatural. Which being impossible, as he thinks, there must neither be two worlds nor more than two, but this one only, composed of all matter, and established according to Nature and to the several qualities of matter.

XXVI. ‘However, all this is more plausible than true. Look at it in this way,’ I went on, ‘dear Demetrius: when|D|he says that some bodies move downward towards the middle, others upwards from the middle, others around the middle, with reference to what does he take the middle? Not to the void surely, for on his view there is none. But in the view of those who allow a void, it has no middle, just as it has no first or last, for these are limits, but the infinite has no limits. Or if a man were to force himself, by sheer thinking, to conceive any middle point in an infinite void, what is the resulting difference in the movements of the different bodies towards it? Bodies have no force in the void, nor yet have bodies any choice or impulse to make them aim at the middle and tend towards it from all sides. Besides, where there are bodies with|E|no soul, and a place which is incorporeal and without difference of parts, it is as impossible to conceive of any movement towards it arising out of themselves, as of any attraction upon them arising out of it. It remains that the middle is spoken of not in a local sense but in a corporeal. For granted that this world has unity of structure with many dissimilar elements, the different parts have necessarily different movements towards different objects. This is clear from the consideration|F|that different elements, where their substance is transferred, change their places at the same time; rarefaction distributes in a circular movement the matter raised upwards from the middle; consolidation and condensation press matter downward towards the middle and force it together.

XXVII. ‘On this subject more words are needless here. Whatever you assume to be the effective cause of these vicissitudes and changes, it will hold each world together within itself. Each world has earth and sea, each has a middle point|425|of its own, its own vicissitudes and changes of the bodies upon it, and a nature and a force which preserve everything and keep it in its place. As for what is outside, whether it be nothing or an infinite void, it presents no middle point, as we have said; while, if there be many worlds, each has a middle point of its own, and therefore a special movement of bodies to or from or about that middle (to follow the distinction made by these thinkers). To insist that, where there are many middle points, weights press from all sides to one, is as though we should insist that, whereas there are many men, the blood from all should flow together into a single vein, and the brains of all be enveloped in a single pia mater; and to make it a grievance|B|that all hard bodies in nature should not be together in one place, and all rarefied bodies in another. That would be preposterous, and equally so to complain that wholes should have their parts disposed in their natural order within each of them. It might be absurd to call that a world which has a moon low down[169]within it, like a man with his brain lodged in his ankles or his heart in his temples. But to make several independent worlds, and then to differentiate the parts in sets to follow their wholes, and so divide them, is not absurd. Earth,|C|sea, and heaven will be in their natural and proper arrangement within each. Above, below, around, middle have no relation to another world or to the outside, each world has them all in and for itself.

XXVIII. ‘As to the “stone” which some assume to be outside the world, it is not easy to form a conception of it, either as at rest or in motion. For how is it either to remain at rest,being weighty, or to move towards the world, like other heavy bodies, being no part of it nor reckoned in with its substance? Earth embraced in another world, and attached to it, need cause|D|no difficulty, when it does not part from the whole because of its weight, and shift hitherwards, since we see the natural strain by which each of the parts is held in its place. For if we look, not to the world but outside it, to get our conception of “below” and “above”, we shall find ourselves in the same difficulties as Epicurus, who made all his atoms move to places under our feet, as though either the void had feet, or infinite space permitted us to conceive of “above” or “below” within itself! Hence, again, we must feel surprise at Chrysippus, or indeed be quite at a loss as to what possessed him to say that the world has been settled “in the middle”, and that its substance, having occupied this middle place from all eternity,|E|works therewith for permanence and in fact for indestructibility. These are his words in the Fourth Book of his work on “Things Possible”, where he falsely dreams of a middle of the infinite, and assigns, still more preposterously, to that non-existent middle the cause of the stability of the world; and yet he had often said in other works, that substance is controlled and maintained by the movements towards and away from its own middle point.

XXIX. ‘Then as to the other arguments of the Stoics, who can find them alarming? They ask how we are to keep one Destiny and one Providence if there are many worlds, and whether we shall not have many “Diès” and many “Zenès”.|F|In the first place, if it is absurd that we should have Zeus in the plural number, surely their scheme will be far more absurd; for they make, in the revolutions of infinite worlds, sun, moon, Apollo, Artemis, Poseidon, all multiplied to infinity. Then, what makes it necessary that there should be many “Diès”, if there are more worlds than one, rather than one principal God the emperor of the whole, possessing intelligence andreason, sovereign in each world, such a one as he who is called with us lord and father of all? Or what is to prevent all worlds|426|from being subject to the Destiny and Providence of Zeus, and that he should overlook and control each in turn, supplying to each the principles, the seeds, the formulae of all which is brought about? It cannot be that here we often have a single body composed of diverse bodies, as an assembly, an army, a choir, each of whose component bodies has life, thought, apprehension (and this is the view of Chrysippus), and yet that it should be impossible that in the Whole there should be ten worlds or fifty, or a hundred, all based on a common|B|formula, and ranged under a single principle. Nay, such a disposition is altogether worthy of Gods. We have not to make them sovereigns of a hive out of which they never pass; to guard, nor to enclose or imprison them in matter, which is what the Stoics do when they make the Gods atmospheric phases, or powers of the waters or the fire, infused therein, brought into being with their world and again burnt up with it, not leaving them unattached or free, as charioteers or steersmen might be; but rather, as statues are nailed or soldered to their bases, shut into the corporeal and clamped thereto, to share with it till there come destruction and general dissolution and change.

XXX. ‘Yet the other theory is loftier and more magnificent,|C|that the Gods are masterless and self-controlled, as the Tyndaridae when they help sailors in storm.

They visit them, the waves they bindBy soothing pow’r, and tame the wind,

They visit them, the waves they bindBy soothing pow’r, and tame the wind,

They visit them, the waves they bindBy soothing pow’r, and tame the wind,

They visit them, the waves they bind

By soothing pow’r, and tame the wind,

not going on board themselves to share the peril, but appearing from above and delivering men; even so the Gods visit the worlds, now one and now another; drawn on by joy as they contemplate, and steering each in its natural course.|D|For the Zeus of Homer[170]had not very far to carry his eye from Troy to the parts of Thrace, and the wandering tribes about the Ister; but the real Zeus has beautiful passages and becoming to himself among worlds more than one, not looking out upon an infinite void, nor having his mind intent upon himself and nothing else (as was the view of some), but surveying many works of Gods and men, and movements and periodic orbits of stars. The divine nature is no foe to changes, but takes much delight in them, if we may judge from the bodies which|E|appear in the heavens, their changes and periods. Now Infinity is altogether without feeling or reason; it has no room to admit a God, all goes by chance and spontaneously. But the Providence which cares for worlds defined and limited in number appears to me to involve nothing less dignified or more laborious than that which has entered a single body, and attached itself thereto, to refashion or shape it anew in infinite particulars.’

XXXI. Having said so much, I paused. Philippus, after a short interval, went on: ‘Whether the truth about these|F|things be so, or not, I could not, for my own part, assert with confidence. But if we are to force the God outside one world, why make him the artificer of five worlds and no more; and what is the bearing of that number on the plurality of worlds? I would rather be informed on this point than as to the inner meaning of the consecration of the letter “E” in this place. That letter is neither triangle, nor square, nor “perfect”, nor cubic, nor has it any other apparent elegance for those who love and admire such things. The process out of the elements, at which the Master obscurely hinted, is hard to grasp|427|in every respect, and shows none of that probability which must have drawn him on to say that it is likely that out of five solid bodies having equal angles and equal faces and enclosed byfigures of equal area, when set into matter, the same number of perfect worlds was at once produced.’

XXXII. ‘Yes,’ said I, ‘yet Theodorus of Soli seems to treat the argument very fairly, in expounding the Mathematics of Plato. This is his method: the Pyramid, the Octahedron, the Eicosahedron and the Dodecahedron, the solid figures which Plato ranks first, are all beautiful because of the symmetry and equality of their formulae; nothing better than these or equal to them has been left over for Nature to compose|B|or to frame. They have not, however, all been constructed on a single plan, nor have all a similar origin. The Pyramid is the finest and smallest, the largest and the one of most parts is the Dodecahedron; of the remaining two the Eicosahedron is more than double the Octahedron in number of triangles.[171]It follows that it is impossible for all to take their origin at once from one and the same matter. For those which are fine and small, and more simple in their structures, must be the first to obey him who stirs and fashions the mass; they must sooner cohere and be completed than those whose parts are abundant, and the figures complex, and their construction more laborious,|C|as the Dodecahedron. It follows that the Pyramid is the only primal body, and that none of the others is so; they are left behind by Nature in the becoming. For this strange result there is, however, a remedy, the division and distribution of matter into five worlds. Here the Pyramid (for it first formed substance), there the Octahedron, in a third world the Eicosahedron. But from the figure which first took substance in each the rest will take their origin, all change arising by concretion or dissolution of parts, as Plato himself shows.[172]He goes thoroughly into nearly all the cases, but for us a brief survey will suffice. Since air is formed when fire is extinguished, and when rarefied|D|again yields fire out of itself, we must observe what happens tothe seeds of either element, and the changes. The seeds of fire[173]are the Pyramid with its twenty-four primary triangles; the seeds of air are the Octahedron with its forty-eight. Therefore one element of air is formed by the commixture and coherence of two of fire; and one of air is exchanged into two of|E|fire, or by close pressure into itself passes away into the form of water. Thus, universally, that which is first formed readily allows the others to come into being by transmutation. It is not the case that one is first; different elements in different structures give the initial and prerogative movement into being, yet the common name is kept throughout.’

XXXIII. ‘Bravo, Theodorus!’ said Ammonius; ‘he has worked out his task with spirit. Yet I shall be surprised if he is not found to be using assumptions which are mutually destructive. He wants to have it that all five solids do not attain their structure together, the finest and easiest of|F|composition always breaking first into being. Then, as though following upon this, and not conflicting with it, he lays it down that it is not all matter which admits the finest and simplest element first, but that sometimes the heavy and complex objects are the first to emerge out of matter. But to pass over this, whereas it is assumed that there are five primal bodies, and therefore an equal number of worlds, he makes out probability for four only; he has discarded the Cube as if playing at|428|counters, since Nature does not adapt it to pass into the others or them into itself, because the triangles are not of the same kind. In the other cases the basis of formation is the semi-(equilateral) triangle; to the Cube the right-angled isosceles is peculiar, which is incapable of converging towards the others or joining with them to form one solid angle. If then, there are five bodies and five worlds, and in each the primary belongs to some one, then where the Cube has been the first to comeinto being, the rest will be nowhere, for it is unable to change into any of them. I pass by the fact that they make the element of the Dodecahedron also a different thing from that scalene|B|out of which Plato constructs the Pyramid, the Octahedron, and the Eicosahedron. And so’, added Ammonius, with a laugh, ‘you must either resolve these difficulties, or give us something of your own about the common problem.’

XXXIV. ‘I have nothing more probable to offer, at least at the moment;’ I said, ‘yet perhaps it is better to show cause for one’s own view than for that of others. I say then, going back to the beginning, that if we assume two natures, one sensible, liable to changes of becoming and perishing, and to various movements at different times, the other essential, intellectual, always behaving alike under the same conditions, it is strange, friend, that the intellectual should admit of distinction and division within itself, while with regard to that which is bodily, and subject to affections, there should be trouble and|C|dissatisfaction if we refuse to leave it one, self-coherent and self-convergent, but separate and part it. Surely it is rather the permanent and divine which should hold together and shrink, as far as may be, from all dissection and analysis. Yet the force of “the Other” has gripped them, and has worked greater divergences than those of place in things intellectual, I mean those made by Reason and Idea. Hence Plato,[174]opposing those who make out the Whole to be one, tells us of Being, and the|D|Same, and the Different, and, besides all these, of Movement and Rest. Given then these five, it would not be wonderful if these five corporeal elements have been made by Nature copies and images of them severally, none free from admixture or transparent, but each element so far as it could best participate in each principle. Thus the Cube is clearly a body congenial to Rest, because of the stability and firmness of its surfaces.No one can fail to detect the fire-like, active character of the Pyramid in the fineness of its sides and the sharpness of its angles. The nature of the Dodecahedron, which embraces|E|the other figures, might well be taken for an image of Being in relation to all that is corporeal. Of the remaining two, the Eicosahedron is found most to partake of the idea of the Different, the Octahedron of that of the Same. Therefore the latter represented air, which holds all being in one constant form, the former water, which when mixed assumes new qualities the most numerous. If then Nature requires throughout equality before the law, it is probable that worlds have been created neither more nor less in number than the patterns, in order that each pattern in each world may hold that primacy and power which it has had in the composition of the elementary bodies.

|F|XXXV. ‘So much for that! May it reassure any one who is surprised at our dividing the natural processes of becoming and mutation into so many classes! Now comes another point, which I will ask you all to consider with me. Of the ultimate first principles, by which I mean unity and the undelimited two, the latter, as the element of all shapelessness and disorder, has been called Infinity; but unity by its nature limits and arrests what is void and irrational and undetermined in|429|Infinity, and imparts shape, and fits it to receive and endure that definition of things apprehended by the senses which is implied in counting. These principles appear first in connexion with number; but I would rather say, universally, that plurality is not number until unity supervenes, as form upon matter, and cuts off from undetermined Infinity, more on this side, less on that. For plurality in each case only becomes number when it is determined by unity. Again, if unity be struck off, the undetermined two throws all into a confusion without balance or limit or measure. Now since form is not a withdrawal|B|of underlying matter but is shape and order thereof, bothprinciples must necessarily be found in number, and hence arises the first and greatest difference or dissimilarity. The undetermined principle is the constructive cause of the even, the better one of the odd. Two is the first of the even numbers, three of the odd; out of them comes five, in its composition common to both lists, in its effect, odd. For when the sensible and corporeal was to be divided into several parts, in virtue of the inherent cogency of the Other, their number must not be the first even nor yet the first odd, but the third, that formed out of these, so that it may take its origin from both|C|principles, that which constructs the even and that which constructs the odd; for neither could possibly be separated from the other; each possesses the nature and power of a principle. Both principles then being paired, the better one checked the indeterminate when it was dividing up the corporeal; and prevailed; when matter was being distributed between the two it set unity in the middle, and did not allow an equal division of the whole. So a plurality of worlds has been brought into being by the “Other” quality in the undetermined, and by difference; but that plurality is odd, made so by the operation of “the Same” and “the Determinate”, and odd in such a sense that Nature was not allowed to advance beyond what was best. For if the unity had been without admixture|D|and pure, matter would have been exempt from any breaking up whatever; but as it has been mingled with the discriminative power of the two, separation and division were so far accepted; but there it stopped, the even overcome by the odd.

XXXVI. ‘Hence again the ancients were accustomed to use the words “to take fives” for to count. I think, too, that the word for “all” (panta) has been logically formed as though from “five” (pente) because the number five is composed of the first numbers. For the others when multiplied by other numbers come out to a product different from themselves;but five if taken an even number of times gives a perfect ten, if an odd, it reproduces itself. I pass over the facts|E|that five is composed of the first two squares, one and four, and that its own square is equal to the sum of the two before it, forming with them the most beautiful of right-angled triangles, and that it is the first number to give sesquiplicate ratio. For perhaps they are not germane to the subject before us. This, however, is more germane, that the number five has a divisory virtue, and Nature divides most things by five. In|F|ourselves are five senses, and there are five parts of the soul, those of growth, sense, appetite, passion, reason. We have five fingers on each hand; seed is most fertile when it parts into five (no instance has been recorded of a woman bearing more than five at a birth); Rhea is said in Egyptian mythology to have given birth to five Gods,[175]a veiled reference to the production of the five worlds out of one matter. Turning to the universe, the surface of earth is divided into five zones, and the Heavens are divided by five circles, two Arctic, two|430|Tropic, one in the middle, the Equinoctial. Five are the orbits of the planets, if we take those of the sun and Venus and Mercury as one. Lastly, the universe has been composed in the Enharmonic Scale, just as our melody is made up of the arrangement of five Tetrachords, lowest, middle, conjunct, disjunct, highest. And the intervals are five: diesis, semitone, tone, tone and a half, double tone. Thus it seems that Nature loves to make all things on the principle of five, rather than, as Aristotle[176]used to say, of the Sphere.

XXXVII. ‘What is the real reason, some one will ask, why Plato[177]referred the number of five for his worlds to the five solid figures, saying that “God used the fifth formation on the universe to mark it out”? In the sequel, when he raises the|B|problem of plurality of worlds, whether we should properlyspeak of one or of five as naturally existing, he shows clearly that the suggestion came from the solids. If, then, we are to adjust what is actually probable to his conception, let us consider that difference in movement must in each case follow difference in the solids and their shapes, as Plato[178]himself teaches, when he|C|shows that what is rarefied or condensed suffers a change of place simultaneously with alteration of substance. If from air fire be formed, the Octahedron being resolved and broken up into Pyramids, or again if air from fire, when compressed and thrust into an Octahedron, it is impossible that either should remain where it was before; they fly off rapidly to another place, forcing a way out and battling with whatever resists and presses upon them. The result is shown still more clearly by an illustration from grain “tossed and winnowed by the fans and implements used for cleaning corn”; Plato[179]says that|D|in like manner the elements toss matter about and are tossed by it; like approaches like, different objects take different places, before the whole comes out finally marshalled. Thus then, matter being what any universe must be from which God is absent, the first five properties, each with its own tendency, at once began to move apart, not being entirely or purely separated, because, when all things were mixed up together, the vanquished particles always followed their conquerors, in despite of Nature. Hence they produced in the kinds of bodies, as they were borne in different directions, parts and divisions as many as themselves: one not of pure fire but|E|resembling fire, one not of unmixed air but resembling air, one not of earth simple and absolute but resembling earth. Most general was the association of air with water, because they passed out saturated with the many other classes. For God did not separate nor disperse being; but taking it up dispersed by its own operation and borne about in so many streamsof disorder, he ordered and disposed it in symmetry and proportion.|F|Then he set reason in each to be a governor and guardian, and created as many worlds as there were kinds of primal bodies. Let so much then be inscribed to Plato for Ammonius’ sake. For myself, I could never speak with confidence as to the number of worlds and affirm that there are so many: but I think the view that there are more than one, yet not an indefinite but a limited number, as reasonable as either of the other views, when I see how scattered and divided matter naturally is, that it does not abide in one place, nor yet|431|is suffered by reason to pass into Infinity. Here, if anywhere, let us remember the Academy rule, and clear ourselves of excessive credulity, and treading on this slippery ground when reasoning about Infinity, only make sure that we keep our footing.’

XXXVIII. When I had finished, ‘Lamprias gives us sound advice’, said Demetrius. ‘The Gods by many forms—not “of sophistries”, as it is in Euripides,[180]but of things—deceive us, when we dare to pronounce opinions about these|B|great matters as if we knew. But “we must cry back”, to quote the same authority,[181]to the assumption from which our argument started. The statement that the oracles, when the daemons move off and desert them, lie idle and speechless, like musical instruments with none to play on them, raises another and a greater question as to the cause and power whereby they make the prophets and prophetesses subject to fits of inspiration and fancy. For it is impossible to allege the desertion as a cause of the silence unless we are first satisfied in what sense they preside and by their presence make the oracle active and vocal.’ ‘What?’ rejoined Ammonius, ‘do you suppose that the daemons are anything but souls which move around, as Hesiod[182]says “garmented in mist”? Inmy view, as man differs from man when he plays tragedy or|C|plays comedy, so soul differs from soul after it has fashioned for itself a body convenient to its present life. It is not then irrational or even wonderful that souls meeting souls should create within them fancies of that which is to be, just as we convey to one another, not only through voice, but often by written signs, by a touch, a glance, many intimations of things past, and forewarnings of things future. Or perhaps you have something different to tell us, Lamprias? For a rumour reached us lately that you had held a long discussion on these subjects with strangers at Lebadeia; but our informant|D|did not clearly remember any of it.’ ‘Do not be surprised at that,’ I said, ‘for there were many interruptions and much was going on, because it was a day of consultation and sacrifice, which made our conversation fragmentary and intermittent.’ ‘But now’, said Ammonius, ‘you have listeners with full leisure, and eager to inquire and to be told. There is no question of rivalry or faction, and you see what a frank full hearing has been accorded to every view.’

XXXIX. The others joined in encouraging me, and after a few minutes of silence I went on: ‘I must begin by saying|E|that it so happens that you, Ammonius, have given me a sort of opening for bringing forward now what I then said. For if the souls which have been separated from the body or have never had commerce with one at all, are daemons as you say, and God-like Hesiod[183]also:


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