CHAPTER IXTHE ANNEXATION
Theproclamation of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegowina in 1908, with the evacuation of the Sanjak as a compensation to Turkey, took Europe by surprise. The general feeling was one of utter astonishment, that Austria-Hungary, herself far along the road to bankruptcy, should presume to annex anything. It is doubtful whether any one realised that Germany stood firm behind her in her high-handed action. Even if this were known vaguely, no one was aware that Germany had been consulted, had fathered the plan, and perhaps even conceived it in all its naked unscrupulousness. When the spasm of astonishment was over there was a loud outcry. Austria-Hungary had “torn up” the Treaty of Berlin in violating Article 29. An army, that was ready for the eventualities that the country shrewdly suspectedmight ensue, was hastily thrown upon the Bosnian frontier, another was pushed up towards Russia. Germany also despatched a large force to the Russian front. The country resounded with the noise and confusion of a mobilisation, for, strange to say, Austria-Hungary, although aware her troops would be required, had made no definite preparations. Stories of Bohemian regiments, driven into troop trains covered by their officers’ revolvers, ran like wildfire through the country. Further reports soon proved that the mobilisation was simply organised confusion. Germany heard and marked. There could be no war under such conditions. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian mobilisation was followed by rapid action on the other frontiers. Russia put troops on her frontiers. Servia, feeling concerned for her safety, increased her frontier forces. Count Aehrenthal, besides promising to evacuate the Sanjak, undertook to compensate Turkey financially for the loss of her provinces. In all these arrangements it must be noted that Turkey was never consulted. She had to look on while her territory was taken away, powerless to defend her interests. This was a matter of quite secondary interest to the Great Powers, who simply demanded to know what were the intentionsof Austria-Hungary. The winter of 1908–09 was spent in negotiation. The soldiers, carefully provided with winter clothing, spent the months on the chilly frontiers, and pitiful letters of complaint of the severity of the Galician and Servian climates reached Vienna. These were from the common soldiers, whose lot has always been a hard one. They were subjected to the severe discipline that prevails in the Prussian army, but whereas the Prussian gets his full allowance of food-stuff and has the proper clothing for the climate at the end of October, the Austrian trooper is, as often as not, supplied with ice-making machines in December and woollen sleeping-sacks in July. New needs that cropped up at the front were only met long after the cold that made them indispensable had changed to spring-like warmth and the armies felt the inconveniences of an inefficient officialdom very severely.
The young officers at the front, who were well provided with money, spent a healthy winter. Ski-ing was one of the chief amusements; they brought the sport back to Vienna, where it had previously been something of a novelty. Otherwise the social life of the people was but little affected by the diplomatic trouble that wascausing such perturbation at the Ballplatz. There was some complaining at the scarcity of men. Vienna hostesses had always counted on providing each girl with a choice of partners; this year the available men were either getting on in life or unduly young, as the mobilisation had swept up the rest. Those who remained at home, too, were overworked, and could not spend their days in semi-somnolence in the office and their nights in the whirling activity of the ball-room. It was only a year later, on returning from the annual holiday, that people began to notice that prices had gone up. The explanation was simple enough. The army, after the unsuccessful mobilisation which had revealed all kinds of deficiencies, began to make numerous demands. The guns they had tested during the very frequent frontier skirmishes whose history has never been written were useless. Much of the ammunition was counterfeit. Stories of corruption touching even the highest officials were current. Some great personages were dismissed without the customary decoration, the Emperor plainly saying that he would show no mercy to those who had betrayed their country. The excuse that they had no idea that a war was perhaps pending did not palliate their crime in the eyes of the agedEmperor, who is a soldierpar excellencein all that concerns discipline and order.
The discovery of many lacunae and “discrepancies” in the service made Austria-Hungary herself chary of going to war. When the chance of a compromise came she was ready to take it. This was the easier for her, as Germany, who was prepared for a world-war in the month of October, absolutely refused to back Austria-Hungary in an adventurous policy in December. The reason was plain. Germany and her Emperor had believed all the reports they had received of Austria’s readiness; it was only when they saw how the mobilisation hung fire, and realised how unwilling her men—especially those belonging to the subject races—were to fight, that they saw they had been deceived, not intentionally, but by the difference between what the Austrians believed and the actual state of affairs. Kaiser Wilhelm began to see for the first time that he could not take the Emperor’s word for things; not that the aged man had the faintest intent to deceive him, but simply that he lived in a world created by his courtiers, and existed in the atmosphere prevalent at Courts a century ago. His councillors, old men like himself, never told the Emperor anything unpleasant. If they believed that hedid not wish to hear it, the truth was carefully concealed. It is doubtful whether the Emperor ever knew of the discontent in the ranks of the army.
Kaiser Wilhelm had but small difficulty in holding back the politicians who sat in Vienna and appreciated his arguments. Modern wars, said the Kaiser, cannot be waged without munitions and money. Austria-Hungary had numbers of men, but her munitions were of ancient pattern; her guns were not fit for active service. Wealth she possessed in plenty, as Austria-Hungary is a rich country, but it was not realised. It was all invested in lands, machinery, and other plant. Her subjects were not accustomed to direct taxation to any extent. The military party could not grasp these arguments.
A great nation ought not to stoop to negotiate, it said. Why should they hesitate when their army was over two millions strong?
It is a curious fact that during the negotiations no one mentioned the really salient point in so many words, nor asked, “By what right had Germany, through Austria, arrogated to herself the power to disturb the peace of Europe and to steal a march upon her neighbours in the night?” Neither country has ever advanced areason to excuse this action. The first cause was doubtless Kaiser Wilhelm. In the plenitude of his arrogance, which made him consider himself beyond all human laws, he regarded the rights and wishes of others as entirely negligible quantities where the greatness of the German Empire, which meant his greatness, was concerned. Every German child was taught that Germany should be supreme over all. In the schools they learnt that nothing, not even truth or justice, could be allowed to interfere with Germany’s commercial progress. The young men who stole into Italy or Bohemia as clerks and took copies of the names of customers for the use of their countrymen, were not considered thieves in the usual sense. They were simply German patriots; men who had been reared from childhood to consider that the old standards had fallen, and a new German philosophy had taken its place. This teaching had one object, and one only, the aggrandisement of Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm was at the head of this movement. He regarded the other nations as effete and degenerate. They had no right to block the way of the Prussians, who were a reincarnation of the Goths of old, and who would sweep everything before them. Prussians of high standing were not backward in expounding this theory.The other German races murmured at the “unscrupulousness” of the Prussian. They felt that men of this character were dangerous, and that they ought not to be entrusted with the supreme command in the Empire. Austria-Hungary, meanwhile, chafed at the bit that she was beginning to feel. After all the delicate questions had been settled and the terms of the agreement arranged, her statesmen sighed and said: “This has been a mistake, we ought to have gone to war.”
Statesmen saw that they had placed themselves too unreservedly in Germany’s hands. Peace, too, had been preserved by unusual means. When things had reached a very critical stage, the aged Emperor Francis Joseph stemmed the current that was carrying the country towards war. He let it be known that he objected to the peace being broken. He wished to end his days in tranquillity. Such respect was felt for the Emperor that this was sufficient to turn the scale in favour of peace. Austrian statesmen, however, were encouraged in an irresponsible feeling that they might go to great lengths in threatening war without being called upon to back up their threats by action. The Austro-Hungarian supreme War Lord could save the situation by a word. Germanycould prevent things reaching a climax if the Emperor’s petition for peace were not sufficient.
These ideas were radically wrong. The Emperor tacitly undertook not to break the peace again when he made his appeal. It is certain that he never intended to do so. But this should have hampered his statesmen. It did not. Instead of feeling that the Emperor’s pledge to Europe laid a responsibility upon them, they, on the contrary, felt that their acts were always liable to be disavowed by the monarch, and that they were not forced to show the same caution as they would if their decisions were final. In the same way, they failed to realise that Germany would inevitably demand compensation for her protection. The noblemen who held the helm in Vienna were not a match for the calculating business men who were pursuing a “real” policy at Berlin, and who had little to do with ideals.