CHAPTER XIXCOUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD AND COUNT STEPAN TISZA, THE MEN WHO DECIDED ON WAR
Count Berchtold,the Austro-Hungarian Minister who was responsible for the policy that led to the Great War, is the prototype of the Austro-Hungarian aristocrat, and essentially a gentleman. He was for this reason totally unfit to cope with the crowd of unscrupulous pro-German politicians around him. He was brought up in the old school, and no one who knows him personally would hesitate to describe him as a gentlemanpar excellence. The fine, delicate features, the slim, slender hands, and a bearing that has something almost apologetic, are characteristic of the man. He is the ideal landowner and feudal lord, able to manage large estates, a merciful landlord who would remit rent in bad years, a kindly neighbour, and valued friend.
Count Berchtold’s greatest interest was horse-racing, and his large fortune enabled him to keep a splendid stud. He invariably attended all the big race-meetings, but he was there merely to watch the horses, not to meet the representatives of the diplomatic and political world like his fellow-officials. His eye never wandered from the course during the whole meeting. Other politicians never so much as glanced at the horses; they were concentrating their attention on more important matters. A secretary posted them in the events to enable them to discuss them when necessary, to keep up the farce that they were there to watch the horses. They watched their opportunity to slip up to some great man and discuss some point at issue between them in a friendly and casual way. The Foreign Minister knew nothing of such manœuvres. If he wished to discuss a delicate matter with the Ambassador of some unfriendly Power, he sought him in his Embassy and at once raised the question to an affair of State instead of ascertaining in a non-committal way how matters stood before formulating a demand. Count Berchtold was essentially an honest and straightforward man when he took over the onerous duties of Foreign Minister, and had no slur upon his character.He was very loth to assume the responsibilities of office, and only accepted at the Emperor’s direct request. He felt that he was not fit to take the helm of State at such a critical moment. There is not the slightest doubt that the Count was correct in the estimate of his own powers. It would have required a much less simple-minded man to guide the country through the troubled waters which seethed all around. The Hungarian aristocrat, perhaps more than the Austrian noble, lives a somewhat secluded life far from railroad and market town. He is brought up in the same way as the old feudal barons in the Middle Ages. He is surrounded by a swarm of servants, whom he regards more in the light of serfs than free men. He fills the obligations as well as enjoys the privileges of a feudal overlord. The young aristocrat enjoys life. It is made up of hunting, often in the primæval forest; he is constantly invited to shooting-parties, and spends his time in that and other manly and outdoor occupations. He is always an expert climber, can stalk a chamois, and would never fear for his footing on the most precipitous rocks. He can fence, box, and is, of course, an expert swordsman. He never knows when he may be called upon to fight a duel, with any weapons. He learns to speakfour or five languages from native tutors. He must be proficient in German, French, and, if possible, English and Italian, before he leaves the schoolroom. He acquires these languages without trouble, often from his nurses, and learns to ride while still little more than a baby. All these accomplishments fit him to cut a figure in the fashionable world, but form a poor equipment for battling with foreign diplomatists, who have had the advantage of a training in a much severer school. Even if the education, which he receives at the hands of a tutor, chosen rather for his sporting proclivities than for his erudition, is completed by a university course, no professor in Austria-Hungary would venture to deal with a young aristocrat in the same fashion as with a student belonging to the middle classes. Thus, although the aristocrat is peculiarly suited to occupy important positions on account of his birth and manners, he is frequently unfit to deal with very intricate problems or to match his wits against those of other politicians. Count Berchtold was a great favourite in Vienna because of his hospitality. The Hungarians are known far and wide for their hearty hospitality, and he even excelled the traditions of his race. He gave entertainments at the Ballplatz, the Austro-HungarianForeign Ministry, close to the Hofburg, that were unique of their kind. He had a kindly word for everyone who entered the vastsallesthat opened one into the other at the top of the great marble staircase. Beneath the historic portraits he entertained Archduchess and peasant deputy with unvarying affability. When he was seen in other social centres it was always conceded that he was the most distinguished-looking man in the room. The tall, dark figure flitted restlessly to and fro, always anxious to contribute his part to making the entertainment a success. But close observers noted something in the formation of the skull and the glance of the eye that denoted lack of firmness. He was a man who could be persuaded against his better judgment. Had he been called upon, like most of his predecessors in office, to be a mere figurehead, all would have been well, but under the actual circumstances it was fatal to the peace of Europe. It is more than probable that Berchtold was chosen to fill the important post at the suggestion of Count Tchirsky, or some other emissary of Kaiser Wilhelm, who desired to have a weak man in power in Vienna.
Once he had taken office, Count Berchtold discovered that all quiet was at an end. Therewere constant attacks upon him in the German subsidised Press of Vienna. During the long diplomatic struggles that took place while he held office he was accused of hesitation and of vacillation. He was, however, merely trying to steer a middle course between the two policies dictated by the two parties within the Empire. The Emperor was firm in his desire to die in peace. His reign had begun with the loss of territory following upon defeat on the battlefield. It was well known that he absolutely refused to contemplate any policy that might lead the Empire into further hostilities. It was the Emperor who sent the autograph letter to the Czar in the Annexation year, begging him to allow him to go down to the grave in peace, and to desist from a war which seemed inevitable. On the other hand, Archduke Francis Ferdinand was anxious for a war. He was at the head of the military party, composed of the younger aristocrats, who were more or less tools in the hands of Kaiser Wilhelm. They comprehended nothing of what war meant at this period in the world’s history. They suspected nothing of the plans of Kaiser Wilhelm, who pushed the Emperor of Austria into the foreground when he wished the scales to be turned in favour of peace, and skilfully broughtforward the military party when he wished Austria-Hungary to threaten war. Count Berchtold was very sensitive to public opinion; the attacks made upon him by the Press, hinting that he was lacking in courage, annoyed him. They also prepared public opinion for war. Austria-Hungary was depicted as the sufferer from a hundred slights—as the down-trodden country that was forced to bear all kinds of insults. Insults from Servia, insults from Montenegro, had been accepted lying down. All news of what the small Balkan States had to endure before they made the protests was, of course, suppressed. Their point of view was never considered. Caricatures of Count Berchtold, showing him on his way to Salonica but frightened to go on by the claws of the Russian bear, were published in the comic papers. The lengths to which these papers went in turning the Foreign Minister to ridicule—a deadly crime in Austria-Hungary—was indicative of the strength of the Imperial Germans in Austria. They were even able to protect their minions against the Austrian censor. When any politician showed indications of strong-mindedness and of a disposition to resist German influence, the terrors of the German subsidised Press were turned upon him. Heinvariably had to go. The Press in Count Berchtold’s case, however, was merely used to bring him to a sense of his own impotence and to deceive him as to the state of public opinion. The Germans did not desire his dismissal, although they frequently had rumours of his impending resignation published. His being in office suited their purpose much too well for them to wish to see him leave his place. Count Tchirsky and other pro-Prussians filled the air with rumours of the Emperor’s inability to rule. They said that the old man was in his dotage. This sounded reasonable, although it was by no means the case. Count Berchtold was naturally inclined to believe these reports, as, although he was very loyal to his sovereign, he, like many other men of the modern school, could not comprehend the monarch’s peculiar idiosyncrasies, and was apt to mistake his religious fervour for an expression of feeble-mindedness. This rendered Berchtold ready to believe the insinuations that were cunningly suggested to him that the Emperor could not be trusted with secrets of State. He might tell all to his father-confessor, who would report it to Rome, where the hated Italians might learn it, said the German diplomatists. Berchtold thus entered on a course that led to the undoingof his country. He acted without consulting the Emperor, and concealed important facts from him at times of crisis. His tempters no doubt showed him good and sufficient reason why he should do this. The course was, however, a lapse from honesty—an honesty that had been Berchtold’s chief virtue. So long as the supreme power was vested in one man, that man, whatever his age, should have been in possession of the full facts of the case. The Emperor of Austria alone had to decide whether there should be peace or war, and his Foreign Minister had no right to deceive him on any point. Count Berchtold and the German Ambassador had guilty secrets between them. It was thus that the Ambassador got his hold over the Foreign Minister and used it mercilessly. The country gentleman could not believe that the German aristocrats around him were liars and were capable of acts unthought-of by persons of his simple creed.
History will pronounce judgment on Berchtold. Contemporaries see him as a weak man, who lost his country’s cause through a complete inability to cope with the scoundrels who surrounded him. He was unable to comprehend the peculiar art of lying that German diplomacy had brought to a fine art, the sphinx-like promisesthat could be made and interpreted according to need. A man of less honourable instincts would have been more capable of dealing with the situation; a man of character might have saved his country.
Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was a man of iron will. He was frequently called the Hungarian “Cromwell,” “the man with the mailed fist.” He had fought more duels than any other Hungarian aristocrat, and his courage was well proven. Not only had he physical courage, but moral courage as well. Like Count Berchtold, he had received the education and training of a Hungarian aristocrat. He is an autocrat of the old school, whose strong will has never been broken by opposition. Possessed of great strength of character, but educated in an atmosphere of unreality, he had no grasp of what was really happening in Europe. Tisza always prided himself on his loyalty to the Emperor. When the sovereign told him to reduce the rebellious Hungarian Parliament to order, he did not hesitate to order the soldiers to drag out offending members. On another occasion he had armed men placed at the entrance to the House to prevent the entrance of all refractory members. The Emperor and Tisza both looked upon the Parliament as anecessary evil that must be dealt with in the best way circumstances allowed. Neither of them considered that the people had any rights. They were not of the same flesh and blood as Emperors and Counts.
This autocratic idea, born of circumstances and surroundings, led both men to act in a most tyrannous way towards the people. Tisza especially had a profound contempt for the mob. He looked upon the subject-peoples as beneath contempt. Neither he nor his Imperial master could brook Notes send by the Serbs. It seemed to them the acme of impertinence that a nation of so little importance should dare to address the Emperor of Austria as an equal.
Count Tisza has always been most anxious to make Hungary equal to Austria. He considered that the two nations should enjoy equal rights. He resented the fact that the Court was established at Vienna, and that Budapesth always took a second place. Tisza and every Hungarian statesmen knew that the common funds were spent for the benefit of Austria rather than for that of Hungary. At the same time Hungary, who claimed equal rights with Austria, always refused to take a half of the common expenses on her shoulders; the Hungarian share was always a third, Austria payingtwo-thirds. Hungary is very wealthy, but has very little ready money. Her nobles regulate taxation and take great care that the burden falls on the people in the way of indirect taxation of necessities. Before the war there was no income tax in Hungary, although the revenues enjoyed by the great landowners are immense. Kaiser Wilhelm was very exactly informed of the relations between Austria and Hungary. He took pains to attach Tisza to his person. Tisza was invited to Berlin frequently; he was summoned to confer with the Kaiser constantly, while Count Berchtold was seldom consulted. The Kaiser dazzled Tisza and the Hungarians with promises of assistance in their fight against Austria. The Kaiser seemed to be the only man who comprehended their position. An ambitious and warlike people, the Magyar minority could not be swamped by the Slavs within the kingdom, or overwhelmed by the Germans in Austria. Count Tisza, although a very strong man, is not capable of comprehending a character like that of Kaiser Wilhelm. Single of purpose himself, he cannot comprehend duplicity in another. Like the Emperor Francis Joseph and Count Berchtold, he was duped. He desired to go to war with Servia because, likeCount Berchtold, his personal vanity had been hurt. He could not take an international view of the situation. The great Slav peril within the Empire seemed more important to him than the fear of All-German domination.
Count Berchtold.
Count Berchtold.
Count Tisza.
Count Tisza.
Count Tisza might have done much to save his country from ruin; instead, he preferred to see the subject-races oppressed. He considered that a war that would enable the Government to thin out the Slavs, by letting them fight one against the other, the soldiers from within the Empire against those without, would secure the supremacy of the Magyars. He failed to comprehend that the Magyars were to be thinned out in their turn to make way for Germans who wished to exploit the rich treasures of Hungary and exhaust her mineral wealth.
Count Tisza was a gambler accustomed to play with gentlemen; when he played at statesmanship with the German Emperor he did not count upon his adversary using loaded dice.
The very uprightness of his character prevented his suspecting others. The man in the street suspected Kaiser Wilhelm; the Premier did not.
The Hungarian aristocrat had never been “up against life”; he had no instinct to guide him. He fondly believed that he was twistingthe Kaiser round his finger and using him for his own ends. These ends were the glorification of Hungary, for Tisza is a patriot to his finger-tips. Unfortunately, he was deeply imbued with the sentiment that a king cannot commit meannesses. He placed the Kaiser on the same level as a Hungarian noble.