Chapter 4

[1]Hyp.I. 96-97.

[2]Adv. Math.VII. 93.

[3]UeberwegOp. cit.195.

[4]Adv. Math.VII. 354.

[5]Hyp.I. 98-99.

The Fourth Trope. This Trope limits the argument to each separate sense, and the effect is considered of the condition of body and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the several sense-organs.[1]The physical states which modify sense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All of these conditions of the body entirely change the character of the mental images, producing different judgments of the color, taste, and temperature of objects, and of the character of sounds. A man who is asleep is in a different world from one awake, the existence of both worlds being relative to the condition of waking and sleeping.[2]

The subjective states which Sextus mentions here as modifying the character of the mental representations are hating or loving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and sanity or insanity.[3]No man is ever twice in exactly the same condition of body or mind, and never able to review the differences of his ideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only are subject to careful inspection.[4]Furthermore, no one is free from the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he can be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be established that can be shown to be true, but on the contrary, whatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterion and the proof will be thrown into thecirculus in probando, for the truth of each rests on the other.[5]

[1]Hyp.I. 100.

[2]Hyp.I. 104.

[3]Hyp.I. 100.

[4]Hyp.I. 112.

[5]Hyp.I. 117.

Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this Trope, but in a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of this train of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal conditions are also natural. In referring at first to the opposing states of body and mind, which so change the character of sense-perception, Sextus classifies them according to the popular usage as κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν. This distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, and was especially developed by the Stoics[1]in a broader sense than referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics, however, considered only normal conditions as being according to nature. Sextus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal states are also conditions according to nature,[2]and just as those who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who are in health, so also those not in health are in a state that is natural to those not in health, and in some respects according to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking exist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3]One mental representation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental conditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedly in his exposition of this Trope. "The insane are not in a condition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we also see the sun as if it were stationary."[4]Furthermore, in different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond of balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, and the aged still others.[5]The wisdom contained in this Trope in reference to the relative value of the things most sought after is not original with Sextus, but is found in the more earnest ethical teachings of older writers. Sextus does not, however, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but only uses it as an argument for ἐποχή.

[1]Diog. VII. 1, 86.

[2]Hyp.I. 103.

[3]Hyp.I. 104.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 82.

[5]Hyp.I. 106.

The Fifth Trope. This Trope leaves the discussion of the dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, and takes up the influence of the environment upon them. It makes the difference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, and place of objects, thus taking apparently their real existence for granted. Things change their form and shape according to the distance from which they are observed, and the position in which they stand.[1]

The same light or tone alters decidedly in different surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle at which the picture is suspended.[2]With Diogenes this Trope is the seventh,[3]and his exposition of it is similar, but as usual, shorter. Both Sextus and Diogenes give the illustration[4]of the neck of the dove differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an illustration used by Protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the senses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light sunny and purple."[5]Since, then, all phenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certain distance, and according to a certain position, each of which relations makes a great difference with the mental images, we shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving of the opinion.[6]

[1]Hyp.I. 118.

[2]Hyp.I. 120

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 85.

[4]Hyp.I. 120; Diog. IX. 11, 86.

[5]Schol. zu Arist.60, 18, ed. Brandis; Pappen.Er. Pyrr. Grundzüge, p. 54.

[6]Hyp.I. 121.

The Sixth Trope. This Trope leads to ἐποχή regarding the nature of objects, because no object can ever be presented to the organs of sense directly, but must always be perceived through some medium, or in some mixture.[1]This mixture may be an outward one, connected with the temperature, or the rarity of the air, or the water[2]surrounding an object, or it may be a mixture resulting from the different humors of the sense-organs.[3]A man with the jaundice, for example, sees colors differently from one who is in health. The illustration of the jaundice is a favorite one with the Sceptics. Diogenes uses it several times in his presentation of Scepticism, and it occurs in Sextus' writings in all, as an illustration, in eight different places.[4]The condition of the organ of the ἡγεμονικόν, or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures. Pappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea ofa priori, only on a materialistic foundation.[5]A careful consideration of the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with the philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, ἴσως δὲ καὶ αὔτη (ἡ διάνοια) ἐπιμιξίαν τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀναγγελλόμενα,[6]stood alone, without further explanation, it might well refer toa priorilaws of thought, but the explanation which follows beginning with "because" makes that impossible.[7]"Because in each of the places where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, we see present certain humors, which are the cause of mixtures." Sextus does not advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty in the body, which is, according to the Stoics, the principal part of the soul, where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate,[8]but simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, which claim on the one hand that it is in the brain, and on the other that it is in the heart.[9]This subject he deals with more fully in his work against logic.[10]As, however, he bases his argument, in discussing possible intellectual mixtures in illustration of the sixth Trope, entirely on the condition of the organ of the intellect, it is evident that his theory of the soul was a materialistic one.

[1]Hyp.I. 124.

[2]Hyp.I. 125.

[3]Hyp.I. 126.

[4]See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus.

[5]Papp.Er. Pyr. Gr.p. 55.

[6]Hyp.I. 128.

[7]Hyp.I. 128.

[8]Diog. VII. 1, 159.

[9]Hyp.I. 128.

[10]Adv. Math.VII. 313.

The Seventh Trope. This Trope, based upon the quantities and compositions of objects, is illustrated by examples of different kinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the different effects according to the quantity taken, as the harmfulness and the usefulness of most things depend on their quantity. Things act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large quantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the form of a solid.[1]The result is that ideas vary according to the composition of the object, and this Trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard to them.[2]This Trope is illustrated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity.[3]

[1]Hyp.I. 129-131.

[2]Hyp.I. 134.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 86.

The Eighth Trope. The Trope based upon relation contains, as Sextus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine,[1]for the general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes the other statements made. The prominence which Sextus gave this Trope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect here new illustrations and added[2]arguments for ἐποχή. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been used to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to the eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to the relation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that is not found elsewhere where as an argument for ἐποχή.[3]This Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his reasoning in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not directly make,i.e., that everything is in relation to the understanding.[4]

[1]Hyp.I. 39.

[2]Hyp.I. 135-140.

[3]Hyp.I. 135-140.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 88.

The Ninth Trope. This is based upon the frequency and rarity of events, and refers to some of the phenomena of nature, such as the rising of the sun, and the sea, as no longer a source of astonishment, while a comet or an earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to them.[1]The value of objects also depends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold.[2]Furthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and at another not so, according to the frequency and rarity of the occurrence.[3]Therefore this Trope also leads to ἐποχή. Diogenes gives only two illustrations to this Trope, that of the sun and the earthquake.[4]

[1]Hyp.I. 141-142.

[2]Hyp.I. 143.

[3]Hyp.I. 144.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 87.

The Tenth Trope. We have already remarked on the difference in the character of the tenth Trope, dealing as it does, not with the ideas of objects, like the other nine Tropes, but with philosophical and religious opinions, and questions of right and wrong. It was the well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to the laws and customs of the land where they were found, and to conform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies; this they did without either affirming or denying the truth of the principles upon which these teachings were based,[1]and also without any passion or strong feeling in regard to them,[2]as nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth Trope accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs, laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that they are also changeable and relative, and not of absolute worth. The foundation-thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his introduction[3]to the life of Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes.[4]As it is apparently one of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much used in discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wide ethical significance, and must also have held an important place in the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophical discussions. The definition[5]in the beginning of Sextus' exposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken from Aristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs and dogmatic opinions,[6]and the definition which Diogenes gives of law in his life of Plato[7]is similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps from Chrysippus.[8]The argument is based upon the differences in development of thought, as affecting the standpoint of judgment in philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which we find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in the variety in religious belief, and in the laws and customs of different countries. Therefore the decisions reached in the world of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding the absolute value of any standards, with those obtained through sense-perception, and the universal conflict of opinion regarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us also according to this Trope to the reserving of the opinion.[9]This Trope is the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly after the first four which relate more especially to human development,[10]while Sextus uses it as the final one, perhaps thinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of man deserves the last place, or is the summation of the other arguments.

[1]Hyp.I. 24.

[2]Hyp.III. 235.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 83.

[5]Hyp.I. 145-147.

[6]Fabricius, Cap. IV. H.

[7]Diog. III. 86.

[8]PappenheimGr. Pyrr. Grundzüge, p. 50.

[9]Hyp.I. 163.

[10]Diog. IX. 11, 83.

Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the older Sceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he attributes to the "later Sceptics."[1]Sextus nowhere mentions the author of these Tropes. Diogenes, however, attributes them to Agrippa, a man of whom we know nothing except his mention of him. He was evidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a scholar of influence in the Sceptical School, who must have himself had disciples, as Diogenes says, οἱ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν[2]add to these tropes other five tropes, using the plural verb. Another Sceptic, also mentioned by Diogenes, and a man unknown from other sources, named some of his books after Agrippa.[3]Agrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of the Sceptical School, but[4]his influence in the development of the thought of the School must have been great, as the transition from the ten Tropes of the "older Sceptics" to the five attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows the entrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in it. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written from an entirely different standpoint. The ten Tropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are rather rules of thought leading to logical proof, and are dialectic in their character. We find this distinction illustrated by the different way in which the Trope of relativity is treated in the two groups. In the first it points to an objective relativity, but with Agrippa to a general subjective logical principle. The originality of the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their substance matter, but in their formulation and use in the Sceptical School. These methods of proof were, of course, not new, but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by the Sceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon,[5]while the πρός τι goes back at least to Protagoras. The five Tropes are as follows.

Two of these are taken from the old list, the first and the third, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are intended to supplement the ten Tropes, and to show the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways.[6]The order of these Tropes is the same with Diogenes as with Sextus, but the definitions of them differ sufficiently to show that the two authors took their material from different sources. According to the first one everything in question is either sensible or intellectual, and in attempting to judge it either in life, practically, or "among philosophers," a position is developed from which it is impossible to reach a conclusion.[7]According to the second, every proof requires another proof, and so on to infinity, and there is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning.[8]According to the third, all perceptions are relative, as the object is colored by the condition of the judge, and the influence of other things around it.[9]According to the fourth, it is impossible to escape from theregressus in infinitumby making a hypothesis the starting point, as the Dogmatics attempt to do.[10]And the fifth, or thecirculus in probando, arises when that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the thing to be proved.

[1]Hyp.I. 164.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 88.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 106.

[4]Diog. IX. 12, 115-116.

[5]Compare Natorp.Op. cit.p. 302.

[6]Hyp.I. 177.

[7]Hyp.I. 165.

[8]Hyp.I. 166.

[9]Hyp.I. 167.

[10]Hyp.I. 168.

Sextus claims that all things can be included in these Tropes, whether sensible or intellectual.[1]For whether, as some say, only the things of sense are true, or as others claim, only those of the understanding, or as still others contend, some things both of sense and understanding are true, a discord must arise that is impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judged by the sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of the intellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the result of all reasoning must be either hypothetical, or fall into theregressus in infinitumor thecirculus in probando.[2]The reference above to some who say that only the things of sense are true, is to Epicurus and Protagoras; to some that only the things of thought are true, to Democritus and Plato; and to those that claimed some of both to be true, to the Stoics and the Peripatetics.[3]The three new Tropes added by Agrippa have nothing to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon the possibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of logic, in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely, with the exception of the tenth, to material objects. Sextus claims that these five Tropes also lead to the suspension of judgment,[4]but their logical result is rather the dogmatic denial of all possibility of knowledge, showing as Hirzel has well demonstrated, far more the influence of the New Academy than the spirit of the Sceptical School.[5]It was the standpoint of the older Sceptics, that although the search for the truth had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers, and Sextus claims to be faithful to this old aim of the Pyrrhonists. He calls himself a seeker,[6]and in reproaching the New Academy for affirming that knowledge is impossible, Sextus says, "Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness."[7]The ten Tropes claim to establish doubt only in regard to a knowledge of the truth, but the five Tropes of Agrippa aim to logically prove the impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that Sextus does not see this decided contrast in the attitude of the two sets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of those of Agrippa, and makes more frequent use of the fifth of these, ό διάλληλος, in his subsequent reasoning than of any other argument.[8]

[1]Hyp.I. 169.

[2]Hyp.I. 170-171.

[3]Adv. Math.VIII. 185-186; VIII. 56; VII. 369.

[4]Hyp.I. 177.

[5]HirzelOp. cit.p. 131.

[6]Hyp.I. 3, 7.

[7]Hyp.I. 227.

[8]See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works.

We find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after the time of Aenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic teaching that—so far as the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the New Academy can be unravelled, and the separation of Pyrrhonism can be understood, at the time that the Academy passed over into eclecticism—was one of the causes of that separation.

It is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great progress in the development of thought. They furnish an organisation of the School far superior to what went before, placing the reasoning on the firm basis of the laws of logic, and simplifying the amount of material to be used. In a certain sense Saisset is correct in saying that Agrippa contributed more than any other in completing the organisation of Scepticism,[1]but it is not correct when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism with which the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony. It was through the very progress shown in the production of these Tropes that the school finally lost the strength of its position.

Not content with having reduced the number of the Tropes from ten to five, others tried to limit the number still further to two.[2]Sextus gives us no hint of the authorship of the two Tropes. Ritter attributes them to Menodotus and his followers, and Zeller agrees with that opinion,[3]while Saisset thinks that Agrippa was also the author of these,[4]which is a strange theory to propound, as some of the material of the five is repeated in the two, and the same man could certainly not appear as an advocate of five, and at the same time of two Tropes.

[1]SaissetOp. cit.p. 237.

[2]Hyp.I. 178.

[3]Zeller III. 38; Ritter IV. 277.

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