PYRRHONIC SKETCHES

[1]Hyp. I. 227.

[2]Hyp. I. 229.

[3]Hyp. I. 230.

[4]Hyp. I. 231.

[5]Hyp. I. 235.

During all the chequered history of the Academy the dormant idealism was there, underlying the outward development. Although during the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference was so slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yet the different foundations on which the two schools stood was always recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of idealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on the other, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in the final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true, especially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of ἐποχή.[1]Both placed great weight on ἰσοσθένεια, or the equal value of opposing arguments.[2]The foundation of the ἐποχή was, however, different in the two cases. Arcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was empirical.

[1]Hyp.I. 232.

[2]Diog. IX. 73;Hyp.II. 130; III. 65.

The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the outer world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannot distinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is impossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in ideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently the existence of all truth, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐπὶ πάντων.[1]The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was possibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be known to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being seekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to give knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such knowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the method. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth, therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to prove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation of the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of Scepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In Pyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic Scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in the theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress upon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2]is utterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches that, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of knowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his actions by the probable.[3]

[1]Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2]Hyp.I. 229.

[3]Compare MaccollOp. cit.39.

After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy, Pyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, and it flourished for over two centuries after our era, and then also disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophical school.

Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism as presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly note the characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, and the causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that every philosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Sceptic remains always in the beginning. This remark may well be applied to Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental philosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of great philosophical progress, but which were never developed to any positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some of them well fitted to prepare the way to idealism. The great idea of the relativity ofVorstellungenis made very prominent by the ten Tropes of ἐποχή. Aenesidemus, in his eight Tropes against aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of causality when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him final, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον. He could not divine that although the result which he presented was logical, it only led to a higher truth. It was reserved for the greatest of modern philosophers to reveal to the world that causality is a condition, and a necessary condition, of thought. When Aenesidemus proved by his seventh Trope that causality is subjective, he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine; yet this conclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy, although Aenesidemus could not himself see it in all its bearings. The great difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is the difference between the materialist and the believer in subjective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of theDing an sich, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end of all his philosophy; to Kant, however, the beginning.

Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstanding its points of fatal weakness, marked service to the world in science, philosophy, ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific thought by emphasising empirical methods of investigation, and by criticising all results founded without sufficient data upon false hypotheses. If, instead of denying the possibility of all science because of the want of a criterion of the truth of phenomena, the Pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a science of phenomena, they might have led the world in scientific progress.[1]Their service to philosophy lay in the stimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmatic beliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought together all the most prominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to test their weakness and expose their contradictions, and this very process of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truth which they contained.

Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church Fathers with corrupting religious belief, and yet the greatest service which Pyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethical lines. This service did not, naturally, consist in destroying belief in absolute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in preparing the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious teachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and to put in practical use the right of reason and free discussion.

Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience and rational criticism,[2]and the absolute right of scientific thought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none of the benefits of their own system. They remained, as it were, always on the threshold of possible progress. With the keys to great discoveries in their hands, the doors of philosophical and scientific advancement were for ever closed to them by the limitations of their own system. The inherent weakness of Pyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in its negative character. I think that we may safely say that Pyrrhonism was the most consistent system of Scepticism ever offered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly that complete Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may give up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are ideas that are popularly accepted, he will be called a Sceptic, as was the case with Hume. He must, however, replace these ideas by others equally positive, and then he is no longer a Sceptic, but a Dogmatic, for he believes in something.

[1]Compare LewesOp. cit.p. 463.

[2]Compare ChaignetOp. cit.p. 460.

We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absolute Scepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised what consistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almost every page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not a paragraph of his books in which he does not, after all, dogmatise on some subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to the fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves some affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and therefore some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, and others advocated ἀφασία[1]as one of the doctrines of their system.

[1]Hyp.I. 192.

The very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. Ἀταραξία was only another name for happiness, and in one instance, even, is given as ἡδονή, and thus, in spite of themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness. Pyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, and thought that he had found it in ἀταραξία, the peace of mind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms. The difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, and Epicureans was more apparent than real. To them all philosophy was a path to lead to happiness. The method of Pyrrhonism was, however, negative. Its strength consisted in its attacks on Dogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for its positive side could not be recognised according to its own doctrines. Therefore there was no real development in Pyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed.

We find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, no growth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement in methods. Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim, as that would form, as we have shown, a psychological contradiction. The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, but passivity can never lead to progress. Much of the polemical work of Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by providing a vast store of scientific data, but progress was to the Pyrrhonists impossible. They sounded their own scientific death-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, and putting an end to all theories.

The life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the attempt to find the hidden truth. To the Sceptic there was no truth, and there could be no progress. As progress is a law in the evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophy could never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism in religion can be a lasting influence. Both of them are only outgrowths. As the foundation principles of Scepticism were opposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that could never originate anything. Pyrrho taught from the beginning that the Sceptic must live according to law and custom; not, however, because one law or custom is better than another in itself, but simply for the sake of peace. This basis of action was itself a death-blow to all reform in social or political life. It was a selfish, negative way of seeking what was, after all, a positive thing, the ἀταραξία that the Sceptic desired. Life with the Pyrrhonist was phenomenal, and not phenomenal simply in regard to the outer world, but also subjectively, and no absolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personal existence was possible.

The cause of the downfall of Pyrrhonism lay in the fact that it had nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it had destroyed. It made no appeal to human sympathies, and ignored all the highest motives to human action. The especial materialistic standpoint from which Pyrrhonism judged all that pertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal, and all possibility of absolute truth. It was an expression of the philosophic decadence of the age when it flourished, and although it possessed some philosophic worth, yet it bore in itself the causes of its decay.

The Principal Differences between Philosophers.

It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will either find it as they continue the search, will deny that it can be found and confess it to be out of reach, or will go on seeking it. Some have said, accordingly, in regard to the things sought in philosophy, that theyhave found the truth, while others have declared it impossible to find, and still others continue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are those who are especially called Dogmatics, as for example, the Schools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others. Those who havedeclared it impossible to find are Clitomachus, Carneades, with their respective followers, and other Academicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. It appears therefore, reasonable to conclude that the three principal kindsof philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the other Schools, but as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline of it, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be said do we speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, but we shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us.

Ways of Treating Scepticism.

One way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called general, and the other special. The general method is that by which we set forth the character of Scepticism, declaring what its idea is, what its principles are, its mode of reasoning, its criterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt, οί τρόποι τῆς ὲποχῆς, and the way in which we should understand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. The special method, on the contrary, is that by which wespeak against each part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Scepticism at first in the general way, beginning our delineation with the nomenclature of the Sceptical School.

The Nomenclature of Scepticism.

The Sceptical School is also called the "Seeking School,"from its spirit of research and examination; the "Suspending School," from the condition of mind in which one is left after the search, in regard to the things that he has examined; and the "Doubting School," either because, as some say, the Sceptics doubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because they never know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called the Pyrrhonean School, because Pyrrho appears to us the best representative of Scepticism, and is more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it.

What is Scepticism?

The δύναμις of the Sceptical School is to place thephenomenal in opposition to the intellectual "in any way whatever," and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and things (ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων) opposed to each other, to reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, ἐποχή, and afterwards that of imperturbability, ἀταραξία. We do not use the word δύναμις in anyunusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. By the phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place the intellectual in opposition to it. The phrase "in any way whatever," may refer to the word δύναμις in order that we may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or it may refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in opposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in a variety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and the intellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say "in any way whatever," in order that all methods of opposition may be included. Or "in any way whatever" may refer to the phenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask how does the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived, but that we may understand these things in a simple sense. By "reasons opposed to each other," we do not by any meansunderstand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that they offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality in regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the reasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should not excel another in trustworthiness. ἐποχή is a holding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither deny nor affirm anything. ἀταραξία is repose and tranquillity of soul. We shall explain how ἀταραξία accompanies ἐποχή when we speak of the aim.

The Sceptic.

What is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can beunderstood from the idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonean, namely, who identifies himself with this system.

The Origin of Scepticism.

Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope ofattaining ἀταραξία; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed by the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to believe, began to question what things are true, and what false, hoping to attain ἀταραξία as a result of the decision. The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas.

Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?

We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We donot say this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing that is unknown. Furthermore,he does not dogmatise even when he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are unknown, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or any of the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he assumes that the saying "All is false," includes itself with other things as false, and likewise the saying "Nothing is true"; in the same way "Nothing more," states that together with other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself therefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in regard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he dogmatises,the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings in such a way that they are understood to be themselves included, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying these things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae is that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own feelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in regard to external objects.

Is Scepticism a Sect?

We respond in a similar way if we are asked whetherScepticism is a sect or not. If the word sect is defined as meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in conformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogma means an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply that we have no sect. If, however, one means bysect, a school which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena, and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live rightly, not understanding "rightly" as referring to virtue only, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be able to suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect. For we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon phenomena, and which shows us how to live according to the habits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our own feelings.

Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?

We reply similarly also to the question whether theSceptic should study natural science. For we do not study natural science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding any of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also for the sake of ἀταραξία. In the same way we study the logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy.

Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?

Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomenaappear to me to be in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we do not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead us to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena. When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears to be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question, not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the phenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is sweet. This we concede, for we experiencesweetness through sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however, argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness of the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown, so as not to rashly follow it?

The Criterion of Scepticism.

It is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomenafrom what we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. The word criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a proof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shall speak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers to action, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, in doing some things and refraining from doing others, and it is about this that we shall now speak. We say, consequently, that the criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and in callingit so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted, as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling. Hence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so, but one questions if it is as it appears. Therefore, as we cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily life, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an unprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertainsto the daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the necessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. It is directed by the guidance ofnature, for by nature we are capable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of the feelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; by the traditions of laws and customs, for according to them we consider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by the teaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts we undertake. We say all these things, however, without expressing a decided opinion.

What is the aim of Scepticism?

It follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of theSceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things are done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other words, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say, then, that the aim of the Sceptic is ἀταραξία in those things which pertain to the opinion, and moderation in the things that life imposes. For as soon as he beganto philosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas, and to understand which are true and which are false, in order to attain ἀταραξία. He met, however, with contradictions of equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withheld his opinion; and while his judgment was in suspension ἀταραξία followed, as if by chance, in regard to matters of opinion. For he who is of the opinion thatanything is either good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when he does not possess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he is tortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursues those that he thinks to be good. Having acquired them, however, he falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyond reason and without measure from fear of a change, and he does everything in his power to retain the things that seem to him good. But he who is undecided, on the contrary,regarding things that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoids anything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of ἀταραξία. For that which is related of Apelles the painter happened to the Sceptic. It is said that as he was once painting a horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the picture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it up and threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the colors from the painting. As soon, however, as it touched the picture it produced a good copy of the foam. The Sceptics likewisehoped to gain ἀταραξία by forming judgments in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension ἀταραξία followed, as if by chance, as the shadow follows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic wholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are inevitable. We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, and that he suffers in such ways. But in these things even the ignorant are beset intwo ways, from the feelings themselves, and not less also from the fact that they think these conditions are bad by nature. The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, as he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature. Therefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is ἀταραξία in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in those things that are inevitable. Some notable Sceptics have added also suspension of judgment in investigation.

The General Method of Scepticism.

Since we have said that ἀταραξία follows the suspensionof judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to explain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking in general it takes place through placing things in opposition to each other. We either place phenomena in opposition to phenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, or reciprocally. For example, weplace phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower appears round from a distance but square near by; the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to prove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil, and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no providence. The intellectual isplaced in opposition to phenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is white, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water is black, snow must also be black. Likewise we sometimes place the present in opposition to the present, similarly to the above-mentioned cases, and sometimes also the present in opposition to the past or the future. As for example, when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say to him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belongwas born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now seems to be strong." Inorder to make it clearer to us what we mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Tropes (τρόποι), through which the suspension of judgment is produced, without asserting anything about their meaning or their number, because they may be unsound, or there may be more than I shall enumerate.

The Ten Tropes.

Certain Tropes were commonly handed down by theolder Sceptics, by means of which ἐποχή seems to take place. They are ten in number, and are called synonymously λόγοι and τρόποι. They are these: The first is based upon the differences in animals; the second upon the differences in men; the third upon the difference in the constitution of the organs of sense; the fourth upon circumstances; the fifth upon position, distance, and place; the sixth upon mixtures; the seventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects; the eighth upon relation; theninth upon frequency or rarity of occurences; the tenth upon systems, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. We make this order ourselves. TheseTropes come under three general heads: the standpoint of the judge, the standpoint of the thing judged, and the standpoint of both together. Under the standpoint of the judge come the first four, for the judge is either an animal, or a man, or a sense, and exists under certain circumstances. Under the standpoint of that which is judged, come the seventh and the tenth. Under the one composed of both together, come the fifth and the sixth, the eighth and the ninth. Again, these three divisions are included under the Tropeof relation, because that is the most general one; it includes the three special divisions, and these in turn include the ten. We say these things in regard to their probable number, and we proceed in the following chapter to speak of their meaning.

The first Trope, we said, is the one based upon thedifferences in animals, and according to this Trope, different animals do not get the same ideas of the same objects through the senses. This we conclude from the different origin of the animals, and also from the difference in the constitution of their bodies. In regard to the difference in origin, some animals originate without mixture of the sexes, while others originate through sexual intercourse. Ofthose which originate without intercourse of the sexes, some come from fire, as the little animals which appear in the chimneys, others from stagnant water, as musquitoes, others from fermented wine, as the stinging ants, others from the earth, others from the mud, like the frogs, others from slime, as the worms, others from donkeys, as the beetles, others from cabbage, as caterpillars, others from fruit, as the gall insect from the wild figs, others from putrified animals, as bees from bulls, and wasps from horses. Again, of those originating from intercourse ofthe sexes, some come from animals of the same kind, as in most cases, and others from those of different kinds, as mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, as men, others from eggs, as birds, and others are born a lump of flesh, as bears. It is probable therefore, that theinequalities and differences in origin cause great antipathies in the animals, and the result is incompatibility, discord, and conflict between the sensations of the different animals. Again, the differences in the principal parts of the body,especially in those fitted by nature to judge and to perceive, may cause the greatest differences in their ideas of objects, according to the differences in the animals themselves. As for example, those who have the jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white, and those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red. Accordingly, as some animals have yellow eyes, and others blood-shot ones, and still others whitish ones, and others eyes of other colors, it is probable, I think, that they have a different perception of colors. Furthermore, when we look steadilyat the sun for a long time, and then look down at a book, the letters seem to us gold colored, and dance around. Now some animals have by nature a lustre in their eyes, and these emit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night, and we may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear the same to them as to us. Jugglers bylightly rubbing the wick of the lamp with metal rust, or with the dark yellow fluid of the sepia, make those who are present appear now copper-colored and now black, according to the amount of the mixture used; if this be so it is much more reasonable to suppose that because of the mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals, their ideas of objects would be different. Furthermore, whenwe press the eye on the side, the figures, forms and sizes of things seen appear elongated and narrow. It is therefore probable that such animals as have the pupil oblique and long, as goats, cats, and similar animals, have ideas different from those of the animals which have a round pupil. Mirrors according to their different construction, sometimesshow the external object smaller than reality, as concave ones, and sometimes long and narrow, as the convex ones do; others show the head of the one looking into it down, and the feet up. As some of the vessels around the eyefall entirely outside the eye, on account of their protuberance, while others are more sunken, and still others are placed in an even surface, it is probable that for this reason also the ideas vary, and dogs, fishes, lions, men, and grasshoppers do not see the same things, either of the same size, or of similar form, but according to the impression on the organ of sight of each animal respectively. The same thing is true in regard to the other senses;for how can it be said that shell-fish, birds of prey, animals covered with spines, those with feathers and those with scales would be affected in the same way by the sense of touch? and how can the sense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have the narrowest auditory passages, and in those that are furnished with the widest, or in those with hairy ears and those with smooth ones? For we, even, hear differently when we partially stop up the ears, from what we do when we use them naturally. The sense of smellalso varies according to differences in animals, since even our sense of smell is affected when we have taken cold and the phlegm is too abundant, and also when parts around our head are flooded with too much blood, for we then avoid odors that seem agreeable to others, and feel as if we were injured by them. Since also some of the animals are moist by nature and full of secretions, and others are very full of blood, and still others have either yellow or black bile prevalent and abundant, it is reasonable because of this to think that odorous things appear different to each one of them. And it is the same inregard to things of taste, as some animals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist. We too, when we have a dry tongue in fever, think that whatever we take is gritty, bad tasting, or bitter; and this we experience because of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to be in us. Since, then, different animals have different organs for taste, and a greater or less amount of the various humors, it can well be that they form different ideas of the same objects as regards their taste. For just as the samefood on being absorbed becomes in some places veins, in other places arteries, and in other places bones, nerves, or other tissues, showing different power according to the difference of the parts receiving it; just as the same water absorbed by the trees becomes in some places bark, in other places branches, and in other places fruit, perhaps a fig or a pomegranate, or something else; just as the breath ofthe musician, one and the same when blown into the flute, becomes sometimes a high tone and sometimes a low one, and the same pressure of the hand upon the lyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone, so it is natural to suppose that external objects are regarded differently according to the different constitution of the animals which perceive them. We may see this moreclearly in the things that are sought for and avoided by animals. For example, myrrh appears very agreeable to men and intolerable to beetles and bees. Oil also, which is useful to men, destroys wasps and bees if sprinkled on them; and sea-water, while it is unpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it, is most agreeable and sweet to fishes. Swine also prefer to wash in vile filth rather thanin pure clean water. Furthermore, some animals eat grass and some eat herbs; some live in the woods, others eat seeds; some are carnivorous, and others lactivorous; some enjoy putrified food, and others fresh food; some raw food and others that which is prepared by cooking; and in general that which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal to others, and should be avoided by them. Thushemlock makes the quail fat, and henbane the hogs, and these, as it is known, enjoy eating lizards; deer also eat poisonous animals, and swallows, the cantharidae. Moreover, ants and flying ants, when swallowed by men, cause discomfort and colic; but the bear, on the contrary, whatever sickness he may have, becomes stronger by devouring them. The viper is benumbed if one twig of the oaktouches it, as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree. The elephant flees before the ram, and the lion before the cock, and seals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded, and the tiger from the sound of the drum. Many other examples could be given, but that we may not seem to dwell longer than is necessary on this subject, we conclude by saying that since the same things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others, and the pleasure and displeasure depend on the ideas, it must be that different animals have different ideas of objects. And since thesame things appear different according to the difference in the animals, it will be possible for us to say how the external object appears to us, but as to how it is in reality we shall suspend our judgment. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own ideas and those of other animals, being ourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more in need of being judged than being ourselves able to judge. And furthermore, we cannot give thepreference to our own mental representations over those of other animals, either without evidence or with evidence, for besides the fact that perhaps there is no evidence, as we shall show, the evidence so called will be either manifest to us or not. If it is not manifest to us, then we cannot accept it with conviction; if it is manifest to us, since the question is in regard to what is manifest to animals, and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us who are animals, then it is to be questioned if it is true as it is manifest to us. It is absurd, however, to try tobase the questionable on the questionable, because the same thing is to be believed and not to be believed, which is certainly impossible. The evidence is to be believed in so far as it will furnish a proof, and disbelieved in so far as it is itself to be proved. We shall therefore have no evidence according to which we can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-called irrational animals. Since therefore ideas differ according to the difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them, it is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external objects.

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