CHAPTER VIIITHE NINETY-SECOND DIVISION

CHAPTER VIIITHE NINETY-SECOND DIVISION

The Ninety-second Division gave to the Negroes of the United States the opportunity which they had long desired, namely, organization into fighting units commanded largely by Negro men. In its creation Negroes were drafted from all sections of the country and from all walks of life. The largest group of Negro officers ever commissioned served with this division, which was not trained in one camp, as was true with other divisions in the National Army, but whose various units were distributed among seven camps, extending from Camp Funston,Kan., to Camp Upton,N. Y.The units were stationed as follows:

As the headquarters troops, the military police, the 317th ammunition, sanitary, and supply trains were all organized and trained with the headquarters of the Division at Camp Funston, there was great enthusiasm for achievement among these troops, and an earnest effort was made to have them attain the highest possible efficiency. Being close to the inspiration and brains of the Division, they set the standard for the other units. By their wonderful progress moreover they changed the attitude of the camp in regard to Negro soldiers and developed in themselves and in their commanding officers greater confidence in their ability.

The infantry regiments were probably the best known, not only among the Negro people but in Army circles as well. Negroes had made a glorious record in this branch of the service and were naturally expected to defend that record. The thousands of soldiers inducted into the Division, and especially those drawn into the four infantry regiments, began their training resolved that they would live up to the traditions of the past. Every man realized that he was representing a confident and loyal people who prayed and hoped for the success of the Division, who followed every step of its progress, and who rejoiced with every victory and sorrowed at every failure. The men were fully conscious of their responsibility and began their work with enthusiasm.

From reveille to retreat the recruits were carried through intensive training, which included physical exercise, a study of the articles of war, practice marching, use of the bayonet, shooting, the use of grenades, and signal and semaphore work. Besides their program of purely military instruction they were given lectures on personal hygiene and first aid that prepared them to be not only good soldiers but also better men. From five to seven months of such training showed wonderful results in every regiment. Undeveloped young men from the farms and cotton-fields of the South learned to stand erect and to walk with a firm step, and they were also made to feel that America expected each of them to do a man’s work.

So well did Negroes absorb this training that they were often considered the best drilled and best disciplined organizations in the camps where they were trained. This was said to be true, for instance, of the 367th Infantry, commonly known as the “Buffaloes,” which was trained at Camp Upton. It paraded in New York City on Washington’s Birthday, 1918, when it was presented with colors by the Union League Club. The 368th was reviewed by President Wilson in Baltimore during a Liberty Loan drive. At such times the press of the country carried articles commending the Negro men for their martial appearance and wonderful marching, and this praise not only developed a greater pride in themselves but caused other Americans to recognize their real value as soldiers.

The organization of the 92nd Division made it necessary to train Negroes in other branches of service than the infantry. The mere suggestion of Negro artillery regiments brought laughter from some old Army men, and even officers assigned to train the soldiers in this branch of the service were dubious as to their success. However, three artillery regiments were organized and the experiment proved a success. After seven months of hard work at Camps Dix and Meade these regiments were ready to sail to France, where they were to receive additional training before doing combat duty. Specialist details, composed of “non-coms,” were given intensive training, and before leaving the States they were able to calculate firing data, to use the various American optical instruments, to connect up and use the field telephones, to signal, and to perform efficiently the work connected with the occupation of a position.

In the three machine-gun battalions—the 349th, 350th, and 351st, trained at Camps Funston, Grant, and Upton respectively—it was found that Negroes immediately grasped the intricacies of the machine-gun and soon excelled in its mechanical manipulation. Ignorant men, those unable either to read or to write, could take apart and assemble every part of a gun to the minutest spring. As in other branches, they worked with a will to succeed, and learned map-reading, trench-digging, the use of dug-outs, and the construction of shafts and camouflaged machine-gun emplacements, all of which knowledge was to be essential when they met the enemy in France. They also mastered the drill and made a splendid record on the range. In the Division overseas a machine-gun school was also started, in charge ofLieut.Benjamin H. Mosby, a Negro officer, one of the main objects being to make machine-gun officers out of infantry officers. More than two hundred men attended this course.

The organization of the 325th Signal Corps marked the first time in the history of the country when Negro men were placed in this branch of the service. Before the organization of this unit was completed, a representative of the War Department visited Negro educational institutions and explained the qualifications for this branch of the service. As a result, men with superior technical and academic training were inducted into it. The work was new to most of the men, but their training enabled them to master it rapidly, so much so that they surprised the higher officials. The corps was organized and trained at Camp Sherman, and six officers were raised from the ranks. The unit boasted of having one of the best health records in France; not one case of venereal disease was discovered in it. The story is told of one man who, though he could scarcely write his name when he entered the service, was able, at the time of the Armistice, to take messages at the rate of twenty-five words a minute.

The distribution of the troops in the Division handicapped the administration somewhat. Orders were delayed in transmission, and it was impossible to correlate the activities of the several arms of the service; nor could the Division assemble for a review. The first opportunity the different units had of meeting came when they were ordered to join the American Army in France and met at Hoboken, June 10, 1918, just before sailing. After an exciting voyage all the units arrived safely at Brest; and after a short stay at Camp Pontenazen, the headquarters troops and infantry regiments went on to Bourbonne-les-Bains, making the four-day trip in crowded French box cars.

Bourbonne-les-Bains is a beautiful old city, located in Haute-Marne at the end of a valley encircled by a picturesque chain of hills. The people were hospitable and welcomed the soldiers into their homes and places of amusement. While the atmosphere was restful, however, the task before the Division was eminently serious. Eight weeks of intensive training were given in the methods of modern warfare, and terrain exercises and tactical problems worked out. The men perfected themselves in shooting, in the use of the bayonet and grenades, and in signal work and trench-digging.

The three artillery regiments, comprising the 167th Field Artillery Brigade, on reaching France were stationed at different centers for six weeks of intensive training—the 349th and 350th at Montmorillion and the 351st at Lathus. Finally the brigade was mobilized at La Courtine. Here instruction was given in radio, telephone, and motor operations, dug-out construction, gun emplacement, and range work. Even after they reached France, there was still doubt in the minds of some as to whether the Negro men would make artillerymen. A French officer, however, came to test the barrage made by the 350th Artillery, and after it had been put over, he jumped up and clapped his hands, saying that it was the fastest and the most accurate he had ever seen put over. In all the training area of the 92nd Division unusually fine relations existed between the soldiers and the French people.

From Bourbonne-les-Bains the infantry regiments and headquarters troops were moved to Bruyères, and it was here that they heard for the first time the roar of the big guns. Here also it was that the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing, first visited the division. After spending twelve days in securing necessary equipment, all moved toSt.Die. Here the Americans were welcomed as deliverers. The Germans had occupied the city for fourteen days in 1914 and because of their treatment the people had learned to hate them. The bishop’s house and the church, more than six hundred years old, were used as headquarters.

Because of the nature of the terrain theSt.Die sector was usually quiet and for this reason it was used for schooling divisions of recruits, who often got here their baptism of fire before leaving. There was a little bathing pool in “No Man’s Land,” and it was said that at certain times, by agreement between the Germans and the French, each had access to it without being fired upon. The 6th Division of the American Army, however, which occupied the sector before it was given over to the 92nd, fired on every German that ventured forth. When the French said that such action would precipitate offensive tactics, the Americans insisted that this was their purpose. The 92nd Division accordingly found the enemy active when it entered the sector. While there was no major offensive, raiding parties from both sides were frequent and patrol duty was very necessary.

TheSt.Die sector will always be remembered by the men of the 92nd Division because it was there that they received their first casualties. The first man killed was Private Moses Justice, Company H, 365th Infantry. He had worked as a farmer and enlisted from Marietta, Ohio. While on patrol duty September 2, 1918, SecondLieut.Thomas J. Bullock, Company D, 367th Infantry, was killed, the first officer in the division to fall. In this sector the Negro soldiers remained until September 21, 1918, when they were ordered to the Meuse-Argonne region, the 81st Division, known as the “Wildcats,” relieving the 92nd when it entrained.

Between September 21 and 23 the 92nd Division was carried from theSt.Die sector to the Argonne region, and by September 24 various units had been assigned a place in the big drive scheduled for the 25th. Headquarters were at Beauchamps Farm and Triacourt, and the division was attached to the First Army Corps.

On September 23 the 368th Infantry was assigned to the 38th French Army Corps, commanded by General Durand. It was given a position on the right bank of the Aisne, north of Vienne-Le-Château and La Harozee and 500 meters west of Binarville. The Second Battalion of the regiment, which was in the front line, on September 26 “reconnoitered the enemy trench position opposite it and progressed at a slow pace, because of the abundance of wire, until the right half had made an advance of three kilometers, where it met with strong opposition of machine-gun nests.” The Third Battalion, according to plan, supported the advance of the second. On September 27 both were ordered to attack, the objective being the Trench du Dromadaire. The Second Battalion progressed two kilometers against machine-gun fire and the third reached the enemy trench line. On September 28 the objective of the two battalions remained unchanged.

As these two battalions advanced and were subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and enemy artillery barrage, the major commanding the second was relieved of duty because of physical exhaustion. The Third Battalion was within two hundred meters of its objective when, under heavy fire, a portion of the line of an advance company broke and withdrew to the rear. This company was reorganized and the attack was resumed, but again the line broke. In spite of the action of some of their comrades, however,Capt.R. A. Williams and FirstLieut.T. M. Dent held their position with the part of the company with them until the following day, when they were relieved by the 9th Cuirassiers, a French regiment.

As to the withdrawals, it was stated by company officers that “some one, identity unknown, ordered a retreat.” Secretary Baker’s report on this affair said that “there is strongly supported evidence that orders from some quarters were carried forward by runners directing the withdrawal, although orders had been given ... that no withdrawal order, not in writing and signed by the battalion commander, should be obeyed. The investigation showed that no such written order had been issued.” The First Battalion, which had been in reserve, was placed in the front line to renew the attack. It joined the French in the advance on Binarville and progressed until the leading company reached and passed by 200 meters the objective that had been given the regiment. The advance covered four and a half kilometers and 11 prisoners and 5 machine-guns were captured. The total casualties, including killed, wounded, and gassed, were 9 officers and 269 enlisted men. The commanding officer’s report of this engagement said that there was insufficient use of the infantry rifle. Although machine-guns and Stokes mortars were with each battalion ready and seeking opportunity for action, the character of the terrain prevented their use. This sector, which had been held alternately by the French and Germans during the war, consisted of a rolling country, cut up by ravines and covered with the debris of the Argonne Forest, blasted by four years of shell fire; and it was interlaced by solid wire defences of all kinds.Col.F. R. Brown, who was in command during the engagement, said of the regiment: “It deserves commendation for successfully performing its original mission of liaison between the 38th (French) Corps and the 77th Division (U. S.). It deserves commendation as a whole for successfully advancing as rapidly as did the French units on our left, in spite of the many difficulties encountered.”

As a result of the withdrawals of the Third Battalion of the 368th Infantry during the Argonne engagement, rumors spread in both France and America that the 92nd Division had been charged with “cowardice before the enemy.” So great was the confidence of the Negro people in the bravery of their soldiers, based upon the deeds of a glorious past, that such rumors seemed almost unbelievable; and when the men in other regiments of the division heard the reports, many of them begged for an opportunity to go to the front. The final report of the Secretary of War, however, somewhat allayed the rumors. He said: “The circumstances disclosed by a detailed study of the situation do not justify many of the highly colored accounts which have been given of the behavior of the troops in this action, and they afford no basis at all for any of the general assumptions with regard to the action of colored troops in this battle or elsewhere in France. On the contrary, it is to be noted that many colored officers, and particularly three in the very battalion here under discussion, were decorated with Distinguished Service Crosses for extraordinary heroism under fire.”

The Division remained in the Argonne until October 5, 1918, when it was ordered to the Marbache sector, where it remained until the signing of the Armistice. It was in this sector that the best fighting was done. During the quiet days between October 5 and November 8, considerable patrol work was carried on. Some of the enemy soldiers were killed and others captured, and a number of 92nd soldiers met a similar fate. Active operations began November 8, the 183rd Infantry Brigade holding the portion of the Allied line east of the Moselle River, extending from Pont-à-Mousson to Marbache. On the morning of November 10 an attack was executed on Bois Frehaut by the Second Battalion of the 365th Regiment, commanded by Major Warner A. Ross. A similar attack was made on Bois Voivrotte by two platoons of the Second Battalion of the 366th Infantry, commanded by Major A. E. Sawkins. Each battalion was supported by its machine-gun company and had the co-operation of the divisional artillery. Trench mortars and 37 M. M. guns were to support the attack, the object being to capture and hold the above named places and advance the line of observation in the sector. On the afternoon of November 9 the Second Battalion of the 365th Infantry was placed in Pont-à-Mousson and the Second Battalion of the 366th in Forêt de Facq in preparation for the attack which was to be made at 5 a. m. on November 10. The hour was changed from 5 to 7 in order that the 92nd Division might co-operate with the Second American Army, which was to launch its drive at that time. By 8.12 a. m. the Second Battalion of the 366th had completely occupied Bois Voivrotte and taken three prisoners, and by 11.45 the Second Battalion of the 365th completely occupied Bois Frehaut, although it had been heavily shelled with gas and high explosives. After the first objectives had been successfully reached, reinforcements were brought forward and a new attack launched on the strong enemy positions of Champey, Bouxières, La Côte, and Bois Cheminot at 5 a. m. on November 11. The troops making the attack were met by the strong artillery, machine-gun and infantry fire of the enemy. However, by 7.30 they had reached the outskirts of Bouxières and Bois Cheminot. Then a telephone message from headquarters, ordering all hostilities to cease, stopped the advance of the 92nd Division, which was sweeping the enemy before it. The opposing units engaged between the Moselle and Seille rivers were the 86th and 30th Regiments of infantry, the 31st Landwehr Brigade, and the 47th Infantry Regiment. They were supported by one battalion of sharpshooters. East of the Seille River were the 70th Infantry Regiment and the 6th Grenadiers.

In the report of the commanding general of the 183rd Infantry Brigade on the offensive operations in this sector in the last engagement during the Great War,Brig. Gen.Malvern Hill Barnum made the following summary and conclusion:

“The advance of the brigade in this battle, most of which was made on the east banks of the Moselle River was 3½ kilometers. It was against heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and high concentration of gas. In order to drive the enemy from their strongly fortified positions all forms of auxiliary arms, such as machine-guns, Stokes mortars, 37 M. M. guns, and rifle grenades, were effectively used against them. The divisional artillery supported this attack with a rolling barrage, which was well laid. It also placed a heavy concentration fire on German machine-gun nests, completely routing the enemy.“A great part of this attack was executed over an open, sloping terrain, heavily wired, which was completely controlled by German artillery. The Bois Frehaut and Bois Voivrotte were woods protected with heavy German wire and were filled with machine-gun nests, trench mortars, light artillery, and infantry. The enemy was driven from his strongholds with a loss of six prisoners and approximately the following material: 1000 grenades, all types; 5000 rounds ammunition; 25 boxes M. G. ammunition, in belts; 50 rifles and bayonets; 10 pairs field glasses; 4 machine-guns; 6 carrier pigeons; 1 signal lamp and battery; 2 Very pistols; 3 carbide lamps; 100 helmets. Many overcoats, boots, canteens, belts, and other articles of equipment were left by the fleeing enemy.“In this advance the brigade suffered the following casualties in the 365th and 366th Infantry and the 350th Machine-Gun Battalion: killed, 32; wounded, 119; gassed, 285; missing, 8; total, 444.”

“The advance of the brigade in this battle, most of which was made on the east banks of the Moselle River was 3½ kilometers. It was against heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and high concentration of gas. In order to drive the enemy from their strongly fortified positions all forms of auxiliary arms, such as machine-guns, Stokes mortars, 37 M. M. guns, and rifle grenades, were effectively used against them. The divisional artillery supported this attack with a rolling barrage, which was well laid. It also placed a heavy concentration fire on German machine-gun nests, completely routing the enemy.

“A great part of this attack was executed over an open, sloping terrain, heavily wired, which was completely controlled by German artillery. The Bois Frehaut and Bois Voivrotte were woods protected with heavy German wire and were filled with machine-gun nests, trench mortars, light artillery, and infantry. The enemy was driven from his strongholds with a loss of six prisoners and approximately the following material: 1000 grenades, all types; 5000 rounds ammunition; 25 boxes M. G. ammunition, in belts; 50 rifles and bayonets; 10 pairs field glasses; 4 machine-guns; 6 carrier pigeons; 1 signal lamp and battery; 2 Very pistols; 3 carbide lamps; 100 helmets. Many overcoats, boots, canteens, belts, and other articles of equipment were left by the fleeing enemy.

“In this advance the brigade suffered the following casualties in the 365th and 366th Infantry and the 350th Machine-Gun Battalion: killed, 32; wounded, 119; gassed, 285; missing, 8; total, 444.”

This attack, on the last two days of the war, was made in a sector that had been organized for four years. It was in front of the great fortress of Metz and was occupied by young, efficient soldiers of the most famous military power in the world. Yet against this opposition the inexperienced Negro troops took complete possession of “No Man’s Land,” constantly remaining on the offensive until the enemy had been pushed back three and a half kilometers.

The Congressional Record of February 28, 1919, contains the following statement concerning the First Battalion of the 367th Infantry of the 92nd Division: “The entire first battalion of the three hundred and sixty-seventh (Buffaloes) Infantry was cited for bravery, and awarded the Croix de Guerre, thus entitling every officer and man in the battalion to wear this distinguished French decoration. This citation was made by the French Commission because of the splendid service and bravery shown by this battalion in the last engagement of the war.” The writer has been unable to find a copy of the citation in the War Department records; but because it did appear in the Congressional Record as indicated and also given publicity in the newspapers of the country, it is included in the story of the 92nd Division.

The various other units in the Division contributed their share toward developing the efficiency which it attained. The 167th Field Artillery Brigade surprised not only old Army officers but Americans generally by the ability of the men to absorb training, which was fully demonstrated when they forced the enemy to retire from strong fortifications held for four years. It had been thought that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find Negro men with adaptability for this work; yet sometimes it developed that non-commissioned officers were better at taking messages than their instructors. The most surprising thing about the Negro gunner was the rapidity with which he was able to fire. One gun crew in the 349th Artillery fired four rounds in 62⁄5seconds with the French 75’s, while another crew was making four shots in 7½ seconds. A striking example of the efficiency of the artillery was the manner in which it laid down a barrage at Pregny for a unit of the 78th Division and its own division without endangering the lives of the men in the infantry.

It was during the last days of the war, from November 4 to 11, in the fighting around Bois Frehaut, Bois de la Voivrotte, Cheminot, Pagny, and Bois de la Côte, that Negro artillerymen did their most effective work. At daybreak on November 4 the 349th laid down a rolling barrage to cover the advance on Cheminot of a patrol of the 365th Infantry. This was followed by a box barrage continuing nearly an hour, during which time 1062 shells were fired. On November 6 the regiment was again called upon for a rolling barrage through Bois Frehaut and a combing fire in Bois Voivrotte, to be followed by a standing barrage in front of Champey and Bouxières. Two hundred and fifty rounds were fired in the combing fire, and 2033 in the rolling and box barrages. The accuracy of the Negro artillerymen reduced the resistance of the enemy and enabled the 92nd Division infantry to reach its objectives without great loss. The action in co-operation with the infantry was carefully watched by officials, who commended the brigade on “the good execution of the Rolling and Standing Barrage” and also said that the good work was being favorably commented on by those “higher up.” Because of the qualities displayed by both officers and men in this sector, General John H. Sherburne, who commanded the 167th Field Artillery Brigade, commended them in orders on November 18, 1918, saying, “You have been zealous soldiers and skillful artillerymen.... By day and night, often under the hail of shrapnel, often through clouds of deadly gas, you have marched and fought, dragged your guns sometimes by hand into line, kept up your lines of communication and brought up your supplies, always with a cheerfulness that earned you the admiration of all.” Colonel Wade H. Carpenter, of the 351st Field Artillery, was a West Point graduate and a South Carolinian by birth. Although he too had been doubtful of success at first, in the end he was no less enthusiastic about the achievements of his regiment. Under date December 27, 1918, he said to his command: “When you landed in France you were acclaimed as comrades in arms, brothers in a great cause. In the days that have passed no man, no little child, has had cause to regret that first glorious welcome. Surrounded by new and unusual conditions, beset by subtle temptations, you have kept your hearts high and, with purpose fixed on the high ideal of service, you have put away those things that did not contribute strength for the task at hand. You have been men.... Through rain and in tents or in cold billets you have cheerfully pushed on to fit yourself for the final test and at length you came to the front lines. There, under fire, by day and by night you served the pieces, sending back gas for gas and shell for shell, two for one. The orders reached the guns because you maintained the connections; the ammunition was there because neither the elements nor enemy stopped you. This mission has been accomplished and you have been what America expects her sons to be—brave soldiers.”

In the proposed drive against Metz, which was to have been the greatest battle of the entire war, the 167th Field Artillery Brigade had been selected to support the Second Army, of which the 92nd Division was a part. Such confidence on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. clearly shows that the Negro artilleryman had proved beyond doubt his ability to become proficient in this branch of service.

This brigade was able to accomplish what it did because the men were eager to learn and easily disciplined. No task was too dangerous or too difficult for them. They kept their lines of communication intact under all conditions. The six colored officers who were graduated at Fort Sill and who remained with the brigade throughout the campaign in France, greatly contributed to the morale and did excellent work in handling and instructing the men. The Negro non-commissioned officers were also an important factor. They took advantage of their opportunities and made a record in the school at La Courtine that was not surpassed in excellence by any group from other artillery organizations. The officers and enlisted men in this brigade were pioneers in a field where success was uncertain, but they brought faithfulness and patriotic fervor to their task, and their record is one that should encourage and inspire all Negro people.

The 317th Engineer Regiment was formally organized at Camp Sherman on November 4, 1917, as the sapper engineer regiment of the 92nd Division. Two thousand draftees were turned over to this regiment from the 158th Depot Brigade. After careful examination 1490 of these men were inducted into the regiment. This group included a large number of men who had knowledge of the building trades and also students from well known industrial schools.

After it was decided to organize an engineer regiment in the 92nd Division, considerable discussion arose in the War Department over the question of officers to command it. Negro officers who had graduated at the training school for infantry in Des Moines were suggested, but engineer officials opposed this plan because these men had had no special training for the work. Letters in the War Department files pointed out that from 15,000 applicants to serve in this branch of the service only one Negro, a graduate of Harvard University, had qualified. Although it had been found expedient to have trained engineers as officers in engineer labor battalions, thirty Negro infantry officers with no engineering experience were assigned to the 317th Engineers. White captains were also assigned to the regiment, but were soon transferred and sent to France. During the winter of 1917-18 a War Department inspector investigated the organization and reported that the Negro officers did not have sufficient knowledge and experience to train the regiment, and he recommended that they be replaced by white officers with engineer training. In March, 1918, accordingly white captains replaced the Negro captains, but the Negro lieutenants were retained.

In spite of the unrest caused in the regiment by the change in the personnel of the officers, the training continued. On June 1 the regiment left Camp Sherman for Hoboken, whence it sailed on June 8, reaching Brest on the 19th. Thence it was sent to the Pontenazen barracks, which consisted of stone buildings erected by Napoleon Bonaparte on the site of an old Roman camp. Heavy working details, comprising 85 per cent of the regiment’s strength, loaded baggage and constructed roads and barracks. On June 25 the regiment left for the Bourbonne-les-Bains area, arriving on the night of June 27. Here it was given intensive training for four weeks, and in the area it constructed mess halls, bath houses, warehouses, stables, and railroad yards.

Additional equipment arrived August 2, ten days before the regiment moved into a quiet sector in the Vosges Mountains for intensive training around Ponseux and Archettes, and on August 20 there was further removal to theSt.Die sector previously occupied by the 7th Engineers of the 5th Division. Just before this division left forSt.Mihiel, it conducted several local attacks down the Fave Valley and around Frappelle, which were finally captured. When then the 317th Engineers began the work of organizing and consolidating the positions left by the 5th Division, they found the enemy active. They constructed dug-outs, repaired trenches, often under shell fire, and mined bridges if these were in danger of being captured by the enemy. They also worked at logging and sawmill operations in order to supply French institutions as well as the fighting regiments at the front with firewood. Especially courageous was the work of twenty-five enlisted men engaged in gas-proofing dug-outs. They worked three days and nights under heavy bombardment where mustard gas and phosgene were used by the enemy, but they continued their labors until all the dug-outs were protected.

On September 24, 1918, the regiment moved into the Argonne between Les Islettes and Clermont, and was assigned to the First Army Corps. The objective of the First Army was to close the Grand Pré gap and flank the armies operating against the French and British. The bombardment for this attack lasted three hours and it was estimated that 100,000 shells were fired. The American artillery averaged a gun every eight meters. After the bombardment changed to a rolling barrage, the men of the 77th, 28th, 35th, 79th, 4th, 80th, and 33rd Divisions went over the top in the greatest attack ever made by United States forces. In this attack one battalion of the 317th Engineers opened the road from Neuvilly to Bourielles, cutting it through to “No Man’s Land” on the night of September 26. The 111th Engineers assisted in this work. The Second Battalion opened the road from Croix de Pierre and Pierre Croisée, while the Third opened the valley road from La Claon to La Harze. In many places these roads had been completely obliterated by the heavy artillery fire. The engineers had to relocate them, often at night, and rebuild them through swamps out of logs and planks in order that the wounded might be carried to the rear and ammunition carts reach the front. Sometimes they used rocks and timbers taken from mined enemy trenches and burned buildings. They built light- and heavy-gauge railroads for hauling shells to new artillery positions on the front, and heavy-gauge railroads in the back areas, especially in the vicinity of Grand Pré. Throughout this offensive from September 26 to November 11 the 317th Engineers spent most of the time building roads and supplying the fighting units at the front with the necessary materials. The men often worked day and night under shell fire, but they labored cheerfully and successfully.

Orders, letters, and memoranda bear testimony to their achievement. The chief engineer of the First Army, Colonel G. R. Spaulding, in expressing his appreciation of what had been done by the troops aiding in the construction of railroads in the First Army area, wrote on November 10, 1918: “Especial credit is given to the 317th Engineers which were very instrumental in the rehabilitation of the lines in the Fôret d’Argonne and on the line fromSt.Juvin to the north.” General Pershing wrote toLt. Col.J. Edward Cassidy on April 7, 1919, thanking him for his services and saying, “With the 317th Engineers on the front you gave us valuable service.”Lt.Colonel Cassidy himself in his order to the regiment on February 3, 1919, commended it for being true in the fullest sense to the trust reposed in it by the American people and for doing work of a high and efficient order. Said he: “For more than a hundred years the Corps of Engineers has maintained a proud record of achievement, whether in peace or war, from the blazing sun of the tropics to the eternal ice and snow of the Arctic regions, and it is a pleasure to the commanding officer to be able to say that your work has been in accordance with the best traditions of the Engineer Service.”

The 317th Engineers “played the game” without fear and without grumbling in theSt.Die sector and in the Argonne-Meuse offensive. For nearly three months the regiment did front line work, first as a part of the 33rd Corps of the 7th French Army in the Vosges Mountains at Frapelle, Lafontanelle, Lesseux, and other points in theSt.Die sector, and later as a corps regiment of the First American Army, at Neuvilly, Bourielles, Cheppy, Varennes, Four de Paris, Abri de Crochet, La Besogne, Lançon, Grand Pré,St.Juvin, Briquenay,St.Georges, and Le Mort Homme in the Argonne region, and at Buzancy in the Ardennes. For this work it was generously commended by the officials in the American Army and it deserved the sincere gratitude of all the American people.

The 317th Motor Supply Train was composed of 18 officers and 475 enlisted men. At first it operated 35 trucks in the divisional area in France, but the demand soon increased this number to 49. When there was a scarcity of supplies the soldiers in the outfit were often required to work both day and night and even then they were not always able to meet the demands made upon them. In the 317th Military Police there were 9 officers and 200 enlisted men. This group was trained at Camp Funston and did police duty both there and in France. The 317th Ammunition Train consisted of 38 officers and 1175 men. It included the motor battalion, the horse battalion, ordnance, and medical detachment headquarters. Both trucks and wagons were used and often the men helped to move the artillery guns under fire. On one occasion the 367th Infantry, which was under fire, gave an order for ammunition at 3 a. m. This was obtained by the 317th Ammunition Train 37 kilometers away and delivered under fire at 7 a. m. This unit was commanded by Major M. T. Dean, one of the three Negroes in the 92nd Division who rose to that rank during the war.

The 317th Sanitary Train included the field hospitals and also the ambulance companies of the 365th, 366th, 367th, and 368th Infantry Regiments. These units were formed at Camp Funston on November 9, 1917, with a personnel of 57 officers and 700 men, which last number was later increased to 860. All of the men were trained litter-bearers. There were also in the organization mechanics, cooks, horse-shoers, and first class privates. During the winter of 1917-18 epidemics of meningitis, measles, parotitis, and influenza affected the command, but no deaths occurred at Camp Funston; and meanwhile there were weekly inspections to safeguard the health of the men. The units entrained for overseas June 7, 1917, remained eight days at Camp Upton, and reached Brest on June 25. It was quartered at the Pontenazen barracks until July 2, when it left for the training area at Bourbonne-les-Bains. On August 13 the advanced training area was reached, and the unit received a week of intensive training before it departed for theSt.Die sector.

Here field hospitals were established and functioned by the 365th at Raon l’Étape and by the 366th atSt.Die, and the 367th established dressing stations at Sells, Virge, and Clarice. The organization was moved from theSt.Die sector to Givry, Argonne, on September 25, and there it was a part of the First Army for five days. Passing through Passovant, Jailon, and Marbache enroute to Millery, the 366th and 368th established field hospitals, and the ambulance companies of the 365th, 367th, and 368th established dressing stations. From Millery the Sanitary Train went to Mayenne, where it remained until January 28. Le Mans was reached on February 4, 1919, and Brest on February 6, from which port the unit sailed on the “Olympic” on February 18, reaching New York on the 24th.

That the efficiency of the Sanitary Train of the 92nd was observed and appreciated may be seen from a communication from Colonel C. R. Reynolds, of the Medical Corps of the Second Army of the A. E. F., to the Division Surgeon under date November 15, 1918. Said he: “I desire to express my admiration and appreciation of the splendid hospital organized and administered by the Medical Department of the 92nd Division at Millery. Your department has received most favorable comments by the Army Commander ... and all medical officers who have visited the institution. The transportation and hospitalization of the battle casualties and respiratory diseases have been accomplished in accordance with the principles of military surgery and preventative medicine, which reflects the intelligence and training on the part of the officers, nurses, and enlisted men of the Medical Department of the 92nd Division, in which pride may be justly felt.”

That the work of the 317th Sanitary Train was successful was due in some measure to the fact that the officers and men were encouraged and inspired by those with whom they came in contact. There was one promotion to the rank of major, that ofCapt.Joseph H. Ward, and sixteen lieutenants were promoted to captaincies. Major Ward was commissioned by cablegram on September 24, 1918. At first he was assigned to the 325th Signal Corps, but he also served as a surgeon in Base Hospital 49, where he had been a patient. During his convalescence he was asked to help dress wounds, and later he was given fifty cases to attend to in a tent; being finally transferred to a ward as surgeon, he had here his regular turn on operating day, and he was shown every courtesy and given every privilege. For their specific duties it is reasonable to suppose that as a group the medical men were better prepared than many of the other officers.

The history of the 92nd Division will always be of interest to the American Negro because it gave him his first opportunity to serve in a great military organization where Negro officers led Negro troops. The old idea that Negro soldiers would not respect Negro officers was proved untrue. When the war suddenly came to an end, however, both officers and men turned their faces homeward having uppermost in their minds some of the policies to which they had been subjected at times in the Army itself and in the welfare organizations. The commanding officer, Major General Charles C. Ballou, whom the officers and the Negro people in general had desired for the post after Colonel Charles Young was declared ineligible, was severely criticised. Undoubtedly he wanted the Division to succeed, but some of the methods that he used and that he allowed his staff officers to use had a most demoralizing effect on both officers and men. Even in the face of all the charges, however, it must be said to his credit that both officers and men were subjected to less humiliation and suffering when he was with the division than they were after he left it, between the signing of the Armistice and the departure for America. The attitude of some of the white officers also helped. Brigadier General Malvern H. Barnum, commanding the 183rd Brigade; General John H. Sherburne, commanding the 167th Artillery Brigade; Colonel Vernon A. Caldwell, commanding the 365th Regiment; Colonel James A. Moss, who at one time advised the officers not to insist upon respect, yet worked for the interest of the 367th in France; Majors Warner A. Ross and John C. Sheffield of the 365th; Major Appleton of the 367th, and Major Alfred E. Sawkins of the 366th, are especially named as having worked for the success of the division. Of Major Sawkins it is said that whatever fare his officers had he shared with them, that he worked for the interest of both officers and men at all times, and that the spirit of his men when they went into battle was always high. They suffered the greatest casualties of any battalion and won nearly half the Distinguished Service medals which were won in the 92nd Division.

In the last analysis the verdict in regard to the 92nd Division rests upon its achievement. Said an operation memorandum issued on November 7, 1918, from division headquarters:

1. When the Marbache sector was taken over by the 92nd Division the Germans owned “No man’s land” and were aggressive. They held: Belie Air Farm, Bois de Tête d’Or, Bois de Frehaut, Voivrotte Farm, Voivrotte Woods, Bois de Cheminot, Moulon Brook.2. The constant aggressive action of our patrols, night and day, has resulted in many casualties to the enemy, and the capture of many prisoners.3. Each of the places named above has been raided, as has Epley also, and patrols have penetrated north nearly to the east and west line through Pagny. The enemy has been driven northward beyond Frehaut and Voivrotte woods, and eastward from Cheninit woods across the Seilée, destroying the Cheminot bridge, flooding the Seilée, and attempting to destroy the Seilée bridge—evidence of the fact that he regards the 92d Division as an uncomfortable neighbor, and intends to avoid close relations in future.4. West of the river excellent results have followed energetic offensive action. The enemy has suffered losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners during the occupancy of this part of the sector.

1. When the Marbache sector was taken over by the 92nd Division the Germans owned “No man’s land” and were aggressive. They held: Belie Air Farm, Bois de Tête d’Or, Bois de Frehaut, Voivrotte Farm, Voivrotte Woods, Bois de Cheminot, Moulon Brook.

2. The constant aggressive action of our patrols, night and day, has resulted in many casualties to the enemy, and the capture of many prisoners.

3. Each of the places named above has been raided, as has Epley also, and patrols have penetrated north nearly to the east and west line through Pagny. The enemy has been driven northward beyond Frehaut and Voivrotte woods, and eastward from Cheninit woods across the Seilée, destroying the Cheminot bridge, flooding the Seilée, and attempting to destroy the Seilée bridge—evidence of the fact that he regards the 92d Division as an uncomfortable neighbor, and intends to avoid close relations in future.

4. West of the river excellent results have followed energetic offensive action. The enemy has suffered losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners during the occupancy of this part of the sector.

The memorandum issued November 18, 1918, at the Division Headquarters by Major General Ballou sums up his own estimate of the work he was able to accomplish, as follows:

Five months ago to-day the 92d Division landed in France.After seven weeks of training it took over a sector in the front line, and since that time some portion of the Division has been practically continuously under fire.It participated in the last battle of the war with creditable success, continually pressing the attack against highly organized defensive works. It advanced successfully on the first day of the battle, attaining its objectives and capturing prisoners, this in face of determined opposition by an alert enemy, and against rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire. The issue of the second day’s battle was rendered indecisive by the order to cease firing at 11A. M., when the Armistice became effective.The Division commander, in taking leave of what he considers himself justly entitled to regard ashisDivision, feels that he has accomplished his mission. His work is done and will endure. The results have not always been brilliant, and many times were discouraging, yet a well organized, well disciplined, and well trained colored division has been created and commanded by him to include the last shot of the great world war.May the future conduct of every officer and man be such as to reflect credit upon the Division and upon the colored race.

Five months ago to-day the 92d Division landed in France.

After seven weeks of training it took over a sector in the front line, and since that time some portion of the Division has been practically continuously under fire.

It participated in the last battle of the war with creditable success, continually pressing the attack against highly organized defensive works. It advanced successfully on the first day of the battle, attaining its objectives and capturing prisoners, this in face of determined opposition by an alert enemy, and against rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire. The issue of the second day’s battle was rendered indecisive by the order to cease firing at 11A. M., when the Armistice became effective.

The Division commander, in taking leave of what he considers himself justly entitled to regard ashisDivision, feels that he has accomplished his mission. His work is done and will endure. The results have not always been brilliant, and many times were discouraging, yet a well organized, well disciplined, and well trained colored division has been created and commanded by him to include the last shot of the great world war.

May the future conduct of every officer and man be such as to reflect credit upon the Division and upon the colored race.

Just before the 92nd Division left France it passed in review before General Pershing at Le Mans and on this occasion he spoke as follows: “Officers and men of the 92nd Division, I wish to express to you my appreciation for your co-operation during your stay on the A. E. F. This Division is one of the best in the A. E. F., and the conduct of the officers and men has not been surpassed in any other. The officers are on the average with the officers of the A. E. F. Owing to the late arrival of the Division in France, it was not able to take as active part as was contemplated, but it had been planned to have the Division in the action on the east bank of the Moselle, which would have taken place two or three days preceding the Armistice, but the Armistice prevented. I had no fear of the Division not making a showing for I know what colored troops can do, having served with them in Cuba, the Philippines, and in Mexico.”

Even in the work that was done, however, there were outstanding individual heroes. While the 368th Infantry was in the Argonne, it became necessary to send a runner with a message to the left flank of the American firing-line. The way was across an open field swept by heavy machine-gun fire. Volunteers were called for, and Private Edward Saunders of Company I responded. Before he had gone far a shell cut him down. As he fell he cried to his comrades, “Some one come and get this message; I am wounded.”Lieut.Robert L. Campbell of the same company sprang forward. He dashed across the shell-swept area, picked up the wounded man, and with the Germans fairly hailing bullets around him, carried his comrade back to the American lines. For their valor both men were cited for the Distinguished Service Cross and Lieutenant Campbell was recommended for a captaincy. On another occasion this same officer was with a few soldiers who were armed only with their rifles, trench knives, and hand grenades picked up from small holes along the way, and who were moving over a road in the Château-Thierry sector. Suddenly their course was crossed by the firing of a German machine-gun. They tried to locate it by the direction of the bullets, but could not. To their right, a little ahead, lay a space covered with thick underbrush; just back of it was an open field.Lieut.Campbell, who knew by the direction of the bullets that the Germans had not seen his party, ordered one of the men, with a rope which they happened to have, to crawl to the thick underbrush, there to tie the rope to several stems of the brush; then to withdraw as far as possible and pull the rope, thus making the brush shake as though men were crawling through it. The purpose was to draw direct fire from the machine-gun and thus to locate its position. The ruse worked. Lieutenant Campbell then ordered three of his men to steal out and flank the machine-gun on one side, while he and the others moved up and flanked it on the other side. The brush was shaken more violently by the rope, and the Germans, with their eyes fixed upon it, poured a hail of bullets into it. Then at a given signal the flanking party dashed up, and they killed four of the Germans and captured the remaining three, also the machine-gun. For such exploitsLieut.Campbell was held up to his organization by the commanding general as an example of the soldier who combined courage and initiative.

Lieut.Charles G. Young, of the 368th, while in command of a scout platoon near Dinarville, September 27-28, 1918, was twice severely wounded by shell fire, but refused attention and remained with his men, helping to dress their wounds and to evacuate his own wounded during the entire night, and holding firmly his exposed position covering the right flank of his battalion. Private Bernard Lewis, also of the 368th, during an attack on Binarville September 30, volunteered to go down the road that led to the village to rescue a wounded soldier of his company. He was compelled to go under heavy machine-gun and shell fire, but in total disregard of personal danger he brought his comrade safely back to his lines. Private Robert M. Breckenridge, an automatic rifleman, of Company B, 365th Infantry, at Ferne de Belwir on October 29, although severely wounded in the leg, continued in action, crawled forward for a distance of a hundred yards, and assisted in preventing any enemy party from taking a position on the company’s flank. In spite of his wound, he continued to use his weapon with great courage and skill until he was killed by machine-gun fire. Corporal Russell Pollard, of Company H of the 365th, during the assault on Bois Frehaut on November 10, skilfully conducted his squad until his rifle was broken. He then used his wire-cutter with speed and skill under heavy fire, and although wounded in his right arm, he continued to cut the wire with his left, assisting his men in getting through, until for the second time he was ordered to the dressing-station by his company commander.Lieut.Thomas Edward Jones, of the Medical Corps of the 368th, went into an open area swept by fire to care for a wounded soldier who was being carried by another officer. While he was dressing the wounded runner, a bullet passed through his arm and his chest and a man was killed within a few yards of him. Corporal Van Horton, of Company E of the 366th, displayed extraordinary heroism near Lesseux on September 4. “During a hostile attack, preceded by a heavy minenwerfer barrage, the combat group to which this courageous soldier belonged was attacked by about twenty of the enemy, using liquid fire. The sergeant in charge of the group and four other men having been killed, Corporal Horton fearlessly rushed to receive the attack, and the persistency with which he fought resulted in stopping the attack and driving back the enemy.”

These instances are only typical of those who were outstanding for bravery and who were cited for honors. Thus these stalwart soldiers and others like them upheld the record that the Negro had previously made in the wars in which his country had engaged.

In all the exploits and achievements of Negro soldiers in the World War, and the difficulties that they encountered in their display of loyalty, it is not to be forgotten that there were true friends who were interested in them and who believed that each one should be given a man’s chance. One explanation of how it was that they were able to “carry on” even under the most adverse conditions was that they believed that the men guiding the destinies of the American arms were fair, broad-minded men who would not countenance petty things. Wherever Negro soldiers were visited they always seemed to feel that Secretary Baker and General Pershing wanted them to have a square deal, and that if these officials really knew of unsatisfactory conditions they would endeavor to correct them immediately. Secretary Baker on numerous occasions showed that he was actuated by a genuine belief in democracy. This led him to examine into the conditions under which Negro soldiers worked, trained, and fought, and also to consider their possibilities of rendering the country the greatest possible service. When objections were made to sending Negro soldiers to certain camps for fear of trouble because of the Houston riot which occurred in 1917 just as plans were being formulated to call thousands of Negroes in the first draft, and when on other occasions pressure was strong, he never ceased to feel that avenues open to other soldiers should be open in like manner to Negroes. Against strong and determined opposition he saw that training as officers was given, and when the future of the first training camp was uncertain, it was Secretary Baker who assured the men that he was depending on them and expected them to reach the standards set by men in other camps. While, as he said, he was not trying to solve the race problem, he did put forth great effort to eliminate those things which tended to break down morale; and it is only necessary to recall such a camp as Hill at Newport News, Virginia, in the winter of 1917-18 to realize how War Department pressure was exerted to remedy bad conditions.

Some of the outstanding features of Secretary Baker’s policy with reference to Negro soldiers may be summarized as follows, and the statements given below embody his plans as stated before justice was sometimes thwarted:

1. That Negro soldiers should be organized and trained on the same basis as all other soldiers.

2. That Negro men should be given the opportunity to train as officers, and that those who met the qualifications should be appointed for service just as others who qualified.

3. That a Negro man should be appointed as one of the assistants to the Secretary.

4. That Negro men should receive every possible aid in making a thoroughgoing study of conditions in both American and French camps.

5. That wherever injustice came to the attention of the Secretary immediate attention should be given to the matter and effort made to correct it.

General Pershing’s service with the Negro units in the regular army and his recommendation of Major Charles Young of the Tenth Cavalry to the Adjutant General of the Army from Headquarters Punitive Expedition U. S. Army, Colonia Dublan, Mexico, August 21, 1916, along with other officers “who had shown very high efficiency throughout the campaign,” and his tributes to the soldierly qualities of Negroes on several occasions, gave Negroes in America the idea that he stood for a square deal and would give honor to whom honor was due. When agitation arose over the use of Negro soldiers in the war, General Pershing let it be known that he desired Negro troops in France. When one of the Allies made strong objections to the attachment of any battalions of Negro infantry for training with their forces, and General Pershing was asked for his views by the War Department, he said: “In event Department still desires early to despatch 92nd Division, I adhere to former recommendations that Division be included among those to be employed temporarily with ——. I have informed —— —— that these soldiers are American citizens and that I can not discriminate against them in event War Department desires to send them to France.”

When stories were circulated among Negro people to the effect that Negroes were being wrongly treated, and subjected to most dangerous positions to save white troops, and shot by Germans when captured or left to die if wounded, General Pershing saw that these were repudiated; and he further said that “the only regret expressed by colored troops is that they are not given more dangerous work to do. I can not commend too highly the spirit shown among the colored combat troops who exhibit fine capacity for quick training and eagerness for the most dangerous work.” When he visited any section of territory occupied by Americans, he always showed an interest in the Negro soldiers; they were impressed and encouraged by his inquiry into the conditions under which they labored; and his understanding of the hard life of the stevedores, and his appreciation of their efforts, did much to make their work less burdensome. The men also felt that in the case of court martials, if verdicts were reviewed by General Pershing, as was done in some important cases, absolute justice would be meted out.

When in the midst of the charges and counter-charges relative to the fitness of Negro officers to lead men General Pershing was questioned about a few Negro officers who were declared inefficient by a board, he assured his hearers that because a few officers had been declared unfit, this was by no means to be construed as an indication of lack of capacity on the part of the race, because at that time more than 6000 white officers had been returned to the states for unfitness to lead men and certainly no one considered the white race a failure because of that fact. Finally we have seen how the General reviewed the 92nd Division just before it departed for America, commending the officers and men for their splendid record overseas. He assured them of his confidence by saying that he had planned to place them before the great fortress of Metz; and his words did much to soften the bitterness of feeling and let both officers and men return to their homeland feeling that after all the commander and chief of the American Expeditionary Forces had appreciated their part in the great struggle. No one can tell what greater things might not have been accomplished by Negro soldiers during the war if the spirit of Secretary Baker and General Pershing had followed them throughout the service.


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