Our Losses

(To face page 64.)Map 3.

(To face page 64.)

Map 3.

From May 28 till June 5 the fighting seemed to concentrate itself around Quinn's Post. Threeenemy galleries had been detected there, and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed twenty Turks and injured thirty. One gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at 3.30 a.m. on May 29, a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack, before which our left centre sub-section fell back, letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one sub-section on the left from the two other sub-sections on the right.

At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 a.m. the position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed. All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured, and the work of restoration was begun.

At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, supported by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs from the trenches. The fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of the infantry enabled us to inflict upon the enemy a bloody repulse, demoralizing them to such an extent that the bomb throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the middle of their own first line.

At 8.15 a.m. the attack slackened, and by 8.45 a.m. the enemy's attacks had practically ceased.

Our casualties in this affair amounted to 2 officers, 31 other ranks killed, 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses must have been serious, and were probably equal to those sustained on May 9-10. Except for the first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine explosion, all ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage.

On May 30 preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within 5 yards of our fire trench. Two storming parties of thirty-five men went forward at 1 p.m., cleared the sap heads and penetrated into the trenches beyond, but they were gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in spite of our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited supply.

During May 31 close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.

On June 1, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of guncotton against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely demolished.

After sunset on June 4 three separate enterprises were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in compliancewith an order which I had issued that the enemy's attention should be distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the southern zone.

(1) A demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the Navy co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.

(2) A sortie at 11 p.m. towards a trench 200 yards from Quinn's Post. This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men took place at 2.55 a.m. on June 5 and penetrated to the Turkish trench; demolished a machine-gun emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good order.

(3) At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 p.m. A party of sixty men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and twenty-eight captured. A working party followed up the attack and at once set to work. Meanwhile the Turkish trenches on the left of the post were heavily assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which drew from them a very heavy fire. After daybreak a strong bomb attack developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier type of bomb than hitherto.

At 6.30 a.m. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was found necessary to retire to the original fire trench of the post and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Our casualties were eighty; those of the enemy considerably greater.

On June 5 a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by 2 officers and 100 men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officer's Trench. A special party of ten men with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial Force) made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the ten men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of 5 feet and another three at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were thirty-six.

I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of June 4.

From May 25 onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On May 25 the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions crept 100 yards nearerto the Turks, and on the night of May 28-29 the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that same night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere.

All Turkish counter-attacks during May 29 were repulsed. On the night of May 30 two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment. But on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet.

On every subsequent night up to that of June 3-4 assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

Taking our line of battle from right to left the troops were deployed in the following order:—The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lancs) Division and the 29th Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding 8th Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My General Head-quarters for the day were at the command post on the peninsula.

At 8 a.m. on June 4 our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced, and continued till 11.20 a.m., when a feint attack was made which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11.30 a.m. all our guns opened fire and continued with increasing intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced.

The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French 1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot," for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.

The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed forward with great dash; the "Anson" Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt which formed a salient in the enemy's line, the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12.15 p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12.25 p.m.

The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 12.30 p.m. the Brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.

On the left the 29th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, though the 14th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the Brigade could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on the left, skilfully led along thecliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the Brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left so that, if possible, a fresh attack might be organized.

Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the "Haricot." The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions to enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1.30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its original position, the "Collingwood" Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wipedout. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant Brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the Brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed; yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success. By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be extricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line, which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spiritdisplayed by this Brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the 88th Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back.

At 4 p.m. under support of our artillery the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly 3 miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amountedto 400, including 11 officers: amongst these were 5 Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from theGoeben. Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.

From the date of this battle to the end of the month of June the incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have so grievously swelled our lists of casualties have been caused by the determination of the Turks to regain ground they had lost, a determination clashing against our firm resolve to continue to increase our holding. Several of these daily encounters would have been the subject of a separate despatch in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but, with due regard to proportion, they cannot even be so much as mentioned here. Only one example each from the French, British, and Australian and New Zealand spheres of action will be most briefly set down so that Your Lordship may understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies and fortitude of the troops.

(1) At 4.30 a.m. on June 21 the French Corps Expéditionnaire attacked the formidable works that flank the Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd Division had stormed all the Turkish first and second line trenches to their front and had captured theHaricot redoubt. On their right the 1st Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-attacked and driven out. Fresh troops were brought up and launched upon another assault, but the Turks were just as obstinate and drove out the second party before they had time to consolidate. At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud issued an order that full use might be made of the remaining five hours of daylight, and that, before dark, these trenches must be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At 6. p.m. the third assault succeeded; 600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made through the night by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French drafts specially distinguished themselves by their forwardness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at 7,000. The losses of the Corps Expéditionnaire were 2,500.

(2) The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with special tenacity into the coast. In the scheme of attack submitted by Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, commanding 8th Army Corps, our left, pivoting upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If theoperation was successful then, at its close, we should have driven the enemy back for a thousand yards along the coast, and the trenches of this left section of our line would be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east. Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivoted right. Five Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the sea: only two Turkish trenches in the section furthest from the sea. At 10.20 a.m. on June 28 our bombardment began. At 10.45 a.m. a small redoubt known as the Boomerang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At 11 a.m. the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but further to the east; near the pivotal point the remainder of the 156th Brigade were unable to get on. Precisely at 11.30 a.m. the second attack took place. The 86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over the trenches already captured by their comrades of the 87th Brigade, and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two more lines of trenches, thus achieving the five successive lines along the coast. This success was further improved upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed to secure, and to place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west of the furthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our casualties were small; 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered heavily, especially in the repeated counter-attacks,which for many days and nights afterwards they launched against the trenches they had lost.

(3) On the night of June 29 and 30 the Turks, acting, as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha, to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line which was under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1.30 a.m. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another grand attack took place against our left and left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.

On the evening of this day, June 30, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force suffered grievous loss owing to the wounding of General Gouraud by a shell. This calamity, for I count it nothing less, brings us down to the beginning of the month of July.

The command of the Corps Expéditionnaire français d'Orient was then taken over by General Bailloud, at which point I shall close my despatch.

Brigadier-General R. W. Melville Jackson, C.B., C.M.G.(To face page 78.)

Brigadier-General R. W. Melville Jackson, C.B., C.M.G.

(To face page 78.)

During the whole period under review the efforts and expedients whereby a great army has had its wants supplied upon a wilderness have, I believe, been breaking world records.

The country is broken, mountainous, arid, and void of supplies; the water found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite inadequate for their needs; the only practicable beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage, of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges.

Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy submarines. On May 22 all transports had to be dispatched to Mudros for safety. Thenceforth men, stores, guns, horses, etc., had to be brought from Mudros—a distance of 40 miles—in fleet sweepers and other small and shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every danger and every difficulty was doubled.

But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be thwarted in their landing operations either by nature or by the enemy, whilst the Army Service Corps, under Brigadier-General F. W. B. Koe, and the Army Ordnance Corps, under Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, have madeit a point of honour to feed men, animals, guns, and rifles in the fighting line as regularly as if they were only out for manœuvres on Salisbury Plain.

I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool courage and unfailing efficiency with which the Royal Navy, the beach personnel, the engineers, and the administrative services have carried out these arduous duties.

In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, Director of Army Signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and has rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General Head-quarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high explosive shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, RoyalEngineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communication by apologizing for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method, and even a certain quiet heroism have characterized the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.

In my three Commanders of Corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calmin crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his Chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter-Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute Commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attacks are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal assistance he has continued to render me ever since.

The thanks of every one serving in the Peninsula are due to Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B.(To face page 82.)

Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B.

(To face page 82.)

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of the force, I must refer to the shadowcast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life, but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

I have the honour to be,Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,Ian Hamilton, General,Commanding MediterraneanExpeditionary Force.

August 10

Sir Ian Hamilton reports that fighting at several points on the Gallipoli peninsula has taken place during the last few days. Substantial progress has been made.

In the southern zone 200 yards on a front of 300 yards has been gained east of the Krithia road, and has been held in spite of determined counter-attacks, which have been repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

Repeated attacks by the Turks elsewhere in this zone have been beaten off.

Several attacks by the French Corps have been made and their whole-hearted co-operation has proved of the greatest assistance.

In the Anzac zone a footing on the Chunuk Bair portion of Sari Bair has also been gained and a crest occupied after fierce fighting and the successful storming of strongly held positions.

Here, too, the enemy's losses have been considerable. The advance was commenced at night under cover of a searchlight from a destroyer.

Elsewhere a fresh landing was successfully effected and considerable progress made.

Six hundred and thirty prisoners have been taken together with one Nordenfelt gun, two bomb mortars, nine machine-guns, and a large number of bombs. Scattered about are quantities of the enemy's rifles, ammunition, and equipment.

August 11

The latest report from Sir Ian Hamilton states that severe fighting continued yesterday in the Gallipoli Peninsula, mainly in the Anzac zone and in that to the north.

The positions occupied were slightly varied in places, but the general result is that the area held at Anzac has been nearly trebled owing chiefly to the gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, while to the north no further progress has yet been made.

The troops have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and the French battleshipSt. Louisis reported to have put out of action five out of six guns in Asiatic batteries.

Admiralty,August 16, 1915.

The following despatch has been receivedfrom Vice-Admiral John M. de Robeck, reportingthe landing of the Army on the Gallipoli Peninsula,April 25-26, 1915:

Triad,July 1, 1915.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith an account of the operations carried out on April 25 and 26, 1915, during which period the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was landed and firmly established in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The landing commenced at 4.20 a.m. on 25th. The general scheme was as follows:

Two main landings were to take place, the first at a point just north of Gaba Tepe, the second on the southern end of the peninsula. In addition a landing was to be made at Kum Kale, and a demonstration in force to be carried out in the Gulf of Xeros near Bulair.

The night of the 24th-25th was calm and very clear, with a brilliant moon, which set at 3 a.m.

The first landing, north of Gaba Tepe, was carried out under the orders of Rear-AdmiralC. F. Thursby, C.M.G. His squadron consisted of the following ships:

Battleships.Cruiser.Destroyers.Seaplane Carrier.Trawlers.Balloon Ship.QueenBacchanteBeagleArk Royal15ManicaLondonBulldogPrince ofFoxhoundWalesScourgeTriumphColneChelmerRibble

ToQueen,London, andPrince of Waleswas delegated the duty of actually landing the troops. ToTriumph,Majestic, andBacchantethe duty of covering the landing by gunfire.

In this landing a surprise was attempted. The first troops to be landed were embarked in the battleshipsQueen,London, andPrince of Wales.

The squadron then approached the land at 2.58 a.m. at a speed of 5 knots. When within a short distance of the beach selected for landing the boats were sent ahead. At 4.20 a.m. the boats reached the beach and a landing was effected.

The remainder of the infantry of the covering force were embarked at 10 p.m., 24th.

The troops were landed in two trips, the operation occupying about half an hour, this in spiteof the fact that the landing was vigorously opposed, the surprise being only partially effected.

The disembarkation of the main body was at once proceeded with. The operations were somewhat delayed owing to the transports having to remain a considerable distance from the shore in order to avoid the howitzer and field-guns' fire brought to bear on them and also the fire from warships stationed in the Narrows, Chanak.

The beach here was very narrow and continuously under shell fire. The difficulties of disembarkation were accentuated by the necessity of evacuating the wounded; both operations proceeded simultaneously. The service was one which called for great determination and coolness under fire, and the success achieved indicates the spirit animating all concerned. In this respect I would specially mention the extraordinary gallantry and dash shown by the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade (Colonel E. G. Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O.), who formed the covering force. Many individual acts of devotion to duty were performed by the personnel of the Navy; these are dealt with below. Here I should like to place on record the good service performed by the vessels employed in landing the second part of the covering force; the seamanship displayed and the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on the beach is deserving of the highest praise.

On the 26th the landing of troops, guns and stores continued throughout the day; this was a most trying service, as the enemy kept up an incessant shrapnel fire, and it was extremely difficult to locate the well-concealed guns of the enemy. Occasional bursts of fire from the ships in the Narrows delayed operations somewhat, but these bursts of fire did not last long, and the fire from our ships always drove the enemy's ships away.

The enemy heavily counter-attacked, and though supported by a very heavy shrapnel fire he could make no impression on our line which was every minute becoming stronger. By nightfall on April 26 our position north of Gaba Tepe was secure.

The landing at the southern extremity of the Gallipoli peninsula was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., his squadron consisting of the following ships:

Battleships.Cruisers.Fleet Sweepers.Trawlers.SwiftsureEuryalus614ImplacableTalbotCornwallisMinervaAlbionDublinVengeanceLord NelsonPrince George

Landings in this area were to be attempted at five different places; the conditions at eachlanding varied considerably. The position of beaches is given below.

Position of Beach.—Y beach, a point about 7,000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. X beach, 1,000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. W beach, Cape Tekeh—Cape Helles. V beach, Cape Helles—Seddul Bahr. Camber, Seddul Bahr. S beach, Eski-Hissarlik Point.

Taking these landings in the above order:Landing at Y Beach.—The troops to be first landed, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, embarked on the 24th in theAmethystandSapphire, and proceeded with the transportsSouthlandandBraemar Castleto a position off Cape Tekeh. At 4.0 a.m. the boats proceeded to Y beach, timing their arrival there at 5 a.m., and pulled ashore covered by fire from H.M.S.Goliath. The landing was most successfully and expeditiously carried out, the troops gaining the top of the high cliffs overlooking this beach without being opposed; this result I consider due to the rapidity with which the disembarkation was carried out and the well-placed covering fire from ships.

The Scottish Borderers were landed in two trips, followed at once by the Plymouth Battalion Royal Marines. These troops met with severe opposition on the top of the cliffs, where fire from covering ships was of little assistance, and, afterheavy fighting, were forced to re-embark on the 26th. The re-embarkation was carried out by the following ships:Goliath,Talbot,Dublin,Sapphire, andAmethyst. It was most ably conducted by the beach personnel and covered by the fire of the warships, who prevented the enemy reaching the edge of the cliff, except for a few snipers.

Landing at X Beach.—The 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (two companies and M.G. section) embarked inImplacableon 24th, which ship proceeded to a position off the landing-place, where the disembarkation of the troops commenced at 4.30 a.m., and was completed at 5.15 a.m.

A heavy fire was opened on the cliffs on both sides. TheImplacableapproached the beach, and the troops were ordered to land, fire being continued until the boats were close into the beach. The troops on board theImplacablewere all landed by 7 a.m. without any casualties. The nature of the beach was very favourable for the covering fire from ships, but the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model.

Landing at W Beach.—The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers embarked inEuryalusandImplacableon the 24th, who proceeded to positions off the landing-place, where the troops embarked in the boats at about 4 a.m. Shortly after 5 a.m.Euryalusapproached W beach andImplacableX beach. At 5 a.m. the covering ships opened a heavy fire on the beach, which was continued up to the last moment before landing. Unfortunately this fire did not have the effect on the extensive wire entanglements and trenches that had been hoped for, and the troops, on landing at 6 a.m., were met with a very heavy fire from rifles, machine-guns, and pom-poms, and found the obstructions on the beach undamaged. The formation of this beach lends itself admirably to the defence, the landing-place being commanded by sloping cliffs offering ideal positions for trenches and giving a perfect field of fire. The only weakness in the enemy's position was on the flanks, where it was just possible to land on the rocks and thus enfilade the more important defences. This landing on the rocks was effected with great skill, and some maxims, cleverly concealed in the cliffs, and which completely enfiladed the main beach, were rushed with the bayonet. This assisted to a great extent in the success of the landing, the troops, though losing very heavily, were not to be denied and the beach and the approaches to it were soon in our possession.

The importance of this success cannot be overestimated; W and V beaches were the only two of any size in this area on which troops, other than infantry, could be disembarked, and failure to capture this one might have had serious consequences, as the landing at V was held up. The beach was being continuously sniped, and a fierceinfantry battle was carried on round it throughout the entire day and the following nights. It is impossible to exalt too highly the service rendered by the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in the storming of the beach; the dash and gallantry displayed were superb. Not one whit behind in devotion to duty was the work of the beach personnel, who worked untiringly throughout the day and night, landing troops and stores under continual sniping. The losses due to rifle and machine-gun fire sustained by the boats' crews, to which they had not the satisfaction of being able to reply, bear testimony to the arduous nature of the service.

During the night of the 25th-26th enemy attacked continuously, and it was not till 1 p.m. on the 26th, when V beach was captured, that our position might be said to be secure.

The work of landing troops, guns, and stores continued throughout this period, and the conduct of all concerned left nothing to be desired.

(To face page96.)Map4.

(To face page96.)

Map4.

Landing at V Beach.—This beach, it was anticipated, would be the most difficult to capture; it possessed all the advantages for defence which W beach had, and in addition the flanks were strongly guarded by the old castle and village of Seddul Bahr on the east and perpendicular cliffs on the west; the whole foreshore was covered withbarbed wire entanglements which extended in places under the sea. The position formed a natural amphitheatre with the beach as stage.

The first landing here, as at all other places, was made in boats, but the experiment was tried of landing the remainder of the covering force by means of a collier, theRiver Clyde. This steamer had been specially prepared for the occasion under the directions of Commander Edward Unwin; large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways built whereby the troops could reach the lighters which were to form a bridge on to the beach.

V beach was subjected to a heavy bombardment similarly to W beach, with the same result,i.e., when the first trip attempted to land they were met with a murderous fire from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun, which was not opened till the boats had cast off from the steamboats.

A landing on the flanks here was impossible, and practically all the first trip were either killed or wounded, a few managing to find some slight shelter under a bank on the beach; in several boats all were either killed or wounded; one boat entirely disappeared, and in another there were only two survivors. Immediately after the boats had reached the beach theRiver Clydewas run ashore under a heavy fire rather towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient breakwater during future landing of stores, etc.

As theRiver Clydegrounded, the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore were run outahead of the collier, but unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations and a gap was left between two lighters over which it was impossible for men to cross; some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in position into the sea and wading ashore; this method proved too costly, the lighter being soon heaped with dead and the disembarkation was ordered to cease.

The troops in theRiver Clydewere protected from rifle and machine-gun fire and were in comparative safety.

Commander Unwin, seeing how things were going, left theRiver Clydeand, standing up to his waist in water under a very heavy fire, got the lighters into position; he was assisted in this work by Midshipman G. L. Drewry, R.N.R., of H.M.S.Hussar; Midshipman W. St. A. Malleson, R.N., of H.M.S.Cornwallis; Able Seaman W. C. Williams, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B. 3766), and Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A, both of H.M.S.Hussar.

The bridge to the shore, though now passable, could not be used by the troops, anyone appearing on it being instantly shot down, and the men inRiver Clyderemained in her till nightfall.

At 9.50 a.m.Albionsent in launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews to assist in completing bridge, which did not quite reach beach; theseboats, however, could not be got into position until dark owing to heavy fire.

It had already been decided not to continue to disembark on V beach, and all other troops intended for this beach were diverted to W.

The position remained unchanged on V beach throughout the day, men of war and the maxims mounted inRiver Clydedoing their utmost to keep down the fire directed on the men under partial shelter on the beach.

During this period many heroic deeds were performed in rescuing wounded men in the water.

During the night of the 25-26 the troops inRiver Clydewere able to disembark under cover of darkness and obtain some shelter on the beach and in the village of Seddul Bahr, for possession of which now commenced a most stubborn fight.

The fight continued, supported ably by gunfire from H.M.S.Albion, until 1.24 p.m., when our troops had gained a position from which they assaulted Hill 141, which dominated the situation.Albionthen ceased fire, and the hill, with old fort on top, was most gallantly stormed by the troops, led by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, General Staff, who fell as the position was won. The taking of this hill effectively cleared the enemy from the neighbourhood of the V beach, which could now be used for the disembarkation of theallied armies. The capture of this beach called for a display of the utmost gallantry and perseverance from the officers and men of both services—that they successfully accomplished their task bordered on the miraculous.

Landing on the "Camber," Seddul Bahr.—One half company Royal Dublin Fusiliers landed here, without opposition, theCamberbeing "dead ground." The advance from theCamber, however, was only possible on a narrow front, and after several attempts to enter the village of Seddul Bahr this half company had to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.

Landing at "De Totts" S Beach.—The 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) and a detachment 2nd London Field Company R.E. were landed in boats, convoyed byCornwallis, and covered by that ship andLord Nelson.

Little opposition was encountered, and the hill was soon in the possession of the South Wales Borderers. The enemy attacked this position on the evening of the 25th and during the 26th, but our troops were firmly established and with the assistance of the covering ships all attacks were easily beaten off.

Landing at Kum Kale.—The landing here was undertaken by the French.

It was most important to prevent the enemyoccupying positions in this neighbourhood, whence he could bring gun fire to bear on the transports off Cape Helles. It was also hoped that by holding this position it would be possible to deal effectively with the enemy's guns on the Asiatic shore immediately east of Kum Kale, which could fire into Seddul Bahr and De Totts.

The French, after a heavy preliminary bombardment, commenced to land at about 10 a.m., and by the afternoon the whole of their force had been landed at Kum Kale. When they attempted to advance to Yeni Shehr, their immediate objective, they were met by heavy fire from well-concealed trenches, and were held up just south of Kum Kale village.

During the night of the 25th and 26th the enemy made several counter-attacks, all of which were easily driven off; during one of these 400 Turks were captured, their retreat being cut-off by the fire from the battleships.

On the 26th, when it became apparent that no advance was possible without entailing severe losses and the landing of large reinforcements, the order was given for the French to withdraw and re-embark, which operation was carried out without serious opposition.

I now propose to make the following more general remarks on the conduct of the operations:

From the very first the co-operation betweenArmy and Navy was most happy; difficulties which arose were quickly surmounted, and nothing could have exceeded the tactfulness and forethought of Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff.

The loyal support which I received from Contre-Amiral E. P. A. Guepratte simplified the task of landing the Allied armies simultaneously.

The Russian fleet was represented by H.I.R.M.S.Askold, which ship was attached to the French squadron. Contre-Amiral Guepratte bears testimony to the value of the support he received from Captain Ivanoff, especially during the landing and re-embarkation of the French troops at Kum Kale.

The detailed organization of the landing could not be commenced until the Army Head-quarters returned from Egypt on April 10. The work to be done was very great, and the naval personnel and material available small.

Immediately on the arrival of the Army Staff at Mudros, committees, composed of officers of both services, commenced to work out the details of the landing operations, and it was due to these officers' indefatigable efforts that the expedition was ready to land on April 22. The keenness displayed by the officers and men resulted in a good standard of efficiency, especially in the case of the Australian and New Zealand Corps, who appear to be natural boatmen.

Such actions as the storming of the Seddul Bahr position by the 29th Division must live in history for ever; innumerable deeds of heroism and daring were performed; the gallantry and absolute contempt for death displayed alone made the operations possible.

At Gaba Tepe the landing and the dash of the Australian Brigade for the cliffs was magnificent—nothing could stop such men. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in this, their first battle, set a standard as high as that of any army in history, and one of which their countrymen have every reason to be proud.

In closing this despatch I beg to bring to their Lordships' notice the names of certain officers and men who have performed meritorious service. The great traditions of His Majesty's Navy were well maintained, and the list of names submitted of necessity lacks those of many officers and men who performed gallant deeds unobserved and therefore unnoted. This standard was high, and if I specially mention one particular action it is that of Commander Unwin and the two young officers and two seamen who assisted him in the work of establishing communication betweenRiver Clydeand the beach. Rear-Admirals R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., C. F. Thursby, C.M.G., and Stuart Nicholson, M.V.O., have rendered invaluable service. Throughout they have been indefatigable in their efforts tofurther the success of the operations, and their loyal support has much lightened my duties and responsibilities.

I have at all times received the most loyal support from the Commanding Officers of His Majesty's ships during an operation which called for the display of great initiative and seamanship.

Captain R. F. Phillimore, C.B., M.V.O., A.D.C., as principal Beach Master, and Captain D. L. Dent, as principal Naval Transport Officer, performed most valuable service.

Commander Unwin and His Midshipmen

CommanderEdward Unwin, R.N.

While inRiver Clyde, observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under a murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor, for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to savesome wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion.

MidshipmanGeorge L. Drewry, R.N.R.

Assisted Commander Unwin at the work of securing the lighters under heavy rifle and maxim fire. He was wounded in the head, but continued his work and twice subsequently attempted to swim from lighter to lighter with a line.

MidshipmanWilfred St. A. Malleson, R.N.

Also assisted Commander Unwin, and after Midshipman Drewry had failed from exhaustion to get a line from lighter to lighter, he swam with it himself and succeeded. The line subsequently broke, and he afterwards made two further but unsuccessful attempts at his self-imposed task.

Able SeamanWilliam Chas. Williams, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766).

Held on to a line in the water for over an hour under heavy fire, until killed.

Seaman R.N.R.George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A.

Worked on a lighter all day under fire, attending wounded and getting out lines; he was eventually dangerously wounded by maxim fire.

Lieut.-CommanderRalph B. Janvrin, R.N.

Conducted the trawlers into Morto Bay, for the landing at "De Totts," with much skill.This officer showed great judgment and coolness under fire, and carried out a difficult task with great success.

Conducted the trawlers into Morto Bay, for the landing at "De Totts," with much skill.

This officer showed great judgment and coolness under fire, and carried out a difficult task with great success.

Lieut.John A. V. Morse, R.N.

Assisted to secure the lighters at the bows of theRiver Clydeunder a heavy fire, and was very active throughout the 25th and 26th at V beach.

SurgeonP. B. Kelly, R.N., Attached To R.N.A.S.

Was wounded in the foot on the morning of the 25th inRiver Clyde. He remained inRiver Clydeuntil morning of 27th, during which time he attended 750 wounded men, although in great pain and unable to walk during the last twenty-four hours.

Lieut.-CommanderAdrian St. V. Keyes, R.N.

General Sir Ian Hamilton reports as follows: "Lieut.-Commander Keyes showed great coolness, gallantry, and ability. The success of the landing on Y beach was largely due to his good services. When circumstances compelled the force landed there to re-embark, this officer showed exceptional resource and leadership, successfully conducting that difficult operation."I entirely concur in General Hamilton's opinion of this officer's services on April 25 and 26.

I entirely concur in General Hamilton's opinion of this officer's services on April 25 and 26.

CommanderWilliam H. Cottrell, R.N.V.R.

This officer has organized the entire system of land communication; has laid and repaired cables several times under fire; and on all occasions shown zeal, tact, and coolness beyond praise.

Mr.John Murphy, Boatswain,Cornwallis.

MidshipmanJohn Saville Metcalf, R.N.R.,Triumph.

MidshipmanRupert E. M. Bethune,Inflexible.

MidshipmanEric Oloff de Wet,London.

MidshipmanCharles W. Croxford, R.N.R.,Queen.

MidshipmanC. A. L. Mansergh,Queen.

MidshipmanAlfred M. Williams,Euryalus.

MidshipmanHubert M. Wilson,Euryalus.

MidshipmanG. F. D. Freer,Lord Nelson.

MidshipmanR. V. Symonds-Taylor,Agamemnon.

MidshipmanC. H. C. Matthey,Queen Elizabeth.

Lieut.Massy Goolden,Prince of Wales.

Recommended for accelerated promotion:

Mr.Charles Edward Bounton, Gunner, R.N.,Queen Elizabeth.

The following officers are "Commended for service in action":

Capt.H. A. S. Fyler,Agamemnon, Senior Officer inside the Straits.

Capt.A. W. Heneage, M.V.O., who organized and trained the mine-sweepers.

Capt.E. K. Loring, Naval Transport Officer, Gabe Tepe.

Capt.H. C. Lockyer,Implacable.

Capt.C. Maxwell-Lefroy,Swiftsure.

Capt. theHon. A. D. E. H. Boyle, M.V.O.,Bacchante.

Capt.A. V. Vyvyan, Beach Master, Z beach.

Capt.C. S. Townsend, Beach Master, W beach.

Capt.R. C. K. Lambert, Beach Master, V beach.

Commander theHon. L. J. O. Lambart,Queen.

Commander (now Captain)B. St. G. Collard, Assistant Beach Master, W beach.

CommanderC. C. Dix, Assistant Beach Master, Z beach.

CommanderN. W. Diggle, Assistant Beach Master, V beach.

CommanderH. L. Watts-Jones,Albion(acting Captain).

CommanderI. W. Gibson, M.V.O.,Albion.

Lieut,-Commander (now Commander)J. B. Waterlow,Blenheim.

Lieut.-CommanderH. V. Coates,Implacable.

Lieut.-CommanderE. H. Cater,Queen Elizabeth.

Lieut.-CommanderG. H. Pownall,Adamant(killed in action).

Lieut.A. W. Bromley, R.N.R.,Euryalus.

Lieut.H. R. W. Turnor,Implacable.

Lieut.H. F. Minchin,Cornwallis.

Lieut.Oscar Henderson,Ribble.

Lieut.Kenneth Edwards,Lord Nelson.

MajorW. T. C. Jones, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., Beach Master, X beach.

MajorW. W. Frankis, R.M.L.I.,Cornwallis.

Tempy. SurgeonW. D. Galloway,Cornwallis.

Mr.Alfred M. Mallett, Gunner T.,Ribble.

Mr.John Pippard, Boatswain,Sapphire.

MidshipmanEric Wheler Bush,Bacchante.

MidshipmanCharles D. H. H. Dixon,Bacchante.

MidshipmanDonald H. Barton,London.

MidshipmanA. W. Clarke,Implacable.

Proby. MidshipmanWilliams D. R. Hargreaves, R.N.R.,Sapphire.

MidshipmanF. E. Garner, R.N.R.,Triumph.

MidshipmanGeorge H. Morris, R.N.R.,Lord Nelson.

Midshipman theHon. G. H. E. Russell,Implacable.

MidshipmanD. S. E. Thompson,Implacable.

MidshipmanW. D. Brown,Implacable.

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