RUDOLF EUCKEN

[1]The University of Chicago Press published a second edition of "School and Society", revised and enlarged, in 1915.

[2]"Schools of To-morrow", by John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey (Dutton), 1915.

[3]Doctor Georg Kerschensteiner who founded the famous "workshop schools" of Munich also acknowledges his indebtedness to Dewey.

[4]No. I of Series 2 of Philosophical Papers of the University of Michigan, 1887.

[5]"Schools of To-morrow", p. 301.

[6]See the admirable article inAtlantic Monthlyof November, 1908, by President Pritchett of the Carnegie Foundation, contrasting Harvard and West Point, "The College of Freedom and the College of Discipline."

[7]International Journal of Ethics, vol. 26, p. 359-367.

[8]The New Republic, January 22, 1916.

[9]To get the full force of this portentous definition one must read it in the original:Gewiss ist der Pragmatismus erkenntniss-theoretisch Nominalismus, psychologisch Voluntarismus, naturphilosophisch Energismus, metaphysisch Agnosticismus, ethisch Meliorismus auf Grundlage des Bentham-Millschen Utilitarismus.

[10]"A Catechism Concerning Truth" in "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays."

[11]Published as "German Philosophy and Politics" (Holt), 1915.

[12]"German Philosophy and Politics" is sympathetically reviewed by Professor Santayana in theJournal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methodsfor November 25, 1915. The same Journal reprints (vol. XII, p. 584) a criticism appearing inThe New Republic(vol. IV, p. 234) by Professor Hocking of Harvard, who thinks that the fault of the Germans is being too pragmatic. Professor Dewey's reply is published with it. See also Dewey's admirable analysis of the national psychology of Germany, France, and England in his article "On Understanding the Mind of Germany",Atlantic, vol. 117, p. 251.

[13]Mind, April, 1916.

[14]The New Republic, March 13, 1915.

[15]The New Republic, July 1, 1916.

To the history of and criticism of these conceptions and their terminology Professor Eucken has brought thorough and careful reading, acute and candid criticism, and a clear and solid style. While he is at home among the systems of the past, he seems equally familiar with the controversies of the present. Above all, he has studied brevity, and has mastered the art of expressing in a few words the results of patient research and critical discrimination.The writer of this notice was constrained to recommend the work for translation to his friend and former pupil by his estimate of the intrinsic value of the treatise and the desire that it might be brought within reach of English readers as eminently suited to the times. He can say with assured confidence that there are few books within his knowledge which are better fitted to aid the student who wishes to acquaint himself with the course of superlative and scientific thinking and to form an intelligent estimate of most of the current theories.[1]

The writer of this notice was constrained to recommend the work for translation to his friend and former pupil by his estimate of the intrinsic value of the treatise and the desire that it might be brought within reach of English readers as eminently suited to the times. He can say with assured confidence that there are few books within his knowledge which are better fitted to aid the student who wishes to acquaint himself with the course of superlative and scientific thinking and to form an intelligent estimate of most of the current theories.[1]

These were the words with which Professor Eucken was introduced to the American public in 1880 by one who was a good judge of men and books, the primary qualification of a college president. Thirty-two years later Professor Eucken came to America; this time in person, but under the auspices of Harvard and the University of New York, instead of Yale. This time he reached a larger audience; partly owing to his greater fame, partly to a change in the popular attitude toward the views he presents. In 1908, when Eucken received the Nobel prize for the greatest work of idealistic literature, there was no book of his accessible to the English reader, for the translation instigated by President Porter was out of print. Since then all his important works have been brought out in England and America; and the periodical indexes record a growing interest in his thought, corresponding to that which is manifested in Germany.

The Nobel prizes have failed to carry out the intention of their founder, which was to place $100,000 or so immediately into the hands of a man who had made a signal contribution to science, literature, or peace. Instead of this, the Nobel committees absorb a liberal moiety of the income of the fund in local "administrative expenses" and usually give the residue, now amounting to some $37,000, to men whose reputations have long been established; for example, in literature, Sully-Prudhomme, Mommsen, Björnson, Mistral, Kipling, and Heyse. But in so interpreting their mandate the Nobel committees have fulfilled another useful function, possibly as much needed as that conceived by Alfred Nobel. If they have not discovered original genius, they have at least pointed it out to the world at large. The men thus distinguished as having contributed to human progress have extended their influence over their contemporaries, as well as received a due appreciation of their efforts. The Nobel prize does not add to the stature of a man, but it does elevate him to a pulpit.

In the case of Eucken the value of this is evident. He did not need the assistance of the Nobel fund in order to prosecute his researches, for the laboratory expenses of a metaphysician are but slight, and Jena is as cheap a place to live as can nowadays be found in civilized lands. The award of the prize did not, of course, add to his reputation in philosophical circles, but Eucken does not believe that the influence of a philosopher should be confined to philosophical circles. He repudiates entirely the aloof, impartial, disinterested spectator attitude which philosophers in general have thought it necessary to pretend to assume. The question is, in short, what kind of a scientist the philosopher should imitate: the chemist who transforms the world in which he lives, or the meteorologist who merely records the atmospheric currents without attempting to guide them? Eucken is not only a teacher; he is a preacher. He has a message which he believes of vital importance to his contemporaries, so it cannot be a matter of indifference to him that he is, in his later years, gaining a wider audience, that his works are the most widely current philosophical writings of the present day in Germany,[2]and are being extensively translated into other languages.

This growing popularity is all the more noteworthy since it is not attained by any novelty of form, or even brilliancy of style. Eucken never tries to stimulate thought by shocking the reader with audacious paradoxes, as did Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, as do Shaw and Chesterton. He has none of the freshness of phraseology and wealth of novel illustrations which attract to James and Bergson their wide circle of admirers. He does not, like Ostwald and Haeckel, make use of the direct and concrete mode of expression which has been introduced into literature by modern science. Eucken always writes in a serious and methodical style, elaborating his line of thought as he goes along with exactness and just proportion; expressing himself in general and abstract terms, rarely making use of imagery or concrete illustrations, never introducing personalities. A sweeter-tempered philosopher never lived. He speaks no evil, even of the dead. He indulges in no polemics with his contemporaries. In his historical works he passes through all fields of thought, gleaning good grain wherever he goes, and saying as little as possible about the tares and brambles that he finds with it.

Very curiously, it has been Eucken's lot to have been closely associated, on the faculties of small universities, with the two men whose views are most antagonistic to his: at Basel with Nietzsche and at Jena with Haeckel, and he has been on the best of terms with both of them. I was particularly interested in what Professor Eucken told me of Nietzsche, whose personality and philosophy were in such violent contradiction. This advocate of ruthless brutality, this scorner of sympathy and compassion, was in reality a most tender-hearted man, but too shy and sensitive to be popular; and when his feelings were hurt he wrote down in a passion what he felt at the moment.

At the University of Basel Professor Eucken often served with Nietzsche on the examining committee of candidates for the doctorate in classical philology. On such occasions, if the student appeared to be getting the worst of it in the verbal contest, Nietzsche would be observed to become more and more nervous until, finally, he could contain himself no longer and would break in with leading questions: "I suppose you mean so-and-so?" or "Do you not believe this or that?" until he got the student to say just about what he should have said in the first place. Professor Eucken does not regard the widespread influence of Nietzsche as altogether evil, believing he should not be held responsible for all the vagaries and extravagances of his devotees. The reason of Nietzsche's popularity, according to Eucken, is his strong individualism; for the Germans, in spite of governmental control and the Social Democracy, are pronounced individualists in character. The German will insist upon having his own house, his own seat, his own opinion. This sounded strange to the American, accustomed to have Germany referred to as the most regimented of nations.

But modern Germany is a land of incongruities and contradictions, a wild confusion of swirling cross-currents. The increase of population, the checking of emigration, the amazing prosperity, the extension of commerce, the demand for territorial expansion, would indicate a sound physical constitution and a healthful growth. The immense sale of serious works on religion and philosophy shows a revival of interest in spiritual affairs. Yet, if we were to judge of the character of the people by the most conspicuous of its achievements in art and literature, we should say that modern Germany is hopelessly decadent and corrupt. In drama and fiction Gallic license is allied with Gothic coarseness. In pictorial art hideousness and viciousness are depicted by means of strange and violent methods. Germany of to-day, as seen by the tourist, is a land of spotted painting, spotted literature, and spotted faces.[3]In the little university town of Jena the incongruities of modern Germany are curiously conspicuous. In this historic stronghold of Protestantism, this leader in the Enlightenment, the home of Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, Fichte, the Humboldts, Hegel, Schelling, and Wieland, the barbarous customs of the past have the strongest hold. A student is likely to miss his seven o'clock Wednesday lecture on the spiritual life because he sat up till two o'clock drinking compulsory beer with his corps brothers in the middle of the marketplace. And he may cut out his eight o'clock Saturday lecture because he has an imperative engagement to cut off the nose or the ear of a fellow student at the Mensurort of Döllnitz.

Among the nobler manifestations of the spirit of new Germany the tourist is likely to take most interest in the architecture. Here, indeed, he will find much that is displeasing and eccentric, but that in itself is encouraging, for it shows that we are in the presence of a living art which is not content to keep to the safe and beaten paths, but would strike out new ways for itself. In city and country unexpected forms and colors delight the eye on villa, monument, and public building; new and ingenious solutions of problems as old as man. The modern German architect is not the imitator, but the rival, of the master builders of the past. He knows how to harmonize the old with the new, utilizing the old to give him inspiration, but not permitting it to hamper him. A striking example of this is the new university buildings of Jena, erected on the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the university in 1908. The whole group cost only three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars, not so much as some single buildings in our leading universities, yet I know of none more satisfactory from both the utilitarian and the esthetic point of view. Here the problem of harmonization was particularly difficult; not only must the new buildings fit into the picture of old Jena, but a tower of the ancient ducal castle was actually to be incorporated. Yet the architect, Theodor Fischer, has made no sacrifices to the spirit of antiquity. At Oxford the newer buildings either clash violently with their elders or imitate them so closely as to be almost equally inconvenient and uncomfortable. The Jena buildings look as though they might well have been built by Kurfürst Johann Friedrich der Grossmütige in 1558, but are up to date, commodious, hygienic, well ventilated, steam heated, equipped with electric lights and clocks, and electric vacuum cleaners.

There are no superfluous statues stuck around in niches and on pedestals. The adornment, plastic and polychromatic, is strictly structural. It is put where it belongs. With the possible exception of a Rodin bust of Minerva in the vestibule, I did not see any "objects of art" that I could have carried off without tearing down the building. On the stone of the north façade are roughly chiseled the Ephesian Diana in the gable, and, beneath, four Egyptian-like figures representing the four faculties. That ofPhilosophie, with solemn and inscrutable face, is very appropriately nearest to the lecture room of Professor Eucken. As we enter we see opposite the portal to theAula, the university hall of state, on either side of which are gigantic paintings emblematic of the transmission of culture, a grown man on one side holding out his torch to a young man, that he may light his torch by it. The most important picture at the Jena University is theAuszug deutscher Studenten im Jahre 1815by Hodler, who used as a model for the middle figure the youngest son of Professor Eucken.

Auditorium Number 1, the largest classroom of the new building, is assigned to Eucken, and we find it already about half filled, although it is not yet seven o'clock in the morning. Some seventy students I count, and among them about a dozen women, not segregated, but scattered here and there, for Jena is coeducational now, and masculine resentment at the intrusion of women has quite died out. The students may seat themselves wherever they choose, affixing a card with name and hour if they want to hold a particular place. These cards and even the desks are scrawled with automatic writing and sketches by the inattentive hands of students. The seats, long benches with a fixed desk and book rack in front, are better than those found in English universities, but not so good as the American individual seats. There are plenty of windows along one side of the room, and the walls—white above, light green below—diffuse the rays agreeably. The floor slants down to a plain pine desk and a small blackboard. On the wall is a mosaic portrait of the late Professor Abbé, the real patron of the University, for a prosperous optician is of much more use to a modern university than a needy Gross-Herzog.

Promptly on the hour a vigorous shuffling and stamping of feet announces the arrival of the professor, who begins with "Mein' Herren und Damen" as his first foot steps upon the platform. A German professor always gives good measure, a full hourful, pressed down, shaken together, and running over; no period of preliminary meditation on what he shall say and of casual conversation at the end, as often in America. Nor do the German professors find it necessary to adopt the low voice, indifferent air and hesitating utterance regarded at Oxford and Harvard as the mark of the gentleman and the scholar. In fact I find, in roaming about our universities, that so many of our younger men have adopted this pitch and tempo, being often inaudible and never impressive to the back seats, that I am tempted to lay down the law that the younger the instructor the poorer the voice. When I complain of it they reply coldly: "One can never shout and tell the truth." But Eucken is evidently not afraid that being heard will impair his veracity. You might take him for a revivalist. You would not be wrong if you did. His voice rings out loud and clear. He is tremendously in earnest. Occasionally, when he thinks of it, he sits down. But not for long. He springs to his feet and throws himself forward on the reading-desk in the effort to really reach his audience. He clasps his hands to his breast and then throws his arms out wide, as though to seize theGeisteslebenwith which his heart is overflowing and spread it far over a materialistic and indifferent generation. Who can doubt the reality of "the spiritual life" after he has seen Eucken? It shines in his face. We do not need to be told that Activism is his philosophy. It shows in his movements. He lives his theories. Few philosophers do, luckily for most of them.

"Happiness" is the subject of this lecture. The spiritual life is the theme of it, as always. The spiritual life, he says, goes out from within and transforms the world, thus giving true happiness. We must work with the world movement if we would partake of its divine purpose. And here he quotes Plotinus, the first religious philosopher, for whom he has as high regard as have Maeterlinck and Bergson. We must utilize the force of faith; must bring this Christian power into modern life. True ability is moral ability. Labor is not merely activity; it has a purpose; it is directed against opposition. By strife and striving we must reach the reality of the spiritual life. Through labor and love we attain our true selves. The fulfilling of duty is inner freedom. The unrest and stress of the present day are the signs of a new spiritual birth. The function of philosophy is not to afford intellectual or esthetic gratification, but it is to deepen and enrich life. To the fine old German saying, "A man is more than his work", Eucken added "Mankind is more than his culture." It is aLebensanschauungrather than aWeltanschauungthat he teaches, for to him a theory of life is more important than a theory of the cosmos.

These are merely a few fragmentary thoughts that I gathered in that memorable hour. Of no value in themselves, I give them merely to prove that I got something out of the lecture, for I never understood spoken German until I heard Eucken. But even a deaf man would have found it profitable to be there. A second lecture followed immediately, on "Pessimism and Optimism", delivered with the same vigor and listened to with the same interest. Professor Eucken was then sixty-seven years old, and would have been Carnegied if he were in an American university, instead of giving lectures from seven to nine. His hair and beard are pure white, but set off handsomely his pink cheeks and his bright blue eyes still unspectacled.

And when he leaves the lecture room he does not leave his work, but goes to more of it at home. On one wall of his study is a photograph of Michael Angelo's "Creation", from the Sistine Chapel, and on the opposite a cast of a section of the Parthenon frieze. Between these is the desk of the man who has brought together the highest aspirations of Greek and Christian culture; a table stacked high with papers and manuscripts.

His correspondence is now voluminous, but he answers all letters promptly and carefully, writing his replies in the old-fashioned way, with a pen. He receives all visitors and will talk of his philosophy to a single auditor with the same unwearied enthusiasm as to an audience. Even those who are repelled by the severity of his literary style are attracted by the charm of his personality, and this accounts in large part for his devoted following in all parts of the world.

After granting me an interview which took the heart out of his afternoon, Professor Eucken returned good for evil by inviting me to dinner in the evening, when I found that the lady on my right was from Nebraska and the one on my left from Switzerland, while around the table I saw a young Boer from the Transvaal, a don from Oxford, a professor from Tokyo, and representatives of I don't know how many other nationalities.

The extension of the influence of Professor Eucken through this hearty hospitality is due largely to his wife. Frau Eucken has happily not confined herself to the duties which the Kaiser prescribes as woman's only sphere,Kirche, Kueche und Kinder[4]She is not only wife, mother and housekeeper, but artist and musician as well. Her success in managing what might be called an international salon of philosophy is facilitated by her ability to converse in many languages. On account of the generous hospitality extended to students and strangers by the Eucken household a removal was made last year to a new villa in the suburbs. Professor Eucken's wife and daughter came with him on his visit to America.

Eucken's philosophy of life is dramatic. His life has been undramatic; the even, ordered course of the typical German professor, made even more uneventful by reason of his mastery of the gentle art of not making enemies. Born in Aurich, East Friesland, January 5, 1846, he studied at Göttingen under Lotze, and at Berlin under Trendelenburg; taught for four years in agymnasium; then for three years in the University of Basel; in 1874 was called to the University of Jena, where he has ever since remained, in spite of calls to larger institutions. His inner life has been as uneventful as its external aspects; a continuous, methodical, logical development of thought, without leaps or backslidings.

First, in 1878, he laid the foundations in the study of the concepts of philosophy which attracted the attention of President Porter. Seven years later he was ready to outline his own guiding theory in a volume bearing the characteristically Germanic title of "A Prolegomena for the Investigation of the Unity of the Spiritual Life in the Consciousness and Acts of Mankind." From this standpoint of the unique significance of the spiritual life he then reviewed the whole history of the evolution of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche. His purpose in this work, known in English as "The Problem of Human Life", was, as he explains, "to afford historical confirmation of the view that conceptions are determined by life, not life by conceptions", and "that human destinies are not decided by mere opinions and whims, either of individuals or of masses of individuals, but rather that they are ruled by spiritual necessities with a spiritual aim and purport, and that for man a new world dawns, transcending the merely natural domain—the world, namely, of the spiritual life."

The sentences quoted are alone enough to show that Eucken's "history of philosophy" is a very different thing from what usually goes by that name, that is the chronicling of the speculations of successive generations of metaphysicians, each one wiping clean the slate before he began to write. Eucken sees an aim and purpose in philosophic thought. He does not regard it as a mere amusement or as an intellectual exercise, but rather as a method by which humanity may grow into a higher sphere of existence. The vital need of the day, then, is to awaken the present indifferent and busy generation to a realization of the supreme importance of spiritual things and to the necessity of bringing the Christian religion into vital connection with modern thought.

This is the task to which Eucken devoted his energies when by the close of the nineteenth century he had fully matured his views, and the rapid succession of volumes which have since come from his pen are concerned with the moral and intellectual difficulties which nowadays impede religious progress.

The development of natural science and especially the theory of evolution have led to the identification of man with nature. Yet the very fact that we have come to know that we belong to nature shows that we are more than nature.

A transcendence of nature is already accomplished in the process of thought. A consideration of all the facts leads us to the result that a life consisting solely of nature and intelligence involves an intolerable inconsistency; form and content are sharply separated from each other; thought is strong enough to disturb the sense of satisfaction with nature, but is too weak to construct a new world in opposition to it. Life is in a state of painful uncertainty and man is a Prometheus bound in that he must experience all the constraint and meaninglessness of the life of nature, and must suffer therefrom an increasing pain without being able to change this state in any way.[5]

From time to time in the course of history, spiritual impulses arise which are fundamentally different from physical self-preservation. "They force human activity into particular channels; they speak to us with a tone of command and require absolute obedience. Neither the interests of individuals nor those of whole classes prevail against them; every consideration of utility vanishes before their inner necessity." Religious movements show life in a particular form; something emerges in it which, unconcerned with the weal and the woe of man, follows its own course and makes absolute demands. Man is not altogether the creature of his environment, nor are his moral standards determined by society. The individual is able in the light of his own conscience to approve and value something which all around him reject; and conversely to condemn and reject something which all around him esteem and respect. This opposition of individuals to the condition of things in the social environment has been the main source of all inner progress in matters of morality.

This line of thought leads Eucken to the conclusion that a new life distinct from that of nature arises in our soul. The spiritual life is not the product of a gradual development from the life of nature, but has an independent origin and evolves new powers and standards. We must recognize in the spiritual life a universal life which transcends man, is shared by him and raises him to itself. The philosophical treatment of history ought first of all to trace the liberation of life from the mere human; the inner elevation of our being to a more than human.

In discussing the question of how man attains the spiritual life, Eucken steers carefully between the position of Buddhism, that each man must work out his own salvation without any aid from above, and the extreme Calvinistic position, that man is purely passive and altogether undeserving. Or to quote his own words:

It is necessary to acknowledge that in all the spiritual movement which appears in the domain of man, there is a revelation of the spiritual world; as merely human power cannot lead the whole to new heights, in all development of the spiritual life the communication of the new world must precede the activity of man. At the same time, where we are concerned with a life that is independent, and of which the activity is conscious and self-determined, the change cannot possibly merelyhappento man; it must be taken up by his own activity; it needs his own decision and acceptance.Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at the height to which it has attained.

Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at the height to which it has attained.

This leads to the distinctive form of Eucken's philosophy of life, known as Activism. This is like Pragmatism in its rejection of the mere intellectualistic view of life and in basing truth upon a more spontaneous and essential activity. But Eucken's objection to Pragmatism is stated in the following language:

Pragmatism, which has recently made so much headway among English-speaking peoples and beyond them, is more inclined to shape the world and life in accordance with human conditions and needs than to invest spiritual activity with an independence in relation to these, and apply its standards to the testing and sifting of the whole content of human life.At its highest, religion has always been concerned with winning a new world and a new humanity, not with the achievement of something within the old world and for the old humanity.

At its highest, religion has always been concerned with winning a new world and a new humanity, not with the achievement of something within the old world and for the old humanity.

It will be seen that Eucken does not fall in with the tendency of the times to subordinate the individual to society. The spiritual life springs up, not in the "social consciousness", but in the soul of the individual, elevating his spiritual nature above all environment. But such a person is guarded against the arrogance of a superman by realizing that this superiority is not due to personal merit, but solely to the presence of the spiritual world.

This, as Eucken recognizes, may be called a form of mysticism, but it differs decidedly from the older mysticism in some important respects. It is not Quietism, but its opposite, Activism. Eucken does not regard the individual as seeking a peaceful haven by absorption into the infinite; on the contrary, the infinite enters the individual and rouses him to intensest and creative activity.

Here Eucken shows a striking similarity to Bergson. TheGeisteslebenmight be regarded as a higher development or manifestation of theélan vital. Both involve the conception of an upward impulse acting at individual points which thus become centers of spontaneous vital activity. It is curious that this view, so characteristically modern and as novel as anything can be in the realm of metaphysical speculation, should have simultaneously and independently been made a fundamental doctrine by two philosophers so unlike in temperament and training, the French philosopher starting from the standpoint of mathematical physics and Spencerian evolution, and the German from academic metaphysics and Christian theology. Such a coincidence, as well as the reception which the teachings of Bergson and Eucken have received in many lands, show that their common principle is in harmony with the spirit of the age. Eucken and Bergson met for the first time at Columbia University in 1912.

It might be feared that Eucken, emphasizing as he does the individualistic origin of religious inspiration and realizing as he does the injury done to the Christian cause by clinging to antiquated formulas and medieval conceptions, would be inclined to undervalue ecclesiastical institutions and to advocate too violent a break with historic Christianity. But here again his moderation and sanity are manifest. He cannot be called orthodox from the standpoint of the established Lutheran Church. He agrees entirely with his colleague Haeckel in condemning the union of Church and State, but for opposite reasons; Haeckel because the Church receives thereby artificial support; Eucken because the Church is thereby hampered in its freedom of development.

He never, however, falls into the error of thinking that a "new" religion can be made to order to suit the times, or even the needs of any one person. He finds in historic Christianity all the essentials of a permanent and universal religion, capable, when properly understood and presented, of satisfying the severe requirements of modern thought and feeling. But this is not to be accomplished by merely eliminating whatever the modern mind finds objectionable.

A religion is not primarily a mere theory concerning things human and divine—such a theory can, of course, be quite easily put together with a little ingenuity—it discloses ultimate revelations of the spiritual life, further developments of reality, great organizations of living energy, movements, in a word, which have convulsed the age in which they came victoriously to birth, and have subsequently proved themselves strong enough to attract large portions of mankind, weld each of these inwardly together, and set an invisible world before it as the main basis of life. In such upheavals of the life of the people there is opened a rich mine of fact which becomes the property of all men, and includes valuable experiences of humanity as a whole. He who would cut himself off from this great stream of experience, inward as well as outward, will soon find out how little the isolated individual can do in matters of this kind. It is easy to find fault with what tradition hands down, no less easy to draw up vague views of one's own, but how immense is the distance which separates procedure such as this from the creative effort which urges its sure way forward, from the synthesis which embraces all men's lives and exercises an elemental compulsion upon them.[6]

Eucken's clairvoyant faith sees through the present anti-religious atmosphere the dawning of a new era in which the spiritual life shall again be dominant. Yet no one has recognized more clearly the alienation of the Church from the cultural and the practical life of the day. This chasm is no doubt greater in Germany, where the Catholic and Protestant churches are State institutions and identified with reactionary elements, than it is in our own country, where there is fortunately no Church, but many churches, all equally free to adapt themselves to changing conditions and to prove themselves useful to society in their own way. But it must be admitted that our churches are not availing themselves of this exceptional freedom and do not show the originality and diversity which is characteristic of life and growth.

Eucken is conciliatory, but no compromiser. He does not solicit for religion a humble place in modern life by using arguments like those employed in the sale of "patent medicines", that it is innocuous at the least and may somehow do some good. He meets modern science upon her own ground. He claims for religion an equal practicality and efficiency; he demands for it a greater certitude, and he is willing, as Jesus was willing, to put it to the pragmatic test.

Since we have found that religion is linked thus closely with the whole, we need not make any timid compromise with certain superficial contemporary movements and content ourselves with a lower degree of certainty, saying, for instance, that we can never altogether eliminate the subjective element, and that religious truths can never have the certainty of such formulae as 2 x 2 = 4. On the contrary, we maintain that it is a very poor conception of religion which deems any certainty superior to hers, and does not claim for her truth a far more primary certainty than that of the formula 2 x 2 = 4. Only a shallow and perverse conception of truth can allow the certainty of the part to exceed the certainty of the whole.[7]Either religion is merely a product of human wishes and ideas under the sanction of tradition and social convention—and then neither art nor might nor cunning can prevent so frail a fabrication from being whelmed by the advancing spiritual tide—or else religion is based on facts of a suprahuman order, and in that case the most violent onslaught cannot shake her; rather will it help her in the end, through all the stress and toil of human circumstance, to discover where her true strength lies, and to express in purer ways the eternal truth that is in her.[8]

Either religion is merely a product of human wishes and ideas under the sanction of tradition and social convention—and then neither art nor might nor cunning can prevent so frail a fabrication from being whelmed by the advancing spiritual tide—or else religion is based on facts of a suprahuman order, and in that case the most violent onslaught cannot shake her; rather will it help her in the end, through all the stress and toil of human circumstance, to discover where her true strength lies, and to express in purer ways the eternal truth that is in her.[8]

I have thought best to leave the article on Eucken just as I published it inThe Independentof February 27, 1913, with only a few slight changes in tense and time references. It presents a picture of German life and thought as I saw it shortly before the war, and it would be impossible for me to bring it up to date now when the British censorship prevents German books and papers from reaching America. I can only add some quotations from Eucken's recent writings to show his attitude toward the war.

In the fall of 1914, Eucken joined with his colleague in the university and his opponent in philosophy, Professor Ernst Haeckel, in a public statement charging that British greed and egotism had caused the Great War.[9]In the following spring Eucken sent an appeal to the American people in the form of eight questions which I quote entire.

You say that we are a nation militarist and greedy for conquest. Permit us a few questions with regard to that rash statement.First.—How do you explain that in times gone by Germany did not take advantage of the difficulties of her present opponents—as, for instance, England's difficulty during the Boer war or Russia's difficulty during the Japanese war? If we had meant conquest should we have chosen the very moment when half the world was against us, and we were numerically in the minority? Do you really think that we are as stupid as all that?Second.—Next, how do you explain that all parties in Germany approve of the policy of the government and loyally hold together, including the Social Democrats? Yesterday they were our decided opponents. Do you believe that the Socialists have overnight, as it were, become changed from decided opponents to adherents of militarism?Third.—How do you explain the fact that the Americans who were in Germany at the outbreak of the war in an overwhelming majority sided with us? Does not the opinion of those who see events quite near—nay, who live through them—carry greater weight than the view of such as observe occurrences from a remote distance?Fourth.—You believe that the Germans are oppressed and narrowed down by the rule of militarism. How do you explain that education and technical and scientific research are so highly developed and universally esteemed in Germany and that for this reason so many Americans come to Germany in order to study sciences and arts?Fifth.—You always discuss war with regard to Belgium, France and England only. Have you forgotten Russia, with her one hundred and fifty million inhabitants and her army, which is by far the largest in the whole world? Russia is a danger to Germany and to the whole of Europe and just now insists on the possession of Constantinople. Have you forgotten that Russia, by interfering with the Servian murder case, began the war, and that England, according to the parliamentary statement made by Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, was determined, even before the German invasion of Belgium, to abandon her neutrality in favor of France?Sixth.—You generally argue that all Europe was in profound peace and that only the greed of Germany disturbed that peace. Have you forgotten that long before the war there was a triple entente which was directed against Germany and that the entente newspapers openly discussed the war plans hatched against Germany and even recommended 1916 as a suitable year for commencing hostilities?Seventh.—You want to be good Christians and as such work for peace among the nations. Can you reconcile such Christianity with the fact that your country sends huge consignments of arms and ammunition to our opponents and thus intensifies and lengthens the war? Can you further reconcile that with neutrality, a neutrality in spirit and not merely in the letter?Eighth.—Do not you think that a great nation with a glorious past should see the events of the day with its own eyes and that such independence of thought is the highest test of true liberty? But you contemplate present history more or less through English spectacles, as if your country were still a British colony and not an independent empire with its own goals and standards. In such a passion-stirred age as ours neutrals have the lofty duty to keep out of party strife and to endeavor to be just and impartial to both sides. This endeavor is lacking in Germany's American opponents.

You say that we are a nation militarist and greedy for conquest. Permit us a few questions with regard to that rash statement.

First.—How do you explain that in times gone by Germany did not take advantage of the difficulties of her present opponents—as, for instance, England's difficulty during the Boer war or Russia's difficulty during the Japanese war? If we had meant conquest should we have chosen the very moment when half the world was against us, and we were numerically in the minority? Do you really think that we are as stupid as all that?

Second.—Next, how do you explain that all parties in Germany approve of the policy of the government and loyally hold together, including the Social Democrats? Yesterday they were our decided opponents. Do you believe that the Socialists have overnight, as it were, become changed from decided opponents to adherents of militarism?

Third.—How do you explain the fact that the Americans who were in Germany at the outbreak of the war in an overwhelming majority sided with us? Does not the opinion of those who see events quite near—nay, who live through them—carry greater weight than the view of such as observe occurrences from a remote distance?

Fourth.—You believe that the Germans are oppressed and narrowed down by the rule of militarism. How do you explain that education and technical and scientific research are so highly developed and universally esteemed in Germany and that for this reason so many Americans come to Germany in order to study sciences and arts?

Fifth.—You always discuss war with regard to Belgium, France and England only. Have you forgotten Russia, with her one hundred and fifty million inhabitants and her army, which is by far the largest in the whole world? Russia is a danger to Germany and to the whole of Europe and just now insists on the possession of Constantinople. Have you forgotten that Russia, by interfering with the Servian murder case, began the war, and that England, according to the parliamentary statement made by Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, was determined, even before the German invasion of Belgium, to abandon her neutrality in favor of France?

Sixth.—You generally argue that all Europe was in profound peace and that only the greed of Germany disturbed that peace. Have you forgotten that long before the war there was a triple entente which was directed against Germany and that the entente newspapers openly discussed the war plans hatched against Germany and even recommended 1916 as a suitable year for commencing hostilities?

Seventh.—You want to be good Christians and as such work for peace among the nations. Can you reconcile such Christianity with the fact that your country sends huge consignments of arms and ammunition to our opponents and thus intensifies and lengthens the war? Can you further reconcile that with neutrality, a neutrality in spirit and not merely in the letter?

Eighth.—Do not you think that a great nation with a glorious past should see the events of the day with its own eyes and that such independence of thought is the highest test of true liberty? But you contemplate present history more or less through English spectacles, as if your country were still a British colony and not an independent empire with its own goals and standards. In such a passion-stirred age as ours neutrals have the lofty duty to keep out of party strife and to endeavor to be just and impartial to both sides. This endeavor is lacking in Germany's American opponents.

That even the antagonisms aroused by the war have not shaken Eucken's faith in the power of religion and philosophy to heal the wounds of humanity is shown by a recent article on "The International Character of Modern Philosophy" in theHomiletic Reviewof New York. In this he discusses with great impartiality the contributions which England, France, Germany, and Italy have made to philosophy and concludes as follows:

After all, philosophy is summoned to proclaim the unity of mankind over against the present split among the peoples. To be sure, this does not mean that individual philosophers are less earnest to put forward the claims of their own people than the claims of others; for they are not mere scholars, they are also living men and citizens of their own nation. When they see this assaulted and its existence put in peril, it is for them a holy duty to come to the defense of the fatherland—if not with the weapons of war, at least to do their best with the weapons of the intellect. Meanwhile, the belief is entirely proper that the intellectual gains which are the result of philosophical labor remain unharmed by war, that a realm of intellectual creation will retain full recognition beyond the enmities of man. Keenest blame is deserved by the attempt to array against each other the intellectual leaders of a people which is for the moment a foe, or to disparage the entire mental character of the opponent. That is the stamp of a small and vengeful disposition—he who aims to depreciate others to whom great thanks are due dishonors himself. Let each, therefore, remain true to his own people, but never forget the task and aim of philosophy—to consider things under the form of perpetuity, maintaining for humanity in the present a world superior to all the littlenesses of human action.A further and much more weighty task is from this arising for philosophy—to work mightily for the inner unity of human life and endeavor; the lack of such a unity has contributed not a little to whet the antagonisms of the nations.... Only when we are convinced that we belong together essentially, that we have a great work to accomplish in common and have to raise mankind from the stage of nature to that of intellect—that we have to carry on unitedly a fight against the manifold unreason of life—only by the strengthening and operation of such convictions can the division of humanity into hostile nationalities be successfully withstood. Not through elegant addresses and articles, only by means of a dynamic deepening of life and the introduction of new power can we progress in the solution of these problems.[10]

A further and much more weighty task is from this arising for philosophy—to work mightily for the inner unity of human life and endeavor; the lack of such a unity has contributed not a little to whet the antagonisms of the nations.... Only when we are convinced that we belong together essentially, that we have a great work to accomplish in common and have to raise mankind from the stage of nature to that of intellect—that we have to carry on unitedly a fight against the manifold unreason of life—only by the strengthening and operation of such convictions can the division of humanity into hostile nationalities be successfully withstood. Not through elegant addresses and articles, only by means of a dynamic deepening of life and the introduction of new power can we progress in the solution of these problems.[10]

Eucken is not a man of one book. He has put forth his ideas in many different forms; large volumes and little, works historical, expository, argumentative, theoretical and practical, but his point of view has remained throughout his long productive career essentially unchanged, and is so clearly indicated in all his works that one may be sure of obtaining the fundamental principles of his philosophy from whatever volume he selects. If, however, I am expected to prescribe a particular book as an introduction to Eucken, I should say that the general reader who is interested in the relation of philosophy to religion—and one who is not interested in that would not care to read Eucken anyway—would find "Christianity and the New Idealism" (translated by Lucy Judge Gibson and W. R. Boyce Gibson, Harper) most suitable for the purpose. It is a small volume, as easy reading as anything of Eucken's, and discusses frankly the present crisis in religious thought and indicates what he believes the churches ought to discard and what they must maintain of their inherited doctrines and forms. "The Truth of Religion" (translated by W. Tudor Jones, Putnam) covers similar ground, but in a more thorough and theoretical manner.

The volumes entitled in their English version "The Meaning and Value of Life" (Gibson translation, Macmillan); "The Life of the Spirit" (translated by F. L. Pogson, Putnam), are intended for the non-philosophical reader; while "Life's Basis and Life's Ideals" (translated by Alban G. Widgery, Macmillan); "Main Currents of Modern Thought: A Study of the Spiritual and Intellectual Movements of the Present Day" (translated by Meyrick Booth, Scribner); and "The Contest for the Spiritual Life" (Putnam) are of a more technical character.

"The Problem of Human Life as Viewed by Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time" (translated by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson, Scribner) differs decidedly from the ordinary history of philosophy in that the author is not trying to set at odds and overthrow the successive philosophers, but is seeking for whatever in them is good and permanent, finally coming to "see them linked together as workers in one common task: the task of building up a spiritual world within the realm of human life, of proving our existence to be both spiritual and natural."

Single lectures and articles by Eucken readily accessible in English are: "Religion and Life" (Putnam); "Back to Religion" (Pilgrim Press); "Can We Still Be Christians?" (Macmillan); "Naturalism or Idealism" (the Nobel Lecture). Twenty of his papers are included in "Collected Essays of Rudolf Eucken" (Scribner, 1914).

The titles of Eucken's chief works in German and in the English versions are as follows: "Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart" (The Main Currents of Modern Thought), 1878; "Die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und Tat der Menschheit", 1888; "Die Lebensanschauungen der Grossen Denker" (The Problem of Human Life), 1890; "Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt", 1896; "Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion" (The Truth of Religion), 1901; "Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung" (Life's Basis and Life's Ideal), 1907; "Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart" (Christianity and the New Idealism), 1907; "Sinn und Wert des Lebens" (The Meaning and Value of Life), 1905; "Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens" (The Life of the Spirit), 1908; "Erkennen und Leben" (Knowledge and Life, 1912).

Of the numerous books and articles about Eucken which have appeared in Europe, it will be sufficient to mention: "Rudolf Eucken. Die Erneuerer des deutschen Idealismus", by Theodor Kappstein (Berlin-Schöneberg: Bucherlag der "Hilfe"); "Rudolf Eucken's Werk, Eine neue idealistische Lösung des Lebensproblems", by Kurt Kesseler (Bunzlau: Kreuschmer, 1911); "Eucken's dramatische Lebensphilosophie", by Otto Braun (Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 1909); "Rudolf Eucken's Christenthum", by Ludwig von Gerdtell (Verlag von Becker). On Eucken's seventieth birthday, January 5, 1916, theZeitschrift für Philosophiepublished aFestschriftdevoted to his work. "La philosophie de M. Rudolph Eucken", by Emile Boutroux (Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, 1910).

It is unnecessary to give a list of articles about Eucken in American magazines because any library that contains the files will have a periodical index, but a few references may be given: "Religious Philosophy of Eucken", Harvard Theological Review (vol. 2, p. 465, 1909); "Eucken and St. Paul", by Richard Roberts,Contemporary Review(vol. 97, p. 71); "Religious Philosophy of Eucken", by Baron F. von Hügel,Hibbert Journal(vol. 10, p. 660); "Eucken's Philosophy of Life", by W. Fite, The Nation (vol. 95, p. 29); "Eucken's New Gospel of Activism",Current Literature(vol. 53, p. 67); "Idealism of Rudolf Eucken", by S. H. Mellone,International Journal of Ethics(vol. 21, p. 15).

There are two excellent expositions of Eucken's philosophy in English, by his students and translators: "Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life", by W. R. Boyce Gibson (Macmillan), and "An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy", by W. Tudor Jones (Putnam). A briefer compendium, "Eucken: A Philosophy of Life", by A. J. Jones, has appeared in a series of handy volumes known as "The People's Books" (New York: Dodge Publishing Company). Meyrick Booth (Ph.D. of Jena) has published "Rudolf Eucken: His Philosophy and Influence," London (Unwin, 1913).

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