For reasons already stated, Pegram entertained no fear of an attack on his left and rear, but was somewhat apprehensive that his right was not equally secure, and hence, early on the 11th, he had sent a small picket to near Hart's house and taken the further precaution to have his right vigilantly watched. The message found on the captured orderly informed Pegram that Rosecrans was leading a column to his rear.( 5) The latter thereupon sent a strong reinforcement under Captain Julius A. De Lagnel to the picket already on the mountain summit. By reason of the expected approach of a force around the right, breastworks were hastily thrown up and two pieces of artillery put in position to repel an attack from that direction. Pegram, in his uncertainty, concluded that Rosecrans might take a still wider circuit around his right and thus pass over the mountain by a pathway or road leading into the turnpike one and a half miles from Beverly; and to guard against this he ordered Col. Wm. C. Scott, with the 44th Virginia, then at Beverly, to take position with two pieces of artillery at the junction of the roads mentioned, and to scout well the flanking road.( 6)
The unexpected presence of the enemy at the summit of the mountain is thus explained, and the reliability and faithfulness of the guide vindicated. Captain De Lagnel, as well as Rosecrans, was doomed also to a surprise.
Rosecrans' command debouched from the wooded mountain and along its crest upon the rear of De Lagnel's position, and new dispositions of the Confederate force had to be made to meet the attack.
The position of De Lagnel's force was on and near the line of the turnpike as it passed over the mountain, and hence Rosecrans' column, in its approach from the southward, having gained the heights some distance from the road, was from a greater elevation.
The 10th Indiana, under Colonel Manson, was in advance and received the first fire of the enemy.
After a delay of some forty minutes, during which time the enemy was receiving reinforcements, and both sides rectifying their positions to the real situation, the order to advance and attack was given by Rosecrans, and though the troops were new and little drilled, they were well led and responded gallantly. The battle proper did not last beyond fifteen minutes. The Confederates made a brave resistance, but they were not exceeding 800 strong, and though they had the advantage of artillery, they were not advantageously posted, consequently were soon overthrown, their commander being shot down, and 21 prisoners, about 50 stand of arms, 2 pieces of artillery, and some supplies taken. The Union loss was 12 killed and 69 wounded, and the Confederate loss probably about the same.
Captain De Lagnel was, by both sides, reported killed, and his gallantry was highly lauded.( 7) General McClellan and others of the regular army officers assumed next day to recognize his body and to know him, and to deplore his early death. He had been shortly before, as we have seen, captured as aUnionofficer at Fayetteville, N. C., and had at a still later date resigned from the U.S.A. His alleged death, being generally reported through the Confederacy, was made the occasion of many funeral sermons and orations, eulogizing hisSouthernloyalty and glorious sacrifice of life "on the heights of Rich Mountain" in the cause of human slavery, called Southern rights, or Southern freedom.
But we shall hear of De Lagnel again.
Pegram, learning of the disaster on the mountain in his rear, called his best troops around him and in person started to attack and dislodge Rosecrans. He reached the proximity of the battlefield about 6 P.M., but being advised by his officers that his men were demoralized, and could not be relied on, desisted from attacking, and returned to his main camp and position.( 8)
Of the dispersed Confederate forces some escaped towards Beverly, joining Scott's 44th Virginia on the way, and some were driven back to the fortified camp and to join Pegram.
While Rosecrans was operating on the enemy's rear, McClellan was inactive in front. McClellan claimed he was to receive hourly word from Rosecrans during his progress through and up the rugged mountain, and not thus often hearing from him, he, in the presence of his officers, denounced the movement, and put upon Rosecrans the responsibility of its then predicted certain failure.
The only information received from Rosecrans during the day was a message announcing the successful progress of the column at 11 A.M. on the 11th; it was then approaching Hart's house, and about one and a half miles distant from it.( 9)
The arrangement made in advance was that on Rosecrans gaining a position on the mountain he was to move down it upon Pegram's rear, and McClellan with the main army was to attack from the front. It was not contemplated that Pegram should be fully advised of the plan before it could be, in considerable part, executed. Rosecrans' men, being much exhausted by the laborious ascent of the precipitous mountain, and having to fight an unexpected battle, did not advance to attack the enemy's intrenchments in the rear, but awaited the sound of McClellan's guns on the front. The day was too far spent the communicate the situation by messenger, and McClellan remained for the day and succeeding night in total ignorance of the real result of the battle; and though its smoke could be plainly seen, and the sound of musketry and artillery distinctly heard from his position, from circumstances which appeared to be occurring in the enemy's camp after the sound of the battle had ceased, McClellan reached the conclusion that Rosecrans was defeated, if not captured and destroyed, and this led McClellan and certain members of his staff to industriously announce that Rosecrans had disobeyed orders and would be held responsible for the disaster which had occurred. McClellan remained with the main body of his army quietly in camp on Roaring Creek until about midday when, he states in his report, "I moved up all my available force to the front and remained in person just in rear of the advance pickets, ready to assault when the indicated movement arrived."
While the troops were waiting for the "indicated movement," the enemy had drawn in his skirmishers in expectation of an assault. I was on the front with the skirmishers, and in my eagerness and inexperience naturally desired to see the real situation of the enemy's fortifications and guns. With two or three fearless soldiers following closely, and without orders, by a little detour through brush and timber to the left of the principal road, I came out in front of the fortifications close under some of the guns and obtained a good survey of them. The enemy, apprehending an assault, opened fire on us with a single discharge from one piece of artillery,(10) which he was not able to depress sufficiently to do us any harm. We, however, withdrew precipitately, and I attempted at once to report to McClellan the situation and location of the guns of the enemy and the strength and position of his fortified camp, but, instead of thanks for the information, I received a fierce rebuke, and was sharply told that my conduct might have resulted in bringing on a general battle before theGeneralwas ready. I never sinned in that way again while in McClellan's command.
Late in the afternoon of the 11th, when the sound of the battle on the mountain had ceased, an officer was seen to gallop into the camp of the enemy on the mountain side; he made a vehement address to the troops there, and the loud cheers with which they responded were distinctly heard in our camp.
This proceeding being reported to McClellan, at once settled him and others about him in the belief that Rosecrans had been defeated. A little later Confederate troops were seen moving to the rear and up the mountain. This, instead of being as reinforcements for defeated troops, as it really was, was taken as a possible aggressive movement which, in some occult way, must assail and overthrow the main army in front. As the day wore away, Poe, of the engineers, was sent to our right to find a position on the immediate left of the enemy where artillery could be used. I was detailed with two companies of the 3d Ohio to accompany him. We climbed a mountain spur and soon reached a position within rifle-musket range of the enemy which completely commanded his guns and fortifications. So near was my command that I desired permission to open fire without awaiting the arrival of artillery, but this not being given by Poe, of the headquarters staff, and being fresh from a rebuke from that quarter, I gave a peremptory ordernotto fire unless attacked. On discovering us in his rear, the enemy turned his guns and fired a few artillery shots at us, doing no harm, but affording a plausible excuse for a discharge of musketry that seemed to silence the enemy's guns, as their firing at once ceased.
Poe was a young officer of fine personal appearance, superb physique,a West Point graduate, and a grandson of one of the celebratedIndian fighters, especially noted for killing the Wyandot Chief,Big Foot, on the Ohio River in 1782.
Poe was on staff duty throughout the war; became a Brevet-Brigadier, corps of engineers, and died as a Colonel in the United States army at Detroit, Michigan, October 2, 1895.
My acquaintance with him commenced on the spur of Rich Mountain under the circumstances mentioned.
McClellan, in his report, says:
"I sent Lieutenant Poe to find such a position for our artillery as would enable us to command the works. Late in the afternoon I received his report that he had found such a place. I immediately detailed a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it was too late to get them into position before dark, and as I had received no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans' movements, I finally determined to return to camp, leaving merely sufficient force to cover the working party. Orders were then given to move up the guns with the entire available infantry at daybreak the following morning.As the troops were much fatigued, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and just as the guns were starting intelligence was received that the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the mountains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, ammunition, tents, and baggage behind.
"Then for the first time since 11 o'clock the previous day, I received a communication from General Rosecrans, giving me the first intimation that he had taken the enemy's position at Hart's farm."(11)
Here was a commanding general in the peculiar situation that he could almost see and could plainly hear a battle raging, but did not learn its successful result until fifteen hours after it ceased.
I remained on the mountain spur in command of a few companies of infantry with orders to keep the men standing in line of battle, without fires, during the entire night. It rained most of the time, and the weather becoming cold the men suffered intensely. The rest of the army retired to its camp a mile and a half distant.
Pegram gathered his demoralized forces together, and with such as were supposed able to make a long march, started about midnight to escape by a mountain path around to the westward of the Hart farm, hoping to gain the main road and join Garnett's forces, still supposed to be at Laurel Hill.
On the morning of the 12th of July we found a few broken-down men in Pegram's late camp, and a considerable number of mere boys— students from William and Mary and Hamden-Sidney colleges—too young yet for war.
McClellan and his staff, with dazzling display, rode through the deserted works, viewed the captured guns, gazed on the dejected prisoners, and then wired the War Department: "In possession of all the enemy's works up to a point in sight of Beverly. Have taken all his guns. . . . Behavior of troops in action and towards prisoners admirable."
The army moved up the mountain to the battle-field, and halted a few moments to view it. The sight of men with gunshot wounds was the first for the new volunteers, and they were deeply impressed by it; all looked upon those who had participated in the battle as veritable heroes.
Late on the 12th the troops reached Beverly, the junction of the turnpike roads far in the rear of Laurel Hill, and there bivouacked.
Garnett, learning of Pegram's disaster at Rich Mountain, abandoned his intrenchments at Laurel Hill, and leaving his tents and other property hastily retreated towards Beverly, pursued rather timidly by Morris' command. Had Garnett pushed his army rapidly through Beverly he could have passed in safety on the afternoon of the 12th, but being falsely informed that it was occupied in the morning of that day by McClellan's troops, he turned off at Leadsville Church, about five miles from Beverly, and retreated up the Leading Creek road, a very rough and difficult one to travel. A portion of Morris' command, led by Captain Benham of the regular army, followed in close pursuit, while other went quietly into camp under Morris' orders.
Pegram, with his fleeing men, succeeded in finding a way over the mountain, and at 7 P.M. of the 12th reached Tygart's Valley River, near the Beverly and Laurel Hill road, about three miles from Leadsville Church. They had travelled without road or path about twelve miles, and were broken down and starving. Pegram here learned from inhabitants of Garnett's retreat, the Union pursuit, and of the Union occupancy of Beverly. All hope of escape in a body was gone, and though distant six miles from Beverly, he dispatched a note to the commanding officer of the Union forces, saying:
"Owing to the reduced and almost famished condition of the force now here under my command, I am compelled to offer to surrender them to you as prisoners of war. I have only to ask that they receive at your hands such treatment as Northern prisoners have invariably received from the South."
McClellan sent staff officers to Pegram's camp to conduct him and his starving soldiers to Beverly, they numbering 30 officers and 525 men.(12) Others escaped.
The prisoners were paroled and sent South on July 15th, save such of the officers, including Colonel Pegram, as had recently left the United States army to join the Confederate States army; these were retained and sent to Fort McHenry.(13)
Garnett retreated through Tucker County to Kalea's Ford on Cheat River, where he camped on the night of the 12th. His rear was overtaken on the 13th at Carrick's Ford, and a lively engagement took place, with loss on both sides; during a skirmish at another ford about a mile from Carrick's, Garnett, while engaged in covering his retreat and directing skirmishers, was killed by a rifle ball.(14)
Garnett had been early selected for promotion in the Confederate army, and he promised to become a distinguished leader. His army, now much demoralized and disorganized, continued its retreatviaHorse-Shoe Run and Red House, Maryland, to Monterey, Virginia. General C. W. Hill, through timidity or inexperience, permitted the broken Confederate troops to pass him unmolested at Red House, where, as ordered, he should have concentrated a superior force.
McClellan, July 14th, moved his army over the road leading through Huttonville to Cheat Mountain Pass, and a portion of it pursued a small force of the enemy to and beyond the summit of Cheat Mountain, on the Staunton pike, but no enemy was overtaken, and the campaign was at an end.
It was the first campaign; it had the appearance of success, and McClellan, by his dispatches, gathered to himself all the glory of it. He received the commendation of General Scott, the President, and his Cabinet.(15)
From Beverly, July 16, 1861, McClellan issued a painfully vain, congratulatory address to the "Soldiers of the Army of the West."(16)
As early as July 21, 1861, he dispatched his wife that he did not "feel sure that the men would fight very well under any one but himself"; and that it was absolutely necessary for him to go in person to the Kanawha to attack General Wise. Thus farhe had led no troops in battle. The Union defeat, on this date, at Bull Run, however, turned attention to McClellan, as he alone, apparently, had achieved success, though a success, as we have seen, mainly, if not wholly, due to Rosecrans.
On July 22, 1861, he was summoned to Washington, and on the 24th left his "Army of the West" to assume other and more responsible military duties, of which we will not here speak. In dismissing him from this narrative, I desire to say that I wrote to a friend in July, 1861, an opinion as to the capacity and character of McClellan as a military leader, which I have not since felt called on to revise, and one now generally accepted by the thoughtful men of this country. McClellan was kind and generous, but weak, and so inordinately vain that he thought it unnecessary to accept the judgment of men of higher attainments and stronger character. Even now strong men shudder when they recall the fact that George B. McClellan apparently had, for a time, in his keeping the destiny of the Republic.
To indicate the state of his mind, and likewise the immensity of his vanity, I here give an extract from a letter, of August 9, 1861, to his wife, leaving the reader to make his own comment and draw his own conclusions.
"General Scott is the great obstacle. He will not comprehend the danger. I have to fight my way against him. To-morrow the question will probably be decided by giving me absolute control independently of him. . . . The people call on me to save the country.Imust save it, and cannot respect anything that is in the way.
"I receive letter after letter, have conversation after conversation, calling on me to save the nation, alluding to the presidency, dictatorship, etc. . . .I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved," etc.(17)
General McClellan was not disloyal, nor did he lack a technical military education. He was a good husband, an indulgent father, a kind and devoted friend, of pure life, but unfortunately he was for a time mistaken for a great soldier, and this mistakehenever himself discovered.
He had about him, while holding high command, many real and professed friends, most of whom partook of his habits of thought and possessed only his characteristics. President Lincoln did not fail to understand him, but sustained and long stood by him for want of a known better leader for the Eastern army, and because he had many adherents among military officers.
Greeley, in the first volume of hisAmerican Conflict, written at the beginning of the war, has a page containing the portraits of twelve of the then most distinguished "Union Generals." Scott is the central figure, and around him are McClellan, Butler, McDowell, Wool, Fremont, Halleck, Burnside, Hunter, Hooker, Buell, and Anderson. All survived the war, and not one of them was at its close a distinguished commander in the field. One or two at most had maintained only creditable standing as officers; the others (Scott excepted, who retired on account of great age) having proved, for one cause or another, failures.
In Greeley's second volume, published at the close of the war, is another group of "Union Generals." Grant is the central figure, and around him are Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, Hancock, Blair, Howard, Terry, Curtis, Banks, and Gilmore—not one of the first twelve; and he did not even then exhaust the list of great soldiers who fairly won eternal renown.
The true Chieftains had to be evolved in the flame of battle, amid the exigencies of the long, bloody war, and they had to win their promotions on the field.
( 1) For a summary life of the writer before and after the war, see Appendix A.
( 2)War Records, vol. ii., p. 48.
( 3) Colonel Pegram's Rep.,War Records, vol. ii., p. 267.
( 4)Citizen Soldier(John Beatty), p. 22.
( 5) It seems that this orderly did decline to say which flank Rosecrans was turning, as he must have had doubts after what had transpired as to his instructions; nevertheless Pegram decided Rosecrans was passing around his right, and so notified Garnett.—War Records, vol. ii., pp. 256, 260, 272.
( 6)Ibid., vol. ii., p. 275.
( 7)War Records, vol. ii., p. 245.
( 8)Ibid., (Pegram's Report), vol. ii., p. 265.
( 9)War Records(McClellan's Report), vol. ii., p. 206.
(10)Citizen Soldier(Beatty), p. 24.
(11)War Records, vol. ii., p. 206.
(12)War Records(Pegram's Report), vol. ii., p. 267.
(13) At Beverly lived a sister of Thomas J. Jackson (Stonewall), Mrs. Arnold, who, though her husband was also disloyal, was a pronounced Union woman and remained devoted to the Union cause throughout the war.
(14)War Records, vol. ii., p. 287.
(15)Ibid., p. 204.
(16)Ibid., p. 236.
(17)McClellan's Own Story, p. 84.
General Rosecrans, from headquarters at Grafton, July 25, 1861, assumed command of the "Army of Occupation in Western Virginia." He subsequently removed his headquarters to the field on the Kanawha and there actively participated in campaigns.
Brigadier-General Joseph J. Reynolds, of Indiana, a regular officer, was assigned to the first brigade and to command the troops in the Cheat Mountain region.
Many of the troops who served under McClellan were three-months' men who responded to President Lincoln's first call and, as their terms of service expired, were mustered out, thus materially reducing the strength of the army in Western Virginia, and as the danger apprehended at Washington was great, new regiments, as rapidly as they could be organized, were sent there.
Already a movement at Wheeling had commenced to repudiate the secession of Virginia, and to organize a state government, and subsequently a new State.
Great efforts were put forth at Richmond by Governor Letcher and the Confederate authorities to regain possession of Western Virginia and to suppress this loyal political movement.
John B. Floyd and Henry A. Wise, both in the Confederate service, and others were active on the Kanawha and in Southwestern Virginia, but as the line from Staunton across Cheat Mountain led to Buchannon and Clarksburg, and alsoviaLaurel Hill to Webster and Grafton, striking the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at two points, it was regarded at Richmond as the gateway to Western Virginia which, if opened, would insure its permanent recovery.
General R. E. Lee, from the first a favorite of the Confederate authorities, who had thus far won no particular renown, not even participating in the Bull Run battle and campaign, was now (about August 1st) sent to Western Virginia "to strike a decisive blow at the enemy in that quarter."( 1)
He established his headquarters at Staunton, but we find him, in August, with his main army at Valley Mountain (Big Springs), on the Huntersville road, and about twelve miles south of the Union camp at Elk Water on the Tygart's Valley River. General W. W. Loring, late of the United States Army, an officer who won some fame in the Mexican War, was in immediate command of the Confederate troops at Valley Mountain. Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson—not Stonewall Jackson, as so often stated—commanded the Confederate forces, subject to the orders of Loring, on the Greenbrier, on the Staunton road leading over Cheat Mountain to Huttonville. On these two lines Lee soon had above 11,000 effective soldiers present for duty, and he could draw others from Floyd and Wise in the Kanawha country.( 2)
Confronting Lee's army was the command of General Reynolds, with headquarters at Cheat Mountain Pass,( 3) three miles from Huttonville on the Staunton pike. Here Colonel Sullivan's 13th Indiana, part of Loomis' battery, and Bracken's Indiana Cavalry were camped. On Cheat Mountain, at the middle mountain-top, about nine miles to the southeast of Huttonville on the Staunton pike, were the 14th Indiana, 24th and 25th Ohio, and parts of the same battery and cavalry, Colonel Nathan Kimball of the 14th in command. At Camp Elk Water, about one mile north of the mouth of Elk Water in the Tygart's River Valley, and about seven miles southward from Huttonville on the Huntersville pike, the 15th and 17th Indiana and the 3d and 6th Ohio Infantry, and still another part of Loomis' battery, were posted. Reynolds' entire command did not exceed 4000 available men, and in consequence of almost incessant rains the roads became so bad that it was difficult to supply it with food and forage. The troops being new and unseasoned to camp life, suffered much from sickness. The service for them was hard in consequence of the necessarily great amount of scouting required on the numerous paths leading though the precipitous spurs of the ranges of both Rich and Cheat Mountains, which closely shut in the valley of the Tygart's.
The writer was often engaged leading scouting parties through the mountains.
(The accompanying map will give some idea of the location of the troops and the physical surroundings.)
Whole companies were sometimes posted at somewhat remote and inaccessible places for observation and picket duty.
Scouts and spies constantly reported large accessions to the enemy. Reynolds, therefore, called loudly for reinforcements, but only a few came. On August 26th five companies of the 9th Ohio (Bob McCook's German regiment) and five companies of the 23d Ohio (Col. E. P. Scammon) reached Camp Elk Water. These companies numbered, present for duty, about eight hundred.
The two regiments later became famous. Robert L. McCook and August Willich were then of the 9th, and both afterwards achieved distinction as soldiers.
The 23d was originally commanded by Colonel Wm. S. Rosecrans; then by Colonel E. P. Scammon, who became a Brigadier-General; then by Colonel Stanley Matthews, who became a United States Senator from Ohio, and a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; then by Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, who became a Brigadier-General and Brevet Major-General, and distinguished himself in many battles; he subsequently became a Representative in Congress, was thrice Governor of Ohio, and then President of the United States. Its last commander was Colonel James M. Comly, a brilliant soldier who, after the war, became a distinguished journalist, and later honorably represented his country as Minister at Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands. Lieutenant Robert P. Kennedy was of this regiment, and not only became a Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General, but was brevetted a Brigadier-General, and since the war has been Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio and four years in Congress. Wm. McKinley was also of this regiment, serving as a private, Commissary Sergeant, became a Second and First Lieutenant, then a Captain and Brevet Major, and, since the war, has served four terms as Representative in Congress, has been twice Governor of Ohio, and (as I write) the indications are that he will be nominated in June, 1896, for President, with a certainty of election the following November.( 4)
On August 14, 1861, while Captain Henry E. Cunard, of the 3d Ohio, with part of his company, was on advanced picket on the Brady's Gate road, privates Vincent and Watson, under Corporal Stiner, discovered a man stealthily passing around them through the woods, whom they halted and proceeded to interrogate.
"He professed to be a farm hand; said his employer had a mountain farm not far away, where he pastured cattle; that a two-year-old steer had strayed away, and he was looking for him. His clothes were fearfully torn by brush and briars. His hands and face were scratched by thorns. He had taken off his boots to relieve his swollen feet, and was carrying them in his hands. Imitating the language and manners of an uneducated West Virginian, he asked the sentinel if he 'had seed anything of a red steer.' The sentinel had not. After continuing the conversation for a time he finally said: 'Well, I must be a-going, it is a-gettin' late and I'm durned feared I won't get back to the farm afore night. Good-day.' 'Hold on,' said the sentinel; 'better go and see the Captain.' 'O, no, don't want to trouble him, it is not likely he has seed the steer, and it's a-gettin' late.' 'Come right along,' replied the sentinel, bringing down his gun; 'the Captain will not mind being troubled; in fact, I am instructed to take such as you to him.'"( 5)
The boots were discovered by the keen instinct of the inquiring Yankee to be too neatly made and elegant for a Western Virginian mountaineer employed at twelve dollars a month in caring for cattle in the hackings. When asked the price paid for the boots, the answer was fifteen dollars. The suspect was a highly educated gentleman, wholly incapable of acting his assumed character. He had touched the higher education and civilization of men of learning, and his tongue could not be attuned to lie and deceive in the guise of one to the manor born. Though at first Captain Cunard hesitated, he told the gentleman he would take him for further examination to camp. Finding the Captain, in his almost timid native modesty, was nevertheless obdurate, the now prisoner, knowing hope of escape was gone, declared himself to be Captain Julius A. De Lagnel, late commander of the Confederates in the battle of Rich Mountain, where he was reported killed. His tell-tale boots were made in Washington. He was severely wounded July 11th, and had succeeded in reaching a friendly secluded house near the battle-field, where he remained and was cared for until his wound healed and he was able to travel. He had been in the mountains five days and four nights, and just as he was passing the last and most advanced Union picket he was taken.
His little stock of provisions, consisting of a small sack of biscuits, was about exhausted, and what remained was spoiled. He was taken to camp, wet, shivering, and exhausted from starvation, cold, and exposure. It is needless to say his wants of all kinds were supplied at once by the Union officers. After remaining a few days in our camp, and meeting General Reynolds, who knew him in the United States Army, he was sent to join Pegram at Fort McHenry. Both these officers were soon exchanged, and served through the war, neither rising to great eminence. Pegram became a Major-General, and died, February 6, 1865, of wounds received at Hatcher's Run. De Lagnel became a Brigadier-General, and survived the war. He had the misfortune of being twice captured, as we have seen,( 6) once as a Union and once as a Confederate officer; neither capture, however, occurred through any fault of his.
The 3d Ohio was encamped on the banks of Tygart's Valley River, usually an innocent, pleasantly-flowing mountain stream, but, as it proved, capable of a sudden rise to a dangerous height, as most streams are that are located to catch the waters from many rivulets, gulches, and ravines leading from the adjacent mountain sides and spurs.
Illustrating the exigencies of camp life, an incident is given of this river suddenly rising (August 20th) so as to threaten to sweep away in the flood the 3d Ohio hospital, located by Surgeon McMeans for health and safety on a small island, ordinarily easy of access. The hospital tent contained two wounded and a dozen or more sick. The tents and inmates were at the first alarm removed to the highest ground on the island by men who swam out thither for the purpose. By seven in the evening, however, it became apparent that the whole island would soon be submerged; and logs, driftwood, green trees, etc., were sweeping down the river at a tremendous speed. To rescue the wounded, sick, and attendants at the hospital seemed impossible. Various suggestions were made; a raft was proposed, but this was decided impracticable as, if made and launched, it would in such a current be uncontrollable.
Lieutenant-Colonel John Beatty, of the 3d Ohio, with that Scotch- Irish will and heroic determination which characterized him in all things, especially in fighting the enemy, met the emergency. He got into an army wagon and compelled the teamster to drive into the rushing stream above the island so that he could move, in part, with the current. Thus, by swimming the horses, he, with a few others, escaped the floating timbers and reached the imperiled hospital. He found at once that it was impossible to carry back the occupants or even to return with the wagon. He promptly ordered the driver to unhitch the horses and swim them to shore, and to return in like manner with two or three more wagons. Two more wagons reached Beatty, but one team was carried down the stream and drowned. He placed the three wagons on the highest ground, though all the island was soon overflowed, chained and tied them securely together and to stakes or trees. On the wagon boxes the hospital tent was rolled, and the sick and wounded were placed thereon with some of the hospital supplies. He, with those accompanying him, decided to remain and share their fate, and he, with some who could not get into the wagon, climbed into the trees. The river at 10 P.M. had reached the hubs of the wagons and threatened to submerge them, but soon after it commenced to recede slowly, though a rain again set in, lasting through the night. Morning found the river fast resuming its normal state, and the Colonel and his rescuing party, with the hospital occupants, were all brought safely to the shore.
Two diverting incidents occurred in the night. A false alarm led to the long roll being beaten, the noise of which, and of the men rapidly assembling, could just be heard on the island above the roar of the water. Francis Union, of Company A of the 3d, was shot in the dark and killed, without challenge, by a frightened sentinel. This caused the long roll to be beaten.
Beatty mentions an entertainment, not on the bill, to which he and others were treated while clinging to the trees above the flood, and which was furnished by a soldier teamster (Jake Smith) who had swum to the aid of the hospital people, and a hospital attendant, both of whom were so favorably located as to enjoy unrestrained access to the hospital "commissary." They both became intoxicated, and then quarrelled over their relativerankand social standing. The former insisted upon the other addressing him asMr.Smith, not as "Jake." The Smith family, he asserted, was not only numerous but highly respectable, and, as one of its honored members, no person of rank below a major-general should take the liberty of calling him "Jake;" especially would this not be tolerated from "one who carried out pukes and slop-buckets from a field hospital" —such a one should not even call him "Jacob." This disrespectful allusion to his calling ruffled the temper of the hospital attendant, and, growing profane, he insisted that he was as good asSmith, and better, and at once challenged "the bloviating mule scrubber to get down off his perch and stand up before him like a man." "Jake" was unmoved by this counter-assault, and towards morning, with a strong voice and little melody, sang:( 7)
"Ho, gif glass uf goodt lauger du me,Du mine fader, mine modter, mine vife;Der day's vork vas done, undt we'll seeVot bleasures der vos in dis life.
"Undt ve sit us aroundt mit der table,Undt ve speak of der oldt, oldt time,Ven ve lif un dot house mit der gable,Un der vine-cladt banks of der Rhine," etc.
While at camp at Elk Water my wife and three months' old son, Joseph Warren, Jr., Hon. William White (brother-in-law) and his wife Rachel, and their son, Charles R. White (then twelve years old), visited me for a brief experience in camp with the army. They remained until the morning of September 12th. On the 11th Judge White accompanied me to Reynolds' headquarters, at Cheat Mountain Pass, and while there he was, by the General, invited to visit the camp on Cheat Mountain summit. It was suggested that in doing so I should, with the Judge, join Lieutenant Wm. E. Merrill, of the engineers, at Camp Elk Water the following morning, go by the main road to the summit, thence down the mountain pathviathe Rosecrans house to camp. This suggestion we were inclined to adopt, but on regaining camp I ascertained that the enemy had been seen nearer our camp than usual, and decided it was safest for the visiting party to depart for home. They accordingly bade us good-by on the next morning and proceededviaHuttonville, Beverly, Laurel Hill, Philippi, Webster, and Grafton, safely to their homes at Springfield, Ohio.
Lieutenant Merrill, with a small escort, departed as arranged, and soon, on the main road, ran into a Confederate force (Anderson's); he and his party were captured and carried with the retreating Confederates to Valley Mountain camp, thence to Richmond, where they remained for a considerable time in Libby Prison. Thus narrowly, Judge White ( 8) and myself escaped the fate of Lieutenant Merrill.
Having disposed of some of the incidents of camp life and spoken of family and friends, I return to the situation, as stated, of the opposing forces of Reynolds and Lee.
At this time Floyd and Wise were actively operating in the Kanawha country, confronting Rosecrans, who was commanding there in person, their special purpose then being to prevent reinforcements going to Reynolds, upon whom the heavy blow was to fall; Lee in person directing it.
Lee was accompanied to Valley Mountain by two aides-de-camp, ColonelsJohn A. Washington and Walter H. Taylor.
General Loring, who retained the immediate command on this line, had the 1st North Carolina and 2d Tennessee, under General Donnelson; a Tennessee brigade, under General Anderson; the 21st and 42d Virginia and an Irish Virginia regiment, under Colonel Wm. Gilham; a brigade under Colonel Burke; a battalion of cavalry under Major W. H. F. Lee; three batteries of artillery, and perhaps other troops. On the Staunton pike at Greenbriar River, about twelve miles in front of Kimball's camp on Cheat Mountain, General Jackson had the 1st and 2d Georgia, 23d, 31st, 37th, and 44th Virginia, the 3d Arkansas, and two battalions of Virginia volunteers; also two batteries of artillery and several companies of cavalry.
Though conscious of superior strength, Lee sought still further to insure success by grand strategy, hence he caused Loring to issue a confidential order detailing a plan of attack, which is so remarkable in its complex details that it is given here.
"(Confidential.)
"Headquarters, Valley Mountain, "September 8, 1861. "(Special Order No. 28.) "1. General H. R. Jackson, commanding Monterey division will detach a column of not more than two thousand men under Colonel Rust, to turn the enemy's position at Cheat Mountain Pass ('summit') at daylight on the 12th inst. (Thursday). General Jackson, having left a suitable guard for his own position, with the rest of his available force, will take post on the Eastern Ridge of Cheat Mountain, occupy the enemy in front, and co-operate in the assault of his attacking column, should circumstances favor. The march of Colonel Rust will be so regulated as to attain his position during the same night, and at the dawn of the appointed day (Thursday, 12th) he will, if possible, surprise the enemy in his trenches and carry them.
"2. The 'Pass' having been carried, General Jackson with his whole fighting force will immediately move forward towards Huttonville, prepared against an attack from the enemy, taking every precaution against firing upon the portion of the army operating west of Cheat Mountain, and ready to co-operate with it against the enemy in Tygart's Valley. The supply wagons of the advancing columns will follow, and the reserve will occupy Cheat Mountain.
"3. General Anderson's brigade will move down Tygart's Valley, following the west slope of Cheat Mountain range, concealing his movements from the enemy. On reaching Wymans (or the vicinity) he will refresh his force unobserved, send forward intelligent officers to make sure his further course, and during the night of the 11th (Wendesday) proceed to the Staunton turnpike, where it intersects the west top of Cheat Mountain, so as to arrive there as soon after daylight on the 12th (Thursday) as possible.
"He will make disposition to hold the turnpike, prevent reinforcements reaching Cheat Mountain Pass (summit), cut the telegraph wire, and be prepared, if necessary, to aid in the assault of the enemy's position on the middle-top (summit) of Cheat Mountain, by General Jackson's division, the result of which he must await. He must particularly keep in mind that the movement of General Jackson is tosurprisethe enemy in their defences. He must, therefore, not discover his movements nor advance—before Wednesday night— beyond a point where he can conceal his force. Cheat Mountain Pass being carried, he will turn down the mountain and press upon the left and rear of the enemy in Tygart's Valley, either by the new or old turnpike, or the Becky's Run road, according to circumstances.
"4. General Donnelson's brigade will advance on the right of Tygart's Valley River, seizing the paths and avenues leading from that side of the river, and driving back the enemy that may endeavor to retard the advance of the center, along the turnpike, or to turn his right.
"5. Such of the artillery as may not be used upon the flanks will proceed along the Huntersville turnpike, supported by Major Mumford's battalion, followed by the rest of Colonel Gilham's brigade in reserve.
"6. Colonel Burke's brigade will advance on the left of Tygart's Valley River, in supporting distance of the center, and clear that side of the valley of the forces of the enemy that might obstruct the advance of the artillery.
"7. The cavalry under Major Lee will follow, according to the nature of the ground, in rear of the left of Colonel Burke's brigade. It will watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter, give notice of, and prevent if possible, any attempt to turn the left of the line, and be prepared to strike when opportunity offers.
"8. The wagons of each brigade, properly parked and guarded, under the charge of their respective quartermasters—who will personally superintend their movements—will pursue the main turnpike, under the general direction of their chief quartermaster, in rear of the army, and out of cannon-range of the enemy.
"9. Commanders on both lines of operations will particularly see that their corps wear the distinguishing badge, and that both officers and men take every precaution not to fire on our own troops. This is essentially necessary, as the forces on both sides of Cheat Mountain may unite. They will also use every exertion to prevent noise and straggling from the ranks, correct quietly any confusion that may occur, and cause their commands to rapidly execute their movement when in the presence of the enemy.
"By order of General W. W. Loring,
"Carter L. Stevenson,"Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General."
General Lee, to stimulate his army to great effort, himself, by another special order of same date, exhorted it as follows:
"The forward movement announced to the Army of the Northwest in special order No. 28, from its headquarters, of this date, gives the general commanding the opportunity of exhorting the troops to keep steadily in view the great principles for which they contend, and to manifest to the world their determination to maintain them. The eyes of the country are upon you. The safety of your homes and the lives of all you hold dear depend upon your courage and exertions. Let each man resolve to be victorious, and that the right of self-government, liberty, and peace shall in him find a defender. The progress of this army must be forward."( 9)
The column from Greenbrier under Colonel Albert Rust, of Arkansas, was given the initiative, and on its success the plan detailed pivoted, but the several columns were expected to act at the same time and in concert. Colonel Rust's command, about 2000 strong, by a blind road to the Union right reached its designated position between the Red Bridge and Kimball's fortified position. Here it captured an assistant commissary, and from him received such an exaggerated account of the strength of Kimball's camp and the number of its men that, without awaiting the columns of Donnelson and Anderson, it retired with the one prisoner. Lee's main army moved north from Valley Mountain camp, on the turnpike, Anderson and Donnelson taking their designated routes to the right, the former passing to the head of Becky's Run, thence through the mountains to a position on the road in the rear of Cheat Summit camp, arriving at daylight of the 12th of September. Donnelson, by another path nearer the road which the principal column under Loring pursued, marched to Stuart's Run, then down it to the Simmons house, where, on the 11th, it captured Captain Bense and about sixty men of the 6th Ohio, who were in an exposed position and had not been vigilant. Donnelson then marched to Becky's Run and to a point where, from a nearby elevation, he could see the Union camp at Elk Water, and he was to the eastward of it and partially in its rear. Here, with his command, he remained for the night. General Lee followed and joined Donnelson in the early morning of the 12th, and together they advanced to Andrew Crouch's house, within a mile of Elk Water camp and fairly in its rear. Lee, however, ordered Donnelson to retire his column to Becky's Run at the Rosecrans house. Neither Rust, Anderson, nor Donnelson, though each led a column into the region between the Elk Water and Cheat Mountain camps (distant apart through the mountains about six miles) seemed, at the critical time, to know where the others were, or what they were doing. The presence of Lee with Donnelson on the morning of the 12th did not materially improve the conditions in this respect. Donnelson, before Lee's arrival, contemplated an attack on a body of what he supposed a thousand men (the detachments of the 9th and 23d Ohio) camped in rear of the main Union camp and near Jacob Crouch's house. Colonel Savage of the 16th Tennessee advised against the attempt, and Lee, on his arrival, must have regarded it as too hazardous. Lee wrote Governor Letcher five days later that "it was a tempting sight" to see our tents on Valley River.
Loring, with the principal command, accompanied by all the artillery, forced the Union pickets back to the mouth of Elk Water, where he encountered resistance from a strong grand-guard and the pickets. Here some shots both of infantry and artillery were exchanged, but with little result.
It is due to the truth of history to say that none of the movements of Lee's army were known or anticipated by Reynolds and his officers, and whatever was done to prevent its success was without previous plan or methods. As late as the evening of the 11th, Reynolds was still with his headquarters at Cheat Mountain Pass, six miles distant by the nearest route from either camp. On this day Captain Bense was surprised and his entire company taken where posted some three miles from Camp Elk Water, but this capture was not known until the next day. The proximity of Donnelson's command to this camp was also unknown until after it had withdrawn, and Rust's and Anderson's presence on the Staunton pike in rear of Cheat Summit camp was likewise unknown both to Reynolds and Kimball until about the time they commenced to retreat. True, on the 12th, the presence of some force in the mountain between the Union camps became known. Lieutenant Merrill and his party departed from the valley to the mountain summit on the morning of the 12th entirely ignorant of any movement of the enemy. But both Reynolds and Kimball acted, under the circumstances, with energy and intelligence. General Reynolds moved his headquarters to Camp Elk Water, the better to direct affairs. On the morning of the 12th of September Kimball started a line of wagons from his camp to the pass, for the usual supplies, and it was attacked by Rust's command before it had proceeded a mile. This attack was reported to Kimball, who supposed it was made by a small scouting party, but on going to the scene of it with portions of the 25th Ohio, under Colonel Jones, 24th Ohio, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, and Captains Brooks and Williamson's companies of the 14th Indiana, a body of the enemy supposed to number 2500 was encountered. Kimball, supposing serious work was at hand, ordered the position held until further dispositions could be made to meet the danger. A sharp skirmish ensued, which ended in Rust's troops precipitately retreating from their position on the road under cover of the timber, and becoming so demoralized that they threw away "guns, clothing, and everything that impeded their progress."(10)
Rust's command continued its retreat through the mountains, and at 10 P.M. of the 13th Rust dispatched General Loring that "The expedition against Cheat Mountain failed." He indulged in some criticism on his men, denouncing some ("not Arkansians") as cowards. At the same time General Jackson reported to Loring that he was in possession of the first summit of Cheat Mountain in front of Kimball's position, but only holding it until he should receive orders, meanwhile hoping something would be done in Tygart's valley. He, however, did nothing more, and soon withdrew to his former camp.(11)
Captain Coons of the 14th Indiana was sent on the evening of the 18th from Cheat Mountain summit with 60 men of the 14th Indiana, 24th and 25th Ohio, on a path leading to Elk Water camp, with instruction to take position at the Rosecrans house on Becky's Run. Kimball, on the 12th, sent 90 men under Captain David J. Higgins, of the 24th Ohio, to relieve Captain Coons. In going thither, when about two miles from where Colonel Rust was attacked, Higgins ran unexpectedly into Colonel Anderson's column from Valley Mountain, and engaged it with great spirit. The enemy was thrown into some confusion by this unexpected encounter, but the loss on either side was slight, and when Major Wm. Harrow of Indiana arrived from Kimball's camp with two more companies, and ascertained that Anderson had a brigade in the vicinity, he ordered the Union troops withdrawn to within about one mile of camp.
Captain Coons, owing to a heavy rain, darkness, and the difficulty in following the mountain path, did not reach the Rosecrans house until after daybreak of the 12th. He passed to the rear of Anderson's brigade as it marched to the pike in rear of Cheat Mountain camp. When Captain Coons reached the Rosecrans house he found evidence of troops having been there recently, and soon discovered smoke and heard the snapping of caps on a mountain spur towards Elk Water camp. He concluded, however, that he was near a Union picket post from that camp, and sent forward five men to ascertain who his neighbors were. As these men ascended the mountain they were fired on and three were shot down, two killed, and the others captured. They were not challenged. This was Donnelson's command, General Lee and his aide, Colonel Taylor, then being with it. Colonel Savage of Tennessee commanded the troops first encountered. The Confederates advanced, firing wildly. Captain Coons' men returned the fire promptly, killed and wounded some, and when they had checked the enemy retired to higher ground to the eastward and took position behind fallen timber. As the enemy approached across the narrow valley, Coons made a most gallant resistance and drove back the large force attacking him, but feeling his complete isolation, he finally retired by a trail towards the pike. He had not gone far, however, until he ran into a bunch of the enemy consisting of surgeons, quartermasters, and negroes, who, on being fired into, fled to a main force nearer the pike. This was Anderson's column, and about the time when Major Harrow and Captain Higgins' men were firing on it from the other side.
Thus the several bodies of the enemy, without special design, seemed to be seriously attacked from many directions and became dismayed. Captain Coons withdrew safely, and later found his way to camp.
Rust had failed, and the two other columns having become entangled in the mountains, and not knowing how soon they would again be assailed, beat a disorderly retreat, and, like Rust's men, threw away overcoats, knapsacks, haversacks, and guns. Lee says he ordered a retreat because the men were short of provisions, as well as on account of Rust's failure. Had Captain Coons reached his destination a few hours earlier he would probably have captured Lee and his escort of ten men, who, in the previous night, having lost their way, had to remain unprotected near the Rosecrans house until daybreak. But few prisoners were taken on either side. The columns of Anderson and Donnelson, broken, disheartened, and disorganized, reached Loring in the Valley. There was then and since much contention among Confederate officers as to the causes of this humiliating failure.
On the morning of the 13th, at 3 A.M., Reynolds dispatched Sullivan from the Pass by the main road, and Colonels Marrow and Moss with parts of the 3d Ohio and 2d Virginia (Union) from Elk Water camp, by the path leading past the Rosecrans house, to cut their way to Cheat Mountain summit, but these columns encountered no enemy, and only found the débris of the three retreating bodies. The real glory of the fighting in the mountains belonged to the intrepid Captain Coons, who afterwards became Colonel of his regiment and fell in the battle of the Wilderness.
Both Lee and Loring, deeply chagrined, were reluctant to give up a campaign so hopefully commenced and so comprehensively planned, but thus far so ingloriously executed.
They decided to look for a position on Reynolds' right from which an attack could be made on Elk Water camp in conjunction with a front attack, and accordingly Colonel John A. Washington, escorted by Major W. H. F. Lee (son of General Lee) with his cavalry command, was dispatched to ascertain the character of the country in that direction.
Early on the 12th of September I was sent with a detachment of four companies of the 3d Ohio, as grand-guard at an outpost and for picket duty as well as scouting, to the point of a spur of Rich Mountain near the mouth and to the north of Elk Water, west of the Huntersville pike, and about one mile and a half in advance of the camp. This position covered the Elk Water road from Brady's Gate, the pike, the there narrow valley of the Tygart's, and afforded a good point of observation up the valley towards the enemy. A portion of the time I had under me a section of artillery and other detachments. Here Reynolds determined to first stubbornly resist the approach of the enemy, and consequently I was ordered to construct temporary works. Another detachment was located east of the river with like instructions. On the 12th the enemy pushed back our skirmishers and pickets in the valley and displayed considerable disposition to fight, but as we exchanged some shots and showed our willingness to give battle, no real attack was made. We noticed that each Confederate officer and soldier had a whitepatchon his cap or hat. This, as we knew later, was in accordance with Loring's order, to avoid danger of being fired upon by friends. From the badge, however, we argued that raiding parties were abroad.
In the night of the 12th Loring, during a rain and under cover of darkness, sent a small body to the rear of my position, and thus having gained a position on the spur of the mountain behind and above us, attempted by surprise to drive us out or capture us; but the attack was feebly made and a spirited return fire and a charge scattered the whole force.
Colonel Washington, on the 13th, in endeavoring to get on our right came into Elk Water ValleyviaBrady's Gate, and descended it with Major Lee's cavalry as escort. A report came to me of cavalry approaching, but knowing the road ran through a narrow gorge and much of the way in the bed of the stream, little danger was apprehended, especially as the road led directly to my position. A few troops of an Indiana regiment then on picket duty were, however, sent up the Elk Water road a short distance, and a company of the 3d Ohio was dispatched by me along the mountain range skirting the ravine and road, with instruction to gain the rear of the approaching cavalry if possible.
Washington was too eager to give time for such disposition to be carried out; he soon galloped around a curve and came close upon the pickets, Major Lee accompanying him. Sergeant Weiler and three or four others fired upon them as they turned their horses to fly. Three balls passed through Washington's body near together, coming out from his breast. He fell mortally wounded. Major Lee was unhurt, though his horse was shot. Lee escaped on foot for a short distance and then by mounting Washington's horse.(12)
When reached, Colonel Washington was struggling to rise on his elbow, and, though gasping and dying, he muttered, "Water," but when it was brought to his lips from the nearby stream he was dead. His body was carried to my outpost headquarters, thence later by ambulance to Reynolds' headquarters at camp. Washington's name or initials were on his gauntlet cuffs and upon a napkin in his haversack; these served to identify him. He was richly dressed for a soldier, and for weapons had heavy pistols and a large knife in his belt. He also had a powder-flask, field-glass, gold-plated spurs, and some small gold coin on his person. His sword, tied to the pommel of his saddle, was carried off by his horse.
On the next day Colonel W. E. Starke, of Louisiana,(13) appeared in front of my position bearing a flag of truce, and a letter addressed to the commanding officer of the United States troops, reading:
"Lt. Col. John A. Washington, my aide-de-camp, while riding yesterday with a small escort, was fired upon by your pickets, and I fear killed. Should such be the case, I request that you shall deliver to me his dead body, or should he be a prisoner in your hands, that I be informed of his condition.
"I have the honor to be your obedient servant,"R. E. Lee,"General Commanding."
Colonel Milo S. Hascall of the 17th Indiana conveyed Washington's body, on the 14th, by ambulance, to Lee's line, and there delivered it to Major Lee.
One of Colonel Washington's pistols was sent by Reynolds to Secretary of War Cameron; the Secretary directed the other one to be presented to Sergeant John J. Weiler, the knife to Corporal Birney, and the gauntlets to private Johnson, all soldiers of the 17th Indiana. General Reynolds obtained the field-glass, but subsequently gave it to Colonel Washington's son George. Hascall took possession of the spurs and powder-flask, and Captain George L. Rose, of Reynolds' staff, retained one or more letters (now in possession of his son, Rev. John T. Rose), through which one or more of the fatal bullets passed.
Colonel Washington was buried on his plantation, "Waveland," nearMarshall, Fauquier county, Virginia.
Thus early, on his first military campaign, fell John Augustine Washington, born in Jefferson County, Virginia, May 3, 1821, the great-grandson of General Washington's brother, John Augustine Washington, and on his mothers' side a great-grandson of Richard Henry Lee, Virginia's great Revolutionary patriot statesman. He inherited Mount Vernon, but sold it before the war to an association of patriotic ladies, who still own it.
The tragic death of Colonel Washington was a fitting close of the complex plan of campaign, which, though entered upon under most favorable circumstances, failed fatally in execution in each and all important parts, though Generals Lee and Loring, Colonel Savage, and others of the Confederate officers present with the troops, had seen much real service in the Mexican War, and many of them were educated West Point officers.
Neither Lee or Loring ever made an official report of the campaign, and both for a time were under the shadow of disgrace because of its ineffectiveness.
General Lee was not quite candid with his own army when, on the 14th of September, he announced to it:
"Theforcedreconnoissance of the enemy's positions, both at Cheat Mountain Pass and on Valley River, having been completed, and the character of the natural approaches and the nature of the artificial defences exposed, the Army of the Northwest will resume its former position."
In a private letter, however, dated Valley Mountain, September 17, 1861, addressed to Governor John Letcher, Lee speaks of the failure of the campaign with great candor.
"I was very sanguine of taking the enemy's works on last Thursday morning. I had considered the subject well. With great effort, the troops intended for the surprise had reached their destination, having travelled twenty miles of steep rugged mountain paths; and the last day through a terrible storm which lasted all night, and in which they had to stand drenched to the skin in cold rain. Still their spirits were good. When the morning broke I could see the enemy's tents on Valley River at the point on the Huttonville road just below me. It was a tempting sight. We waited for the attack on Cheat Mountain, which was to be the signal, till 10 A.M. The men were cleaning their unserviceable arms. But the signal did not come. All chance for a surprise was gone. The provisions of the men had been destroyed the preceding day by the storm. They had had nothing to eat that morning, could not hold out another day, and were obliged to be withdrawn. The attack to come off from the east side failed from the difficulties in the way; the opportunity was lost and our plan discovered. It was a grievous disappointment to me, I assure you; but for the rain storm I have no doubt it would have succeeded. This, Governor, is for your own eye. Please do not speak of it; we must try again.
"Our greatest loss in the death of our dear friend, Colonel Washington. He and my son were reconnoitering the front of the enemy. They came unawares upon a concealed party, who fired upon them within twenty yards, and the Colonel fell pierced by three shots. My son's horse received three shots, but he escaped on the Colonel's horse.
"His zeal for the cause to which he had devoted himself carried him, I fear, too far."
Lee, finding trouble in the Kanawha country, repaired thither, andon September 21st assumed immediate direction of the forces there.A violent quarrel had just then arisen between the fiery Henry A.Wise and Floyd.
Lee, however, soon returned to Richmond, and though still in favor with his Governor and President Davis, his failure in Western Virginia brought him under a cloud from which he did not emerge until after he succeeded General Joseph E. Johnston on the latter being wounded while in command of the Confederate Army at Seven Pines near Richmond, May, 1862.(14)
The principal part of Reynolds' command assembled at Cheat Mountain, and, advancing, attacked Jackson in position at Greenbrier, October 3d, but was repulsed. Thereafter active operations ceased in the Cheat and Rich Mountain and Tygart's Valley region.
An unimportant and indecisive affair, hardly above a skirmish, occurred at Scarey Creek, July 17th, between a part of General J. D. Cox's command and forces under Henry A. Wise; the capture of Colonels Norton, Woodruff, and De Villiers, with two or three other officers, being the principal Union loss. No decisive advantage was gained on either side. Carnifax Ferry, on the Gauley River, was a more important affair. It was fought, October 10, 1861, between troops led by Rosecrans and those under Floyd. Floyd was found strongly posted, but was compelled to precipitately retreat across the river and abandon his stores.
The campaign season ended with the Union forces practically in possession of the forty-eight counties, soon to become the State of West Virginia.(15)
A convention held at Wheeling, June 11, 1861, declared the State offices of Virginia vacant by reason of the treason of those who had been chosen to fill them, and it then proceeded to form a regular state government for Virginia, with Francis H. Pierpont for its Governor, maintaining that the people loyal to the Union should speak for the whole State. The Pierpont government was recognized by Congress. This organization, on August 20, 1861, adopted an ordinance "for the formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of this State." This ordinance was approved by a vote of the people, and, November 26, 1861, a convention assembled in Wheeling and framed a constitution for the proposed new State. This also was ratified, April, 1862, by the people, 18,862 voting for and 514 against it. The recognized Legislature of Virginia, in order to comply with the Constitution of the United States, May 13, 1862, consented to the creation of a new State out of territory hitherto included in the State of Virginia. The people of the forty-eight counties having thus made the necessary preparation, Congress, December 31, 1862, passed an act for the admission of West Virginia into the Union, annexing, however, a condition that her people should first ratify a substitute for the Seventh Section, Article Eleven of her Constitution, providing that children of slaves born in her limits after July 4, 1863, should be free; that slaves who at that time were under ten years of age should be free at the age of twenty-one; and all slaves over ten and under twenty- one years of age should be free at the age of twenty-five; and no slave should be permitted to come into the State for permanent residence.
March 26, 1863, the slavery emancipation clause was almost unanimously ratified by a vote of the people, and, April 20, 1863, President Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring that West Virginia had complied with all required conditions and was therefore a State in the Union.
The anomalous creation and admission of this new State was justified only by the rebellious times and in aid of the loyal cause. It is the only State carved out of another or other States. It remains a singular fact that the day preceding the final Emancipation Proclamation of Lincoln, he approved a law of Congress admitting West Virginia as a slave State (with gradual emancipation) into the Union. The proclamation excepted the counties, commonly then called West Virginia, from its application.
The fruit of the successful occupancy of Western Virginia in 1861 by the Union Army and the consequent failures there in the same year of the Confederate leaders, Lee, Floyd, Wise, and others, was the formation of a new State, thenceforth loyal to the flag and the Constitution.
We now dismiss West Virginia, where we first learned something of war, but in time shall return to it again. I have in this chapter dealt more largely in detail than I intend to do in those to follow, as the reader, if even inexperienced in war, will have by this time learned sufficient to enable him to comprehend much belonging to a great military campaign which is often difficult and sometimes impossible to narrate.
( 1) No order assigning Lee to Western Virginia seems to have been issued, but see Davis to J. E. Johnston of August 1, 1861,War Records, vol. v., p. 767.
( 2) An abstract of a return of Loring's forces for October, 1861, shows present for duty 11,700 of all arms.—War Records, vol. v., p. 933.
( 3) While the Third Ohio was temporarily camped in Cheat Mountain Pass (July, 1861) word came of the Bull Run disaster, and while brooding over it Colonel John Beatty, in the privacy of our tent, early one morning before we had arisen, exclaimed in substance: "That so long as the Union army fought to maintain human slavery it deserved defeat; that only when it fought for the liberty of all mankind would God give us victory." Such prophetic talk was then premature, and if openly uttered would have insured censure from General McClellan and others.
( 4) This prediction has been fulfilled. Major Wm. McKinley was inaugurated President of the United States March 4, 1897.
( 5)Citizen Soldier(Beatty), p. 51.
( 6)Ante, pp. 161, 196.
( 7)Citizen Soldier, p. 60-1.
( 8) William White was then a common pleas Judge; in March, 1864, he became a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio, a position he held until his death. He was appointed by President Arthur and confirmed by the Senate (March, 1883) United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio; his sudden death prevented his qualifying and entering upon the duties of the office. He was remarkable for his judicial learning, combined with simplicity and purity of character. Born (January 28, 1822) in England, both parents dying when he was a child, having no brother or sister or very near relative, poor, and almost a homeless waif, he, when about ten years of age, came in the hold of a ship to America. From this humble start, through persevering energy and varying vicissitudes he, under republican institutions, acquired an education, won friends, became eminent as a lawyer and jurist, and earned the high esteem of his fellow-men, dying (March 12, 1883) at Springfield, Ohio, at sixty years of age, having served as a common pleas Judge eight years and Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio nineteen years.
His only son, Charles Rodgers White (born May 25, 1845), also became a distinguished lawyer and judge, and died prematurely, July 29, 1890, on a Pullman car on the Northern Pacific Railroad, near Thompson's Falls, Montana, while returning from Spokane Falls, where he, while on a proposed journey to Alaska, was taken fatally ill.
( 9)War Records, vol. v., p. 192.
(10) Kimball's Report,War Records, vol. v., p. 186.
(11) Rust's Report,War Records, vol. v., p. 291.
(12) W. H. F. Lee served through the war; was wounded and captured at Brandy Station, 1863; chiefly commanded cavalry; became a Major- General and was surrendered at Appomattox. He, later, became a farmer at White House, Virginia, on the Pamunkey, and was elected to Congress in 1886. His older brother, George Washington Custis Lee, a graduate of West Point, served with distinction through the war; also became a Confederate Major-General, and was captured by my command at the battle of Sailor's Creek, April 6, 1865. Robert E. Lee, Jr., General Lee's other son, also served in the Confederate army, but not with high rank.
(13) Colonel Starke was, as a General, killed at Antietam. His son, Major Starke, met me March 26, 1865, between the lines in front of Petersburg, under a flag of truce, while the killed of the previous day were being removed or buried. On Lee's surrender I found him, and gave him his supper and a bed for the night.
(14)Manassas to Appomattox(Longstreet), p. 112.
(15) West Virginia was admitted as a State in April, 1863, with forty-eight counties, but Congress consented, by an act approved March 10, 1866, that the counties of Berkeley and Jefferson should be added.—Charters and Cons., Par II., p. 1993.