FOOTNOTES:

The rich worker stops producing early, while the sacrifice entailed is still small; but his product sells as well as if it were costly.If we say that the prices of things correspond with the amount andefficiencyof the labor that creates them, we say what is equivalent to the above proposition. The efficiency that figures in the case is power and willingness to produce a certain effect. The willingness is as essential as the power.... Moreover, the effect that gauges the efficiency of a worker is the value of what he creates; and this value is measured by the formula that we have attained.

The rich worker stops producing early, while the sacrifice entailed is still small; but his product sells as well as if it were costly.

If we say that the prices of things correspond with the amount andefficiencyof the labor that creates them, we say what is equivalent to the above proposition. The efficiency that figures in the case is power and willingness to produce a certain effect. The willingness is as essential as the power.... Moreover, the effect that gauges the efficiency of a worker is the value of what he creates; and this value is measured by the formula that we have attained.

But surely the circle is very clear here: the price (the expression of the value) of the good depends on the efficiency of the labor that produces it; and the efficiency of the labor depends on the value (of which price is the expression) of the good produced. Our "pervasive element" is complicated, as a determinant of social value, with several factors, among themthe value of the wealth of the different producers, and the efficiency, which can be defined only in terms ofvalue product, of the workers. Value is an ultimate in the explanation of value, and the effort to make individual costs and utilities an ultimate explanation of value has failed—as it must needs fail—even in the hands of Professor Clark.

The validity of this criticism, assuming it valid, in no way invalidates Professor Clark's contention that value is, after all, the work of the social organism, and that the value of a good, at a given time, measures its importance to the social organism at that time. The difficulty with theanalysis just criticized is that it has not been an analysis of an organic process, but rather, a mathematical study of sums. The individuals have been treated, not as interacting in their mental processes, but as isolated atoms, each of whom has a definite individualquantumof pain or pleasure, and the social unit of pain or pleasure has been treated as simply a sum of these. But it is characteristic of an organism that the simple rules of arithmetic do not hold precisely in its activity. The whole is more than the sum of its parts, and something different from that sum. Professor Clark elsewhere says:—

But the owner is a part of the social body, and is the organic whole indifferent to his suffering? If so, society is an imperfect and nerveless organism. It ought to feel, as a whole, the sufferings of every member, and what makes or mars the happiness of every slightest molecule, should make or mar the happiness of all.A sympathetic connection between members of society exists, etc.[86]

A sympathetic connection between members of society exists, etc.[86]

True: and indicative of the true line of study for the conception of value as a product of an organic society. But in the foregoing analysis we have no hint of "nerves" or social sympathy or other manifestation of a collective mental activity. The "social psychology" promised on page 261 of the article just reviewed, turns out not a social psychology at all, but simply a summation of the results of many individual psychologies. But the line along which the true nature of value is to be found is clearly indicated in thegeneral conception of the psychical organic unity of society, and it remains for the present writer to make use of the studies in social psychology of Tarde, Cooley, Baldwin, and others,[87]not available, for the most part, when Professor Clark's article was written, in an effort to get nearer the heart of the problem.

The doubly abstract conceptions of individual costs and individual satisfactions, connected with economic goods,—abstracted first from the socialmilieu, and second, from the rest of the individual's interests and desires,—lead us around in a circle, from value to value, but never to anything else. It is the belief of the writer that we get out of the circle only by broadening our explanation phenomena, by giving up these abstractions, and getting back to the concrete reality of the total intermental life of men in society.

FOOTNOTES:[82]Seeinter aliaBöhm-Bawerk, "Ultimate Standard of Value,"Annals of the American Academy, vol.v; also his "Grundzüge," p. 516, n.; Wieser,op. cit., bk.v.[83]See Laughlin, J. L., "Marshall's Theory of Value and Distribution,"Q. J. E.vol.i, pp. 227-32. See also Marshall's reply in the same volume.[84]There is a needless complication here. For Professor Clark's purposes it is not necessary to seek aunitof value; what is needed is simply a vindication of the quantitative social value concept. The unit may then be arbitrarily chosen—e.g., the amount of value in 23.22 grains of gold.Cf.the discussion of abstract units of value,infra, chap.xvii, pp. 183-84.[85]The issue appears to be shifted here. If an ultimatecauseof value is being sought, it is certain that labor does not supply it for the monopolized goods; and if it be simply ameasureof the amount of value embodied in the monopolized goods that is looked for, then it is clear that goods produced entirely by competitive labor (assuming that such goods exist, which I deny) can fulfill this function only by virtue of being themselvesvaluable—and that they serve this purpose no better than other goods into which a monopoly element enters. The doctrine here criticized goes back to Ricardo: "If the state charges a seignorage for coinage, the coined piece of money will generally exceed the value of the uncoined piece of metal by the whole seignorage charged,because it will require a greater quantity of labour, or, which is the same thing, the value of the produce of a greater quantity of labour, to procure it." (Italics mine.) Ricardo,Works, McCulloch edition, 1852, p. 213.[86]Philosophy of Wealth, 1892 ed., p. 83.[87]Tarde,The Laws of Imitation,Psychologie Économique, 2 vols., Paris, 1902. Cooley, C. H.,Human Nature and the Social Order,Social Organisation. Baldwin, Mark,Social and Ethical Interpretations. Elwood, C. A.,Some Prolegomena to Social Psychology, Chicago, 1901; "The Psychological View of Society,"American Journal of Sociology, March, 1910. Hayden, Edwin Andrew,The Social Will, 1909. No attempt is made at an exhaustive list here, nor are the writers mentioned to be held accountable for the views maintained in the text, though their point of view is in general that which I shall maintain.

[82]Seeinter aliaBöhm-Bawerk, "Ultimate Standard of Value,"Annals of the American Academy, vol.v; also his "Grundzüge," p. 516, n.; Wieser,op. cit., bk.v.

[83]See Laughlin, J. L., "Marshall's Theory of Value and Distribution,"Q. J. E.vol.i, pp. 227-32. See also Marshall's reply in the same volume.

[84]There is a needless complication here. For Professor Clark's purposes it is not necessary to seek aunitof value; what is needed is simply a vindication of the quantitative social value concept. The unit may then be arbitrarily chosen—e.g., the amount of value in 23.22 grains of gold.Cf.the discussion of abstract units of value,infra, chap.xvii, pp. 183-84.

[85]The issue appears to be shifted here. If an ultimatecauseof value is being sought, it is certain that labor does not supply it for the monopolized goods; and if it be simply ameasureof the amount of value embodied in the monopolized goods that is looked for, then it is clear that goods produced entirely by competitive labor (assuming that such goods exist, which I deny) can fulfill this function only by virtue of being themselvesvaluable—and that they serve this purpose no better than other goods into which a monopoly element enters. The doctrine here criticized goes back to Ricardo: "If the state charges a seignorage for coinage, the coined piece of money will generally exceed the value of the uncoined piece of metal by the whole seignorage charged,because it will require a greater quantity of labour, or, which is the same thing, the value of the produce of a greater quantity of labour, to procure it." (Italics mine.) Ricardo,Works, McCulloch edition, 1852, p. 213.

[86]Philosophy of Wealth, 1892 ed., p. 83.

[87]Tarde,The Laws of Imitation,Psychologie Économique, 2 vols., Paris, 1902. Cooley, C. H.,Human Nature and the Social Order,Social Organisation. Baldwin, Mark,Social and Ethical Interpretations. Elwood, C. A.,Some Prolegomena to Social Psychology, Chicago, 1901; "The Psychological View of Society,"American Journal of Sociology, March, 1910. Hayden, Edwin Andrew,The Social Will, 1909. No attempt is made at an exhaustive list here, nor are the writers mentioned to be held accountable for the views maintained in the text, though their point of view is in general that which I shall maintain.

The connection between social philosophy, on the one hand, and metaphysics and epistemology on the other hand, has always been a close one,—a fact not always adequately recognized by writers in the field of social science, in economics, especially. Scientists often "ignore" philosophy, holding that their concern is simply with the world of phenomenal "facts," and that the injection of philosophic considerations is illicit and unscientific. And this is often well enough in the field of the physical, chemical, and biological sciences, where the procedure is primarily inductive, and the data are got from sense observation. But in the social sciences, where the procedure is so largely deductive, and where the data are often principles of mind, whose truth is assumed as a starting point for investigation, and especially in economic theory, such an attitude cannot be justified. For philosophical assumptionswillcreep in, and the scientist has no option about it. The only thing he can do is to be critical, and know definitelywhatphilosophical assumptions he is making,—and most of our treatises on economic theory do not bear evidence that this critical work has been done.

There may be traced in the history of philosophy, in the ancient world, and also in the modern era, three main stages in philosophic thought, each accompanied by a distinctive set of ideas concerning the nature of society. In distinguishing these three stages, in showing the relation of each to social philosophy, and especially in tracing a parallel between the philosophy of the ancients and that of modern times, I recognize the grave dangers of giving a superficial treatment, and of distorting facts to make them fit a schematism. I recognize, further, that a host of details and a multitude of differences must be ignored in tracing the parallel I propose. Considerations of space, moreover, prevent such a detailed justification of the views here presented as would be required were this more than a minor phase of my subject. The need for this is lessened, however, by the fact that much of what follows is part of the commonplaces of the history of philosophy,—albeit a repetition of it seems needed in a criticism of economic theory. The three stages are: the dogmatic stage; the skeptical stage; and the critical stage. In Greek philosophy, the first stage is represented by the cosmological philosophers, as Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander, who, with perfect confidence in the power of their minds to solve the riddles of the universe, or rather, without questioning that point at all, proceeded to spin out poetical accounts of the origin and nature of things. The second stage is represented by the Sophists, who, struck by the manifold divergencesin the philosophies of the earlier schools, and by the lack of harmony between the god-given laws and rules of morality which earlier tradition had handed down, and the needs of the social conditions among which they lived, found themselves unable to find truth readily, and reached the conclusion that each man is the measure of truth, that there are no universal criteria, or valid standards. The third stage begins with Socrates, who sought for a common principle of truth and justice in the midst of divergences, and this critical movement, continued by Plato and Aristotle, led to conceptions of unity once more.

Now the social philosophy which goes with the first stage is relatively undefined. It is for the most part content with the existing order, recognizes a supernatural basis for it, and raises few questions. The social philosophy of the second period is intensely individualistic. In the third stage, the emphasis upon social solidarity and upon a unified, organic conception of society, a society which is paramount to individual interests and rights, comes to the fore again. The extreme poles of thought are, on the one hand, an individualism which leaves scant room for any very significant social relations whatsoever, and, on the other hand, a socialism—like that of theRepublic—which swallows up the individual. The compromise view, expressed in the Aristotelian doctrine of the relation between "form" and "matter," applied to the social problem, finds the individualvery real, to be sure, but still real only in his social relationships. Individual activities are facts, but social activity is more than a mere sum of individual activities. Society and the individual are alike abstractions, if viewed separately.

The mediæval conflict over realism and nominalism really derives its interest from the practical social issues involved, for the reality of the Church, as more than a mere aggregate of its members, and the validity of Christian doctrine, as more than the sum of individual beliefs, are at stake.

The cycle began again in modern times. As representatives of the dogmatic period in modern philosophy, DesCartes and Spinoza may be chosen. They were not, of course, naïvely dogmatic, for philosophy had learned much from its many disappointments, and DesCartes, especially, starts out with reflections which would seem to make him very much a skeptic. And yet each believed in the power of the mind to draw absolute truth from itself, and each proceeded in a highly rationalistic way to build up his system. The very title of Spinoza's great work indicates this attitude of mind: "Ethica more geometrico demonstrata." The conception of society which characterizes this period is, again, not naïve, but still has a supernatural, or at least a superhuman, basis, for it is in a Law of Nature (capitalized and personified) that social institutions find their origin and justification. Critical reflections, starting with Locke, and passing through Berkeley to the absolute skepticism of Hume, bring inthe second, or skeptical, period, in which the rationalistic-dogmatic certitude of Spinoza and DesCartes is banished. And going with this movement in philosophic thought comes the extreme individualism of Rousseau in politics, and Adam Smith in economics. The movement away from skepticism, beginning with Kant, puts the world, and especially society, back into organic connections again, and we have, in Hegel, especially, society to the fore, and the individual real only as a part of society. The organic conception, revived by Hegel, and vitalized by the positivistic studies which applied the Darwinian doctrine to social phenomena, has characterized the greater part of the social philosophy of the last half hundred years—of course, not without protest and highly necessary criticism.

Now all of this is, of course, commonplace. And yet a failure to recognize it has vitiated very much thinking in the field of economic theory. Economic thought is to-day very largely based on the philosophic conceptions which characterize the period in which economics began to be a differentiated science,—the skeptical doctrines of David Hume, the close friend of Adam Smith.[88]The individual is all-important; his world of thought and feeling is shut off from that of every other man; social relationships are largely mechanical, and grow out of calculating self-interest on the part of the individual; sociallaws are conceived after the analogy of physical laws. Ethics and politics, however, have been far more influenced by later thinking, and the organic conception of society has largely dominated these sciences of late, while the new science, sociology, free to base itself more largely upon present-day epistemological, philosophical, and psychological notions, has gone further than any other in accepting the doctrine of the unity and pervasiveness of social relations, organically conceived. I think there are few things more strikingly in contrast than the conception of society which the student meets in most works on economic theory, and that which he meets in studying the other social sciences. That this is so is due precisely to the fact that the economists have too largely neglected philosophy and psychology, and have accepted uncritically the assumptions of the founders of the science. Doctrines accepted then have becomecrystallized, and still form part of the current stock in trade of economic science, even though rejected by philosophy itself.

To one of these faulty doctrines from the earlier time, attention has already been called. It is that the intensities of wants and aversions in the mind of one man stand in no relation to the same phenomena in the mind of another man, and that there can be no comparison instituted between them. The individual is an isolated monad,[89]mechanically connected with his fellows,who are to him "a part of thenon-ego,"[90]but spiritually self-sufficient and inaccessible. The doctrine appears in Marshall's statement:[91]"No one can compare and measure accurately against one another even his own mental states at different times, and no one can measure the mental states of another at all, except indirectly and conjecturally, by their effects." Pareto I have quoted, as also Jevons, in chapteriv. The doctrine appears in Professor Veblen's recent article in criticism of Professor Clark:[92]—

It is evident, and admitted, that there can be no balance, and no commensurability, between the laborer's disutility (pain) in producing the goods and the consumer's utility (pleasure) in consuming them, inasmuch as these two hedonistic phenomena lie each within the consciousness of a distinct person. There is, in fact,no continuity of nervous tissue[italics mine] over the interval between consumer and producer, and a direct comparison, equilibrium, equality, or discrepancy in respect of pleasure and pain can, of course, not be sought except within each self-balanced individual complex of nervous tissue.

In the recent elaborate study,Value and Distribution, by Professor H. J. Davenport, the theories based on the conception of the individual as an isolated monad, a self-complete whole, with purely mechanical relationships with other men, find their fullest and most self-conscious expression, and the philosophical presuppositions are explicitly premised. The following quotation from Thackeray'sPendennisis given as a footnote,[93]in which Professor Davenport's own conception is expressed:—

Ah, sir, a distinct universe walks about under your hat and under mine—all things in nature are different to each—the woman we look at has not the same features, the dish we eat has not the same taste, to the one and to the other; you and I are but a pair of infinite isolations, with some fellow islands a little more or less near us.

This is, of course, manifestly the theme of the old subjectivistic analysis, by which all things are reduced to thoughts, sensations, and desires within the individual soul, and in accordance with which we have none save conjectural knowledgeof anything outside of our own souls. Now a general answer might be given that this is an epistemological principle which holds true only for what Kant calls the "Ding an sich,"—if such a thing there be—and that there is no more reason why it should apply to human emotions, considered purely as phenomena, than to any other of the phenomena with which science busies itself. If this principle be adhered to, its effect will be simply to cast doubt on the conclusions of all sciences, physical as well as psychical. Certainly psychology would be impossible on this assumption, except in so far as the psychologist claims only to be working out a science of his individual soul, which, so far as he knows, is not true of any other individual. But it is preciselynotthis that psychology attempts. It is concerned with the laws and behavior of minds in general, with the "typisch und allgemeingültig" and not with the mental idiosyncrasies of the particular individual.

But the doctrine can be met from the standpoint of epistemology itself. The writers who are responsible for this subjective analysis, have held thatmindis more nearly capable of being known by mind than is anything else, since we can interpret things only in terms of our own experiences. The real nature of a purely physical thing is far more deeply hidden from our view than is the real nature of a mental fact, even though it be in the mind of another. And especially would they grant a degree, at least, of objective currency to clearly phrased conceptualthought. Now I base myself upon the present day pragmatic philosophy,[94]which is, essentially, concerned with the problem of knowledge. Its principle is that we believe things to be true, not because of any knowledge we have of some mystical, absolute truth, but because of our experiences of utilitarian sort. That is true which works. That is true which we find will satisfy our desires and needs. In a word, desire, volition,values, lie at the basis of intellect.[95]Whence it follows, that if our minds are so constituted that we understand each other on the intellectual side, then there must be a still deeper and more underlying similarity on the desire, feeling, volitional side.[96]Consequently, if there be anything at all, outside of our own mind, which wecanunderstand, it must be the feelings and emotions of other men.

Considerations of a practical nature give us the strongest possible grounds for a belief that human desires, feelings, etc., are homogeneous and communicable. The fact is that we all have back of us many millions of years of evolutionary history in the same general environment. In the past, with relatively minor variations, the same influences have played upon our ancestors fromthe beginnings of life on our planet. And then, we are born into the same society, and it has given us, not, to be sure, the power of reaction, but certainly all of our most important stimuli.[97]Further, we do get along in society. We laugh together, we play together, we share each other's sorrows, we love and hate each other, in a way that would be wholly impossible if we did not in practice assume the correctness of our "inferences" about one another's motives and desires. And the fact that these "inferences" are in the main correct is the one thing that makes social life possible. We can, and do, understand one another's motives, desires, wants, emotions. We can, and do, constantly communicate our feelings to one another.

It is only on the basis, further, of an intellectualistic psychology that such a subjectivistic conception is possible. If the voluntaristic psychology and the doctrine of "the unconscious" be accepted—and certainly the psychological facts on which the latter is based must be accepted, whether the metaphysical conclusions are or not[98]—we have no basis whatever for this doctrine that clearness holds within the mind, but that without all is uncertain. Really, only a little part of our mental life is in consciousness at any given moment. The "stream of consciousness" is but a narrow thing, and the unity of the individualmind is a unity, not of consciousness, but offunction. As Goethe somewhere says, we know ourselves never by reflection, but by action. And often does it happen that a sympathetic friend, or even an observant enemy, may interpret more accurately our actions than we ourselves can do, and may measure more accurately the strength of a given motive for us than we can ourselves. In a certain sense, our knowledge of other minds is inference. We see other men's actions, or hear their voices, or watch the muscles of their faces, and so, indirectly, get at their thoughts and feelings. But, in much the same sense, our knowledge of their actions, or of their voices, is inference too. For we must interpret the image on the retina, or the sense excitation in the ear. But practically, neither is inference, if by inference be meant a consciously made judgment from premises of which we are conscious. In a casual walk with a friend, where conversation flows smoothly on easy topics, one is asimmediatelyconscious of his friend's thoughts and feelings, expressed in the conversation, as he is of the scenes that present themselves by the way, or even of the thoughts that arise within himself.[99]

The significance of this conclusion is not quite the same as that which might be expected from the context from which I have taken the doctrine under criticism. The feelings of men with reference to economic goods are facts of definite,tangible nature, and subject-matter of social knowledge. But we have not yet reached a standard or source of social value. No homogeneous "labor jelly," or "pain jelly," or "utility jelly,"[100]made up by averaging arithmetically, or adding arithmetically, individual efforts or pains or pleasures, will solve our problem for us—as indeed I have been at pains to show in what has gone before. The purpose of the foregoing criticism is primarily to clear the ground for a conception of social organization which is more than mechanical, and in which the individual is both less and more than a self-sufficient monad.

FOOTNOTES:[88]This criticism applies to the teachings of James Mill, J. S. Mill, and other sensationalist followers of Hume, even more than to Adam Smith. But see Professor Albion W. Small'sAdam Smith and Modern Sociology, Chicago, 1907, esp. p. 51.[89]It is easy for "analysis" to separate society into "individual" monads, and impossible for "synthesis"—once the validity of the analytic process is accepted—to put society together again. In fact, once the analytic process is begun, and once its results are accepted as anything more than matters of logical convenience, all unity and all organic connections, whether in the social or in other fields, seem to vanish like a dissolving show. There is a psychological doctrine of monadism, quite as logical as the sociological monadology here criticized, which finds it impossible to link together even the elements in a single individual's mind. (See William James,Principles of Psychology, 1905 ed., vol.i, pp. 179-80.) Into what inextricable difficulties one falls, in pursuing the monadistic logic, is more dramatically illustrated than by anything else I know by Bradley'sAppearance and Reality, esp. chaps.iiandiii. The most useful viewpoint seems to be as follows: unity is as much an object of immediate knowledge as is plurality,—both being, in fact, the products of reflective thought. And unity is no more called upon to justify itself, before we recognize its existence, than is plurality.Cf.William James,The Meaning of Truth, New York, 1909, p. xiii; and also hisPsychology, vol.i, pp. 224-25.Cf.also the writings of Professor John Dewey.[90]Jevons,Theory of Pol. Econ., 3d ed., p. 14.[91]Principles, 1907, p. 15 (1898 ed., p. 76). See also Marshall's criticism of Cairnes' conception of supply and demand, in the 1898 edition of thePrinciples, p. 172.[92]"Professor Clark's Economics,"Q. J. E., 1908, p. 170.[93]Davenport,op. cit., p. 300, n. It may seem somewhat unfair to hold a man responsible for the view of another writer which he throws into a footnote of his own book. One who has read Professor Davenport's book, however, will recognize, I think, that this quotation does express Professor Davenport's view. His discussion in the text on pages 300-301 affirms virtually this same doctrine, as a proposition of psychology. See also his discussions in small type on pages 336-37. His whole system is based upon this doctrine.[94]See, especially, William James,Pragmatism, andThe Meaning of Truth; John Dewey,Essays in Logical Theory; and F. C. S. Schiller,Humanism.[95]The utter impossibility of adequately summing up a philosophic doctrine in two or three sentences will excuse this statement to those pragmatists who would prefer a somewhat different formulation.[96]I am indebted for suggestions here to Professor H. W. Stuart's article on "Valuation as a Logical Process," in Dewey'sStudies in Logical Theory, pp. 322-23.[97]Cf.Baldwin,Social and Ethical Interpretations,passim, and Cooley,Human Nature and the Social Order,passim.[98]The most interesting discussion of these topics I know is that of Friedrich Paulsen, in hisIntroduction to Philosophy(translated by Professor Frank Thilly).[99]Cf.Perry, R. B., "The Hiddenness of the Mind,"Jour. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Jan. 21, 1909; "The Mind Within and the Mind Without,"Ibid., April 1, 1909; "The Mind's Familiarity with Itself,"Ibid., March 4, 1909. Urban, W. M.,Valuation, p. 243.[100]Davenport,op. cit., p. 331.

[88]This criticism applies to the teachings of James Mill, J. S. Mill, and other sensationalist followers of Hume, even more than to Adam Smith. But see Professor Albion W. Small'sAdam Smith and Modern Sociology, Chicago, 1907, esp. p. 51.

[89]It is easy for "analysis" to separate society into "individual" monads, and impossible for "synthesis"—once the validity of the analytic process is accepted—to put society together again. In fact, once the analytic process is begun, and once its results are accepted as anything more than matters of logical convenience, all unity and all organic connections, whether in the social or in other fields, seem to vanish like a dissolving show. There is a psychological doctrine of monadism, quite as logical as the sociological monadology here criticized, which finds it impossible to link together even the elements in a single individual's mind. (See William James,Principles of Psychology, 1905 ed., vol.i, pp. 179-80.) Into what inextricable difficulties one falls, in pursuing the monadistic logic, is more dramatically illustrated than by anything else I know by Bradley'sAppearance and Reality, esp. chaps.iiandiii. The most useful viewpoint seems to be as follows: unity is as much an object of immediate knowledge as is plurality,—both being, in fact, the products of reflective thought. And unity is no more called upon to justify itself, before we recognize its existence, than is plurality.Cf.William James,The Meaning of Truth, New York, 1909, p. xiii; and also hisPsychology, vol.i, pp. 224-25.Cf.also the writings of Professor John Dewey.

[90]Jevons,Theory of Pol. Econ., 3d ed., p. 14.

[91]Principles, 1907, p. 15 (1898 ed., p. 76). See also Marshall's criticism of Cairnes' conception of supply and demand, in the 1898 edition of thePrinciples, p. 172.

[92]"Professor Clark's Economics,"Q. J. E., 1908, p. 170.

[93]Davenport,op. cit., p. 300, n. It may seem somewhat unfair to hold a man responsible for the view of another writer which he throws into a footnote of his own book. One who has read Professor Davenport's book, however, will recognize, I think, that this quotation does express Professor Davenport's view. His discussion in the text on pages 300-301 affirms virtually this same doctrine, as a proposition of psychology. See also his discussions in small type on pages 336-37. His whole system is based upon this doctrine.

[94]See, especially, William James,Pragmatism, andThe Meaning of Truth; John Dewey,Essays in Logical Theory; and F. C. S. Schiller,Humanism.

[95]The utter impossibility of adequately summing up a philosophic doctrine in two or three sentences will excuse this statement to those pragmatists who would prefer a somewhat different formulation.

[96]I am indebted for suggestions here to Professor H. W. Stuart's article on "Valuation as a Logical Process," in Dewey'sStudies in Logical Theory, pp. 322-23.

[97]Cf.Baldwin,Social and Ethical Interpretations,passim, and Cooley,Human Nature and the Social Order,passim.

[98]The most interesting discussion of these topics I know is that of Friedrich Paulsen, in hisIntroduction to Philosophy(translated by Professor Frank Thilly).

[99]Cf.Perry, R. B., "The Hiddenness of the Mind,"Jour. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Jan. 21, 1909; "The Mind Within and the Mind Without,"Ibid., April 1, 1909; "The Mind's Familiarity with Itself,"Ibid., March 4, 1909. Urban, W. M.,Valuation, p. 243.

[100]Davenport,op. cit., p. 331.

Conceptions of the social unity fall, in the main, into three classes: the mechanical, the biological, and the psychological. Each of these conceptions recognizes, of course, that the individual has a mind, but the first thinks of that mind as so shut in that the only connections between men must be of an external sort; the second sees modes of collective actionanalogousto the modes of individual action, and reaches the conception of a social mind by analogy; while the third treats the social mind as an empirical fact, the phenomena of which can be studied as concrete things in detail. And there are gradations here, and combinations.

The following extract, freely translated and substantially abridged, is taken from chapteriof DeGreef'sIntroduction à la Sociologie:—

It is in vain that Spencer protests against the accusation that he has assimilated the laws of biology with those of sociology. The confusion is everywhere complete. He has not indicated a single law, nor a single phenomenon, which has not its correspondent, if not its equivalent, in the antecedent sciences. Draper, in hisHistory of the Intellectual Development of Europe, adopts precisely the doctrine that the laws of biology apply equally to sociology. Man is the archetype of society. Nations pass through their periods of infancy, adolescence, maturity, age, death. Thissort of thing makes sociology wholly unnecessary. The attempt of Stanley Jevons to explain economic crises by sun-spots, so far from being an effort of genius, is simply ajeu d'esprit. It is simply a recognition of the common fact that climate is one of the factors that influence man in society. According to Hesiod, physical forces first engender each other, then in turn the gods and man. Since then, social science has in turn been founded on the laws of astronomy, chemistry and biology. To-day it is the last, vitiated, further, by false psychological notions about the power and unlimited liberty of the reason, and the consciousness of human individuals, and applied by analogy to the collective reason.The error consists in looking for the explanation of social phenomena in the most general laws. This is natural within certain limits, but has been pushed to extreme, but logical consequences, by the American, Carey (Social Science). He looks, in effect, to one of the oldest sciences, and one, consequently, relating to the most highly general phenomena, those of astronomy, for the universal laws of society. Geometry, he holds, gives us principles equally valid for the chemist, the sociologist, and for him who measures the earth. A system assuming to explain complex phenomena solely by the laws of phenomena more simple, may be compared to the effort to give an account of a book, not by reading it line by line, but by examining the cover and the title-page.

The error consists in looking for the explanation of social phenomena in the most general laws. This is natural within certain limits, but has been pushed to extreme, but logical consequences, by the American, Carey (Social Science). He looks, in effect, to one of the oldest sciences, and one, consequently, relating to the most highly general phenomena, those of astronomy, for the universal laws of society. Geometry, he holds, gives us principles equally valid for the chemist, the sociologist, and for him who measures the earth. A system assuming to explain complex phenomena solely by the laws of phenomena more simple, may be compared to the effort to give an account of a book, not by reading it line by line, but by examining the cover and the title-page.

As DeGreef elsewhere puts it, there is a hierarchy in science, proceeding from the more general to the less general, depending on the nature of the phenomena studied. This hierarchy has been variously stated. Comte puts it thus: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, social physics (sociology). Baldwin,[101]writing much later, of course, puts it thus:—

So here, as elsewhere, there is a gradation, a hierarchy, in science: chemistry necessary to life, but not itself of life; forces in the environment necessary to evolution, but not themselves vital; life-processes necessary to consciousness, but not themselves mental; consciousness necessary to society, but not all consciousness social; social consciousness necessary to social organization, but not all social consciousness actually in a social organization.

Now the point with DeGreef is that the special laws of each successively narrower group of phenomena are to be explained only by concrete study, and that it is wholly vain to think that the application of principles drawn from other, more general groups of phenomena give us these laws. Thus the economists talk of "equilibria" between various economic forces, just as if they were physical forces;[102]and a whole school of mathematical economists has arisen, who find economic life a thing that will fit into equations. This work is valuable, but it is not final. Analogies are helpful, but are not ultimate. Similarly, the biological conception, which likens society to a man, has its contributions. The biological analogy has been pushed very far: thus Novikow calls the social intellectualélitethe socialsensorium; Lilienfeld likens the action of a mob to female hysterics; Simiand calls the idle rich the adipose tissue of society, the priests also represent fat, while the police are the social phagocytes which eat up wandering criminal cells.[103]But this, though suggestive, is not an ultimate social philosophy or even an approachto it. Even DeGreef, as I shall indicate a little later, errs by trying to trace a too rigid parallel between individual structure and social structure. We must introduce a careful study of the peculiarly social phenomena, those phenomena which are to be found only in society, before we are privileged to talk of a social organism or a social mind.[104]

On the other hand, it seems to me that Baldwin has erred in the opposite direction. The laws of chemistry do not cease to be operative in the human body, even though more complex biological laws operate there. And the laws of biology are not suspended just because an animal organism develops a mind. The greatest defect of the older psychology, against which the experimental psychology is a reaction, was its failure to take proper account of physical processes connected with consciousness. Now society, according to Baldwin, is best described as analogous to a psychological organization, and such an organization as is found in the individual inideal thinking.[105]But surely this is an abstraction, and not a fact. Society does not cease to be physical, chemical, biological, subconscious, merely because it has also attained in part a higher form of psychical activity (to which Professor Baldwin would object on the basis of his distinction between the "social" and the "socionomic").

DeGreef's conception seems to me better, on this logical point,—though of course Baldwin'sanalysis of facts represents a great advance—but it is not satisfactory:[106]—

Since unconsciousness, instinct, and reflex action characterize the psychic life of inferior beings, and even the greater part of the intellectual activity of those most highly developed, man included, we ought not to be astonished,a priori, that the collective force which constitutes the social superorganism presents the same characteristics.Consciousness is aroused in the individual, and new activities result, which soon, however, lose their conscious character, and become reflex and automatic. So with society.

Consciousness is aroused in the individual, and new activities result, which soon, however, lose their conscious character, and become reflex and automatic. So with society.

Then follows an elaborate analogy between the individual brain and nervous system and their functions, and the social structure and its functions, which we need not reproduce here. This analogy seems forced to me. There is little point to trying to find such exact correspondences. It is enough if we have our general organic principle as a method of study, and then proceed to the study of social facts. I shall myself, however, make use of some analogies in what follows, but shall not insist too strongly upon them. I may here express the opinion that society is an organism less highly developed than a man's body or a man's mind, and that its unity is primarily a unity offunctionrather than ofstructure,[107]though there is some structural unity.

The conception of the social unity which seems most useful for the purpose of our study—and the writer would insist that no social theory isvalid for all purposes, and that many social theories have value for some particular purposes—is that of Professor C. H. Cooley, as set forth, particularly, in the opening chapters of hisSocial Organization. As this book, however, presupposes certain doctrines set forth in Professor Cooley's earlier book,Human Nature and the Social Order, a brief account of certain points in that study must also be given. It may be noted, at the outset, that Professor Cooley neglects the study of the material aspects of society, and centres his attention upon the mental side. His purpose in this is not to deny the significance of the material factors, as he explains in the preface toSocial Organization, but simply to narrow the scope of his labors. The writer wishes here to make a similar statement regarding his own viewpoint. In the following pages, attention will be centred almost exclusively upon the psychical forces involved, upon what we shall call the "social mind." In this, however, it is explicitly recognized that the physical environment and the biological individuals are essential factors, and that the forces which are manifested in them must be recognized as coefficients with the psychical forces which we shall study, in the determination of any concrete social situation. I have no intention whatever of giving an independent, ontological character to this psychical abstraction. For the purposes of this study we shall regard the physical factors as constant,—an assumption justified for purposes of study, provided we subsequently, in handling concreteproblems, make allowance for the extent to which it is untrue.

In his earlier book,[108]Professor Cooley objects to the customary antithesis between "individual" and "social." They are simply two aspects of the same thing. He discriminates three meanings of the word, social, none of which, he says, is properly to be contrasted with "individual": (1) that pertaining to the collective aspect of humanity, in its widest and vaguest meaning; (2) that pertaining to immediate intercourse; (3) conducive to collective welfare, and so nearly equivalent to moral. But none of these meanings has "individual" as its natural or logical antithesis.

There are several forms of individualistic views: (1)MereIndividualism. The distributive phase of human life is almost exclusively regarded. Each person is thought of as a separate agent; all social phenomena originate in the action of such agents. This view is much discredited by evolutionary science and philosophy, but is by no means abandoned even in theory, and practically it enters as a premise into most common thought of the day. (2) Double Causation,—a partition of power between society and the individual, both thought of as separate causes. This is ordinarily the view met with in social and ethical discussions. There is here the same premise of the individual as a separate, unrelated agent; but over against him is set a vaguely conceived collective interest or force. People are so accustomed to think of themselves as uncaused causes, specialcreators on a small scale, that when general phenomena are forced on their notice, they think of them as something additional, and more or less antithetical. The correction of this error will leave the contest between individualism and socialism, considered as philosophical notions, rather than as names for social programs, among the forgottendébrisof speculation. (3) The third view he calls Primitive Individualism. The individual is prior in time to society. This view is a variety of the preceding, perhaps formed by mingling individualistic preconceptions with a rather crude evolutionary philosophy. Individuality is lower in rank as well as prior in time. The social is the good, moral, and the individual is the anti-social and bad. Professor Cooley's view is that individuality is neither prior in time, nor inferior in rank, to sociality. If social be applied only to the higher forms of mental life, it should be opposed, not to individual, but to animal or sensual, or the like. Our remote ancestors were just as inferior when viewed separately as when viewed collectively. (4) The fourth form of individualism he calls the Social Faculty view. The social includes only a part, and often a rather definite part, of the individual. Individual and social are two different parts of human nature. Love is social; fear and anger are unsocial and individualistic. Some writers have treated intelligence as an individualistic faculty, and have founded sociality on some form of sentiment. This is well enough if we use social in the second sense of pertaining to immediate conversation,or fellow feeling. But that these sociable emotions are essentially higher, or pertain peculiarly to collective life, is very doubtful. Cooley holds that no such division of human nature is possible. Social or moral progress consists less in the aggrandizement of certain faculties and suppression of others, than in the discipline of all with reference to a progressive organization of life.

The rest of the book is devoted to a study of society in its distributive aspect, or as we should say ordinarily, using the terms which Professor Cooley objects to, the study of the social nature of individuals. It is based in large measure upon a study of the development of children. Personality is an essentially social thing. The "I" feeling is a thing which only social influences can develop.[109]The thought process within the "individual mind" is a social process,—we think in words, and, indeed, in conversations.[110]I shall not develop these notions at length. They are of similar nature to those in Professor Baldwin'sSocial and Ethical Interpretations, when he discusses the "dialectic of personal growth." They are interesting and pertinent as showing in a concrete way the tremendous and comprehensive sweep of social factors in the creation of the individual mind.

Social Organization, which appeared in 1909, takes up the collective aspect of human-mental life.

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