FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[119]See the discussion of Simmel's contention,supra, p. 19, n.[120]Ehrenfels, C.,System der Werttheorie, Leipzig, 1897; Kreibig, J. C.,Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie, Vienna, 1902; Kallen, H. M., "Dr. Montague and the Pragmatic Notion of Value,"Jour. of Philosophy, etc., Sept., 1909; Montague, W. P., "The True, the Good and the Beautiful, from a Pragmatic Standpoint,"Ibid., April 29, 1909; Meinong, A.,Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, Graz, 1894; Paulsen, Friedrich,Introduction to Philosophy, andSystem of Ethics; Stuart, H. W., "The Hedonistic Interpretation of Subjective Value,"Jour. of Pol. Econ., vol.iv, "Valuation as a Logical Process," in Dewey'sStudies in Logical Theory, Chicago, 1903; Shaw, C. C., "The Theory of Value, and its Place in the History of Ethics,"International Jour. of Ethics, vol.xi; Slater, T., "Value in Moral Theology and Political Economy,"Irish Eccles. Rec., ser. 4, vol.x, Dublin, 1901; Tufts, J. H., "Ethical Value,"Jour. of Philosophy, etc., vol.xix; Baldwin'sDictionary of Philosophy, etc.,s. v."Worth" (article by W. M. Urban); Simmel, G.,Philosophie des Geldes, Leipzig, 1900, "A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value,"Amer. Jour. of Sociology, vol.v; Urban, W. M.,Valuation, London, 1909. These titles are representative of an extensive literature on the subject.[121]Supra, p. 19, n.[122]I am indebted to Professor John Dewey for many valuable suggestions and criticisms in connection with this part of my study. My more general obligations to him will be manifest to any one who is familiar with his epoch-marking point of view. Economic, sociological and political philosophy have, in my judgment, more to learn from him than from any other contemporary philosopher.[123]Pp. 141-42.[124]Cf.Gabriel Tarde,Psychologie Économique, vol.i, p. 63, and Urban,Valuation, p. 78.[125]Urban,op. cit., p. 32.[126]Paulsen, Friedrich,Ethics,passim.[127]System der Werttheorie, vol.i, chap.i.[128]Op. cit., p. 311.[129]Cf.Urban,op. cit., p. 36; Meinong,op. cit., pp. 15-16.[130]Meinong,op. cit., pt.i, chap.i; Urban,op. cit., pp. 38-39.[131]Op. cit., pp. 14-16, and following chapter.[132]Urban,op. cit., p. 39.[133]Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, Graz, 1894, pt.i, chap.i, esp. p. 21.[134]"La psychologie en économie politique,"Revue Philosophique, vol.xii, pp. 337-38.[135]Op. cit., pp. 41et seq.[136]See chapterxvi,infra.[137]The German, with its facility in compounding, offers a convenient nomenclature here:WertandUnwert.Cf.Ehrenfels,op. cit., for a brief discussion of negative values (pp. 53-54).[138]For this generalization, see Urban,op. cit., chap.vi; Ehrenfels,op. cit., vol.ii, chap.iii, esp. p. 86.[139]An analogue in the field of social values is readily suggested. A new heresy starts, opposed by the dominant element in the social will,i.e., having a negative value for the majority. As the heresy increases, the negative value rises till, in a crucial point, the tide turns, and the heretics become the dominant element in the society. Then—since their position is far from certain—new recruits to the heresy have a high positive value, but, as the heresy still further spreads, additional recruits count for less and less.[140]Cf.Urban,op. cit.,passim; Ehrenfels,op. cit., vol.i, pp. 43et seq.; Mackenzie, criticism of Ehrenfels and Meinong inMind, Oct., 1899.Cf.also, Wicksteed,The Common Sense of Political Economy, London, 1910, pp. 402et seq.[141]The generalization of the idea of price, while not original with Wicksteed, is interestingly developed by him in chaps.iandiiof hisCommon Sense of Political Economy, London, 1910.[142]Davenport,op. cit., pp. 303-11, gives a good summary of economic discussions of hedonism. His own view is that the Austrians are not essentially bound up with hedonism.[143]Supra, chaps.viandvii.

[119]See the discussion of Simmel's contention,supra, p. 19, n.

[120]Ehrenfels, C.,System der Werttheorie, Leipzig, 1897; Kreibig, J. C.,Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie, Vienna, 1902; Kallen, H. M., "Dr. Montague and the Pragmatic Notion of Value,"Jour. of Philosophy, etc., Sept., 1909; Montague, W. P., "The True, the Good and the Beautiful, from a Pragmatic Standpoint,"Ibid., April 29, 1909; Meinong, A.,Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, Graz, 1894; Paulsen, Friedrich,Introduction to Philosophy, andSystem of Ethics; Stuart, H. W., "The Hedonistic Interpretation of Subjective Value,"Jour. of Pol. Econ., vol.iv, "Valuation as a Logical Process," in Dewey'sStudies in Logical Theory, Chicago, 1903; Shaw, C. C., "The Theory of Value, and its Place in the History of Ethics,"International Jour. of Ethics, vol.xi; Slater, T., "Value in Moral Theology and Political Economy,"Irish Eccles. Rec., ser. 4, vol.x, Dublin, 1901; Tufts, J. H., "Ethical Value,"Jour. of Philosophy, etc., vol.xix; Baldwin'sDictionary of Philosophy, etc.,s. v."Worth" (article by W. M. Urban); Simmel, G.,Philosophie des Geldes, Leipzig, 1900, "A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value,"Amer. Jour. of Sociology, vol.v; Urban, W. M.,Valuation, London, 1909. These titles are representative of an extensive literature on the subject.

[121]Supra, p. 19, n.

[122]I am indebted to Professor John Dewey for many valuable suggestions and criticisms in connection with this part of my study. My more general obligations to him will be manifest to any one who is familiar with his epoch-marking point of view. Economic, sociological and political philosophy have, in my judgment, more to learn from him than from any other contemporary philosopher.

[123]Pp. 141-42.

[124]Cf.Gabriel Tarde,Psychologie Économique, vol.i, p. 63, and Urban,Valuation, p. 78.

[125]Urban,op. cit., p. 32.

[126]Paulsen, Friedrich,Ethics,passim.

[127]System der Werttheorie, vol.i, chap.i.

[128]Op. cit., p. 311.

[129]Cf.Urban,op. cit., p. 36; Meinong,op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[130]Meinong,op. cit., pt.i, chap.i; Urban,op. cit., pp. 38-39.

[131]Op. cit., pp. 14-16, and following chapter.

[132]Urban,op. cit., p. 39.

[133]Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, Graz, 1894, pt.i, chap.i, esp. p. 21.

[134]"La psychologie en économie politique,"Revue Philosophique, vol.xii, pp. 337-38.

[135]Op. cit., pp. 41et seq.

[136]See chapterxvi,infra.

[137]The German, with its facility in compounding, offers a convenient nomenclature here:WertandUnwert.Cf.Ehrenfels,op. cit., for a brief discussion of negative values (pp. 53-54).

[138]For this generalization, see Urban,op. cit., chap.vi; Ehrenfels,op. cit., vol.ii, chap.iii, esp. p. 86.

[139]An analogue in the field of social values is readily suggested. A new heresy starts, opposed by the dominant element in the social will,i.e., having a negative value for the majority. As the heresy increases, the negative value rises till, in a crucial point, the tide turns, and the heretics become the dominant element in the society. Then—since their position is far from certain—new recruits to the heresy have a high positive value, but, as the heresy still further spreads, additional recruits count for less and less.

[140]Cf.Urban,op. cit.,passim; Ehrenfels,op. cit., vol.i, pp. 43et seq.; Mackenzie, criticism of Ehrenfels and Meinong inMind, Oct., 1899.Cf.also, Wicksteed,The Common Sense of Political Economy, London, 1910, pp. 402et seq.

[141]The generalization of the idea of price, while not original with Wicksteed, is interestingly developed by him in chaps.iandiiof hisCommon Sense of Political Economy, London, 1910.

[142]Davenport,op. cit., pp. 303-11, gives a good summary of economic discussions of hedonism. His own view is that the Austrians are not essentially bound up with hedonism.

[143]Supra, chaps.viandvii.

Our conclusions reached in previous chapters, from the standpoint of economic theory, and from the standpoint of sociological theory, alike forbid us to stop with the results so far obtained as to the nature of value. From the standpoint of social theory, we are unable to consider the individual values discussed in the last chapter as completely accounted for on the psychical side by what goes on in the individual mind: every individual mind is a part of a larger whole; every thing in the individual mind has been influenced by processes in the minds of others; every process in the individual mind influences, directly or indirectly, processes in the minds of others. There is a social mind. And the values in the mind of an individual constitute no self-complete and independent system, either in their origin, in their interactions, or in their consequences for action. In our psychological phrase, their "presuppositions" include elements in the minds of other men, and they themselves constitute part of the "presuppositions" of the values in the minds of other men. Finally, there are values which correspond to the values of no individual mind, great social values, whose presuppositions are tremendouslycomplex, including individual values in the minds of many men, as well as other factors which we shall have to analyze in considerable detail, great social values whose motivating power directs the activities of nations, of great industries, of literary and artistic "schools," of churches and other social organizations, as well as the daily lives of every man and woman—impelling them in paths which no individual man foresaw or purposed. In Urban's phrase,—

between the subjectively desired and the objectively desirable in ethics, between subjective utility and sacrifice and objective value and price in economic reckoning, between the subjectively effective and the objectively beautiful in art, there is a difference for feeling so potent that in naïve and unreflective experience the feelings with such objectivity of reference are spoken of as predicates of the objects themselves.[144]

And our theory carries us even further than Professor Urban cares to go here. Naïve and unreflecting experience is perfectly justified in treating these objective values as qualities of the objects themselves. To the individual man, an objective value, say the value of an economic good,isas a rule, a quality almost wholly independent of his personal subjective feelings or point of view. The average man, "by taking thought," can no more affect the value of wheat or corn or other big staple than he can "add a cubit to his stature." For the great mass of men, and the great mass of commodities, this holds true. The individual finds the world ofeconomic values a part of the brute universe, like the force of gravity, or the weather, or the law against murder—less invariable than the force of gravity, and less variable, as a rule, than the weather—to which he must adapt his individual economy. He is not wholly impotent to change this world of economic values, nor is he wholly without influence on the balance of cosmic forces. And, if possessed of enough socialpower(which we shall find to constitute the essence of these social values) he may substantially modify the action of the law against murder, or the values of those commodities about which the rich may be capricious; or even, if intelligent in the use of his power, he may undertake a successful "bull" campaign, and force up the value of wheat or cotton. But even in such cases, he deals with objective facts,—which often, in the midst of a bull campaign, behave in a most surprising and disconcerting manner![145]The existence of external constraining and directive forces are matters of every day experience. Laws, moral values, social constraints of a thousand subtle and obvious kinds, are facts so well known that education has made it its central task to teach the individual how to adjust himself to them. They have been described and elaborated in innumerable books.[146]Thatthey exist is certain. Their origin, nature and function we shall study in what is to follow.

We were led to a similar conclusion by the analysis of the necessities of economic theory. Economic value as a quality, present in a good in definite, quantitative degree, regardless of the idiosyncrasy of the particular holder of the good, we found a necessity of economic thought. The argument may be briefly recapitulated, and a few points added. If goods are to be added together and a sum of wealth obtained, there must be a homogeneous element in them by virtue of which the addition can be made. We do not add a crop of wheat and a lead-pencil,[147]and a gold watch, and twenty dollars and a theatre ticket, on the basis of length or weight or other physical quality. Only by picking out the homogeneous quality, value, can we add them. We cannot compare two economic goods, and put them into a ratio, except on the basis of such a homogeneous quality. We have no terms for our ratios apart from quantities of value, and yet our ratios must have terms. We find economists speaking of value as the essential characteristic or quality of wealth. We find theorists speaking of money as a "measure of values"—a conception only possible if value be a quality of the sort of which we speak, present both in the money measure and in the thing measured in definite quantitative degrees. A point or two may be added. We find economists, notably theAustrians, undertaking the problem of "Imputation," breaking up the value of a consumption good into different parts, one part being assigned to the labor immediately concerned in its production, and other parts of that value to goods of the next "rank"—owned by people different from those who consume the good—and this value further subdivided among goods of remoter ranks,—the whole process possible only if the original value be an objective quantity of the sort described. We find a differential portion of a crop of wheat compared with the land which produced it, and spoken of as a percentage of the land, which is true only if thevalueof each be considered—and indeed is meaningless, else. Or, we find merchants reckoning their gains in the form of money at the end of the year, as a certain percentage of their capital—which has consisted throughout the year of goods of various sorts. Everywhere in the economic analysis this conception of value has been essential for the validity of the analysis, and this is especially true when we come to the ultimate problems of monetary theory. We may ignore, sometimes, the element of value when dealing with non-monetary problems, in terms of quantities of money, simply because it is not necessary to refer to fundamental principles explicitly all the time. But when we come to the problem of money itself, we must make use of the value concept, and the value concept is implicit in the whole procedure.

Further, the value concept has been calledupon to explain the motivation of the economic activity of society, and value has been conceived of as a motivating force.[148]Schaeffle, especially, has stressed this phase of the matter in his criticism of the socialistic theories of value. "Utility value," he holds, does direct industry into proper channels, but a value based on labor-time would get supply and needs into a hopeless discrepancy.[149]

No ratio "between objective articles" will serve these functions which the economists have put upon the value concept. Value as a purely individual phenomenon, varying from man to man, will in no way[150]serve these purposes of the economists. Value as a mere brute quantity of physical objects given in exchange for other physical objects, could in no way serve these purposes. Value must be an objective quality, apower, embodied in the object, independent of the individual judgment or desire. A strong feeling that this is so is manifested in the term which theEnglish School so often uses as the equivalent of value, namely, "purchasing power"[151]—a term which Böhm-Bawerk approves.[152]The notion of relativity which has, historically, been bound up with this term, we have criticized in chapter II, and it is not necessary to repeat the argument here. But the other aspect of it, its recognition of the dynamic character of value, and of the quantitative character of value, even though often confusedly and vaguely, seems very much to strengthen the case for the thesis I am maintaining.[153]

The effort of the Austrians, and of other schools of economic theory, to explain and justify this notion of value as an objective quantity, has already been considered, and our conclusion has been that, through a too narrow delimitationof their determinants, they have been led into circular reasoning. A further criticism is now possible, in the light of our sociological and psychological conclusions: the picking out ofanyabstract elements, however numerous, with the effort, by a synthesis, to combine them into a concrete social quantity, must fail. In the process of abstraction we leave out vital elements of the concrete social situation; how shall we expect these vital elements left out to reappear when we put the abstract elements into a synthesis? They cannot, if the synthesis be logically made. And it is precisely because Professor Davenport is so accurate in his logic that he fails to get a social quantity out of the abstract elements of subjective utility, etc. But the majority of economists, less careful in their formal logic, but more impressed by the facts of social life and by the exigencies of getting a working set of concepts, have assumed and used the quantitative concept, with satisfactory results so far as practical problems are concerned, but without fundamental theoretical consistency. The elements which the abstract theories suppress persist, under the guise of economic value itself, in the facts of life, and take their vengeance on the theory by forcing it into a circle. Our problem, then, is not to find out certain elements out of which to construct social value by a synthesis. The proper procedure will be the reverse of that: to take social value as we find it—i.e., as itfunctionsin economic life,—and then to analyze it, picking out certain prominent and significantphases, or moments, in it, which, taken abstractly, are not the whole story, but which furnish the criteria of social value, and control over which is significant for the purpose of controlling social values.

In subsequent chapters, we shall, carrying out this plan, try to put concrete meaning into our abstract formulation of the problem.

FOOTNOTES:[144]Op. cit., p. 17.[145]Cf.Royce, J.,The World and the Individual, New York, 1901, vol.i, pp. 209-10, and 225.[146]I may refer here particularly to Durkheim,De la division du travail social, Paris, 1893. In giving this reference, of course, I do not commit myself to the "mediæval realism" of which Durkheim has been, perhaps justly, accused.Cf., also, Professor Ross's admirableSocial Control.[147]Cf.Ely,Outlines of Economics, 1908 ed., pp. 99-100, and Tarde,Psychologie Économique, vol.i, p. 85, n. Seesupra, chap.ii.[148]Cf.Wieser,Natural Value, pp. 65, 162-63, 210-12, and 36; Flux,Economic Principles, chap.ii.[149]Quintessence of Socialism, London, 1898, pp. 55-59, 91et seq., 123-24.[150]I take pleasure in availing myself of the privilege which Professor W. A. Scott, of the University of Wisconsin, accords me, of quoting him to the effect that "such a conception of value [a value concept which makes the value of a commodity a quantity, socially valid, regardless of the individual holder of the coin or the commodity, and regardless of the particular exchange ratio into which the value quantity enters as a term] is absolutely essential to the working-out of economic problems." Professor Scott has been driven to this conclusion in the course of his studies in the theory of money. Dean Kinley expresses a somewhat similar view in hisMoney, p. 62. It is, of course, in the theory of money that the need for such a concept makes itself most acutely felt. But the same view is expressed by Professor T. S. Adams, from the standpoint of the statistician. See his article, "Index Numbers and the Standard of Value,"Jour. of Pol. Econ., vol.x, 1901-02, pp. 11 and 18-19.[151]Even Professor H. J. Davenport finds a quantitative value concept necessary in places. For example, on page 573 of hisValue and Distribution, he speaks of capital, considered as a cost concept, as standing "for the total invested fund of value, inclusive of all instrumental values, and of all the general purchasing power devoted to the gain-seeking enterprise." It might be unkind to remind him of his definition of value on page 569, and ask him what a "fund" of "ratio of exchange" might mean! And the notion of value as a quantity, instead of a ratio, is involved, as indicated in the text, in the term, "purchasing power," which he also uses in the passage quoted. This term, "purchasing power," as apparently a substitute for value, Professor Davenport uses in several instances, where the ratio notion clearly will not work: on page 561, "distribution of purchasing power," page 562, "redistribution of purchasing power," and page 571. I say "apparently," for I do not think Professor Davenport anywhere in the volume gives a formal definition of "purchasing power."[152]"Grundzüge," etc., Conrad'sJahrbücher, 1886, pp. 5 and 478, n.[153]This line of argument, drawn from the usage of the economists in the treatment of other terms, and in the handling of problems, might be almost indefinitely expanded. Almost everybody has a quantitative value concept in mind when he is reasoning about practical problems. The trouble comes only when a value theory has to be constructed!Cf.the discussion of production as the "creation of utilities,"infrachap.xviii.

[144]Op. cit., p. 17.

[145]Cf.Royce, J.,The World and the Individual, New York, 1901, vol.i, pp. 209-10, and 225.

[146]I may refer here particularly to Durkheim,De la division du travail social, Paris, 1893. In giving this reference, of course, I do not commit myself to the "mediæval realism" of which Durkheim has been, perhaps justly, accused.Cf., also, Professor Ross's admirableSocial Control.

[147]Cf.Ely,Outlines of Economics, 1908 ed., pp. 99-100, and Tarde,Psychologie Économique, vol.i, p. 85, n. Seesupra, chap.ii.

[148]Cf.Wieser,Natural Value, pp. 65, 162-63, 210-12, and 36; Flux,Economic Principles, chap.ii.

[149]Quintessence of Socialism, London, 1898, pp. 55-59, 91et seq., 123-24.

[150]I take pleasure in availing myself of the privilege which Professor W. A. Scott, of the University of Wisconsin, accords me, of quoting him to the effect that "such a conception of value [a value concept which makes the value of a commodity a quantity, socially valid, regardless of the individual holder of the coin or the commodity, and regardless of the particular exchange ratio into which the value quantity enters as a term] is absolutely essential to the working-out of economic problems." Professor Scott has been driven to this conclusion in the course of his studies in the theory of money. Dean Kinley expresses a somewhat similar view in hisMoney, p. 62. It is, of course, in the theory of money that the need for such a concept makes itself most acutely felt. But the same view is expressed by Professor T. S. Adams, from the standpoint of the statistician. See his article, "Index Numbers and the Standard of Value,"Jour. of Pol. Econ., vol.x, 1901-02, pp. 11 and 18-19.

[151]Even Professor H. J. Davenport finds a quantitative value concept necessary in places. For example, on page 573 of hisValue and Distribution, he speaks of capital, considered as a cost concept, as standing "for the total invested fund of value, inclusive of all instrumental values, and of all the general purchasing power devoted to the gain-seeking enterprise." It might be unkind to remind him of his definition of value on page 569, and ask him what a "fund" of "ratio of exchange" might mean! And the notion of value as a quantity, instead of a ratio, is involved, as indicated in the text, in the term, "purchasing power," which he also uses in the passage quoted. This term, "purchasing power," as apparently a substitute for value, Professor Davenport uses in several instances, where the ratio notion clearly will not work: on page 561, "distribution of purchasing power," page 562, "redistribution of purchasing power," and page 571. I say "apparently," for I do not think Professor Davenport anywhere in the volume gives a formal definition of "purchasing power."

[152]"Grundzüge," etc., Conrad'sJahrbücher, 1886, pp. 5 and 478, n.

[153]This line of argument, drawn from the usage of the economists in the treatment of other terms, and in the handling of problems, might be almost indefinitely expanded. Almost everybody has a quantitative value concept in mind when he is reasoning about practical problems. The trouble comes only when a value theory has to be constructed!Cf.the discussion of production as the "creation of utilities,"infrachap.xviii.

Our point of view will be more adequately defined if we consider briefly the theories of social value, set forth from the angle of a general (as opposed to a specifically economic) conception of value, by Professor W. M. Urban and Gabriel Tarde. These theories contain some elements which we shall need, and our criticism of them will bring into clearer light the need for the distinctive point of view of this book.

Professor Urban's conception as to the nature of value, in its individual manifestation, has been already indicated, in part, in chapterx. Stressing the organic nature of the relations of a value to other phases of the mental life, insisting on a recognition of the "presuppositions" of value, and recognizing that both feeling and desire (or desire-disposition) are involved in value—our cursory account cannot begin to do justice to the subtlety and exhaustiveness of his masterly analysis—he still insists on finding the fundamental nature of value in a phase of itsstructure(rather than in its function), namely, in thefeeling. From this part of his doctrine we have found it necessary to differ. When he comes to the problem of social value, he carries over the same conception of value, and he finds that socialvalues appear when many individuals, through "sympathetic participation,"feelthe same value. With our conclusion (chapterviii) that we can share each other's emotional life he is in thorough accord. His argument in this connection is admirable.[154]His interest is primarily in moral social values, and he attempts no detailed treatment of economic social values, seeming to hold that the Austrian treatment of objective value is adequate.[155]Both moral and economic values are "objective and social."[156]

Collective desire and feeling, when it has acquired this "common meaning," when the object of desire and feeling is consciously held in common, we may describe as Social Synergy; and the objective, over-individual values may be described as the resultants of social synergies. The introduction of this term has for its purpose the clearest possible distinction between social forces as conscious and as subconscious. It is with the former that we are here concerned.[157]

Conscious collective feeling is thus insisted upon as an essential in social values, and Professor Urban insists[158]that the value ceases to be a value as this conscious feeling wanes—even though conceding[159]that it retains the power of influencing thefeltvalues, after it has passed into the realm of "things taken for granted."

But this stressing of the conscious element of feeling—which as I have previously shown is a variable element even within the individual psychology, and has no necessary quantitative relation to the functional significance, the amountofmotivating power, of the value—makes it really impossible for him to resolve the question of how thestrengthof a social value is to be determined. He does, indeed, undertake something of the sort[160](he is speaking of ethical values), making the quantity of value depend on "supply and demand," the supply depending on the number of people willing to supply a given moral act, and the intensity of their willingness to do it—extension and intention both being recognized. And demand is similarly determined. The thing seems to be nothing more than an arithmetical sum of intensities of individual feelings, or, most justly, individual values. But this leaves us no wiser than before as to the socialweight, the socialvalidity, of these social values. An infinite deal would depend, both in the case of supply and demand, onwhothe individuals are. A demand for a given act from a poor group of fanatics, however intense, might count for little, while such a demand coming from a group with great prestige, with great socialpower, might have a very great significance. If we are trying to get an objective quantity of social value, which shall have a definite weight in determining social action—the function of social values—we are as poorly off as we were with the Austrian analysis which, in order to get an objective quantity of economic value out of individual "marginal utilities," has to assume value in the background as the validating force behind these individual elements. The error here,as there, comes from an abstraction, from centring attention upon the conspicuous conscious elements. And it comes in stressing the structure, the content, of social values, to the exclusion of their functionalpower. Here is our real problem, if we would determine the social validity of values. This lurking element of social power remains an unexplained residuum.

This residuum ofpower, backing up the conscious psychological factors, gets explicit recognition, even though no real explanation, at the hands of Gabriel Tarde,[161]to whose theory of social value we now turn. I quote chiefly from hisPsychologie Économique, and the numerals which follow refer to pages in volumei. (63-64) Value understood in its largest sense, takes in the whole of social science. It is a quality which we attribute to things, like color,[162]but which, like color, exists only in ourselves.... It consists in the accord of the collective judgments ... as to the capacity of objects to be more or less, and by a greater or less number of persons, believed, desired, or admired. This quality is thus of that peculiar species of qualities which present numerical degrees, and mount or descend a scale without essentially changing their nature, and hence merit the name of quantities.

There are three great categories of value: "valeur-vérité," "valeur-utilité," and "valeur-beauté." To ideas, to goods (in a generic sense of the term), and to things considered as sources "de voluptés collectives," we attribute a truth, a utility, a beauty, greater or less. Quite as much as utility, beauty and truth are children of the opinion of the mass, in accord, or at war, with the reason of anélitewhich influences it.

(It may be noted in passing that Tarde's "trinitarian" conception of value is not as artificial as it seems. It is simply a method of classification, and there are many subdivisions under each head. Economic value, e.g., is a subspecies within the group of utility values—"goods" include "pouvoirs," "droits," "mérites," and "richesses" (66). Our own conception is, of course, that values are thoroughly "pluralistic" as to their structure, and are "monistic" in their function.)

(64) The greater or less truth of a thing signifies three things diversely combined: the greater or smaller number, the greater or less social importance ("poids," "considération," "compétence," "reconnue") of the people who believe it, and the greater or less intensity of their belief in it. The greater or less utility of an object expresses the greater or less number of people who desire it in a given society at a given time, the greater or less social "poids" ("ici poids veut dire pouvoir et droit") of the persons who desire it, and the greater or less intensity of their desire for it. And so with beauty.

Here is, then, an explicit recognition of the element of the socialweightof those who create a social value, as a factor coördinate with their number and the intensity of their desires, etc. Toward resolving it, however, Tarde makes no real contribution. If enough be read into the parenthetical expressions given above, following the word "poids" in each case, they would be found to harmonize with the theory of the writer, shortly to be set forth. As it happens, however, Tarde attempts to resolve this factor of the social weight of a participant in a social value, in an analogous case, and gives us a different sort of explanation. He is seeking a "glorio mètre," or measure of glory—for glory is a social value too. He finds that to determine a man's glory we must take account of two things: one his notoriety, and the other, the admiration in which he is held (71-72). The first is simple: we will count the number who watch him and talk about what he does. The second is harder, for we must not merely count the number who admire him, but also determine the importance of each as an admirer. But how get at this? Tarde suggests that the study of the cephalic index will throw light upon the problem—no satisfactory solution, I think!—but says that anyhow the problem is practically solved every day in university and administrative examinations.

Apart from the fact that conscious desire (or conscious belief, etc.), rather than functional power, is made the basis of Tarde's social value, and apart from the failure to give any real accountof the origin of this "social weight," of the individuals in the group which creates the social value, there is a further defect in Tarde's analysis which cannot be strongly objected to. It is his effort to treat organic processes as if they were an arithmetical sum of elements. A sum of abstractions will not give you a concrete reality. A man's social weight is not a thing independent of relations, a thing which can be thrown now here and now there with the same results in each case. And two men, each with a definite social weight, do not have precisely twice that social weight when they combine with each other. Two great leaders of opposing, evenly balanced political parties, combining their influence, may secure wonderful results, leading both parties to agree on a programme, and carrying it through. Two equally great leaders, but both within the same party, may be unable to accomplish anything by combining their efforts. And it may happen that two men, each with great weight in his own sphere, would be so incongruous if they tried to coöperate, that their joint weight would be less than the weight of either alone. It is not a matter of arithmetical addition. Social power can be used in certain ways, and in certain organic connections. If we care to use a mechanical phrase, the effort to use it out of organic connections is apt to result in so much "friction" that much of the power is lost.

The objection to the insistence on the amount of conscious desire or feeling as a criterion of the amount of value holds for social values quiteas much as for individual values. The social value of the gold standard, judging by the amount of desire and feeling involved, by the degree to which it was a factor in consciousness, was vastly greater during the campaign of 1896, while its validity was still in question, than it was after it had been validated, and made a really effective fact. Social value depends, not on conscious intensity, but on motivating power. The social consciousness, as the individual consciousness, is economical. And the need for conscious feeling, for conscious desire, in connection with social, as with individual, values, arises when values must be compared, when they are in question, when they must show themselves for what they are, that they may be brought into equilibrium with antagonistic values. And the amount of consciousness will not be greater than the need for it—and, alas, is rarely as great as the need! When a value becomes accepted, when its place is secure, when the equilibrium is established, conscious feeling and desire with reference to it tend to pass away, and peace comes.

Tarde seems to recognize this, indeed, when he says (72, n.):—

Of nobility, as of glory, it is proper to remark that it is a force, a means of action, for him who possesses it, but that it is a faith, a peace, for the people who accept it, and who, in believing in it, create it.

FOOTNOTES:[154]Op. cit., chap.viii, esp. p. 243.[155]Ibid., p. 319.[156]Ibid., p. 312.[157]Ibid., p. 318.[158]Ibid., pp. 333-36.[159]Ibid., p. 335.[160]Op. cit., pp. 329-30.[161]"La croyance et le désir: possibilité de leur mésure,"Rev. philosophique, vol.x(1880), pp. 150, 264. "La psychologie en économie politique,"Ibid., vol.xii(1881), pp. 232, 401. "Les deux sens de la valeur,"Rev. d'économie politique, 1888, pp. 526, 561. "L'idée de valeur,"Rev. politique et littéraire (Rev. Bleue), vol.xvi, 1901.Psychologie Économique, Paris, 1902.[162]Cf.Conrad,Grundriss zum Studium der politischen Oekonomie, Jena, 1902, Erster Teil, p. 10.

[154]Op. cit., chap.viii, esp. p. 243.

[155]Ibid., p. 319.

[156]Ibid., p. 312.

[157]Ibid., p. 318.

[158]Ibid., pp. 333-36.

[159]Ibid., p. 335.

[160]Op. cit., pp. 329-30.

[161]"La croyance et le désir: possibilité de leur mésure,"Rev. philosophique, vol.x(1880), pp. 150, 264. "La psychologie en économie politique,"Ibid., vol.xii(1881), pp. 232, 401. "Les deux sens de la valeur,"Rev. d'économie politique, 1888, pp. 526, 561. "L'idée de valeur,"Rev. politique et littéraire (Rev. Bleue), vol.xvi, 1901.Psychologie Économique, Paris, 1902.

[162]Cf.Conrad,Grundriss zum Studium der politischen Oekonomie, Jena, 1902, Erster Teil, p. 10.

How are we to get out of our circle:[163]The value of a good, A, depends, in part, upon the value embodied in the goods, B, C, and D, possessed by the persons for whom good A has "utility," and whose "effective demand" is asine qua nonof A's value? The most convenient point of departure seems to be the simple situation which Wieser has assumed in hisNatural Value.[164]Here the "artificial" complications due to private property and to the difference between rich and poor are gone, and only "marginal utility" is left as a regulator of values. But what about value in a situation where there are differences in "purchasing power"? How assimilate the one situation to the other?

A temporalregressus, back to the first piece of wealth, which, we might assume, depended for its value solely upon the facts of utility and scarcity, and the existence of which furnished the first "purchasing power" that upset the order of "natural value," might be interesting, but certainly would not be convincing. In the first place, there is no unbroken sequence of uninterrupted economic causation from that far away hypotheticalday to the present, in the course of which that original quantity of value has exerted its influence. The present situation does not differ from Wieser's situation simply in the fact that some, more provident than others, have saved where others have consumed, have been industrious where others have been idle, and so have accumulated a surplus of value, which, used to back their desires, makes the wants of the industrious and provident count for more than the wants of others. And even if these were the only differences, it is to be noted that private property has somehow crept in in the interval, for Wieser's was a communistic society. And further, an emotion felt ten thousand years ago could scarcely have any very direct or certain quantitative connection with value in the market to-day. Even if there had been no "disturbing factors" of a non-economic sort, the process of "economic causation" could not have carried a value so far. It is the living emotion that counts! Values depend every moment upon the force of live minds, and need to be constantly renewed. And there would have been, of course, many "non-economic" disturbances, wars and robberies, frauds and benevolences, political and religious changes—a host of historical occurrences affecting the weight of different elements in society in a way that, by historical methods, it is impossible to treat quantitatively.[165]

What is called for is, not atemporal regressus, which, starting with an hypothesis, picks up abstractions by the way, and tries to synthesize them into a concrete reality of to-day, but rather alogical analysisof existing psychic forces, which shall abstract from the concrete social situation the phases that are most significant. This method will not give us the whole story either. Value will not be completely explained by the phases we pick out. But then, we shall be aware of the fact and we shall know that the other phases are there, ready to be picked out as they are needed, for further refinement of the theory, as new problems call for further refinement. And, indeed, we shall include them in our theory, under a lump name, namely, the rest of the "presuppositions" of value.

Our reason for choosing a logical analysis of existing psychic forces instead of a temporalregressus—instead, even, of an accurate historical study of the past—is a twofold one: first, we wish to coördinate the new factors we are to emphasize with factors already recognized, and to emerge with a value concept which shall serve the economists in the accustomed way—it is illogical to mix a logical analysis with a temporalregressus. But, more fundamental than this logical point, is this: the forces which have historicallybegota social situation are not, necessarily, the forces whichsustainit. The rule doubtless is that new institutions have to win their way against an opposition which grows simply out of the fact that we are, through mental inertia, wedded to what is old and familiar. We resist the newasthe new. Even those who are most disposed to innovate are still conservative, with reference to propaganda that they themselves are not concerned with. The great mass of activities of all men, even the most progressive, are rooted in habit, and resist change. When, however, a new value has won its way, has become familiar and established, the very forces which once opposed it become its surest support. Or, waiving this unreflecting inertia of society, as things become actualized they are seen in new relations. What, prior to experiment, we thought might harm us, we find beneficial after it has been tried, and so support it—or the reverse may be true. The psychic forces maintaining and controlling a social situation, therefore,are not necessarily the ones which historically brought it into being.[166]

We turn, therefore, to a logical analysis of existing social psychic forces for our explanation of social economic value, and for the explanation of the motivation of the economic activity of society. It will still pay us, however, to halt for a moment in Wieser's hypothetical "natural" community, for we shall find there that many of the concrete complexities which he sought to eliminate have really persisted in slight disguise. Really there is no such simplicity as Wieser supposes. The "natural" society has, indeed, no private property, or differences between rich and poor, but it has, none the less,legalandethicalstandards ofdistribution, which are just as efficient in the determination of economic values as are the results of our present system of distribution. The term, "natural," has misled Wieser, when it leads him to say that marginal utility alone will rule. For "natural" here means, not "simple," but "ethically ideal." The word has—as Wieser and others who have used it often fail to see—a positive connotation of its own: a definite set of legal and ethical values are bound up in it in this case. That such a society should exist, and that in it "marginal utility" should be the onlyvariableaffecting value (apart from the limitations of physical nature), implies the legal rule of equality in distribution, and such a set of moral values actually ruling the behaviorof the people as to make this legal rule effective,—or else the most extraordinary activity on the part of the government to maintain the rule. Wieser himself fails to see this, for he concedes that the "moral" principle of distribution in such a society would recognize the superior merits of the leaders who furnish ideas and direction, as entitling them to a higher reward than the merely mechanical laborers.[167]But this, it is evident, would give them an excess of that same vexatious "purchasing power"[168]—whether embodied in gold or commodities or labor-checks matters little—and so would destroy the efficiency of the principle of "marginal utility" as the ruler of values.

As phases in the "presuppositions" of economic value, then, coördinate with "marginal utility," our theory puts the legal and ethical values concerned with distribution, which rule in a community at a given time. Reinforcing and validating the values ofgoodsare the social values ofmen. President F. A. Walker[169]defines value as "the power an article confers upon its possessorirrespective of legal authority or personal sentiments, of commanding, in exchange for itself, the labor, or the products of the labor, of others." [Italics are mine.] In our view, this definition is precisely wrong. A change in laws or in morals respecting the social ranking of men, respecting property rights, will at once affect economic values. Earlier economists often wrote as ifdistribution were primarily a physically determined matter, and so we got from them an "Iron Law of Wages," etc. But it is pertinent to quote from one who, though in many ways allied to the older school, and in value theory avowedly their follower, still stands as a bridge between the theories I am criticizing and my own. John Stuart Mill[170]says:—

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