FOOTNOTES:

The evidence of the greater part of the General Officers accompanying the expedition to Plattsburg, who viewed the naval action; of the commanding officer, and others of the Artillery; of naval men on board of our fleet, and of various other persons on shore, could and would have been produced upon the trial of the question, had it taken place, in proof of the fact as here stated. But independently of all opinion upon the subject, is it probable or credible that the American naval Commander would have placed his squadron in such a situation, that bypossibility they could be annoyed or injured from works which he saw it was the evident intention of Sir George Prevost to attack, and which he must have felt convinced would in such a case have fallen? That he was aware of the danger to which his squadron was exposed by its vicinity to the forts, appears from the circumstance before adverted to, of his having moved further into the Bay from the station which he occupied on the 6th, the day of the arrival of our troops before Plattsburg. The position which the American Commander thus took, was one in which, according to his judgment, he could not have been annoyed by the fall of the works on shore, an event for which he was prepared. This opinion was expressed in the presence of a British officer who had been made prisoner during the naval action. The same opinion was entertained by Captain Henley, of the American brig, Eagle, who had himself reconnoitred the position in which the fleet was anchored, and which upon his report was selected by the American Commander, because it was evidently out of the range of the guns from the shore. If any thing more were wanting in confirmation of this fact, it will be amply supplied by the opinions of the two officers most capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject. The following letters of Commodore Macdonough and General Macomb, the AmericanNaval and Military Commanders, will, it is apprehended, set the question at rest in the mind of every unprejudiced person.

"Portsmouth, New Hampshire,July 3, 1815."Dear Sir,Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday; the letter you addressed to me at Washington has not been received, or it assuredly should have been attended to.In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between it and the British squadron on the 11th September, 1814.I am, with much respect,Your obedient servant,(Signed)J. Macdonough.""Cadwr. Colden, Esq."

"Portsmouth, New Hampshire,July 3, 1815.

"Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday; the letter you addressed to me at Washington has not been received, or it assuredly should have been attended to.

In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between it and the British squadron on the 11th September, 1814.

I am, with much respect,Your obedient servant,(Signed)J. Macdonough.""Cadwr. Colden, Esq."

"City of New York, June 15, 1815."Sir,I should have replied earlier to your letter of the 26th ultimo, had it not been mislaid amidst a mass of communications on the subject of the army.With respect to the distance of the American squadron from the batteries at Plattsburg, I willstate that it is my decided opinion that the squadron was moored beyond the effectual range of the batteries, and this I know from a fruitless attempt made to elevate our guns so as to bear on the British squadron during the action of the 11th of September last. No guns, however, were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach. This opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the Confiance—her heaviest metal falling several hundred yards short of the shore when closely engaged with our vessels.With a hope that this reply will be satisfactory, I subscribe myself,Sir,Your most obedient servant,(Signed)Alex. Macomb.""Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."

"City of New York, June 15, 1815.

"Sir,

I should have replied earlier to your letter of the 26th ultimo, had it not been mislaid amidst a mass of communications on the subject of the army.

With respect to the distance of the American squadron from the batteries at Plattsburg, I willstate that it is my decided opinion that the squadron was moored beyond the effectual range of the batteries, and this I know from a fruitless attempt made to elevate our guns so as to bear on the British squadron during the action of the 11th of September last. No guns, however, were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach. This opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the Confiance—her heaviest metal falling several hundred yards short of the shore when closely engaged with our vessels.

With a hope that this reply will be satisfactory, I subscribe myself,

Sir,Your most obedient servant,(Signed)Alex. Macomb.""Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."

"New York, August 1, 1815."Sir,In reply to your letter of the 30th ult. asking the distance of the American squadron from the batteries of Plattsburg, on the 11th day of September, 1814, while engaged with the British squadron, I will state that it is my decided opinion that the American squadron was upwards of three thousand yards distantfrom the batteries, being confirmed in that belief from observations made on the actual range of the heaviest guns of the British ship, Confiance, when fired towards the batteries, the balls falling short upwards of five hundred yards.With respectful consideration,I am, Sir,Your obedient servant,(Signed)Alex. Macomb.""To Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."

"New York, August 1, 1815.

"Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 30th ult. asking the distance of the American squadron from the batteries of Plattsburg, on the 11th day of September, 1814, while engaged with the British squadron, I will state that it is my decided opinion that the American squadron was upwards of three thousand yards distantfrom the batteries, being confirmed in that belief from observations made on the actual range of the heaviest guns of the British ship, Confiance, when fired towards the batteries, the balls falling short upwards of five hundred yards.

With respectful consideration,

I am, Sir,Your obedient servant,(Signed)Alex. Macomb.""To Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."

If therefore our squadron could not have been recovered, or that of the enemy annoyed or injured by the capture of their works on shore, it may be asked, what advantages could have resulted from persevering in the attack? It has been already shewn that the primary object of this expedition was the destruction of the enemy's flotilla on the Lake. Had that object been accomplished, Plattsburg might have been occupied by our troops, and from thence, with the assistance of our squadron, they might have been transported to other parts of the Lake for the further annoyance of the enemy. The loss of our squadron, however, immediately rendered all these important operations impracticable. Without the assistance of a fleet, nothing beyond the occupation of Plattsburg could have been accomplished. That Plattsburg would have fallen, neither the Commander of the forces, nora man under him, could have entertained a doubt. The enemy were indeed strongly entrenched, and under works, which afforded complete shelter to several thousand expert marksmen, from whose fire our troops must have suffered most severely; but granting, that after a considerable loss, we had carried the enemy's works, what adequate advantages should we have gained? To retain Plattsburg was not possible without the assistance of a fleet, which would have been necessary to the provisioning of our army; a retreat, therefore, after destroying all we could not carry away, would have been indispensable. Such was, however, the state of the season and of the weather, that 24 hours delay in retiring with our troops to Canada, would not only have made such a measure dangerous, from the advance of the enemy in every direction, but would have rendered the conveyance of our ordnance and stores exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The militia of the state of New York and Vermont were turning out, and rapidly increasing in numbers; and although in the open field our troops would justly have despised them, they would have proved most formidable in the woods, and hanging upon the flank and rear of a retreating army. Sir George Prevost knew that he had only to give the word, and that his gallant troops would accomplishall his wishes,[90]but he knew at the same time how useless the acquisition would be, and how costly the sacrifice at which it was probable it would be made. He was also bound to bear in mind the instructions of His Majesty's Government, with regard to the committal of the force under him, so necessary for the preservation of the Provinces entrusted to his care.

He therefore wisely determined to retreat, whilst retreat was practicable, and whilst it could be effected with the least possible loss. The order was accordingly given for that purpose, and such was the energy and promptitude of the execution, that the retreat was conducted without the smallest molestation from the enemy, who, in fact, were not aware of it until it was nearly completed. Notwithstanding the almost impassable state of the roads, from the rains which were falling, not a gun was left behind; and, although the subject has been much exaggerated, yet in fact only a very small quantityof provisions and stores, together withfifteenwounded men in hospital, was left to the enemy. Of deserters, the utmost amount was under 300 men, which was the consequence, not as has been falsely asserted, of theretreat,[91]but of theadvance, many of them having deserted upon our entry, and as we afterwards penetrated into the American territory; a consequence which almost invariably attended every attack upon their frontier, and was most strongly manifested in Colonel Scott's expedition, in December, 1813, against part of General Wilkinson's army, when, out of a force of not more than 500 men, he lost upwards of 90 by desertion.

The exaggerated account of this retreat having induced his Majesty's government to call upon Sir George Prevost for a more particular detail of the losses attending it, it appears, by Sir George Prevost's reply to Lord Bathurst's despatch on the subject, together with the documents accompanying it, that the whole loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters, from the time of the army entering the American territory, until it was withdrawn, did not amount to 500 men. This affords a complete answer to one of the Reviewer's concluding mis-statements, that when Sir George Prevost wrote the despatch from Montreal, though dated at Plattsburg,[92]"he knew that the desertion of 800 men had attended his shameful defeat."

The unfortunate loss of our fleet, and the consequent withdrawing of our troops from the American territory, afforded an opportunity to the party opposed to Sir George Prevost's civil administration in Canada, of which they immediately and eagerly availed themselves, of circulating the most unfounded statements, and the most exaggerated accounts, with respect to both those transactions. These were industriously transmitted to England by a private ship belonging to one of Sir George Prevost's most violent opponents, and upon their arrival, and in the absence of any official accounts of the transactions to which they referred, they created a general belief that the disastrous result of the naval action had been occasioned by a want of co-operation from the shore; that the retreat had been conducted in a precipitate and disgraceful manner; that a severe loss of men, guns, stores, and provisions, had been the consequence of it; and that the whole army was indignant at the conduct of their commander. The arrival of Sir George Prevost's despatches, together with the explanations afforded, as well by them as by the person to whom they had been given in charge, could not fail to undeceive His Majesty'sGovernment on this subject, and to convince them of the grossness of the misrepresentations which had gone forth. Had not some expressions in Sir James Yeo's letter, accompanying the account of the naval action, been construed into charges against Sir George Prevost, which, in justice to him, as well as to the public, it was deemed proper to call upon him to answer, there cannot be a doubt but that the further management of the war in the Canadas would still have been entrusted to the Commander who had hitherto so successfully conducted it. Even if the subsequent conduct of Sir James Yeo did not afford ample proof of the fact, there is not wanting other evidence to shew that the letter in question was written by him under the irritation of the moment, and in consequence of Captain Pring's communication to him of the result of the naval action, but without any intention of making a charge against Sir George Prevost, and without the most distant idea that it could be so construed. Sir James Yeo must have possessed too honourable a mind to become a guest in Sir George Prevost's family, and to partake of his attention and hospitality, had he for a moment supposed that his public letter, on the subject of the naval action at Plattsburg, could have been construed into a formal accusation. Had he really meant it as such, he would most undoubtedly, in a manly and openmanner, have communicated the proceeding he had adopted to the party accused; and, under such circumstances, would, no less certainly, have refused the kindness and attention of the person of whom he had publicly expressed so unfavourable an opinion. That this must have been the case may further be inferred, from the circumstance that, although Sir George Prevost was recalled to answer the charges, amounting to three in number, supposed to be contained in Sir James Yeo's letter, it was not until more than four months after both these officers arrived in England, that the precise charges upon which he was to take his trial, were officially communicated to him, and which charges differed materially from those in Sir James Yeo's letter. Whether, under these circumstances, Sir James Yeo would have supported the charges, had the investigation taken place, cannot now be determined; but a confident appeal may be made to the intelligent reader, whether, upon the facts disclosed in these pages being made known, such an attempt must not have utterly failed.

With regard to the naval action on Lake Champlain, we are unwilling to say more than may be necessary for the vindication of the character and conduct of Sir George Prevost. The real causes of the disastrous result of that affair, were such, as particularly belong to naval actions, and which, when they do occur, mustmaterially influence the issue of the conflict. It is not a little remarkable, that the naval Court-martial on Captain Pring and his officers, should have overlooked or disregarded these causes; and it is greatly to be regretted, that they should have thought themselves justified in ascribing the disaster to the conduct of Sir George Prevost, and in passing so severe a censure upon an officer of another service, of whose orders and instructions they must necessarily have been ignorant, and who was neither present to defend himself, nor amenable to their jurisdiction. It is clear that it was Captain Downie's intention, on going into action, to lay his own ship, in the size and strength of which he seemed to place great confidence, along side of the American Commodore; but the unfortunate failure of the wind, before he could accomplish this object, obliged him to anchor at a distance of more than half a mile from his opponent; the same circumstance also induced Captain Pring, in the Linnet, to take his situation still farther from the enemy. But even this disadvantage would probably not have been attended with the consequences which afterwards ensued, had Captain Downie's invaluable life been spared, and had all under him done their duty. The Finch, in going into action, grounded out of the line of fire, and was shortly afterwards taken possession of by the enemy. The gun-boats, when the action commenced, were considerablydistant from the enemy's line, and slowly pulling up in apparent confusion. The Chub, very shortly after the action, having her cables shot away, drifted into the enemy's line, and was obliged to surrender. The Confiance, it would thus appear, being left nearly alone to bear the brunt of the whole action; the greater part of the enemy's fire being directed against her; the two schooners gone, and the gun-boats, with the exception of two or three, taking no part in the contest, it is not to be wondered at, that against such fearful odds, the men could not be kept to their guns, and that, notwithstanding the exertions and bravery of the officers, she was compelled to surrender. The real causes of the disaster must, therefore, be sought for in the unfavourable circumstances under which the action commenced; in the squadron's not taking the station which Captain Downie had designed they should; in the early loss of that officer; the grounding of the Finch; the surrender of the Chub, and the desertion of the gun-boats—circumstances more than sufficient to account for the capture of our squadron, without having recourse to a reason which the gallant Downie would have scorned to assign, and which we have already shewn to be without the slightest foundation—namely, the want of a co-operation from the army. Had even the gun-boats done their duty, the result of the actionmight, and probably would, have been widely different, as the men on board of the Confiance assigned it as one reason for their refusing to stand to their guns, that the gun-boats keeping at a distance, the whole fire of the enemy was directed against the Confiance. The Commander of these gun-boats, it is to be observed, was so sensible of his own misconduct, that he shortly after the action, made his escape from Kingston, and was not afterwards heard of. The removal of Captain Fisher from the command of the Lake Champlain squadron, precisely at the period when it was about to be employed in the service before mentioned, was particularly unfortunate; and it was no less so that his zealous offer to Captain Downie, to serve under him in command of the gun-boats, could not be accepted by that officer.

In the month of March, 1815, Sir George Prevost received the despatch communicating to him the Prince Regent's pleasure, that he should return to England to answer the charges preferred against him by Sir James Yeo, and a commission was, at the same time, transmitted to Lieutenant-General Drummond, revoking the appointment of Sir George Prevost as Governor-in-Chief and Commander of the forces in the Canadas, and authorizing General Drummond to assume, provisionally, the chief civil and militarycommand of those Provinces. By this measure, Sir George Prevost was compelled either to remain for six weeks, until the navigation of the St. Lawrence should be open—a private individual in the country over which he had so lately presided as its chief magistrate, and exposed to the observations of all who had been hostile to his measures,—or to encounter at a most inclement season the fatigue and dangers of a journey, to be performed, frequently on foot, through the wilderness to New Brunswick. His high and honourable feelings did not permit him to hesitate for a moment as to the course which it was his duty to pursue, and he immediately quitted his government. It was no inconsiderable consolation to him, under circumstances like these, to know that he carried with him on his departure the regret and the good wishes of the inhabitants of Canada, which were manifested, not only by the different addresses and letters[93]which were presented to him upon this occasion, but in a still more striking manner, by the terms of a vote of the House of Representatives, who proposed to present to their late Governor-General a service of plate of the value of 5,000l.This munificent act, though honoured with the approbation of the Prince Regent, wasnot carried into effect, in consequence of a refusal to accede to it on the part of the legislative council.[94]

On the arrival of Sir George Prevost in England, in the month of May, 1815, it was evident that his constitution had suffered a fatal injury. His health had yielded to the excessive fatigues of his journey to New Brunswick, and his illness was aggravated by the delays which he experienced in urging forward the investigation which he so earnestly desired. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the Court-martial was not directed to assemble before the month of January, 1816—a delay which proved fatal to his hopes. He died on the 5th January, 1816, in the 49th year of his age.[95]

That Sir George Prevost was a zealous, active,and faithful servant to his king and country, the preceding pages are amply sufficient to prove. The defence of Dominica, and the preservation of the Canadas against greatly superior forces, attested his merits as officer, and excited the admiration of some of the first soldiers of the age. His system, upon both occasions, was necessarily a defensive one; and he has, therefore, lost much of that eclat which attaches to more active operations. But had his field of action been different, he would, doubtless, have displayed the same gallant and enterprising spirit which distinguished him on former occasions, and particularly when he led the assault on Morne Fortunée, in the island of St. Lucie. Of his total disregard of personal considerations, and of his readiness to sacrifice his own fame for the promotion of the great interests committed to him in America, there cannot be a stronger proof than that afforded by his conduct at Plattsburg. He must have been well aware that the capture of the works, especially after the loss of the fleet, would be considered by the public in general as a brilliant exploit, which could not fail to add to his military reputation; and he must also have foreseen the popular outcry which the resolution he adopted would occasion. But those personal feelings gave way to considerations of far greater weight in the mind of a wise, humane, and honourablesoldier. Sir George Prevost had justly calculated the consequences of his probable success—a great loss of valuable lives, the immediate abandonment of his conquest, and an unavoidable and difficult retreat. Although these considerations were far from obvious, and not of a nature to be justly appreciated by the public at large, he chose, without hesitation, that line of conduct which his judgment and heart approved, and, notwithstanding his conviction that this determination would necessarily expose him to much unmerited odium, he resolutely adopted it. His subsequent recal, and premature decease, were undoubtedly the consequences of this measure; but his country will not fail, finally, to do justice to the purity of his motives, and, on an impartial review of his conduct, to rank him amongst its ablest and most faithful defenders.[96]

As a civil governor, Sir George Prevost had the gratification of knowing that he was invariably esteemed and respected by the people over whom he was placed. His zeal and devotion to his duties, both in his civil and military character, were eminently conspicuous. No personal considerations, no fatigue, no dangers, everinterfered with what he esteemed the good of the service. Over the public interests he watched with the most sedulous attention. In private life, he was remarkable for the purity of his moral character, for the generosity of his heart, and for his pleasing and conciliatory manners.

In consequence of the lamented death of Sir George Prevost, at the very period when he was on the point of substantiating, before a competent tribunal, his innocence of the charges preferred against him, the care of his honour and reputation devolved upon his widow; nor did she neglect this sacred trust. Soon after Sir George Prevost's decease, his brother, Colonel William Augustus Prevost, addressed a letter to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, in which, after stating the distressing situation in which Sir George Prevost's family were placed, he requested that an investigation of his brother's conduct might be ordered before a court of inquiry. A reference to the Judge-Advocate was made upon the subject, who was of opinion that such an inquiry could not properly be instituted. Immediately after this determination, Lady Prevost represented, by letter, to the Commander-in-Chief, the painful circumstances in which she was placed. She intreated his Royal Highness to extend his protection to herself and her family, and to procure from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent a gracious considerationof their claims, to such marks of distinction as might be due to the memory of the deceased. The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief, who assured Lady Prevost, that he would gladly do any thing calculated to alleviate her distress, but that he declined interfering with the Prince Regent on the subject, to whom he was of opinion it could only be regularly submitted by His Majesty's ministers.

A memorial was accordingly drawn up by Lady Prevost, which was submitted to the Prince Regent through the regular channel. His Royal Highness, having taken the same into consideration, was graciously pleased publicly to express the high sense entertained by him of the services of Sir George Prevost; conferring, at the same time, as a mark of his approbation, additional armorial bearings to the arms of his family.

The following grant of heraldic distinctions appeared in the London Gazette of 11th September, 1816.

"Whitehall, September 3rd.—His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, taking into his royal consideration the distinguished conduct and services of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Baronet, during a long period of constant active employment in situations of great trust, both military and civil, in the course ofwhich his gallantry, zeal, and able conduct were particularly displayed at the conquest of the island of St. Lucie, in 1803, and of Martinique, in 1809; as also, in successfully opposing, with a small garrison, the attack made in 1805 by a numerous French force upon the island of Dominica, then under his government; and while Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the British provinces in North America, in the defence of Canada against the repeated invasions perseveringly attempted by the American forces during the late war; and His Royal Highness being desirous of evincing, in an especial manner, the sense which his Royal Highness entertains of these services, by conferring upon his family a lasting memorial of His Majesty's royal favour, hath been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to ordain that the supporters following may be borne and used by Dame Catherine Anne Prevost, widow of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, during her widowhood; viz. "On either side a grenadier of the 16th (or Bedfordshire) regiment of foot, each supporting a banner; that on the dexter side inscribed "West Indies," and that on the sinister, "Canada;" and the said supporters, together with the mottoservatum cineri, may also be borne by Sir George Prevost, Baronet, son and heir of the said late Lieutenant-General, and by his successors in the said dignityof a baronet, provided the same be first duly exemplified according to the laws of arms, and recorded in the Herald's office. And His Royal Highness hath also been pleased to command, that the said concession and especial mark of Royal favour be registered in His Majesty's College of Arms."

Whilst the impartiality of His Majesty's Government towards the servants of the public is strongly evidenced by the recal of Sir George Prevost from his command in the Canadas, under the circumstances before stated, their sense of justice is no less strongly manifested by the above grant of posthumous honours to his family, whose feelings of satisfaction were greatly heightened by the gratifying manner in which His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief was pleased to express himself upon this occasion, in the following letter.

"Horse Guards, 17th September, 1816."Madam,"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Ladyship's letter of the 12th inst., and to assure you that I am highly gratified to find that His Majesty's Government has adopted a measure grateful to your feelings and honorable to the memory of your late distinguished husband.I am, Madam,Your most obedient servant,(Signed)Frederick."Lady Prevost.

"Horse Guards, 17th September, 1816.

"Madam,

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Ladyship's letter of the 12th inst., and to assure you that I am highly gratified to find that His Majesty's Government has adopted a measure grateful to your feelings and honorable to the memory of your late distinguished husband.

I am, Madam,Your most obedient servant,(Signed)Frederick."Lady Prevost.

Lady Prevost having thus satisfactorily accomplished the great wish of her heart, the vindication of her husband's injured fame, was almost immediately afterwards attacked by an alarming disorder, evidently occasioned by her severe afflictions, under which, after suffering for several years, she finally sunk in 1821.[97]The family of Sir George Prevost, deprived by an untimely death of one parent, and called upon to witness the calamitous state of the other, were neither able nor willing, under such circumstances, to enter into any further discussion upon the merits of their father's conduct, in reply to the anonymous attacks made upon it. They knew that in the opinion of every unprejudiced person, his military character had been fully redeemed from the obloquy cast upon it, by the high and honorable approbation bestowed upon it by his Sovereign, and they had hoped that this strong attestation to Sir George Prevost's worth would have sheltered his name from further attack or reproach. The article in the Quarterly Review having disappointed them in this reasonable expectation, it has become imperative upon them to prepare the present statement. Whatever were the objects and motives of the Reviewer, it is certainly not too muchto say, that he has deliberately advanced charges which he knew to be unfounded. The just feelings of indignation which every page of the article in question is calculated to excite, were restrained by the persuasion alone, that it was only requisite that the real facts of the case should be made known, to rescue the memory of an honorable and gallant officer from the aspersions thus wantonly cast upon it. In the Reviewer's assertions, with regard to the preparations for the war; the care of our Provincial Marine; the orders given to the subordinate Commanders; the attack upon Sackett's Harbour; the reinforcing of General Procter's division; the neglect of Captain Barclay's demands; the successes of General Vincent, Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey, and others; the disposal of the troops which arrived from Bourdeaux, and the expedition against Plattsburg; inallof these instances, the Reviewer has been convicted, by the most unimpeachable evidence, of shameful inaccuracy, and in many of them of gross ignorance and of wilful misrepresentation. In ascribing to the Commander of the forces in the Canadas "vacillation, indecision, and error" at the commencement of the war, it has been shewn that the Reviewer was totally ignorant of, or misconceived the grounds and motives of his policy and conduct, which in the very instancesselected by the critic for censure, received the pointed approbation of His Majesty's Government. To "the want of talent, energy, and enterprise," of which the Reviewer has not scrupled to accuse Sir George Prevost in the prosecution of the war, have been opposed the various measures in which his vigilance and foresight were conspicuous, in planning and directing those successful operations, the merit of which the Reviewer would give to the subordinate Commanders alone. To the charge of neglecting to preserve our marine ascendancy on Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, which the Reviewer has styled "the most fatal and palpable error" of Sir George Prevost, and the one in which his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant, a reply has been given not only by facts, in direct contradiction to his assertions, but by the letters of the Naval Commanders on both Lakes; the one from Sir James Yeo, who commanded in chief, in strong approbation of the general attention of the Commander of the forces to the Marine service, and the other from Captain Barclay, directly asserting the falsehood of the Reviewer's statement. The true causes of the failures at Sackett's Harbour and at Plattsburg, which have been so unjustly attributed to Sir George Prevost's misconduct, have been distinctly pointed out, and the wisdom and energyof his proceedings, upon both those expeditions, clearly established. To the Reviewer's laboured attempts throughout the whole article, to prove that Sir George Prevost was not the real defender of the Canadas, an answer has been given, by shewing, that for three campaigns those provinces were preserved, whilst he held the chief command in them, from the persevering attempts of a powerful and superior enemy, and that to his unwearied efforts, the inhabitants repeatedly expressed their firm conviction that they were mainly indebted for their safety.

The expression of concern and indignation with which the appearance of this Review was instantly met amongst all who were in any degree qualified to form a judgment upon the subject, was highly consolatory to the wounded feelings of Sir George Prevost's family. They have in particular, the greatest satisfaction in presenting to the public the two following letters, addressed to the present Sir George Prevost, by Sir Herbert Taylor, and by Earl Bathurst.

"Horse Guards, Nov. 15th, 1822."Sir,"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, containing a statement,[98]"which thefamily of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost have felt themselves called upon to make public, in reply to a wanton and malignant attack which has been recently made in an article of the Quarterly Review upon his military character and reputation.""His Royal Highness orders me to assure you, that it has not been without great concern and indignation that he has noticed the ungenerous and cowardly attack to which you advert: ungenerous, because, even if it had been borne out by facts, it was calculated to wound most deeply the feelings of respectable and amiable individuals who had not provoked it; cowardly, as being directed by an anonymous libeller against the memory of an officer whose premature death had alone deprived him of the benefit of an investigation into accusations which he was prepared to meet, with the confident expectation that he could successfully refute them. His Royal Highness' sentiments upon the character, conduct, and services of the late Sir George Prevost, have, upon a former occasion, been conveyed to his family. Those of His Majesty's Government, in approval of his distinguished services, his gallantry, zeal, and ableconduct, are recorded in a public act of His Majesty's, dated 4th September, 1816, which you have inserted in your statement. To that record His Royal Highness conceives that you may with confidence appeal for a refutation of the calumnies recently published; and having adverted to that document, so honorable to the memory of the late Sir George Prevost, His Royal Highness considers that he needs only to add, that nothing has since the date of it come to his knowledge, which can shake the opinion he then entertained in perfect unison with the sentiments therein expressed.I have the honor to be,Sir,Your obedient humble servant,(Signed)Ht. Taylor.""Sir George Prevost, Bart.Oriel College, Oxford."

"Horse Guards, Nov. 15th, 1822.

"Sir,

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, containing a statement,[98]"which thefamily of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost have felt themselves called upon to make public, in reply to a wanton and malignant attack which has been recently made in an article of the Quarterly Review upon his military character and reputation."

"His Royal Highness orders me to assure you, that it has not been without great concern and indignation that he has noticed the ungenerous and cowardly attack to which you advert: ungenerous, because, even if it had been borne out by facts, it was calculated to wound most deeply the feelings of respectable and amiable individuals who had not provoked it; cowardly, as being directed by an anonymous libeller against the memory of an officer whose premature death had alone deprived him of the benefit of an investigation into accusations which he was prepared to meet, with the confident expectation that he could successfully refute them. His Royal Highness' sentiments upon the character, conduct, and services of the late Sir George Prevost, have, upon a former occasion, been conveyed to his family. Those of His Majesty's Government, in approval of his distinguished services, his gallantry, zeal, and ableconduct, are recorded in a public act of His Majesty's, dated 4th September, 1816, which you have inserted in your statement. To that record His Royal Highness conceives that you may with confidence appeal for a refutation of the calumnies recently published; and having adverted to that document, so honorable to the memory of the late Sir George Prevost, His Royal Highness considers that he needs only to add, that nothing has since the date of it come to his knowledge, which can shake the opinion he then entertained in perfect unison with the sentiments therein expressed.

I have the honor to be,Sir,Your obedient humble servant,(Signed)Ht. Taylor.""Sir George Prevost, Bart.Oriel College, Oxford."

"Cirencester, Nov. 13, 1822."Sir,"I have had the honour of receiving your letter, inclosing a statement which you inform me that the family of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost consider themselves compelled to make public, in reply to some attack which has recently been made upon his memory."In returning the statement, I can only say that I read with the utmost regret the cruel attack which has been so unwarrantably made in the Quarterly Review upon your Father's memory, and can well understand the anxiety which his family must feel to refute it as soon as possible.I have the honor to be,Sir,Your obedient humble servant,(Signed)Bathurst."Sir George Prevost, Bart.Oriel College, Oxford."

"Cirencester, Nov. 13, 1822.

"Sir,

"I have had the honour of receiving your letter, inclosing a statement which you inform me that the family of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost consider themselves compelled to make public, in reply to some attack which has recently been made upon his memory.

"In returning the statement, I can only say that I read with the utmost regret the cruel attack which has been so unwarrantably made in the Quarterly Review upon your Father's memory, and can well understand the anxiety which his family must feel to refute it as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be,Sir,Your obedient humble servant,(Signed)Bathurst."Sir George Prevost, Bart.Oriel College, Oxford."

The family of the late Sir George Prevost, justly proud of the sentiments thus expressed by such high authorities upon his character and conduct, consider any further attempt to vindicate his fame as altogether unnecessary. In sanctioning the present publication, they have been actuated solely by the pure motive of rescuing the reputation of their father from unmerited reproach. Called upon by every feeling of filial affection to expose the injustice of the cruel aspersions which have been cast upon his memory, they trust that their endeavours will not be fruitless, and that the impartial readers of these pages will be convinced that the merits of Sir George Prevost were not confined to theprivate virtues which endeared him to his family and friends, but that in public life, as a Civil Governor and a Military Commander, he deserved the esteem and approbation of his country.

FOOTNOTES:[1]Vide the Quarterly Review for October, 1822, p. 405.[2]Vide Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. iv, p. 518, Appendix, No. I.[3]Mr. Gibbon to Mr. Holroyd.—"Let me tell you a piece of Lausanne news. Nanette Grand is married to Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost. Grand wrote to me; and by the next post I congratulated both father and daughter. There is exactness for you.—Beriton, Oct. 31st, 1765." Vide Gibbon's Miscellaneous Works, vol. i. p. 439.[4]See Appendix, No. II.[5]Vide Letter from the Duke of Portland, Appen. No. III.[6]Vide Appendix, No. IV.[7]Vide Appendix, No. V.[8]Vide accounts of the capture of St. Lucie and Tobago, from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. VI.[9]Vide extracts from letters, Appendix, No. VII.[10]Vide Appendix, No. VIII.[11]Vide account of this expedition from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. IX. Also the public despatches and letters, No. X.[12]Vide letter from H. R. H. the Duke of York to the Earl of Camden, Appendix, No. XI.[13]Vide Appendix, No. XII.[14]Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XIII.[15]Vide the resolutions, and the letter of the chairman general Prevost, Appendix, No. XIV.[16]Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XV.[17]Vide extract from the Dominica Journal, Appendix No. XVI.[18]Vide the public despatches, and letters from Lord Castlereagh, Appendix, No. XVII.[19]Vide the addresses and answer, Appendix, No. XVIII.[20]Vide Appendix, No. XIX.[21]Vide Appendix, No. XX.[22]Vide Review, page 413.[23]Vide Quarterly Review, p. 413.[24]Review, p. 413.[25]Review, p. 413.[26]Review, p. 414.[27]Ibid. p. 413.[28]Ibid. p. 409.[29]Review, p. 410.[30]Review, p. 411.[31]Review, p. 411.[32]Review, p. 414.[33]Review, p. 411.[34]Review, p. 414.[35]Review, p. 415.[36]Review, p. 413.[37]Review, p. 418.[38]Review, p. 414.[39]Ibid. p. 415.[40]Review, p. 415.[41]Review, p. 415.[42]Ibid.[43]Review, pp. 415, 416.[44]Review, p. 412.[45]Vide the Addresses in the Appendix, No. XXI.[46]Review, p. 417.[47]Review, p. 411.[48]Review, pp. 418, 419, 420.[49]Vide the Report in the Appendix, No. XXII.[50]Review, p. 419.[51]Review, p. 418.[52]Review, p. 420.[53]There cannot be a stronger contradiction to the Reviewer's assertion, that the order to retreat was precipitate, than the fact which was known to every officer engaged in the expedition, that after the last assault, and before any order was given for the retreat or re-embarkation of the troops, a flag of truce was sent into the town, with a summons for the surrender of the place, and that some time necessarily elapsed before a refusal was received to that demand. It was not until after the return of the officer with that refusal, and when all hope of the co-operation of the fleet had been relinquished, the artillery still not having been landed, that the order was given for the re-embarkation of the troops.[54]Review, p. 419.[55]Vide Appendix, No. XXIII.[56]Review, p. 425.[57]Vide Review, p. 426.[58]Review, p. 427.[59]Review, p. 425.[60]Review, p. 427.[61]Review, p. 427.[62]Review, p. 427.[63]"I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 9th and 18th inst. The first I received at York on my way to the centre division, and I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at your having allowed the clamour of the Indian warriors to induce you to commit a part of your force in an unequal and hopeless combat."You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division."[64]Review, p. 428.[65]The order here alluded to by Capt. Barclay, is contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General, Col. Baynes, to General Procter, dated the 18th Sept. 1813, nine days after the naval action had taken place, and before the account of it had reached Sir George Prevost. This letter was written in contemplation of the necessity of General Procter retiring from Amherstburgh, in consequence of the difficulties of his situation, in which case it was thought advisable that an action should be risked.[66]Vide Appendix, No. XXIV.[67]Vide the Proceedings of the Court-martial, Appendix, No. XXV.[68]Review, p. 432.[69]Review, pp. 433, 434.[70]Ibid, pp. 438, 439.[71]Vide General Orders, Appendix, No. XXVI.[72]Review, p. 440.[73]Vide Extracts in the Appendix, No. XXVII.[74]Review, p. 441.[75]Review, pp. 440, 441.[76]Review, p. 441.[77]Review, p. 442.[78]Ibid. p. 443.[79]Review, p. 443.[80]Ibid.[81]As a confirmation of this statement, the reader is referred to an extract from a Letter addressed by Major-General Kempt to Sir George Prevost upon the subject of the intended attack on Sackett's Harbour, of which General Kempt was to have taken the personal command. Appendix, No. XXVIII.[82]The extract from a letter addressed by Sir James Yeo, to Sir George Prevost, given in the Appendix, No. XXIX. will shew his opinion of the manner in which the Lake Champlain Squadron was manned.[83]The following is the Reviewer's mode of stating this:—"Had the Commander-in-Chief suffered these works to be assaultedas was eagerly proposed to himon the same evening, there is no question but they must have fallen with scarcely an effort before a single brigade."—p. 445.[84]Vide the whole of this Correspondence in the Appendix, No. XXX.[85]This statement and those of the General and other officers, subsequently referred to, all of which are under the hand, and many of them attested by the oaths of the parties, contain the facts relative to the expedition against Plattsburg, to which those officers would have been ready to depose before a Court-Martial.[86]Review, p. 446.[87]Review, p. 446.[88]In the celebrated action between our fleet, commanded by Lord Howe, and that of the French, on the 1st of June, 1794, whilst they were in sight of each other, and preparing for action, the order was given for our men to go to breakfast. See Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 272-307.[89]Review, p. 448.[90]Notwithstanding the opinion entertained by Sir George Prevost and the army regarding the probable fall of Plattsburg, it must be recollected that failure was possible, and that nearly at this very period we had been disappointed in our attempts both upon Baltimore and New Orleans. The opinion of the Americans themselves upon this subject, will be found well expressed in an extract from a Burlington paper (State of Vermont) of that period, given in the Appendix, No. XXXI.[91]Review, p. 447.[92]Review, p. 448.[93]Vide Appendix, No. XXXII.[94]A further confirmation of the favourable sentiments entertained in Canada, on the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct and services, during the war, will be found in the extracts given in the Appendix, No. XXXIII. from Christie's Memoirs of the Administration of the Government of Lower Canada, and Bouchette's Topographical Account of that Province.[95]Sir G. Prevost's family, at the time of his decease, consisted of his widow and three children, viz. the present Sir George Prevost and two daughters. He likewise left two brothers, Major-General Wm. Prevost, late Lieutenant-Colonel of the 67th regiment, and James Prevost, Esq. Post-Captain in the Royal Navy. A monument to the memory of her husband was erected by Lady Prevost in Winchester Cathedral, with the inscription which will be found in the Appendix, No. XXXIV.[96]The motives by which Sir George Prevost was actuated, upon this occasion, are forcibly expressed in his private despatch to Lord Bathurst, given in the Appendix, No. XXXV.[97]Lady Prevost was the eldest daughter of Major-General Phipps, of the Royal Engineers.[98]A few copies of the statements above referred to, which first appeared in the Courier of 13th Nov. 1822, were printed and distributed, under the title of "A brief Reply to the Calumnies of the last Quarterly Review, against the military character and reputation of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart."

[1]Vide the Quarterly Review for October, 1822, p. 405.

[2]Vide Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. iv, p. 518, Appendix, No. I.

[3]Mr. Gibbon to Mr. Holroyd.—"Let me tell you a piece of Lausanne news. Nanette Grand is married to Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost. Grand wrote to me; and by the next post I congratulated both father and daughter. There is exactness for you.—Beriton, Oct. 31st, 1765." Vide Gibbon's Miscellaneous Works, vol. i. p. 439.

[4]See Appendix, No. II.

[5]Vide Letter from the Duke of Portland, Appen. No. III.

[6]Vide Appendix, No. IV.

[7]Vide Appendix, No. V.

[8]Vide accounts of the capture of St. Lucie and Tobago, from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. VI.

[9]Vide extracts from letters, Appendix, No. VII.

[10]Vide Appendix, No. VIII.

[11]Vide account of this expedition from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. IX. Also the public despatches and letters, No. X.

[12]Vide letter from H. R. H. the Duke of York to the Earl of Camden, Appendix, No. XI.

[13]Vide Appendix, No. XII.

[14]Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XIII.

[15]Vide the resolutions, and the letter of the chairman general Prevost, Appendix, No. XIV.

[16]Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XV.

[17]Vide extract from the Dominica Journal, Appendix No. XVI.

[18]Vide the public despatches, and letters from Lord Castlereagh, Appendix, No. XVII.

[19]Vide the addresses and answer, Appendix, No. XVIII.

[20]Vide Appendix, No. XIX.

[21]Vide Appendix, No. XX.

[22]Vide Review, page 413.

[23]Vide Quarterly Review, p. 413.

[24]Review, p. 413.

[25]Review, p. 413.

[26]Review, p. 414.

[27]Ibid. p. 413.

[28]Ibid. p. 409.

[29]Review, p. 410.

[30]Review, p. 411.

[31]Review, p. 411.

[32]Review, p. 414.

[33]Review, p. 411.

[34]Review, p. 414.

[35]Review, p. 415.

[36]Review, p. 413.

[37]Review, p. 418.

[38]Review, p. 414.

[39]Ibid. p. 415.

[40]Review, p. 415.

[41]Review, p. 415.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Review, pp. 415, 416.

[44]Review, p. 412.

[45]Vide the Addresses in the Appendix, No. XXI.

[46]Review, p. 417.

[47]Review, p. 411.

[48]Review, pp. 418, 419, 420.

[49]Vide the Report in the Appendix, No. XXII.

[50]Review, p. 419.

[51]Review, p. 418.

[52]Review, p. 420.

[53]There cannot be a stronger contradiction to the Reviewer's assertion, that the order to retreat was precipitate, than the fact which was known to every officer engaged in the expedition, that after the last assault, and before any order was given for the retreat or re-embarkation of the troops, a flag of truce was sent into the town, with a summons for the surrender of the place, and that some time necessarily elapsed before a refusal was received to that demand. It was not until after the return of the officer with that refusal, and when all hope of the co-operation of the fleet had been relinquished, the artillery still not having been landed, that the order was given for the re-embarkation of the troops.

[54]Review, p. 419.

[55]Vide Appendix, No. XXIII.

[56]Review, p. 425.

[57]Vide Review, p. 426.

[58]Review, p. 427.

[59]Review, p. 425.

[60]Review, p. 427.

[61]Review, p. 427.

[62]Review, p. 427.

[63]"I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 9th and 18th inst. The first I received at York on my way to the centre division, and I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at your having allowed the clamour of the Indian warriors to induce you to commit a part of your force in an unequal and hopeless combat."You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division."

"You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division."

[64]Review, p. 428.

[65]The order here alluded to by Capt. Barclay, is contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General, Col. Baynes, to General Procter, dated the 18th Sept. 1813, nine days after the naval action had taken place, and before the account of it had reached Sir George Prevost. This letter was written in contemplation of the necessity of General Procter retiring from Amherstburgh, in consequence of the difficulties of his situation, in which case it was thought advisable that an action should be risked.

[66]Vide Appendix, No. XXIV.

[67]Vide the Proceedings of the Court-martial, Appendix, No. XXV.

[68]Review, p. 432.

[69]Review, pp. 433, 434.

[70]Ibid, pp. 438, 439.

[71]Vide General Orders, Appendix, No. XXVI.

[72]Review, p. 440.

[73]Vide Extracts in the Appendix, No. XXVII.

[74]Review, p. 441.

[75]Review, pp. 440, 441.

[76]Review, p. 441.

[77]Review, p. 442.

[78]Ibid. p. 443.

[79]Review, p. 443.

[80]Ibid.

[81]As a confirmation of this statement, the reader is referred to an extract from a Letter addressed by Major-General Kempt to Sir George Prevost upon the subject of the intended attack on Sackett's Harbour, of which General Kempt was to have taken the personal command. Appendix, No. XXVIII.

[82]The extract from a letter addressed by Sir James Yeo, to Sir George Prevost, given in the Appendix, No. XXIX. will shew his opinion of the manner in which the Lake Champlain Squadron was manned.

[83]The following is the Reviewer's mode of stating this:—"Had the Commander-in-Chief suffered these works to be assaultedas was eagerly proposed to himon the same evening, there is no question but they must have fallen with scarcely an effort before a single brigade."—p. 445.

[84]Vide the whole of this Correspondence in the Appendix, No. XXX.

[85]This statement and those of the General and other officers, subsequently referred to, all of which are under the hand, and many of them attested by the oaths of the parties, contain the facts relative to the expedition against Plattsburg, to which those officers would have been ready to depose before a Court-Martial.

[86]Review, p. 446.

[87]Review, p. 446.

[88]In the celebrated action between our fleet, commanded by Lord Howe, and that of the French, on the 1st of June, 1794, whilst they were in sight of each other, and preparing for action, the order was given for our men to go to breakfast. See Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 272-307.

[89]Review, p. 448.

[90]Notwithstanding the opinion entertained by Sir George Prevost and the army regarding the probable fall of Plattsburg, it must be recollected that failure was possible, and that nearly at this very period we had been disappointed in our attempts both upon Baltimore and New Orleans. The opinion of the Americans themselves upon this subject, will be found well expressed in an extract from a Burlington paper (State of Vermont) of that period, given in the Appendix, No. XXXI.

[91]Review, p. 447.

[92]Review, p. 448.

[93]Vide Appendix, No. XXXII.

[94]A further confirmation of the favourable sentiments entertained in Canada, on the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct and services, during the war, will be found in the extracts given in the Appendix, No. XXXIII. from Christie's Memoirs of the Administration of the Government of Lower Canada, and Bouchette's Topographical Account of that Province.

[95]Sir G. Prevost's family, at the time of his decease, consisted of his widow and three children, viz. the present Sir George Prevost and two daughters. He likewise left two brothers, Major-General Wm. Prevost, late Lieutenant-Colonel of the 67th regiment, and James Prevost, Esq. Post-Captain in the Royal Navy. A monument to the memory of her husband was erected by Lady Prevost in Winchester Cathedral, with the inscription which will be found in the Appendix, No. XXXIV.

[96]The motives by which Sir George Prevost was actuated, upon this occasion, are forcibly expressed in his private despatch to Lord Bathurst, given in the Appendix, No. XXXV.

[97]Lady Prevost was the eldest daughter of Major-General Phipps, of the Royal Engineers.

[98]A few copies of the statements above referred to, which first appeared in the Courier of 13th Nov. 1822, were printed and distributed, under the title of "A brief Reply to the Calumnies of the last Quarterly Review, against the military character and reputation of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart."

Since the foregoing sheets were sent to press, some observations have appeared in the British Critic, for May, 1823, upon the Civil Administration of Sir George Prevost, in Canada, which may perhaps be thought to require a brief notice. The writer of the remarks in question, after premising that the military conduct of the late Commander of the forces in the Canadas has beensufficiently exposedin another Journal, (the Quarterly Review) proceeds to assert, "that his domestic management of the Colony was no less censurable. That finding that the Canadian party gave him most trouble, his object was to obtain a temporary popularity for his own administration, and a peaceable residence for himself, by every possible species and degree of weak concession, which he dignified with the name of conciliation. That the Catholic Bishop being at the head of the party, was honoured with a seat in the Legislative Council, received a pension of 1,500l. per annum, which he still enjoys, and was either overtly or tacitly confirmed in all the usurpations of power and of Government property,(about 40,000l.per annum,) upon which he had ventured, whilst discouragement andinsult(a term of which the Critic informs his readers he does not repent) were heaped upon the Protestant Bishop and his Clergy, and upon the Loyal Members of both houses, and that the just remonstrances of his Lordship in defence of the rights of his Church, and which it was his first duty to protect, were represented at home as the dictates of party spirit and political feeling."

Although the generality of most of these remarks might seem to preclude the necessity of any reply to them, yet, as the writer, in descending to particular statements, displays a gross want of information, it becomes necessary to expose his misrepresentations, in order that his censures may be rightly appreciated.

The policy of Sir George Prevost towards the Canadians, was, as the foregoing pages will shew, adopted immediately upon his assuming his government, and could not therefore be the consequence of any trouble given him by the Canadian party, from whom, on the contrary, he invariably received the most cordial support. His object in that policy was to strengthen the hands of Government, and to avail himself, as he afterwards did, of the whole resources of the country, in case it should be attacked. But that any concession whatever was made by SirGeorge Prevost to effect that object is altogether untrue.

The Catholic Bishop, though his character and influence well entitled him to that distinction, wasnothonoured with a seat in the Legislative Council during the government of Sir George Prevost, nor did he receive during that period a pension of 1,500l.per annum. In 1775, the British Government granted to the then Catholic Bishop a pension of 200l.per annum. In the year 1778, a further sum of 150l.per annum, was given to the same Bishop for the hire of the Episcopal Palace at Quebec, for public offices. These two sums were continued to the subsequent Bishops, and constituted the only income received by them from Government, until the arrival of Sir George Prevost in Canada. During his administration, His Majesty's Government was pleased toincreasethat salary to the sum of 1,000l.per annum, in favour of M. de Plessis, the present Catholic Bishop, "as a testimony," to use the words of Lord Bathurst, in his despatch upon the subject, "of the sense which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent entertained of the loyalty, and good conduct of M. de Plessis, and of the other Catholic clergy of the Province."

The charge that Sir George Prevost either tacitly or overtly confirmed the Catholic bishop in all the usurpations of power and of governmentproperty, upon which he had ventured, is so obscurely worded, that it is difficult to give it a distinct answer. The privileges and possessions of the Catholic clergy were assured to them at the period when Canada became a British province, and the present Catholic bishop is not in possession of any property, nor does he exercise any power which his predecessors have not enjoyed since that period with the knowledge and concurrence of all former governors of the Province, and of His Majesty's Government. The "accustomed dues and rights" of the Catholic clergy of Canada, are formally secured to them by the act of 14 Geo. 3. c. 83, §. 5.

To the assertion, positive in proportion to its want of proof, that the Protestant Bishop and his clergy, and the loyal members of both Houses, were treated with insult, it will be merely necessary to answer, that Sir George Prevost was incapable of treating any person, much less those of a sacred character and profession, with indignity or insult—and a confident appeal is made to the Protestant clergy of Canada, and to the loyal members of both Houses, against an insinuation as base as it is groundless.

To the critic's charge of general mismanagement in the affairs of the Colony, a reply, if any were wanting, will, it is trusted, be found, in the foregoing pages; in the approbation of His Majesty's Government of the very policy whichthis writer so acrimoniously condemns, and in the highly flattering testimonials to the merits of Sir George Prevost's civil administration, which he received not only from the Canadians, but from the most respectable of the English inhabitants.

It is evident that the writer of the article in the British Critic has blindly adopted the prejudices and feelings of the Quarterly Reviewer towards Sir George Prevost, and as he appears to dwell with particular complacency upon the exposure which he imagines to have been made of that officer's military character, he is justly entitled to share in the disgrace which must attend his coadjutor's failure, and in the odium which will always attach to the anonymous traducer of departed merit.

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