FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[6]For much valuable information I am indebted to the editor of theSouth African Volunteer Gazette.

[6]For much valuable information I am indebted to the editor of theSouth African Volunteer Gazette.

The troops with General French were in very fine fettle. They had no past history; they were not damped by the remembrance of a Majesfontein, a Stormberg, or a Colenso. They had perfect confidence in their chief; they had just enough hard work to keep their wits polished and their minds alert, and in the intervals there was sport of a kind for those who fancied it.

Fighting in and around Colesberg was incessant. The Boers were most stubborn in their determination to get rid of the British, and General French was equally stubborn in his determination to get rid of the Boers! Colesberg was a situation to be desired, and both British and Boer forces fought desperately to hold it. It is situated some thirty-seven miles north of Naauwpoort, which is the junction of a branch line to De Aar. Between Naauwpoort and Colesberg are undulating pastures, and the town itself, which boasts a population of 1900 souls, possesses three—till lately—thriving hotels. In addition to these attractions it has for the Boers another—the attraction of being the birthplace of Oom Paul. Its capture would have mightily impressed the waverers in Cape Colony, consequently General French determined to celebrate the New Year by making another lunge at the enemy.

Early on Monday morning his troops took up a position upon the kopjes surrounding the town. His force, divided into two brigades commanded by Colonel Porter (Carabineers) and Colonel Fisher (10th Hussars), simultaneously attacked the Boer position.

The second brigade started from Rensburg at five on the previous afternoon, passed the night at Maider’s farm, and in the small hours proceeded to their destination, the Boer position on Kul Kop, and seized the kopjes overlooking Colesberg on the west.

The advance was made on the Boer haunts at nine, and was greeted by a tornado from the surprised enemy, whose position extended for six miles round the entire village. Our artillery answered briskly, continuing a two hours’ argument which had the result of effectually silencing the seven or eight Boer guns. (Curiously enough, on inspection, it was discovered that some of the Boer shells had been manufactured at the Royal Laboratory, Woolwich!)

Meanwhile the cavalry and horse-artillery were endeavouringto work round to the north of the enemy’s position. The foe, ever nimble, was kept “on the trot.” He was driven from hill to hill. Brilliantly the Berkshires, under Major M’Cracken, stormed a kopje to the west of Colesberg, occupying successive positions and pouring a torrent of lead on the enemy, who fled in disorder with loud shouts! Splendidly wheeled the cavalry, under Colonel Fisher, executing at the same time a flank movement and closing in round the Dutchmen, who had but time to flee. The enemy retired towards the west, followed always by the British, but owing to the peculiar disposition of the many kopjes in the vicinity the task of pursuing them was difficult. In their retreat towards Colesberg Junction they were hotly chased by the cavalry, and Colesberg itself was left almost in our hands.

On the 2nd of January an unfortunate accident occurred. A train within the British lines was mysteriously set in motion, and was carried by the impetus given to it in the direction of the Boer lines. It travelled slowly, but sufficiently fast to get out of reach, and as the machine was full of supplies, it was necessary to fire on and destroy it rather than allow the Boers to reap the reward of rebel treachery. The brakes were found to have been taken off the trucks, and a Dutchman was arrested on suspicion of having perpetrated the deed. At first an attempt was made to mend the trucks, the working party being supported by Carabineers and the Mounted Infantry; but these were bombarded by the Boers, and finally the trucks had to be fired to prevent the rations they contained, a quantity of rum, from falling into the hands of the enemy. The New South Wales Lancers under Major Lee, who were sent to the scene to avert looting by the foe, spent five hours under fire, holding the position and returning the fire with great gallantry.

The small force under General French’s command at this time consisted of the Carabineers, 10th Hussars, Inniskilling Dragoons, O and R Batteries of Horse Artillery, the Berkshires and Suffolks, the New South Wales Lancers and New Zealanders. With this limited number he had worked wonders, driving the Dutchmen out from the kopjes immediately around Arundel, and forcing them continually to shift their position, a process which effectually deterred them from gaining ground. The Boer position now lay on long lines of kopjes to east and west of the rails, from Taaibosch Laagte to Rensburg; in the middle of the plain was the dumpling-figured kopje known as Val Kop which the British had been forced to evacuate.

The enemy now prepared a little surprise. At daybreak on the 4th they made a sudden attempt to outflank the British position beyond Coleskop, westward of the town; thus hoping to reopen communications with the northern waggon bridge.

In General French’s report of the day’s work, he said: “The enemy was found to have established himself in strength at some hills running about east and west at right angles to the left rear of our position. The cavalry on the left should not have allowed him to do this unseen, but in turning him out they rendered signal service. The 10th Hussars, with two guns which I sent to them, threatened to take them in reverse, and they were heavily fired upon by the remaining four guns of O Battery in front. This caused several hundred to abandon the position, and the plain was covered with flying horsemen. The 10th Hussars on one flank, and a squadron of the Inniskillings on the other, dashed after them. The 10th Hussars were checked by some of the Boers taking up a strong position in some rocks to cover the retreat of the others. In a most gallant style Colonel Fisher dismounted his men and led them on foot against this position, which they carried with great boldness and intrepidity.

“In this daring operation, I regret to say, Major Harvey was killed, and Major Alexander severely wounded.

“The 6th Dragoons, led by Captain E. A. Herbert, showed no less dash, pursuing the enemy, mounted, and inflicting some loss with their lances. Some 200 of the enemy had, however, still clung to the hills, and after shelling them for some considerable time, both in front and flank, I decided to clear the position with the Mounted Infantry. Advancing under cover of the fire of the artillery, Captain De Lisle moved his men with great skill to a position where he could move against the enemy’s right flank. Here he dismounted and advanced to attack, choosing the ground with admirable care. At this threat at least 100 more of the Boers took to flight in many small parties, the remainder endeavoured to check the Mounted Infantry advance. When one half the position was made good, a final exodus was made by the enemy, and twenty-one last remaining Boers surrendered. The Mounted Infantry suffered no casualties. This operation was most skilfully and boldly carried out by Captain De Lisle. It has been conclusively ascertained that on this day the enemy lost upwards of ninety killed and wounded, our casualties being six killed and fifteen wounded.”

OFFICERS—CITY OF LONDON IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS.OFFICERS—CITY OF LONDON IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS.Photo by Gregory & Co., London.

OFFICERS—CITY OF LONDON IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS.Photo by Gregory & Co., London.

On the 5th of January, Lieutenant Sir John Milbanke, who went out with a patrol of five men on the plain north of Colesberg, came in touch with the enemy. The Boers galloped up to intercept the small British party, and Sir John Milbanke was slightly wounded in the thigh. This form of skirmish was an almost daily occurrence, for round the place was a species of Boer girdle. The Dutchmen, like flies—swept off at one moment to return the next—now buzzed in the hills within a mile radius from the town, while on the north, in the direction of the Free State, and in the east towards Aliwaland Burghersdorp, they remained in undisturbed possession of the country. To the north of Colesberg was a hill which practically commanded the road to Orange River, and also other roads leading to the town. That this hill should be in British possession was eminently desirable, and Colonel Watson conceived the idea that it might be easily taken and held by us. With General French’s permission, on Friday, the 5th of January, he arranged an expedition, a midnight one, for the purpose of gaining the coveted position. He started forth at two o’clock on the morning of the 6th with four companies of the Suffolk Regiment. After marching stealthily in the darkness for about a mile, they reached the foot of the hill. This kopje had been often reconnoitred by various officers, and it was not due to any rashness on their part that a lamentable accident occurred. They marched through the dead of night to the top of the hill. In the morning twilight they were attacked by the enemy, who, aware of their design, was awaiting them. So completely had the troops fallen into a trap, that when the rifles blazed out they were at a distance of only thirty paces from the Dutchmen. The Colonel, who had halted to address the men, the Adjutant, and two other officers, were wounded before the Suffolks had found time to fire a single shot. Indeed, so quickly were they pounced on, that Colonel Watson, on giving orders to charge, fell riddled with bullets. Suddenly orders, none knew from whence, were given to “retire.” Some said it was a ruse of the Boers. The rear fled back to the pickets, some thousand yards off, believing the order came from their officers; others—about a hundred and twenty officers and men—remained, refusing to budge. They fought bravely, but were eventually compelled to surrender. All were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Of eleven officers, but one remained! The Boers were evidently well-informed of the commanding officer’s programme, and their tactics were so clever and combined that they contrived to create something of a panic when the unfortunate Suffolks, who thought themselves only preparing for attack, were definitely attacked. Critics sitting in judgment at home declared that ordinary precautions would have averted the chance of being entrapped, but others, who knew Kaffir ways and the condition of the country, where every keyhole was an ear and every leaf of a tree an eye, were inclined to marvel that so few disasters happened.

One of the officers writing of the affair said: “It is quite certain the Colonel never gave that order, or the officers would have retired too. They remained to a man, except Graham, who was wounded early, and could not hold his rifle. He dragged himself down the hill, and somehow crawled the two miles into camp. The Boers said those that were left charged three times and behaved splendidly. The position was impossible to take, even if a brigade hadattacked, although it had been carefully reconnoitred. The ditch, with the loopholed wall near the top of the hill, could only have been discovered by a balloon. The Colonel’s last words were, ‘Remember Gibraltar, my boys!’”[7]

There was deep regret at the loss of this distinguished officer, and the whole force lamented the first check which this column had sustained. The enemy was shelled at intervals, so as to make his position as uncomfortable as possible, but the Boers still remained in possession of the route leading to the Free State by Achtertang. Soon the Essex Regiment was sent on to replace the 1st Suffolk, who went south to recruit their shattered forces.

Among the wounded officers was Major Graham; Lieutenants Wilkins, Carey, and White were killed. With those taken prisoners were Captains Brett, Thomson, Brown; Second Lieutenants Allen, Wood-Martin, and Butler. Of the men, 26 were killed, 45 wounded, and 72 taken prisoners or missing.

The British occupied Slingersfontein on the 9th of January. From this time Colonel Porter and his splendidly alert troops—the 5th Dragoons, New Zealanders and New South Wales Lancers—were busily occupied in keeping the enemy “on the run,” forcing him to leave one kopje after another, and maintaining harassing tactics which entirely upset the Dutchmen’s calculations. Still the Boers were ubiquitous. They now held a strong position between Colesberg and Slingersfontein, from which with the small force at hand it was impossible to dislodge them. On the 13th, the inconvenience of the situation was rendered more intense by a perfect cyclone of dust which caused the utmost discomfort. Meals were also made impossible by the aggressive attacks of the enemy, who plumped shell after shell in the midst of the camp. Colonel Porter retired his troops to the cover of a neighbouring hill, while three squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Guards and four guns of O Battery, Horse Artillery, advanced across the plain and prepared to tackle theenemy. This was done with such celerity and decision that almost in five minutes the Boer guns were silenced and the enemy driven to cover. As a result of the prompt activities of our artillery, the Boer tents were removed eastwards.

Position at Colesberg about 20th January.Position at Colesberg about 20th January.

Position at Colesberg about 20th January.

These sand-storms, characteristic of the Veldt, were a terrible test to patience. At one moment the camp was an orderly array of mushroom tents springing decorously from the earth; in the next it was seemingly an animated mass of anthills trying to maintain life against an ochreous avalanche of dust. Occasionally when the cyclone of grit had ceased, it was followed by a hurricane of hail, accompanied by the gloom of night, the bellow of the blast and growl of the thunder-claps fighting together in the hills. Then would the frightened cattle stampede, and the whole routine of military life become deranged. A rushing mob, a battle of the elements, a vast ditch irrigated with rivulets, bombardment by the big guns of the wind—such would be the programme for a good hour or so! Then, as often as not, the sun would suddenly come out and shine affably, with the placid, self-satisfied beam of dear old ladies when they’ve trumped their partner’s best card of a long suit at whist!

After this, the routine of life would go on much as before, the Dutchmen clinging to their positions, and General French determining to make these as untenable as possible.

On the 15th the New Zealanders had an excellent opportunity of exhibiting their smartness and dash. The Boers made a stubborn attempt to seize a hill that practically commanded the country to east and west of their main position. This valuable eminence was held by a detachment of New Zealanders and D Company of the Yorkshire Regiment under Captain Orr. Early in the morning desultory firing began, and later the Boers, increasing the warmth of their fire, worked towards the right of the position held by the New Zealanders. At the same time they assailed the Yorkshires, directing their fire at a small wall held by them and forcing them to keep close cover. Gradually the Boers advanced, creeping towards the wall ever nearer and nearer. They then blazed furiously from their position on the slopes, killing the Sergeant-Major and wounding Captain Orr. At this time Captain Madocks, R.A. (attached to the New Zealand Mounted Rifles), and ten New Zealanders appeared on the scene, and, to the dismay of the Boers, the whole party with a dash and a yell leapt over the wall and charged down on their assailants with fixed bayonets. It was a splendid act, and one which, as the officer commanding the Yorkshires had dropped wounded, came just in time to save the situation.

Away rushed the enemy, rolling one over another in their effort to be off, while a sustained storm of bullets inflicted heavy loss on their retreating numbers. From the distance they made a feeble attempt to fire at the gallant fellows who had routed them, but eventually they retired to the small kopjes at the base of the contested hill. There they were saluted by a detachment of two guns of O Battery from the west of the kopje. The enemy’s long-range gun now came into play and forced the British guns to move their position farther to the west. That done, the small kopjes were effectively shelled and the Dutchmen’s fire silenced. The whole engagement was a signal success, and the Yorkshires and New Zealanders were well pleased with their share of the day’s work. Twenty-one Boers were left dead on the field and many more were wounded. (On the morning of this day an unfortunate incident occurred at Colesberg. Lieutenant Thompson, R.H.A., while out scouting, was wounded and taken prisoner. This officer, together with Lieutenants Talbot Ponsonby, Lamont, and Aldridge, was especially mentioned for services performed with the guns.)

General Frenchs Remarkable Position at Colesberg, as seen from Kul or Coles Kop about 15th January.General French’s Remarkable Position at Colesberg, as seen from Kul or Cole’s Kop about 15th January.Sketch by Frederick Villiers, War Artist.

General French’s Remarkable Position at Colesberg, as seen from Kul or Cole’s Kop about 15th January.Sketch by Frederick Villiers, War Artist.

The events of the last few days had served to show that, however the Colonials might differ in their customs, habits, and ideas, they were assuredly identical in their dogged bravery and their fine spirit of dash—

“They come of The Blood, slower to bless than to ban,Little used to lie down at the bidding of any man,”—

and Captain Madocks and his hardy New Zealanders had now the well-merited good fortune to have earned the esteem and appreciation of all who had seen their splendid rush to the rescue of the Yorkshires. On the 16th General French visited the New Zealanders’ camp and congratulated them on their gallant conduct during the fight.

The Boers now brought to bear on the position one of the guns captured by them at Stormberg, and launched some ten shots into the kopjes held by a company of the Welsh Regiment. They got as good as they gave, and before long the enemy was completely silenced. General French’s system was a tit-for-tat form of warfare, which failed to commend itself to the Dutchmen. It served well, however—in default of sufficient troops to make any definite advance—to hold the enemy from proceeding farther south in British territory. News now came in that a large force of Dutchmen had been transferred from Majesfontein for the purpose of reinforcing the Boer commandoes at Colesberg, and thus rendering the paralysis of the British complete.

A very serious disaster befell a patrol consisting partly of New South Wales Lancers and South Australian Horse, who had so nobly volunteered their services to the Mother Country at the beginning of the war. On the morning of the 16th of January a party of nineteen rode out from Colonel Porter’s camp for the purpose of reconnoitring towards Achtertang. It was not yet dawn, but they pursued their investigations, reaching Norval Camp without seeing any signs of the enemy. About 8A.M.they commenced the return journey naturally with a feeling of greater security than when they started. They unfortunately fell into an ambush. A hot fight ensued, but the Boers were in overwhelming numbers, and the party was hard pressed. Two escaped to camp, and six more, after hiding till it was possible to make good their escape, followed them. The rest were made prisoners, but not without a struggle, as the bodies of four dead Australian and seven dead Boer horses, left on the field, served to testify. Lieutenant Dowling was killed. The enemy now occupied Klein Toren to the north of Slingersfontein.

On the 18th inst. Major-General Clements, D.S.O., arrived with two regiments of the 12th Brigade (the Royal Irish and the Worcestershire), and was placed in command of all the troops at and east of Slinger’s Farm. Two battalions were posted at that place, and occupied a good commanding position, which had been well fortified and intrenched.

General Clements had also, at Slinger’s, one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles; one squadron and four guns. Colonel Porter, 6th Dragoon Guards, with four squadrons, two guns, and one company of infantry, was posted at a farm called Potfontein,some eight miles east, and a little south, of Slinger’s. The enemy’s force at Colesberg was now hemmed in on the west, south, and east, and their position began to look uncomfortable, particularly as a battery firing lyddite shells was at hand to assist in the British operations. The British now held a series of positions of great extent, shaped after the manner of a mark of interrogation, with Colesberg within the curve of the hook.

The distance to be covered between the camps on the east and west flanks was about sixteen miles. Supplies were conveyed by waggons drawn by mules of South African breed—sleek, and as a rule good-tempered beasts. The South American mules were of a weaklier stamp, their poor condition being the result of importation. The tracks through the veldt, called by courtesy roads, were now in many places a foot deep in dust wherever sand-drifts had been lodged, and these promised in the event of rain to develop into morasses.

On the 25th General French made a reconnaissance in person, and discovered that the enemy was strongly posted at Rietfontein. The reconnaissance occupied two days, during which the troops covered forty miles. In spite of many efforts to cut the Boer’s communications with the Free State the Boers outwitted him, or rather out-dodged him, and retained their hold on Colesberg. Their position consisted of commanding hills down a defile through which a spruit flows towards the Orange River. The windings of this stream are followed by Waggon Road for more than a mile, then, after passing the hills, it flows over undulating country towards the river.

On Saturday, the 27th, a melancholy incident took place. For some weeks Major MacCracken had been holding a hill close up to the Boer position, and on this particular morning, though no fighting was taking place, a shell was plumped upon the hill by the enemy with the result that an officer was wounded. A New Zealander named Booth, orderly to General Clements, was killed while holding the General’s horse. At this time General French had mysteriously disappeared. His destination, though not announced, was Cape Town, where he went on a visit to Lord Roberts, whose plans were rapidly approaching completion. The upshot of that momentous visit we shall discover anon.

At Modder River Lord Methuen, to encourage the performers in a series of inter-regimental boxing matches, offered three splendid challenge cups for competition. These were won by the Scots Guards, the Grenadier Guards, and the Argyll and SutherlandHighlanders respectively, on the 3rd of February, when the series came to an exciting conclusion.

Meanwhile, when the cat was away the mice could play. The Boers engaged in their usual game of destroying railway tracks between Modder Camp and Langeberg, and as many as thirty-three explosions were heard, which portended considerable damage to line and culverts. However the trains conveying the sick to hospital at the Cape got away in safety, and as many invalids as possible were despatched to the base in order that the advance movement, when it should commence, would not be hampered.

The junction of De Aar at this time was simmering with activity. Stores to the value of a million pounds were being accumulated in preparation for a gigantic move in the direction of Modder River. Though at the moment Lord Roberts’s plans were not generally known, it was certain that a vast number of troops—many more than those then under Lord Methuen’s command—were about to congregate in the neighbourhood of Orange River, and in consequence there was suppressed excitement among the British and corresponding trepidation among the Free Staters. General French, whose splendid activity had been going on in most trying circumstances, now found himself freed to begin operations on a scale more fitted to his talents and more congenial to them. Cavalry was pouring in, and with cavalry and such a commander there was immense cause for hope.

The Suffolks who, after their disaster at Colesberg, went to Port Elizabeth to recruit their forces, now came up to De Aar, and were re-officered prior to being sent to the front. Other regiments were also trickling in, and slowly disposing of themselves in positions previously arranged by Lord Roberts at the Cape. All these dispositions were made with intense secrecy, Lord Kitchener setting himself to work to reorganise the transport department in such a manner as to make all the complicated moves of the coming war game possible.

WITH GENERAL FRENCH: NEW ZEALANDERS SAVING A PICKET OF THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT NEAR SLINGERSFONTEIN ON JANUARY 15.WITH GENERAL FRENCH: NEW ZEALANDERS SAVING A PICKET OF THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT NEAR SLINGERSFONTEIN ON JANUARY 15.Drawing by W. Small from a Sketch by G. D. Giles.

WITH GENERAL FRENCH: NEW ZEALANDERS SAVING A PICKET OF THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT NEAR SLINGERSFONTEIN ON JANUARY 15.Drawing by W. Small from a Sketch by G. D. Giles.

Life at Modder River began to grow correspondingly animated. Experiments in the working of the Marconi wireless telegraphy were set on foot, and other active preparations for decisive combat were pushed forward. The Boers were busy too. They were making further trenches in front of the Majesfontein ridge with a view to still further strengthening their position, an exertion which they subsequently found to be somewhat unnecessary. They also swelled their numbers. From the report of deserters it seemed that President Steyn had drawn to his banner many reluctant farmers by means of false representations, he having circulated the report that the British meant to seize and confiscate property for the purpose of enriching their own soldiers after the war. The Canadian Regiment, who till then had been guarding the lines of communication, moved to the front. They were in great spirits, and much rejoiced at being allowed to take a more active share in operations.

The Australian Infantry Regiment was now to be mounted. It was a misfortune that the Australians were not mounted from the first, as all were good horsemen, and would have come in handy to assist the British cavalry in the work of reconnaissance, which the mobile nature of Boer movements rendered unusually hard. The companies were composed of about 125 men from Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, West Australia, and Tasmania respectively.

On the 6th of February Lord Roberts left Cape Town for the front. He stoppeden routeat Belmont. Every eye was turned to him as he alighted at the railway station. It was nine o’clock, and presently a crowd collected to view the two warriors on whom the British Empire pinned its faith. One was the smallest man in the station; the other was the largest. The Field-Marshal, neat as a new pin, with his refined visage, grey moustache and tufted imperial, looked young, even happy, and undisturbed by his responsibilities; the hero of Omdurman, large and broad-shouldered, his forage cap crammed on his head, his keen steel-tinted eyes piercing the heart of things at a glance, appeared stern and preoccupied. They were met by Colonel Otter, and the Field-Marshal at once asked to see the Canadians. Colonel Otter accordingly brought him to the main guard, which consisted of one sergeant, one corporal, and two men. One of these described the inspection by the august chief. “We were standing at the present, and Lord Roberts appeared to be sizing us up pretty well. He inquired how we liked our bandoliers for cartridges, and on Sergeant Ellard informing him that they were too loose, and that the cartridges fell out of them, Lord Roberts said that he would see that this was remedied. Lord Roberts presented Sergeant Ellard with a basket of roses, and on distribution of them I received one.” This flower was treasured and sent home to the trooper’s family in remembrance of the great day which brought him face to face with England’s grandest soldier. On the 9th the Chief arrived at Modder River. At this time General Macdonald and the Highland Brigade were keeping the Boers occupied on the west, and during this manœuvre tremendous activities were set on foot. For instance, while General Macdonald’s Brigade was marching back to camp on the 10th of February, a force consisting of 23,000 infantry, 11,000 mounted men, and 48 guns, with transport of some 700 waggons, drawn by 9000 mules and oxen, was approaching the Free State! A brigade of Mounted Infantry under Colonel Hannay was moving from Orange River to Ramdam, situated about eight miles from Jacobsdal. On the 11th, Boers were discovered intercepting the road and holding the hills, but these, with a detached part of Colonel Hannay’s force, were held where they were, while the main body with the baggage pushed on to their destination. On the 12th General French—who was now for the first time since his departure from Ladysmith, in command of a cavalry division—seized the crossing of the Riet River at Dekiel’s Drift, whereupon the 6th and 7th Divisions there encamped themselves.

Before going further, it is necessary to follow the movements of the Highland Brigade, movements which materially assisted the development of the intricate plan of advance.

The Boers were now threatening the line between the Orange and Modder Rivers, and in consequence of various reports regarding their movements Colonel Broadwood proceeded to Sunnyside with the Royal Horse Artillery, Mounted Infantry, and Roberts’s Horse, the newly-raised regiment from whom great things were expected. The enemy retired and crossed the Riet River, taking care to keep well out of the way, for it was known that “Fighting Mac” was on the warpath, and the last thing the rebels desired was to find their own line of communications interrupted.

On the 3rd of February General Macdonald with the Highland Brigade, 9th Lancers, 9th and 62nd Batteries Royal Field Artillery, moved out in a westerly direction with a view to blocking the main drift at Koodoesberg, and thus preventing a force reported to be coming from Griqualand West from joining that coming from the north for the purpose of cutting Lord Methuen’s line of communication. There was also another motive for the movement, and that was to attract the attention and energy of the enemy while Lord Roberts was arranging for a decisive stroke in another quarter. The march was a trying one owing to the tropical temperature, exposure to a scorching sun, and the perpetual inconvenience of dust. The troops however, bore it bravely. They bivouacked at Fraser’s Drift, and on the following (Sunday) morning moved forward to Koodoesberg. The distance—some thirteen miles—was covered, again in sweltering conditions, over a shadeless expanse of rough road, which reflected the glare of the heavens and threw out hot rays as from a baker’s oven. Men dropped continually from sunstroke, and exhaustion, and thirst; but, fortunately, owing to the near proximity of the river, there were few serious cases. The troops arrived at their destination about one o’clock, without having seen any Boers. On reaching the drift the men refreshed themselves by bathing in the river, a luxury in which they revelled. But repose was short. A hurried meal of bully beef and biscuits and they were at work again, providing forcontingencies. Two thousand yards off were a group of kopjes, behind which it was said some 4000 Boers were hiding.

Map illustrating the Movement to Koodoesberg.Map illustrating the Movement to Koodoesberg.

Map illustrating the Movement to Koodoesberg.

The General at once set himself to construct breastworks to protect the drift and secure his positions on north and south of the river, while the 9th Lancers and their scouts reconnoitred the surrounding country to ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy. They came on a small picket of Boers—there was a rapid exchange of shots—but on the nearer approach of our troops the Boers fled. On Monday both sides of the river were taken possession of. A large body of mounted Boers were seen advancing about 2000 yards off, but beyond firing a few shots at the British force no serious conflict took place. On Tuesday there was a smart race between our men and a large force of Boers advancing from their laagers. Both parties made for a big kopje, which was cleverly gained by the British after a breathless scramble. The enemy, worsted, galloped off, pursued by the Lancers.

At nine o’clock on Wednesday, the 7th, the Boers, who had engaged themselves in dragging a heavy gun to the scene of action, began to blaze out upon the Seaforth Highlanders. These, with alacrity, sprang to action. As a private said, “It was not a Majesfontein affair this time, and a holy joy filled our hearts at the prospectof having a little bit of our own back.” The enemy was established at the north end of Koodoesberg, whence they shelled the works that were being constructed to protect the drift. At the drift were seven companies of Highland Light Infantry. On the left bank were the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, half a battalion of Seaforths, two guns, and the 9th Lancers observing both flanks. Holding the south end of Koodoesberg on the right bank of the river were the Black Watch, half a battalion of Seaforths, one company of Highland Light Infantry, and four guns (62nd Field Battery). An animated battle ensued, and the British guns did splendid execution. The troops took cover behind hastily-constructed sangars, and the bullets of the enemy failed to touch them. There were no evidences of the celebrated Boer marksmanship on this occasion. The enemy pounded the hill with shrapnel, and made a ferocious effort to rout the Highlanders from their position. The 62nd Field Battery, after some smart cannonading, which was as effective as it was vigorous, forced the Dutchmen to shift their gun to a position farther north. Eventually the weapon of the Dutchmen was silenced altogether.

Meanwhile, at the request of General Macdonald, General Babington, with his own regiment of cavalry (12th Lancers) and two batteries of Horse Artillery, had been despatched from Modder River. They started at 11.30A.M.on the 7th, and had they arrived in time might have cut off the retreat of the enemy and entirely hemmed them in.

As it was, they marched along the north side of the Modder, and only arrived at four o’clock, in time, however, to quickly pursue the foe in his retreat northwards, which retreat had been begun with all speed on the first hint of the coming of an additional force. The sufferings endured by some of the cavalry were intense, and one man expired through exposure and thirst. Others were in pitiable plight, but finally recovered.

While the great struggle was taking place it was discovered that the enemy was intrenched at a small drift on the west. Whereupon two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders became engaged in a smart skirmish, and gave the Federals so warm a time that by nightfall, after being shelled in their trenches, they were glad enough to slink off. By morning the enemy had entirely evacuated their position, and not a vestige of them was to be seen. Had the cavalry not been utterly worn out on reaching the scene of action, the Dutchmen would have been caught before they had time to seek refuge in flight.

“FIGHTING MAC” AND THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE IN ACTION AT KOODOESBERG.“FIGHTING MAC” AND THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE IN ACTION AT KOODOESBERG.From a Sketch by Lestor Ralph.

“FIGHTING MAC” AND THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE IN ACTION AT KOODOESBERG.From a Sketch by Lestor Ralph.

The troops then, under orders from Lord Methuen, retired to Modder River. They started from Koodoesberg on the evening of Thursday, made a moonlight march to Fraser’s Drift, returningto camp footsore and dilapidated on Friday. But before leaving, the officers and men who fell in the action were buried on the south bank of the river. Among them was Captain Blair, who, after having been previously struck by a bullet, had been mortally wounded by a shell. Lieutenant Tait, a very gallant officer, a notable golfer, and a general favourite, also fell, and Captain Eykyn eventually died of his injuries.

General Macdonald’s reconnaissance at Koodoesberg Drift was entirely satisfactory. The position there was important, as it prevented Boer reinforcements from passingviathe chief drift from Douglas to Majesfontein, and the movement served to confound the enemy, and protect the operations of the Belmont garrison in the direction of Douglas, not to speak of its value in keeping Boer activities to the west of Majesfontein at the time when Lord Roberts was developing his plans in regard to the east of that place. The enemy had been kept amused and out of mischief, and been wholesomely trounced into the bargain!

The casualties, which were comparatively few, were as follows:—

Killed:—2nd Royal Highlanders—Captain Eykyn; Lieutenant Tait. 2nd Seaforth Highlanders—Captain Blair.Wounded:—2nd Seaforth Highlanders—Captain Studdert, A.S.C. 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—Captain Kirk. 9th Lancers—Second Lieutenant Cavendish; Lieutenant Mackenzie, R.A.M.C.

Killed:—2nd Royal Highlanders—Captain Eykyn; Lieutenant Tait. 2nd Seaforth Highlanders—Captain Blair.

Wounded:—2nd Seaforth Highlanders—Captain Studdert, A.S.C. 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—Captain Kirk. 9th Lancers—Second Lieutenant Cavendish; Lieutenant Mackenzie, R.A.M.C.

FOOTNOTES:[7]Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur John Watson was forty-six years of age. He entered the army as a sub-lieutenant of the 12th Foot (now the Berkshires) on August 9, 1873, and received his lieutenancy from the same date. He was instructor of musketry to the regiment from February 12, 1880, to January 24, 1883, received his company on the 14th of April following, and, passing the Staff College in 1884, served with the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren later in the year, and from February 17 to October 28, 1885, was brigade-major in Bechuanaland, being honourably mentioned in dispatches. He was employed on staff service with the Egyptian army from February 12 to September 7, 1886, obtaining his major’s commission on October 21 following; and in 1888 served in the Hazara Expedition as brigade-major to the first column under Brigadier-General Channer, when he was again mentioned in dispatches, and received the medal with clasp. From July 20, 1889, to February 20, 1896, he was garrison instructor in Bengal, and deputy assistant-adjutant-general for instruction in the Punjaub, taking part in 1895 in the operations in the Chitral, accompanying the relief force under Sir Robert Low, acting as road commandant on the lines of communication. For his services in this campaign he received his second medal with clasp. He was gazetted lieutenant-colonel of the Suffolk Regiment on September 19, 1898.

[7]Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur John Watson was forty-six years of age. He entered the army as a sub-lieutenant of the 12th Foot (now the Berkshires) on August 9, 1873, and received his lieutenancy from the same date. He was instructor of musketry to the regiment from February 12, 1880, to January 24, 1883, received his company on the 14th of April following, and, passing the Staff College in 1884, served with the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren later in the year, and from February 17 to October 28, 1885, was brigade-major in Bechuanaland, being honourably mentioned in dispatches. He was employed on staff service with the Egyptian army from February 12 to September 7, 1886, obtaining his major’s commission on October 21 following; and in 1888 served in the Hazara Expedition as brigade-major to the first column under Brigadier-General Channer, when he was again mentioned in dispatches, and received the medal with clasp. From July 20, 1889, to February 20, 1896, he was garrison instructor in Bengal, and deputy assistant-adjutant-general for instruction in the Punjaub, taking part in 1895 in the operations in the Chitral, accompanying the relief force under Sir Robert Low, acting as road commandant on the lines of communication. For his services in this campaign he received his second medal with clasp. He was gazetted lieutenant-colonel of the Suffolk Regiment on September 19, 1898.

A great deal of consternation and not a little surprise was caused by the publication of the official account (London Gazette, April 16, 1900) of the evacuation of Spion Kop. In order to make intelligible the causes of the terrible fiasco it is necessary to quote for the benefit of those interested not only Lord Roberts’s comments on the subject, but the statements of the officers concerned. Sir Redvers Buller, writing from Spearman’s Hill, January 30, 1900, gave his version of the proceedings:—

“I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.“The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox waggons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the waggons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties; but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.“The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.“By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.“On the 16th a reserve of seventeen days’ supply having been collected, General Sir Charles Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichardt’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.“I attach Sir Charles Warren’s report of his operations.“On the night of the 23rd General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships; there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transports on the 25th: this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning, the loaded ox waggons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule waggons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went onday and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed: ox waggons, 232; 10-span mule waggons, 98; 6-span, 107; 4 span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.“By 2P.M.the 26th all the ox waggons were over, and by 11.30P.M.all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4A.M.the 27th all the troops were over, and by 8A.M.the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10A.M.The marches averaged for the mounted troops about seven miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average of five miles.“Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have lasted another half-hour.”

“The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox waggons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the waggons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties; but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.

“The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.

“By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.

“On the 16th a reserve of seventeen days’ supply having been collected, General Sir Charles Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichardt’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.

“I attach Sir Charles Warren’s report of his operations.

“On the night of the 23rd General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships; there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transports on the 25th: this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning, the loaded ox waggons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule waggons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went onday and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed: ox waggons, 232; 10-span mule waggons, 98; 6-span, 107; 4 span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.

“By 2P.M.the 26th all the ox waggons were over, and by 11.30P.M.all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4A.M.the 27th all the troops were over, and by 8A.M.the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10A.M.The marches averaged for the mounted troops about seven miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average of five miles.

“Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have lasted another half-hour.”

He concluded by saying:—

“Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We have suffered very heavy losses, and lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.”

Sir Charles Warren’s report addressed to the Chief of the Staff, ran thus:—

“On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.“On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward, refusing my right (namely) Spion Kop, and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.“I was provided with four days’ rations with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.“On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one Brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.“On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.“The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went overthe country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.“During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the waggons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.“On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the waggons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.“In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance, the eastern one by Acton Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking three or four days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our waggons back across the Tugela, but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.“On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day, after fighting for twelve hours, we were in possession of the whole part of the hills, but found a strongly-intrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.“On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get waggons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.“On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.“On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the waggons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2P.M.on the 26th January.”

“On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward, refusing my right (namely) Spion Kop, and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.

“I was provided with four days’ rations with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.

“On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one Brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.

“On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

“The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went overthe country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

“During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the waggons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.

“On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the waggons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.

“In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance, the eastern one by Acton Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking three or four days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our waggons back across the Tugela, but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.

“On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day, after fighting for twelve hours, we were in possession of the whole part of the hills, but found a strongly-intrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

“On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get waggons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.

“On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

“On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the waggons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2P.M.on the 26th January.”

In regard to the Council of War, Sir Charles Warren amplified his previous statement:

“Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers, together. I pointed out to them that, with thethree and a half (3½) days’ provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks—without impedimenta.”

Sir Charles then added:—

“The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong intrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by waggons, without first taking Spion Kop.“Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.“On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.“The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.“The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half-company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.“The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had intrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties other than three men wounded.“Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was, ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’“He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.“I replied to Colonel Crofton, ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’“This occurred about 10A.M.“Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed, ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’“For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.“I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20P.M.I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.”

“Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.

“On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.

“The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.

“The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half-company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.

“The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had intrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties other than three men wounded.

“Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was, ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’

“He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

“I replied to Colonel Crofton, ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’

“This occurred about 10A.M.

“Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed, ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’

“For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.

“I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20P.M.I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.”

Later on in the evening arrangements were made to send two (Naval) 12-pounders, and the Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to the summit, together with half-company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the intrenchments and provide shell cover for the men. The 17th Company, Royal Engineers—it must be noted—proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the intrenchments, then upon road-making and water supply.

Sand-bags were sent up early on the 24th instant, but they were too late. Colonel Sim and his party, while ascending, met Colonel Thorneycroft descending the hill. The position was evacuated. Sir Charles Warren concluded thus:—

“I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during the day.“During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarter Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.“At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.“In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.“It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.”

“During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarter Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

“At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.

“In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.

“It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.”

General Buller, in forwarding to the Secretary of State for War Sir Charles Warren’s report, made the following observations:—

“Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed three and a half days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for three and a half days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegramwhich he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren:—

(Sent 7.54P.M.Received 8.15P.M.)‘Left Flank, 19th January.‘To the Chief of the Staff—‘I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichardt’s Drift to Potgeiter’s, on the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of waggons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager for two or three days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress.Warren.’

(Sent 7.54P.M.Received 8.15P.M.)

‘Left Flank, 19th January.

‘To the Chief of the Staff—

‘I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichardt’s Drift to Potgeiter’s, on the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of waggons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager for two or three days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress.Warren.’

“The reply to this was that three days’ supply was being sent.“I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th, that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.“I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.“As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and at the moment I could see that our men on the top had given way and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’“The statement that a staff officer reported direct to me during the day is a mistake. Colonel àCourt was sent down by General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.“I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.“But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.“It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatestgallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organised during the day and have been commenced at nightfall.“As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.“Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.“I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.”

“The reply to this was that three days’ supply was being sent.

“I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th, that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.

“I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.

“As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and at the moment I could see that our men on the top had given way and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’

“The statement that a staff officer reported direct to me during the day is a mistake. Colonel àCourt was sent down by General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.

“I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.

“But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.

“It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatestgallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organised during the day and have been commenced at nightfall.

“As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.

“Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.

“I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.”

The Commander-in-Chief, writing to the Secretary of State for War, thus criticised both operations and operators:—

“The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichardt’s Drift, and thence by following the road past Fair View and Acton Homes, to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east and branching off from a point east of Three Tree Hill. The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.”

The abandonment of Spion Kop was condemned by Lord Roberts in the following terms:—

“As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith,I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the defence and bringing up artillery—in regard to which Sir Charles Warren’s report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller’s contention—admitting also that the senior officers on the summit of the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy’s fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and though lamp signalling was not possible at the time owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30P.M.for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke’s departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect.”

In spite of this somewhat severe criticism, however, Lord Roberts went on to say:—

“On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire.”

The action of Captain Phillips he warmly praised:—

“The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30A.M.on the 25th January, and by that time the Naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half-company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.”

Briefly the Commander-in-Chief deplored the chaotic state of affairs prior to the retirement. He said:—

“It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his headquarters in the evening, in order that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke wasnot aware of this. About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30P.M., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that ‘there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.’”

In conclusion, the principal actors in the drama were censured, while the troops engaged received well-merited praise:—

“The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy—probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.“The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.”

“The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.”

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