FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[7]See vol. iv. p. 41.

[7]See vol. iv. p. 41.

While Lord Roberts was moving from Bloemfontein, co-operative action was being taken elsewhere. On the 2nd of May the Boers evacuated Thabanchu and trekked towards the north, and on the following day General French, leaving General Rundle in command, started to join Lord Roberts’s main scheme. Soon after General Brabant joined General Rundle’s force.

On the 4th, General Rundle moved forward from Thabanchu, attacked the enemy, captured their positions, and headed them eastward. There was little hard fighting, the General’s movements being mostly carried out with so much celerity, and strategical and tactical skill, that the enemy, seeing British forces apparently in strength everywhere, judged it advisable to move from post to post rather than run the risk of being mopped up.

On Friday, the 11th of May, Colonel Grenfell, with the 2nd Battalion of Brabant’s Horse, attacked the Boers at Ropin’s Kop, but was overpowered by the enemy and forced to retire, with several wounded. On the following day, Saturday, he, however, drove the Boers out of their position, and captured Newberry Mills at Leeuw River, thus depriving the Dutchmen of an immense store of flour and grain which it had been their ambition to seize. This smart piece of work was accomplished almost without casualties. While these operations had been going forward, some 500 of the Yeomanry had occupied the northern slopes of Thaba Patacka, a position whence they hoped to attack the Boers who might be slinking off in the direction of Basutoland. General Boyes, on the west, was equally active, to the dismay of the Boers, who, owing to General Rundle’s clever strategy, imagined the British held a front of over twenty miles.

On the 13th of May General Rundle advanced to Brand’s Drift, twenty miles to the north-east, taking prisoners and accepting the surrender of many Free-staters, who were perished with cold and exposure, and sickened by defeat. Meanwhile, General Brabant, performing like operations, was slowly moving northwards. On the night of the 15th, Ladybrand was occupied by a force of the Glamorganshire Yeomanry, and thus the two Generals maintained possession, by magnificent strategic moves,of the whole southern corner, which is practically the granary of the Free State, gradually scaring away the enemy from the country through which they passed. On the 24th, a simultaneous movement was made, Brabant’s Colonials marching to occupy Ficksburg, while General Rundle with General Campbell’s Brigade, followed by that of General Boyes, proceeded towards Senekal.

During the march an unfortunate incident took place. On reaching Mequaling’s Nek, a rumour reached General Rundle that the Boers were in retreat from Senekal, consequently on the next day, the 25th, Major Dalbiac and Major Ashton, R.M.A. (Intelligence Officer to the Division), were ordered to investigate the nature of the water supply, and to find a camping ground in the neighbourhood of the town. Major Dalbiac and a company, mainly composed of Middlesex Yeomanry, accompanied Major Ashton as escort, and the party left at dawn and proceeded to Senekal. Here they encountered apparently peaceful inhabitants, and were entirely ignorant of the fact that the Boers had merely vacated the place for the purpose of hiding themselves in a hilly coign of vantage, which practically commanded the streets of the town. Major Ashton proceeded with the inquiries he was deputed to make, and received from a citizen the keys of the official buildings, which had been left by the Landdrost, who with the postmaster and other responsible persons had decamped. Then came the surrendering of arms, and while this was going on, suddenly, without warning, a heavy fusillade was launched at the Yeomanry who formed a group round Major Ashton. For a moment chaos reigned; then all sprung to action. The Boers, delighted at their surprise, blazed away fast and furious, while the two Majors, gathering together their little band, made hurried arrangements. Major Ashton, with some ten men, enclosed himself and promptly commenced firing on the incoming enemy, while Major Dalbiac with a score of the Yeomanry, dashingly galloped off in hope of taking the enemy in rear. But the Boers were many and the unfortunate Yeomanry quite outnumbered. No sooner had they wheeled round the hill, than rifles poured a withering fire on them. Six horses dropped even as the men dismounted, and the ground, open and quite devoid of cover, was strewn in one moment with the slain and the suffering. Major Dalbiac almost instantaneously dropped dead. He was shot through the neck, and four men shared his fate. Lieutenant Hegan Kennard, wounded in the face, was in a desperate plight, while nearly all who remained were injured. Some half-a-dozen men had been sent back with the horses on the first outbreak of the attack, and these only of the valorous band escaped. Meanwhile news of the ambuscade had been carriedto General Rundle, who instantly ordered off the Wilts Yeomanry, 2nd Grenadiers, and 2nd East Yorks, with artillery, to the succour of the unfortunate party. These arrived in time to save Major Ashton. He had fortunately occupied the side of the town towards which the British approached, and the Boers, at the first sound of the guns which had been directed against the kopje where they had ensconced themselves, made off with all possible speed. By the time General Rundle had neared the town, it had resumed its pristine state of innocence, and the inhabitants were preparing effective demonstrations of loyalty. In the evening the remains of the unfortunate dead at the foot of the hill were recovered, and it was found that Major Dalbiac’s body had been rifled by his dastardly opponents of every article of value, and even the ribbons of his medals were missing. On the 26th, General Rundle with the 8th Division entered the town and formally took possession of it.

The remains of Major Dalbiac and the four men of the Middlesex Yeomanry who were killed in the unfortunate affair were buried with military honours, the General and Staff attending the funeral. A patrol of the Hants Yeomanry, while out scouting, got in touch with the enemy, and escaped by what is called the skin of their teeth. Many had very narrow escapes, and one man was killed. Sergeant-Major Foulkes, whose horse was shot under him, was saved through the gallantry of Private Andrews, who returned and bore off his dismounted comrade, while Captain Seely and others behaved in like manner to ensure the safety of those left without mounts.

Of the Highland Brigade since the tragedy of Majersfontein and the smart fight at Koodoesberg little has been said. Their brilliant march and action before Paardeberg, in which General MacDonald was wounded, served to demonstrate the stuff of which they were made and to restore their self-confidence and zest for battle. Lord Roberts’s gracious speech, delivered at the camp, recalling his pleasant association with the Brigade in India, where “they had helped to make him,” and saying that as he had never campaigned without Highlanders, he “would not like to be without them now,” had done much to heal the sore which still rankled in many breasts.

HAULING DOWN THE TRANSVAAL FLAG AT JOHANNESBURGHAULING DOWN THE TRANSVAAL FLAG AT JOHANNESBURGPhoto by Lionel James

HAULING DOWN THE TRANSVAAL FLAG AT JOHANNESBURGPhoto by Lionel James

On the 1st of May the 9th Division marched from Waterval, picked up the Seaforths at the waterworks, and also the Highland Light Infantry from Bloemfontein. The Division, of which the Highland Brigade, the Seaforths, Black Watch, Argyll andSutherland Highlanders, and Highland Light Infantry formed the infantry battalions, with the 5th Battery Royal Field Artillery, two naval guns (4.7 calibre), and a company of Engineers, was under the command of Major-General Sir H. Colvile. The Highland Brigade was commanded by General MacDonald. The Eastern Province Horse, a smart and sportsmanlike set of mounted men, numbering about a hundred, also accompanied the force, and did valuable service in scouting. Later on the force was joined by Lovat’s Scouts, but not till the advance was well under way. On the 4th the Brigade bivouacked at Susanna Fountain after an animated tussle with the enemy, who were finally routed by the gallantry of the Black Watch.

The Division reached Winburg, as we know, on the 6th, and remained in possession till the 17th. Then, the Black Watch and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders advanced, leaving behind them the Highland Light Infantry and Seaforths in the town. On the following day the Zand River was crossed. Ventersburg was entered without opposition, the way having been previously swept by Lord Roberts’s force which had arrived there on the 10th. Here there was a brief halt—a much needed one—as the troops had marched thirty-four miles in 18½ hours. On the 23rd they proceeded towards Lindley, and were joineden routeby the remainder of the divisional and brigade troops. On the 24th the troops reached a point east of Bloemspruit, where they bivouacked, and the next day brought them into the teeth of the enemy, who were hiding in a ridge at Maquanstadt. From this point the Dutchmen were driven by the Seaforths, who from thence proceeded to a peaked kopje which commanded the water supply, a position which was at once vigorously contested by the Boers. After a hard fight, in which one officer and three men were wounded, the Seaforths succeeded in occupying the position. Here they were joined by the Black Watch and the 5th Battery of the Royal Field Artillery, the rest of the troops remaining behind at Hopefield till the 26th.

At Bloemberg, a horseshoe-shaped ridge near Koorspruit (an affluent of the Valsche), the Boers were found strongly posted, and no sooner had the Black Watch appeared than they were greeted by a crackling cross-fire that sent them quickly to cover. Here they held the enemy while a wide turning movement was made to the right. The inner side of the horseshoe position was attacked by the Seaforths, while the outer was assailed by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under Major Urmston, who deftly approached the stony eminence which concealed some sixty of the enemy, and charged with such force and impetuosity that presently the entire position was vacated, and the whole body of Boers,some 1000 in number, were seen racing over the boulders with more than their usual agility. The Bloemberg Ridge gained, it was promptly occupied by Black Watch and Seaforths.

By midday the passage of the hill was accomplished, and by 4P.M.the troops had reached Lindley. The expedition had cost them two killed and eleven wounded. The Highland Brigade crossed the Valsche River and bivouacked north of the drift on the Heilbron Road. Still more north—about two miles—went two companies of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to ensconce themselves on a kopje which commanded the road towards Heilbron.

On the afternoon of the 27th the advance was continued. The Highlanders crossed the Rhenoster River at Mildraai, and on the following day, 28th, moved still further forward till stopped by the presence of the enemy, who barred the line of march on the north of Roodeport. The Highland Light Infantry—the advanced guard—were deployed and sent to seize some kraals about 1200 yards from the enemy’s position, which sprayed itself over about six miles of country. One company was detached to hold a hill on the right front, supported by the Black Watch, while the Seaforths attempted a turning movement to the left and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders guarded the rear and both rear flanks from a point of vantage on Spitzkop. The artillery blazed copiously for an hour, while the Boers also made animated resistance, but after good sixty minutes of assault the enemy gave way, and the Seaforths succeeded in getting round the right flank, while the Highland Light Infantry and Black Watch gained the centre of the now deserted ridge. But the Boers had only scuttled to other ridges whence they could let loose Pandemonium with increased vigour. Thus the Highlanders came in for murderous attention in front, rear, and flank. Presently to their rescue went the invaluable naval guns, snorting vengeance, and determining to show that, though the Field Artillery became outranged and impotent, there was laudable lyddite to save the situation. On this, and with startling velocity, the Federals removed themselves, and they were stimulated in their departure by long-range volleys from the Highland Light Infantry. While the Dutchmen were speeding into the unknown, the Highlanders triumphant were advancing to a position north of Marksfontein. Having crossed the drift they bivouacked on the other side, while the ox transport moved up to the shelter of their wing. The day’s work was not without its pathetic side, for thirty men and three officers were wounded, while two gallant Highlanders were among the slain. The wounded officers were: Seaforth Highlanders—Lieut.-Col. Hughes-Hallet, Lieut. Ratclyffe, and Lieut. Doig.

At this time the Duke of Cambridge’s Yeomanry were to have met Sir H. Colvile, but owing to their failing by an hour or so to join him on his march up from Lindley they were surrounded, and on the 31st were captured by the enemy. The tale of the disaster is told elsewhere. On the 29th, the Division began to move gradually on in caterpillar fashion, drawing up a back segment to propel the forward one, inch by inch, or mile by mile. Mr. Blundell’s description in theMorning Postof the advance shows how risky and ingenuous a proceeding the movements of baggage in face of the enemy may be. “The route lay over a series of ridges and spruits and along a parallel line of hill on which the Boer forces had taken up their position. The baggage, &c., was first concentrated and taken over the spruit, with the Seaforths as right rear flank guard and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as rear guard. As the baggage and transport advanced the Highland Light Infantry advanced, and the battalions guarding flank and rear retired from their position and followed the baggage across the drift, while small bodies of the enemy hovered round the retiring rear at a respectful distance and unable to do any serious damage.”

Finally at 7P.M.on the 29th, exactly to time ordered by the chief, the General and his tired warriors marched into Heilbron, having covered within eight days a distance of 126 miles, fighting “a swarm of hornets” at intervals the whole way, and losing in the advance fifty-four wounded and nine killed—a loss in comparison with the work done by no means heavy. Mr. Blundell’s description of the class of work and its reward so happily hits off the nature of the movement, that the temptation to quote him is irresistible. “To appreciate the humours of the military situation in these regions, one would have to turn to the experiences of one’s schoolboy days with wasps’ nests, when, after the capture of the main position, the survivors take to guerilla warfare in the grass, crawling up your trousers and dropping on your neck from unexpected quarters, and inflicting damage to your temper and prestige out of all proportion to the losses incurred or the advantage gained.”

Christiana, as we know, was occupied on the 16th of May by one of General Hunter’s brigades, while Lord Methuen moved his Division from Boshop to Hoopstad, thus bringing his troops into the zone of the great operations, and pursuing his march eastwards along the south bank of the Vaal. (Hunter’s Brigade afterwards removed to cover the repair of the line along the Bechuanaland Railway towards Vryburg, and there for the present we must leave them.)

Highland Brigade at the End of a Long Forced March.Highland Brigade at the End of a Long Forced March.(Photo by a British Officer.)

Highland Brigade at the End of a Long Forced March.(Photo by a British Officer.)

From Boshop Methuen’s force moved on in zigzag fashion, their destination being Kroonstad. From Hoopstad to Bothaville they passed over good roads, through picturesque country, followed for miles by the graceful bends of the Vaal River—a ribbon of silver fringed with willows. The weather was now growing more and more chilly, and after sundown frost began to nip and biting winds to whistle through the bones. Nights were spent in trying to gain warmth, and when dawn came the sun was welcomed with thanksgiving. The infantry in these raw mornings had the advantage of the cavalry, as they could work themselves into a glow, but there were other occasions in which the mounted men had their revenge, and could forge on ahead and secure, before the arrival of the lagging pedestrians, all manner of tempting edibles—chickens, ducks, sucking pigs, and the like, which happened to be at the farms. These luxuries were greedily coveted, for, coming along from Boshop some 220 miles, diet had been limited to biscuits—hard, dry, and irresponsive—and any variety in the monotonous fare was received with unqualified rejoicing. Near Bothaville, as dawn broke, a curious episode took place. In thedistance was spied a tent—a species of farmyard in the centre of the open veldt. Chickens and cattle and a trek waggon fringed the strange mushroom-shaped domain. It being necessary to discover the nature of the occupant of this shanty, one of the military party approached and hallooed. No answer. He roared louder. Then from the inner recess of the tent a burly voice bellowed—“You can’t commandeer me; I’m an Englishman. The first Dutchman that pokes his head around here will look like a sieve when I’ve done with him.” To this warlike challenge the British soldier meekly replied—described himself and his business—whereupon a change rapid as amusing came over the scene. Out from the tent, “like a cork from a bottle,” burst the inmate, glad past speech, excited past effervescence—wife, children, came rushing forth from their hiding-places, rapture writ in smiling letters over every feature. The British were come—at last—at last! The valiant couple were taken in charge, removed to Bothaville and protected, and their long days of loyal suspense and tribulation were at an end. Then on went the goodly multitude, through streets whose houses fluttered with white, taking with them as they went their Boer prisoners, who, sitting in their own carts, alternately shivered and snarled. At Kroonstad—reached on the 27th of May—they pitched their camps, not in the town itself but discreetly removed from the awful reminiscences of dead horse and beast left by Boer and British armies in their last tussle, and here they thought to take a brief rest before marching away from rail and civilisation. But man proposed and the exigencies of the situation disposed, and by the 1st of June we find Lord Methuen’s troops hastening off to the assistance of the 13th Battalion of Imperial Yeomanry at Lindley. To understand the urgent necessity for this detour we must return to Senekal.

OFFICERS OF THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERSOFFICERS OF THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERSPhoto by Gregory & Co., London

OFFICERS OF THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERSPhoto by Gregory & Co., London

So soon as General Rundle entered Senekal—on the 26th of May—he proceeded to make inquiries as to the whereabouts of General Colvile, whom he believed to be at Lindley, some forty miles north-east of him. It so happened that General Colvile had just vacated that place and continued his march in the direction of Heilbron. No sooner was his back turned than the Boers pounced on Lindley, and not only pounced, but contrived to make themselves instantly aggressive. As ill luck would have it, the Duke of Cambridge’s Yeomanry under Colonel Spragge, who had been sent from Kroonstad to join General Colvile’s force, were caught by the enemy a few miles short of their destination.

They were in the awkward position of having missed General Colvile and lost apied-à-terreat Lindley.

In this dilemma a message was sent to General Rundle informing him of the desperate quandary.

The General, instantly reviewing the critical state of affairs, devised a strategical plan which, he thought, would serve—far off as he was—to extricate the entangled forces who were demanding his assistance. He was aware that a posse of Boers was within some six miles of him, circling around towards Bethlehem in the east, and he conceived the scheme of attacking these with such force and determination as to press them hard and force them in their turn to appeal for help from the hordes that were infesting Lindley to the annoyance and dismay of the not yet united British forces who had prayed his aid. This device was masterly in the extreme, as it, so to speak, forced the masses of the enemy to come south in all haste, and thus saved risks of failure which might have resulted from a long movement of infantry over a distance of about forty miles. So, leaving General Boyes with three battalions in occupation of Senekal, General Rundle, with a force consisting of 2nd Grenadier Guards, 2nd Scots Guards, 2nd East Yorkshire, under General Campbell, the 2nd West Kent Regiment, the 2nd and 79th Batteries Royal Field Artillery, and the 4th and 7th Battalions of Imperial Yeomanry—marched off towards the east over some miles of open country over which the tall grass, bleached now by many days of scorching sun, waved thickly round their knees. In the distance were three ominous hills—such hills as the Dutchmen delight in—fronted by a lower eminence which was occupied by the enemy. These espied the coming of the British, and promptly betook themselves to their main position on two of the hills, Biddulph’s Berg and Tafel Berg. From these points of vantage they greeted the Kent and Derbyshire Yeomanry, who had advanced to reconnoitre, with a storm of bullets which at once laid low many a brave fellow. Still the Derbyshire Yeomanry pursued their way, worked round the hill and dismounted and proceeded to seek cover, where they were forced to remain till dark set in, unable to stir lest the volleys of the enemy should find them out. On the western side the Kent Yeomanry were hotly attacked, and many were wounded. Meanwhile, from the foremost hill, whence the Boers had spied out the coming of Rundle’s force, the British now in possession, commenced to fire upon the heights of the Biddulph’s Berg; the artillery too dropped shells in the direction of the enemy; and the sun went down on the hostile forces, fighting vigorously so long as a ray of daylight served to illumine the deadly operations. Then they bivouacked where they were. At dawn the battle was resumed,and an effort was made to turn the enemy’s right flank. The Grenadiers under Colonel Lloyd moved off to the west, supported by the Scots Guards, West Kent, and Imperial Yeomanry, marching over miles of hard dried grass till within range of the Boers’ lair. But as usual the foe was invisible. It was imagined that he had vacated the position in the night; but to be on the safe side a cascade of shrapnel was poured over the steeps. Even this brusque process of search was unavailing. Not a sign of life was visible, though wounded Dutchmen must have lain in their hiding-places with stoical calm. And now commenced the dangerous, the awe-striking feature of the day. The grass, dried to chip, suddenly burst into a blaze. The carelessness of some one had set it alight, and presently the gallant Grenadiers found themselves fanned with the heat of an oven and forced to move from their position. They were now ordered to face the Boer hiding-place and attack it, while the 79th Battery behind them prepared again to scour the hill. Then, following their usual tactics, the Boer guns burst forth with loud and startling uproar, surprising the troops, who had almost accepted the idea that the enemy had fled. There was no doubt that he was “all there,” with two guns and a “pom-pom,” and meant to make himself objectionable. Just as the Boer shell was dispersing the amazed Yeomanry (who but a few moments before had been preparing the pipe of peace in full security of the Dutchmen’s supposed evacuation), the grass again broke into flame, growing and leaping by bounds, so that the best efforts to stay its progress were unavailing. Still, the artillery duel, once commenced, continued briskly, briskly as the veldt fire below, that, sweeping round the wounded as they fell, made a new and awful panorama in the sufficiently horrific scene of war. The British gunners worked their hardest to silence the Boer gun, and as they proceeded, the great furnace of roaring, crackling grass gathered and grew, and the volumes of smoke soon rendered the Boer position invisible. During this time not a sound of musketry had been heard, only the Boer gun had given tongue vociferously enough to tax all the energies of the British gunners to silence it. Then came the order for the Grenadiers to advance, and this, in spite of smoke and the violent efforts of the Boer artillery, they did in right soldierly fashion, making for the direction of the offensive weapon with splendid coolness and precision. But no sooner had they neared to within some hundred yards of the piece than they suddenly found themselves pelted at by the hitherto inactive rifles of the foe. Thick and fast buzzed the bullets of the Dutchmen, loud roared the guns as the shells burst and bellowed. One man after another dropped—was killed, maimed, mutilated—and there, invisible, lay as he fell, a prey in his helplessness to the devouring flamesthat were now leaping and crackling with an almost majestical vehemence, rushing far and wide, like some vast, ravening, raging demon, with a thousand fiery tongues panting forth volumes of blue-white breath over the whole universe. And within this fearful area the perpetual rattle and roll of musketry continued their fell work, while the wounded, red with their gore, and redder with the scorching of the flames, crept, and crawled and reeled to places of safety, or, woeful truth, writhed where they fell, victims to the most horrible torture that fiendish imagination has yet devised. Amid the stentorian rampage none could hear their cries for aid, none could see their struggles for release. Only now and then, when some succeeded in emerging from the fiery chaos, could the appalled few who were beyond the vivid halo of destruction realise the mighty horror that lay on the skirts of Biddulph’s Hill. But the battle raged on. The Yeomanry, under Colonel Blair, were off in hot haste to attack and rout some Boers who were endeavouring to make a flank attack, while the artillery, despite the scene of carnage, battered the hills whence the Boers, safely hidden, were pouring a horrible fusillade upon the persevering, dauntless Grenadiers. These remained for hours returning the fire of the enemy, in a position of unparalleled peril, until the order came to retire. This movement was executed with splendid precision, but many were left upon the field, and in the succouring of them deeds of heroism followed each other with such rapidity that several glorious acts passed unwitnessed and unsung. Lieutenant Quilter, with twenty men, volunteered to rescue the helpless, and rushed into the flaming furnace without arms, and under the relentless fire of the enemy. One after another of the wretched sufferers were hauled off to safety by these gallant deliverers, who, in full consciousness of the grim fate that must have been theirs should they themselves have dropped, pursued their work with almost amazing heroism. Colonel Lloyd received many injuries, and was also much scorched, but continued to command his gallant Grenadiers till further wounds made him helpless. He might again have been wounded where he lay, but for the assistance of a young drummer (Harries), into whose hand a bullet passed while he was tending his commanding officer.

While the battle was proceeding, General Rundle received a communication from Lord Roberts ordering him to go to the assistance of General Brabant, who also was in difficulties. It became necessary, therefore, to effect the retirement. The manœuvre had, however, produced the desired effect, for the Boers had been somewhat hard hit, and had given up their aggressive operations, leaving the neighbourhood of Lindley open to our force. On Wednesday the 30th General Rundle was informed that De Villiers, the Boer Commandant, was seriously wounded, and that fifty Dutchmen had been killed, and many injured, whereupon a doctor and champagne were sent to the late enemy; this in spite of the fact that very early in the proceedings of Monday the Boers had commenced the battle with their customary treacherous tricks. From an adjacent homestead they had flown a white flag, taking care that directly the scouts went forward to accept their surrender they should be pelted liberally as a reward for their confidence. As a result, one of the British party was wounded mortally, and another severely. Fortunately, the next day (Tuesday) the ruffians received their deserts, for the farmhouse was liberally pounded by the 2nd Battery of Artillery. Nor was this the sole barbaric act of the day. A West Kent Yeoman, while scouting, had passed a Dutch farmhouse, and was invited in to coffee, being assured by the Dutchwoman, who desired to play the hostess, that no Boers had been near the place for days. Happily the wary yeoman refused, for he had no sooner turned to ride off than he was pelted with bullets from a party of Boers who had immediately rushed from the homestead to fire at him. His marvellous escape was merely due to the nature of the ground round the farm, which afforded him cover.

Still General Rundle’s sense of humanity overcame the instinct of reprisal; for after the battle he offered shelter to the Boer wounded, even promising to tend them without considering them prisoners of war.

In the engagement at Biddulph’s Berg thirty of the British were killed and 150 wounded. Among the wounded officers were:—Grenadier Guards—Col. F. Lloyd, D.S.O., Capt. G. L. Bonham, Capt. C. E. Corkran, Lieut. E. Seymour, Lieut. A. Murray. Scots Guards—Major F. W. Romilly D.S.O. Royal Welsh Fusiliers—Captain R. S. Webber, A.D.C. to General Rundle.

On Thursday, May 31st, the troops proceeded to Ficksburg to the assistance of General Brabant, who had engaged the enemy near the Basuto Border on the Tuesday, and was still fighting.

In spite of General Rundle’s desperate fight, the 13th Battalion (Irish) Imperial Yeomanry, on whose account the battle was undertaken, had a most disastrous encounter with an overwhelming number of Boers near Lindley on the 31st of May. This battalion, as we know, was attacked on the way from Kroonstad to Lindley, and temporarily helped by the operations near Senekal. Subsequently the party came upon a superior force of Boers, and was forced to surrender.

TheCape Timesgave its version of the affair:—

“The story was told by Corporal Marks, who, with Trooper Brian, alone escaped capture. The force in question consisted of about 500 men, under the command of Colonel Spragge, and was comprised of the Duke ofCambridge’s Own and the Irish and Belfast Yeomanry. The Duke’s were 125 strong. With this force was a convoy of waggons, while the scouts, of whom our informant, Corporal Marks, was in command, numbered five.“The little battalion left Kroonstad on May 25, under hurried orders to reinforce General Colvile at Lindley without delay. On their way they captured and disarmed a troop of sixteen Boers whom they found in possession of a quantity of ammunition. Taking their prisoners with them, they hurried on at full speed, arriving at Lindley on Sunday, May 27, about noon. As they entered the town a number of horsemen were seen galloping out at the other end in the direction of Heilbron. Much to their disappointment our men found that General Colvile had left at daylight that day, after some severe fighting, for Heilbron....“On Wednesday night, after the gallant little band had been fighting against enormous odds for three days, Colonel Spragge decided to send one scout (C. Smith), in company of a Kaffir guide, in search of General Rundle, who was supposed to be in the neighbourhood of Senekal, with an urgent message for help. Corporal Marks and Trooper Brian were instructed to leave at the same time with a similar message for General Colvile. A close Boer line had been drawn round the position of the devoted garrison, and it was necessary to pierce the cordon to reach Heilbron. The scouts left unarmed, and after a terrible night of it, Marks and Brian got through the enemy’s lines. The night was bitterly cold, and the Boers had lighted camp fires, which proved serviceable guides to the two men. They passed so close to the pickets that they could hear them talking and laughing perfectly distinctly. Taking a circuitous route, they kept the Heilbron road some distance on their right, and by rapid marching reached Colvile’s camp at seven o’clock on Thursday morning. The message was delivered to the General, whose reply was that he could do nothing. Unhappily, Smith and the Kaffir were captured by Boers, and Smith was shot on the spot.“The following is a copy of the despatch given to Corporal Marks for delivery to Colonel Spragge:—“‘Your message received 7A.M.I am eighteen miles from Lindley and twenty-two from Heilbron, which latter place I hope to reach to-morrow. The enemy are between me and you, and I cannot send back supplies. If you cannot join me by road to Heilbron you must retire on Kroonstad, living on the country, and if necessary, abandoning your waggons.—(Signed)H. E. Colvile, Lieutenant-General.’“General Colvile appears to have believed that the little force could make a dash for it and cut their way through to Kroonstad. In any case, he did not see his way to go to the help of the men who had been marching to reinforce himself. Knowing that this message could be of no possible service to Colonel Spragge, and realising the urgency of the case, Corporal Marks decided to take the responsibility of not wasting time by returning to deliver this message, and he and Brian made for Kroonstad as hard as their horses would gallop. About eight miles north-east of the town they learned that Lord Methuen was in the neighbourhood, and they reached his camp about half-past four that afternoon (Thursday). Lord Methuen immediately made preparations to relieve the plucky little force in such hard straits at Lindley, and started the same afternoon. He reached Lindley without opposition the same night. But it was too late.”Another account said:—“The battalion, consisting of the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and three companies of Irish Yeomanry—under 500 in all—reached Kroonstad on Friday morning, May 22, after a long forced march. A few hours after their arrival they received an urgent message from General Colvile requiring them to join him without delay at Lindley, and they started at 8P.M.that same evening with one day’s rations, reaching Lindley, fifty miles distant, on the Sunday morning. When the advanced guard reached the town they found it apparently deserted, the only signs of British occupation being empty beef and biscuit tins; and were informed that General Colvile had left at daybreak. Almost immediately they were fired at from behind walls and houses, and finding the place untenable retreated about a mile outside the town, where Colonel Spragge took up a good position on some kopjes, with a stream of water and good shelter for the horses and waggons. This place they defended, fighting by day and fortifying by night, till Thursday, at 2P.M., on slender rations, though surrounded by greatly superior numbers. On Thursday morning the Boers were largely reinforced, and also brought up cannon—three Krupps and a ‘pom-pom,’—when the shell-fire telling dreadfully at short range, Colonel Spragge felt it would be madness to hold out longer, and surrendered after losing more than seventy-eight in killed and wounded out of his small force—when all was over some of the unwounded were so exhausted that they could hardly march into Lindley, where their gallant enemies as well as the non-combatants gave them the highest credit for the stand they had made in an almost hopeless position. Next day Lord Methuen arrived after a splendid forced march, and the wounded were set free.”

“The little battalion left Kroonstad on May 25, under hurried orders to reinforce General Colvile at Lindley without delay. On their way they captured and disarmed a troop of sixteen Boers whom they found in possession of a quantity of ammunition. Taking their prisoners with them, they hurried on at full speed, arriving at Lindley on Sunday, May 27, about noon. As they entered the town a number of horsemen were seen galloping out at the other end in the direction of Heilbron. Much to their disappointment our men found that General Colvile had left at daylight that day, after some severe fighting, for Heilbron....

“On Wednesday night, after the gallant little band had been fighting against enormous odds for three days, Colonel Spragge decided to send one scout (C. Smith), in company of a Kaffir guide, in search of General Rundle, who was supposed to be in the neighbourhood of Senekal, with an urgent message for help. Corporal Marks and Trooper Brian were instructed to leave at the same time with a similar message for General Colvile. A close Boer line had been drawn round the position of the devoted garrison, and it was necessary to pierce the cordon to reach Heilbron. The scouts left unarmed, and after a terrible night of it, Marks and Brian got through the enemy’s lines. The night was bitterly cold, and the Boers had lighted camp fires, which proved serviceable guides to the two men. They passed so close to the pickets that they could hear them talking and laughing perfectly distinctly. Taking a circuitous route, they kept the Heilbron road some distance on their right, and by rapid marching reached Colvile’s camp at seven o’clock on Thursday morning. The message was delivered to the General, whose reply was that he could do nothing. Unhappily, Smith and the Kaffir were captured by Boers, and Smith was shot on the spot.

“The following is a copy of the despatch given to Corporal Marks for delivery to Colonel Spragge:—

“‘Your message received 7A.M.I am eighteen miles from Lindley and twenty-two from Heilbron, which latter place I hope to reach to-morrow. The enemy are between me and you, and I cannot send back supplies. If you cannot join me by road to Heilbron you must retire on Kroonstad, living on the country, and if necessary, abandoning your waggons.—(Signed)H. E. Colvile, Lieutenant-General.’

“General Colvile appears to have believed that the little force could make a dash for it and cut their way through to Kroonstad. In any case, he did not see his way to go to the help of the men who had been marching to reinforce himself. Knowing that this message could be of no possible service to Colonel Spragge, and realising the urgency of the case, Corporal Marks decided to take the responsibility of not wasting time by returning to deliver this message, and he and Brian made for Kroonstad as hard as their horses would gallop. About eight miles north-east of the town they learned that Lord Methuen was in the neighbourhood, and they reached his camp about half-past four that afternoon (Thursday). Lord Methuen immediately made preparations to relieve the plucky little force in such hard straits at Lindley, and started the same afternoon. He reached Lindley without opposition the same night. But it was too late.”

Another account said:—“The battalion, consisting of the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and three companies of Irish Yeomanry—under 500 in all—reached Kroonstad on Friday morning, May 22, after a long forced march. A few hours after their arrival they received an urgent message from General Colvile requiring them to join him without delay at Lindley, and they started at 8P.M.that same evening with one day’s rations, reaching Lindley, fifty miles distant, on the Sunday morning. When the advanced guard reached the town they found it apparently deserted, the only signs of British occupation being empty beef and biscuit tins; and were informed that General Colvile had left at daybreak. Almost immediately they were fired at from behind walls and houses, and finding the place untenable retreated about a mile outside the town, where Colonel Spragge took up a good position on some kopjes, with a stream of water and good shelter for the horses and waggons. This place they defended, fighting by day and fortifying by night, till Thursday, at 2P.M., on slender rations, though surrounded by greatly superior numbers. On Thursday morning the Boers were largely reinforced, and also brought up cannon—three Krupps and a ‘pom-pom,’—when the shell-fire telling dreadfully at short range, Colonel Spragge felt it would be madness to hold out longer, and surrendered after losing more than seventy-eight in killed and wounded out of his small force—when all was over some of the unwounded were so exhausted that they could hardly march into Lindley, where their gallant enemies as well as the non-combatants gave them the highest credit for the stand they had made in an almost hopeless position. Next day Lord Methuen arrived after a splendid forced march, and the wounded were set free.”

In regard to the loss of the Duke of Cambridge’s Yeomanry, there was a good deal of criticism, and accounts dealing with theraison d’êtreof the disaster vary. Mr. Winston Churchill, in support of Sir H. Colvile, declared that it was sent out with the absurdly inadequate escort by the fiat of a higher authority, with the full knowledge that Heilbron was surrounded by a force of Boers estimated at from 4000 to 5000 men. It was also despatched without warning, being sent, or at any rate received at Heilbron, so that it was impossible to operate from the latter place to assist its passage, especially as it was actually captured almost immediately after leaving Kroonstad, and fourteen miles from Heilbron.

“In the case of the Yeomanry, the message giving notice of the change of place, where it was to join the 9th Division from Ventersburg to Lindley, was by error addressed to the 9th Brigade, and this was not received by Sir H. Colvile till the 21st of June. The first intimation of their position was given by a messenger to General Colvile’s camp when twenty miles out of Lindley from the Yeomanry, then five miles on the other side on the Kroonstad road. The messenger asked for reinforcement and supplies, but did not represent the situation as very serious, as, in fact, at that time it was not. But at this juncture General Colvile was surrounded by a large force of Boers on his flank and rear, and short of supplies himself, and on a timemarch under orders to reach Heilbron on the 29th. He therefore advised Colonel Spragge to retire on the Kroonstad road, and authorised him, if necessary, to abandon his baggage, &c.”

Lord Methuen, who at the time was on the march to Kroonstad, was ordered off, as we already know, to the rescue. Within half-an-hour he had started, and by 10A.M.on the 2nd of June he had accomplished forty-four miles in twenty-five hours. But his expedition was of no avail, for Spragge’s Irishmen had been taken prisoners. Nevertheless having arrived, Lord Methuen proceeded to attack the Boers with vigour, and after five hours’ continuous fighting, put some 3000 of them to flight.

The official list of prisoners of war showed 22 officers and 863 non-commissioned officers and men.

Among the officers were the following:—

13th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry—Lieutenant-Colonel Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, Captain Robinson, Captain Humby, Lieutenant Mitchell, Lieutenant Stannus, Lieutenant the Earl of Leitrim, Lieutenant Rutledge, Lieutenant Montgomery, Lieutenant Lane, Lieutenant Du Pré, Lieutenant Donnelly, Sergeant Wright, Sergeant Woodhouse. Captain Keith had been killed in the affair of the 29th, when Captain Sir J. Power was dangerously wounded, and Captain the Earl of Longford, Lieutenants Stuart, Robin, and Benson, were wounded together with Lieutenant Bertram of the Eastern Province Horse (since dead).

The following officers were also wounded on June 1 and 2:—

3rd Battalion Imperial Yeomanry—Captain L. R. Rolleston, Captain M. S. Dawsany, Lieutenant L. E. Starkey.

Soon after this time the 9th Division was split up, owing to the necessity of detaching small forces. Generals Smith-Dorrien and Bruce-Hamilton joined their forces with that of General Ian Hamilton, while General MacDonald with the Highland Brigade acted as an independent force, and General Sir H. Colvile returned to England.[8]

THEIR ORDEAL OF FIRE: THE GRENADIER GUARDS AT THE BATTLE OF BIDDULPHS BERGTHEIR ORDEAL OF FIRE: THE GRENADIER GUARDS AT THE BATTLE OF BIDDULPH’S BERGDrawing by R. Caton Woodville

THEIR ORDEAL OF FIRE: THE GRENADIER GUARDS AT THE BATTLE OF BIDDULPH’S BERGDrawing by R. Caton Woodville

Meanwhile Sir Charles Warren’s troops, moving from Faberspruit, some twelve miles from Douglas, had a nasty experience. The force consisted of some four hundred Duke of Edinburgh’s Volunteers, one and a half companies of the 8th Regiment of Imperial Yeomanry, some of Paget’s Horse, twenty-five of Warren’s Scouts, and some guns of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Duringthe night, a particularly dark one, the Boers slunk up in two parties to the gardens of farmhouses near which the yeomanry on the one hand, and Sir C. Warren’s and the Duke of Edinburgh Volunteers on the other, were quartered. In the dusk before dawn, these suddenly blazed out on the British, who, like lightning, got under arms. But in the shock and uproar of the first alarm the English horses that had been kraaled burst through the kraal walls and stampeded, thus making the scene of turmoil more intense. With the first streak of daylight the whole British force poured shot and shell into the gardens where the Boers had hidden themselves, and for a good hour the troops were at work driving the invaders from the neighbourhood of the camps. The Boers lost heavily, and a portion of the Yeomanry suffered correspondingly while pressing forward to the support of the pickets. Many of Paget’s Horse were wounded, notably Lieutenant Lethbridge, whose injury was dangerous, and of the Duke of Edinburgh Volunteers three were killed and four wounded. Their gallant Colonel—Colonel Spence—was shot dead while in act of giving orders. Major Kelly, A.D.C. to Sir Charles Warren, was wounded; Lieutenant Patton, A.D.C., was shot in the knee, and Lieutenant Huntingdon was slightly injured. Many Boers were wounded and thirteen were killed, but others contrived to gallop off scot free, as owing to the stampeding of the horses it was impossible to follow them up. The total British casualties were eighteen killed and about thirty wounded. The result of the engagement had a decidedly beneficial effect upon the rebels, who were at that time hesitating on which side of the fence to locate themselves.

Colonel Adye had also surprised the enemy and gained a victory at Kheis on the 27th—a victory which had the effect of defeating the plans of the rebels who had assembled within some twenty miles of that place in hope to effect a junction with others of their kind. The action was a smart one, and many hundred head of stock and prisoners were captured, but it was also costly, as Major J. A. Orr-Ewing, 5th Co. Imperial Yeomanry, was killed; Captain L. H. Jones, 32 Co. Imperial Yeomanry; Surg.-Capt. Dun, 5th Co.; Lieut. Venables, Nesbitt’s Horse, were wounded; and two gallant young officers, Captain Tindall, 1st Welsh Regiment, and Lieutenant Matthews, 2nd Gloucester Regiment, both succumbed to the severe injuries they had received.

Sir Charles Warren, after his engagement, marched without opposition from Faberspruit to Campbell, which was reached on the 5th of June.

FOOTNOTES:[8]While dealing with the matter it is due to General Colvile to repeat the statement made by himself at the end of the year to a representative of Reuter’s Agency:—“I am accused of being chiefly responsible for the surrender of the Yeomanry at Lindley. In my opinion the primary cause of this surrender was the insufficient information given by the headquarters staff to Colonel Spragge and myself. Had I been informed of Lord Roberts’s intentions and of the intended movements of Colonel Spragge, who was in command of the Yeomanry, and had Colonel Spragge been made acquainted with the orders I received from Lord Roberts, this disaster would never have happened. The following details will make it clear that the loss of the Yeomanry was primarily due to bad staff work. On May 20 I received a telegram from the chief of the staff ordering me to concentrate my troops, consisting of the Highland Brigade, the Eastern Province Horse, a field battery, and two naval guns, at Ventersburg on May 23, to leave that town on the 24th and to march to Heilbron,viaLindley, arriving at Lindley on May 26, and at Heilbron on the 29th. I was informed that I should be joined at Ventersburg by the 13th Imperial Yeomanry and Lovat’s Scouts.“On arrival at Ventersburg, finding that neither the Yeomanry nor the Scouts were there, I informed the chief of the staff by telegraph, but received no answer from him at the time, though his reply was handed to me more than a month later, among a bundle of undelivered telegrams. This telegram was worded as follows: ‘May 24. Yeomanry are so late they cannot catch you at Ventersburg. You must march without them. They will join you laterviaKroonstad.’ As I did not receive the telegram till the march was over it did not affect my action, but had I received it at the time its wording would have led me to suppose that the Yeomanry would join me at Heilbron, as was actually the case with Lovat’s Scouts. At this time Lord Roberts’s army was disposed roughly as follows: General Hunter’s Division on the Kimberley-Mafeking Railway, Lord Methuen on the Vaal River, headquarters and General Pole-Carew’s Division on the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg Railway, General Ian Hamilton’s column at Heilbron, and General Rundle and Brabant to the south-east of me. It was, therefore, extended across the Free State, and I assumed that Lord Roberts intended to advance in this formation, sweeping all before him till he got within striking distance of the Vaal, thus forcing the enemy to extend, and that he would then select one point for forcing the passage of the river. I also supposed that Heilbron, which is the head of a short line of railway, would be the supply depot for the columns to the east, as Winburg had been.“My very definite orders, and the fact that I was not to move till the last possible moment, which necessitated my averaging seventeen miles a day, strengthened the assumption that I was taking part in a combined movement, in which great exactitude in conforming to the time table is, of course, of the utmost importance. In a telegram which Lord Roberts had sent to General Hamilton a short time before on a similar occasion he had impressed on him the importance of columns arriving simultaneously. As I had been officially informed that General Hamilton was in occupation of Heilbron, I assumed that my orders to be there on the 29th indicated that that was the day on which he would be required to take part in the general advance, and that any delay on my part would either retard the advance and upset the Commander-in-Chief’s calculations, or that by leaving Heilbron unoccupied I should hand over an important supply depot to the enemy. I have thus explained why in no circumstances should I have felt myself justified in disobeying Lord Roberts’s orders, which I simply carried out from first to last. I now proceed to recite the circumstances in which I became acquainted with Colonel Spragge’s difficulties, and the action I took.“I left Ventersburg on May 24 as ordered, and on the 26th, after a fight outside Lindley, entered it, finding that the place had been vacated by us, a fact of which no notification had been given me, though I had been informed of our occupation of it. Marching at daylight on the following morning we crossed the Rhenoster River just before sunset, having been engaged the greater part of the day, and on the morning of the 28th I received the following message: ‘Colonel Spragge to General Colvile. Found no one in Lindley but Boers. Have five hundred men, but only one day’s food. Have stopped three miles back on Kroonstad road. I want help to get out without great loss.—B. Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel, May 27, 1900.’ I asked the orderly who Colonel Spragge was, and on hearing from him that he was the officer commanding the Yeomanry I learned for the first time that these troops were following me. The statement, which I have seen several times repeated in the papers, that I had urged the Yeomanry to hurry after me, is absolutely untrue. I have reason to believe that this baseless newspaper report has obtained credence in some high official quarters. I have already expressed my views of the necessity of being at Heilbron at the time ordered, and as it is a recognised rule of war that the lesser must be sacrificed to the greater interest, I should in any circumstances have considered it my duty to push on even had I been sure that such action would have entailed the loss of the Yeomanry. But in this case I had two additional reasons for doing so. First, that, as Colonel Spragge had succeeded in retiring three miles on the Kroonstad road I was convinced that he would have no difficulty in making good his retreat, though possibly with loss, as the colonel himself had said; secondly, that I had then only two days’ more food for my force, and had I fought my way back I should not only have reduced the Highland Brigade to the verge of starvation, but should certainly have had insufficient supplies to take me back to Heilbron.”

[8]While dealing with the matter it is due to General Colvile to repeat the statement made by himself at the end of the year to a representative of Reuter’s Agency:—“I am accused of being chiefly responsible for the surrender of the Yeomanry at Lindley. In my opinion the primary cause of this surrender was the insufficient information given by the headquarters staff to Colonel Spragge and myself. Had I been informed of Lord Roberts’s intentions and of the intended movements of Colonel Spragge, who was in command of the Yeomanry, and had Colonel Spragge been made acquainted with the orders I received from Lord Roberts, this disaster would never have happened. The following details will make it clear that the loss of the Yeomanry was primarily due to bad staff work. On May 20 I received a telegram from the chief of the staff ordering me to concentrate my troops, consisting of the Highland Brigade, the Eastern Province Horse, a field battery, and two naval guns, at Ventersburg on May 23, to leave that town on the 24th and to march to Heilbron,viaLindley, arriving at Lindley on May 26, and at Heilbron on the 29th. I was informed that I should be joined at Ventersburg by the 13th Imperial Yeomanry and Lovat’s Scouts.“On arrival at Ventersburg, finding that neither the Yeomanry nor the Scouts were there, I informed the chief of the staff by telegraph, but received no answer from him at the time, though his reply was handed to me more than a month later, among a bundle of undelivered telegrams. This telegram was worded as follows: ‘May 24. Yeomanry are so late they cannot catch you at Ventersburg. You must march without them. They will join you laterviaKroonstad.’ As I did not receive the telegram till the march was over it did not affect my action, but had I received it at the time its wording would have led me to suppose that the Yeomanry would join me at Heilbron, as was actually the case with Lovat’s Scouts. At this time Lord Roberts’s army was disposed roughly as follows: General Hunter’s Division on the Kimberley-Mafeking Railway, Lord Methuen on the Vaal River, headquarters and General Pole-Carew’s Division on the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg Railway, General Ian Hamilton’s column at Heilbron, and General Rundle and Brabant to the south-east of me. It was, therefore, extended across the Free State, and I assumed that Lord Roberts intended to advance in this formation, sweeping all before him till he got within striking distance of the Vaal, thus forcing the enemy to extend, and that he would then select one point for forcing the passage of the river. I also supposed that Heilbron, which is the head of a short line of railway, would be the supply depot for the columns to the east, as Winburg had been.“My very definite orders, and the fact that I was not to move till the last possible moment, which necessitated my averaging seventeen miles a day, strengthened the assumption that I was taking part in a combined movement, in which great exactitude in conforming to the time table is, of course, of the utmost importance. In a telegram which Lord Roberts had sent to General Hamilton a short time before on a similar occasion he had impressed on him the importance of columns arriving simultaneously. As I had been officially informed that General Hamilton was in occupation of Heilbron, I assumed that my orders to be there on the 29th indicated that that was the day on which he would be required to take part in the general advance, and that any delay on my part would either retard the advance and upset the Commander-in-Chief’s calculations, or that by leaving Heilbron unoccupied I should hand over an important supply depot to the enemy. I have thus explained why in no circumstances should I have felt myself justified in disobeying Lord Roberts’s orders, which I simply carried out from first to last. I now proceed to recite the circumstances in which I became acquainted with Colonel Spragge’s difficulties, and the action I took.“I left Ventersburg on May 24 as ordered, and on the 26th, after a fight outside Lindley, entered it, finding that the place had been vacated by us, a fact of which no notification had been given me, though I had been informed of our occupation of it. Marching at daylight on the following morning we crossed the Rhenoster River just before sunset, having been engaged the greater part of the day, and on the morning of the 28th I received the following message: ‘Colonel Spragge to General Colvile. Found no one in Lindley but Boers. Have five hundred men, but only one day’s food. Have stopped three miles back on Kroonstad road. I want help to get out without great loss.—B. Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel, May 27, 1900.’ I asked the orderly who Colonel Spragge was, and on hearing from him that he was the officer commanding the Yeomanry I learned for the first time that these troops were following me. The statement, which I have seen several times repeated in the papers, that I had urged the Yeomanry to hurry after me, is absolutely untrue. I have reason to believe that this baseless newspaper report has obtained credence in some high official quarters. I have already expressed my views of the necessity of being at Heilbron at the time ordered, and as it is a recognised rule of war that the lesser must be sacrificed to the greater interest, I should in any circumstances have considered it my duty to push on even had I been sure that such action would have entailed the loss of the Yeomanry. But in this case I had two additional reasons for doing so. First, that, as Colonel Spragge had succeeded in retiring three miles on the Kroonstad road I was convinced that he would have no difficulty in making good his retreat, though possibly with loss, as the colonel himself had said; secondly, that I had then only two days’ more food for my force, and had I fought my way back I should not only have reduced the Highland Brigade to the verge of starvation, but should certainly have had insufficient supplies to take me back to Heilbron.”

[8]While dealing with the matter it is due to General Colvile to repeat the statement made by himself at the end of the year to a representative of Reuter’s Agency:—

“I am accused of being chiefly responsible for the surrender of the Yeomanry at Lindley. In my opinion the primary cause of this surrender was the insufficient information given by the headquarters staff to Colonel Spragge and myself. Had I been informed of Lord Roberts’s intentions and of the intended movements of Colonel Spragge, who was in command of the Yeomanry, and had Colonel Spragge been made acquainted with the orders I received from Lord Roberts, this disaster would never have happened. The following details will make it clear that the loss of the Yeomanry was primarily due to bad staff work. On May 20 I received a telegram from the chief of the staff ordering me to concentrate my troops, consisting of the Highland Brigade, the Eastern Province Horse, a field battery, and two naval guns, at Ventersburg on May 23, to leave that town on the 24th and to march to Heilbron,viaLindley, arriving at Lindley on May 26, and at Heilbron on the 29th. I was informed that I should be joined at Ventersburg by the 13th Imperial Yeomanry and Lovat’s Scouts.

“On arrival at Ventersburg, finding that neither the Yeomanry nor the Scouts were there, I informed the chief of the staff by telegraph, but received no answer from him at the time, though his reply was handed to me more than a month later, among a bundle of undelivered telegrams. This telegram was worded as follows: ‘May 24. Yeomanry are so late they cannot catch you at Ventersburg. You must march without them. They will join you laterviaKroonstad.’ As I did not receive the telegram till the march was over it did not affect my action, but had I received it at the time its wording would have led me to suppose that the Yeomanry would join me at Heilbron, as was actually the case with Lovat’s Scouts. At this time Lord Roberts’s army was disposed roughly as follows: General Hunter’s Division on the Kimberley-Mafeking Railway, Lord Methuen on the Vaal River, headquarters and General Pole-Carew’s Division on the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg Railway, General Ian Hamilton’s column at Heilbron, and General Rundle and Brabant to the south-east of me. It was, therefore, extended across the Free State, and I assumed that Lord Roberts intended to advance in this formation, sweeping all before him till he got within striking distance of the Vaal, thus forcing the enemy to extend, and that he would then select one point for forcing the passage of the river. I also supposed that Heilbron, which is the head of a short line of railway, would be the supply depot for the columns to the east, as Winburg had been.

“My very definite orders, and the fact that I was not to move till the last possible moment, which necessitated my averaging seventeen miles a day, strengthened the assumption that I was taking part in a combined movement, in which great exactitude in conforming to the time table is, of course, of the utmost importance. In a telegram which Lord Roberts had sent to General Hamilton a short time before on a similar occasion he had impressed on him the importance of columns arriving simultaneously. As I had been officially informed that General Hamilton was in occupation of Heilbron, I assumed that my orders to be there on the 29th indicated that that was the day on which he would be required to take part in the general advance, and that any delay on my part would either retard the advance and upset the Commander-in-Chief’s calculations, or that by leaving Heilbron unoccupied I should hand over an important supply depot to the enemy. I have thus explained why in no circumstances should I have felt myself justified in disobeying Lord Roberts’s orders, which I simply carried out from first to last. I now proceed to recite the circumstances in which I became acquainted with Colonel Spragge’s difficulties, and the action I took.

“I left Ventersburg on May 24 as ordered, and on the 26th, after a fight outside Lindley, entered it, finding that the place had been vacated by us, a fact of which no notification had been given me, though I had been informed of our occupation of it. Marching at daylight on the following morning we crossed the Rhenoster River just before sunset, having been engaged the greater part of the day, and on the morning of the 28th I received the following message: ‘Colonel Spragge to General Colvile. Found no one in Lindley but Boers. Have five hundred men, but only one day’s food. Have stopped three miles back on Kroonstad road. I want help to get out without great loss.—B. Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel, May 27, 1900.’ I asked the orderly who Colonel Spragge was, and on hearing from him that he was the officer commanding the Yeomanry I learned for the first time that these troops were following me. The statement, which I have seen several times repeated in the papers, that I had urged the Yeomanry to hurry after me, is absolutely untrue. I have reason to believe that this baseless newspaper report has obtained credence in some high official quarters. I have already expressed my views of the necessity of being at Heilbron at the time ordered, and as it is a recognised rule of war that the lesser must be sacrificed to the greater interest, I should in any circumstances have considered it my duty to push on even had I been sure that such action would have entailed the loss of the Yeomanry. But in this case I had two additional reasons for doing so. First, that, as Colonel Spragge had succeeded in retiring three miles on the Kroonstad road I was convinced that he would have no difficulty in making good his retreat, though possibly with loss, as the colonel himself had said; secondly, that I had then only two days’ more food for my force, and had I fought my way back I should not only have reduced the Highland Brigade to the verge of starvation, but should certainly have had insufficient supplies to take me back to Heilbron.”

The relief of Ladysmith caused the Boers to fall back towards the Drakensberg, and Sir Redvers Buller, whose troops were thoroughly exhausted, encamped his army to north and west of the dilapidated town, and there remained stationary for several weeks. It was necessary that the force should thoroughly recuperate and get into working order in time to co-operate with the great central advance when Lord Roberts should give the word. There was an immense amount to be done. The mounted troops, many of them, needed to be remounted, and winter clothing was required. The reconstruction of the transport also demanded alteration, while it was necessary, in conjunction with Lord Roberts’s operations, to keep a wary eye on the Boers and prevent them from crossing into the Free State and swelling the enemy’s forces opposing the great advance.

As with the departure of Sir Charles Warren to the western frontier, some slight changes had taken place in the Natal Field Force, it becomes necessary to inspect a rough table of the divisions at this time under Sir Redvers Buller:—

NATAL

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER.

SECOND DIVISION.

Lieutenant-General SirC. F. Clery.

2nd Brigade (Major-General Hamilton).

4th Brigade (Colonel C. D. Cooper).

7th, 14th, and 66th Field Batteries.

FOURTH DIVISION.

Lieutenant-GeneralLyttelton.

7th Brigade (Brigadier-General F. W. Kitchener).

8th Brigade (Major-General F. Howard).

Two Brigade Divisions Royal Artillery.

13th, 67th, 69th Field Batteries.

21st, 42nd, 53rd Field Batteries.

FIFTH DIVISION.

Lieutenant-GeneralH. J. T. Hildyard.

10th Brigade (Major-General J. T. Coke).

11th Brigade (Major-General A. S. Wynne).

19th, 28th, and 78th Field Batteries.

Corps Troops.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

1st Brigade (Major-General J. F. Burn Murdoch).

2nd Brigade (Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst).

3rd Brigade (Major-General the Earl of Dundonald).

ZULULAND.

For some weeks it appeared as though no move were contemplated; but on the 7th of May the machinery began to revolve. General Clery’s Division proceeded from Ladysmith to Modder Spruit, while Lord Dundonald and General Dartnell also prepared to move their troops out of camp at Bug’s Farm. Lord Roberts at this time had reached a point in the Free State level with Ladysmith, and Sir Redvers Buller thus became included in the scheme of advance, and was able to act in conjunction with him. The Boers, numbering some 7000 or 8000, were swarming on the Biggarsberg range, having prepared entrenchments on all points commanding the road from Ladysmith to the Transvaal and as far as Helpmakaar. They knew well by experience, however, the discomforts attendant on their position, for their only clear way of escape was by Laing’s Nek—the passes over the Drakensberg on the west, and Zululand on the east being now closed to them.

On the 11th of May activities began. Dundonald’s Cavalry Brigade and Clery’s Infantry Division were assembled in the neighbourhood of Sunday River Drift south of Elandslaagte. The General’s plan was to post his left at Elandslaagte and swing his right flank round by Helpmakaar and crumple the Boers up towards Dundee.

On the 12th Sir Redvers Buller, with the right column, moved towards Helpmakaar, following the same route as that taken by General Yule in his famous retreat from Glencoe, while General Hildyard (the central column) made a demonstration by crossing Sunday River, near the railway line, and Lyttelton’s Division (theleft column) prolonged the line farther west. Meanwhile, the brigades of Clery and Dundonald—over ruts and obstacles, mere apologies for roads—had reached Waschbank, and were facing the frowning heights of the Biggarsberg, which loomed large and ominous and threatening about fifteen miles in the distance.

The Biggarsberg region, now so pregnant with historical interest is so called after one of the early pioneers of Durban, an Englishman, named Edward Biggar, who in 1838 fought side by side with the Boers against Dingaan. Of the great range in those days a Natalian writer said: “Besides being the first eastern plateau terrace of the Drakensberg, musically termed ‘Quathlamba’ by the natives residing in it, it consists of two long lines of elevation, divided by great ravines abounding in romantic cascades, dizzy precipices, and great pointed peaks towering towards the heavens in fantastic forms, veritable mountain forts,—

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