BOERS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF CUTTING THE TELEGRAPH WIRESDrawing by Wal Paget
With troops refitted, General Kitchener and Colonel Campbell now sped north from Middelburg, bent on getting in touch with the quarry. General Kitchener was successful. At Blaauwbank, on the 29th, a brisk engagement—a brilliant chase by the 19th Hussars, followed by the 18th in support, and a rush with fixed bayonets—resulted in the recapture of the two pom-poms taken from the Victorians on the 11th of June, and the seizure of 32 prisoners and 20 waggons of Viljoen’s commando. The commandant himself made haste to withdraw to north and north-west of the Olifant.
On this day (29th) General Sir Bindon Blood, with Colonel Benson’s column, moved from Wonderfontein to Carolina. The march was not without incident, for by night, at Mooitley, the troops of Colonel Benson made a smart swoop upon a Boer laager, and possessed themselves of 17 prisoners, 50 horses, and 10 waggons. A few days later another descent on the marauders in the same neighbourhood swelled the list of captures by 29 prisoners (five of whom were Botha’s despatch riders), 70 horses, and 5 carts.
August opened with more surprises, skirmishes, and surrenders in other directions. At Diepkloof, on the Kruis River, General Kitchener, on the 3rd, dispersed a small commando, leaving two dead Boers on the field, and taking 13 prisoners. Colonel Park, between Lydenburg and Dullstroom, had also some exciting tussles, after which he proceeded to scour the country between Roos Senekal and the Tautesberg.
Lieutenant-Colonel Colville, from Greylingstad, spent the end of July in scouring the district north of the railway line between the Waterval River and Leeuwspruit, and defeating the mischievous activities of gangs under Alberts, Mears, and Pretorius. It must be remembered that these guerilla chiefs were paid £25 a month by the Boer Government for their services, and that they had this to gain and nothing to lose by adhering to their policy of resistance. The Boer Government, according to rumour, had now formed a new seat (its seats were so many and so portable that it is difficult to remember them!) at Watervalshoek, about twenty-six miles north of Greylingstad, consequently it was decided that this hotbed ofdisorder must be assailed without delay. Thereupon, on the 4th of August, three forces were moved out—Colonel Colville’s and Colonel Stewart’s (Johannesburg Mounted Rifles) to Rooipoort (ten miles west of Bethel), while Colonel Bewicke-Copley marched from Springs towards Watervalshoek. From Rooipoort Colonel Stewart searched the northern road through Drefontein and Saltpeter Krantz, while Colonel Colville exerted his vigilance along the southern route to Watervalshoek. He reaped his reward. At the junction of the Waterval River and Klipspruit he suddenly spied a Boer convoy—the convoy of General Alberts—on the march. Immediately all was excitement. Away went his gallant men, racing and galloping over a good seven miles, never ceasing their rush till the convoy was hounded down, till the whole bunch of guerillas, with 28 loaded waggons, 12 carts, 55 horses, 1400 cattle, and 2000 rounds of ammunition were seized.
Meanwhile, the Boer Government had again vanished into thin air!
Colonels Colville and Stewart moved to Standerton, while Colonel Bewicke-Copley hustled bands of flying Dutchmen, who disappeared into the valley of the Wilge.
General French, in the middle of July, organised a big combined movement to dislodge the raiders from the Camdeboo Mountains near Graaf Reinet. The activities of the troops, brilliant as they had been, had not entirely purged the Cape Colony of the offensive element, and gangs of guerillas were still popping out here and there, in their mischief assisted by traitors, whose Janus faces it took some time to unmask. General French’s efforts were now directed against rebels and raiders, and in a particularly successful series of hunts several Boers were killed and wounded, and 31 prisoners, mostly Cape rebels, were captured.
The combined commandos of Fouché and Myburg made an unusual demonstration on the 14th of July, and actually attacked the Connaught Rangers, under Major Moore, who, while escorting a convoy, were camped in a position between Aliwal North and Jamestown. It took some hours of determined fighting to beat off the ferocious enemy, who were splendidly posted on high hills, and were only defeated by dusk. Three officers and 17 of our wounded were left to tell the tale of stubborn resistance. The enemy were pursued by Colonel Munro, and caught after a wearing chase south-west of Jamestown. Some of their number were killed and some were forced to retreat upon the “Connaughts,” who, as may be imagined, received them in passing with considerable warmth.By the end of the month, Fouché, owing to the incessant vigilance of Colonel Munro and Major Moore, found the Colony too hot to hold him. He therefore betook himself across the Orange near Aliwal North. But Kruitzinger kept up the excitement by dodging in the mountains south of Cradock. From thence he pounced, on the 21st of July, upon Colonel Crabbe and his column. The sudden outburst of musketry at close quarters, as it were from the bowels of the hills, caused the horses to stampede, and the loss of 200 horses at a critical moment was found to be no trifling matter. A horrible tussle ensued, but luckily at the end of the day Colonel Crabbe was able to withdraw to Mortimer Station with his force, five of whom were wounded.
Concentration Camp at Norval’s Pont
Colonel Scobell’s encounter with the enemy on the 23rd was more happy in its results. He formed part of the cordon which was pushing the enemy towards the Orange, and during the operation the indefatigable Colonel Lukin and 90 Cape Mounted Rifles under Captain Cosgrove made a grand swoop upon Lategan’s laager, fought and defeated 150 of the foe, captured 10 prisoners (including a field-cornet, Buys by name) and 105 saddles and horses. But it was what may be called a “touch-and-go” affair, for at onetime Lieutenant Welby with only twelve men was surrounded by forty Boers, whom he withstood for an hour till rescued. Not less successful were the columns of Colonels Doran and Wyndham and the energetic Captain Lund. (This officer, on the 19th, secured a waggon containing the rifles of Smits’ commando.) But such of the enemy as got away now dispersed under cover of darkness into the remote bridle-paths, and bided their time in their well-chosen coigns of vantage, where in ones and twos they were unassailable. General French was therefore obliged to arrange a backward and southward movement of the fan of columns from a line Vlakfontein, Richmond, Middle Mount, Middelburg, Schombie, Steynsburg, Stormberg, so as to force the scattered bands northwards again. From the 29th of July to the 3rd of August was passed in this manœuvre, wearing but remunerative, for by the end of this time the raiders slipped through the loopholes intentionally made by the columns, which had been ordered to contract their fronts for this purpose, and once more the troops (extended laterally on a line Beaufort West, Pearston, Drennan Station, Cameron’s Glen, Cathcart) had the satisfaction of pressing the enemy north towards the line of blockhouses on the Steynsburg-De Aar line. The only big commando that remained south was Scheepers’, which a detached force of 10th Hussars, 12th Lancers, and two guns proceeded to chase.
The process of attrition was going forward slowly and surely. The numbers of captures were monthly increasing, but the organised system of intimidation pursued by the Boer leaders against both burghers, who, if left to themselves, would have surrendered, and natives, who went in fear of their lives, and became informants, made the work of settlement exceedingly harassing. In these circumstances, Lord Kitchener “considered it advisable to form some specially mobile columns for independent and rapid action in different parts of the country, generally at some distance from the operations of other troops.” These columns were given a free hand in respect to their movements, and acted at any time on intelligence gained by themselves in addition to such as might be received from headquarters.
DELAGOA BAY.Drawing by Donald E. M’Cracken.
In May Sir Alfred Milner paid a visit to England, and his reception in Great Britain left no doubt in the mind of people at home and abroad regarding the determination of the Government to adhere to their South African policy. The King conferred on him the dignity of a Baron, and both in the City of London and in that of Cape Town there were rejoicings at the honour done to one who had served the cause of Great Britain with such skill and unswervingdevotion. In August Lord Milner returned to his duties as High Commissioner for South Africa and Administrator of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, much benefited by the brief rest from his labours.
As it was found necessary to adopt sterner measures to crush the lingering guerilla warfare, Lord Kitchener issued, on the 7th of August, the following Proclamation:—
“Whereas the late Orange Free State and the late South African Republic have been annexed to his Majesty’s dominions;“And whereas his Majesty’s forces are and have for some considerable time been in complete possession of the seats of Government of both the aforesaid territories, with their public offices, and the whole machinery of administration, as well as of all the principal towns and the whole of the railway lines;“And whereas the great majority of the Burghers of the two late Republics, to the number of thirty-five thousand, exclusive of those who have fallen in the war, are now either prisoners or have submitted to his Majesty’s Government, and are living peaceably in towns or camps under the control of his Majesty’s forces;“And whereas the Burghers of the late Republics still in arms against his Majesty are not only few in numbers, but have lost almost all their guns and munitions of war, and are devoid of regular military organisation, and are therefore unable to carry on regular warfare or to offer any organised resistance to his Majesty’s forces in any part of the country;“And whereas those Burghers who are still in arms, though unable to carry on regular warfare, continue to make isolated attacks upon small posts and detachments of his Majesty’s forces, to plunder or destroy property, and to damage the railway and telegraph lines, both in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal and in other portions of his Majesty’s South African Dominions;“And whereas the country is thus kept in a state of disturbance, checking the resumption of agricultural and industrial pursuits;“And whereas his Majesty’s Government is determined to put an end to a state of things which is aimlessly prolonging bloodshed and destruction and inflicting ruin upon the great majority of the inhabitants, who are anxious to live in peace and to earn a livelihood for themselves and their families;“And whereas it is just to proceed against those still resisting, and especially against those persons who, being in a position of authority, are responsible for the continuance of the present state of lawlessness, and are instigating their fellow-Burghers to continue their hopeless resistance to his Majesty’s Government;“Now therefore I, Lord Kitchener, &c., under instructions from his Majesty’s Government, proclaim and make known as follows:“All commandants, field cornets, and leaders of armed bands, being Burghers of the late Republics, still engaged in resisting his Majesty’s forces, whether in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal or in any other portion of his Majesty’s South African Dominions, and all members of the Governments of the late Orange Free State and the late South African Republic, shall, unless they surrender before the 15th of September next, be permanently banished from South Africa; the cost of the maintenance of the families of all Burghers in the field who shall not have surrendered by 15th September shall be recoverable from such Burghers, and shall be a charge upon their property movable and immovable in the two Colonies.”
“Whereas the late Orange Free State and the late South African Republic have been annexed to his Majesty’s dominions;
“And whereas his Majesty’s forces are and have for some considerable time been in complete possession of the seats of Government of both the aforesaid territories, with their public offices, and the whole machinery of administration, as well as of all the principal towns and the whole of the railway lines;
“And whereas the great majority of the Burghers of the two late Republics, to the number of thirty-five thousand, exclusive of those who have fallen in the war, are now either prisoners or have submitted to his Majesty’s Government, and are living peaceably in towns or camps under the control of his Majesty’s forces;
“And whereas the Burghers of the late Republics still in arms against his Majesty are not only few in numbers, but have lost almost all their guns and munitions of war, and are devoid of regular military organisation, and are therefore unable to carry on regular warfare or to offer any organised resistance to his Majesty’s forces in any part of the country;
“And whereas those Burghers who are still in arms, though unable to carry on regular warfare, continue to make isolated attacks upon small posts and detachments of his Majesty’s forces, to plunder or destroy property, and to damage the railway and telegraph lines, both in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal and in other portions of his Majesty’s South African Dominions;
“And whereas the country is thus kept in a state of disturbance, checking the resumption of agricultural and industrial pursuits;
“And whereas his Majesty’s Government is determined to put an end to a state of things which is aimlessly prolonging bloodshed and destruction and inflicting ruin upon the great majority of the inhabitants, who are anxious to live in peace and to earn a livelihood for themselves and their families;
“And whereas it is just to proceed against those still resisting, and especially against those persons who, being in a position of authority, are responsible for the continuance of the present state of lawlessness, and are instigating their fellow-Burghers to continue their hopeless resistance to his Majesty’s Government;
“Now therefore I, Lord Kitchener, &c., under instructions from his Majesty’s Government, proclaim and make known as follows:
“All commandants, field cornets, and leaders of armed bands, being Burghers of the late Republics, still engaged in resisting his Majesty’s forces, whether in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal or in any other portion of his Majesty’s South African Dominions, and all members of the Governments of the late Orange Free State and the late South African Republic, shall, unless they surrender before the 15th of September next, be permanently banished from South Africa; the cost of the maintenance of the families of all Burghers in the field who shall not have surrendered by 15th September shall be recoverable from such Burghers, and shall be a charge upon their property movable and immovable in the two Colonies.”
The Proclamation was the result of correspondence which had taken place between Sir H. E. M’Callum, Governor of Natal, and Mr. Chamberlain. The Governor’s telegram, dated 24th July, ran thus:—
“I sent you by last mail long minute submitted to Ministers containing following suggestions:“Protracted continuance of hostilities vitally affecting interests of Natal is viewed with grave concern. Raids into the Colony frequently render it impossible for loyalists to return to farms and avocations. Feeling of unrest among natives created by raids, revenue suffering, trade paralysed, railways monopolised by military, towns overcrowded with refugees and persons awaiting return to Transvaal, stock being affected with diseasedue to introduction of captured stock from the new Colonies, famine prices prevailing, Colony still subject to censorship and martial law.“Under these circumstances Ministers advocate sterner measures to crush present guerilla warfare. They point out that Boers still fighting have little to lose, that their women and children are protected and well treated, and that their farms are safe from confiscation, therefore Boers free from anxiety and encouraged to continue in the field, growing accustomed to life of pillaging and looting, and communicate frequently with refugee camps which thus are source of danger. Those who are not rebels know that if captured they will be treated as prisoners of war and released at the conclusion of hostilities.“Ministers believe that excellent effect would be produced if it were made generally known that if Burghers now in the field do not surrender by given date, say, within one month, cost of maintenance of all women and children will be chargeable against immovable property of Burghers in the field; also that Boer generals and leaders in the field should be informed that unless they and their commandos surrender by date specified they will be banished from South Africa for life when captured.“In making these observations and recommendations Ministers disclaim intention of appearing to reflect on military operations, of which they realise the immense difficulties. They will continue to render the Imperial Government every assistance to secure settlement and pacification.”
“I sent you by last mail long minute submitted to Ministers containing following suggestions:
“Protracted continuance of hostilities vitally affecting interests of Natal is viewed with grave concern. Raids into the Colony frequently render it impossible for loyalists to return to farms and avocations. Feeling of unrest among natives created by raids, revenue suffering, trade paralysed, railways monopolised by military, towns overcrowded with refugees and persons awaiting return to Transvaal, stock being affected with diseasedue to introduction of captured stock from the new Colonies, famine prices prevailing, Colony still subject to censorship and martial law.
“Under these circumstances Ministers advocate sterner measures to crush present guerilla warfare. They point out that Boers still fighting have little to lose, that their women and children are protected and well treated, and that their farms are safe from confiscation, therefore Boers free from anxiety and encouraged to continue in the field, growing accustomed to life of pillaging and looting, and communicate frequently with refugee camps which thus are source of danger. Those who are not rebels know that if captured they will be treated as prisoners of war and released at the conclusion of hostilities.
“Ministers believe that excellent effect would be produced if it were made generally known that if Burghers now in the field do not surrender by given date, say, within one month, cost of maintenance of all women and children will be chargeable against immovable property of Burghers in the field; also that Boer generals and leaders in the field should be informed that unless they and their commandos surrender by date specified they will be banished from South Africa for life when captured.
“In making these observations and recommendations Ministers disclaim intention of appearing to reflect on military operations, of which they realise the immense difficulties. They will continue to render the Imperial Government every assistance to secure settlement and pacification.”
A telegram followed from Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Kitchener containing the draft of the Proclamation, which was to be issued with the least possible delay. Lord Kitchener was desired before issuing it, however, to communicate its terms to the Governors of Cape Colony and Natal, and ascertain whether their governments agreed to them. The proposal was approved by the Colonial governors, the document received a few emendations, and was issued as above.
There was, naturally, an outcry at all sterner measures that were proposed, by what may be called the “Prolong-the-War Party”—the pro-Boer orators who were daily, by their excited utterances, betraying the Boers into the belief that their showy sympathy would bring about practical results. But in reality the stern measure was intended as a merciful measure to save desperate men from a suicidal policy of resistance to the inevitable, the country from devastation, and women and children from suffering. Their territories were annexed, their leaders, most of them, were exiles or prisoners, hostilities had developed from guerilla warfare to simple brigandage and outrage, and the British were keeping up the supply of troops with the determination of “fighting to a finish.” Indeed, by the middle of 1901, there were 138,000 regulars, 58,000 Colonials, 23,000 yeomen, 20,000 militia, and 10,000 volunteers—a total of 250,000 men under arms in South Africa. With this ever-increasing multitude bearing down upon them, the days of the belligerents were numbered, but this they doggedly refused to believe, or, even if they believed the worst, they decided—like the wasp who parts with his sting only to die—on leaving behind them the largest legacy of pain and trouble the circumstances would admit.
The South African Constabulary by the middle of the year had grown into an effective force, and were operating from the vicinity of the railways and occupying fortified posts, and thus rendering themselves exceedingly valuable in checking the efforts of the enemyto pass through the cordon around the cleared districts. The Boers, by the loss of their ox-waggons, were seriously impeded in regard to their supply arrangements, and the series of captures which took place in all parts of the country made a considerable drain on their numbers in the field. Still, small gangs of three to four hundred men roving loosely over the country could, in cases of emergency, concentrate and cause vast trouble and annoyance and even danger to the small mobile columns, broken up as they were, in order to operate over vast areas in search of the scattered hordes.
Viewing the intense labour and increasing strain suffered by the Commander-in-Chief at this time, it is pleasing to quote the letter of an officer competent to speak regarding the magnificence of the steady if slow work that was being accomplished:—
“We are eleven hours a day in the saddle on patrol duty, and good solid work is being done by mobile columns. You will not get much of our movements through the Press, as the policy of secrecy is really the only safe one with the Cape Colony now undermined by rebels from north to south. It would be difficult to over-praise Lord Kitchener for his remarkable power of self-control and ability to keep his own counsel. His ceaseless efforts to get the right men into the higher and brigade commands are recognised by all of us who have suffered in the past from incompetent leaders. In spite of the clap-trap that is being talked in Parliament by ignorant and vain knights of the shires, I can assure you that a more humane and pacific general never directed a force on active service, and this testimony is from Boer and British alike.”
“We are eleven hours a day in the saddle on patrol duty, and good solid work is being done by mobile columns. You will not get much of our movements through the Press, as the policy of secrecy is really the only safe one with the Cape Colony now undermined by rebels from north to south. It would be difficult to over-praise Lord Kitchener for his remarkable power of self-control and ability to keep his own counsel. His ceaseless efforts to get the right men into the higher and brigade commands are recognised by all of us who have suffered in the past from incompetent leaders. In spite of the clap-trap that is being talked in Parliament by ignorant and vain knights of the shires, I can assure you that a more humane and pacific general never directed a force on active service, and this testimony is from Boer and British alike.”
Considerable stir was created in England among the so-called humanitarians regarding the mortality of children in the concentration camps, where the Boer families had of necessity to be housed and cared for. The mortality was certainly high, but on strict inquiry it was found that mainly through the ignorance, listlessness, and idleness of the Boer mothers the sick infants were treated wrongly or neglected. Dr. Jane Waterston, late President of the Women’s Rand Relief Committee, in a letter to theCape Times, with level-headed brevity discussed some points which the Boer sympathisers had carefully ignored. She pointed out that—
“Ordinary colonial women who have been through the stress and strain of the last two years are not very favourably impressed by the present stir in England over the assumed privations of the Boer women and children. If looting, flogging, ruining, and train-wrecking can be dignified by such a name as war, they hold that in all matters of supply our fighting men, who, as well as fighting our battles, guard our women-folk or our sick men, injured by wounds or disease in our service, come first and foremost; after them come our own civilian population; and lastly come our prisoners, or those Boers who have surrendered or been brought in.”
“Ordinary colonial women who have been through the stress and strain of the last two years are not very favourably impressed by the present stir in England over the assumed privations of the Boer women and children. If looting, flogging, ruining, and train-wrecking can be dignified by such a name as war, they hold that in all matters of supply our fighting men, who, as well as fighting our battles, guard our women-folk or our sick men, injured by wounds or disease in our service, come first and foremost; after them come our own civilian population; and lastly come our prisoners, or those Boers who have surrendered or been brought in.”
Again she said:—
“Large as was the sum collected in Great Britain by voluntary subscriptions, at no time did the women and children of the loyal colonial refugees of the poorer classes receive more than mere sustenance. Judging, however, by some of the hysterical whining going on in England at the present time it would seem as if we might neglect or half starve our faithful soldiers, and keep our civilian population eating their hearts out here as long as we fed and pampered people who have not even the grace to say ‘thank you’ for the care bestowed on them.“As we see it, the problem before our military men is, how to manage, feed, and care for large numbers of women and children, and yet not feed the enemy and so prolong the war, or rather existing brigandage. If the women are left on the farms with food, that food will be promptly handed over to the commandos, who would lightly take it all, and trust to British soft-heartedness not to let their women and children die of starvation, but to replenish all the empty larders by means of scattered convoys, which would give them at the same time grand chances of loot and first-rate practice in sniping. To obviate this the military have had to make up their minds either to let the women and children starve on their farms or else gather them into large concentration camps. This war has been remarkable for two things: first, the small regard that the Boers, from the highest to the lowest, have had for their womankind; and secondly, the great care and consideration the victors have had for the same, very often ungrateful, women.“It is the fault of the Boer men, not ours, that their women and children are in concentration camps. The task of ourpro tem.rulers is not made easier by the fact that no consideration of the stuff on a supply train being partly meant for their own wives and children would hinder Boer husbands and fathers from wrecking the train and destroying the food. They comfort themselves with the thought that the soldiers may have to go on half rations and tighten their belts, but ‘these fools of English will serve out as usual the daily ration to the refugee camps.’ At present there is the danger that the Boers will waken up to have a care for their womenfolk, and will go on fighting for some time so as to keep them in comfortable winter quarters at our expense, and thus our women and children will lose a few more of their husbands and fathers.”
“Large as was the sum collected in Great Britain by voluntary subscriptions, at no time did the women and children of the loyal colonial refugees of the poorer classes receive more than mere sustenance. Judging, however, by some of the hysterical whining going on in England at the present time it would seem as if we might neglect or half starve our faithful soldiers, and keep our civilian population eating their hearts out here as long as we fed and pampered people who have not even the grace to say ‘thank you’ for the care bestowed on them.
“As we see it, the problem before our military men is, how to manage, feed, and care for large numbers of women and children, and yet not feed the enemy and so prolong the war, or rather existing brigandage. If the women are left on the farms with food, that food will be promptly handed over to the commandos, who would lightly take it all, and trust to British soft-heartedness not to let their women and children die of starvation, but to replenish all the empty larders by means of scattered convoys, which would give them at the same time grand chances of loot and first-rate practice in sniping. To obviate this the military have had to make up their minds either to let the women and children starve on their farms or else gather them into large concentration camps. This war has been remarkable for two things: first, the small regard that the Boers, from the highest to the lowest, have had for their womankind; and secondly, the great care and consideration the victors have had for the same, very often ungrateful, women.
“It is the fault of the Boer men, not ours, that their women and children are in concentration camps. The task of ourpro tem.rulers is not made easier by the fact that no consideration of the stuff on a supply train being partly meant for their own wives and children would hinder Boer husbands and fathers from wrecking the train and destroying the food. They comfort themselves with the thought that the soldiers may have to go on half rations and tighten their belts, but ‘these fools of English will serve out as usual the daily ration to the refugee camps.’ At present there is the danger that the Boers will waken up to have a care for their womenfolk, and will go on fighting for some time so as to keep them in comfortable winter quarters at our expense, and thus our women and children will lose a few more of their husbands and fathers.”
In corroboration of Dr. Waterston’s statements it may also be noted that the Government, while spending hundreds of thousands of pounds monthly on the Boer refugees, had devoted only £50,000 towards the Imperial Relief fund for helping the loyalists.
Naturally, among the British sufferers, the continual attempts to propitiate an irreconcilable enemy were looked upon with disgust and even suspicion, and very rejoiced were they to find that steps were taken to arrest and remove Boer sympathisers in Johannesburg and elsewhere, who were known to be assisting in a widening conspiracy to get surrendered burghers to return to their commandos, and so reproduce a recrudescence of hostilities. On all sides the lying tongues of the Boer party, who had declared war and quitted the field, strove to urge the remnants towards further resistance by declaring that Great Britain was divided against itself, and that it had not sufficient endurance to see the matter through.
CHURCH SQUARE, PRETORIA.Drawing by Donald E. M’Cracken.
ORANGE RIVER COLONY—AUGUST
At this time, as we know, the troops of Generals Bruce-Hamilton and C. Knox were engaged in clearing operations to the south of the Riet River, but, in consequence of a recrudescence of activity in the south-eastern districts of the Orange Colony, the operations were somewhat curtailed, and attention was directed to the offending quarter. The activity showed itself firstly on the 12th of August, when some 250 Boers under Boshoff, fleeing from the trap that Elliot had prepared for them, burst through the line of blockhouses near Sanna’s Post. Secondly, another marauding gang of the same size, under Kruitzinger, in evading French’s hunters, east of Norval’s Pont, had penetrated the Springfontein-Bethulie line near Providence Siding, on their way to Boesmans Kop—an old and favourite haunt. Finally, a similar party under Smuts and Dreyer, on the 15th, had succeeded in squeezing past the line of police posts on the Modder, to the north of Petrusburg. These three movements suggested the possible concentration of the raiders in the now clear area between Wepener, Rouxville, and Smithfield, and consequently General Knox at once directed his attention to this quarter, in order to prevent any fresh junction of forces, and the entry of swelled commandos into Cape Colony. He therefore moved his troops from west to east of the railway, so as to interpose them between the enemy and the river line. Major Damant’s column was detached from General Bruce-Hamilton’s command, and the Royal Dragoons, under Lord Basing, were brought by rail from the Transvaal to Springfontein, while Colonel Western moved from Bloemfontein to Bethulie to join General Hart, who with Col. the Hon. H. D. Murray’s column, the Connaught Rangers, was guarding the river west and east of Aliwal North.
Nor was this all. Colonel Sir Henry Rawlinson was ordered to pursue Boshoff’s guerillas, who were scurrying through the Bloemfontein-Ladybrand line, but these nimble ones, bent rather on flight than fight, knowingly avoided contact with the pursuers. Kruitzinger, gathering the bedraggled remnants of commandos as he went, veered towards the Basuto border, hugged it gingerly, and stealthily crept towards the river, so that, on the morning of the 4th of September, he succeeded with 300 men,despite the vigilance of our troops, in effecting a crossing into Cape Colony at Kiba Drift. The Boers did not, however, escape Major Damant, who was hunting for them in the neighbourhood of Spitzkop. He scented them out at Oudam, to the west of Boesmanskop, and was off with 300 mounted men, 2 guns, and a pom-pom to attack them. The marauders were on the alert, and they, on the 14th, galloped off as fast as their mounts would carry them. For a good ten miles galloped hunters and hunted, till at last the quarry, dispersing, sought almost inaccessible refuge in the Marsfontein Hills. But 4 prisoners, 20 horses, 6 mules, 5 rifles, a heliograph, and the Commandant’s despatch-box fell into Major Damant’s hands. From the prisoners it was discovered that they formed part of Delarey’s gang, who were moving under Dreyer to reinforce Kruitzinger at the Cape. Meanwhile, Lord Basing was hunting around Boesmanskop, and Colonel Thorneycroft’s two columns, under Colonel Minchin and Major Copeman, were working their way (from Reddersburg and Smithfield respectively) towards Zandfontein, twelve miles east of Rouxville, where they met at the end of August. The enemy, ensconced in the kloofs, crannies, and kopjes between Zastron and the Orange River, succeeded in evading them, not a very marvellous feat considering their intimate acquaintanceship with the geographical features of this locality.
Colonel Pilcher’s two columns of General Knox’s force, under Colonel Taylor and Major Lean, now marched from the west into Bloemfontein and Edenburg, and from thence south to Bethulie, while Colonel Pilcher pushed up the valley of the Caledon towards Smithfield, thus freeing the troops of Colonel Thorneycroft and Lord Basing, who were able to scour further east. About this time, 25th of August, Colonel Sir Henry Rawlinson, marching south from Dewetsdorp, encountered a detached bunch of Smuts’ men scuttling east of Reddersburg. A brilliant chase to the north-east followed, the mounted troops under Major Gosset pursuing with such dash that 25 prisoners out of the party of 120 were secured, and 30 of their horses captured. In September, after the column had obtained supplies at Edenburg, further activities all along the Basuto border were engaged in, and, on the 8th the mischievous hordes were driven north from a position they had taken up in the vicinity of Elandsberg. But Smuts and his following, despite the close proximity of Colonel Thorneycroft, were successful in finding a loophole at Kiba Drift, and escaped into Cape Colony on the 4th. There he was quickly “spotted” by General Hart, who pursued him towards Ladygrey. Both General Hart and General French had now their hands full. Kruitzinger’s and Smuts’ men, who had effected a crossing, required to be dealt with, so, in order to reinforce General French,Colonel Pilcher moved from the Caledon Valley to Burghersdorp on the 7th of September.
We left General Plumer, on the 11th of August, surrounded by the prizes won during his expedition to block the exits to the west during General Elliot’s sweep from the Vaal to the Modder River (see Map, p. 89). These prizes included 32 prisoners, 346 horses, 566 cattle, 28 waggons, and 39 carts. Four days later he was off again on fresh Boer-hunting adventures. On his right moved Colonel Colvin,viâDoornhoek and Roodepan to Zoutpans Drift on the Orange River; on his left marched Colonel Sir J. Jarvis through Koffyfontein and Luckhoff. The place between the Kimberley-Luckhoff line was a desert. Not a Boer showed his nose. Only some cattle, which were captured, betrayed his recent haunts. General Plumer concentrated his force at Zoutpans Drift on the 21st, and on the 23rd began a new move. The Orange River Valley to the east and all its mysterious kloofs were thoroughly searched, and the loopholes, whence the hunted might evade the vigilance of General French’s troops on the other side, were watched with lynx eyes. But the Boers were not to be caught napping in this way. At last, however, a commando under Lategan, which had been forced to run from the Cape Colony before Colonel Byng’s men, came plump upon Plumer, who was then on the look-out, south of Philippolis. A spirited chase ensued, and the fugitive band was relieved of 8 comrades, 4 rifles, 46 horses, and 11 vehicles. General Plumer’s force reached Prior’s Siding and Springfontein on the night of the 30th of August, and, one may almost say, without waiting to draw breath, was off again to join in the hunt for Kruitzinger.
After a brief rest at Glen, General Elliot, on the 18th, spread his troops on the line Glen, Sanna’s Post, Ladybrand, with the intention of making a sweep to the north-east and a final wheel towards the Wittebergen Mountains. The object of this wheel was to drive such Boers as might be lurking about into the arms of General Campbell, who, it may be remembered, was waiting at the Brandwater Basin to mop them up. On General Elliot’s left were Colonel Barker and Major Pine Coffin, working from Winburg to co-operate towards the Tabaksberg and Doornberg; while in the Senekal district was an outstretched net—composed of the troops of General Spens, Colonel Rimington, and Colonel Wilson—ready to haul in any interlopers that might be driven north by General Elliot’s activities.
Haasbroek, whose laager was reported to be somewhere in the vicinity, was now the main object of the hunt. Report said that he, with 300 men, was on the Korannaberg; consequently this eminence was surrounded on three sides by the Mounted Infantry from Thabanchu and Ladybrand working one way, while Colonel Baker and Major Pine Coffin so disposed themselves that the enemy, retreating toward Doornberg, would meet with a warm welcome. But Haasbroek had bolted. When, after a long and weary night march, Colonel Lowe’s doughty men scaled the ridges, they found on the summit only some twenty Boers, two of whom were killed and one wounded. This was especially disappointing, as on the 22nd a commando, said to be under De Wet, cropped up most unexpectedly, and pounced upon a small party of the Black Watch Mounted Infantry, which had been detached from Ladybrand to Modderpoort for the purpose of driving such Boers as they might find towards General Elliot’s right front. And this commando—their superiors in numbers and in point of position—was not to be overpowered, and eventually, after a fierce tussle, in which five of the enemy were killed, including the field cornet, the party was captured. Hearing of the disaster, General Broadwood, who was on General Elliot’s right at Maquatlings Nek, rushed at once to the rescue, making a forced march throughout the night of the 22nd, but without avail. The enemy and their British prize had disappeared. The prisoners were afterwards released—the Boers having already too many mouths to feed and no means of securing their haul. From this time to the 26th the Division halted in the region of the Korannaberg, and the time spent in awaiting supplies was occupied in completely scouring the surrounding country. On the 26th the march towards Wittebergen was resumed. Of course, Haasbroek and his friends Froneman, Koen, and Hermanns Steyn were soon aware of the direction taken by the troops, and were not slow in vacating the position that they had taken up at Wonderkop, and moving north. By the 30th the columns were spreading out on a line—Retief’s Nek, Commando Nek—hunting as they went in valley and kloof, in ridge and ravine, for signs of the marauders. Tiring and fatiguing were the explorations, and often unremunerative; indeed, as a total, the results of so much energy were disappointing. Horses, cattle, and waggons were found in good quantities, but only 13 Boers were killed, 11 wounded, and 21 prisoners taken after numerous exciting expeditions. The rest of the guerillas were driven either in the direction of General Campbell’s troops or towards the north. General Elliot moved to Winburg on the 6th, where he was joined later by Colonel Barker and Major Pine Coffin, who pursued their investigations of the country some days longer.
The columns of General Spens, moving from Heilbron to Kroonstad between the 6th and the 12th of August, performed a prodigious amount of work, Major Gough and his Mounted Infantry alone securing 12 prisoners, 900 cattle, 30 carts, 2 waggons, and 186 horses.
On the 16th the General again made a grand effort, which, however, was not crowned with brilliant results such as those just chronicled. The mounted troops of Colonel Jenner and Major Gough, with four R.H.A. guns, made a laborious night march of 35 miles from a farm north of Welvart, in order to surround Lindley before dawn. The thing was splendidly managed, but to no purpose. The town was vacated. The “slim” ones had slunk off in a manner as disappointing to us as it was commendable in them. So, on the 18th, General Spens was joined six miles north-west of Lindley by his worn and disgusted band. Little rest did they get. On the 20th they were again on the move, for it was necessary that the rolling stone of the Boers should not be allowed anywhere to pause and gather moss in the form of recruits and roving raiders. The country north of the Lindley-Reitz road, as far as Lovedale, was diligently searched. From Stryfontein on the 21st Colonel Jenner and Major Gough were despatched in the direction of two farms on the Lindley-Bethlehem road, which were known to be hotbeds of hostility. A brilliant night march brought the troops to their destination, but the Boers were on the alert, and in the grey of the morning put spurs to their horses, and fled wildly in the direction of the valley of the Valsch River, followed by salvoes from the pursuing force. General Spens continued his sweep, and at last at Olievenfontein (on the Lindley-Kroonstad road) came in touch with the enemy. Here, his left flank guard had 200 to tackle—a desperate band who came, for a wonder, to close quarters, and fought with dogged valour.
It was with no little difficulty that the foe were eventually driven off, and that with the loss of gallant young Wallis (Royal Irish Fusiliers) and 2 men, while 13 of the men were wounded. The force neared Kroonstad by the 29th August, about which time a splendid officer, Captain Dick (Royal Irish Fusiliers), succumbed to wounds incurred while gallantly leading his men.
Colonel Rimington meanwhile had relaxed none of his efforts. A smart little affair on the 15th, in which he caught a Boer convoy trailing along near Doornkloof, some seventeen miles north-west of Lindley, helped to swell his “bag.” Then on the 17th, at Vechtkop, he dashed into a knot of 200 Boers under Waude, Mentz, and Boshoff, and sent them spinning, following hot foot for full eight miles till they dispersed in the mists of the south-east. That done he turnedhis attention to Trommel, near Reitz. Here he pounced on a small laager—secured 16 prisoners and some fat cart-loads of provisions, beside waggons and horses. He was back again at Kroonstad by the 28th. But two days later, he was to the fore taking his place in the scheme of General Elliot’s operations, which have been described, and, later, co-operating with General Spens and Colonel Wilson in their endeavours to intercept the roving bands. His activities were unending. On the 31st of August he “spotted” the commandos of De Vos and Lategan, chased and dispersed them, and secured the best part of their belongings; later, near Senekal, he made a dash on another convoy, chased it, and, after a good ten miles’ rush and a smart fight, killed 4 Boers and took 10 whole, together with 61 loaded waggons, 25 carts, horses, mules, and 2000 cattle. This with the loss of only 4 men wounded. On the 6th of September, after reconnoitring towards Blitzberg, Colonel Rimington returned, heavy with the spoils of war, to Kroonstad.
General Elliot
Here he was followed two days later by Colonel Wilson, who had been following an identical plan of pounce and pursuit on the right. He too had skirmished with good effort, first engaging some of De Vos’ men and sending them to the right-about, and secondly attacking Haasbroek’s commando, midway between Senekal and Ventersburg, and handling it somewhat roughly. Seven Boers were killed, 3 prisoners were taken, together with carts innumerable, full and empty, and cattle to the tune of 2000. The central column under General Spens, which all this time was moving direct on Senekal, worked brilliantly and scored some success, the total result being 5 Boers killed, 3 voluntarily surrendered, 11 prisoners, 34 Cape carts, and 1800 cattle captured.
In August, Colonel Garratt, who was following in rear of General Elliot’s movement on the Modder (see p. 89), marched from the junction of the Vet and Zand Rivers to Bultfontein. Here, on the 12th, he encountered a band of guerillas, took twoand killed two, and pursued the rest as far as the banks of the Zand River. Here he lost them, for horse flesh could do no more. Turning, he veered north towards Honing Spruit. In this direction, near the junction of the Rhenoster and Honing Spruit, was said to be the laager of Spanneberg, and consequently a force under Colonel the Hon. H. White (300 mounted men and 30 Burgher Police) was detached to deal with him. Through the night of the 18th the troops marched warily yet rapidly towards their prey, fearing that at any moment rumour of their approach might render the expedition—as these expeditions were so likely to be—futile. But no; by dawn the sleeping gang was surrounded; they opened their eyes to the consciousness that a small forest of British rifles had grown up around them, and that efforts of defence were useless. They had to deal with men who were more than their match—Simpson of the New Zealand Regiment, Quintal of the New South Wales Bushmen, and other splendid fellows before whom they were only too glad to run! One Boer lost his life in the scrimmage, twenty-five were made prisoners, and Steyn, late Landdrost of Vredefort, was among them. Carts, waggons, horses, cattle too, were taken possession of, and the smart little force, after having covered 56 miles in 36 hours, returned to headquarters, duly elated with their prize. It was now necessary to search in the region of the Losberg for fugitive bands, and to this end Colonel Garratt on the 21st crossed the Vaal at Lindique Drift. The mounted troops were eternally spying and scouring hither and thither, and their activity was not in vain. In the distance on the morning of the 24th loomed what appeared to be a convoy—a convoy moving towards Buffelshoek. In an instant the trackers were after it, and before long the hostile gang was caught, dispersed, their precious freight taken, and with it eight prisoners, carts, oxen, cattle, and horses. With this extra burden on their hands, the party, fatigued after the chase, were, as may be imagined, almost at the mercy of fate. Fate, as it happened, was capricious. Such of the Boers as had contrived to escape gave warning of the perilous position of the British force, and at noon returned with a party of 300 of their fellows, who had been collected from the skirts of the Gatsrand. A vigorous fight ensued. The Boers, doughty always, were now grown dashing, the spur of famine driving them to the valour of despair. Between both was the prize—the prize to be held by those who had won it; by now, infinitely more precious than in the winning—the prize to be recaptured by those who had all the calls of the flesh to prompt the spirit to battle and retaliation. This was indeed a tug of war. Till five of the afternoon—from noon till five—fought those men. The Boers, freshfrom the hills, hungering with a mighty hunger for their precious convoy—the British, worn with the long rush since daylight and the previous fight, but holding on, like the never-say-die fellows they are, till the desperadoes were at length driven off in the direction of the Vaal. But this engagement was costly, for one officer and one man were killed, and two men were wounded.
This brilliant little force, which was covering the establishment of posts by the South African Constabulary, two days later made another successful night march from the Losberg to Leeuwpoort. More prizes of horses, mules, cattle, and prisoners—numbering thirteen—were the fruit of their pluck and perseverance, and in the net they had the satisfaction of discovering a nephew of General Delarey, a person who counted for considerably more than the poor tramps who had joined the guerilla proceedings for reasons of mere bellicose vagrancy.
On the 2nd of September Colonel Garratt marched to Meyerton and Vereening, and from thence moved by rail to Paardekop Station on the Standerton line. This was a precautionary measure, for rumour now pointed to possible raids on the Natal border, and to frustrate any concentration of hostile bodies Colonel Garratt was to commence working from Paardekop towards Wakkerstroom.
We left Colonel Allenby in the occupation of Breedt’s Nek, which the Boers had evacuated.
NIGHT ATTACK ON A BOER CONVOY BY MOUNTED INFANTRY UNDER COLONEL WILLIAMSDrawing by John Charlton from a Sketch by a British Officer
On the 7th of August a movement was made to obtain possession of the Damhoek and Pampoen Kraal Passes. At the latter place a gang of forty Boers was effectively tackled by the Volunteer Service Company and the King’s Own Scottish Borderers under Major Mayne. The whole bunch was most skilfully surrounded and secured, and with them Mr. F. Wolmarans, chairman of the late Volksraad. The passes were occupied, and from the 10th to the 12th of August stray Boers were unearthed by Colonel Allenby in the southern slopes of the Magaliesberg, between Nooitgedacht and Grobelaar’s Pass. Nine Boers were brought in, fourteen rifles, some waggons, carts, and dynamite. About this time Major Butler (in command of the Carabineers) was detached from Colonel Allenby’s column to co-operate with General Gilbert Hamilton, who had been engaging in the incessant harrying of Liebenberg’s commando and other raiders east of Lichtenburg. Marching by night and by day, he had hunted and tracked, worried and pursued, but hadnever succeeded in bringing the enemy to open fight. Now, on his return to Ventersdorp on the 11th, he arranged, with the assistance of Major Butler’s men from the north, for a simultaneous attack upon Koperfontein and Basfontein. The attack was splendidly managed, and on the morning of the 14th, after some vigorous fighting, in which Lieutenant Till (6th Dragoon Guards) and one man lost their lives and 5 men were wounded, 10 prisoners, 27 waggons, and 100 cattle were captured. Three Boers were killed.
Major Butler and the Carabineers rejoined Colonel Allenby at Damhoek, while General Hamilton reconnoitred towards Tafel Kop and made more prisoners.
General Barton now watched the establishment of posts eastwards over the hill from Breedt’s Nek, while Colonels Kekewich and Allenby, having completely effected their sweeping operations, moved to Commando Nek for supplies. But of course the dispersed Boers were forced to hide somewhere, so, going north, they chose Zwartkopies, whence after some skirmishing they were driven by Colonel Allenby. Meanwhile Colonel Kekewich, moving at the same date (19th) from Commando Nek, ferreted along the bed of the Crocodile River and effected the capture of fourteen of the enemy together with their horses. So vigorous were the operations of both these officers that the Boers in the district began to feel that their days were numbered, and that they had better surrender with a good grace. This twenty-nine of them did at Beestekraal, where Colonel Allenby was operating, on the 23rd, while on the 25th sixteen more (including T. Kruger, a nephew of the ex-President) surrendered to Colonel Kekewich, who was then at the junction of the Crocodile and Elands Rivers. As most of the remaining raiders had now betaken themselves to the rugged and almost inaccessible country on the north, where pursuit would have been useless, Colonel Kekewich veered south, while Colonel Allenby moved west, with a view to watching the west of Magaliesberg in the direction of Rustenburg. September found them posted at points where they might work in combination against Kemp’s commando—Colonel Allenby at Bashoek (a northern fringe of the Magaliesberg) and Colonel Kekewich near Magato Pass.
At this date, owing to the unceasing exertions of General Barton, Colonels Kekewich and Allenby, and Lord Basing, together with the extension of the system of Constabulary posts, excellent results had been obtained in the area bounded on the north by the Magaliesberg, on the south by the Vaal, on the east by the Pretoria line, and on the west by the Frederikstad-Breedt’s Nek line of blockhouses. Scarcely a Boer was to be seen. The raiders were forced to the extreme limits, east and west, north and south, and against their safety in these outskirts, further operations were soon to be directed.
Their work over in the Marokani range and the valley of the Harts River, Lord Methuen and General Fetherstonhaugh by parallel routes moved to Klerksdorp. General Fetherstonhaugh marched (on the 9th) his two columns along the right bank of the Vaal, searching in every hole and cranny for nests of marauders and destroying such supplies as he found. Colonel Hickie unearthed few Boers; but Colonel Williams, by a knowing dodge worthy of De Wet himself, set a trap which enclosed a whole convoy plus eighteen prisoners, cattle, and vehicles. His manœuvre was this. Report spoke to the fact that the convoy of Commandant Vermaas on the 19th was trekking towards Katdoornplaats, north of Wolmaranstad. Accordingly, he sent off his convoy under escort towards Leeuwfontein, thus giving the effect that he was on the march in that direction. Meanwhile he reserved his alert Colonials (the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and Bushmen) for an enterprise after their own heart. In the dead of night they were ordered to proceed towards their goal, and at early dawn when they reached Katdoornplaats they traced the tale of Boer departure and the direction of it by the wheel-tracks in the soil. Not a moment did they lose. Off on a gallop of twelve miles they went, lessening, as they plunged onward, the distance between themselves and the lumbering convoy. At last they were even with it; the ping of bullets told the Boers that their flight was a failure and that they had met their match. And so it came to pass that this mettlesome force, after an expedition during which they covered sixty miles in twenty-seven hours, returned to headquarters with the spoil before named, every one of the captured vehicles being brought away with them. Among the prisoners was the late Landdrost of Bloemhof and a telegraphist with complete tapping apparatus.
While these columns were moving on Klerksdorp, which they reached on 22nd and 23rd of August, Lord Methuen, on the left, had been skirmishing his way along, fighting both with the gang of Delarey and with that of Vermaas, fights of no limp nature, for he came into Klerksdorp on the 22nd with 13 prisoners, 23 voluntarily surrendered Boers, 400 trek oxen, 1848 cattle, 43 waggons, 19 carts, 76 horses, and 8 mules. He had lost one man, and one officer and eight men had been wounded in the various frays. In addition to these commandos which were trounced on the journey, report said that General Kemp with some 800 followers was flitting between the kopjes and crevices on the south-west of Olifant’s Nek. An effort therefore had to be made to meet this hostile multitude, and to this end the various troops moved by the 1st of September to situations which were supposed to enclose the marauders and afford them no loopholes of escape. Unfortunately, Lord Methuen’s menwere covering a wide expanse of ground, and were forced to move to block a reported attempt to escape towards Lindley Poort; and through the gap thus created between the columns of Lord Methuen and those of Colonel Hickie, the Dutch leader contrived to bolt. But in his dashing feat only his mounted men could follow him, and consequently a large body of Boers with waggons, carts, ammunition, indeed all his effects, were left behind, and by degrees were unearthed from their burial-places in the kloofs and taken possession of.
Lord Methuen, on the 2nd of September, marched from Brakfontein to Roodival (on his return journey to Zeerust), and while proceeding to the north-west he suddenly espied a convoy in the distance. A mad chase ensued, followed by a brisk fight, in which 6 Boers were left dead on the field. Of prisoners 22 were taken, together with waggons, carts, cattle, and ammunition in enormous quantities. Passing on, Lord Methuen spent the following days in capturing more vagrants; but on the 5th his troops came in for stiff work. They were now in the country of scrub and jungle in the Marico Valley, and round them on their right were Delarey and Field-Cornet Van Tonder, whose convoy had been captured, while on the left were Commandants Botha and Liebenberg. In addition to these was the Marico commando under Commandant Lemmer and Field-Cornet Louw, who attacked the rearguard. A stirring action followed, the brunt of which was sustained by the 5th Imperial Yeomanry and the Welsh Squadrons. Eleven Boers were killed, 8 wounded, and 11 prisoners, while 10 waggons and 5 carts were captured. This haul was somewhat increased by the contributions of Colonel Von Donop, who with his detached column had taken a more southerly route through Quaggashoek and the lead mines, where he collected 3 Boers, 39 vehicles, and some cattle. The total British casualties on the march between Brakfontein and Zeerust were 1 officer and 12 men killed, and 2 officers and 28 men wounded.
While Lord Methuen returned to Zeerust and General Hamilton marched to Kaffir’s Kraal (fifteen miles north-west of Klerksdorp), General Fetherstonhaugh remained for a few days trapping the stragglers from Kemp’s force, in which operation he was assisted by Colonel Kekewich, who afterwards (on the 7th) retraced his stepsviâMiddelfontein towards Naauwpoort. Colonel Allenby on the 9th got backviâRustenburg to Commando Nek, having indulged, as he went, in various exciting exploits. At Schaapkraal he scented out a Boer laager and by night surrounded it so cautiously and so cleverly that the Boers, though they made an effort at fight, had not the ghost of a chance. Unfortunately in the skirmish two men of the Scots Greys fell. Of the enemy, 22 were made prisoners and 2 were killed. Rifles, carts, loaded waggons, and ammunition swelled the total.
Colonel Grenfell spent July and the better part of August in operating against General Beyer’s gang, which still hovered around the west of the Pietersburg line. These marauders in small numbers were captured occasionally, but they were more inclined for manslaughter than for war, and seldom came out into the open, contenting themselves merely with train-wrecking. On the 4th of July, taking advantage of the thick cover that surrounded the line north of Naboom Spruit Station, Commandant Lys and his party lay in wait for a train for which a mine had been previously prepared. The mine exploded to time and the train with its escort of Gordon Highlanders was brought to a standstill. Then from their comfortable ambush the enemy proceeded to fire, killing Lieutenant Best and 9 Gordon Highlanders, an artillery-man, 2 Engineers, the driver, fireman, guard, and 4 natives. The success of this scheme so delighted the ruffians that they tried the same game again and again, and on the 31st of August a still more tragic affair took place. The train was travelling between Waterval and Hamanskraal Stations, and had descended a deep cutting when an explosion occurred. Before the victims could recover the shock of derailment the Boers hiding on the banks rained bullets among their number, killing and wounding at their pleasure. Colonel Vandeleur (Irish Guards), a valuable young officer of great promise, fell; with him among the dead lay 13 men, 1 traveller, and 2 natives. Four officers were wounded, besides 20 men and a woman. The mail-bags were seized by the marauders, who were well pleased with their murderous success.
To effect their chastisement and secure the line in future from further assaults, General Barton quickly despatched from the Hekpoort Valley, by Zilikat’s Nek, to Waterval, a flying column. The force (250 men and two R.H.A. guns), under Colonel Hacket Thompson, pursued the enemy, and near Wagon Drift caught them. A brisk fight ensued, four of the gang were killed and a portion of the captured mails was recovered, after which the column moved back to Eerste Fabriken, and from thence to Waterval by the 8th of September.
The first exploit of General Walter Kitchener in August was the surprise of a convoy near Diepkloof, some thirty-five miles north ofMiddelburg, where he was encamped. Colonel Park meanwhile searched for the remnants of Viljoen raiders in the rugged region of the Tautesberg, and that done, marched to Paardekloof. A week later, as a larger and more rapid swoop upon the enemy was contemplated, General Kitchener from his own, Colonel Campbell’s, and Colonel Park’s columns organised a flying column consisting of the 18th and 19th Hussars, 4th Mounted Infantry Battalion, two guns of the 81st Battery R.F.A., a pom-pom, and sixty “Devons,” who were to be carried in carts. With this column he left Diepkloof at 4A.M.on the 10th for Krokodil Drift on the Olifants River, while Colonels Campbell and Park, with the remainder of the infantry (in waggons), proceeded to Rooikraal and Holnek.
General Kitchener now scoured the valley of the Blood River, and finding it clear of guerillas, and hearing that Viljoen’s horde had betaken itself to the banks of the Moos stream, he pushed thither with his cavalry, over the stream and on towards the valley of Elands River, leaving the Mounted Infantry with the pom-pom to guard Krokodil Drift. Up to this time no vestige of the quarry had been sighted. But now from the low banks fringing Elands River, dust in the distance, some seven miles off, seemed to hint of a moving convoy. The vision was tantalising. But an almost impregnable jungle stretched between the dust-cloud and the British troops, and the General decided that a cut across country would be futile. From his observations he calculated that this convoy moving down the left bank of the river towards Commissie Drift might be headed off at that point; therefore the column was soon pushing along the right bank towards the drift in expectation of a fight. But the Boers were wary. By the time the British force gained the drift, they discovered to their dismay that the enemy had retraced their steps and were off to the south-west. After this disappointment the column moved to Uyskraal, and from thence on the 16th they pushed up the Elands Valley to Vrieskrall. The 19th Hussars, who were in advance, soon found to their cost that the dense jungle in that region was populated with Boers, and at midday the officer commanding sent back word that he was being hard pressed. The Boers, indeed, were on all sides, and as fast as the officers advanced, they found themselves surrounded. The predicament threatened to be disastrous, for four of the officers and nineteen of the troopers had been seized when the 18th Hussars and guns, which had been pushed forward in support, turned the scale of events. Fighting, fast and furious, in the thick of a dense mass of scrub and tangle was carried on, the enemy sticking to the bush with fierce tenacity, the Hussars steadily pushing them back and back to the region of some kopjes where, in the shadow of the night, they sought refuge. Fortunately, during thescrimmage the foe were forced to let loose the officers and men whom they had captured, but five gallant troopers were lost. The Boers made use of the darkness to effect their escape, and by the morning the whole of their position was evacuated. General Kitchener now rejoined Colonel Campbell at Roorikraal, the flying column was broken up, and the 4th Mounted Infantry returned to Colonel Park.
From this date till the end of the month the columns moved slowly down to the railway, those of General Kitchener and Campbell by Blinkwater to Wonderfontein (which was reached on the 4th September), and that of Colonel Park by Roosenekal and Welpoort to Bankfontein (five miles north-east of Middelburg), which was reached on the 8th. The combined “bag” contained 53 prisoners, 22 voluntarily surrendered burghers, 2072 cattle, 76 horses, 60 waggons, and 24 carts. Sixteen Boers were killed. A 15-pounder gun and three Maxims were found by Colonel Park, the enemy having first taken care to destroy them.
Colonel Benson meanwhile had been untiringly sweeping the district between Carolina and Ermelo, causing the Boers to live in a state of sleepless anxiety lest he, in one of his midnight swoops, should catch them snoring. On the 15th he arranged another of these expeditions, the direction being Warmbaths, some thirty-four miles north-east of Carolina, where he then was. He moved first to Nooitgedacht. Here he dropped his encumbrance in the form of waggons, &c.; and thus lightened, he stole with his brilliant little band, Colonel Wools-Sampson leading them, across the pitch-black veldt towards the enemy’s camp. For thirty-four miles they crept on their errand of surprise. The stratagem was successful. A good number of Boers escaped, but they went horseless and cattleless. Fifty-two prisoners were taken, the majority of whom were captured in a dashing rush by the Eastern Transvaal Scouts under Major Young. Among the captives was a captain of scouts for the Carolina districts, and also the father-in-law of Mr. Schalk Burger. Colonel Benson now returned to Carolina, where he remained till the 21st of August.
Of the activities of Colonel Benson’s force the correspondent of theMorning Postreported enthusiastically. He said:—
“The intelligence officers of the column, for some time under Colonel Wools Sampson, did their work in a most efficient manner. By various clever tactics they would locate bodies of the enemy, perhaps twenty and sometimes even fifty miles away from the camp. On their information a sudden swoop would be planned, and carried out, as a rule, successfully. On occasion the whole column would march several miles in the opposite direction to that of the object of attack. Then after the camp was formed, the horses fed, and the men about to turn in for the night, sudden orders would be given for the mounted men to march. The plans were not known generally, even by the officers, till within an hour of marching. Then the camp would be left in charge of the infantry, and the mounted menwould proceed as silently as possible on their night march of from twenty to fifty miles. If guns were taken the wheels would be muffled, and every possible precaution would be taken to keep the movement secret. Through the intelligence officers knowing the roads thoroughly very few mishaps have occurred. The march was usually done in column of fours until the point was reached whence the attack was to be made. Even on the darkest nights, when it was difficult for a trooper to see his horse’s head, only very rarely has a man got off the road and lost the column. After a couple of months’ practice the men became adepts at the work.“When the point was reached from which the attack was to be made the force would be divided into several independent squadrons and sent round the position occupied by the enemy, each squadron leader being carefully instructed about what he had to do, whether his part in the plan was to hold a nek over which the enemy would probably attempt to escape, or whether it was to rush the position at a given time. The usual plan was to make the attack just as daylight began to appear. The leading squadrons detailed for the work, as a rule with Colonel Benson at their head, would gallop for the farmhouse or laager and be right among the Boers before they were properly awake. Latterly the Boers have been taking greater precautions, and some of the commandants have made it a rule to be saddled up by three o’clock every morning. The districts operated in—Carolina, Ermelo, Middelburg, and Lydenburg—have become noted during the war for the stubborn resistance they have made. In these districts there are still considerable numbers of the enemy about, mostly split up into small lots of ten, twenty, or perhaps fifty men. There are many farms which have not been visited by any column. These are situated away from the main roads, and hidden in kloofs and valleys among the hill ranges. These contain stores of food and serve as resting-places for the enemy. The work of destroying these food depôts is steadily prosecuted, but is necessarily a slow process. The Boers, however, obtain abundant supplies from the Kaffir kraals, mealies, meat, and salt being the principal food, and, judging from the condition of the prisoners taken, the Boers thrive on it.”
“The intelligence officers of the column, for some time under Colonel Wools Sampson, did their work in a most efficient manner. By various clever tactics they would locate bodies of the enemy, perhaps twenty and sometimes even fifty miles away from the camp. On their information a sudden swoop would be planned, and carried out, as a rule, successfully. On occasion the whole column would march several miles in the opposite direction to that of the object of attack. Then after the camp was formed, the horses fed, and the men about to turn in for the night, sudden orders would be given for the mounted men to march. The plans were not known generally, even by the officers, till within an hour of marching. Then the camp would be left in charge of the infantry, and the mounted menwould proceed as silently as possible on their night march of from twenty to fifty miles. If guns were taken the wheels would be muffled, and every possible precaution would be taken to keep the movement secret. Through the intelligence officers knowing the roads thoroughly very few mishaps have occurred. The march was usually done in column of fours until the point was reached whence the attack was to be made. Even on the darkest nights, when it was difficult for a trooper to see his horse’s head, only very rarely has a man got off the road and lost the column. After a couple of months’ practice the men became adepts at the work.
“When the point was reached from which the attack was to be made the force would be divided into several independent squadrons and sent round the position occupied by the enemy, each squadron leader being carefully instructed about what he had to do, whether his part in the plan was to hold a nek over which the enemy would probably attempt to escape, or whether it was to rush the position at a given time. The usual plan was to make the attack just as daylight began to appear. The leading squadrons detailed for the work, as a rule with Colonel Benson at their head, would gallop for the farmhouse or laager and be right among the Boers before they were properly awake. Latterly the Boers have been taking greater precautions, and some of the commandants have made it a rule to be saddled up by three o’clock every morning. The districts operated in—Carolina, Ermelo, Middelburg, and Lydenburg—have become noted during the war for the stubborn resistance they have made. In these districts there are still considerable numbers of the enemy about, mostly split up into small lots of ten, twenty, or perhaps fifty men. There are many farms which have not been visited by any column. These are situated away from the main roads, and hidden in kloofs and valleys among the hill ranges. These contain stores of food and serve as resting-places for the enemy. The work of destroying these food depôts is steadily prosecuted, but is necessarily a slow process. The Boers, however, obtain abundant supplies from the Kaffir kraals, mealies, meat, and salt being the principal food, and, judging from the condition of the prisoners taken, the Boers thrive on it.”
While the Eastern Transvaal Scouts, under Major Young, were making their reputation for dash in this district, the South African Constabulary and Morley’s Scouts, under Captain Wood, had been doing splendid service patrolling the region of Bronkers Spruit. Boers were known to be in the valley, and the Constabulary posts were threatened by the dangerous contiguity of snipers sheltered in networks of dongas beyond them, but the strength of the Boers was not determined till the 17th, when the small British force came suddenly upon a gang of some 800 marauders which had halted at Middelburg. There was nothing to be done but to attack, and that with rapidity, and before the sudden and really splendid rush of Constabulary and Scouts the great Boer mass gave way—their horses stampeded—and many were wounded, while 11 were taken prisoners. But alas for the tide in the affairs of men! It turned at the most critical moment. The Boers, becoming suddenly aware of the small number of their assailants, made haste to rally their forces and boldly lunged back on the British party. Hand-to-hand fighting, ferocious and sustained, followed, during which Captain Morley of the Scouts was dangerously wounded. Back and back went the Constabulary, on and on came the Boers, till they had recovered the 11 prisoners that had been taken from them and secured 14 of the British to boot. In the fierce fray five of our men were wounded and one killed. On the following day an effort was made by Colonel Bewicke Copley to catch the guerillas and punish them, but without avail. He made a forced march fromSprings towards Middelburg, but the commando which had wrought such havoc among Captain Wood’s men was nowhere to be seen. Report said it had disappeared towards the south-east, so after dispersing such stragglers as were found hanging about the line of march preparing to locate themselves in the comfortable sniping-places of spruit and donga, he proceeded to Olifantsfontein, whence he sent for further supplies from Springs. At Olifantsfontein he stayed a week, then went to Springs for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Benson. This officer, owing to some misunderstanding regarding the urgency of the orders calling him west, and being ignorant of the Boer concentration that had been effected on the 17th, moved from Carolina only on the 21st of August. He marched by Vaalbank to Middelkraal; from thence he veered northwards; drew supplies from Middelburg, and again proceeded on his course towards Brakfontein, near the sources of the Wilge River. Here Colonel Bewicke Copley, after a twenty-mile march, had arrived, and here at dawn on the 31st he came in collision with 450 Boers; fought them; wounded Lieutenant Roos of the Staats Artillery and some others; took 7 prisoners, some horses, cattle, and waggons, and sent the rest scattering to the south.
Colonel Benson, too, was doing his share of the Boer-hunting. Hearing that the enemy had gone south towards the upper part of the Waterval Valley, he decided on another of his night marches for the surprise of the foe. Leaving his waggons in charge of the infantry, he led his mounted troops towards the laager at Kroomdraai (west of Ermelo). The pickets were “rushed,” and before the startled Boers could reach their horses, the gallant Scottish Horse plunged in among them. Fourteen prisoners were taken. The late Landdrost of Heidelberg, and Brink, a member of the Special Government Court for the trial of prisoners, were of the number.
At the conclusion of the adventure—in which he captured 12 waggons, 17 Cape carts, 80 horses, 514 cattle, 11 mules, and some supplies—and in consequence of the Boers having escaped beyond pursuit to the south-east, Colonel Benson proceeded early in September to the Delagoa line (Witbank Station), while Colonel Bewicke Copley returned to Springs.