TRANSVAAL (WEST)

MISHAP TO THE SCOTS GREYS AT KLIPPAN, FEBRUARY 18, 1902Drawing by H. W. Koekkoek

A co-operative movement was now organised for the purpose of making a descent on Langkloof (near the junction of the Olifant and Wilge Rivers), where the Boer Government was shortly expected to arrive, but owing to the nature of the rocky and intersected country, the arrangements were impeded. The said Government, by the time the troops surrounded the place, had got some hours’ start and were well on their way to Pietersburg. Colonel Park,who was unavoidably prevented from reaching his assigned position in time, proceeded to investigate the kloofs on the western side of Rhenoster Kop, and unearthed seventeen prisoners and many oxen, horses, and vehicles.

Operations continued in February as before, save that Colonel Von Donop at Wolmaranstad had succeeded temporarily to the command of Lord Methuen’s mobile troops. On the 23rd an empty convoy of over one hundred waggons was despatched to refill at Klerksdorp and bring back supplies to Wolmaranstad. The escort was composed of 5th Imperial Yeomanry, three companies 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, two guns and a pom-pom, under Colonel W. C. Anderson (Imperial Yeomanry). Till the 25th all went well. Then, before dawn, as the convoy was moving from its bivouac ground ten miles south-east of Klerksdorp, a furious attack was made on the advance guard from the darkness of dense bush on the left. Flashes and forks of flame only showed where the enemy plied his rifles, but on this point the guns and pom-pom at once opened fire. The waggons of the convoy, which had stampeded back to the old camping-ground in the midst of the first shock of attack, were again closed up as rapidly as possible from the rear. A second and a third attack upon the rearguard were boldly and indeed brilliantly repulsed. Then Colonel Anderson, fearing the increased pressure on his rearguard, ordered the convoy to proceed towards Klerksdorp, instructing his transport officer to try and trot the waggons clear of the fire. He then made noble efforts to extricate his force, supporting the hard pressed rearguard, as it struggled to cover the retirement, with his guns and such troops as could be collected from the front. But without avail. The enemy under Delarey and Kemp, old and accomplished hands, kept the advantage. They had had the first word in the darkness; they were superior in numbers; they pressed triumphantly forward and caught the convoy where they had expected to catch it—in crossing the Jagd Spruit. The difficulty of the operation, the terror and stampede of natives and beasts in the hail of bullets that fell on them, contributed to the disaster. The convoy was lost. The escort, gallant and stubborn, was overpowered; 5 officers and 53 men fell, 6 officers and 123 men were wounded. The remainder, with the exception of 3 officers and 106 men, who reached Klerksdorp, were captured. They were subsequently released. Though the pursuit of the Boers was at once taken up, little could be done. The empty waggons were burnt, and the captors had dispersed as rapidly as they had assembled.

In order to intercept, if possible, the captured guns, and prevent Delarey from moving to the Marico district, Lord Methuen resumed the vigorous pursuit of him in which he had for sometime previously been engaged. To this end the column started from Vryburg on the 2nd of March. Colonel Kekewich was directed to send a column from Wolmaranstad towards Rooirantjesfontein, there to meet the column under Major Paris (R.M.A.), from Vryburg, while Colonel Rochefort was directed to cross the Vaal from Orange River Colony and drive Delarey towards the columns heading for Rooirantjesfontein.

LORD METHUEN RALLYING HIS BROKEN FORCES AT TWEEBOSCHDrawing by C. M. Sheldon

The movement seemed excellently planned, and every precaution to avert surprise taken, but nevertheless Delarey and Kemp made an overwhelming and successful attack on Lord Methuen, with the result that this commander, who has worked with indefatigable zeal throughout the war, was dangerously wounded and taken prisoner. Since the details of this unfortunate affair havenot yet been fully sifted, it is best to satisfy ourselves with reading Lord Methuen’s own report of the events connected with the Tweebosch disaster:—

From Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen to the Chief of Staff.“Klerksdorp,13th March 1902.“Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that, with the object of preventing the force under General Delarey from moving northwards to the Marico district through the gap between Lichtenburg and Mafeking, I sent orders to Colonel Kekewich, C.B., at Wolmaranstad, to send a column towards Rooirantjesfontein, where he would meet a column under Major Paris, Royal Marine Artillery, from Vryburg.I, at the same time, directed Colonel Rochefort to cross the Vaal from Orange River Colony, and to move northwards by the Bamboo Spruit, or the Harts River, and thus drive General Delarey towards the columns which were heading for Rooirantjesfontein.2. Colonel Kekewich informed me, on the 2nd March, that he was sending a column, consisting of 1600 mounted men, lightly equipped; while Colonel Rochefort wired that the command would contain about 1000 mounted men.3. The column, under Major Paris, which I accompanied, consisted of the following units:—5th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, 184 men, under Captain Jennings; Cape Police (including Special Police), 233 men, under Major Berangé; Cullinan’s Horse, 64 men, under Captain Cullinan; British South African Police, 24 men, attached to Cullinan’s Horse; 4th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one section, under Lieutenant Venning, D.S.O.; one pom-pom ‘GG’ Section, under Captain Geoghegan, Royal Field Artillery. These units did not belong to Major Paris’s column, but were an addition, placed under his command.Major Paris’s column before the fresh units were placed under his command at Vryburg:—86th Company Imperial Yeomanry, 110 men; Diamond Fields Horse, 92 men; Dennison’s Scouts, 58 men, under Captain Browne; Ashburner’s Light Horse, 126 men, under Captain Ashburner; 38th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one section, under Lieutenant Nesham; one pom-pom, ‘D’ Field Artillery; 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 200 men, under Captain Montagu; 1st Battalion Royal North Lancashire Regiment, 100 men, under Lieutenant Paul. The infantry were attached to the columns at Vryburg.4. My written instructions to Major Paris were that I should give him daily the direction of the march, and the time of starting for the following day; in case of any fighting, that he should look after the mounted brigade, and that I would stand by the guns and infantry, and give him general instructions.The mounted troops were the best horsed force that I have yet had under me, added to which the Cape Police, under Major Berangé, held an exceptionally high reputation, as did also the local corps. I remarked to Major Paris, on leaving Vryburg, that I could not believe in the numbers given to me. He again made inquiries, and satisfied himself that the numbers were correct.5. I informed Colonel Kekewich, by wire, that I should reach Rooirantjesfontein on 7th March.6. 2nd March.—The column under Major Paris left Vryburg at 5A.M.; the Supply column consisting of 39 ox waggons, and the baggage of 46 mule waggons; owing to heavy rains which had fallen during the night the last waggon did not reach O’Reiley’s Pan, a distance of thirteen miles, till 5P.M.I therefore at once sent a message to Colonel Kekewich to inform him that I should be one or perhaps two days late at Rooirantjesfontein. I had previously informed him that the position of the enemy had rendered it necessary for Major Paris’s column to bear more to the north-west towards Polfontein (254).7. 3rd March.—Owing to the animals being exhausted by the previous day’s trek, the column was only able to reach Grootpan (Bestersfarm), a distance of six miles. During the march the Police, forming the advance guard under Major Berangé, killed three local rebel Boers, by name Steyn, Bester, and ‘Janson.’8. 4th March.—At Grootpan I heard that large droves of cattle and Van Zyl’s (rebel) commando had moved eastwards towards Doornbult (197). That morning Major Paris’s column marched to Graspan, two miles beyond Mooiplatz (244 B), a distance of thirteen miles, where there was plenty of water. As there had been no rain in these parts it was very doubtful whether, if I trekked by Klipdrift (188), as I had told Colonel Kekewich I intended to do, I should find water at Vaalkop (183), or Rietvlei (279).9. 5th March.—I therefore moved to Boschpan (68) in the morning, which I found all but dry, and in the afternoon to Barberspan, a distance of twenty-one miles, where there was plenty of water. Here I was informed that there had been rain at Leeuwkuil (95), and that there certainly was water at Leeuwkuil (23).10. 6th March.—The column moved off at 5A.M., the ox convoy having moved at 4A.M.The whole force reached Leeuwspruit (232) about 7.30A.M.Here I sent on a detachment of Cape Police to Leeuwkuil (95) to make certain of the existence of water.There had been some sniping at the rearguard by about 100 of Van Zyl’s commando, and seeing some confusion, I went back myself, sending at the same time for a section of the 38th Battery.I found the men forming the rear screen, which consisted of the 86th Company Imperial Yeomanry, very much out of hand and lacking both fire discipline and knowledge of how to act. There seemed to be a want of instructed officers and non-commissioned officers. Van Zyl’s commando being accurately shelled by the section Royal Artillery, eventually retired and moved round our right flank to Tweebosch (247), while the column halted at Leeuwspruit (232).On receiving information that there was no water at Leeuwkuil (95), I decided to move to Tweebosch (247), where Van Zyl’s commando had taken up a good position in the bed of the Klein Harts River.Major Berangé with the Police, the section 4th Battery, and the pom-pom ‘GG’ Section, were ordered to move straight on Tweebosch (247), while Dennison’s Scouts, supported by Cullinan’s Horse, were to move round the enemy’s left flank.The commando retired rapidly, the Police under Major Berangé working with the greatest quickness.Much praise is due to Major Berangé for the way in which he handled his men.Our casualties were one killed and two wounded.As the day was hot, and it was then 11.30A.M., I decided to remain at Tweebosch (247).11. 7th March.—At 3A.M.the ox convoy moved off towards Leeuwkuil (23) with an escort of 1 squadron Cape Police; 86th Company Imperial Yeomanry; 200 men 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; 100 men 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; 1 section 4th Battery Royal Field Artillery; 1 pom-pom ‘GG’ Section. The whole was under command of Captain Montagu, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.The main column moved off at 4A.M.as follows:—Advance guard:—1 squadron Cape Police; Ashburner’s Light Horse; 1 pom-pom Diamond Fields Artillery.Main body:—Cullinan’s Horse; British South Africa Police; Detachment 5th Regiment, Imperial Yeomanry; 1 section 38th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.Rearguard:—Diamond Fields Horse; Dennison’s Scouts.Thinking there was a likelihood of an attack in rear, I had called Major Paris’s attention to the necessity of putting thoroughly reliable troops in the rearguard.The country through which we passed was flat and without brush. At daybreak (about 5A.M.) a heavy fire was opened on the rearguard. The fire was so intense that the rear screen was at once reinforced by the section of the 38th Battery, and one pom-pom Diamond Fields Artillery. A portion of Ashburner’s Light Horse, and the detachment of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, were extended on either flank, round which the enemy seemed intent on galloping.At this time (5.30A.M.) the ox convoy was about a mile in front of the baggage, which was moving in four lines well closed up. I therefore ordered the ox convoy to halt, and the baggage to join it. Major Berangé was directed to move, with the police that were with him, towards a fresh body of the enemy, who now appeared on our right rear. The time was about 6A.M.I joined the ox convoy about this time, and found Captain Tilney, D.A.A.G., assisting Captain Montagu, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, Commanding the Infantry, to extend the men to meet the attack on our right flank.The section 4th Battery Royal Field Artillery and the pom-pom ‘GG’ Section had already taken up a position to meet this attack.I could see no mounted men available, and could only assume that they had all gone to reinforce the rear screen, so I ordered the baggage to continue to advance, it being impossible to move the ox convoy, as the native drivers were lying under the waggons and refused to move.I would here like to draw attention to the orderly manner and complete control exercised by Lieutenant Hartley, Transport Officer to Major Paris’s column, over the mule waggons during the fight.The Boers, attacking the rearguard, had come on with great determination rightamongst the rear screen, but the support to the screen having been reinforced by Ashburner’s Light Horse, Cullinan’s Horse, and some of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, held them in check till about 6.30A.M.A heavy attack then developed on our rear and right flank, which caused, as far as I could see, all mounted troops then in rear (some of them which had originally been there had moved off towards the flanks to meet threatened attacks) to break, and they galloped in complete confusion past our left flank. The section 38th Battery was thus left unprotected, but continued in action until every man, with the exception of Lieutenant Nesham, was hit. I am informed that this officer was called upon to surrender, and on refusing to do so was killed.The attack on our right flank was pressed home to within six hundred yards of the gun of the 4th Battery.I then gave orders for a kraal about one mile along the road to Leeuwkuil to be occupied, and sent orders to rally the mounted men on the rising ground beyond the kraal. The kraal was occupied by Major Paris and Major Berangé with some forty men. The mounted troops in the meantime continued their retirement. I remained with the guns, 4th Battery, and Infantry until my horse was killed, and my thigh fractured by a bullet.They held out in a most splendid manner until about 9.30A.M., when all the men round the guns had been shot down and Lieutenant Venning, commanding the section, had been killed. In the meantime the two guns and a pom-pom with Commandant Cellier’s commando had rendered the kraal untenable, when the men at the kraal and those remaining with the baggage surrendered.The Boer Commandants present were—Delarey, Vermaas, Cellier, Kemp, Van Zyl, D. Botha, and Lemmer. It is difficult to estimate the number of Boers on the field, but I should say about 1500. General Delarey treated myself and the prisoners with the greatest kindness, and left General Cellier to look after our wounded on the ground; they buried eleven of their own men at Kareelaagte, and, from what I can learn, their losses were heavy.I beg to draw attention to the good work done by Major Paris in endeavouring to keep the mounted troops in hand, and to the promptitude with which Captain Tilney, 17th Lancers, D.A.A.G., assisted in placing the Infantry round the convoy.I would also call attention to the gallant manner in which Lieutenants Nesham and Venning, Royal Field Artillery, stuck to their guns.Captain Montagu, commanding detachment 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, and Lieutenant Paul, commanding detachment 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, held on until further resistance was impossible. Civil Surgeon Prentice, with the rearguard, and Captain Thurston, Royal Army Medical Corps, with the guns, continued bandaging the wounded throughout the engagement.Colonel Townsend, C.B., my Principal Medical Officer, remained in the fighting line until he had received three wounds; he has, from the commencement of the campaign, always acted most gallantly.Captain Fernyhough did good work with the rearguard during the action. He has been of very great value to me ever since he has served under me.A large number of the Boers were dressed in khaki, many of them wearing the chevrons of non-commissioned officers. This, in several instances, led to misapprehension by our troops, and to losses by death, wounds, and capture among us. Owing to having been wounded and taken prisoner, I am unable to give any list of casualties. This report is, for the same reason, based solely on what came under my own observation and what I have been able to gather from the few officers with whom I have had the opportunity of speaking on the subject.”

From Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen to the Chief of Staff.

“Klerksdorp,13th March 1902.

“Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that, with the object of preventing the force under General Delarey from moving northwards to the Marico district through the gap between Lichtenburg and Mafeking, I sent orders to Colonel Kekewich, C.B., at Wolmaranstad, to send a column towards Rooirantjesfontein, where he would meet a column under Major Paris, Royal Marine Artillery, from Vryburg.

I, at the same time, directed Colonel Rochefort to cross the Vaal from Orange River Colony, and to move northwards by the Bamboo Spruit, or the Harts River, and thus drive General Delarey towards the columns which were heading for Rooirantjesfontein.

2. Colonel Kekewich informed me, on the 2nd March, that he was sending a column, consisting of 1600 mounted men, lightly equipped; while Colonel Rochefort wired that the command would contain about 1000 mounted men.

3. The column, under Major Paris, which I accompanied, consisted of the following units:—5th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, 184 men, under Captain Jennings; Cape Police (including Special Police), 233 men, under Major Berangé; Cullinan’s Horse, 64 men, under Captain Cullinan; British South African Police, 24 men, attached to Cullinan’s Horse; 4th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one section, under Lieutenant Venning, D.S.O.; one pom-pom ‘GG’ Section, under Captain Geoghegan, Royal Field Artillery. These units did not belong to Major Paris’s column, but were an addition, placed under his command.

Major Paris’s column before the fresh units were placed under his command at Vryburg:—86th Company Imperial Yeomanry, 110 men; Diamond Fields Horse, 92 men; Dennison’s Scouts, 58 men, under Captain Browne; Ashburner’s Light Horse, 126 men, under Captain Ashburner; 38th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one section, under Lieutenant Nesham; one pom-pom, ‘D’ Field Artillery; 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 200 men, under Captain Montagu; 1st Battalion Royal North Lancashire Regiment, 100 men, under Lieutenant Paul. The infantry were attached to the columns at Vryburg.

4. My written instructions to Major Paris were that I should give him daily the direction of the march, and the time of starting for the following day; in case of any fighting, that he should look after the mounted brigade, and that I would stand by the guns and infantry, and give him general instructions.

The mounted troops were the best horsed force that I have yet had under me, added to which the Cape Police, under Major Berangé, held an exceptionally high reputation, as did also the local corps. I remarked to Major Paris, on leaving Vryburg, that I could not believe in the numbers given to me. He again made inquiries, and satisfied himself that the numbers were correct.

5. I informed Colonel Kekewich, by wire, that I should reach Rooirantjesfontein on 7th March.

6. 2nd March.—The column under Major Paris left Vryburg at 5A.M.; the Supply column consisting of 39 ox waggons, and the baggage of 46 mule waggons; owing to heavy rains which had fallen during the night the last waggon did not reach O’Reiley’s Pan, a distance of thirteen miles, till 5P.M.I therefore at once sent a message to Colonel Kekewich to inform him that I should be one or perhaps two days late at Rooirantjesfontein. I had previously informed him that the position of the enemy had rendered it necessary for Major Paris’s column to bear more to the north-west towards Polfontein (254).

7. 3rd March.—Owing to the animals being exhausted by the previous day’s trek, the column was only able to reach Grootpan (Bestersfarm), a distance of six miles. During the march the Police, forming the advance guard under Major Berangé, killed three local rebel Boers, by name Steyn, Bester, and ‘Janson.’

8. 4th March.—At Grootpan I heard that large droves of cattle and Van Zyl’s (rebel) commando had moved eastwards towards Doornbult (197). That morning Major Paris’s column marched to Graspan, two miles beyond Mooiplatz (244 B), a distance of thirteen miles, where there was plenty of water. As there had been no rain in these parts it was very doubtful whether, if I trekked by Klipdrift (188), as I had told Colonel Kekewich I intended to do, I should find water at Vaalkop (183), or Rietvlei (279).

9. 5th March.—I therefore moved to Boschpan (68) in the morning, which I found all but dry, and in the afternoon to Barberspan, a distance of twenty-one miles, where there was plenty of water. Here I was informed that there had been rain at Leeuwkuil (95), and that there certainly was water at Leeuwkuil (23).

10. 6th March.—The column moved off at 5A.M., the ox convoy having moved at 4A.M.The whole force reached Leeuwspruit (232) about 7.30A.M.Here I sent on a detachment of Cape Police to Leeuwkuil (95) to make certain of the existence of water.

There had been some sniping at the rearguard by about 100 of Van Zyl’s commando, and seeing some confusion, I went back myself, sending at the same time for a section of the 38th Battery.

I found the men forming the rear screen, which consisted of the 86th Company Imperial Yeomanry, very much out of hand and lacking both fire discipline and knowledge of how to act. There seemed to be a want of instructed officers and non-commissioned officers. Van Zyl’s commando being accurately shelled by the section Royal Artillery, eventually retired and moved round our right flank to Tweebosch (247), while the column halted at Leeuwspruit (232).

On receiving information that there was no water at Leeuwkuil (95), I decided to move to Tweebosch (247), where Van Zyl’s commando had taken up a good position in the bed of the Klein Harts River.

Major Berangé with the Police, the section 4th Battery, and the pom-pom ‘GG’ Section, were ordered to move straight on Tweebosch (247), while Dennison’s Scouts, supported by Cullinan’s Horse, were to move round the enemy’s left flank.

The commando retired rapidly, the Police under Major Berangé working with the greatest quickness.

Much praise is due to Major Berangé for the way in which he handled his men.

Our casualties were one killed and two wounded.

As the day was hot, and it was then 11.30A.M., I decided to remain at Tweebosch (247).

11. 7th March.—At 3A.M.the ox convoy moved off towards Leeuwkuil (23) with an escort of 1 squadron Cape Police; 86th Company Imperial Yeomanry; 200 men 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; 100 men 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; 1 section 4th Battery Royal Field Artillery; 1 pom-pom ‘GG’ Section. The whole was under command of Captain Montagu, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.

The main column moved off at 4A.M.as follows:—Advance guard:—1 squadron Cape Police; Ashburner’s Light Horse; 1 pom-pom Diamond Fields Artillery.Main body:—Cullinan’s Horse; British South Africa Police; Detachment 5th Regiment, Imperial Yeomanry; 1 section 38th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.Rearguard:—Diamond Fields Horse; Dennison’s Scouts.

Thinking there was a likelihood of an attack in rear, I had called Major Paris’s attention to the necessity of putting thoroughly reliable troops in the rearguard.

The country through which we passed was flat and without brush. At daybreak (about 5A.M.) a heavy fire was opened on the rearguard. The fire was so intense that the rear screen was at once reinforced by the section of the 38th Battery, and one pom-pom Diamond Fields Artillery. A portion of Ashburner’s Light Horse, and the detachment of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, were extended on either flank, round which the enemy seemed intent on galloping.

At this time (5.30A.M.) the ox convoy was about a mile in front of the baggage, which was moving in four lines well closed up. I therefore ordered the ox convoy to halt, and the baggage to join it. Major Berangé was directed to move, with the police that were with him, towards a fresh body of the enemy, who now appeared on our right rear. The time was about 6A.M.

I joined the ox convoy about this time, and found Captain Tilney, D.A.A.G., assisting Captain Montagu, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, Commanding the Infantry, to extend the men to meet the attack on our right flank.

The section 4th Battery Royal Field Artillery and the pom-pom ‘GG’ Section had already taken up a position to meet this attack.

I could see no mounted men available, and could only assume that they had all gone to reinforce the rear screen, so I ordered the baggage to continue to advance, it being impossible to move the ox convoy, as the native drivers were lying under the waggons and refused to move.

I would here like to draw attention to the orderly manner and complete control exercised by Lieutenant Hartley, Transport Officer to Major Paris’s column, over the mule waggons during the fight.

The Boers, attacking the rearguard, had come on with great determination rightamongst the rear screen, but the support to the screen having been reinforced by Ashburner’s Light Horse, Cullinan’s Horse, and some of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, held them in check till about 6.30A.M.A heavy attack then developed on our rear and right flank, which caused, as far as I could see, all mounted troops then in rear (some of them which had originally been there had moved off towards the flanks to meet threatened attacks) to break, and they galloped in complete confusion past our left flank. The section 38th Battery was thus left unprotected, but continued in action until every man, with the exception of Lieutenant Nesham, was hit. I am informed that this officer was called upon to surrender, and on refusing to do so was killed.

The attack on our right flank was pressed home to within six hundred yards of the gun of the 4th Battery.

I then gave orders for a kraal about one mile along the road to Leeuwkuil to be occupied, and sent orders to rally the mounted men on the rising ground beyond the kraal. The kraal was occupied by Major Paris and Major Berangé with some forty men. The mounted troops in the meantime continued their retirement. I remained with the guns, 4th Battery, and Infantry until my horse was killed, and my thigh fractured by a bullet.

They held out in a most splendid manner until about 9.30A.M., when all the men round the guns had been shot down and Lieutenant Venning, commanding the section, had been killed. In the meantime the two guns and a pom-pom with Commandant Cellier’s commando had rendered the kraal untenable, when the men at the kraal and those remaining with the baggage surrendered.

The Boer Commandants present were—Delarey, Vermaas, Cellier, Kemp, Van Zyl, D. Botha, and Lemmer. It is difficult to estimate the number of Boers on the field, but I should say about 1500. General Delarey treated myself and the prisoners with the greatest kindness, and left General Cellier to look after our wounded on the ground; they buried eleven of their own men at Kareelaagte, and, from what I can learn, their losses were heavy.

I beg to draw attention to the good work done by Major Paris in endeavouring to keep the mounted troops in hand, and to the promptitude with which Captain Tilney, 17th Lancers, D.A.A.G., assisted in placing the Infantry round the convoy.

I would also call attention to the gallant manner in which Lieutenants Nesham and Venning, Royal Field Artillery, stuck to their guns.

Captain Montagu, commanding detachment 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, and Lieutenant Paul, commanding detachment 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, held on until further resistance was impossible. Civil Surgeon Prentice, with the rearguard, and Captain Thurston, Royal Army Medical Corps, with the guns, continued bandaging the wounded throughout the engagement.

Colonel Townsend, C.B., my Principal Medical Officer, remained in the fighting line until he had received three wounds; he has, from the commencement of the campaign, always acted most gallantly.

Captain Fernyhough did good work with the rearguard during the action. He has been of very great value to me ever since he has served under me.

A large number of the Boers were dressed in khaki, many of them wearing the chevrons of non-commissioned officers. This, in several instances, led to misapprehension by our troops, and to losses by death, wounds, and capture among us. Owing to having been wounded and taken prisoner, I am unable to give any list of casualties. This report is, for the same reason, based solely on what came under my own observation and what I have been able to gather from the few officers with whom I have had the opportunity of speaking on the subject.”

Lord Methuen concluded by saying that should he have omitted to bring to notice some who had distinguished themselves during the action Major Paris would supply the deficiency.

Of the General’s staff of six, five were wounded. Lieutenants Venning and Nesham, Royal Field Artillery, were killed while gallantly serving their guns with case. Lieutenant Hartley, Steinacker’s Horse, also lost his life. Among the wounded were Colonel Wilson, 3rd York and Lancashire Regiment, Captain Outram, 3rd Highland Light Infantry, Lieutenant Dennis, Yeomanry, Lieutenant Nash, Cape Police, and Lieutenant Logan, Yeomanry. Lord Methuen was taken to the Boer laager, but was subsequently allowed by Delarey to proceed with Colonel Townsend, who was also wounded, to the hospital at Klerksdorp.

BRILLIANT DEFENCE BY NEW ZEALANDERS AT HOLSPRUIT, FEBRUARY 23, 1902Drawing by Allan Stewart from Sketches supplied by a New Zealand Officer

After some days’ rest, the troops which had formed the cordon to enclose De Wet’s force were engaged in a new and far-reaching scheme of operations. This was divided into two phases, in the first of which two simultaneous movements were to be made to the east, one between the Heidelberg-Standerton Railway and the Wolvehoek-Frankfort-Tafel Kop blockhouse line; the other, from the line Kroonstad-Ventersburg-Doornberg up to the blockhouses between Lindley and Bethlehem. For the second phase, it was arranged that whilst the northern columns, then on a line between Standerton and Tafel Kop, made a right wheel on to Botha’s Pass-Tafel Kop blockhouses, with Tafel Kop as a pivot, the southern columns should move east to the Wilge, and in conjunction with the troops at Harrismith, hold the line of the Wilge between Strydpoort and Majoor’s Drift. Finally, with the line of the Wilge so held to the west, and the passes of the Drakensberg closed to the enemy from the east by the troops from the Natal command, the northern line of columns was to move south from the Tafel Kop-Botha’s Pass position, right down to the blockhouses between the Van Reenan’s Pass and Elands River Bridge, near Harrismith. These brilliant operations, on the principle of previous “drives,” began about the middle of the month, and culminated on Majuba Day in the capture of 728 Boers, 25,000 cattle, 2000 horses, 200 waggons, and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. Various efforts were, of course, made to break through the encircling cordon, but none so violent as that which took place at the last stage of these proceedings. At dawn on the 23rd a general advance to the south was made towards the Van Reenan’s Pass-Elands River Bridge blockhouses. It was timed to take four days. At night, at the close of the first day’s march, another dashing attempt on the same principle as the last was made by De Wet to escape the net into which he had been driven by the advancing columns. In darkness, eighteen miles south of Vrede, at the point where Byng’s right and Rimington’s left joined, the noted chief, with his mob of cattle rapidly driven by natives, attempted his gallant rush. The New Zealanders of Garratt’s column, commanded by Major Bauchop, with characteristic dash, gallantly resisted and repelled the attack made, and the 3rd New South Wales Mounted Rifles brought heavy fire to bear on the enemy, but De Wet and Steyn themselves succeeded in breaking through the toils. Still, the whole of the Boer cattle and vehicles were captured, and thirty-one Boers, while 160 horses were killed at the place where the gallant Colonials made their notable resistance. Our own casualties were severe, two officers and eighteen men were killed, five officers and thirty-three wounded, the majority of whom belonged to the New Zealand contingent. On the 26th Colonel Nixon repulsed a like attack made upon the line of the Cornelis River, but on the 27th the sweep down to Harrismith closed with the surrender to Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson of Commandant Truter and 650 men.

Colonel Lawley and Major Du Cane made more captures in the vicinity of the Doornberg, and Colonel Barker’s troops groped for Boers in the kloofs and caves of the western slopes of the Wittebergen. Before the 25th, owing to Colonel Barker’s various activities, he collected 30 prisoners, 725 cattle, and 280 horses. The Boers, as may be imagined, began to accept these convincing proofs that further resistance to the British was little else than suicide.

On the 2nd of February the general disposition of troops in the Cape Colony stood thus: Those under Crabbe, from Beaufort West, and those under Capper and Lund, from Sutherland, converging towards Fraserburg, where a concentration of the enemy had taken place; those under Haig and under Kavanagh and Wyndham moving from Clanwilliam upon Calvinia; the intervening space watched by Doran, forty miles north-east of Clanwilliam, and by Callwell near Sutherland. Crewe’s Colonial troops occupied both the Elandsvlei and Sutherland.

On the 30th January Colonel Crabbe’s column (acting as a screen to a convoy of donkey waggons which, under its own escort, was some distance in the rear) was suddenly menaced by a swarm of Boers. Their attitude and their numbers warned the Colonel to take up a defensive position at Rietfontein (twenty-five miles east of Fraserburg). That done, he there fought tenaciously, determined to hold his own till Colonel Capper and Major Lund could arrive from Sutherland to his support. Foiled in their effort to overpower Crabbe’s men, the Boers promptly decided to assail the convoy. This, guarded by 60 District Mounted Rifles and 100 men of the 4th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment, under Major Crofton, was halted on the night of the 4th some forty miles south-east of Fraserburg. The Boers in great strength rushed on the British prize. All through the night fighting was fierce and sustained, and in the end the Boers were triumphant. They secured and destroyed the waggons. Though Colonel Crabbe promptly rushed to the scene he was unable to act. The waggons were wrecked, and the assailants too strong to be handled by his column unaided. He awaited the troops under Colonel Capper and Major Lund, and with them proceeded to trounce and disperse the rebels, and hunt them north-east of Fraserburg. The losses during these engagements were considerable, Major Crofton, another officer, and 11 men being killed, and 1 officer and 47 men wounded. On the 5th of February there was a tussle at Calvinia between Theron’s men and Colonel Haig’s, when the Boers were driven north with the loss of two killed and two wounded. Considerable loss on our side was sustained on the 6th. Colonel Doran, with 100 men, then on the hunt for Gelhenhuis, a rebel leader, was assailed by the enemy during his return march to Calvinia. In the pitch darkness his little band had to fight a prolonged rearguard action to cover their withdrawal over the mountains. This conflict led to the loss of 3 officers and 7 men killed, 17 men being wounded.

The main body of rebels—some 600 of them—heartened by their capture of the convoy on the night of the 4th, assembled on the 16th thirty miles east-north-east of Fraserburg, with a view to earning fresh laurels. But their hopes were nipped in the bud. General French had his eye on them. The congregating evil must be arrested, and the columns under General Stephenson were disposed upon a general line from Nelspoort Station, by Beaufort West, to Rhenosterfontein (fifteen miles north-west of Beaufort West), Colonel Doran on the right, Colonel Capper and Major Nickalls in the centre, and Colonel Crabbe and Major Lund on the left. An advance to north-west towards Williston was begun on the 17th—but the Boers were shy. No sooner did they come in contact with our troops than they dispersed. Some were wounded and some captured on the 18th, among them being Judge Hugo, who subsequently died of his injuries; but the rest got off. Malan’s group doubled round Doran’s right flank and scuttled over the rail towards the midlands,another gang fled north-west, and one J. T. Smith, with a rebel crew, broke through the blockhouse line, with some loss, to the north and then to the north-east of Victoria West.

The pursuit of Malan to the east now occupied the column under Major Wormald and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers. This force had already chased the remnants of Kruitzinger’s band, under Wessels, out of the midlands well to the west. Colonel Haig, with Colonels Kavanagh and Williams, skirmished and hunted in the Calvinia and Van Rhynsdorp districts, and on the 13th Bouwer’s laager was rushed by Kavanagh’s braves, and eleven prisoners, with horses, rifles, and ammunition, &c., were secured.

In the midlands the enemy straggled about on the hills for the most part of the month. The rebels daily found an increasing difficulty in procuring food and necessaries from their quondam sympathisers, and their diminished popularity served somewhat to damp their activities; but early in March Fouché and Myburg made a dash across the East London Railway, whither they were chased to the south of Steynsburg by Colonels Price and Baillie.

Colonel Crewe

THE CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES—MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY 1902

General B. Hamilton, as we know, over mountainous country followed Botha to the neighbourhood of Vryheid. The Boer force consisted of a concentration of some 800 men who had been hustled from other districts of the Eastern Transvaal. A laager was located east of Vryheid on the 10th of March, and General Bruce-Hamilton having blocked all exits in the Ngotsi valley, proceeded to attack it. The manœuvre was rewarded. General Cherry Emmett, Botha’s brother-in-law, and seventeen prisoners were taken, and Botha merely escaped by concealing himself in a kloof near the spot where his relative was seized. Eighteen more prisoners, some of importance in the fighting roll, were secured on the 18th.

On the 1st day of April, near Springs, a laager was suddenly discovered by a party of Queen’s Bays and some National Scouts under Colonel Fanshawe of Colonel Lawley’s column. Immediately the Boers in great strength attacked the small British force, and in the close and spirited fighting, which lasted from dawn till dusk, Major Walker was killed, and Captains Herron, Ward, and Lieutenant Hill were wounded. As an instance of the hand-to-hand nature of the combat it may be mentioned that the butt-ends of rifles as well as the blades of swords came into play. Two squadron leaders and ten non-commissioned officers and men were killed and five officers and fifty-nine men were wounded. This concentrated body of the enemy was commanded by Alberts and Pretorius. Commandant Prinsloo, who was with them, was wounded. The Boers lost twelve killed and forty wounded.

The middle of the month was spent by General B. Hamilton in sweeping from Middelburg to Standerton between the blockhouse lines. The hard-worked columns of Park and Williams and Spens were engaged in the undertaking, which was, though always hazardous, fatiguing as it was monotonous. One hundred and forty-five Boers were killed, wounded, or captured in the course of the operations.

Beyers, a troublesome personage, had betaken himself to a fertile valley in the region of Pietersburg. He then proceeded to invest Fort Edward, a fortified post near Louis Trichardt, placing the small garrison of fifty souls in an unenviable quandary. To their rescue went Colonel Denny (Northamptonshire Regiment) with some 500 men, but he was so strongly opposed at various points that he had to fall back on Dwars River without effecting his purpose. Colonel Colenbrander, hurrying from Klerksdorp however, succeeded. He completely surprised the enemy on the 29th and effected the relief of the Fort. Then Beyers himself had to be dealt with, and on the 8th of April Colonel Colenbrander and his warlike scouts, with the Inniskilling Fusiliers under Colonel Murray, started to ferret him out and attack him. Through the difficult and exhausting country, a wilderness of crags and steeps, the troops movedcarefully, exercising the utmost perseverance and sagacity in stopping up all poorts or points of exit. They then secured a commanding position—one which the Boers had imagined to be inaccessible—and systematically delivered the attack. Their determination and dash and dexterity were marvellous. By night the Boers were driven out of their mountain stronghold, but only with great loss on both sides. Colonel Murray was seriously, Lieutenant Thompson slightly, wounded. Lieutenant Lincoln was killed. The enemy’s loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 106. But Beyers himself escaped. Operations against him were continued in this region till May with excellent results, for though the Boer leader was not caught, his following was considerably reduced, and thus his power to be mischievous crippled.

Captain H. T. Lukin

Colonel Douglas Haig(Photo by J. Edwards)

After the Majuba Day successes the lower part of the Orange Colony remained clear. Colonels Du Cane and Rimington in the region of Tafel Kop made some important captures. Among the prisoners were Adjutant Labuschaque and Viemann. Elsewhere, in the caves of the river bed, a large Boer supply depot was discovered by Major Ross (Canadian Scouts). A Krupp, a pom-pom, a Nordenfeldt, ammunition, heliographs, and other valuable supplies were taken possession of or burnt. Another of Lord Kitchener’s big drives took place, the troops and tactics being the same as before. The columns were encamped in the neighbourhood of Harrismith, and the impression was given that they would sweep towards the northern blockhouses. De Wet, finding that Elliot and Rimington pushed him north, consequently flew west round Elliot, and in the very direction desired. By the night of the 9th there was a complete line of troops from Lindley to Frankfort, De Wet and Steyn beingenclosed. Stray parties made rushes at Dunlop’s and Scott’s lines but were repulsed, and some Boers were made prisoners. On the 10th, all keeping touch, the advance continued. It was scorching weather, but the British stalwarts, under the blazing sun, maintained splendid courage and cheeriness. As an example of their endurance, it may be noted that Rawlinson’s men on the 10th and 11th covered sixty miles. On the 11th the drive concluded, but not with the capture of the redoubtable one.

De Wet and Steyn, it appeared, had escaped west of the main Orange Colony Railway by crossing the Heilbron-Frankfort line at night at an hour when some of the British troops were expected to cross. Mentz, to escape Colonel Cox and Rimington’s Australians, adopted the same tactics as De Wet’s former ones. He rushed the Heilbron-Wolvehoek line on the night of the 10th of March by furiously driving a herd of horses against the line held by the Leinsters near Gothenburg. Though these leaders got off, in the course of the operations, 127 Boers were taken and Commandant Celliers was wounded.

De Wet and Steyn remained west of the railway line endeavouring, it was presumed, to get into communication with Delarey. That some Boers had evaded the big drive was evident by the fact that a convoy was attacked between Kronspruit and Frankfort. The enemy was, however, beaten off by the Mounted Infantry, who had some of their number wounded.

The members of the so-called Acting Transvaal Government—Messrs. Schalk Burger, Reitz, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, and Vanderwalt—proceeded on the 22nd of March, under flag of truce, from Balmoral to Kroonstad to interview Mr. Steyn, with Lord Kitchener’s consent. The interview had reference to possible peace proposals. The delegates travelled by special train accompanied by Captain Marker, A.D.C. to Lord Kitchener, Major Leggett, Assistant Director of Railways, and four other staff officers. The meeting concluded a few days later, apparently without practical results. The commandos in the district were now much scattered and reduced, but on the last day of April, near Frankfort, Colonel Barker had the good fortune to capture Mamie Botha (a smart and resourceful ally of De Wet), his adjutant, and eleven Boers.

Early in May (the 6th) another rapid drive took place. A continuous line of columns left Frankfort-Heilbron-Vredefort Road line quite unimpeded by wheel transport, and drove swiftly to Kroonstad-Liebenberg-Vlei line, which was reached in the afternoon. The British casualties were nil. The prisoners taken were 208. Ten Boers were killed. From opinions drawn from prisoners it was obvious that these “drives” were heartily dreaded, and the fact of being thus chased from their own district was a fruitful source of surrender.

A new and original combined movement against Delarey was now conceived by Lord Kitchener. The Boers were dotted about recuperating in farms near Hartebeestefontein, and these had to be mopped up somehow before they had time to concert or to concentrate. The district was too vast for the usual cordon process, and there was great difficulty in arranging a plan which would dispose sufficient troops on the west. There, there were no blockhouse lines, but a line ran from the Vaal to Klerksdorp and thence up the Schoenspruit till it joined the Lichtenburg-Ventersdorp line. The programme was most concise. No wheeled transport and no guns were to be taken. The thing was to beaccomplished “in the blink of an eye,” so to say, at the rate of nearly eighty miles in twenty-four hours at most. On the night of the 23rd of March every one was to be under way, silent and secret as burglars, bold and resolute as lions. Kekewich, from Vaalbank, was to march west. Rawlinson, from Klerksdorp, with columns of Scott, Briggs, and Dawkins, was to march south of Hartebeestefontein straight through the enemy’s lines—a thing the enemy would be at a loss till too late to understand—and arrive at dawn at a point thirty-nine miles to west. General W. Kitchener (with Keir, Lowe, and Cookson’s columns) was to continue the line and march south of Rawlinson to a point some forty miles distant. Lord Basing, from south of the Vaal, was to fill in the more southerly place, and Colonel Rochfort was to form up to the south of him with his right resting on the Vaal. Thus working on the 24th in a line drawn from north to south, the columns were to start forth and then drive back the enemy against the Schoenspruit blockhouse line.... The midnight march was admirably executed under the brilliant rays of the moon, and a Boer convoy was even chased and captured by Dawkins’ men by way of interlude! By dawn on the 24th, after a forty-mile march, the machinery was set in the appointed position. With sunrise the required revolution took place. The whole force turned right-about face and marched swiftly back again. It was not till 10A.M.that Boers were discerned. Then, preparations were promptly made to welcome them, and Rawlinson’s men, in spite of their sore and aching frames, advanced with alacrity. But the Dutchmen made haste to retreat. By arrangement a signal was fired to inform the British line that the quarry in force was sighted. Excitement prevailed. All got into the semi-crescent position—the military equivalent for “open arms.” There were necessary gaps, however, before the troops could extend into touch on so vast an area, and these the Boers made for. But owing to the splendid activity of our men, the 2nd and 8th Mounted Infantry, the Scottish Horse, and others, the enemy failed to get away either their waggons or their guns. Lieutenant Herd (2nd Mounted Infantry), with the remnant of his company, pursued the fleeing band and expedited their race for the north, forcing them also to leave their valuables behind. They were now in the position of the traditional Derby dog—rushing helter-skelter, first north then south, not knowing where to find a loophole of escape. Finally, however, some of them abandoning everything did find it, and scurried towards Klerksdorp. The total results of this cleverly arranged movement, which concluded on the 25th, were 185 prisoners, 12 Boers killed; two 15-pounders, one 12-pounder, two pom-poms, a quantity of ammunition, over 1000 head of cattle, about 60 vehicles, and a lot of horses and mules captured.

That more of the enemy were not taken was accounted for by Reuter’s correspondent, who stated:—

“One commando was disturbed very early near a spot where two columns had not yet extended into touch. One of these columns saw what appeared to be the next column getting into position on its flank, and pressed on in order not to be outdistanced, but the column on its right acted strangely, and soon it was discovered that the strange column was a Boer commando seeking to escape. As a pursuit would have resulted in making a larger loophole the enemy got away.“In another place a large body was observed passing along our front, and it was greeted with a volley, whereon an officer in British uniform, complete in every detail, with ‘K.F.S.’ on the shoulder-straps, rode up and reported that it was a British column passing along to take up its allotted place in the line. The force was accordingly allowed to proceed on its way. The ‘K.F.S.’ officer, however, was a Boer and the column a Boer commando.”

“In another place a large body was observed passing along our front, and it was greeted with a volley, whereon an officer in British uniform, complete in every detail, with ‘K.F.S.’ on the shoulder-straps, rode up and reported that it was a British column passing along to take up its allotted place in the line. The force was accordingly allowed to proceed on its way. The ‘K.F.S.’ officer, however, was a Boer and the column a Boer commando.”

It was discovered after all that Delarey had not been within the radius of the big movement, and therefore General W. Kitchener, in hope still to entrap him, set to work to reconnoitre towards the Hart River. On the 31st of March Cookson and Keir struck track of guns, and presently they were attacked with great determination. A long running fight was continued for eight miles through the bush and scrub of the region. A position in the open was taken, and both parties set to work. Delarey, Kemp, and some 1500 Boers fought brilliantly, but were outmatched by the dogged courage of the newly raised R.H.A. Rifles, who let them advance within 200 yards, and then repelled them with steady gusts of rifle fire; by the staunchness of Colonel Evans’ Canadian Rifles, of which one party under young Bruce-Carruthers held their ground till every man was either killed or wounded; and by the dash of the 28th Mounted Infantry, Damant’s Horse, Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts, and the 17th and 27th Mounted Infantry. The enemy after losing tremendously refused to continue the conflict, in spite of being frantically urged forward by their leaders.

The columns of Von Donop and Grenfell under General Kekewich on the 11th of April, in the region of Rooival, had a hot fight with the enemy. These eventually were repulsed by the Yeomanry, Scottish Horse, and South Africa Constabulary, who fought with their accustomed coolness and brilliancy. Forty-four Boers were left dead on the field and thirty-four wounded. Twenty prisoners were taken. Captain Salter (7th Imperial Yeomanry) and five men were killed and fifty-two wounded. Lieutenant Bull, 3rd Inniskilling Fusiliers, died of wounds. The pursuit of the band was vigorously taken up, and General Kekewich had the satisfaction of securing two guns, a pom-pom, ammunition, and waggons. Among the Boer dead was Commandant Potgieter of Wolmaranstad, one of Delarey’s right-hand men. About this time Colonel Rochfort’s column made a night raid on a laager at Schweizerreneke, and secured fifty-five prisoners, with waggons and stock.

The columns under General Ian Hamilton continued their systematic sweeping of the Western Transvaal, and after clearing the central area to east of Harts River they formed a line, and in conjunction with Colonel Rochfort from Bloemhof, moved west on the 7th of May. They reached the railway on the 11th plus 357 prisoners and practically all the waggons and stock of the commandos in the district. The total reduction, therefore, in Delarey’s forces since his success at Tweebosch amounted to 860 men. The process of exhaustion had been steady and sure.

A spirited engagement took place at Buffelshoek between Fouché’s commando and Colonel Price’s men, with the result that Commander Odendaal and Captain Vanderwalt were killed and two Boers wounded. Major Wormald’s and other columns meanwhile hunted Malan and Fouché in the region of the Camdeboos Mountains, where pursuit is difficult, sometimes impossible.

THE TRAIN CONVEYING THE REMAINS OF MR. RHODES SALUTED BY THE BLOCKHOUSE GUARDS ON ITS WAY TO THE MATOPPO HILLSDrawing by Ernest Prater

And then, when negotiations for peace were being made between the two nations, while all the sad events of the last three years were apparently coming to a happy conclusion, the British nation lost a man whose like, one may safely say, will never be found again. On the 26th of March, at Muizenburg, Mr. Cecil Rhodes breathed his last. He had long been ailing, therefore this misfortune was not unexpected, and the effect of his loss on public affairs was minimised by the fact that with characteristic foresight he had arranged all hisbusiness matters, so that in his absence they might proceed without a hitch. His Will, when opened, proved to be a document for all time, one which might be studied with advantage by every British boy whose hope it is to leave his country greater than he found it. To this man’s life-work we have already alluded. Of his influence in the future it is impossible at present to write. Certain it is that his name is writ large wherever the glory of Great Britain’s greatest finds a place. He gave minute directions regarding his last resting-place. Neither St. Paul’s nor Westminster Abbey were wide enough for his free spirit.

“I admire the grandeur and loneliness of the Matoppos in Rhodesia, and I therefore desire to be buried in the Matoppos, on the hill which I used to visit and which I called the ‘View of the World,’ in a square to be cut out in the rock on the top of the hill, covered with a plain brass plate with these words thereon, ‘Here lie the remains of Cecil John Rhodes,’ and accordingly I direct my executors at the expense of my estate to take all steps and do all things necessary or proper to give effect to this my desire, and afterwards to keep my grave in order at the expense of the Matoppos and Buluwayo fund hereinafter mentioned. I direct my trustees, on the hill aforesaid, to erect or complete the monument to the men who fell in the first Matabele War at Shangani in Rhodesia, the bas-reliefs for which are being made by Mr. John Tweed, and I desire the said hill to be preserved as a burial-place; but no person is to be buried there unless the Government for the time being of Rhodesia, until the various states of South Africa, or any of them, shall have been federated, and after such federation the Federal Government, by a vote of two-thirds of its governing body, says that he or she has deserved well of his or her country.”

His wishes were carried out with reverence and to the letter. His body was conveyed to Groote Schuur, where it lay in state till it was removed to the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town, where it lay all night. Next day the procession started for the Cathedral. All business was suspended. The streets were draped with black—the thoroughfares were lined with troops and sorrowing crowds. A more wonderful service, a more impressive ceremony, has never been seen in South Africa. Finally the remains started on their last voyage. Of this melancholy journey the correspondent of theStandardwrote:—

“Not the least striking feature was the reception given to the train by the garrisons of the blockhouses as we passed them in succession. As we glided slowly out of a station away ahead of us would stretch the long vista of the line, dotted here and there with the little fortresses. We would gather speed, and the sun glinted on steel as the garrison of the nearest blockhouse began to fix bayonets and fall in. Then as we swept swiftly forward the little squad of men came abreast of us, and the bayonets rose and fell symmetrically amid the solemn solitude. Then the blockhouse was whirled away behind us and lost to sight. So it went on for mile after mile, the fireman busy at his duties and the driver, one of the oldest servants of the railway department, steady and watchful at his post. Down into De Aar we swept at such speed that as we passed the blockhouses the saluting rifles seemed to rise and fall mechanically and without intermission.”

Buluwayo was reached on April 8th, and the coffin placed in the Drill Hall and guarded by two Rhodesian volunteers with drawn swords. Finally it was borne, on the 10th, to its lonely bed in the almost inaccessible steeps that he loved.

Early in April the trial of Kruitzinger was concluded, and the prisoner was acquitted of the charges of murder or train-wrecking that were brought against him. He therefore fell into the category of prisoners of war. From intercepted despatches forwarded by the commandant to Scheepers it was discovered that he had seriously condemned the inhuman practices of his countrymen. The raiders continued their mischievous activities, the columns their incessant chases and hunts. Lovat’s Scouts engaged Bezuidenhout at Kaal River onthe 26th of April, and in the scrimmage two of the rebels were wounded. On the 1st of May the town of Ookiep (in north-west of Cape Colony), which for some time had been invested by the Boers, was practically relieved by the appearance of reinforcements from Namaqualand under Colonels Cooper and Caldwell. These relieved the column at Klipfontein (fifty miles from Ookiep), and thus took the pressure off the neighbouring places.

Further particulars were given in theMorning Post:—“General Smuts demanded the surrender of Ookiep on 4th April. Colonel W. Shelton refused to entertain any terms whatever, saying that he would hold out to the bitter end. He must, however,” the letter proceeded, “have a relief column if the place is to be saved, as he has 6000 people to feed and provisions for only three weeks. Colonel Shelton brought in the Mesklip and Nababeep garrisons with all their arms and ammunition successfully. Nababeep has since been looted. Springbokfontein made a gallant fight, but had to surrender to overwhelming numbers, our casualties being four killed and six wounded. It is reported that Concordia surrendered without firing a shot. Colonel Shelton ordered the Concordia Town Guard to Ookiep, but they refused to go. The Boers seem to be bent on doing as much damage as they possibly can. They have destroyed miles of railway and are burning the sleepers as they take them up. The dynamite which they seized at Garrakop, eight miles from Ookiep, they are now using to destroy the blockhouses by dropping charges on the roofs from the kopjes above. Colonel White and his column are at or entrenched near Gassies, and cannot get out. Anenous, Kookfontein, Steinkop, Ooboop, and all outlying stations are deserted. Two trains of refugees arrived at Port Nolloth this morning during a heavy shower of rain. Lilliesfontein refugees are also here, making the number over fifteen hundred. The inhabitants of Port Nolloth are feeling very uneasy, for they greatly fear that an attack will be made on the port; but our defences are perfect, and with the assistance of his Majesty’s shipBarracoutawe mean to give the Boers a warm reception. During a thunderstorm that broke over Ookiep a few days ago a party of Boers was seen on the mountain to the east of Ookiep making a blockhouse in good position, but Major Edwards with a small patrol soon put them to flight.”

A member of the garrison of the Springbokfontein blockhouse, commanded by Lieutenant Dorrington, reported as follows: “The Boers were gallantly kept at bay for twenty-four hours, when they succeeded in making a rush on the village. They first made a raid on the Civil Commissioner’s house, which they found locked, the magistrate, Mr. J. A. Van Renen, being at Ookiep at the time on his way back from Port Nolloth, where he had been to fetch his family. Lieutenant Dorrington, seeing a fire at the Residency from the blockhouse, thought the Boers were setting fire to the house. He ordered his men to open fire on them, whereupon the Boers rushed the kopje on the top of which the blockhouse was built, and demanded its immediate surrender. When Lieutenant Dorrington refused to surrender he was greeted with charges of dynamite. The Boers then crept under the hill, making it quite impossible for our men to fire on them, and began to place dynamite underneath the blockhouse. They again sent to tell the officer in command that if he did not surrender he and his men would be blown up. A message was sent back to them to say that he would surrender on condition that they did not harm his men. This was agreed to, and the men came out. They were all promptly lodged in prison. The same informant states that Mr. Stuart, the resident magistrate’s clerk, Mr. Van Coernden’s son, and two others were killed by charges of dynamite thrown on the top of the blockhouse from a kopje.”

A second letter, which was dated 12th April, announced that transports had arrived at Port Nolloth and that reinforcements were pouring into the town. A third letter was written on the following day, and it said: “Lieutenant Meyrick, with his party of N.B.S., has so far gallantly defended the viaducts and the mountain pass above Anenous. A native who has just come in reports that the Boers have, however, come round the mountain and destroyed the railway on this side of Anenous as far as the 37th mile. Mr. F. Phillips, of Concordia, son of the superintendent, arrived at Port Nolloth yesterday, having obtained a pass from the Boer Commandant Smuts. He states that the Boers who have got possession of Concordia are mostly Transvaal men. Ookiep is evidently giving the Boers a warm time, for many wounded are brought into Concordia, others going back to take their place. They say that they are quite determined to take Ookiep at any cost, and seem to have quietly settled down at Concordia. They have their doctor and chaplain, and hold services twice daily. The Commandant Smuts lives in the doctor’s house, the doctor being absent in Cape Town. He has his secretary with him, a Frenchman, whom they have nicknamed ‘Roberts,’ and who has a great reputation for ability among them.”

On the 27th of May Major Collett, with the Jansenville District Mounted Horse, encountered the Boers, who thought this a fine opportunity for attacking raw material. But the local force was tougher than they thought, and moreover Lovat’s Scouts, who had been pursuing Malan for a long time, were at hand. These promptly came to the rescue, upon which the enemy fled, leaving Malan—one of the best of the Boer leaders—in their hands. Malan was one of the “irreconcilables,” and he had rejected the offer of a safe conduct to attend the Vereeniging conference, which at this time was taking place with a view to the signing of peace.

It was officially computed that by May 1902 the British forces had been reduced through the South African war by 1055 officers and 20,520 men who died in South Africa, 1 officer and 131 men returned as missing and prisoners, 7 officers and 487 men who died after having been sent home as invalids, and 5531 invalided men who left the Service as unfit. These figures represent a total of 27,732. The following figures, taken from a table published by Colonel Henderson, Professor of Military Art and History at the Staff College, in his “Life of Stonewall Jackson,” may be found interesting for purposes of comparison with the British losses:—

Of the Boer losses no exact total could be arrived at.

In April, a careful computation of the strength of the enemy in the field put it at about 10,000 men. The commando of Delarey and Kemp was the largest, their following being about 900 men; but concentration was marvellously quickly accomplished, and near at hand on the west were odd bands of perhaps a hundred, commanded by Potgieter, Klassen, and Cronje. Beyers, with less than four hundred, hung about Zoutpansberg, and other leaders near Lydenburg were practically dependent on fragments from their master’s table, otherwise the escaped ones and twos from Botha’s and De Wet’s hunted forces. In the Eastern Transvaal, east of Springs, were Alberto, Opperman, and Van Niekirk, with small yet enterprising gangs. Klassen and Badenhorst were fairly well supported at Ermelo, and 200 Boers hung occupationless about Piet Retief. Minor leaders were sprinkled about the Orange Colony, clinging mostly to the sheltering region of the Brandwater Basin.

In the Cape Colony they were equally scattered. Malan and Fouché north of Murraysburg, Maritz and Bowers near Garees, Theron north of Calvinia, Van Reenan north-east, near Fraserburg, had each a small trail of troublesome rebels at his heels. Raking and combing was taking place everywhere. Since the 22nd of March, when the question of peace came to be discussed, the Boer forces had been reduced by about 860 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. A conference between Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner was held in Pretoria, the result of which was digested on the 20th by the Boer leaders, who then took themselves off to rejoin their commandos. Meanwhile Lord Kitchener maintained his vigilant tactics, knowing that the wily ones if given an inch would take an ell, and General Ian Hamilton in the west, General Bruce-Hamilton in the east, and Colonel Colenbrander in the north, continued their sweeping operations.

It was now decided that the Boer leaders, who had again met together at Klerksdorp on the 11th of April, were to reassemble on the 15th of May to deliberate among themselves and arrive at a decision as to the terms of surrender they would be prepared to accept. The conference, which opened at Vereeniging in due course, included the representatives of all the bodies of Boers throughout the two colonies. The delegates chosen by the conference at Vereeniging arrived at Pretoria on the 20th May. They were six in number, consisting of members of the two “Governments,” with Generals Delarey and De Wet, accompanied by their secretaries. They were lodged in the house next to that occupied by Lord Kitchener. Lord Milner also arrived.

There was an interval of great suspense, which was shared by the whole civilised world. All parties watched the telegraph wires with bated breath, then on Saturday, May 31st, the great Boer War came to an end. The conference at Vereeniging had brought forth good results! The Peace Agreement, long anxiously looked forward to by both belligerents, was signed!

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS—COMMENCED MARCH 12, 1902—CONCLUDED MAY 31, 1902

The following is the text of the draft agreement signed by the Boer representatives in Pretoria on the 31st of May after it had been approved by his Majesty’s Government:—

His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T. Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their respective burghers, desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following articles:—

1. The Burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in their possession or under their control, and desist from any further resistance to the authority of his Majesty King Edward VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.

2. All Burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present outside South Africa who are Burghers, will, on duly declaring their acceptance of the position of subjects of his Majesty King Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as transports can be provided and their means of subsistence ensured.

3. The Burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be deprived of their personal liberty or their property.

4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any of the Burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this clause will not extend to certain acts contrary to usages of war which have been notified by Commander-in-Chief to the Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial immediately after the close of hostilities.

5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice.

6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their protection on taking out a licence according to law.

7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.

8. The question of granting the franchise to natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.

9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the war.

10. As soon as conditions permit, a commission, on which the local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purpose of assisting the restoration of the people to their homes and supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, &c., indispensable to the resumption of their normal occupations.

His Majesty’s Government will place at the disposal of these commissions a sum of £3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African Republic and all receipts given by officers in the field of the late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a judicial commission, which will be appointed by the Government, and if such notes and receipts are found by this commission to have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they will be received by the first-named commissions as evidence of war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally given. In addition to the above-named free grant of £3,000,000, his Majesty’s Government will be prepared to make advances on loan for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent. interest.

No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit of this clause.

The correspondence relating to the last stage of the South African War was published as a Parliamentary Paper. As the future policy of South Africa will be directed by the considerations which influenced the wording of the final agreement, the important part of the correspondence is quoted in its entirety. A series of brief despatches passed between Lord Kitchener and the Secretary of State for War between March 12 and April 11. The first despatch announced the desire of Mr. Schalk Burger, after receiving from Lord Kitchener a copy of the correspondence connected with the Dutch Government’s negotiations, to obtain safe conduct in order to meet Mr. Steyn with a view to making peace proposals. The meeting of the Boer commanders, as is known, was arranged, and it took place at Klerksdorp. On April 11 Lord Kitchener received permission from the Secretary of State for War to accede to a request from the Boer representatives for permission to lay certain proposals before him. This Boer request was addressed to Lord Kitchener in the following terms:—“After quoting at length the correspondence between his Majesty’s Government and the Netherlands, they are of opinion that it is a suitable moment to do everything possible to put a stop to the war, and therefore decide to make certain propositions to Lord Kitchener which can serve as a base for further negotiations in order to bring about the desired end. They further decide that, in their opinion, in order to accelerate the desired aim and prevent misunderstanding, Lord Kitchener be requested to meet them personally, time and place to be appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals, which they are prepared to submit, and in order to settle at once, by direct communication with him, all questions that may present themselves, and thereby to make sure that this meeting will have the desired result.”

“After quoting at length the correspondence between his Majesty’s Government and the Netherlands, they are of opinion that it is a suitable moment to do everything possible to put a stop to the war, and therefore decide to make certain propositions to Lord Kitchener which can serve as a base for further negotiations in order to bring about the desired end. They further decide that, in their opinion, in order to accelerate the desired aim and prevent misunderstanding, Lord Kitchener be requested to meet them personally, time and place to be appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals, which they are prepared to submit, and in order to settle at once, by direct communication with him, all questions that may present themselves, and thereby to make sure that this meeting will have the desired result.”

Then followed the succeeding telegraphic correspondence.

From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War.Pretoria,April 12, 1902, 9.22P.M.All Boer representatives met to-day and wished the following telegram sent:—“The Boer representatives wish to lay before his Majesty’s Government that they have an earnest desire for peace, and that they consequently decided to ask the British Government to end hostilities, and to enter into an agreement by which, in their opinion, all future war between them and the British Government in South Africa will be prevented. They consider this object may be attained by providing for following points:—“1. Franchise.“2. Equal rights for Dutch and English languages in education matters.“3. Customs Union.“4. Dismantling of all forts in Transvaal and Orange River Colony.“5. Post, Telegraph, and Railways Union.“6. Arbitration in case of future differences, and only subjects of the parties to be the arbitrators.“7. Mutual amnesty.“But if these terms are not satisfactory they desire to know what terms the British Government would give them in order to secure the end they all desire.”I have assured them that his Majesty’s Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain independence of Republic, as this would do, and that they must expect refusal.From the Secretary of State for War to Lord Kitchener.War Office,13th April 1902, 2.30P.M.His Majesty’s Government sincerely share the earnest desire of the Boer representatives for peace, and hope that the present negotiations may lead to that result; but they have already stated in the clearest terms, and must now repeat, that they cannot entertain any proposals which are based upon the continued independence of the former Republics, which have been formally annexed to the British Crown.From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War.Pretoria,14th April 1902, 6.10P.M.The High Commissioner and I met the Boer representatives this morning, when I communicated to them the substance of your telegram. We then endeavoured to induce them to make fresh proposals, but President Steyn, who throughout acted as their leading spokesman, immediately took the line that while the Boer Governments were competent to make peace they were not competent to surrender the independence of their country; that only the people could do this—the people, as explained, meaning the Burghers still in the field. If he was to suggest anything involving the abandonment of independence, it would be a betrayal of their trust.Schalk Burger and General Botha took precisely the same line. As no progress could be made the meeting was adjourned by mutual consent till this afternoon. The Boer representatives then suggested an armistice in order to consult their people; but I pointed out, with Lord Milner’s full concurrence, that we had not got nearly far enough in the direction of agreement to justify such a course. Finally it was agreed that I should send you the following message, which was read over several times, and fully agreed to by the representatives, to whom I have given a copy of it:—“A difficulty has arisen in getting on with proceedings. The representatives state that constitutionally they have no power to discuss terms based on the surrender of independence, inasmuch as only the Burghers can agree to such a basis; therefore, if they were to propose, it would put them in a false position with regard to their people. If, however, his Majesty’s Government would state the terms that, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence, they would be prepared to grant, the representatives, after asking for the necessary explanations, without any expression of approval or disapproval, would submit such conditions to their people.”

From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War.

Pretoria,April 12, 1902, 9.22P.M.

All Boer representatives met to-day and wished the following telegram sent:—

“The Boer representatives wish to lay before his Majesty’s Government that they have an earnest desire for peace, and that they consequently decided to ask the British Government to end hostilities, and to enter into an agreement by which, in their opinion, all future war between them and the British Government in South Africa will be prevented. They consider this object may be attained by providing for following points:—

“1. Franchise.

“2. Equal rights for Dutch and English languages in education matters.

“3. Customs Union.

“4. Dismantling of all forts in Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

“5. Post, Telegraph, and Railways Union.

“6. Arbitration in case of future differences, and only subjects of the parties to be the arbitrators.

“7. Mutual amnesty.

“But if these terms are not satisfactory they desire to know what terms the British Government would give them in order to secure the end they all desire.”

I have assured them that his Majesty’s Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain independence of Republic, as this would do, and that they must expect refusal.

From the Secretary of State for War to Lord Kitchener.

War Office,13th April 1902, 2.30P.M.

His Majesty’s Government sincerely share the earnest desire of the Boer representatives for peace, and hope that the present negotiations may lead to that result; but they have already stated in the clearest terms, and must now repeat, that they cannot entertain any proposals which are based upon the continued independence of the former Republics, which have been formally annexed to the British Crown.

From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War.

Pretoria,14th April 1902, 6.10P.M.

The High Commissioner and I met the Boer representatives this morning, when I communicated to them the substance of your telegram. We then endeavoured to induce them to make fresh proposals, but President Steyn, who throughout acted as their leading spokesman, immediately took the line that while the Boer Governments were competent to make peace they were not competent to surrender the independence of their country; that only the people could do this—the people, as explained, meaning the Burghers still in the field. If he was to suggest anything involving the abandonment of independence, it would be a betrayal of their trust.

Schalk Burger and General Botha took precisely the same line. As no progress could be made the meeting was adjourned by mutual consent till this afternoon. The Boer representatives then suggested an armistice in order to consult their people; but I pointed out, with Lord Milner’s full concurrence, that we had not got nearly far enough in the direction of agreement to justify such a course. Finally it was agreed that I should send you the following message, which was read over several times, and fully agreed to by the representatives, to whom I have given a copy of it:—

“A difficulty has arisen in getting on with proceedings. The representatives state that constitutionally they have no power to discuss terms based on the surrender of independence, inasmuch as only the Burghers can agree to such a basis; therefore, if they were to propose, it would put them in a false position with regard to their people. If, however, his Majesty’s Government would state the terms that, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence, they would be prepared to grant, the representatives, after asking for the necessary explanations, without any expression of approval or disapproval, would submit such conditions to their people.”

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