FOOTNOTES:[3]See “From Boer to Boer and Englishman,†by Paul M. Botha. London: Hugh Rees, 1901.[4]SeeMacmillan’s Magazine, May 1900.[5]This is published in full in theWeekly Timesof December 1, 1899, and is fully referred to in Wilmot’s “History of Our Own Times in South Africa.†See also “The Truth about the Transvaal†and various other publications.[6]SeeDaily Newsof May 10, 1900.[7]Reported in theTimesof May 24, 1900.[8]Paper read at the Cradock Farmers’ Association in October 1893.[9]This was Mr. Norton. See the dramatic manner in which this is referred to in the second volume of “The Life of Sir Harry Smith.â€
[3]See “From Boer to Boer and Englishman,†by Paul M. Botha. London: Hugh Rees, 1901.
[3]See “From Boer to Boer and Englishman,†by Paul M. Botha. London: Hugh Rees, 1901.
[4]SeeMacmillan’s Magazine, May 1900.
[4]SeeMacmillan’s Magazine, May 1900.
[5]This is published in full in theWeekly Timesof December 1, 1899, and is fully referred to in Wilmot’s “History of Our Own Times in South Africa.†See also “The Truth about the Transvaal†and various other publications.
[5]This is published in full in theWeekly Timesof December 1, 1899, and is fully referred to in Wilmot’s “History of Our Own Times in South Africa.†See also “The Truth about the Transvaal†and various other publications.
[6]SeeDaily Newsof May 10, 1900.
[6]SeeDaily Newsof May 10, 1900.
[7]Reported in theTimesof May 24, 1900.
[7]Reported in theTimesof May 24, 1900.
[8]Paper read at the Cradock Farmers’ Association in October 1893.
[8]Paper read at the Cradock Farmers’ Association in October 1893.
[9]This was Mr. Norton. See the dramatic manner in which this is referred to in the second volume of “The Life of Sir Harry Smith.â€
[9]This was Mr. Norton. See the dramatic manner in which this is referred to in the second volume of “The Life of Sir Harry Smith.â€
SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS
ByE. F. KNIGHT
Author of “Where Three Empires Meetâ€; “The Cruise of the ‘Falcon,’†&c.
In all the long romantic story of the making of the British Empire, no episode more strongly appeals to the imagination than the foundation of Rhodesia. Well is it named Rhodesia; for the history of Great Britain’s acquisitions on either side of the Zambesi, the 750,000 square miles of magnificent territories which lie under the sway of the British South Africa Company, is the history of the Englishman, Cecil John Rhodes: had it not been for whose foresight, statesmanship, untiring vigilance, determined but patient endeavour for years towards the accomplishment of his mighty schemes, the South African Plateau, with its gold-bearing reefs, its vast tracts of rich arable and pastoral lands, would have fallen into the hands of one or other of the foreign Powers which keenly contested with him its possession.
It is a trite saying that when the time is ripe for great doings on the part of a nation the necessary man invariably appears. It is a saying hardly warranted by fact, for many a golden opportunity have nations, Great Britain as often as others, lost because the right man was not forthcoming. Happily it has not been so in South Africa. It is almost certain that, had it not been for the accident of Mr. Rhodes seeking the South African shores for his health when a lad, the Germans and the Boers would have cut off the Cape Colony from all possibility of expansion to the north. Those Powers had even found their right men. The Transvaal had her stubborn Kruger; Germany had her shrewd and energetic agents and explorers preparing the way to annexation in different portions of the Dark Continent; while even Portugal had her D’Andrade, a man who displayed much of the spirit and enterprise of the Portuguese discoverers and conquerors of olden days. Cecil Rhodes took his place in South African affairs but just in time. The Transvaal War had been followed by a period of extraordinary apathy both in England and in the Cape Colony. No one seemed to care in the least what became of the territory lying beyond our then limits. At home men were sick of the very name of SouthAfrica. Many would have gladly abandoned all our possessions about the Cape of Storms, and abdicated an Empire which seemed to bring us nothing but futile wars, disaster, and disgrace. It was at this critical period that Mr. Rhodes came to the front to save our supremacy in South Africa—too late, indeed, to save for us much that should have been ours; too late, for example, to secure our sovereignty over Namaqualand and Damaraland, territories which had been long recognised as being within Britain’s sphere of influence, which formerly had been annexed to the Cape, but which latterly had been totally neglected both by the Imperial and Cape Governments, so that the watchful Germans were left at liberty, first to establish their trading missions, and finally to assert their sovereignty over those extensive regions.
Five-Mile Spruit on Melsetter Road, RhodesiaFive-Mile Spruit on Melsetter Road, Rhodesia
The richness and beauty of the highlands, extending over an immense area both north and south of the Zambesi, had for many years been known to both English and Boer travellers. Mr. Rhodes, in his early days at Kimberley, met many an adventurous wanderer who had come from that wonderful region, and their glowing tales perhaps first inspired in him that ambitious dream of the creation of a great new British colony that should include all the finest country in South and Central Africa. As far back as 1882, having commenced to take an active part in Cape politics, Mr. Rhodes took the initial steps towards the attainment of the one absorbing purpose of his life.
A HUNTER’S WAGGON, RHODESIAPhoto by Wilson, Aberdeen
Of fascinating interest is the story—a story for the most part yet untold to the world—of Cecil Rhodes’ long struggle with the Boers and Portuguese who attempted to keep the Empire-builder out of the Promised Land, and of his frequent forestallings of further German expansion at our expense. The first, the most critical and anxious period of all, was occupied with the contest for the very gate of the country, the right-of-way to the north, which we were so nearly losing, and without which our advance would have been hopelessly barred. The only outlet to the north from the Cape Colony lay through Bechuanaland, a vast region that was divided into several independent native kingdoms, and hemmed in between the Germans, then advancing from the west, and the Transvaal Boers on the east. This gateway to the north has been likened to the neck of a bottle; the narrow neck which, once passed, opens out into the broad and precious Zambesia. Kruger, clever and obstinate, commenced his career of attempted expansion by seizing this neck with the intention of thus cutting us off completely from the north. It was his ambition to extend the Boer rule westward to the German line, eastward to Delagoa Bay and the Indian Ocean, and northwards over the steppes of Zambesia. Pretorius had declared that the Transvaal had no boundary on the west, unless it were the Atlantic Ocean. The first struggle therefore between Rhodes and Kruger was for this vital point of vantage, the neck. Had Kruger grasped it the British flag would never have floated on the northern plateau, the Boers and Germans would have joined hands—there had been a talk of a German Protectorate over the Transvaal—and theirs, not ours, would have been the splendid prize. And what is more, seeing what a vast conspiracy had been organised against us, we should probably have lost the Cape Colony itself: the foundations of our Empire would have been shaken. Immense was the threatening peril to which we shut our eyes. The Transvaal War had left the Cape Colonists in a distinctly anti-British frame of mind. Disgusted at the follies of the Imperial Government, even those of British blood sympathised with the Transvaal Boers, and had no objection to the north falling into the hands of the Dutch Republicans. Indeed, the general feeling at the Cape at that time appears to have been republican. Cecil Rhodes had not only to out-manœuvre Germany, the Transvaal, and Portugal, but had also to overcome the opposition of colonial prejudice, and the complete indifference of the English to all affairs South African. He stood almost alone, and had to create a party for himself. Not only man of action, but diplomatist and opportunist in the best sense of the word, he played his game with wondrous skill, and succeeded at last in winning overthe reluctant colonists to his views. The very Africander Bond became his ally for a time.
Cape to Cairo Railway. Laying the Rails
That struggle for the neck of Bechuanaland is an interesting story that cannot be told here. First Kruger attempted to establish himself in Mankoroane’s territory. Mankoroane, to protect himself, offered to cede his country to the Cape Colony, which point-blank refused it. Rhodes, in 1882, went himself to the chieftain, and so arranged matters that the Imperial Government found itself compelled to take over the district. Thwarted at this point, Kruger attempted to cut us off further to the north, and sent his agents to establish the freebooting republics of Goshen and Stellaland. Again Rhodes checked him. Going himself to Stellaland, he persuaded the Boers in possession to accept the British flag on the condition that our Government ratified their titles to the land they had occupied. The Warren expedition, despatched at last in consequence of the strong representations of Rhodes and his far-seeing ally, Sir Hercules Robinson, the then High Commissioner, resulted in the expulsion of the Boer freebooters from Montsioa’s country, where Mafeking now stands, and the extension of our protectorate over the whole of Bechuanaland. Then Rhodes arranged for the taking over of Khama’s land, and the gateway tothe north was won. Foiled again, and thus hemmed in on the west, the stubborn Kruger sent his very able agent Grobler to Lobengula to obtain from him a Matabele concession to the Transvaal. Rhodes found that it was hopeless to attempt to bring the Imperial Government to a sense of the danger of the position, so now, before it was too late, he had to act promptly for himself. He sent Maguire Thomson and Rudd to Lobengula to obtain a concession from him before Grobler had carried out his mission. They were successful; the Governor ratified the concession. Dr. Jameson and Dr. Harris went to Matabeleland to deliver to the king the stipulated arms and ammunition; and despite the bitter opposition of the Cape statesman and consistently anti-British Englishman, Mr. Merriman, the deed of concession was sealed, and its validity was recognised by the Government. And thus in 1888, after years of patient endeavour, Cecil Rhodes at last had made the way clear for the realisation of his mighty scheme.
The sinews of war had now to be found; and Rhodes, in anticipation, before the granting of the concession, had made his provisions. First he had brought about the amalgamation of the diamond-mining companies, and then, as head of the great De Beers Corporation with its rent-roll of four millions sterling a year, he, in 1887, effected the alteration of the De Beers Trust Deed by a liquidation of the Company, so as to give the De Beers directors power to apply the Company’s funds to outside objects, that is, to the development of the North. Messrs. Barnato and Beit agreed to this on the condition of being made life governors, and ever since loyally co-operated with Rhodes in the execution of his scheme.
The next step was the granting of the charter by the British Government in 1889, and the creation of the British South Africa Company. Then Rhodes sent out the famous Pioneer Expedition to Mashonaland, and the white men established themselves in Rhodesia. It must be borne in mind that at that time and for years afterwards Rhodes had to be ever closely watching and cunningly circumventing the German Boers and Portuguese, who spared no effort to keep us from the north. Bismarck’s agent, Count Pffeil, was sent on a secret mission to South Africa and all but succeeded in anticipating Rhodes, and in winning for Germany a broad strip of territory that would have connected her eastern and western possessions, so forming a bar across Africa from ocean to ocean that would have effectually shut us out. Then there was the Boer trek into Mashonaland in 1891, when the Rhodesians guarded the drifts against the invaders—a scheme of Kruger’s that was frustrated without the shedding of blood. Even when the Pioneer Expeditionwas on its way, the energetic Portuguese D’Andrade was distributing the flags of his country among the chiefs, and attempting to get concessions that would cut Mashonaland off from Matabeleland. To defeat his plans Rhodes entered into a treaty with Umtassa, and obtained the Gazaland concession from Gungunyana, a concession which would have extended the Chartered Company’s possessions to the shores of the Indian Ocean had not Lord Salisbury refused to ratify it and acknowledged the claims of Portugal. Then again in 1889 Rhodes, whose Intelligence Department always supplied him in good time with information as to the doings of his rivals, hearing that Germany intended to cut us off at the head of Lake Nyassa, secretly sent Mr. H. H. Johnson to hoist British flags at Port Abercorn on Lake Tanganyika and other places, as proof of our occupation. The Portuguese also hoped to erect a wall against our expansion by connecting her eastern and western territories, and for this purpose an expedition set out from Angola to seize the Barotse country, but here Rhodes again forestalled them; his mission was the first to arrive in the country, and Barotseland was placed under our protection. The way these things were done by Rhodes’ agents, the hardships endured, the perils incurred by these adventurous men who—unlike the Portuguese agents who were always accompanied by large bands of armed men—plunged alone into these savage regions to carry out their hazardous missions, makes a wonderful story indeed of British pluck and enterprise.
The Pioneer Expedition set out in June 1890. The Pioneer Column, which had been enrolled by Major Frank Johnson, consisted of 187 men who had decided to try their fortunes in the new country, and it was accompanied by 650 mounted police, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Pennefather. The famous hunter, Selous, acted as guide. The ox-waggons carried provisions and other stores sufficient to supply the whole force for six months. For four hundred miles the Pioneers marched into Mashonaland, constructing a road as they went, and making drifts at the many rivers to enable the waggons to cross. Forts were built at intervals, and small garrisons were left in them. At last they came to their objective point, Mount Hampden; and hard by it they built Fort Salisbury, now the capital of all Rhodesia. The Pioneer Force was now disbanded, each man receiving, in addition to his pay, the right to peg out fifteen gold claims and 3000 acres of land. The men scattered over the country, prospecting for gold and pegging out their claims and farms. The first rainy season was a terrible one for them; it was an exceptionally bad year; all transport was interrupted, supplies fell short; the men had to live on native foodstuffs; great privations were endured; many died; and, as in everyother part of our Empire, the ways of Rhodesia are strewn with the bones of the men who won the land for their country.
But the men who go out as the pioneers of the Empire are not easily discouraged. The settlement and development of the country was at once undertaken with energy. Arrangements were made for the administration of the new State; a legal system was created; roads were constructed; mining plant was brought up; mining operations commenced; land was brought under cultivation; stores were opened; townships were surveyed, and rose rapidly from the wilderness, handsome brick buildings taking the place of the huts in which the pioneers roughed it at first. But the development of the country was much retarded by the difficulty of communication and the enormous cost of transport. Little could be done until Rhodesia was afforded railway communication with the coast; so Mr. Rhodes made arrangements for the extension of the Cape railway from its then terminus at Kimberley, and for the construction of a line to Beira on the east coast.
The Chartered Company had not long effected its active occupation of Mashonaland before the Matabele impis resumed their murderous raids on the Mashonas, and in 1893 the Matabele war broke out, leading to the overthrow of Lobengula and the absorption of Matabeleland by the Chartered Company. Nearly every able-bodied white man in Mashonaland volunteered his services. Three columns, numbering nine hundred men in all, marched through the country, defeating the Matabele impis on the Shangani and Zambesi; Bulawayo was occupied, and with the gallant stand of Wilson and his little force, the war was brought to a conclusion.
Then the white man’s city began to rise from the veldt, hard by the burnt kraal of Lobengula. Towards the close of the war I travelled in an ox-waggon with some Boer transport riders from the Marico Valley in the Transvaal—about thirty miles from Mafeking—to Bulawayo. This beautiful valley (“the Granary of the Transvaalâ€) was the old home of Moselekatse, Lobengula’s father. It was a fat land; there is none so rich for a hundred leagues around; for tribes of Zulu blood will establish themselves in none but the best country, and they will trek far to find it. The rolling land of Marico is as fertile as it is beautiful. It is as green as Devon, and the pretty farmhouses of the prosperous people are scattered among rich pastures, great fields of corn, and fruit orchards. Fifty years ago the Boers and their Baralong allies drove Moselekatse and his raiding warriors out of Marico, and sent them trekking north to seek a new home. So northward they travelled, murdering and cattle-lifting as they went, traversing good country, but not such as would satisfy the Zulu, until at last, nearly five hundred milesfrom Marico, they came to a land even more favoured than that they had left, and settled down in what is now called Matabeleland. I followed their route, and could then understand their choice. Fair indeed to the eye appears the green, well-watered high veldt of Matabeleland as the traveller from the south opens it out on reaching the watershed between the Crocodile and the Zambesi rivers. Lieutenant Maund, who some years before had been sent to spy out Matabeleland, with justice reported that, “when compared to the country south of it, it was as Canaan after the wilderness.†When I reached the place where Bulawayo, with its stately buildings, now stands, I found a few hundred white men occupying a little temporary settlement of native huts and tattered tents that had sprung up round the newly-constructed fort; the building of the modern city had not commenced. A little later I was present at the first auction of township stands. The alternate land lots bearing even numbers, lining one side of what was to be the chief street, were sold. They fetched about £50 apiece. A few months afterwards the alternate stands bearing odd numbers were sold by auction; they all fetched over £400 apiece, the highest price realised being £900. Some of the stands, that could have been purchased for £50 each in 1893, are at the present time worth six or seven thousand pounds apiece, and realise that price when put on the market. I quote these figures to show that whatever critics at home may think of the future of Rhodesia, those on the spot have confidence in it. The Matabele War was scarcely over before the volunteers, having received their mining, farm, and loot rights, scattered over the country to prospect and peg out their claims. It was wonderful to observe how quickly, under Dr. Jameson’s able administration, everything was put in order, and Matabeleland began to assume the aspect of a settled country. Bulawayo was soon a fine city, having its water-works, electric lighting, hospitals, public schools, its imposing court-house and other handsome public buildings. Townships sprang up like mushrooms all over the high veldt in the vicinity of the gold-bearing reefs. The population rapidly increased. The Chartered Company, in the meanwhile, pushed on the railway from Mafeking towards Bulawayo, proceeded to construct the line from Umtali to Beira, and quickly placed Bulawayo into telegraphic communication with the outer world. And now there was every sign of prosperity; the development of the gold mines gave encouraging results; trade was good; the value of the land for farming was proved, and excellent crops were raised; Rhodesia’s future seemed assured. But it was fated that its progress should be retarded by an extraordinary succession of disasters; surely no new country was ever so sorely tried.
All was going well until the early part of 1896, when the first of its many scourges swept down on the unhappy land—the dreaded rinderpest came from the North, and despite every precaution that could be taken to prevent its spreading, it destroyed over 90 per cent. of the cattle in the country, and played like havoc among the wild game. It is difficult for one who was not in Rhodesia at the time to realise the magnitude of this misfortune. As this was a land then entirely dependent upon oxen for transport, a stoppage was put to agricultural and mining operations; and the cattle-owning native population suffered greatly. Before the rinderpest broke out the average price of an ox in Rhodesia was £6, and now, though it is over five years since the rinderpest was stamped out, the price is about £28. Transport rates rose from 10s. to £5 per 100 lbs., and all the necessaries of life went up to famine prices. These figures, which will be found in an interesting pamphlet written by Mr. P. S. Inskip of the British South Africa Company’s service, will convey some idea of the situation. Absolute ruin faced the settlers; it is wonderful that the bulk of them did not abandon the country in despair, but pioneers are not easily disheartened, and they stubbornly struggled on, taking every possible measure to mitigate the effect of the plague.
Rhodesian Natives Washing ClothesRhodesian Natives Washing Clothes
But misfortune followed on misfortune. The rinderpest was raging when the Matabele rose, and the Rhodesians had to suppress a formidable rebellion, which was rendered the more difficult to copewith by the scarcity of oxen. The white settlers were massacred in outlying districts; there were heroic rescues, the rising spread to Mashonaland, and it was not until 1897 that the rebellion was crushed and peace for a little while came to the troubled land. Our total casualties were 690; and of the white settlers in the country alone 390 were killed and 150 were wounded, that is, 10 per cent. of the population. The Company spent £360,000 in compensating the settlers for the losses the rebellion had brought upon them.
It had fortunately been discovered that the rinderpest could be stamped out by inoculation, but no sooner had this plague been conquered by science than a terrible outbreak of red-water decimated the remaining cattle. Locusts, too, came in unwonted numbers to devour the crops, and horse sickness was very destructive. Then, on the top of all Rhodesia’s troubles, came the but just concluded Boer war cutting off this inland territory from its communications with its commercial and military bases on the coast, retarding its development, and once more calling on its manhood to abandon industry and take up arms for their country. The Rhodesians responded well to the call; twelve and a half per cent. of the population fought in the war, and it will be in the memory of all how well they acquitted themselves in the defence of Bechuanaland and the relief of Mafeking. Thanks to the foresight of Cecil Rhodes, Matabeleland was ours. Had it not been so, the Boers when defeated in war would have trekked north into the rough country—through which it would have been almost impossible for us to follow them—there to form new independent states, to intrigue against us as before. It would have been the old story over again; and after a few years we should have been plunged into another Boer war. But Rhodes had hemmed in the two Boer Republics. The quarrel had to be fought out within their boundaries. There was no outlet for them into the wilderness this time.
THE OUTLET BELOW VICTORIA FALLS, ZAMBESI RIVER.After Photo by G. W. Wilson, Aberdeen.
Notwithstanding these successive disasters the Chartered Company and the settlers had done much during those few troublous years to develop the country. The rinderpest and the native rebellion made it all the more urgent to complete the railway system that was to open communication with the coast. The Company hurried on the construction. In November 1897 the line had been extended from Mafeking to Bulawayo, and in 1899 the line from Salisbury to Beira was completed. Then the line from Bulawayo to Salisbury was pushed on; this connection has just been completed, and one can now travel by rail without changing carriage from Capetown to BeiraviâBulawayo and Salisbury. Another line is being constructed through the Wankie coalfieldswhich will cross the Zambesi near the Victoria Falls. How short a time ago it seems since the man who had visited the Falls was regarded as a great explorer! Other branches, too, will shortly open communication to the various goldfields.
Macheckie Railway Bridge on the Salisbury Line, Mashonaland Railway
It is worthy of notice that Rhodesia, though the most remote from the coast, was the one State in South Africa whose industries were kept going during the war, so that the conclusion of peace found her ready for an immediate expansion of her trade. This was due to the wise policy of the Company. Early in 1900 it was represented to the Administration that unless communication, which had been interrupted at the commencement of the war, was soon restored, work could not proceed on the mines; the native labourers would have to be discharged, and the mines would have to be closed down. The Administration realised that it would not only be disastrous to throw so many Europeans and natives out of work, but that the closing down of the mines would convince the Matabele that there was truth in the report which the Boer agents were diligently spreading to the effect that the English were being driven out of the country, and that the opportunity for rebellion had arrived. The Administration therefore came to the assistance of the mining community by making arrangements for the importation of sufficient necessaries for six months through Beira, at a fixed transport rate of £25 per ton from Port Elizabeth. The Company found itself about £5 a ton out of pocket by this arrangement, but great distress was saved. At the opening of the war the price ofgrain and meal rose 100 per cent.; but the Hon. Sir Arthur Lawley, the then Administrator of Matabeleland, warned the Chamber of Commerce at Bulawayo that if the cost of necessaries rose too high he would open the Government Stores—in which a large reserve of supplies had been laid up at the outbreak of the war—and sell to white men at a reasonable rate. This had the desired effect for a time, but later on the merchants took an unfair advantage of the situation, whereupon the Administrator carried out his threat, and so brought prices sharply down again. The result of this policy was excellent; the development of the mines proceeded, even if slowly; the crops were sown and there was a good harvest; the natives remained quiet and readily paid their hut-tax, which amounted to a larger sum than had been raised in any previous year.
Considering all the disasters, from the rinderpest down to the Boer War, that have befallen the country, it is indeed wonderful that so much has already been done towards the development of the resources of Rhodesia. There are critics at home who maintain that the country is valueless, that there are no payable gold reefs in it, else the mines would by this time have been working at a profit. People in the old days spoke in the same way of the Rand. Now, it was not until 1897, when the railway reached Bulawayo, that the real development of the mines commenced, and since then the country has produced gold to the value of a million and a quarter sterling, and this with a very limited number of stamps running. The gold belt extends for about 500 miles. Out of the 114,000 claims that have been pegged out, only 737 have been worked at all. Some of the mines have already paid dividends. The future possibilities of these yet practically untouched goldfields no one can estimate.
It had been naturally expected that so soon as the opening of the Rhodesian railways lowered the cost of transport rapid progress would be made in the working of the mines, and critics at home express their wonder that more has not been done; but the enormous increase in the cost of local transport due to the rinderpest has cancelled the advantage gained by the low railway rates from the south. Before the railway was constructed or the rinderpest appeared, the transport from Mafeking to Bulawayo, a distance of 500 miles, was ten shillings per 100 lbs. It costs as much as that now to transport mining machinery by ox-waggon from the Bulawayo railway-yard to a mine only 50 miles distant; and some of the mines are as far as 200 miles from a railway station. The branch lines that are being constructed will bring many of the mines within easy reach of the railway, but no great general progress can bemade throughout Rhodesia until cattle become plentiful and cheap again. The Chartered Company is taking active steps to restock the country. The importation of cattle on a large scale, both by the various companies and by individuals, is now proceeding. Cattle of an excellent breed, suitable to the climate, are being brought from Angoniland, and will be crossed with Kerry or Jersey bulls. Importers of stock intended for breeding purposes can carry them over the Rhodesian railways at considerably reduced rates. Moreover, the Administration advances money to farmers on easy terms, on the security of their farms, to enable them to purchase cattle. With regard to the rinderpest, inoculation has proved successful, and the Government should be able to subdue any fresh outbreak by using the serum which is now manufactured at Kimberley.
Now that peace has come to South Africa, all that Rhodesia wants to enable her to make rapid progress is cheap transport, which she will shortly have, and abundant and efficient native labour; for surely the sore trials of her youth, which she so pluckily endured and survived, are over at last. The gold is there; the majority of the reefs are permanent, and to quote from the report of the Chartered Company’s Resident Consulting Engineer:—“What the future may hold it is impossible to say, but the most grievous pessimist must surely admit that the experimental stage has been safely passed, and that Rhodesia has been proved to be a valuable gold-mining country of which the possibilities are enormous.†The recent discovery of valuable coal deposits will greatly assist the development of the country’s resources, more especially benefiting the gold-mining industry, for the timber is becoming exhausted in the vicinity of the mines, and the price of wood fuel is ever advancing. A careful examination of one small section of the Wankie bed shows that it will yield 1000 tons a day of coal of excellent quality for the next hundred years. It is too early yet to discuss the value of the iron, copper, and other ores which exist in Rhodesia.
To turn to agriculture. There seems to be no production of the temperate and sub-tropical zones that does not flourish on the favoured, well-watered soil of Southern Rhodesia. The area under cultivation is rapidly extending. The one great drawback is the locust. However, farming pays well despite occasional bad seasons. Here is a story that exemplifies the tenacity, under disaster, of the Rhodesian settler. In one year, when the successive locust swarms ate up the land, a certain farmer sowed his farm with mealies. The locusts devoured the crop: undiscouraged, he sowed his fields a second time: again he lost his crop. Yet a third time he sowed, and got his harvest in safely. Despite the two failures, he nowrealised a handsome profit. Happily, in the season of 1898-99 locusts almost entirely disappeared, and apparently they have never since invaded the country in their former numbers. It is claimed that this is due to the extensive use of toxine, with which for the last few years a campaign of extermination has, with apparent success, been carried on against these scourges of the land. The toxine has been distributed among the white farmers and the native chiefs, with instructions for its use, and satisfaction with the results has been generally expressed. An energetic farmer does well in Rhodesia, and finds among the mining communities an ever-increasing market for his produce. At present the principal products are mealies, barley, wheat, oats, forage, and potatoes, and excellent crops are raised. Market farming and dairy farming in the vicinity of the towns are industries that require little capital, and are exceedingly profitable. Boer tobacco is produced in large quantities, and experiments that have been tried with American seed have proved the suitability of soil and climate for the cultivation of the superior qualities of tobacco. Oranges, peaches, walnuts, apples, bananas, figs, cherries, vines, and other fruits do very well in Rhodesia. In the yet uncolonised north of this vast territory wild rubber of high commercial value covers large tracts of country. The Chartered Company is taking steps to protect the plant against the destructive native methods of extraction, and to make it a source of wealth to Rhodesia as well of revenue to itself. In several districts the cultivation of coffee and tea promises to prove successful.
The Wankie ExpeditionThe Wankie Expedition
As elsewhere in South Africa, the chief difficulty in the way of the development of the country is the disinclination of the idle natives to work on the mines or elsewhere, all the more so now that so many have been spoilt by the excessive wages paid to them by the military authorities during the war. The native of Mashonaland, for example, living in a country blessed with a fruitful soil and splendid climate, protected by our rule from the raids that used to devastate his lands, reaping his crops in security, assisted by the Administration in hard times of rinderpest or locust scourge, is now more than ever loth to work. He can earn as much as £3 a month with food and lodging. But for the protection which he enjoys, and which enables him to wax rich, he only contributes to the expenses of Government his hut-tax of ten shillings. An increase in his hut-tax might induce him to work for a few weeks in the year. If nothing will overcome his deep-rooted indolence, other labour must be imported. Arabs from Aden are already working in some of the mines.
The pay of the skilled white miner is 30s. a day. Throughout Rhodesia the artisan earns good wages, the blacksmith and the bricklayer, for example, receiving respectively 30s. and 35s. a day in Salisbury. Detractors of Rhodesia are constantly asserting that the white population is outrageously taxed, each settler, they state, having to pay £40 per annum to the Chartered Company in the shape of taxes; and a well-known politician, beloved of Little Englanders, has publicly declared that this is the case. It appears that these ingenious people arrived at this conclusion by dividing the amount of the Company’s revenue, £440,000, by the number of Europeans in the country, namely, 12,000, which certainly does give a result of nearly £40 per head. It is thus assumed that all the Company’s revenue is derived from the taxation of the settlers. Now, in the first place, out of this £440,000 of revenue, £113,000 represents the amount of the native hut-tax, and is therefore not contributed by white people at all. Another £23,000 is derived from the sales and rent of land, the Company’s property; and another £58,000 from the telegraph and postal services, which up till now have been worked at a loss. No one can maintain that these items fall under the head of taxation. To go further, another £86,000 of the Company’s revenue is paid directly by the mining companies that have been floated—that is, by the shareholders in England, not by the people of Rhodesia. These figures added up amount to £280,000, which leaves a balance of £160,000—the taxation laid on the settlers, that is, about £13 per head. To go still further, of this £160,000, £73,000 is derived from the duties on wines, spirits, and tobacco. Therefore if one puts these luxuriesout of the calculation the taxation amounts to only £7 a head per year, which is anything but high when one bears in mind that there are no paupers in Rhodesia, that women and children are few, and that the large bulk of the population are adult males in the prime of life earning high wages.
Rhodesian Mining. The Dobie Mill
The climate of the Rhodesian plateau is undoubtedly healthy and well suited to British colonists. It is a land where the white man can work in the fields. The British children reared here are as rosy of cheek and as sturdy of limb as those at home. There is, of course, malaria in the lowlands, but that will disappear before occupation and civilisation, even as it has done in once unhealthy districts of the Transvaal and the Cape Colony. It is the same with the diseases that affect domestic animals: thus horse-sickness once prevailed far to the south, and gradually has been driven north before advancing civilisation. The dreaded tsetse fly too, fatal to horses and cattle, can only exist where the larger wild beasts abound, and vanishes with the latter wherever the white man establishes himself. The rinderpest, in killing off the wild buffalo, did one good service: the tsetse disappeared with the buffalo, and now only frequents remote and unfrequented regions.
From every point of view the future of Rhodesia now looks hopeful. The young State suffered from every calamity that can befall a new country, but was too vigorous to succumb. The Company and the Rhodesian community have displayed pluck, energy, and patriotism in the hour of Britain’s danger, and every loyalEnglishman must sincerely wish Rhodesia prosperity. As regards the prospects of the Chartered Company itself, I will conclude by calling attention to one point. Up till now the Company has been compelled to maintain a large and expensive military force, costing £276,000 a year. Now that the Boer war has been brought to a conclusion, the necessity for so large a force has ceased to exist, and Mr. W. H. Milton, the Senior Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, has recommended, as sufficient to meet the requirements of the country, the maintenance of a force of 400 Europeans and 400 natives, with a simple organisation on the lines of the Cape Police. The cost of this, he maintains, should not exceed £100,000 per annum. If his proposal is accepted, the revenue of the Chartered Company should balance its expenditure, and the corner will be turned.
By JAMES STANLEY LITTLE
Author of “South Africa,†“The Progress of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century,†“The United States of Britain,†&c. &c.
The magnificent vagueness of the subject the editor of this volume has, in his wisdom, thought fit to apportion to me might have its conveniences, were it not that such pregnant matters as emigration, federation, education, irrigation, and half-a-dozen subjects besides, all of which bristle with problems and possibilities of the most clamant kind, are ruled out of this paper, in that their consideration has been entrusted to highly competent and patriotic writers, upon whose preserves it would be unbecoming to poach. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to everybody that it will not be possible to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the problems and possibilities of the future, and to keep entirely clear of these all-important factors in the case; seeing that every political, ethnical, financial, and economic problem impinges on these special subjects of which one and all are a part.
THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE TRANSVAAL A BOER FAMILY RETURNING TO THEIR FARM.Drawing by Chas. M. Sheldon.
As to the political situation to-day, it seems scarcely to be apprehended in this country that the lines of cleavage between parties and factions at the Cape, and indeed in the new colonies, are by no means simple ones. In South Africa generally it is not merely a case of BritonversusBoer; it is not in Cape Colony simply a case of Dutch AfricanderversusBritish loyalist. In the Transvaal the problem is not solely how to bring the Boers and English together, or how to conciliate and retain the loyalty of those men, largely of British origin, formerly known as Uitlanders. A labour party, championing a programme practically identical with that with which all students of later-day politico-social questions are familiar, is coming into existence, and is, I think, certain to make itself a power in the land as time advances. It has been frequently, if somewhat hastily, assumed that in South Africa generally parties will follow the lines of division common to most civilised communities, and range themselves in camps, the composition of which will be determined respectively by the place of residence and occupation of the units of the people; the interests, sentiments, and aspirations of the town dwellers being at variance with those of the rural inhabitants. In a sense, we may take the people of Johannesburg to represent what passes for the urban population of old-settled countries. Roughly speaking, the citizens of the older established and smaller towns were dependent for their existence, and are likely to continue to be so dependent, on the agriculturists, since outside the Rand the Transvaal had no industries, no manufactures worth considering: for some time to come she is not likely to have any. So the Rand stood and stands for the towns, and the Uitlanders for the townsmen. The rest of the State stood and stands for the country, and, the agriculturists being mainly Dutch, the Boers stand for the countrymen. In the future, however, the race question, which has practically overruled any dividing lines drawn on the basis of townsmen and countrymen in Cape Colony, should cease to govern, in quite the old way, the political antagonisms of the inhabitants of the Transvaal; in any case, if the various schemes for settling British farmers in the land are crowned with reasonable success, it will no longer be possible to regard the rural Transvaalers as simply Boers, and the townsmen as simply Britishers. At present in the Transvaal there exists, of course, the great and principal division of its people, the British and philo-Britishversusthe Dutch and philo-Dutch. But the interests of the great mining companies are not now, and never can be, on all-fours with those of the operatives; while the traders are likely to find their ideals at variance with those of the mining magnates and operatives alike. Obviously there will be no immediate community of interest and aim between the old Boer farmers and the new British elements introduced on to the land. The differences of the townsmen are likely to be more strictly economic than political; but they must necessarily take a political complexion in the process of their devolution. It would be rash to attempt anything in the shape of a precise forecast; but it certainly seems to me quite unlikely that the future divisions into parties of the citizens of the Transvaal can take the simple form of BritonversusBoer. No doubt the existence of the two races, living side by side, with the remembrance of a century’s differences between them, will continue to give a decided tincture to the parties to be formed in the future. It depends entirely on the kind of statecraft Great Britain brings to bear on the settlement of the new colonies and on its results, whether the progressive elements in the existing population—the population waiting for the gates to be opened to it may, for the purposes of this argument, be considered as entirely progressive—range themselves on the side of British imperialism, or whether they will join themselves to those forces, already existing, which openly or secretly aim at the establishment of a republican régime. It is quite a mistake to suppose thatthese forces—republican sympathies, that is to say—are at the moment entirely to be sought for in the Boer camp. It is, or it ought to be, common knowledge that the internal movement for reform on the Rand, and for the elimination of the Dopper-Hollander dominance of Pretoria, was not exactly inspired or sustained by men who wished to see the Transvaal an integral portion of the British Empire. At the same time, it is not denied that a great many sympathisers with this movement, and not a few of its active supporters—the late Mr. Rhodes, for instance—were above all things anxious that when the Transvaal flag was hauled down the Union Jack should be run up.
Apart, however, from such considerations, matters of history, it may be allowed that whatever the nationality or preferences of respective Uitlanders at that time of day, a rough sense of justice would reconcile most of them now to the flag of the country, which at enormous sacrifice of treasure and men has procured their release from the bondage of Pretoria. It is equally certain, more so in fact, that their acceptance of the British flag, now and hereafter, is and will be contingent on the treatment they receive at the hands of the new Government. Already many voices are heard in the land declaring that, so far from the new Government having brought relief to the mining industry and to the Uitlanders—and it must be clearly understood by all Englishmen, however much they may resent the fact, that upon the prosperity of the mines not only the welfare of the Transvaal but of all South Africa depends—it has increased its burdens. The limits of space will not permit any exhaustive examination into the basis of this complaint. Mr. Chamberlain, before these lines are in the hands of the public, will doubtless be on the spot examining into the grounds of the complaint. It would be clearly impossible for any one to accuse me, of all persons, of favouring the millionaires, or of holding a brief for their views and interests. But this is not a millionaires’, or a mining question; it is the question of the to be or not to be of South Africa as a British dependency. It may be said at once, that if, as Mr. Chamberlain at one time indicated, the somewhat contradictory and superficial report drawn up by Sir David Barbour, full of inconsistencies and injustices as it is, is to be accepted by the British Government, then I would not care to purchase at any price a seven years’ repairing lease—a repairing lease with a vengeance—of British tenure of South Africa, much less the freehold of the property. Whether he be a financial expert or not, no man who possesses a sound working knowledge, personal knowledge, of South Africa and its affairs can study this report and preserve his equanimity. It fills one with fear and trembling. Sir DavidBarbour’s proposals savour of the arbitrary confiscation of mining profits. This perhaps, standing alone, would not matter much from a South African point of view, since the loss would mainly fall on the hundreds of thousands of English and foreign shareholders interested in the mines; according to theStatist, the British public has something like £250,000,000 invested in the mines. However, it is not with such losses we are at present concerned. My contention is that if the Transvaal is taxed out of all proportion to its wealth—its immediate or permanent prospects even; if the new colonies, despite the heavy losses from the war, and the serious—for a long time to come it will be serious—dearth of labour contingent thereon, is burdened with taxation, the incidence of which is to be double, or in any case greatly in excess of the monstrous charges levied by Kruger and his advisers; if the Transvaal is to be saddled with a heavy war debt, then the financial, political, and economic ruin of South Africa in general, and the Transvaal in particular, must follow as an inevitable consequence, and this will happen even should a short respite be given. I have set forth again and again, in the columns of theTimesandPost, and in the Anglo-African journal I formerly conducted, that apart from the uneconomic and impolitic nature of these suggestions, they are morally unsound. He who calls the tune must pay the piper. The British people, by allowing themselves to be ruled and betrayed by men who persisted in blinding their eyes to the writing on the wall, though there were Daniels in abundance to interpret it to them; by allowing themselves to be served by an army wholly inadequate in numbers, and largely composed of inefficients, are responsible for the cost of a war which never would have taken place had British pro-consuls and colonists on the spot been trusted; their counsel listened to here, and their hands freed and actions upheld yonder.
Moreover, all such heroic schemes of taxation in the interest of the British taxpayer, of which Sir David Barbour’s report is a type, are based on proleptic statistics of an expansion which after all is problematical, and which in any case will not become solid fact if onerous conditions are imposed upon the Rand in advance of that expansion. The profits from the mines, great as they ought to be if we do not strangle the goose right away, are ephemeral profits—thirty to fifty years will see the last of them. Possibly the high-water mark of production will be reached twenty years hence, and from that time the decline will begin as in the case of the Australian and Californian mines. It is obvious, therefore, that a heavy war debt must press disastrously on the industry during its growth and during its decline. Taxation seems to havebeen proposed on the basis of the anticipation, as if it were already an accomplished fact, of the most prosperous days possible of attainment by the industry, and in entire obliviousness of the fact that no sooner is the zenith reached than gradual decline, ending in extinction, must supervene. Unjust taxation would be a suicidal policy; it would retard the flow of capital, render all but a few higher-grade mines unprofitable, with the result that the budgets of the new colonies would show deficits year after year. Not only would capital awaiting employment be frightened into other channels, but schemes of federation would remain sterile schemes; and the hope of a prosperous and united South Africa would continue a mere day-dream, impossible of accomplishment.
I have put this question of the taxation of the Transvaal in the forefront of this paper, because it is of pressing importance and immediate interest. Scarcely less important, though the subject will probably be dealt with more fully by another pen, is the question of land settlement. We are approaching this matter too parochially and timidly. If the land companies and burghers will not part with suitable land to settlers on reasonable terms, they must be made to do so. The example of New Zealand must be followed. It is absolutely essential that we should plant out settlers on a large scale; especially is it essential in view of the fact that the loyalty of the dwellers in Johannesburg and other mining centres is not to be counted on confidently. With these men commercial considerations are certain to be dominant. Even if they are not given the solid reasons for discontent already foreshadowed, reasons, real and imaginary, in plenty are certain to crop up. Hence their loyalty will not be a matter of sentiment, but one of calculation. Further, every help and encouragement must be given to the right kind of settlers; the country which spent over two hundred millions sterling in making South Africa a possible place for Englishmen to live in, should not grudge another ten, twenty, or if necessary thirty millions to make the conditions of life sufficiently attractive to the emigrating English agriculturist. The conditions underlying land settlement have been carefully studied by Mr. Arnold Forster’s Land Commission, and they were lucidly set forth in the report of that Commission. It remains for the Imperial Government to make them operative, by coming to the country for generous support. I can do no more here than record my absolute conviction, for what it may be worth, that if land settlement in the new colonies is to find its own level, so to speak; if we are trusting to men with the necessary capital, some £300 or more, to come forward in anything like sufficient numbers to affect appreciably the question of BritishversusBoer in favour of the British, or the problem of self-seeking Cosmopolitanism (purelycommercial interests)versussentimental and patriotic Imperialism, we are building our hopes on sand. The drawbacks to farming in Africa are many: absence of transport (and obviously without well-devised and speedily carried out railway schemes the internal development of South Africa is impossible); absence of navigable rivers; recurrent droughts (here again I may say that nothing less can avail than grand schemes of organised irrigation such as those favoured by Mr. Hedger Wallace and by Mr. Willcocks in his luminous report); cattle disease and locusts. Theignis fatuusof the Rand, it must always be remembered, is ever present to lure away the settler when he has once been induced to settle. To the Englishman the love of isolation is not generally the strongly developed vice or virtue it is with the Boer. Consequently, we must go before the settler and prepare the way for him. Large and well-organised schemes of planting families on communal principles, freely scattered over the land in the midst of the Boers, both from an economic and political point of view, are absolutely necessary if we are to retain our hold on the country, or ensure its permanent prosperity. Under proper conditions and safeguards, generous schemes of female immigration must be initiated. It has been said, and I do not gainsay it, that South Africa requires almost immediately 70,000 more women. Also the Children of the State, the waifs and strays, the foundlings, those who are physically and morally fit, of course, should be sent out to South Africa, there to be carefully prepared in proper establishments for colonial life. In this matter we may well learn wisdom from the early Dutch settlers, who, under an arrangement with the Amsterdam authorities, received into their midst a number of foundlings. From these the present race of sturdy burghers has sprung. The subject is too vast for detailed treatment here; else much might be said about the policy of obliging all male settlers to bind themselves to a course of military training and contingent service, and as to the expediency of encouraging a respectable number of Canadians and Australians to make their home in South Africa. It is, in any case, obvious that no tentative tinkering with the question of land settlement can avail.
The sooner we face this necessity the better; since the sooner it is in a fair way to being faced, mastered, and provided for, the sooner can those electoral and legislative concessions we have promised the Boers, and which honour, justice, and expediency oblige us to grant at the earliest possible date, be granted. As things now are, we have a British autocracy in power, alternating in turn between the desire to repress the clamant demands of the one great industry of South Africa—the gold mines, and dread of that powerful confederacy—the Rand magnates. The methods and example of the great financialcorporations and financial princes are not, to write temperately, conducive to the elevation of public morals; nor do they tend to give to the public life of a colony a high or healthy tone. Students of Mr. Cecil Rhodes’ career cannot fail to notice the disintegrating effect on that great patriot’s manners, and on his public and private procedure, which resulted from his close association with, and inexplicable reliance on, men, most of whom (it would be invidious to specialise the exceptions) lived and moved and had their being on a plane infinitely lower than Rhodes’ natural one. The destinies of the new colonies are for the moment nominally in the hands of British officials. These officials have practically nobody to go to for counsel but the mining and financial experts. This is not as it should be. The sooner there is a free play of interests and opinions between the Boers, British settlers, and Johannesburgers the better. These divergent classes, all colonial, however antagonistic their interests and prejudices, must fight out their differences among themselves as best they may. The British official, excellent as he is in dealing with subject races, is not seen at his best in controlling men of his own flesh and blood—men, I should say, of his own colour—when these men are in a position of political inferiority to himself.
The mention of this subject reminds me, that one of the most effective arguments in favour of granting representative institutions to the new colonies as quickly as may be is to be found in the native question. In this matter, as indeed in every matter, colonial opinion asserting itself through the necessarily imperfect, but only possible, system of parliamentary institutions, must be respected. As to the native question, an enormous majority of British South Africans, though it may reprobate certain tendencies to undue harshness, brutality even, still observable in the conduct of Boers of the baser sort, is nevertheless convinced that the Dutch attitude toward the native is, in its essence, the only possible or safe one. There is not the smallest fear that anything in the shape of compulsory labour will be sanctioned by any legislature in South Africa. But that the principles and provisions of that most statesmanlike Act, the Glen Grey Act, will be further extended there can be no doubt.
That the labour question throughout South Africa, and especially as it affects the mining industry, is among the more difficult problems of the future, most persons are aware. It is said that in five years’ time 320,000 natives will be required at Johannesburg to work the mines, irrespective of enormous domestic requirements there. To this total we must add the hundreds of thousands needed for industrial and household work throughout South Africa. It is estimated that in five years’ time there will be no more than 600,000working Kaffirs south of the Zambesi. It is obvious that under the most favourable computation the supply is certain to continue to be totally inadequate to the demand. This is the more apparent when it is remembered, that it is only possible to get a small proportion of able-bodied Kaffirs to work at all, and that the average service of these willing ones is not more than four months a year, taking one year with another. Doubtless the new laws as to capitation tax, and the modifications in the direction of greater stringency in the hut tax, alterations which must have the effect of reducing the economic evil of polygamy, will effect some amelioration in the conditions now obtaining. But the lowering of wages and the prohibition of the liquor sale have retarded the immediate supply. I have had to listen before now to arguments in favour of the unrestricted sale of liquor to the natives, and in advocacy of establishing drinking booths from one end to the other of the Rand. This would be as suicidal, politically and socially, and in the long run as uneconomic a policy as could well be devised, to say nothing as to its cynical immorality. Of course, when schemes of organisation are perfected, and labour is largely drawn from Central Africa, the employers will enjoy some measure of relief; but in the end, unless relief comes from that highly debatable source—the importation of coolie labour—the prejudice against white labour in Africa will have to break down: a way out, I am sure, always provided the whites can be differentiated and segregated from the blacks, which cannot but be fraught with results of lasting benefit to the country, in procuring for it a solid substratum of Caucasian settlers who will become the industrial backbone of the country. The indirect advantages of such an innovation cannot be reaped, however, if schemes of heavy taxation are to be sanctioned. The margin between loss and profit in working most of the mines—they are what are called in city slang “low-grade propositionsâ€â€”is so small, that a slight increase even in the price of labour would often make mining unprofitable.
The employment of white labour would have the effect of disabusing the minds of the natives of the growing conviction that they are necessary to our well-being and existence. The truth is not so far short of this; but we must not make it apparent: we must try to make it less true than it is. During the war the native, spoiled by the military, did not gain respect for the Englishman. He is a shrewd fellow, and although our arms were victorious in the end, he cherished no delusions. Man for man, he has seen for himself how much more effective as a fighter the Boer was than the Briton. Enjoying special advantages—his knowledge of the country and his control over the Kaffirs—the Boer was enabled tomake the best use of his superior marksmanship, tactics, and mobility; with the result that it was easy for him to inflict much greater damage on his opponents than that opponent, with all his courage and spirit, could inflict in return. The native has seen our men lying in ghastly, mutilated masses. He has seen few such spectacles on the Boer side. The native is no sentimentalist. He is much like a prevalent type of modern young woman—fond of laughing, enjoyment, gew-gaws and sweets, while viewing everything from the standpoint of self-interest. In brief, despite his jollity he is as hard as nails. It is perfectly right that we should show him some consideration as the descendant of tribes who conquered the land some century or so earlier than we conquered it; for, except so far as being an inhabitant of the continent is concerned, it is absurd to talk of the existing South African tribes as aborigines. But if the “nigger†will not work, he must in the long run give place to men who will, to British and Continental labourers and to other British subjects—the coolies of India, for instance—men who will work, and who are now starving, or are on the brink of starvation, for the want of it. That this step is not to be taken lightly I am free to admit. It is fraught with grave difficulties and dangers—political, economic, and ethnical—considerations which are by no means to be minimised even if for a larger good—South Africa cannot be allowed to languish for lack of labour—they will have to be ignored.