[72]I have avoided the use of the word determine. It would be well to distinguish between that which isdeterminedfrom without, that is, conditioned, and that which isdeterminate, that is, grounded in the constitution. I am here, I think, in line with Bosanquet. (SeePrinciple of Individuality and Value, e. g. pp. 341, 352.) I have also avoided all reference to teleology. Without committing myself to the acceptance of all that Mr. Bosanquet says in the fourth lecture of the series to which reference has just been made, his treatment, there, appears to be on right lines. There is no opposition in teleology, so treated, to what is determinate. Indeed, such teleology is the expression of the logical structure of the world, or, as Spencer would say, the universality of law. For just as highertypes of relatedness imply a substratum of physico-chemical processes, so do all events imply the underlying logic of events. Cf. W. T. Marvin,A First Book of Metaphysics, ch. xiii, 'On the logical strata of reality.'
[72]I have avoided the use of the word determine. It would be well to distinguish between that which isdeterminedfrom without, that is, conditioned, and that which isdeterminate, that is, grounded in the constitution. I am here, I think, in line with Bosanquet. (SeePrinciple of Individuality and Value, e. g. pp. 341, 352.) I have also avoided all reference to teleology. Without committing myself to the acceptance of all that Mr. Bosanquet says in the fourth lecture of the series to which reference has just been made, his treatment, there, appears to be on right lines. There is no opposition in teleology, so treated, to what is determinate. Indeed, such teleology is the expression of the logical structure of the world, or, as Spencer would say, the universality of law. For just as highertypes of relatedness imply a substratum of physico-chemical processes, so do all events imply the underlying logic of events. Cf. W. T. Marvin,A First Book of Metaphysics, ch. xiii, 'On the logical strata of reality.'
[73]Cf. Ps., vol. i, pp. 99 and 140.
[73]Cf. Ps., vol. i, pp. 99 and 140.
[74]Problems of Philosophy, ch. v; cf.Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 1910-11, p. 108.
[74]Problems of Philosophy, ch. v; cf.Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 1910-11, p. 108.
[75]It should be distinctly understood that I here speak of one order of being in reference to the phenomena dealt with by science, including the cognitive phenomena discussed in the text. Whether we should speak of the Source of phenomena as constituting a separate order of being is a question I cannot discuss in a note. Does the logic of events imply a Logos? That is the question in brief. But, since the implication in question is not of the scientific kind, I may leave it on one side in considering a philosophy of science.
[75]It should be distinctly understood that I here speak of one order of being in reference to the phenomena dealt with by science, including the cognitive phenomena discussed in the text. Whether we should speak of the Source of phenomena as constituting a separate order of being is a question I cannot discuss in a note. Does the logic of events imply a Logos? That is the question in brief. But, since the implication in question is not of the scientific kind, I may leave it on one side in considering a philosophy of science.
[76]Ps., vol. i, p. 140.
[76]Ps., vol. i, p. 140.
[77]F. P., p. 178.
[77]F. P., p. 178.
[78]I have confined my attention to the cognitive type of relatedness. Other higher modes supervene when the course of evolution is traced further upwards. Indeed, cognition is only part of the underlying basis implied by the richer forms of distinctively human relational life. Spencer has much to say of them in hisSociologyand hisEthics, though he fails to realize that the phenomena he is dealing with involve essentially new constitutive features in man and in society. Can music or any form of art be discussed in terms of cognition only? I merely add this note to show that I am not unaware of the patent fact that when we have reached the cognitive type of relatedness, we are nowhere near the top of the evolutional tree.
[78]I have confined my attention to the cognitive type of relatedness. Other higher modes supervene when the course of evolution is traced further upwards. Indeed, cognition is only part of the underlying basis implied by the richer forms of distinctively human relational life. Spencer has much to say of them in hisSociologyand hisEthics, though he fails to realize that the phenomena he is dealing with involve essentially new constitutive features in man and in society. Can music or any form of art be discussed in terms of cognition only? I merely add this note to show that I am not unaware of the patent fact that when we have reached the cognitive type of relatedness, we are nowhere near the top of the evolutional tree.
[79]The part which is the centre of awareness, may be spoken of as experiencing, in contradistinction to what is experienced. It is clear that such experiencing is always correlative to what is experienced actually or ideally (Spencer's vividly or faintly). The centre of awareness is either the cortex, or some specific part of the cortex, or (more generally) the organism as owning the cortex, in each case in accordance with the universe of discourse.
[79]The part which is the centre of awareness, may be spoken of as experiencing, in contradistinction to what is experienced. It is clear that such experiencing is always correlative to what is experienced actually or ideally (Spencer's vividly or faintly). The centre of awareness is either the cortex, or some specific part of the cortex, or (more generally) the organism as owning the cortex, in each case in accordance with the universe of discourse.
[80]Few physicists would, I think, be prepared to deny that, within a field of effective relatedness, there may be, and very often is, guidance without work done or any change in the 'amount of energy'. What physicists are concerned to insist on is their cardinal principle that every physical change involves physical terms in physical relatedness. This can be fully and freely accepted in accordance with the doctrine of implication sketched in the text.It is when Life or Consciousness is invoked to play the part of a non-physical term, or thing, which acts and reacts as if it were a physical term or thing, that physicists enter an emphatic protest. Cognitive relatedness among physical things may well be effective in guidance. To claim its presence must not, however, be regarded as in any sense equivalent to a denial of underlying physico-chemical relatedness.
[80]Few physicists would, I think, be prepared to deny that, within a field of effective relatedness, there may be, and very often is, guidance without work done or any change in the 'amount of energy'. What physicists are concerned to insist on is their cardinal principle that every physical change involves physical terms in physical relatedness. This can be fully and freely accepted in accordance with the doctrine of implication sketched in the text.It is when Life or Consciousness is invoked to play the part of a non-physical term, or thing, which acts and reacts as if it were a physical term or thing, that physicists enter an emphatic protest. Cognitive relatedness among physical things may well be effective in guidance. To claim its presence must not, however, be regarded as in any sense equivalent to a denial of underlying physico-chemical relatedness.
[81]Until those who seek to furnish evidence of the existence of discarnate spirits can make some plausible suggestions as to the nature of a comprehensible scheme of correlation which shall serve to link the discarnate with the incarnate, one is forced to enter their results in a suspense account. It is of little use to proclaim the existence of 'facts scorned by orthodox science'. The so-called facts must be incorporated within a consistent scheme, before they can claim a place in the fabric of scientific truth.
[81]Until those who seek to furnish evidence of the existence of discarnate spirits can make some plausible suggestions as to the nature of a comprehensible scheme of correlation which shall serve to link the discarnate with the incarnate, one is forced to enter their results in a suspense account. It is of little use to proclaim the existence of 'facts scorned by orthodox science'. The so-called facts must be incorporated within a consistent scheme, before they can claim a place in the fabric of scientific truth.
[82]As the word entity is now often used, for example by Mr. G. E. Moore, cognitive relatedness may be termed an entity. 'When I speak of an entity I shall mean to imply absolutely nothing more with regard to that which I so call, than that itisorwas—that it is or was contained in the Universe; and of anything whatever whichisorwas, I shall take the liberty to say that it is an entity.' G. E. Moore,Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 1909-10, p. 36.
[82]As the word entity is now often used, for example by Mr. G. E. Moore, cognitive relatedness may be termed an entity. 'When I speak of an entity I shall mean to imply absolutely nothing more with regard to that which I so call, than that itisorwas—that it is or was contained in the Universe; and of anything whatever whichisorwas, I shall take the liberty to say that it is an entity.' G. E. Moore,Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 1909-10, p. 36.
[83]I have no space to discuss the physiological differentiation which is implied by the effectiveness of the cognitive relation. It involves, I believe, the differentiation of a superior cortical system from an inferior system of nervous arcs. I have dealt with it in some detail elsewhere. SeeInstinct and Experience.
[83]I have no space to discuss the physiological differentiation which is implied by the effectiveness of the cognitive relation. It involves, I believe, the differentiation of a superior cortical system from an inferior system of nervous arcs. I have dealt with it in some detail elsewhere. SeeInstinct and Experience.
[84]F. P., pp. 91-2.
[84]F. P., pp. 91-2.
OXFORD: HORACE HART M.A.PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY