Study I.

Study I.

“The Elements of Moral Science: ByFrancis Wayland, D.D.,President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Fortieth Thousand. Boston, 1849.” Pp. 396.

Thisauthor informs us that he has been many years preparing the work, with a view to furnish his pupils with a text-book free from the errors of Paley. Like Paley, whom he evidently wishes to supersede, he has devoted a portion of his strength to the abolition of slavery. We propose to look into the book with an eye to that subject alone. President Wayland says:

P. 24. “Moral Law is a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results.”

Pp. 25, 26. “An order of sequence established, supposes, of necessity, an Establisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of a Universal Cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of his enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, is just as inviolable as an order of sequence in physics.

“Such being the fact, it is evident that the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The results which God has connected with actions will inevitably occur, all the created power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding.

“Yet men have always flattered themselves with the hope that they could violate the moral law and escape the consequences whichGod has established. The reason is obvious. In physics, the consequent follows the antecedent, often immediately, and most commonly after a stated and well-known interval. In morals, the result is frequently long delayed; the time of its occurrence is always uncertain:—Hence, ‘because the sentence against an evil work is notspeedilyexecuted, therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to do evil.’ But time, whether long or short, has neitherpowernortendencyto change the order of an established sequence. The time required for vegetation, in different orders of plants, may vary; but, yet, wheat will always produce wheat, and an acorn will always produce an oak. That such is the case in morals, a heathen poet has taught us.‘Raro, antecedentum scelestum deseruit pede pœna claudo.’Hor.lib. iii. car. 2.

“A higher authority has admonished us, ‘Be not deceived; God is not mocked; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.’ It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs.”

To this doctrine we yield the highest approval.

The first obvious deduction from the lesson here advanced is, that the laws of God, as once revealed to man, never lose their high moral qualities nor their divine character, at any subsequent age of the world. The law, which God delivered to Moses from Mount Sinai, authorizing his chosen people to buy slaves, and hold them as an inheritance for their children after them, is, therefore, the law of God now. The action of the law may be suspended at a particular time or place, from a change of contingencies,—yet the law stands unaffected.

We hope no one doubts the accuracy of the doctrine thus fairly stated in these “Elements.” But we shall see how fatal it is to some portions of the author’s positions concerning slavery. And we propose to show how this doctrine, as connected with slavery, has been, and is elucidated in scripture. The twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy shows that the fruits of wickedness are all manner of curses, finally terminating in slavery or death.

Here, slavery, as a threatened punishment, distinctly looks back to a course of wickedness for its antecedent. The same idea is spread through the whole Scriptures: “Whosoever committeth sin, is theservantof sin.”Johnviii. 34. “I am carnal, sold under sin.”Rom.vii. 14. “Behold, for your iniquities have ye sold yourselves.”Isa.1. 1. See, also,Jer.xiii. 22.

The biblical scholar will recollect a multitude of instances where this doctrine is clearly advanced, recognising sin as the antecedent of slavery.

Abraham was obedient to the voice of God. His conduct was the antecedent and the consequent was, God heaped upon him many blessings and among them, riches in various things,—“male and female slaves,” some of whom were “born in his house,” and some “bought with his money;” and God made a covenant with him, granting him, and his seed after him, the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession.

But this gift, as is the continuance of all other blessings, was accompanied with a condition, which is well explained inGenesis, xviii. 19: “For I know him, that he will command his children andhis householdafter him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him.”

Scholars will concede the fact that “his household” is a term by which his slaves are particularly included, over whom his government was extended; and, without its proper maintenance, the covenant so far on his part would be broken.

From the wording of the covenant it is evident that Abraham had slaves before the covenant was made, since it embraced regulations concerning slaves, but, in no instance, hints that the existence of slavery was adverse to the law of God, or that the holding of slaves, as slaves, was contrary to his will. The deduction is, that slavery exists in the world by Divine appointment; and that the act of owning slaves is in conformity with the moral law.

The doctrine, that sin is the antecedent of slavery, is further elucidated and made still more manifest by the recognition of the institution by the biblical writers, where they place sin and slavery in opposition to holiness and freedom:—thus, figuratively, making righteousness the antecedent of freedom. “Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.”Gal.v. 1. “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”Johniii. 32.

The abuse of slavery, like the abuse of any thing else, is doubtless a great sin. Of the blessings God bestows on man, there is perhaps no one he does not abuse; and while we examine the laws of God, as presenting to the mind the vast field of cause and effect,—of antecedent and consequent,—we may be led to a reflectionon the necessity of a conformity thereto, lest a long continuance of such abuses shall become the antecedent to future calamities and woes, either to ourselves or posterity; woes and calamities prefigured by those nations and tribes already under the infliction of slavery, as a just punishment of sin.

Thus far, we thank the Rev. Dr. Wayland for this fairexposéof his views of the moral law of God; and if he will apply them now to the institution of slavery,—if he will unfetter his intellect from the manacles imposed on it by a defective education on that subject, and cut himself loose from the prejudices that his associations have gathered around him, we may yet have occasion to rejoice over him as one once an estray from the fold of truth, but now returned, “sitting in his right mind and clothed.” And will not Mr. Fuller and Professor Taylor rejoice with us!

In those “Elements of Moral Science,” we find the following, p. 29:

“From what has been said, it may be seen that there exists, in the actions of men, an element which does not exist in the actions of brutes * * * * * * We can operate upon brutes only by fear of punishment, and hope of reward. We can operate upon man, not only in this manner, but also by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong; and by such means as may improve his moral nature. Hence, all modes of punishment, which treat men as we treat brutes, are as unphilosophical as they are thoughtless, cruel, and vindictive. Such are those systems of criminal jurisprudence which have in view nothing more than the infliction of pain upon the offender.”

It was unnecessary to inform us that man possesses higher mental endowments than the brute. But the main object of the author in the foregoing paragraph is his deduction; that, because we can operate on man by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong, therefore any other mode of governing him is wrong. Thisconsequentwe fail to perceive. We also fail in the perception that his postulate is universally true: which we think should have been proved before he can claim assent to the deduction. If thisour view be correct, we beg the reverend author to reflect how far he may have made himself obnoxious to the charge of sophistry!

If President Wayland intends, by the clause,—“and by such means as may improve his moral nature,”—to includecorporeal punishment, then his mind was unprepared to grapple with the subject; for, in that case, the whole paragraph is obscure, without object, and senseless. We most readily agree that to govern man by appeals to his consciousness of right and wrong is highly proper where the mind is so well cultivated that no other government is required.

But, however unhappy may be the reflection, too large a proportion of the human family will not fall within that class. How often do we see among men, otherwise having some claim to be classed with the intelligent, those of acknowledged bad habits; habits which directly force the sufferer downward to poverty, disgrace, disease, imbecility, and death,—on whom argument addressed to their “consciousness of right and wrong,” “is water spilled on the ground.”

Children, whose ancestors have, for ages, ranked among the highly cultivated of the earth,—each generation surpassing its predecessor in knowledge, in science, and religion,—have been found to degenerate, oftener than otherwise, when trained solely by arguments addressed to their reason, and unaccompanied by physical compulsion.

What then are we to expect from man in a savage state, whose ancestors have been degenerating from generation to generation, through untold ages,—him, who has scarcely a feeling in common with civilized man, except such as is common to the mere animal,—him, whom deteriorating causes have reduced to the lowest grade above the brute?

Domberger spent twelve years in passing through the central parts of Africa, from north to south. He found the negroes, in a large district of country, in a state of total brutality. Their habits were those only of the wild brutes. They had no fixed residences. They lay down wherever they might be when disposed to sleep. They were not more gregarious than the wild goats. So far as he could discover, they had not a language even, by which to hold intercourse with each other. They possessed no power by which they were enabled to exhibit moral degradation, any more than the wild beasts.

Hanno, the Carthaginian navigator, in his Periplus, eight hundredyears before the birth of Christ, gives a similar account of a race he calls Gætuli.

It is possible that man, in these extreme cases, where there is very little to unlearn, might sooner be regenerated, elevated to civilization, physical and mental power, than in other cases where there may be far more proof of mental capacity, but where the worst of intellectual and physical habits have stained soul and body with, perhaps, a more indelible degradation.

It would be a curious experiment, and add much to our knowledge of the races of man, to ascertain how many generations, under the most favourable treatment, it would require to produce an equal to Moses, or a David, a Newton, or the learned Dr. Wayland himself, (if such be possible,) from these specimens of man presented before us! And we now inquire, what course of treatment will you propose, as the most practical, to elevate such a race to civilization?

It appears to us God has decided that slavery is the most effectual.

“Therefore my people are gone into captivity, because they have no knowledge.”Isa.v. 13. “And they forsook the Lord, and served Baal and Ashteroth. And the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of the spoilers that spoiled them, and hesoldthem into the hands of their enemies round about.”Judg.ii. 13, 14. See also, iii. 6–8. “If his children forsake my law and walk not in my judgments: if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments: then will I visit their transgressions with the rod and their iniquity with stripes.”Ps.lxxxviii. 30–32. “He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind: and the fool shall be the servant (עֶבֶדʿebedebed,slave) to the wise of heart.”Prov.ii. 29. “And her daughters shall go into captivity. Thus will I execute judgments in Egypt: and they shall know that Iamthe Lord.”Ezek.xxx. 18.See also the preceding part of the chapter.

It is highly probable that among savage tribes, punishment and the infliction of pain are often applied with no higher view than to torture the object of displeasure. But to us it seems remarkably unfortunate, in a student of moral and civil jurisprudence, to suggest that legal punishment, among civilized men, is ever awarded or ordered with any such feeling. If our education has given us a correct view of the subject, the man who inflicts pain even on the brute, solely on the account of such a feeling, instantly, so faras it is known, sinks to the grade of a savage; and much more explicitly when the object of revenge is his fellow man. On the contrary, when “the offender” has given unquestionable evidence of a depravity too deeply seated for any hope of regeneration, and the law orders his death, it selects that mode of execution which inflicts the least suffering, and which shall have also the greatest probable influence to deter others who may be downward bound in the road of moral deterioration. There never has been a code of laws among civilized nations, where the object of punishment was to inflict pain on the implicated; only so far as was thought necessary to influence a change of action for the better. The object of punishment invariably has been the improvement of society.

If the Rev. Dr. Wayland had been teaching legislation to savages, or, perhaps, their immediate descendants, his remarks, to which we allude, might have been in place. But may we inquire to what cause areweindebted for them?

Permit us to inquire of the Doctor, where now are to be found the “systems of criminal jurisprudence” to which he alludes? Does he imagine that such system has somelikenessto the government of the civilized man over his slave? Or, in their government, does he propose to abolish corporeal punishment, because he may think that will destroy the institution itself? For “a servant (עָ֑בֶדʿabedabed,a slave) though he understand, he will not answer.”Prov.xxix. 19.

We cannot pass over the paragraph we have quoted, without expressing the most bitter regret to learn from Dr. Wayland’s own words, that he recognises the fact, without giving it reproval, that “we” punish “brutes” with no other view than to inflict pain. Tous, such an idea is most repugnant and awful! And we hope—we pray Him who alone hath power to drag up from the deep darkness of degradation, that the minds of such men may be placed under the controlling influence of a rule that will compel to a higher sense of what is proper, and to a more clear perception of what is truth!

LESSON III.

The learned Doctor says:

P. 49. “By conscience, or moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality.

“Byfacultyis meantany particular partof our constitution, by which we become affected by the various qualities and relations of beings around us?” * * * “Now, that we do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men, must, I think, be admitted. Every human being is conscious, that, from childhood, he has observed it.” * * * * *

P. 50. “The question would then seem reduced to this: Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or by a combination of faculties? I think it must be evident from what has been already stated, that this is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, anddistinct from every other notion.

“Now, if this be the case, it seems self-evident that we must have adistinctandseparate faculty, to make us acquainted with the existence of thisdistinctandseparate quality.”

And for proof, he adds: “This is the case in respect to all other distinct qualities: it is, surely, reasonable to suppose, that it would be the case in this.”

What! have we a distinct faculty by which we determine one thing to be red, and another distinct faculty by which we discover a thing to be black; another distinct faculty by which we judge a thing to be a cube, and another distinct faculty by which we determine it to be a triangle? Have we one distinct faculty by which we find a melon, and another by which we find a gourd? What! one distinct faculty by which we determine a professor of moral philosophy to be a correct teacher, and another by which we discover him to be a visionary?

This faculty ofmoral senseputs us in mind of Dr. Testy’s description of the peculiar and distinct particles upon the tongue, which render a man a liar, a lunatic, or a linguist; a treacher, a tattler, or a teacher, and so on. His theory is that every mental and moral quality of a man has its distinct particle, or little pimple, upon the tongue, whereby the quality is developed; or, by the aidof which the man is enabled to make the quality manifest. Long practice in examining the tongues of sick people enabled him, he says, to make the discovery. We should like to know what acuminated elevation of the cuticle of the tongue represented “conscience or moral sense,” as a separate and distinct faculty!

Why does he not at once borrow support from the extravagancies of phrenology, and assert, according to the notions of its teachers, that, since the brain is divided into distinct organs for the exercise of each distinct faculty, therefore there must be a distinct faculty for the conception of each idea? There is surely an evident relation between this theory of the author and the doctrines of Gall; nor will the world fail to associate it with the phantasies of Mesmer.

But we ask the author and his pupils to apply to this theory the truism of Professor Dodd: “It is, at all times, a sufficient refutation of what purports to be a statement of facts, to show that the only kind of evidence by which the facts could possibly be sustained, does not exist.”

The theory by which the Doctor arrives at the conclusion that we possess a separate and distinct faculty for the perception of each separate and distinct quality, assimilates to that of a certain quack, who asserted that the human stomach wasmappedoff, like Gall’s cranium, into distinct organs of digestion; one solely for beef-steak, one for mutton-chops, and another for plum-pudding!

It is a great point with certain of the higher class of abolition writers to establish the doctrine that man possesses a distinct mental power, which they callconscience, ormoral sense, by which he is enabled to discover, of himself, and without the aid of study, teaching, or even inspiration, what is right and what is wrong.

The practice is, the child is taught by them that slavery is very wicked; that no slaveholder can be a good man; and much of such matter. Books are put into the hands of the schoolboy and the youth, inculcating similar lessons, fraught with lamentation and sympathy for the imaginary woes of the slave, and hatred and disgust towards the master; and when maturer years are his, he is asked if he does not feel that slavery is very wicked; and the professors of moral philosophy then inform him that he feels so because he possesses “a distinct mental faculty”—distinct from the judgment—which teaches those who cultivate it, infallibly, all that is right and wrong; that this conscience, or moral sense, is more to be relied on than the Bible—than the ancient inspirations of God!

Hence, Channing says:

“That same inward principle, which teaches a man what he is bound to do to others, teaches equally, and at the same instant, what others are bound to do to him.” * * * “Hisconscience, in revealing the moral law, does not reveal a law for himself only, but speaks as a universal legislator.” * * * “There is no deeper principle in human nature than the consciousness of right.” Vol. ii. p. 33.

And Barnes, on Slavery, says:

P. 381. “If the Bible could be shown to defend and countenance slavery as a good institution, it would make thousands of infidels; for there are multitudes of minds that will see more clearly that slavery is against all the laws which God has written on the human soul, than they would see, that a book, sanctioning such a system, had evidence of Divine origin.”

And this same author makes Dr. Wayland say:

P. 310. “Well may we ask, in the words of Dr. Wayland, (pp. 83, 84,) whether there was ever such a moral superstructure raised on such a foundation? The doctrine of purgatory from a verse of Maccabees; the doctrine of papacy from the saying of Christ to Peter; the establishment of the Inquisition from the obligation to extend the knowledge of religious truth, all seem nothing to it. If the religion of Christ allows such a license from such precepts as these, the New Testament would be the greatest curse that ever was inflicted on our race.”

This book, as quoted by Barnes, we have not seen.

Such is the doctrine of these theologians, growing out of the possession, as they imagine, of thisdistinct moral faculty, infallibly teaching them the truth touching the moral quality of the actions of men. And what is its effect upon their scarcely more wicked pupils? One of them, in a late speech in Congress, says:

“Sir, I must express the most energetic dissent from those who would justify modern slavery from the Levitical law. Myreasonandconsciencerevolt from those interpretations which

Torture the hallowed pages of the Bible,To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood,And, in oppression’s hateful service, libel‘Both man and God!’”

Torture the hallowed pages of the Bible,To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood,And, in oppression’s hateful service, libel‘Both man and God!’”

Torture the hallowed pages of the Bible,To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood,And, in oppression’s hateful service, libel‘Both man and God!’”

Torture the hallowed pages of the Bible,

To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood,

And, in oppression’s hateful service, libel

‘Both man and God!’”

The ignorant fanaticism, so proudly buoyant even in repose upon its ill-digested reason,—here so flippantly uttered,—to us bespeaks a dangerous man, (as far as he may have capacity,) in whateverstation he may be found. The most hateful idolatry has never presented to the world a stronger proof of a distorted imagination giving vent to the rankest falsehood. It is to be deeply regretted that such intellects are ever permitted to have any influence upon the minds of the young. We deem it would be a fearful inquiry, to examine how far the strange assassinations, lately so common at the North, have been the direct result of that mental training of which we here see an example. We fear too little is thought of the quick transition from this erroneous theology to the darkened paths of man when enlightened alone by his own depraved heart.

The saying is true, however awful: He who rejects or dispels the plain meaning of the Bible, rejects our God, and is an idolater; and God alone can give bound to his wicked conceptions.

The foregoing extracts show us a specimen of the arguments and conclusions emanating from the doctrine that the conscience is a distinct mental power, and that it infallibly teaches what is right before God. We deem it quite objectionable—quite erroneous!

We present the proposition: The judgment is as singly employed in the decision of what is right and wrong, as it is in the conclusion that all the parts of a thing constitute the whole of it. True, the judgment, when in the exercise of determining what is right and wrong in regard to our own acts, has been namedconscience. But it remains for that class of philosophers, who argue that man possesses a faculty ofclairvoyance, to establish that man has also a sister faculty, which they callconscience, ormoral sense; and that it exists as an independent mental power, distinct from judgment.

Most men live without reflection. They think of nothing but the objects of sense, of pressing want, and the means of relief. The wonderful works of nature create no wonder. A mine of sea-shells on the Andes excites no surprise. Of the analogies or dissimilarities between things, or their essential relations, the mind takes no notice. Even their intellectual powers exist almost without their cognisance. Their mental faculties are little improved or cultivated; and, as they are forced to the Gazetteer for the description of some distant locality, so they would be to their logic, before they could speak of their own mental functions.

The teaching of this doctrine, untrue as it is, may, therefore,be very harmful; as ill-informed individuals often form a very erroneous judgment about right and wrong, and, under the influence of its teachings, may come to think and believe that their conclusion concerning right and wrong is the product of their infallible guide, theconscience, ormoral sense, and therefore past all doubt and beyond question; that their minds are under the influence and control of anewandspiritually higher lawthan the law of the land, or even the moral law as laid down in the Bible, when not in unison with their feelings. And we venture to prophesy, in case this doctrine shall gain general credence, that such will be the rocks on which multitudes will founder; for simple and ill-informed people may thus be led, and doubtless are, to do very wicked and mischievous acts, under the influence of this belief—a belief of their possessing this power, which no one ever did possess, unless inspired.

“There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death.”Prov.xvi. 25.

Thus we see there is a class of theologians, who, in hot pursuit of abolitionism, seem ready to sacrifice their Bible and its religion to the establishment of such principles as they deem wholly contradictory to, and incompatible with, the existence of slavery; and it is hence that they attempt to teach that man possesses an intuitive sense of its wrong. But shall we not be forced, with regret, to acknowledge, that there are quacks in divinity as well as in physic?

We do not charge Dr. Wayland with being the author of this new doctrine that man possesses an independent and distinct power, faculty, or sense, by the exercise of which he perceives right and wrong, or, in other words, the moral quality of the actions of men, and upon which perception he may rest with safety, as to its accuracy and truthfulness; for the same doctrine has been suggested by greater men than Dr. Wayland, long ago. Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutchinson, and Dr. Reid have laid the foundation; the latter of whom says, (p. 242,) “The testimony of ourmoral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.“ Again: “As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the figures and colours of bodies about us, we have the same reason, with security, to rely upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience with regard to what we ought or ought not to do.”

Such sentiments may seem to some to be deducible from an indistinct and indefinite reference to our judgment after the understanding has been improved by moral culture, when such judgment, by a mere looseness of language, is sometimes described as if the writers confounded it with the state of mind and moral perfectibility produced by the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Archbishop Secker, in his Fourth Lecture on the Catechism, says:

“How shall all persons know what they are taught to believe is really true?

“Answer.The greater part of it, when it is once duly proposed to them, they may perceive to be so by the light of their own reason and conscience.”

Now it is evident that the bishop’s answer is predicated upon the supposition that the understanding has been cultivated in conformity to the principles of moral truth.

But, from such hasty, perhaps thoughtless, snatches of speculation, occasionally found in some few of the older metaphysical writers, our author and his co-associates in this belief have drawn their materials, remodelled the parts, and reared, even as to heaven, a lofty structure upon a doubtful, tottering base, bringing untold social and political evils upon society, and spiritual death, in its fall, to all who shelter under it. But for the good of the world, in opposition to such a doctrine, truth has erected her column of solid masonry, against which the fanaticism and sophistry of these builders can only, like successive drops of water, carry down the walls some useless portions of the cement.

We repeat, how tottering must be the argument founded upon analogy where there is no relation! We all agree that the senses make truthful representations: all see, smell, and taste alike; vinegar will be sour to the savage, as well as the savant. But is their judgment the same about the moral qualities of actions? What says this moral sense, this conscience, in the savage, who is taught to steal from his friend and torture his enemy? Does thereverend doctor think his moral sense will dictate the same conclusion? What right has he, then, to say, it is the voice of nature—of God? Does he fail to perceive that the moral quality of actions is distinguished by man in conformity to his experience, his training, his education?

We see that men often differ about the moral quality of an action. It might be that no two men would have the same idea about the moral quality of a particular action. Would the conscience, this moral sense, or faculty, in such case, be right in each one? If not, who is to determine which is right and which is wrong? And further, of what use to man can be this distinct, independent, and unchangeably truthful power, which, nevertheless, brings him no certainty? But has the mind of man ever found out that God has overdone, or unnecessarily done, any thing? Will these theorists reflect, that, in case God had seen fit to bestow such a sense on man, inspiration would have been useless, and the Bible not wanted? And the condition of man upon the earth would be wholly stationary instead of progressive. And permit us to inquire, whether this notion of theirs is the reason why some of these theorists speak so rashly, we might say blasphemously, of that sacred volume, upon the condition which they dictate?

The truth is, we have no such infallible guide. The idea of right and wrong, either theologically or physically considered, is always fixed through an exertion of the powers of the understanding. We have no instinctive power reaching the case. Our judgment, our feelings are often unstable, irregular, and sometimes antagonistic. In abstruse cases, very often we cannot even satisfy ourselves what is right and will it be said that we do not often fail to see the object, design, and law of God touching a case?

On every decision on a question of right or wrong, a train of mental action is called into operation, comparing the ideas already in the mind with the facts of the case under review, and noting the similarity of these facts to our idea of right, or whether the facts conform to our idea of wrong. This decision we call judgment: but when the decision reaches to the question of right or wrong, touching our own conduct only, logicians have agreed to call it conscience; not a distinct action from judgment—much less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof of accuracy and correctness than is our judgment about any other matter, where the ideas and facts are equally manifest and accurately presented.

There is another consideration which to us gives proof that the conscience or moral sense is not an independent faculty of the mind, nor to be relied on at all as infallible. Many of us have noticed the changes that imperceptibly come over our moral feelings, and judgment of right and wrong, conscience or moral sense, through the influences of association and habit. Our affluent neighbour, who manifests to others many virtues and some follies, our mind, by association and habit, regards as a perfect model of human greatness and perfection. Thus a corrupt government soon surveys a corrupt people; and a somewhat licentious, but talented and accomplished clergyman, soon finds his hearers in fashion. Nor is it unfrequent, that which should stigmatize a father is beheld with admiration by the son. Thus wealth, to most, is desirable, but its desirability has been created by association; we recollect the objects it enables us to command, often the objects of our principal pursuit. The quality the mind associates with these gratifications, it eventually associates with that which procures them. Thus, we perceive, the mind is able to form a moral estimate upon considerations wholly artificial, which could never happen in case the moral sense was independent, and a distinct faculty teaching us infallible truth.

But how are we to account for the fact that some of the finest intellects, as well as the most learned men, have fallen into this most dangerous error? It should be a subject of deep thought!

We discover, in some men of the highest order of intellects, the power of arriving, as it were instantaneously, at a conclusion, giving it the appearance of being intuitive, rather than the result of what would be, when analyzed, a long chain of reasoning. Thus, the instant and happy thought often springing to the mind when in some sudden or unforeseen difficulty. The nice and instant perception, often displayed by medical men, of the condition of the patient, is an example; and hence the astonishing accuracy of judgment, sometimes noticed in the military commander, from a mere glance of the eye.

In such cases the mind is often not conscious of any mental action; and others, who observe these facts, are led, sometimes, to confound what, in such cases, is a deductive judgment, with intuitiveness. The judgment, thus formed without any perceptible succession of thought, is merely the result of acquirement from long experience and habits of active ratiocination. Some few instances of this unconscious and rapid thought have been exemplifiedby mathematicians, when the calculator could give no account how he arrived at the conclusion. Will any one claim that they abstract their answers from the most abstruse propositions intuitively, or by instinct, or by any new and distinct faculty of the mind? This habit of mind is as applicable to morals as to any thing else. But in mathematics the data are everywhere the same; whereas in morals the data are as different among men as are their conditions of life; because our ideas of right and wrong, existing in the mind before the judgment is formed on the case to be considered, were introduced by the aid of the senses, through the medium of experience and education; and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the idea of right in one man may be quite like the idea of wrong in another.

But it remains to show the fallacy of the argument by which Dr. Wayland arrives at his conclusion. Let us examine the paragraph quoted, and sift from verbiage the naked points of the argument:

“We do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men.”

“Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or a combination of faculties? This notion” (the perception of the moral quality of an action) “is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.”

“We have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities.” “Therefore, it is self-evident that this is a separate and distinct faculty.”

The syllogism is defective because the idea of right or wrong is not simple nor ultimate, but complex, and ever subject to change from the influence of any new light presented to the mind. Nor is it true that we possess a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with each distinct quality; for, if so, the mind would be merely a very large bundle of faculties; and we should neither possess nor stand in need of any reasoning powers whatever, because the naked truth about every thing would always stand revealed before us by these faculties; which, we think, is not the fact.

In syllogistic argument, the first principles must be something that cannot be otherwise—unalterable—an eternal truth; “because these qualities cannot belong to the conclusion unless they belong to the premises, which are its causes.”

The syllogism will then stand thus:

It is not true our notion, or idea, of the moral quality of anaction “is simple and ultimate, and distinct from any other idea or notion:”

It is not true that we have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities:

Therefore, it is not true, nor self-evident, that we perceive the moral qualities of an action, or that we have the idea or notion of it, by the aid of a single distinct and separate faculty.

The “notion” advanced by Dr. Wayland, on this subject, appears to us so strange, that it would be difficult to conceive it to have been issued or promulgated by a schoolman, did we not know how often men, led by passion, some by prejudice, argue from false premises to which they take no heed, or, from a want of information, honestly mistake for truths.

P. 206. “It” (slavery) “supposes that the Creator intended one human being to govern the physical, intellectual, and moral actions of as many other human beings as, by purchase, he can bring within his physical power, and that one human being may thus acquire a right to sacrifice the happiness of any number of other human beings, for the purpose of promoting his own.”

This proposition is almost a total error. Slavery supposes the Creator intended that the interest of the master in the slave who, by becoming his slave, becomes his property, should secure to the slave that protection and government which the slave is too degenerate to supply to himself; and that such protection and government are necessary to the happiness and well-being of the slave, without which he either remains stationary or degenerates in his moral, mental, and physical condition.

P. 207. “It” (slavery) “renders the eternal happiness of the one party subservient to the temporal happiness of the other.”

This is equally untrue. Slavery subjects one party to the command of another who is expected to feel it a duty to so “command his household” that “they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment.”

This is the voice of God on the subject, as heretofore quoted. The learned Dr. Wayland is evidently wholly unacquainted withthe spirit and intention, and, we may add, origin of the institution of slavery; yet he has, doubtless, been studying some of its abuses.

But suppose a man to study nothing of Christianity but its abuses, and from these alone undertake to describe what he conceives to be its results, its character, and suppositions; he doubtless would make what Dr. Wayland would very justly call a distorted representation; and perhaps, he might safely use a harsher phrase. But would such a representation be productive of any good in the world? It might do much mischief by spreading, broadcast, its errors and misrepresentations; a most delicious food for the morbid appetite of the ignorant and fanatic infidel! Yes, infidelity has its fanatics as well as abolitionism!

“Obey them that have rule over you, and submit yourselves: for they watch for your souls as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy and not with grief: for that is unprofitable for you.”Heb.xiii. 17.

P. 207. “If argument were necessary to show that such a system as this must be at variance with the ordinance of God, it might easily be drawn from the effects which it produces, both upon morals and national wealth.”

The author, in this instance, as he has in many others, designs to produce an effect on the mind of his reader from what he does not say, as well as from what he does say. We acknowledge this mode to be quite noncommittal, while, on the minds of some, it may be very skilfully used to produce an impression. But we confess ourselves ignorant of any logical rule by which it is entitled to produce any on us. The mode of speech used is intended to produce the impression that the proposition is someway self-evident, and therefore stands in no need of proof or argument. But how the proposition, that slavery is “at variance with the ordinances of God” is self-evident, and needs no proof nor argument, we have not the “moral sense” or “faculty” to discover. But as Dr. Wayland proposes, nevertheless, to prove its truth by its effects on morals and wealth, let us listen to the evidence.

Idem.“Its effects must be disastrous upon the morals of both parties. By presenting objects on whom passion may be satiated without resistance and without redress, it tends to cultivate in the master, pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licentiousness. By accustoming the slave to subject his moral principles to the will of another, it tends to abolish in him all moral distinctions; and thusfosters in him lying, deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up to the appetites of his master.”

This is his proof that slavery is “at variance with the ordinances of God,” as he has drawn it from its effect on morals;—in which we think him singularly unfortunate. He asks us to receive, as proof of the truth of the proposition, a combination of propositions all requiring proof of their truth, but of the truth of which he offers no proof.

This view of the state of the argument, we imagine, would be sufficient to condemn it in all well-schooled minds; but, nevertheless, we propose to show that which he offers as proof is not true; and even if true, is no proof of the truth of the proposition he endeavours to sustain.

In regard to the master, the effect complained of may or may not exist, as may be the fact whether the master is or is not capable of administering the charge and government of slaves wisely for himself and them. But these abuses, when found to exist, are no proof of the moral impropriety of the institution; for, if so, the abuses of a thing are proof that the thing itself is evil. There are many abuses of government: is government, therefore, at variance with the ordinances of God? The same of matrimony; and is it, therefore, to be set aside? Some men make an abusive use of their education, and, in consequence, would have been more valuable members of society in a state of comparative ignorance: are our universities, therefore, to be abolished? Money has been said to be “the root of all evil;” it, to some extent, is the representative of wealth and power; the possession of either of which may, in some individuals, sometimes apparently enable the possessor “to cultivate pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licentiousness.” The same may be said of power of any kind. But has not Dr. Wayland learned that there are cases where the effect would be and is entirely the reverse?—where power, wealth, or even the possession of slaves, produces in the possessor a greater degree of humility, placidity or mildness, sympathy or charity for others, and orderly conduct in himself? Does the reverend moral philosopher make so low an estimate of the value of civilization—of the influence of Christianity—as not to admit the capability of enjoying a blessing without abusing it?

If Dr. Wayland’s argument be founded on truth, it will be easy to show that any system of things must be at variance with the ordinances of God which permit the possession of either power orwealth: consequently, in such case, we must and should all go back to the savage state. We ask this learned standard author to read the history of Abraham and Isaac, and inform us whether slavery produced the effect on them which he supposes to be an entailment of the institution; for the effect must be proved to be an unchangeable, a universal and unavoidable consequence, before it can receive the character of evidence in the case to which he applies it.

But Dr. Wayland thinks that slavery “tends to abolish all moral distinctions in the slave”—“fosters in him lying, deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up to minister to the appetites of his master;” and, therefore, “is at variance with the ordinances of God.”

If the doctor had seen the native African and slave in the wild, frantic joy of his savage worship, tendered to his chief idol-god, the imbodiment of concupiscence; if he had seen all the power of the Christian master centered to effect the eradication of this heathen belief, and the habits it engendered; had he witnessed the anxiety of the master for the substitution of the precepts of Christianity; if he had seen the untiring efforts of the masters, sometimes for several generations, before this great object could be accomplished, and the absolute necessity of its accomplishment before the labour of the slave could ordinarily become to him an article of full and desirable profit,—he would probably never have written the paragraph we have quoted!

But since, in the honest, we may perhaps say the amiable, simplicity of his mind, he has composed this lesson for his pupil, which, like the early dew in imperceptible showers on the tender blade, becomes the daily nutriment of his juvenile mind and the habitual aliment of its maturity, we deem it necessary to make one further brief remark in proof of its entire inadequacy to the task assigned it in his argument, as a particular and special, and of its total untruthfulness as a general and comprehensive, maxim in morals.

Our experience is, that the crimes here named, when detected in the slave, are punished, and, if necessary, with severity, if for no other reason, because they render the slave less valuable to his master. The master wishes to find in his slave one on whom he can rely with certainty; in whom there is no dissonance of interest from his own, and whose honesty and obedience are past doubt. The qualities which are the exact opposite of the crimes imputedare, therefore, sedulously cultivated in the slave,—and truly, very often, with small success. But we are surprised at the doctrine which proclaims a system of government that ever punishes and looks with displeasure on “lying, deceit, hypocrisy, and dishonesty,” to be the very thing to foster and nourish those vices! When such is proved to be the fact, we shall regard it as a new discovery in morals.

As to the last clause of what he has adduced as proof of his proposition, we say that any one who is in the employ, or even the company, of another, either as a friend, wife, child, or hireling, as well as slave, may manifest a growing willingness to minister to the appetites of such person; and such inclination, or willingness, will operate to the benefit or injury of those so influenced, in proportion as such appetite is good or bad, or tends to good or evil: but this influence, whether tending to benefit or injury, is not an exclusive incident of slavery, and, therefore, cannot with any propriety, be quoted either for or against it: for, everywhere, “evil communications corrupt good manners.”

Dr. Wayland informs us that slavery is at variance with the ordinances of God, because it diminishes the amount of national wealth. If the diminishing of national wealth be proof of the variance from the ordinances of God, then it will follow that whatever will increase such wealth must be in conformity to such ordinances,—a position which we think no one will attempt to maintain. But let us notice the evidence he adduces to prove that slavery diminishes national wealth. His first proof is, that slavery does not “impose on all the necessity of labour;” but that it “restricts the number of labourers—that is, of producers—by rendering labour disgraceful.”

Now this is surely a proposition which requires to be proved itself before it can be received as a proof of an antecedent proposition; and President Wayland seems to have perceived that, under the general term, “labourers,” it would be incapable of proof; and, therefore, he informs us that by labourers he means producers. The logicians will agree that there is a disjointedness in this proposition (very common in this author) to which exception might betaken; but we suppose Dr. Wayland means that slavery decreases the number of those whose labour is employed in the production of the articles or products of agriculture; for we do not presume he means that the labours of the law, physic, divinity, the mechanic arts, commerce, politics or war, are rendered disgraceful by slavery, but agriculture alone; and that, therefore, it is at variance with the ordinances of God, because it thus diminishes the amount of national wealth. If this is not his meaning, we confess ourselves unable to find any meaning in it.

We know of no surer method to test its truth or falsehood than for the Slave States to compare their number of agricultural producers with those of the Free States, having relation to the entire population. The result will be found wholly adverse to the reverend moralist’s position. In fact, so great is the disproportion between the numbers of agricultural labourers in the Slave States, compared to those in the Free, that the articles of their produce often fall down to prices ruinous to the agriculturist, which very seldom, or never, happens in the Free States. Let Dr. Wayland study the statistics touching this point, and he will find himself in error.

But the proposition of President Wayland includes this minor proposition: That the increase of agricultural products, to the greatest possible extent, increases national wealth. We are very far from discovering the truth of this; because the increase of a production, beyond utility and demand, can add nothing to the value of the production, since value depends upon utility and demand. If this position be true, which we think very few at this day will dispute, it is quite obvious that President Wayland, and even Adam Smith, (from whom we suppose the former has received this notion,) are quite mistaken when they predicate the amount of labour to be the sole measure, or, in fact, the amount of wealth; since that position must render the amount of labour and the amount of wealth terms of convertible significance, which, in fact, is seldom the case. Such, then, being the state of the argument, Dr. Wayland’s proposition is, in effect: That the production of the articles of agriculture, to an extent beyond any demand or value, is in conformity to the ordinances of God; and, therefore, their production, to any less extent, is at variance with those ordinances, because the first increases and the latter decreases national wealth. We shall leave these contradictions for the consideration of the professor of moral philosophy and his pupils.

The second witness Dr. Wayland introduces to prove the truth of his proposition, that slavery lessens the amount of national wealth, is that slavery takes from the labourer the natural stimulus to labour,—the desire of individual benefit,—and substitutes the fear of punishment: And for the third and last, that slavery removes from both parties the disposition and motive to frugality; by which means national wealth is diminished.

If national wealth be the desideratum, in order not to be at variance with the ordinances of God, it matters not whether the contributors to it did so contribute through the selfish view of personal aggrandizement and a desire of elevation above their fellows, or whether they did so to relieve themselves from some stigma or personal infliction that a refusal might be expected to fasten upon them. The motive in both cases is the same—a desire to benefit themselves. Thus Dr. Wayland, therefore, makes a distinction where, in reality, there is no difference.

But again, if the amount of labour be the criterion of the amount of national wealth, as he seems to suppose, it can make no difference, in a national point of view, whether A and B squander the result of their labours into the possession of C and D, or retain it themselves because the change of possession in no way destroys the thing possessed. It might be gathered, from this part of Dr. Wayland’s argument, that the greatest misers would be the most efficient builders of national wealth, and, therefore, most in accordance with the ordinances of God.

We are somewhat at loss to perceive the precise idea the author affixes to the term “national wealth.” Whether this be his or our fault, we leave for others to decide.

Has it ever occurred to the reverend author to estimate the wealth of a nation by the moral, physical, and individual welfare of the population?

But we cannot attempt, or undertake, to expose, nor explain, all the false reasoning, distorted views, and prejudiced conclusions found heaped up, in heterogeneous confusion, by the abolition writers. The dissection of mental putridity is as unwelcome a task as that of the animal carcass in a state of decomposition.

If we cast our eyes over the surface of human life, we notice that wealth and power usually travel hand in hand but that wealth is distributed unequally, varied from the lofty possessions of royal power down to the most scanty pittance of poverty and want;—yet leaving a vast majority in possession of nothing save life, andtheir right to the use of the elements of nature. It is with these lower classes we have the most to do. The wants of these, most generally, are physical: indeed, we sometimes find them only on a level with the brute. Thus, the African mountaineer is prone and content to feed on the decaying remains of what he may find, and wanders, like the hyena, upon the trail of what he hopes to find his prey; while the savage islanders of the distant seas are satisfied with what the ocean heaves on shore. We notice that these wants are increased by climate; hence, the native of the extreme north, content with his flitch of blubber, yet robs the bear of his hide for a blanket. These wants we also find enlarged by the least contact with civilization. Hence we see the African, on the western coast of his continent, garnished out with the gewgaws of Europe, and the Indian of our own clime with the trinkets of trade. And thus we may notice that, as civilization and capital increase in any country, new objects of desire, new individual wants increase in proportion. Hence, the farm-house now exhibits its carpet, whereas Queen Elizabeth was content with straw!

All these wants require some action, on the part of those who desire their gratification, to continue their supply, or it must cease; because, as a general rule, the product of individual labour must bound the supply of individual wants, in all cases where the individual possesses no capital which yields an additional revenue.

But a large portion of those in savage life produce nothing; so, also, a portion from civilized society seem ever disposed to break through the rules of civilization, to retrograde as to morals, and subsist by trick or some dishonesty. They produce nothing, and are, therefore, a total drawback on the welfare of others. We find, also, another portion, the product of whose labour is inadequate to the supply of their individual wants, and who are without capital to supply the deficiency. Such must die, or resort to charity; or retrograde, and live by their wits. Good men, in all ages, have striven to obviate these evils. The Levitical law did so by permitting the unfortunate man to sell himself, as a slave, for six years, or for life, as he might choose, under the state of the case; or, in case he did not so choose to sell himself, but became indebted beyond his means, the law forced his sale, and also that of his whole family. Although, to some, this law may look harsh, yet its spirit, intention, and effect were in favour of the general good, of morals, and of life. Yet it was slavery; and wetake liberty here to say, although some may not be prepared to receive it, that such ever was, is now, and ever will be the spirit, intention, and effect of slavery, when not disfigured by its abuse.

We have in vain looked through these “Elements” for some proposal of the author to meet such cases as those of savages, and of those degenerating and deteriorating poor, in all countries, known to be so from the fact that they ever strive to live by their wits. And here we may remark that it is evident the system of alms-giving must terminate when the capitalists shall find the amount of alms beyond their surplus revenue; and no one will deny that the whole system has a direct tendency towards a general bankruptcy. We therefore ask Dr. Wayland to make a proposal that shall be a permanent and effectual remedy in the cases under consideration.

Now, very few will say, but that if society can find out some humane plan by which beggars and thieves can be forced, if force be necessary, to yield a product of labour equal to the supply of their necessary wants, the ordinances of God will not sanction the act.

From imperfection, perhaps, in the organization of society, we not only see individuals branching off, and taking a downward road, but also, in all old countries, from the very stimulus of nature, a constant tendency to such an increase of population as lessens the value of labour by overstocking the demand, whereby its product becomes less than is required for the supply of individual wants. The consequences resulting from these facts, so ruinous to individual morals and happiness, often become national evils and the causes of national deterioration. But, under the Levitical law, and in all countries with similar provisions, the effect has been, and ever will be, a division of such population into a separate caste,—not national deterioration.

With a view to remedy the evils to which we have invited the attention of the Rev. Dr. Wayland, Sismondi, book vii. chap. 9, has proposed, that inasmuch, as he says, the low wages of the labouring poor redound wholly to the pecuniary benefit of the capitalists who employ them, those capitalists shall be charged by law with their support, when wages become too low to supply the necessary wants of the labourer; at the same time bestowing power on the capitalists to prevent all marriages when the labourer can give no evidence of a prospect of increased means of subsistence, satisfactory to the capitalist, that he will not be burdened with thesupport of the offspring. We are, by no means, the advocates of Sismondi’s proposed arrangement. But if the labourers, since in some sense they may be considered freemen, give their consent to it, we do not perceive that it would be “at variance with the ordinances of God.”

The author of these “Elements” and Sismondi, we believe, differed little, if any, on the subject of the abolition of slavery touching the negro race. Will he say, the proposal of that philosopher to benefit the condition of the labouring poor, if carried into effect as suggested, would be “at variance with the ordinances of God?” Yet, all the world perceive that it is a mere modification of slavery, containing conditions more obnoxious to human nature than appertains to any condition of slavery now known beyond the African shores.

Man has ever been found to advance in moral improvement civilization, and a stable and healthy increase of population, only in proportion as they have been taught to supply their necessary wants by the products of individual labour. This is what first distinguishes civilized from savage life. The savage relies wholly upon the elements, the casualties that bring him advantage, and the spontaneous productions of nature. The idea of supplying his wants through the products of labour never enters the mind. And will it be denied that, even in civilized countries, they who solely rely upon begging, trick, and dishonesty, for their support, are always found to be deteriorating, both in morals and in their physical ability, rapidly receding from all the characteristics of civilization, in the direction towards savage life. Indeed, a tendency to move in the same direction is often perceptible among those who only partially supply the wants of civilized support by the product of individual labour, and rely upon their wits for the remainder, thus, to some extent, becoming the plunderers of society. We would have been happy to have found the causes why these things are so, as well as to have found the remedy, in “The Elements of Moral Science.”

But let us contemplate, for a moment, a certain class of freemen, the lazaroni of Italy, who exist, merely, upon one small dish of macaroni, daily issued to them from the Hospital of St. Lazarus. We are all familiar with the condition of these people. Let us compare theirs with what would be the condition of the beggars and thieves of some other countries, were they placed under the control of some salutary power, whereby their necessary wantswould be supplied by the product of their individual labour. We need not ask which condition is most “at variance with the ordinances of God!”

Dr. Wayland has retained, for his last witness, the old trite charge that slavery impoverishes the soil; that, therefore, it constantly “migrates from the old to new regions,” “where alone the accumulated manure of centuries” can “sustain a system at variance with the laws of nature.” “Hence,” he says, “slavery in this country is acknowledged to have impoverished many of our most valuable districts.”

We are not aware how far Dr. Wayland has founded this statement upon facts drawn from his own observation. Has he done so at all; or has he, carelessly and without reflection, adopted it from the assertions of others notoriously destitute of ability to form an opinion with accuracy, or else too deeply prejudiced to give their opinion any value? Does he wish us to infer that the plough and the hoe, in the hands of a slave, communicate some peculiar poison to the soil; and by reason of which “the ground shall not henceforth yield her strength?” Will he please explain how the effect of which he complains is produced? If he finds it merely in the mode of cultivation, we then inquire whether the same mode would not produce the same effect, even if the plough and hoe were held by freemen? If so, then it is evident that “the impoverishment of many of our most valuable districts” is not the result of slavery, but of a bad mode of cultivation. Or, will the doctor contend that if those valuable districts had been cultivated by free hired men, the evils from negligence in the labourer would be remedied? “He that is a hireling fleeth, because he is a hireling, and careth not for the sheep.”Johnx. 13.

Dr. Wayland will not deny that the “heathen round about,” of whom the Jews were permitted to buy slaves, were a slave-holding people; but we have no account that their country was impoverished thereby. The Canaanites, whom the Israelites drove out from Palestine, were slaveholders; yet the country was represented as very fertile, even to “overflowing with milk and honey.” The Danites found “Laish very good,”Judg.xviii. 9. And the children of Judah “found fat pasture and good” about Gedar. 1Chron.iv. 40. “For they of Ham had dwelt there of old!”

For many centuries, slavery extended over every part of Europe, yet history gives us no account of the ruin of the soil. In Greece and Rome, the numbers of slaves were extended to millions beyondany number these States possess; but their historians failed to discover their destructive influence on the fertility of those countries.

Before the impoverishment of the soil can, with any force, be adduced as proof against slavery, it must be proved to be a necessary consequence; which, we apprehend, will be a difficult labour, since the sluggishness and the idleness of the Canaanites, and of the nations round about, left their country overflowing with milk and honey, abounding in fat pastures and good, notwithstanding their population were, to a large extent, slaves,—since, also, the servile cultivation of the soil in Greece and Rome did not impoverish it; and since slavery, which everywhere abounded in Europe, never produced that effect.

If Dr. Wayland will discover the legitimate cause of this impoverishment of the soil in the Slave States, and teach the planters a better mode of cultivation, we doubt not he will receive their thanks, and deserve well of his country, as a public benefactor.


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