Chapter 7

*      *      *      *      *Vague rumours reached us from the front, always carefully doctored by the censor. Prinsloo was taken prisoner with several thousand men; but on the line to Lourenço Marques Botha was still defending himself vigorously. After the taking of Pretoria the Government, incarnating itself, so to speak, in the person of President Kruger, installed itself in a special train. There Oom Paul slept, received, ate, and lived. There the official printing-press was also set up, and the money that was circulated was minted there. As in the hurried departure from Pretoria it had not been possible to carry off a complete set of weights, the sovereigns issued were simple gold discs, quite plain, without image or inscription.It was on this line, too, that the last great battles were fought, at Middelburg, Belfast, and Machadodorp, after which, renouncing all attempts at defence, the Boers began that guerilla campaign which De Wet had already successfully essayed.In a few days our steamer sailed. It was not without a pang that we quitted the land we had hoped to see free, for which we had fought for seven months, and which had proved the grave of a venerated leader and of beloved friends.CONCLUSION.An inexperienced writer, more expert with arms than with the pen, I do not know if I have described all these events in a manner sufficiently clear and coherent to convey a distinct impression. I shall therefore try to sum up on a few broad lines the ideas I have been able to form after the experiences I have recorded.First of all, two great questions seem to present themselves: Why, in spite of all their qualities, have the Boers been beaten? Why are the English, with over 250,000 men, held in check by a handful of peasants?These two questions are closely connected, for, though this seems a paradox, the chief cause of the defeat of the Boers is also the cause of their long resistance. I will explain.I think we must attribute the defeat of the federated troops mainly to their absolute lack of military organization, for in spite of the legend of the volunteers of 1792, no undisciplined force, however brave, will ever prove a match for a regular army.Resistance may be more or less prolonged, phases more or less heroic, but the issue is foredoomed.This lack of organization, of discipline--that is the great thing--explains the absence of cohesion, of combined action, of rational leadership.I have already sufficiently pointed out the evils of suffrage as applied to the election of commanders. In addition to this, what enthusiasm or confidence can these feel, when they know that half the men of their commando will leave them on the road if they feel so inclined? And even if they do not actually do so, the leader's confidence is put to a rude test!Yet these same Boers who have fought like lions on occasion, and on occasion have fled without firing a shot, are capable of education in the art of war.The Johannesburg Politie is a striking proof of this. With the elementary discipline that obtains among them, this corps held their own for a whole day against Lord Roberts's 40,000 men on two occasions, at Abraham's Kraal on March 10, and near Machadodorp on August 27, almost unsupported. And each time at the price of a third of their number!*      *      *      *      *To this chief and primordial cause we must add another, not altogether inexcusable, but very harmful under the circumstances. I mean the dread and hatred of the foreigner.Not inexcusable, I say, for, for nearly a century, the foreigner has been to the Boer the invader, the robber, and the enemy!The Boers therefore, as a whole, could never believe that for love of a noble cause, or a passion for adventure, men of every nation should have come to espouse their cause against the United Kingdom quite disinterestedly.In the unfortunate state of mind that prevailed among them, the eulogies of a well-intentioned but maladroit press had the most disastrous effect.What sort of respect, indeed, could these primitive people feel for Europeans when Lombroso and Kuyser had written in all good faith: 'As 63 per cent. of Boer blood is Dutch, 12 per cent. French, 12 per cent. Scotch, and 3 per cent. German, this mixture of the best nations of Europe ought to constitute a centre of liberty and civilization, a race superior to any in Europe!'Why, when one belongs to 'a race superior to any in Europe,' should one follow the advice of officers of the European armies, and, consequently, of the inferior races?And, indeed, when we consider the remarkable campaign now being carried on by De Wet and Botha, we may well ask whether Europeans could obtain better results. Under present conditions, I think, it would be hard to do better.But if General de Villebois' advice had been taken from the first, it is very probable that the guerilla war would never have been inaugurated. The campaign would have been over long ago; for whereas the Boers were content to hold the English in check, the Europeans wanted to beat them.Not satisfied with successful engagements that gave no solid advantage, they wanted to push forward, with the enthusiasm that surprises a demoralized enemy, creates a panic, and results in total rout.Haunted by the names that gleam in the folds of our banners--Jemmapes, Valmy, Marengo and Austerlitz--we dreamed of great victories. And if the Boers had wished it, this dream might have been realized!We now come to the reason why the English, with over 250,000 men, are held in check by a handful of peasants.I have said that this question is closely bound up with the cause of the Boer defeat--the absence of discipline. For how is it possible to surround, to conquer, and to crush adversaries who will never be drawn into a battle, and who make off directly a blow is struck at them?Are they closely pressed by the enemy? Each man goes off as he chooses in a different direction, and the commando of 500 men which attacked a little convoy yesterday has melted away before the column of 2,000 sent in pursuit of it.Far away in the bush, to the east, a horseman disappears on the horizon, another on the west--and that is all.If one of these men should have been too closely engaged in the English lines, the first farm he comes to offers him an asylum. His rifle is thrust under a plank in the flooring, his horse turned out to graze, the white flag floats over the house, and Her Majesty has no more inoffensive subject than my Burgher--for the next twenty-four hours.If need be, when the English authority is too near, an old gun--I once saw a flintlock--will be handed to him in sign of submission, and the oath of neutrality taken.This explains the enormous number of arms that have been given up, while the Burghers have retained their good Mausers and Martini-Henrys, and still use them.But as soon as the English, pleased at a fresh submission, have gone off, the rifle--the good one this time--is brought out, the horse stealthily mounted, and the Burgher is abroad once more.The dispersions are merely momentary, and very often a rallying-point among the hills has been fixed on in advance. Eight days later the commando, concentrating again, appears on the scene with some unexpected stroke. This kind of thing may go on for a long time.'Egaillez-vous, les gas!' was the cry of the Vendéen chiefs; and it is this manoeuvre, and the rally which follows it, that regular troops cannot execute.This kind of warfare is obviously very painful and fatiguing for the invader. But it is a purely defensive method, and cannot have any decisive success, unless the invading army should give up the struggle.For which side does Fortune reserve her final favours? It is certain that the English are weary, very weary, and that they have been so for some time.Ten months ago, at the beginning of January, a soldier of the 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment wrote with mournful resignation:'We shall all be thankful when this war is over, and this horrible butchery at an end!'Another, less disciplined and more easily discouraged, a yeoman, wrote after Colenso:'If I come through alive, the army will have seen the last of me! I have had enough of it, and I bitterly regret having rejoined my regiment.'I do not say that these sentiments are general, but they indicate the weariness of the combatants. And this lassitude seemed to me to be creeping over all, from the general to the private, among those I met between Springs and Cape Town.The army itself will not be consulted, of course, but I wish to note this state of mind, which seems to me serious.On the other hand, British prestige is too deeply engaged for the English to retreat without losing caste.What will happen? It would be foolhardy to prophesy. 'If in doubt, refrain,' says the sage. I will take his advice, offering for the consideration of those who have followed me so far this melancholy sentence from the Westminster Gazette of last March:'Each Boer will have cost us £2,000 to subdue, and no one can yet say what each will cost us to govern.'October, 1900.BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD[image]Map of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (small version)[image]Map of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (large version)*      *      *      *      *      *      *      *The Transvaal from WithinBY J. P. FITZPATRICKDemy 8vo., cloth, 10s. net. Popular Edition, cloth, 2s. 6d. net.People's Edition, paper, 6d. netMr. Chamberlain, replying to a Westmoreland correspondent, who complained of the want of a printed defence of the Government's policy in the Transvaal, wrote, 'I refer you to Mr. FitzPatrick's book.'Lord Rosebery at Bath: 'A book which seems to me to bear on every page and in every sentence the mark of truth, which gives you wholesale and in detail an extraordinary, and I think I may say an appalling, record of the way in which the Government of the Transvaal was carried on and the subjection to which it reduced our fellow-countrymen there.'The Times: 'Mr. FitzPatrick's book supplies a want which has been widely felt. For the first time, the information which everyone has been asking for, and which nobody has been able to obtain, with regard to the common facts of contemporary Transvaal history, is collected in a volume convenient for reference and easy to read. Nothing that has been written upon the Transvaal brings the conditions of life there so clearly before English readers. Mr. FitzPatrick lays his arguments boldly and simply before his readers, but it is in the facts of the book--facts never before brought together in so convenient a form--that the most powerful of all arguments will be found. Few readers will lay down the volume without feeling that they know more than they have ever known before of the real issues on trial in South Africa.'Why Kruger Made WarOr, Behind the Boer ScenesBY JOHN A. BUTTERYLATE OF THE 'STANDARD AND DIGGERS' NEWS,' JOHANNESBURG1 vol., crown 8vo., 3s. 6d. Second ImpressionThe Times.--'Amid the never-ceasing flood of South African literature, Mr. Buttery's is a book which deserves to be read. He writes with inside knowledge of the Transvaal, its recent history, and its public men. His chapters are pointed, easy to read, and full of interesting local matter. His description of the position of the Cape Dutch and of the Bond is worth reading. The book contains within small compass more useful and interesting information than is sometimes to be found in far more pretentious volumes.'Literature.--'It has the incisiveness that one expects from the work of the man on the spot, and it illuminates the British case with anecdotes and circumstantial details.The Daily Telegraph.--'The author throws a good deal of light on the proceedings of the Hollander clique. The book contains much that is of interest at the present time.The Rise and Fall of KrugerismBY JOHN SCOBLE AND H. R. ABERCROMBIEDemy 8vo., cloth extra, 10s. net. Popular Edition, 2s. 6d. netThe Daily Chronicle.--'The authors throw new light on much that we knew before, and they write with the experience of old inhabitants.'The Daily Express.--'A most timely book, and one well deserving the serious consideration of all public men.'The Scotsman.--'Those in search of enlightenment respecting the rise and fall of Krugerism in South Africa will find this volume a mine of information on the subject.'The Manchester Courier.--'The most striking feature of the work is its almost encyclopedic completeness, for there is hardly one of the many phases of political interest connected with South Africa which is not threshed out in these pages. There is a tone of healthy Imperialism about this book which is refreshing and attractive. It will be welcomed as a logical and painstaking presentation of the South African question.'The Newcastle Daily Chronicle.--'We leave the book convinced that a perusal of it will open the eyes of the British people all over the world to the evils and dangers of Krugerism in such a way as perhaps no other one book could do.'The Yorkshire Post.--'A valuable as well as an interesting work.'The South African ConspiracyOr, The Aims of AfrikanderdomBY FRED. W. BELL, F.S.S.Demy 8vo., cloth extra, 5s. netThe Times.--'The matter is one of great importance, and the volume serves a useful purpose in bringing the known facts and the arguments to be deduced from them within the reach of all.'The Morning Post.--'If there are left in this country any reasonable persons who yet believe in the righteousness of Krugerism and the whole-hearted loyalty of the Afrikander Bond to the Mother Country, we commend to their kind attention "The South African Conspiracy," which forms a valuable companion to "The Transvaal from Within" and "The Rise and Fall of Krugerism." It is well that the voice of yet another who has lived long in South Africa, who has travelled far and wide in Cape Colony and the Transvaal, and who is familiar with the temper and aspirations of every section of the population, should have added its testimony to the mass of evidence which serves to show us how, but for the employment of military force, the British Empire would have soon been in a fair way of classing South Africa with the United States, and other portions of the earth, that were once a part of that Empire, and now are not.'The Scotsman.--'Mr. Bell's book will be found eminently worthy of perusal and consideration. It clears up many points and facts that have been purposely obscured.'The Daily Express.--'A valuable contribution to South African history.'The Yorkshire Post.--'We hope that Mr. Bell's book will be widely read; it should be of real service in the face of the coming settlement.'The Daily Mail.--'The true inwardness of the origin, growth, and achievements of the Afrikander Bond have never been so succinctly and tersely set forth as in this book, which is excellent in its moderation, reserve, and judicious impartiality.'LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN, 21, BEDFORD ST., W.C.*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOKTEN MONTHS IN THE FIELD WITH THE BOERS***

*      *      *      *      *

Vague rumours reached us from the front, always carefully doctored by the censor. Prinsloo was taken prisoner with several thousand men; but on the line to Lourenço Marques Botha was still defending himself vigorously. After the taking of Pretoria the Government, incarnating itself, so to speak, in the person of President Kruger, installed itself in a special train. There Oom Paul slept, received, ate, and lived. There the official printing-press was also set up, and the money that was circulated was minted there. As in the hurried departure from Pretoria it had not been possible to carry off a complete set of weights, the sovereigns issued were simple gold discs, quite plain, without image or inscription.

It was on this line, too, that the last great battles were fought, at Middelburg, Belfast, and Machadodorp, after which, renouncing all attempts at defence, the Boers began that guerilla campaign which De Wet had already successfully essayed.

In a few days our steamer sailed. It was not without a pang that we quitted the land we had hoped to see free, for which we had fought for seven months, and which had proved the grave of a venerated leader and of beloved friends.

CONCLUSION.

An inexperienced writer, more expert with arms than with the pen, I do not know if I have described all these events in a manner sufficiently clear and coherent to convey a distinct impression. I shall therefore try to sum up on a few broad lines the ideas I have been able to form after the experiences I have recorded.

First of all, two great questions seem to present themselves: Why, in spite of all their qualities, have the Boers been beaten? Why are the English, with over 250,000 men, held in check by a handful of peasants?

These two questions are closely connected, for, though this seems a paradox, the chief cause of the defeat of the Boers is also the cause of their long resistance. I will explain.

I think we must attribute the defeat of the federated troops mainly to their absolute lack of military organization, for in spite of the legend of the volunteers of 1792, no undisciplined force, however brave, will ever prove a match for a regular army.

Resistance may be more or less prolonged, phases more or less heroic, but the issue is foredoomed.

This lack of organization, of discipline--that is the great thing--explains the absence of cohesion, of combined action, of rational leadership.

I have already sufficiently pointed out the evils of suffrage as applied to the election of commanders. In addition to this, what enthusiasm or confidence can these feel, when they know that half the men of their commando will leave them on the road if they feel so inclined? And even if they do not actually do so, the leader's confidence is put to a rude test!

Yet these same Boers who have fought like lions on occasion, and on occasion have fled without firing a shot, are capable of education in the art of war.

The Johannesburg Politie is a striking proof of this. With the elementary discipline that obtains among them, this corps held their own for a whole day against Lord Roberts's 40,000 men on two occasions, at Abraham's Kraal on March 10, and near Machadodorp on August 27, almost unsupported. And each time at the price of a third of their number!

*      *      *      *      *

To this chief and primordial cause we must add another, not altogether inexcusable, but very harmful under the circumstances. I mean the dread and hatred of the foreigner.

Not inexcusable, I say, for, for nearly a century, the foreigner has been to the Boer the invader, the robber, and the enemy!

The Boers therefore, as a whole, could never believe that for love of a noble cause, or a passion for adventure, men of every nation should have come to espouse their cause against the United Kingdom quite disinterestedly.

In the unfortunate state of mind that prevailed among them, the eulogies of a well-intentioned but maladroit press had the most disastrous effect.

What sort of respect, indeed, could these primitive people feel for Europeans when Lombroso and Kuyser had written in all good faith: 'As 63 per cent. of Boer blood is Dutch, 12 per cent. French, 12 per cent. Scotch, and 3 per cent. German, this mixture of the best nations of Europe ought to constitute a centre of liberty and civilization, a race superior to any in Europe!'

Why, when one belongs to 'a race superior to any in Europe,' should one follow the advice of officers of the European armies, and, consequently, of the inferior races?

And, indeed, when we consider the remarkable campaign now being carried on by De Wet and Botha, we may well ask whether Europeans could obtain better results. Under present conditions, I think, it would be hard to do better.

But if General de Villebois' advice had been taken from the first, it is very probable that the guerilla war would never have been inaugurated. The campaign would have been over long ago; for whereas the Boers were content to hold the English in check, the Europeans wanted to beat them.

Not satisfied with successful engagements that gave no solid advantage, they wanted to push forward, with the enthusiasm that surprises a demoralized enemy, creates a panic, and results in total rout.

Haunted by the names that gleam in the folds of our banners--Jemmapes, Valmy, Marengo and Austerlitz--we dreamed of great victories. And if the Boers had wished it, this dream might have been realized!

We now come to the reason why the English, with over 250,000 men, are held in check by a handful of peasants.

I have said that this question is closely bound up with the cause of the Boer defeat--the absence of discipline. For how is it possible to surround, to conquer, and to crush adversaries who will never be drawn into a battle, and who make off directly a blow is struck at them?

Are they closely pressed by the enemy? Each man goes off as he chooses in a different direction, and the commando of 500 men which attacked a little convoy yesterday has melted away before the column of 2,000 sent in pursuit of it.

Far away in the bush, to the east, a horseman disappears on the horizon, another on the west--and that is all.

If one of these men should have been too closely engaged in the English lines, the first farm he comes to offers him an asylum. His rifle is thrust under a plank in the flooring, his horse turned out to graze, the white flag floats over the house, and Her Majesty has no more inoffensive subject than my Burgher--for the next twenty-four hours.

If need be, when the English authority is too near, an old gun--I once saw a flintlock--will be handed to him in sign of submission, and the oath of neutrality taken.

This explains the enormous number of arms that have been given up, while the Burghers have retained their good Mausers and Martini-Henrys, and still use them.

But as soon as the English, pleased at a fresh submission, have gone off, the rifle--the good one this time--is brought out, the horse stealthily mounted, and the Burgher is abroad once more.

The dispersions are merely momentary, and very often a rallying-point among the hills has been fixed on in advance. Eight days later the commando, concentrating again, appears on the scene with some unexpected stroke. This kind of thing may go on for a long time.

'Egaillez-vous, les gas!' was the cry of the Vendéen chiefs; and it is this manoeuvre, and the rally which follows it, that regular troops cannot execute.

This kind of warfare is obviously very painful and fatiguing for the invader. But it is a purely defensive method, and cannot have any decisive success, unless the invading army should give up the struggle.

For which side does Fortune reserve her final favours? It is certain that the English are weary, very weary, and that they have been so for some time.

Ten months ago, at the beginning of January, a soldier of the 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment wrote with mournful resignation:

'We shall all be thankful when this war is over, and this horrible butchery at an end!'

Another, less disciplined and more easily discouraged, a yeoman, wrote after Colenso:

'If I come through alive, the army will have seen the last of me! I have had enough of it, and I bitterly regret having rejoined my regiment.'

I do not say that these sentiments are general, but they indicate the weariness of the combatants. And this lassitude seemed to me to be creeping over all, from the general to the private, among those I met between Springs and Cape Town.

The army itself will not be consulted, of course, but I wish to note this state of mind, which seems to me serious.

On the other hand, British prestige is too deeply engaged for the English to retreat without losing caste.

What will happen? It would be foolhardy to prophesy. 'If in doubt, refrain,' says the sage. I will take his advice, offering for the consideration of those who have followed me so far this melancholy sentence from the Westminster Gazette of last March:

'Each Boer will have cost us £2,000 to subdue, and no one can yet say what each will cost us to govern.'

October, 1900.

BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD

[image]Map of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (small version)

[image]

[image]

Map of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (small version)

[image]Map of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (large version)

[image]

[image]

Map of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (large version)

*      *      *      *      *      *      *      *

The Transvaal from Within

BY J. P. FITZPATRICK

Demy 8vo., cloth, 10s. net. Popular Edition, cloth, 2s. 6d. net.People's Edition, paper, 6d. net

Mr. Chamberlain, replying to a Westmoreland correspondent, who complained of the want of a printed defence of the Government's policy in the Transvaal, wrote, 'I refer you to Mr. FitzPatrick's book.'

Lord Rosebery at Bath: 'A book which seems to me to bear on every page and in every sentence the mark of truth, which gives you wholesale and in detail an extraordinary, and I think I may say an appalling, record of the way in which the Government of the Transvaal was carried on and the subjection to which it reduced our fellow-countrymen there.'

The Times: 'Mr. FitzPatrick's book supplies a want which has been widely felt. For the first time, the information which everyone has been asking for, and which nobody has been able to obtain, with regard to the common facts of contemporary Transvaal history, is collected in a volume convenient for reference and easy to read. Nothing that has been written upon the Transvaal brings the conditions of life there so clearly before English readers. Mr. FitzPatrick lays his arguments boldly and simply before his readers, but it is in the facts of the book--facts never before brought together in so convenient a form--that the most powerful of all arguments will be found. Few readers will lay down the volume without feeling that they know more than they have ever known before of the real issues on trial in South Africa.'

Why Kruger Made War

Or, Behind the Boer Scenes

BY JOHN A. BUTTERY

LATE OF THE 'STANDARD AND DIGGERS' NEWS,' JOHANNESBURG

1 vol., crown 8vo., 3s. 6d. Second Impression

The Times.--'Amid the never-ceasing flood of South African literature, Mr. Buttery's is a book which deserves to be read. He writes with inside knowledge of the Transvaal, its recent history, and its public men. His chapters are pointed, easy to read, and full of interesting local matter. His description of the position of the Cape Dutch and of the Bond is worth reading. The book contains within small compass more useful and interesting information than is sometimes to be found in far more pretentious volumes.'

Literature.--'It has the incisiveness that one expects from the work of the man on the spot, and it illuminates the British case with anecdotes and circumstantial details.

The Daily Telegraph.--'The author throws a good deal of light on the proceedings of the Hollander clique. The book contains much that is of interest at the present time.

The Rise and Fall of Krugerism

BY JOHN SCOBLE AND H. R. ABERCROMBIE

Demy 8vo., cloth extra, 10s. net. Popular Edition, 2s. 6d. net

The Daily Chronicle.--'The authors throw new light on much that we knew before, and they write with the experience of old inhabitants.'

The Daily Express.--'A most timely book, and one well deserving the serious consideration of all public men.'

The Scotsman.--'Those in search of enlightenment respecting the rise and fall of Krugerism in South Africa will find this volume a mine of information on the subject.'

The Manchester Courier.--'The most striking feature of the work is its almost encyclopedic completeness, for there is hardly one of the many phases of political interest connected with South Africa which is not threshed out in these pages. There is a tone of healthy Imperialism about this book which is refreshing and attractive. It will be welcomed as a logical and painstaking presentation of the South African question.'

The Newcastle Daily Chronicle.--'We leave the book convinced that a perusal of it will open the eyes of the British people all over the world to the evils and dangers of Krugerism in such a way as perhaps no other one book could do.'

The Yorkshire Post.--'A valuable as well as an interesting work.'

The South African Conspiracy

Or, The Aims of Afrikanderdom

BY FRED. W. BELL, F.S.S.

Demy 8vo., cloth extra, 5s. net

The Times.--'The matter is one of great importance, and the volume serves a useful purpose in bringing the known facts and the arguments to be deduced from them within the reach of all.'

The Morning Post.--'If there are left in this country any reasonable persons who yet believe in the righteousness of Krugerism and the whole-hearted loyalty of the Afrikander Bond to the Mother Country, we commend to their kind attention "The South African Conspiracy," which forms a valuable companion to "The Transvaal from Within" and "The Rise and Fall of Krugerism." It is well that the voice of yet another who has lived long in South Africa, who has travelled far and wide in Cape Colony and the Transvaal, and who is familiar with the temper and aspirations of every section of the population, should have added its testimony to the mass of evidence which serves to show us how, but for the employment of military force, the British Empire would have soon been in a fair way of classing South Africa with the United States, and other portions of the earth, that were once a part of that Empire, and now are not.'

The Scotsman.--'Mr. Bell's book will be found eminently worthy of perusal and consideration. It clears up many points and facts that have been purposely obscured.'

The Daily Express.--'A valuable contribution to South African history.'

The Yorkshire Post.--'We hope that Mr. Bell's book will be widely read; it should be of real service in the face of the coming settlement.'

The Daily Mail.--'The true inwardness of the origin, growth, and achievements of the Afrikander Bond have never been so succinctly and tersely set forth as in this book, which is excellent in its moderation, reserve, and judicious impartiality.'

LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN, 21, BEDFORD ST., W.C.

*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOKTEN MONTHS IN THE FIELD WITH THE BOERS***


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