In Nova Scotia England was weak from the fact that no settlements of her own people had been established there. After thirty years of British rule Mascarene had written, 'There is no number of English inhabitants settled in this province worth mentioning, except the five companies here [at Annapolis] and four at Canso.' Now the restoration to France of Cape Breton with the fortress of Louisbourg exposed Nova Scotia to attack; and in time of war with France the Acadians would be a source of weakness rather than of strength. Great Britain, therefore, resolved to try the experiment of forming in Nova Scotia a colony of her own sons.
Thus it came to pass that a fleet of transports carrying over twenty-five hundred colonists, counting women and children, escorted by a sloop-of-war, cast anchor in Chebucto Bay in July 1749. This expedition was commanded by Edward Cornwallis, the newly appointed governor and captain-general of Nova Scotia. He was a young officer of thirty-six, twin-brother of the Rev. Frederick Cornwallis, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, and uncle of the more famous Lord Cornwallis who surrendered at Yorktown thirty-two years later. With the colonists came many officers and disbanded soldiers; came, also, the soldiers of the garrison which had occupied Louisbourg before the peace; for the new settlement, named Halifax in honour of the president of the Lords of Trade, was to be a military stronghold, as well as a naval base, and the seat of government for the province.
While Cornwallis and his colonists laid the foundations of Halifax, cleared the land, formed the streets, put up their dwellings and defences, and organized their government, the home authorities took up the problem of securing more settlers for Nova Scotia. Cornwallis had been instructed to prepare for settlements at Minas, La Heve, Whitehead, and Baie Verte, the intention being that the newcomers should eventually absorb the Acadians living at these places. It had been suggested to the Lords of Trade, probably by John Dick, a merchant of Rotterdam, that the most effective means to this end would be to introduce a large French Protestant element into Nova Scotia. The government thereupon gave instructions that the land should be surveyed and plans prepared dividing the territory into alternate Protestant and Catholic sections. Through intercourse and intermarriage with neighbours speaking their own tongue, it was fondly hoped that the Acadians, in course of time, would become loyal British subjects. The next step was to secure French Protestant emigrants. In December 1749 the Lords of Trade entered into a contract with John Dick to transport 'not more than fifteen hundred foreign Protestants to Nova Scotia.' [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia A, vol. xxxv, p. 189.] Dick was a man of energy and resource and, in business methods, somewhat in advance of his age. He appears to have understood the value of advertising, judging from the handbills which he circulated in France and from his advertisements in the newspapers. But as time passed emigrants in anything like the numbers expected were not forthcoming. Evil reports concerning Nova Scotia had been circulated in France, and other difficulties arose. After many delays, however, two hundred and eighty persons recruited by Dick arrived at Halifax. The character of some gave rise to complaint, and Dick was cautioned by the government. His troubles in France crept on apace. It began to be rumoured that the emigrants were being enrolled in the Halifax militia; and, France being no longer a profitable field, Dick transferred his activities to Germany. Alluring handbills in the German tongue were circulated, and in the end a considerable number of Teutons arrived at Halifax. Most of these were afterwards settled at Lunenburg. The enterprise, of course, failed of its object to neutralize and eventually assimilate the Acadian Catholic population; nevertheless several thousand excellent 'foreign Protestant' settlers reached Nova Scotia through various channels. They were given land in different parts of the province and in time became good citizens.
Cornwallis's instructions from the British ministry contained many clauses relating to the Acadians. Though they had given assistance to the enemy, they should be permitted to remain in the possession of their property. They must, however, take the oath of allegiance 'within three months from the date of the declaration' which the governor was to make. Liberty of conscience should be permitted to all. In the event of any of the inhabitants wishing to leave the province, the governor should remind them that the time allowed under the Treaty of Utrecht for the removal of their property had long since expired. The governor should take particular care that 'they do no damage, before such their removal, to their respective homes and plantations.' Determined efforts should be made, not only to Anglicize, but to Protestantize the people. Marriages between the Acadians and the English were to be encouraged. Trade with the French settlements was prohibited. No episcopal jurisdiction might be exercised in the province, a mandate intended to shut out the bishop of Quebec. Every facility was to be given for the education of Acadian children in Protestant schools. Those who embraced Protestantism were to be confirmed in their lands, free from quit-rent for a period of ten years. [Footnote: Canadian Archives Report, 1905, Appendix C, vol. ii, p. 50.]
Armed with these instructions, Cornwallis adopted at first a strong policy. On July 14, 1749, he issued a proclamation containing 'the declaration of His Majesty regarding the French inhabitants of Nova Scotia,' and calling on the Acadians to take the oath of allegiance within three months. At a meeting of the Council held the same day, at which representatives of the Acadians were present, the document was discussed. The deputies listened with some concern to the declaration, and inquired whether permission would be given them to sell their lands if they decided to leave the country. The governor replied that under the Treaty of Utrecht they had enjoyed this privilege for one year only, and that they could not now 'be allowed to sell or carry off anything.' The deputies asked for time to consult the inhabitants. This was granted, with a warning that those who 'should not take the oath of allegiance before the 15th of October should forfeit all their possessions and rights in the Province.' Deputies from nine districts appeared before the Council on July 31 and spoke for the Acadians. The Council deliberated and decided that no priest should officiate without a licence from the governor; that no exemption from bearing arms in time of war could be made; that the oath must be taken as offered; and that all who wished to continue in the possession of their lands must appear and take the oath before October 15, which would be the last day allowed them. [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia B, vol. iv, p. 14.]
A month later they presented to Cornwallis a petition signed by one thousand inhabitants to the effect that they had faithfully served King George, and were prepared to renew the oath which was tendered to them by Governor Philipps; that two years before His Majesty had promised to maintain them in the peaceable enjoyment of their possessions: 'And we believe, Your Excellency, that if His Majesty had been informed of our conduct towards His Majesty's Government, he would not propose to us an oath which, if taken, would at any moment expose our lives to great peril from the savage nations, who have reproached us in a strange manner as to the oath we have taken to His Majesty… But if Your Excellency is not disposed to grant us what we take the liberty of asking, we are resolved, every one of us, to leave the country.' In reply Cornwallis reminded them that, as British subjects, they were in the enjoyment of their religion and in possession of their property. 'You tell me that General Philipps granted you the reservation which you demand; and I tell you gentlemen, that the general who granted you such reservation did not do his duty… You have been for more than thirty-four years past the subjects of the King of Great Britain… Show now that you are grateful.' [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia B, vol. iv, p. 49.]
The Acadians, however, showed still a decided aversion to an unqualified oath; and Cornwallis apparently thought it best to recede somewhat from the high stand he had taken. He wrote to the home government explaining that he hesitated to carry out the terms of his proclamation of July 14 by confiscating the property of those who did not take the oath, on the ground that the Acadians would not emigrate at that season of the year, and that in the meantime he could employ them to advantage. If they continued to prove obstinate, he would seek new instructions to force things to a conclusion. [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia A, vol. xxxv, p. 48.] The Acadians, used by this time to the lenity of the British government, were probably not surprised to find, at the meeting of the Council held on October 11, no mention of the oath which had to be taken before the 15th of the month.
The winter passed, and still Cornwallis took no steps to enforce his proclamation. He had his troubles; for the French, from Quebec on the one side and from Louisbourg on the other, were fomenting strife; and the Indians were on the war-path. And, in February 1750, the Lords of Trade wrote that as the French were forming new settlements with a view to enticing the Acadians into them, any forcible means of ejecting them should be waived for the present. Cornwallis replied that he was anxious to leave matters in abeyance until he ascertained what could be done in the way of fortifying Chignecto. 'If a fort is once built there,' he explained, 'they [the Indians] will be driven out of the peninsula or submit. He also wished to know what reinforcements he might expect in the spring. Until then he would 'defer making the inhabitants take the oath of allegiance.'
Meanwhile the Acadians were not idle on their own behalf. In October 1749 they addressed a memorial to Des Herbiers, the governor of Ile Royale, to be transmitted to the French king. They complained that the new governor intended to suppress their missionaries, [Footnote: Cornwallis had denied the jurisdiction of the bishop of Quebec, but had intimated that he would grant a licence to any good priest, his objection being to missionaries such as Le Loutre, who stirred up the Indians to commit hostilities.] and to force them to bear arms against the Indians, with whom they had always been on friendly terms. They therefore prayed the king to obtain concessions from Great Britain— the maintenance of the Quebec missionaries, the exemption from bearing arms, or an extension of a year in which they might withdraw with their effects. [Footnote: Canadian Archives Report, 1905, Appendix N, vol. ii, p. 298.] Two months later they sent a petition to the Marquis de la Jonquiere, the governor of Canada, actuated, they said, by the love of their country and their religion. They had refused to take the oath requiring them to bear arms against their fellow-countrymen. They had, it is true, appeared attached to the interests of the English, in consequence of the oath which they had consented to take only when exempted from bearing arms. Now that this exemption was removed, they wished to leave Nova Scotia, and hoped that the king would help them with vessels, as they had been refused permission to build them. Great offers had been made to them, but they preferred to leave. [Footnote: Ibid., p. 301.]
In the spring of 1750, unable to obtain permission from Cornwallis to take a restricted oath, the Acadians almost unanimously decided to emigrate. On April 19 deputies from several settlements in the district of Minas—the river Canard, Grand Pre, and Pisiquid—appeared before the Council at Halifax and asked to be allowed to leave the province with their effects. [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia B, vol. iv, p. 130.] According to Cornwallis, they professed that this decision was taken against their inclination, and that the French had threatened them with destruction at the hands of the Indians if they remained. [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia A, vol. xxxvii, p. 7.] On May 25 the inhabitants of Annapolis Royal came with a like petition.
In reply to these petitions Cornwallis reminded the inhabitants that the province was the country of their fathers, and that they should enjoy the product of their labours. As soon as there should be tranquillity he would give them permission to depart, if they wished to do so; but in the present circumstances passports could not be granted to any one. They could not be permitted to strengthen the hand of Great Britain's enemy.
But in spite of the prohibition, of the forts that were built to enforce it, and of British cruisers patrolling the coasts to prevent intercourse with the French, there was a considerable emigration. A number of families crossed to Ile St Jean in the summer of 1750. They were aided by the missionaries, and supplied with vessels and arms by the French authorities at Louisbourg. By August 1750 we know that eight hundred Acadians were settled in Ile St Jean.
By the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle the question of the limits of Acadia had been referred to a commission of arbitration, and each of the powers had agreed to attempt no settlement on the debatable ground until such time as the decision of the commissioners should be made known. Each, however, continued to watch jealously over its own interests. The English persisted in their claim that the ancient boundaries included all the country north of the Bay of Fundy to the St Lawrence, and Cornwallis was directed to see to it that no subjects of the French king settled within these boundaries. The French, on the other hand, steadily asserted their ownership in all land north of a line drawn from Baie Verte to Chignecto Bay. The disputants, though openly at peace, glowered at each other. Hardly had Cornwallis brought his colonists ashore at Halifax, when La Galissoniere, the acting-governor of Canada, sent Boishebert, with a detachment of twenty men, to the river St John, to assert the French claim to that district; and when La Galissoniere went to France as a commissioner in the boundary dispute, his successor, La Jonquiere, dispatched a force under the Chevalier de la Corne to occupy the isthmus of Chignecto.
About the same time the Indians went on the war-path, apparently at the instigation of the French. Des Herbiers, the governor of Ile Royale, when dispatching the Abbe Le Loutre to the savages with the usual presents, had added blankets and a supply of powder and ball, clearly intended to aid them should they be disposed to attack the English settlements. Indians from the river St John joined the Micmacs and opened hostilities by seizing an English vessel at Canso and taking twenty prisoners. The prisoners were liberated by Des Herbiers; but the Micmacs, their blood up, assembled at Chignecto, near La Corne's post, and declared war on the English. The Council at Halifax promptly raised several companies for defence, and offered a reward of 10 pounds for the capture of an Indian, dead or alive. Cornwallis complained bitterly to Louisbourg that Le Loutre was stirring up trouble; but Des Herbiers disingenuously disclaimed all responsibility for the abbe. The Indians, he said, were merely allies, not French subjects, and Le Loutre acted under the direction of the governor of Canada. He promised also that if any Frenchman molested the English, he should be punished, a promise which, as subsequent events showed, he had no intention of keeping.
In November 1749 a party of one hundred and fifty Indians captured a company of engineers at Grand Pre, where the English had just built a fort. Le Loutre, however, ransomed the prisoners and sent them to Louisbourg. The Indians, emboldened by their success, then issued a proclamation in the name of the king of France and their Indian allies calling upon the Acadians to arm, under pain of death for disobedience. On learning that eleven Acadians obeyed this summons, Cornwallis sent Captain Goreham of the Rangers to arrest them. The rebels, however, made good their escape, thanks to the Indians; and Goreham could only make prisoners of some of their children, whom he brought before the governor. The children declared that their parents had not been free agents, and produced in evidence one of the threatening orders of the Indians. In any case, of course, the children were in no way responsible, and were therefore sent home; and the governor described Goreham as 'no officer at all.'
When spring came Cornwallis took steps to stop the incursions of the savages and at the same time to check the emigration of the Acadians. He sent detachments to build and occupy fortified posts at Grand Pre, at Pisiquid, and at other places. He ordered Major Lawrence to sail up the Bay of Fundy with four hundred settlers for Beaubassin, the Acadian village at the head of Chignecto Bay. For the time being, however, this undertaking did not prosper. On arriving, Lawrence encountered a band of Micmacs, which Le Loutre had posted at the dikes to resist the disembarkation. Some fighting ensued before Lawrence succeeded in leading ashore a body of troops. The motive of the turbulent abbe was to preserve the Acadians from the contaminating presence of heretics and enemies of his master, the French king. And, when he saw that he could not prevent the English from making a lodgment in the village, he went forward with his Micmacs and set it on fire, thus forcing the Acadian inhabitants to cross to the French camp at Beausejour, some two miles off. Here La Corne had set up his standard to mark the boundary of New France, beyond which he dared the British to advance at their peril. At a conference which was arranged between Lawrence and La Corne, La Corne said that the governor of Canada, La Jonquiere, had directed him to take possession of the country to the north, 'or at least he was to keep it and must defend it till the boundaries between the two Crowns should be settled.' [Footnote: Canadian Archives Report, 1906, Appendix N, vol. ii, p. 321.] Moreover, if Lawrence should try to effect a settlement, La Corne would oppose it to the last. And as Lawrence's forces were quite inadequate to cope with La Corne's, it only remained for Lawrence to return to Halifax with his troops and settlers.
Meanwhile Boishebert stood guard for the governor of Quebec at the mouth of the river St John. In the previous year, when he had arrived there, Cornwallis had sent an officer to protest against what he considered an encroachment; but Boishebert had answered simply that he was commissioned to hold the place for his royal master without attempting a settlement until the boundary dispute should be adjusted. Now, in July 1750, Captain Cobb of the York, cruising in the Bay of Fundy, sighted a French sloop near the mouth of the St John, and opened fire. The French captain immediately lowered his boats and landed a party of sailors, apparently with the intention of coming to a conference. Cobb followed his example. Presently Boishebert came forward under a flag of truce and demanded Cobb's authority for the act of war in territory claimed by the French. Cobb produced his commission and handed it to Boishebert. Keeping the document in his possession, Boishebert ordered Cobb to bring his vessel under the stern of the French sloop, and sent French officers to board Cobb's ship and see the order carried out. The sailors on the York, however, held the Frenchmen as hostages for the safe return of their captain. After some parleying Cobb was allowed to return to his vessel, and the Frenchmen were released. Boishebert, however, refused to return the captain's commission. Cobb thereupon boarded the French sloop, seized five of the crew, and sailed away.
So the game went on. A month later the British sloop Trial, at Baie Verte, captured a French sloop of seventy tons which was engaged in carrying arms and supplies to Le Loutre's Indians. On board were four deserters from the British and a number of Acadians. Among the papers found on the Acadians were letters addressed to their friends in Quebec and others from Le Loutre and officers of Fort St John and of Port La Joie in Ile St Jean. From one of these letters we obtain a glimpse of the conditions of the Acadians:
I shall tell you that I was settled in Acadia. I havefour small children. I lived contented on my land. Butthat did not last long, for we were compelled to leaveall our property and flee from under the domination ofthe English. The King undertakes to transport us andsupport us under the expectation of news from France.If Acadia is not restored to France I hope to take mylittle family and bring it to Canada. I beg you to letme know the state of things in that country. I assureyou that we are in poor condition, for we are like theIndians in the woods.[Footnote: A. Doucet to Mde Langedo of Quebec,August 5, 1750.]
By other documents taken it was shown that supplies from Quebec were frequently passing to the Indians, and that the dispatches addressed to Cornwallis were intercepted and forwarded to the governor of Quebec. [Footnote: Cornwallis to Bedford, August 19, 1750.]
These papers revealed to Cornwallis the peril which menaced him. But, having been reinforced by the arrival from Newfoundland of three hundred men of Lascelles's regiment, he resolved to occupy Chignecto, which Lawrence had been forced to abandon in April. Accordingly Lawrence again set out, this time with about seven hundred men. In mid-September his ships appeared off the burnt village of Beaubassin. Again the landing was opposed by a band of Indians and about thirty Acadians entrenched on the shore. These, after some fighting and losses, were beaten off; and the English troops landed and proceeded to construct a fort, named by them Fort Lawrence, and to erect barracks for the winter. La Corne, from his fort at Beausejour, where he had his troops and a body of Acadians, addressed a note to Lawrence, proposing a meeting in a boat in the middle of the river. Lawrence replied that he had no business with La Corne, and that La Corne could come to him if he had anything to communicate. Acts of violence followed. It was not long before a scouting party under the command of Captain Bartelot was surrounded by a band of Indians and Acadians. [Footnote: La Valliere, one of the French officers on the spot, says that the Indians and Acadians were encouraged by Le Loutre during this attack.—Journal of the Sieur de la Valliere.] Forty-five of the party were killed, and Bartelot and eight men were taken prisoners. A few weeks later there was an act of treachery which greatly embittered the British soldiers. This was the murder of Captain Howe, one of the British officers, by some of Le Loutre's Micmacs. It was stated that Le Loutre was personally implicated in the crime, but there appears not the slightest foundation for this charge. One morning in October Howe saw an Indian carrying a flag of truce on the opposite side of the Missaguash river, which lay between Fort Lawrence and Fort Beausejour. Howe, who had often held converse with the savages, went forward to meet the Indian, and the two soon became engaged in conversation. Suddenly the Indian lowered his flag, a body of savages concealed behind a dike opened fire, and Howe fell, mortally wounded. In the work of bringing the dying officer into the fort ten of his company also fell.
Meanwhile an event occurred which seemed likely to promote more cordial relations between the French and the English. Early in October Des Herbiers returned to Halifax thirty- seven prisoners, including six women, who had been captured by the Indians but ransomed and sent to Louisbourg by the Abbe Le Loutre. It is difficult to reconcile the conduct of the meddlesome missionary on this occasion with what we know of his character. He was possessed of an inveterate hatred of the English and all their works; yet he was capable of an act of humanity towards them. After all, it may be that generosity was not foreign to the nature of this fanatical French patriot. Cornwallis was grateful, and cheerfully refunded the amount of the ransom. [Footnote: Des Herbiers to Cornwallis, October 2, 1750.—Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia A, vol. xxxix, p. 13.]
But the harmony existing between Des Herbiers and Cornwallis was of short duration. In the same month the British sloop Albany, commanded by Captain Rous, fell on the French brigantine St Francois, Captain Vergor, on the southern coast. Vergor, who was carrying stores and ammunition to Louisbourg, ran up his colours, but after a fight of three hours he was forced by Rous to surrender. The captive ship was taken to Halifax and there condemned as a prize, the cargo being considered contraband of war. La Jonquiere addressed a peremptory letter to Cornwallis, demanding whether he was acting under orders in seizing a French vessel in French territory. He likewise instructed Des Herbiers to seize ships of the enemy; and as a result four prizes were sold by the Admiralty Court at Louisbourg.
Open hostilities soon became the order of the day. During the winter a party of Canadians and Indians and Acadians disguised as Indians assembled near Fort Lawrence. They succeeded in killing two men, and continued to fire on the British position for two days. But, as the garrison remained within the shelter of the walls, the attackers grew weary of wasting ammunition and withdrew to harry the settlement at Halifax. According to the French accounts, these savages killed thirty persons on the outskirts of Halifax in the spring of 1751, and Cornwallis reported that four inhabitants and six soldiers had been taken prisoners. Then in June three hundred British troops from Fort Lawrence invaded the French territory to attempt a surprise. They were discovered, however, and St Ours, who had succeeded La Corne, brought out his forces and drove them back to Fort Lawrence. A month later the British made another attack and destroyed a dike, flooding the lands of the Acadians in its neighbourhood.
And during all this time England and France were theoretically at peace. Their commissioners sat in Paris, La Galissoniere on one side, Shirley on the other, piling up mountains of argument as to the 'ancient boundaries' of Acadia. All to no purpose; for neither nation could afford to recede from its position. It was a question for the last argument of kings. Meanwhile the officials in the colonies anxiously waited for the decision; and the poor Acadians, torn between the hostile camps, and many of them now homeless, waited too.
The years 1752 and 1753 were, on the whole, years of peace and quiet. This was largely due to changes in the administration on both sides. At the end of 1751 the Count de Raymond had replaced Des Herbiers as governor of Ile Royale; in 1752 Duquesne succeeded La Jonquiere at Quebec as governor of New France; and Peregrine Hopson took the place of Cornwallis in the government of Nova Scotia. Hopson adopted a policy of conciliation. When the crew of a New England schooner in the summer of 1752 killed an Indian lad and two girls whom they had enticed on board, Hopson promptly offered a reward for the capture of the culprits. He treated the Indians with such consistent kindness that he was able in the month of September to form an alliance with the Micmacs on the coast. He established friendly relations also with Duquesne and Raymond, and arranged with them a cartel of exchange regarding deserters.
Towards the Acadians Hopson seemed most sympathetic. From the experience of Cornwallis he knew, of course, their aversion to the oath of allegiance. In writing to the Lords of Trade for instructions he pointed out the obstinacy of the people on this question, but made it clear how necessary their presence was to the welfare of the province. Meanwhile he did his best to conciliate them. When complaints were made that Captain Hamilton, a British officer, had carried off some of their cattle, Hamilton was reprimanded and the cattle were paid for. Instructions were then issued to all officers to treat the Acadians as British subjects, and to take nothing from them by force. Should the people refuse to comply with any just demand, the officer must report it to the governor and await his orders. When the Acadians provided wood for the garrison, certificates must be issued which should entitle them to payment.
The political horizon at the opening of the year 1753 seemed bright to Hopson. But in the spring a most painful occurrence threatened for a time to involve him in an Indian war. Two men, Connor and Grace, while cruising off the coast, had landed at Ile Dore, and with the assistance of their ruffianly crew had plundered an Indian storehouse. They were overtaken by a storm, their schooner became a total wreck, and Connor and Grace alone survived. They were rescued by the Indians, who cared for them and gave them shelter. But the miserable cowards seized a favourable moment to murder and scalp their benefactors. Well satisfied with their brutal act, they proceeded to Halifax with the ghastly trophies, and boldly demanded payment for the scalps of two men, three women, and two children. Their story seemed so improbable that the Council ordered them to give security to appear in the court at the next general session. [Footnote: Hopson to Lords of Trade, April 30, 1753, p. 30. Deposition of Connor and Grace, April 16, 1753, p. 30 et seq.—Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia A, vol. liii.] The prospect of a permanent peace with the Indians vanished. They demanded that the Council should send a schooner to Ile Dore to protect their shores. The Council did send a vessel. But no sooner had it arrived than the Indians seized and massacred the whole crew save one man, who claimed to be of French origin and was later ransomed by the French.
In September the inhabitants of Grand Pre, Canso, and Pisiquid presented a petition to the Council at Halifax, praying that their missionaries be excused from taking the ordinary oath. The Acadians were entitled to the free exercise of their religion, and the bishop of Quebec would not send priests if they were required to become British subjects. The Council deliberated. Fearing to give the Acadians a pretext for leaving the country on the plea that they had been deprived of the services of their priests, the Council decided to grant the petition, providing, however, that the priests should obtain a licence from the governor.
The Lords of Trade approved Hopson's policy, which appeared to be bearing good fruit. Later in the autumn came another delegation of Acadians who had formerly resided at Pisiquid but had migrated to French territory, asking to be allowed to return to their old homes. They had left on account of the severe oath proposed by Cornwallis, but were now willing to come back and take a restricted oath. For fear of the Indians, they could not swear to bear arms in aid of the English in time of war. They wished also to be able to move from the province whenever they desired, and to take their effects with them. Evidently they had not found Utopia under the French flag. The Council gave them the permission they desired, promised them the free exercise of their religion, a sufficient number of priests for their needs, and all the privileges conferred by the Treaty of Utrecht.
On the whole, the situation in the autumn of 1753 was most promising. The Acadians, said Hopson, behaved 'tolerably well,' though they still feared the Indians should they attach themselves to the English. Of the French on the frontier there was nothing to complain; and an era of peace seemed assured. But before the end of the year another page in the history of Nova Scotia had been turned. Raymond, the governor of Ile Royale, gave place to D'Ailleboust. Hopson was compelled to return to England on leave of absence through failing eyesight, and Charles Lawrence reigned in his stead.
The policy both of France and of England towards the Acadians was based upon political expediency rather than upon any definite or well-conceived plan for the development of the country. The inhabitants, born to serve rather than to command, had honestly striven according to their light to maintain respect for constituted authority. But the state of unrest into which they were so frequently thrown had deprived them of all sense of security in their homes and had created among them a spirit of suspicion. Unable to reason, disinclined to rebel, they had settled down into a morose intractability, while their confidence in the generosity or even in the justice of their rulers gradually disappeared. Those who could have restored them to a normal condition of healthy citizenship saw fit to keep them in disquietude, holding over their heads the tomahawk of the Indian. England and France were nominally at peace. But each nation was only waiting for a favourable moment to strike a decisive blow, not merely for Acadia or any part of it, but for the mastery of the North American continent. With this object ever in the background, France, through her agents, strove to make the Acadians a thorn in Great Britain's side, while England hesitated to allow them to pass over to the ranks of her enemies. At the same time she was anxious that they should, by some visible sign, acknowledge her sovereignty. But to become a British subject it was necessary to take the oath of allegiance. Most of the Acadians had refused to take this oath without reservations. Great Britain should then have allowed them to depart or should have deported them. She had done neither. On the contrary, she had tried to keep them, had made concessions to them to remain, and had closed her eyes to violations of the law, until many of them had been, by various means, acknowledged as British subjects.
A Murray or a Dorchester would have humoured the people and would probably have kept them in allegiance. But this was an impossible task for Lawrence. He was unaccustomed to compromise. He kept before him the letter of the law, and believed that any deviation from it was fraught with danger. He entered upon his duties as administrator in the month of October 1753. Six weeks later he made a report on the condition of affairs in the province. This report contains one pregnant sentence. He is referring to the emigrant Acadians who had left their homes for French soil and were now wishing to come back, and he says: 'But Your Lordships may be assured they will never have my consent to return until they comply [take the oath] without any reservation whatever.' [Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of Trade, December 5, 1753.] This was the keynote of all Lawrence's subsequent action. The Acadians must take the oath without reserve, or leave the country. He does not appear to have given any consideration to the fact that for forty years the Lords of Trade had, for various motives, nursed the people, or that only two years before the Council at Halifax had declared the Acadians to be still entitled to the privileges accorded to them by the Treaty of Utrecht. To him the Acadians were as an enemy in the camp, and as such they were to be treated.
The Lords of Trade partly acquiesced in Lawrence's reasoning, yet they warned him to be cautious. A year before they had announced that those who remained in the country were to be considered as holding good titles; but they now maintained that the inhabitants had 'in fact no right, but upon condition of taking the oath of allegiance absolute and unqualified.' Officials might be sent among them to inquire into their disputes, but 'the more we consider the point, the more nice and difficult it appears to us; for, as on the one hand great caution ought to be used to avoid giving alarm and creating such a diffidence in their minds as might induce them to quit the province, and by their numbers add strength to the French settlements, so on the other hand we should be equally cautious of creating an improper and false confidence in them, that by a perseverance in refusing to take the oath of allegiance, they may gradually work out in their own way a right to their lands and to the benefit and protection of the law, which they are not entitled to but on that condition.' [Footnote: Lords of Trade to Lawrence, March 4, 1754.]
After nine months' tenure of office Lawrence had fully made up his mind as to his policy in dealing with the Acadians. On August 1, 1754, he addressed a letter to the Lords of Trade, to acquaint them with the measures which appeared to him to be 'the most practicable and effectual for putting a stop to the many inconveniences we have long laboured under, from their obstinacy, treachery, partiality to their own countrymen, and their ingratitude for the favour, indulgence, and protection they have at all times so undeservedly received from His Majesty's Government. Your Lordships well know that they always affected a neutrality, and as it has been generally imagined here that the mildness of an English Government would by degrees have fixed them in their own interest, no violent measures have ever been taken with them. But I must observe to Your Lordships that this lenity has not had the least good effect; on the contrary, I believe they have at present laid aside all thoughts of taking the oaths voluntarily, and great numbers of them at present are gone to Beausejour to work for the French, in order to dyke out the water at the settlement.' [Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of Trade, August 1, 1754.] Lawrence explained that he had offered the Acadians work at Halifax, which they had refused to accept; and that he had then issued a proclamation calling upon them 'to return forthwith to their lands as they should answer the contrary at their peril.' Moreover, 'They have not for a long time brought anything to our markets, but on the other hand have carried everything to the French and Indians whom they have always assisted with provisions, quarters, and intelligence. And indeed while they remain without taking the oaths to His Majesty (which they never will do till they are forced) and have incendiary French priests among them there are no hopes of their amendment. As they possess the best and largest tracts of land in this province, it cannot be settled with any effect while they remain in this situation. And tho' I would be very far from attempting such a step without Your Lordships' approbation, yet I cannot help being of opinion that it would be much better, if they refuse the oaths, that they were away. The only ill consequences that can attend their going would be their taking arms and joining with the Indians to distress our settlements, as they are numerous and our troops are much divided; tho' indeed I believe that a very large part of the inhabitants would submit to any terms rather than take up arms on either side; but that is only my conjecture, and not to be depended upon in so critical a circumstance. However, if Your Lordships should be of opinion that we are not sufficiently established to take so important a step, we could prevent any inconvenience by building a fort or a few blockhouses on Chibenacadie [Shubenacadie] river. It would hinder in a great measure their communication with the French.'
In order to prevent the Acadians from trading with the French, Lawrence issued a proclamation forbidding the exportation of corn from the province, imposing a penalty of fifty pounds for each offence, half of such sum to be paid to the informer. The exact purpose of the proclamation was explained in a circular. First, it was to prevent 'the supplying of corn to the Indians and their abettors, who, residing on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, do commit hostilities upon His Majesty's subjects which they cannot so conveniently do, that supply being cut off.' Secondly, it was for the better supply of the Halifax market, which had been obliged to supply itself from other colonies. The inhabitants were not asked to sell their corn to any particular person or at any fixed price; all that was insisted upon was their supplying the Halifax market before they should think of sending corn elsewhere. There was, of course, nothing objectionable in this proclamation. It was only a protective measure for the benefit of the whole colony, and did 'not bind the French inhabitants more or less than the rest of His Majesty's subjects in the Province.'
Towards the Indians Lawrence adopted the same tone as towards the Acadians. The tribes at Cape Sable had for some time talked of peace, and an alliance with them was particularly to be encouraged. The French were becoming more of a menace, having strengthened their works at 'Baye Verte and Beausejour, between which places they lately have made a very fine road and continue to seduce our French inhabitants to go over to them.' The message, however, which Lawrence sent to the Indians was hardly calculated to produce the desired results. 'In short if the Indians,' the message ran, 'or he [Le Loutre] on their behalf, have anything to propose of this kind about which they are really in earnest, they very well know where and how to apply.' [Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 210.]
The answer of the Indians was communicated by Le Loutre. They agreed to offer no insult to the English who kept to the highway, but they promised to treat as enemies all those who departed from it. If a durable peace was to be made, they demanded the cession to them of an exclusive territory suitable for hunting and fishing and for a mission. This territory was to extend from Baie Verte through Cobequid (Truro) to the Shubenacadie, along the south coast to the peninsula of Canso, and back to Baie Verte—an area comprising half the province of Nova Scotia. Whether the Indians were serious in their application for this immense domain, we know not; probably it was an answer to the haughty note of Lawrence. Considering the demand of the Indians insolent, the Council at Halifax vouchsafed no reply to it; but the commandant of Fort Lawrence at Chignecto was instructed to inform the Indians 'that if they have any serious thoughts of making peace… they may repair to Halifax,' where any reasonable proposal would be considered.
A case instructive of the new temper of the administration was that of the Abbe Daudin of Pisiquid. The abbe had been suspected of stirring up trouble among the Indians, and Captain Murray of Fort Edward was requested to keep an eye on him. When the inhabitants refused to bring in wood for fuel and for the repair of the fort, as they had been ordered to do, and presented to Murray a statement signed by eighty-six of their people, declaring that their oath of fidelity did not require them to furnish the garrison with wood, Murray attributed their conduct to the influence of Daudin. Murray therefore received instructions to repeat his orders, and to summon Daudin and five others to appear at Halifax under pain of arrest. When questioned by Murray, Daudin took the ground that the people, who were free, should have been contracted with, and not treated as slaves; but he asserted that if Murray had consulted him instead of reporting to Lawrence, he could have brought the inhabitants to him in a submissive manner. When requested to repair to Halifax, Daudin pleaded illness; and his followers became insolent, and questioned Murray's authority. Daudin and five others were immediately arrested and sent under escort to the capital.
At a special meeting of the Council held on the evening of October 2, 1754, Claude Brossart, Charles Le Blanc, Baptiste Galerne, and Joseph Hebert were required to explain their refusal to obey the orders of Murray, and the following examination took place:
Q. Why did you not comply with that order to bring infirewood?
A. Some of them had wood and some had not, thereforethey gave in the remonstrance to Captain Murray.
Q. Why was that not represented in the remonstrance, which contained an absolute refusal without setting forth any cause?
A. They did not understand the contents of it.
Q. Was the proclamation ever published at the church and stuck up against the wall, and by whom?
A. It was, and they believe by John Hebert.
Q. Was it put up with the wrong side uppermost?
A. They heard that it was.
The inhabitants were never known to boast of a reckless facility in reading, even under normal conditions, and no doubt the grotesque appearance of the letters in the inverted document prompted the answer that 'they did not understand the contents of it.' Neither have we any evidence to prove that John Hebert contributed to their enlightenment by reading the document. The prisoners, however, were severely reprimanded by the Council, and were ordered under pain of military execution to bring in the firewood.
The Abbe Daudin, when brought before the Council, was questioned as to his position in the province. He replied that he served 'only as a simple missionary to occupy himself in spiritual affairs; not in temporal.' The abbe denied that he had made the statements attributed to him, and was allowed to prepare a paper which he termed his defence. The next day his defence was presented and read; but the Council considered that it did not contain anything 'material towards his justification' and ordered his removal from the province. A few weeks later, however, the inhabitants addressed a communication to Lawrence, asking for the reinstatement of the abbe. They expressed their submission to the government, promising to comply with the order regarding the supply of wood; and the Council, considering that the Acadians could not obtain another priest, relented and permitted the abbe to return to his duties.
It is noteworthy, however, that Lawrence's regime was not so rigorous as to prevent some of the Acadians who had abandoned their lands and emigrated to French territory from returning to Nova Scotia. In October 1754 six families, consisting of twenty-eight persons who had settled in Cape Breton, returned to Halifax in a destitute condition. They declared that they had been terrified by the threats of Le Loutre, and by the picture he had drawn of the fate that would befall them at the hands of the Indians if they remained under the domination of the English; that they had retired to Cape Breton, where they had remained ever since; but that the lands given them had been unproductive, and that they had been unable to support their families. They therefore wished to return to their former habitations. They cheerfully subscribed to the oath which was tendered them, and in consideration of their poverty twenty-four of them were allowed provisions during the winter, and the other four a week's provisions 'to subsist them till they returned to their former habitations at Pisiquid.' The Council considered that their return would have a good effect. Thus it came about that the pangs of hunger accomplished a result which threats and promises had failed to produce.
While Lawrence was formulating his policy with regard to the Acadians, events were at the same time rapidly moving towards a renewal of war between France and Great Britain in North America. Indeed, though as yet there had been no formal declaration, the American phase of the momentous Seven Years' War had already begun. France had been dreaming of a colonial empire stretching from Newfoundland to the Gulf of Mexico. She had asserted her ownership of the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi; and she had set before herself the object of confining the English colonies within limits as narrow as possible. In May 1754 Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, had advised the home government that he had received intelligence from Halifax 'that some of the rebel inhabitants of Chignecto, together with the Indians of the Peninsula and St John River, are through the influence of the French garrison at Beausejour engaged in an enterprise to break up all the eastern settlements,' and he pointed out that 'if the advices are true, they will afford … one instance of the many mischievous consequences to the colonists of New England as well as to His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia which must proceed from the French of Canada having possessed themselves of the isthmus of the Peninsula and St John's river in the Bay of Fundy, and continuing their encroachments within His Majesty's territories.' [Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 382. Shirley to Sir T. Robinson, May 23, 1754.] To this communication the government had replied in July 1754 that it was the king's wish that Shirley should co-operate with Lawrence in attacking the French forts in Nova Scotia.
The British, therefore, determined upon aggressive action. In December Shirley acknowledged having received certain proposals made by Lawrence 'for driving the French of Canada out of Nova Scotia according to the scheme laid down in your letters to me and instructions to Colonel Monckton. I viewed this plan most justly calculated by Your Honour for His Majesty's Service with great pleasure and did not hesitate to send you the assistance you desir'd of me for carrying it into execution, as soon as I had perused it. …I came to a determination to co-operate with you in the most vigorous manner, for effecting the important service within your own Government, which Your Honour may depend upon my prosecuting to the utmost of my power.' [Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 389. Shirley says: 'It is now near eleven at night and I have been writing hard since seven in the morning… and can scarce hold the pen in my hand.'] In a letter to the Lords of Trade in January 1755, Lawrence expressed the opinion that 'no measure I could take for the security of the Province would have the desired effect until the fort at Beausejour and every French settlement on the north side of the Bay of Fundy was absolutely extirpated, having very good intelligence that the French had determined as soon as ever they had put the fortifications of Louisbourg into a tolerable condition to make themselves masters of the Bay of Fundy by taking our fort at Chignecto.' [Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of Trade, January 12, 1755.]
In accordance with this Colonel Monckton was instructed to prepare for an expedition against Beausejour and St John in the spring of 1755. He was given for the purpose a letter of unlimited credit on Boston; and every regiment in Nova Scotia was brought up to the strength of one thousand men. By May the expedition was ready. Monckton, with two thousand troops, embarked at Annapolis Royal, and by June 1 the expedition was at Chignecto. In the meantime Vergor, the French commandant at Beausejour, had not been passive. He had strengthened his defences, had summoned the inhabitants of the surrounding districts to his help, had mounted cannon in a blockhouse defending the passage of the river, and had thrown up a strong breastwork of timber along the shore. On June 3 the British landed. They had little difficulty in driving the French from their entrenchments. The inhabitants had no heart in the work of defence; and the French, unable to make a stand, threw their cannon into the river and burned the blockhouse and other buildings. They then retired to the fort, together with about two hundred and twenty of the Acadians; the rest of the Acadians threw away their arms and ammunition, asserting that they did not wish to be hanged. The British took up a position in the woods about a mile and a half from the fort; and on the 13th they succeeded in establishing a battery on a hill within easy range. The bombardment of the place, which began the next day, was at first ineffective; and for a time the British were driven back. But, in the meantime, news reached the French that no reinforcements could be expected from Louisbourg; and such disaffection arose among the Acadians that they were forbidden by a council of war to deliberate together or to desert the fort under pain of being shot. When the British renewed the attack, however, the Acadians requested Vergor to capitulate; and he feebly acquiesced. The British offered very favourable terms. So far as the Acadians were concerned, it was proposed that, since they had taken up arms under threat of death, they were to be pardoned and allowed to return to their homes and enjoy the free exercise of their religion. The soldiers of the garrison were sent as prisoners to Halifax.
After the fall of Beausejour, which Monckton renamed Fort Cumberland, the British met with little further resistance. Fort Gaspereau on Baie Verte, against which Monckton next proceeded, was evacuated by the commandant Villeray, who found himself unable to obtain the assistance of the Acadians. And the few Acadians at the river St John, when Captain Rous appeared before the settlement with three ships, made an immediate submission. Rous destroyed the cannon, burned the fort, and retired with his troops up the river. The Indians of the St John, evidently impressed by the completeness of the British success and awed by their strong force, invited Rous to come ashore, and assured him of their friendliness.
Having removed the menace of the French forts, Lawrence was now able to deal more freely with the question of the Acadians. The opportunity for action was not long in presenting itself. In June the Acadians of Minas presented to Lawrence a petition couched in language not as tactful as it might have been. In this memorial they requested the restoration of some of their former privileges. They first assured the lieutenant-governor of their fidelity, which they had maintained in face of threats on the part of the French, and of their determination to remain loyal when in the enjoyment of former liberties. They asked to be allowed the use of their canoes, a privilege of which they were deprived on the pretext that they had been carrying provisions to the French at Beausejour. Some refugees might have done so, but they had not. They used these canoes for fishing to maintain their families. By an order of June 4 they had been required to hand in their guns. Some of them had done so, but they needed them for protection against the wild beasts, which were more numerous since the Indians had left these parts. The possession of a gun did not induce them to rebel, neither did the withdrawal of the weapon render them more faithful. Loyalty was a matter of conscience. If they decided to remain faithful, they wished to know what were the lieutenant-governor's intentions towards them.
On receiving this memorial Lawrence ordered the deputies of the Acadians to remain in Halifax, on the ground that the paper was impertinent. Upon this the deputies presented another memorial, in which they disclaimed any intention of disrespect, and wished to be allowed a hearing in order to explain. The Council held a meeting; and the lieutenant-governor explained 'that Captain Murray had informed him that for some time before the delivery of the first of the said memorials the French inhabitants in general had behaved with greater submission and obedience to the orders of Government than usual, and had already delivered to him a considerable number of their firearms; but that at the delivery of the said memorial they treated him with great indecency and insolence, which gave him strong suspicions that they had obtained some intelligence which we were then ignorant of, and which the lieutenant-governor conceived might most probably be a report that had been about that time spread amongst them of a French fleet being then in the Bay of Fundy.' [Footnote: Minutes of Council, July 3, 1755.] The deputies were then brought in and told that if they had not submitted the second memorial they would have been punished for their presumption. 'They were severely reprimanded for their audacity in subscribing and presenting so impertinent a paper, but in compassion to their weakness and ignorance of the nature of our constitution,' the Council professed itself still ready to treat them with leniency, and ordered the memorial to be read paragraph by paragraph.
When the question of the oath came up for discussion, the deputies said they were ready to take it as they had done before. To this the Council replied that 'His Majesty had disapproved of the manner of their taking the oath before' and 'that it was not consistent with his honour to make any conditions.' The deputies were then allowed until the following morning to come to a resolution. On the next day they declared that they could not consent to take the oath in the form required without consulting others. They were then informed that as the taking of the oath was a personal act and as they had for themselves refused to take it as directed by law, and had therefore sufficiently evinced the sincerity of their unfriendliness towards the government, the Council could look upon them no longer as subjects of His Majesty, but must treat them hereafter as subjects of the king of France. They were ordered to withdraw. The Council then decided that with regard to the oath none of them should for the future be admitted to take it after having once refused to do so, but that effectual measures ought to be taken to remove all such recusants out of the province. The deputies, again being called in and informed of this resolution, offered to take the oath, but were informed that there was no reason to hope that 'their proposed compliance proceeds from an honest mind and can be esteemed only the effect of compulsion and force, and is contrary to a clause in 1 Geo. II, c. 13, whereby persons who have once refused to take oaths cannot be afterwards permitted to take them, but are considered as Popish recusants.' Therefore they could not be indulged with such permission. Later they were ordered into confinement.
On the 25th of July a memorial signed by over two hundred of the inhabitants of Annapolis Royal was laid before the Council. The memorialists said they had unanimously consented to deliver up their firearms, although they had never had any desire to use them against His Majesty's government. They declared that they had nothing to reproach themselves with, for they had always been loyal, and that several of them had risked their lives in order to give information regarding the enemy. They would abide by the old oath, but they could not take a new one. The deputies who had brought this memorial from Annapolis, on being called before the Council and asked what they had to say regarding the new oath, declared 'that they could not take any other oath than what they had formerly taken.' If it was the king's intention, they added, to force them out of the country, they hoped 'that they should be allowed a convenient time for their departure.' The Council warned them of the consequences of their refusal; and they were allowed until the following Monday to decide. Their final answer was polite, but obdurate:
Inasmuch as a report is in circulation among us, the French inhabitants of this province, that His Excellency the Governor demands of us an oath of obedience conformable, in some manner, to that of natural subjects of His Majesty King George the Second, and as, in consequence, we are morally certain that several of our inhabitants are detained and put to inconvenience at Halifax for that object; if the above are his intentions with respect to us, we all take the liberty of representing to His Excellency, and to all the inhabitants, that we and our fathers, having taken an oath of fidelity, which has been approved of several times in the name of the King, and under the privileges of which we have lived faithful and obedient, and protected by His Majesty the King of Great Britain, according to the letters and proclamation of His Excellency Governor Shirley, dated 16th of September 1746, and 21st of October 1747, we will never prove so fickle as to take an oath which changes, ever so little, the conditions and the privileges obtained for us by our sovereign and our fathers in the past.
And as we are well aware that the King, our master, loves and protects only constant, faithful, and free subjects, and as it is only by virtue of his kindness, and of the fidelity which we have always preserved towards His Majesty, that he has granted to us, and that he still continues to grant to us, the entire possession of our property and the free and public exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion, we desire to continue, to the utmost of our power, to be faithful and dutiful in the same manner that we were allowed to be by His Excellency Mr Richard Philipps.
Charity for our detained inhabitants, and their innocence, obliged us to beg Your Excellency, to allow yourself to be touched by their miseries, and to restore to them that liberty which we ask for them, with all possible submission and the most profound respect.
The inhabitants of Pisiquid presented a similar petition. They hoped that they would be listened to, and that the imprisoned deputies would be released. Another memorial was presented by the inhabitants of Minas. They refused to take a new oath; and thereupon their deputies were ordered to be imprisoned.
There was now, the Council considered, only one course left open for it to pursue. Nothing remained but to consider the means which should be taken to send the inhabitants out of the province, and distribute them among the several colonies on the continent.
'I am determined,' Lawrence had written, 'to bring the inhabitants to a compliance, or rid the province of such perfidious subjects.' [Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of Trade, July 18, 1755.] He was now about to fulfil his promise.
The imprisonment of the deputies, on George's Island at Halifax, naturally agitated the minds of the simple Acadians. In the ripening fields and in the villages might be seen groups discussing the fate of their companions. But, though they may have feared further punitive acts at the hands of the British, they were totally unprepared for the approaching catastrophe, and did not for a moment dream that they were to be cast out of their homes, deprived of all they held dear in the land of their nativity, and sent adrift as wanderers and exiles.
It is no part of this narrative to sit in judgment or to debate whether the forcible expatriation of the Acadians was a necessary measure or a justifiable act of war. However this may be, it is important to fix the responsibility for a deed so painful in its execution and so momentous in its consequences.
The Council at Halifax had no power to enact laws. Its action was limited to the authority vested in the governor by his commission and his instructions. And, as Lawrence had as yet neither commission nor instructions, [Footnote: He had not yet been appointed governor. Hopson had wished to resign in the summer of 1754; but the Lords of Trade, who held him in high esteem, had refused to accept his resignation, and Lawrence had been made merely lieutenant-governor, though with the full salary of a governor.] he asked the chief justice, Jonathan Belcher, to prepare an opinion, as he desired to be fortified with legal authority for the drastic act on which he had determined. Belcher had arrived in Nova Scotia from New England nine months before. He does not appear to have examined the official correspondence between the years 1713 and 1755, or even the Minutes of Council. At any rate, he presented a document ill-founded in fact and contemptible in argument. The Acadians are not to be allowed to remain, he said, because 'it will be contrary to the letter and spirit of His Majesty's instructions to Governor Cornwallis, and in my humble apprehension would incur the displeasure of the crown and the parliament.' [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia A, vol. lviii, p. 380. Opinion of Chief Justice Belcher.] What the instructions to Cornwallis had to do with it is not clear. There is no clause in that document contemplating the forcible removal of the people. But even this is immaterial, since the instructions to Cornwallis were not then in force. Hopson, who had succeeded Cornwallis, had been given new instructions, and the Council was governed by them, since, legally at any rate, Hopson was still governor in 1755; and, according to his instructions, Hopson was 'to issue a declaration in His Majesty's name setting forth, that tho' His Majesty is fully sensible that the many indulgences … to the said inhabitants in allowing them the entirely free exercise of their religion and the quiet peaceable possession of their lands, have not met with a dutiful return, but on the contrary, divers of the said inhabitants have openly abetted or privately assisted His Majesty's enemies … yet His Majesty being desirous of shewing marks of his royal grace to the said inhabitants, in hopes thereby to induce them to become for the future true and loyal subjects, is pleased to declare, that the said inhabitants shall continue in the free exercise of their religion, as far as the Laws of Great Britain shall admit of the same … provided that the said inhabitants do within three months from the date of such declaration … take the Oath of Allegiance.' The next clause instructed the governor to report to the Lords of Trade on the effect of the declaration. If the inhabitants or any part of them should refuse the oath, he was to ascertain 'His Majesty's further directions in what manner to conduct yourself towards such of the French inhabitants as shall not have complied therewith.' [Footnote: Public Archives, Canada. Nova Scotia E, vol. ii. Instructions to Governors.] Hopson had tendered the oath to the Acadians. The oath had been refused by them. Their refusal had been reported to the government; and there the matter rested.
In another paragraph of the opinion the chief justice asserted that 'persons are declared recusants if they refuse on a summons to take the oath at the sessions, and can never after such refusal be permitted to take them.' This, no doubt, was the law. But the king had ignored the law, and had commanded his representatives in Nova Scotia to tender the oath again to a people who, upon several occasions, had refused to take it. It was not reasonable, therefore, to suppose, as the chief justice did, that the king would be displeased at the performance of an act which he had expressly commanded.
We have seen that, in the spring of 1754, when Lawrence had intimated to the government that a number of the Acadians who had gone over to the enemy were now anxious to return to their lands, which he would not permit until they had taken an oath without reserve, he was advised not to 'create a diffidence in their minds which might induce them to quit the province.' That this was still the policy is evident from a letter to the same effect written to Lawrence by Sir Thomas Robinson of the British ministry on August 13, 1755, two weeks after the ominous decision of the Halifax Council. [Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 279. Here is a sentence from the letter: 'It cannot therefore be too much recommended to you, to use the greatest caution and prudence in your conduct towards these neutrals, and to assure such of them as may be trusted, especially upon their taking the oaths to His Majesty and his government, that they may remain in the quiet possession of their settlements, under proper regulations.'] Lawrence, however, could not have received this last communication until the plans for the expulsion were well advanced. On the other hand, the decision of the Council was not received in England until November 20, so that the king was not aware of it until the expulsion was already a reality. The meaning of these facts is clear. The thing was done by Lawrence and his Council without the authority or knowledge of the home government. [Footnote: At the meeting of the Halifax Council which decreed the removal of the Acadians the following members were present: the lieutenant-governor, Benjamin Green, John Collier, William Cotterell, John Rous, and Jonathan Belcher. Vice-Admiral Boscawen and Rear-Admiral Mostyn were also present at the 'earnest request' of the Council.—Minutes of Council, July 28, 1755.]
The proceedings in connection with the expulsion were carried on simultaneously in different parts of the province; and the circumstances varied according to the temper or situation of the people. It will be convenient to deal with each group or district separately.
On July 31, 1755, Lawrence ordered Colonel Monckton, who lay with his troops at the newly captured Fort Cumberland, to gather in the inhabitants of the isthmus of Chignecto, and of Chepody, on the north shore of the Bay. The district of Minas was committed to the care of Colonel Winslow. Captain Murray, in command at Fort Edward, was to secure the inhabitants of Pisiquid, and Major Handfield, at Annapolis Royal, the people in his district.
It is regrettable that we do not find in the instructions to these officers any discrimination made between the Acadians who had persistently refused to take the oath and those who had been recognized by the governor and Council as British subjects. Monckton was advised to observe secrecy, and to 'endeavour to fall upon some stratagem to get the men, both young and old (especially the heads of families)' into his power, and to detain them until the transports should arrive. He was also to inform the inhabitants that all their cattle and corn were now the property of the crown, and no person should be allowed to carry off 'the least thing but their ready money and household furniture.' [Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 267.] On August 8 Monckton was advised that the transports would be available soon, and that in the interval he would do well to destroy all the villages in the vicinity of Beausejour or Cumberland, and to use 'every other method to distress as much as can be, those who may attempt to conceal themselves in the woods.' Monckton promptly conceived a plan to entrap the people. He issued a summons, calling upon the adult males to appear at Fort Cumberland on the 11th. About four hundred responded to the call. The proceedings were summary. Monckton merely told them that by the decision of the Council they were declared rebels on account of their past misdeeds; that their lands and chattels were forfeited to the crown, and that in the meantime they would be treated as prisoners. [Footnote: Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. iv, Journal of Colonel John Winslow, part i, p. 227.] The gates of the fort were then closed.
Less successful was Captain Cobb, who had been sent to Chepody to capture the Acadians there. Before his arrival the people had fled to the woods. Three other parties, detached from Fort Cumberland to scour the country in search of stragglers, reported various successes. Major Preble returned the next day with three Acadians, and Captain Perry brought in eleven. Captain Lewis, who had gone to Cobequid, had captured two vessels bound for Louisbourg with cattle and sheep, and had taken several prisoners and destroyed a number of villages on the route.
The more energetic of the Acadians still at large were not easily caught. The pangs of hunger, however, might tempt many to leave the security of their hiding-places, and Monckton determined to gather in as many more as possible. On August 28 Captain Frye sailed from Fort Cumberland for Chepody, Memramcook, and Petitcodiac, on the north shore, with orders to take prisoners and burn the villages on the way. [Footnote: 'Major Frye with a party of 200 men embarked on Board Captain Cobb Newel and Adams to go to Sheperday and take what French thay Could and burn thare vilges thare and at Petcojack.' —Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. i, p. 131. Diary of John Thomas.] Captain Gilbert was sent to Baie Verte on a similar mission. Finding the village deserted on his arrival at Chepody, Frye set fire to the buildings and sailed toward Petitcodiac. On the way the appearance of a house or a barn seems to have been the signal for the vessels to cast anchor, while a party of soldiers, torch in hand, laid waste the homes of the peasantry. On September 4, however, the expedition suffered a serious check. A landing party of about sixty were applying the torch to a village on the shore, when they were set upon by a hundred Indians and Acadians, and a general engagement ensued. The British, though reinforced by men from the ships, were severely handled; and in the end Frye regained the boats with a loss of twenty-three killed and missing and eleven wounded. This attack was the work of Boishebert, the Canadian leader, whom we met some time ago at St John. On the capture of that place by Rous in the summer Boishebert had taken to the woods with his followers, and was assisting the settlers of Chepody to gather in the harvest when Frye's raiders appeared. Frye did not attempt to pursue his assailants, but retired at once to Fort Cumberland with twenty-three captured women and children. He had, however, destroyed over two hundred buildings and a large quantity of wheat and flax. Meanwhile Gilbert had laid waste the village at Baie Verte and the neighbouring farms. [Footnote: 'A Party Likewise from ye Bay of verte under ye comand of Capt. Gilbert who had bin and consumed that vilige and the Houses adjasent.'—Diary of John Thomas.]
By August 31 the transports had arrived at Beausejour, and early in the month of September the embarkation began. The work, however, was tedious, and in the interval the English met with another misfortune. On October 1 eighty-six Acadian prisoners dug a hole under the wall of Fort Lawrence and, eluding the vigilance of the guards, made good their escape in the night. [Footnote: 'Stormy Dark Night Eighty Six French Prisoners Dugg under ye Wall att Foart Lawrance and got Clear undiscovered by ye Centry.' —Diary of John Thomas.] But on October 13 a fleet of ten sail, carrying nine hundred and sixty Acadian exiles, left Chignecto Bay bound for South Carolina and Georgia. After the departure of the vessels the soldiers destroyed every barn and house in the vicinity and drove several herds of cattle into Fort Cumberland. [Footnote: We Burnt 30 Houses Brought away one Woman 200 Hed of Neat Cattle 20 Horses … we mustered about Sunrise mustered the Cattle Togather Drove them over ye River near westcock Sot Near 50 Houses on Fyre and Returned to Fort Cumberland with our Cattle etc. about 6 Clock P.M.'—Diary of John Thomas, pp. 136-7.]
Lawrence was now rid of nearly a thousand Acadians. It was less than he expected, to be sure, and yet no doubt it was a great relief to him. About this time he should have received Sir Thomas Robinson's letter of August 13, conveying to him the king's wishes in effect that the Acadians were not to be molested. [Footnote: The date of the receipt of this letter is uncertain; but it is evident that he received it before the 30th of November, as on that day he replied to a letter of the 13th of August.] This letter received in time would no doubt have stopped the whole undertaking. But now that some of the people had already been deported, there was nothing to be done but to go on with the business to the bitter end.
At Annapolis Royal, more than a hundred miles south of Monckton's camp, matters proceeded more slowly. Handfield, the commandant there, had decided to wait for the arrival of the promised transports before attempting to round up the inhabitants. Then, when his soldiers went forward on their mission up the river, no sound of human voice met their ears in any of the settlements. The inhabitants had hidden in the woods. Handfield appealed to Winslow, who was then at Grand Pre, for more troops to bring the people to reason. [Footnote: Winslow's Journal, part ii, p. 96.] But Winslow had no troops to spare. Handfield does not appear to have relished his task, which he described as a 'disagreeable and troublesome part of the service.' What induced the inhabitants to return to their homes is not clear, but early in the month of September they resumed their occupations. They remained unmolested until early in November, when a fresh detachment of troops arrived to assist in their removal. On December 4 over sixteen hundred men, women, and children were crowded into the transports, which lay off Goat Island and which four days later set sail at eight o'clock in the morning.