“Proclamation to the People of Cabul.“Be it known to all that the British army is advancing on Cabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore all well-disposed persons who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Embassy or in the plunder of the Residency are warned, that if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army and to the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming into the British Camp or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders. Every effort will therefore be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. Therefore, after the receipt of this proclamation, all persons found armed in or about Cabul will be treated as the enemies of theBritish Government; and further, it must be clearly understood that if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental mischief which may be done to persons and property, even of well-disposed people who may have neglected this warning.“Signed, &c.,F. Roberts.”
“Proclamation to the People of Cabul.
“Proclamation to the People of Cabul.
“Proclamation to the People of Cabul.
“Be it known to all that the British army is advancing on Cabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore all well-disposed persons who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Embassy or in the plunder of the Residency are warned, that if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army and to the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming into the British Camp or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders. Every effort will therefore be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. Therefore, after the receipt of this proclamation, all persons found armed in or about Cabul will be treated as the enemies of theBritish Government; and further, it must be clearly understood that if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental mischief which may be done to persons and property, even of well-disposed people who may have neglected this warning.
“Signed, &c.,F. Roberts.”
Two sowars belonging to the 12th Bengal Cavalry, who were spending their furlough at Cabul, arrived here to-day, and report that the mutineers mean to fight. We have just heard of an unsuccessful attack upon the Shutargardan by Mangals and Ghilzais.[8]
The force is now concentrated, for the first time, for the march onward to Cabul. It is made up as follows:—
There are about 6,000 “followers” and some 3,500 baggageanimals. Fourteen days’ supplies are being carried, with tea and sugar for two months. Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.H.A., commands the artillery (twelve 9-pounder and six 7-pounder guns, with two Gatlings); and Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., is in command of the Engineers. The Cavalry Brigade is of course commanded by General Massy; while the Infantry are brigaded as follows:—1st Brigade (General Macpherson), 67th, 92nd Highlanders, and 28th P.I.; 2nd Brigade (General Baker), 72nd Highlanders, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th P.I. The 23rd Pioneers are not attached to any particular brigade.
Sufed Sang, Zahidabad,4th October.
Yesterday the march was continued, and Macpherson’s Brigade with the cavalry reached Sufed Sang in the evening, after a march of nearly fifteen miles. The same open plain was traversed, but there were more signs of cultivation as the Logar River, which was hidden from sight at Zerghun Shahr by a range of hills, was neared. Along its banks are villages scattered at short intervals, and the orchards of these form a very pleasant relief to the bare barrenness of the Ghilzai Hills on our right. The Logar River is spanned by a narrow bridge near Zahidabad village, but it was found impossible to get wheeled guns across it, and the ford adjacent to the bridge was not so shallow as it should have been, the villagers having turned a large volume of water into the stream from a neighbouring irrigation channel. This was the first sign of the latent hostility of the people in the Logar Valley, but as themaliks(headmen) of Zahidabad and the near village of Sufed Sang came in and paid their respects, we could do nothing in the way of punishment. The troops forded the river, the baggage being sent by way of the bridge. Some of the men were swept off their feet by the force of the current, but as the stream was only fifty or sixty yards in width, no lives were lost. The Prince of Bokhara, who is a refugee at the Amir’s Court, met General Roberts at Zahidabad. He had followed Yakub Khan’s example, and had fled from Cabul in the night. He reported that the troops were being incited to fight by certain disloyal Sirdars, but that no general rising of the people had taken place: the flight of the Amir had prevented any great tribal combination so far.
Our camping ground is in the midst of cultivation, and we are halted here to-day awaiting the arrival of General Baker’s Brigade. Yesterday it was found that the carriage of the force was quite inadequate to carry all the stores and ammunition, now that the whole army had been concentrated, and accordingly General Baker was ordered to halt his brigade at Zerghun Shahr for the night and guard the Commissariat supplies and the Ordnance park. This he did by forming a rude sort of laager, within which the transport animals were placed. He was not molested during the night. The call upon the Transport of the Force to do double work was answered with great alacrity by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote and the officers working under him. After the heavy march of fifteen miles the beasts were well fed and given a few hours’ rest; but at one o’clock in the morning all the strongest camels were paraded and marched off to Zerghun Shahr. There they were loaded up, and with as little delay as possible began the return journey to Sufed Sang—forty-five miles in thirty-six hours.[9]On the previous evening some shots had been fired near the Logar Bridge, but no mischief was done; and we took but little notice of this expression of enmity, except to station strong picquets and warn the sentries to show extra vigilance. This evening, however, a determined attack was made upon the rear-guard, the villagers of Kuti Kheyl and other hamlets creeping up, under cover of darkness, and hiding themselves innullahsand behind orchard walls. Fortunately they were badly armed, and although they kept up a desultory fire at close quarters, Major Stockwell of the 72nd Highlanders drove them off by firing volleys and by throwing skirmishers out to protect his left flank. As the rear-guard crossed the river the villagers grew bolder and followed them up pretty closely, but no baggage was lost; and a few companies being sent from camp to hold the bridge the firing died away, and now (10P.M.) all is again quiet. The halt to-day has been of service in enabling us to get in a few supplies, but the transport difficulty is a serious one, as it is now clear only one infantry brigade can march daily, and the baggage animals must he sent back day by day to bring up the stores and reserve ammunition.To-morrow General Baker’s brigade will move on to Charasia, and the 92nd Highlanders will probably be added to the regiments composing it. There is news to-day from Cabul to the effect that the mutinous regiments have not yet left, but are busy looting the arsenal in the Bala Hissar, wherein are stored many hundred rifles, and an enormous quantity of small-arm ammunition.
Camp Charasia,5th October.
The village of Kuti Kheyl was chiefly responsible for the attack upon General Baker’s rear-guard last night, and we have now a number of prisoners in our hands who were captured in that neighbourhood, and who are said to have been concerned in the skirmish. This morning (Sunday), before striking camp, a small force was sent out with two mountain guns. A squadron of cavalry surrounded Kuti Kheyl, and upon the 9th Lancers finally going in, several men showed fight. Three were run through, one just as he was levelling his piece at an officer, and five were captured; two of whom were wounded on the head with lance-butts. Themaliksof the village were also brought in, but were released after receiving a warning as to their future behaviour. The five prisoners were sent on with the advanced guard here, and were tried this afternoon by drum-head court-martial. One of them was a sepoy of the Amir’s, and he, with two others, was sentenced to death for being in unlawful rebellion against his sovereign. The other two were released, no doubt much to their astonishment.
As the march to Charasia was only a short one of six miles from Sufed Sang, we did not start until ten o’clock. Early in the afternoon the encamping ground was reached, and tents were pitched on the fallow fields which stretch to the foot of the hills on either side. The road followed a due northerly direction, through a cultivated tract of country, for about three miles, to some very low hills which traverse it at right angles, and near which is the village of Childukhteran.[10]On crossing these hills, a long valley lay stretched before us in the shape of a parallelogram; and at the farther extremity could be seen the village of Charasia, with its orchards stretching in front of it, with clumps of trees dottedfarther to the west. Beyond was the mass of hills which shut in Cabul, and hinder any view of the city from the valley. The hills to east and west also close in; and the valley cannot be much more than two miles across. It is all under cultivation by means of irrigation channels. The hills overlooking Charasia are, first, a low range of a light-coloured slaty character, then a higher series of rocky heights, and in the immediate rear, forming the sky-line, is a precipitous range with four or five peaks standing out in bold relief. This range runs sharply down, on the east, to the road which leads direct to the old Cabul camping ground and the Bala Hissar, and, with another high range sloping similarly down on the other side of the road, forms the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, which, if held in strength, would be very difficult to force. Through this defile the Logar River passes into the Cabul Valley. Our encamping ground is south of the village, the head-quarters of Sir F. Roberts being a mile or more from the orchards. The ranges of hills east and west of us are very high and steep; but directly to our left front is only a gradual slope, over which lies the beautiful Chardeh Valley, filled with orchards, and apparently rich in cultivation. A road skirting the hills leads through the valley into Cabul. There is a third road among the hills immediately in rear of Charasia.
A cavalry reconnaissance to-day did not cause any of the enemy to show themselves; but perhaps to-morrow, when more ground is covered, there may be a different result. Emissaries from Cabul are said to have been in the Charasia village yesterday, and the difficulty we have had in getting supplies this afternoon is a proof of their efforts to influence the villagers against us. However, only a few shots have been fired at our cavalry, and we are resting in camp, which is protected by strong outlying picquets. To-morrow morning 1,500 baggage animals go back to Sufed Sang to bring up the rest of the stores, and this delay will cause us to halt here a day. General Macpherson, with the 67th Foot, 28th N.I., three guns, and a squadron of cavalry, has been left behind to take charge of to-morrow’s convoy. He will draw in his camp as much as possible, as the affair at Kuti Kheyl has shown how badly disposed the villagers are towards us.
The Amir and Wali Mahomed have come in with us, but theformer does not seem to have—or will not exercise—control over the villagers we have to deal with. There is plainly much trimming of sails among them as to their immediate attitude, but we are wide-awake enough not to trust them in any way. In case of any check, there cannot be the least doubt that the groups which now watch us marching past would shoulder theirjhezailsand turn out to harass us on all sides. The men with us who know the local character best are strong in their assertion that until we have occupied Cabul we shall be annoyed by these tribesmen, who are loth to let long strings of baggage animals pass through their midst without trying to loot some of the riches they carry. Even to-day a kahar in charge of a mule-load of baggage was cut up. He had wandered from the road, and had made no sign when the rear-guard passed. Half a dozen men watched their opportunity, and when the coast was clear they killed the kahar and walked off with the mule and its burden.
The news that the regiments in Cabul looted the arsenal yesterday would seem to indicate that they mean fighting, and this intelligence is the best that we have had for a long time. The only way in which they can be punished lies in resistance when we advance; for, if they run away, it will be difficult to chase them all over Afghanistan, even if we were disposed to do so. The health of the troops is excellent, although the sun has laid up a number of men with fever. It is of the mildest kind and soon passes off.
Camp Beni Hissar,7th October.
We are now encamped within a few miles of the Bala Hissar and the city of Cabul, the mutinous troops having yesterday been defeated and driven from the heights above Charasia, which they had occupied with the idea of barring our further advance. The details of the action are as follows:—At daybreak yesterday morning (October 6th) a strong working party was sent out to improve the road through the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, but before they had gone two miles from camp the cavalry patrol in advance reported that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position commanding the road. The working party consisted of the 23rd Pioneers, under escort of a wing ofthe 92nd Highlanders and two guns of No. 2 (Swinley’s) Mountain Battery; and upon the cavalry patrols being fired at and falling back, this party received orders to halt and act on the defensive. As the morning advanced it was seen that not only was the Sang-i-Nawishta held in force, but the hills beyond Charasia, from the Chardeh Valley to the Logar River, were crowned with armed men. It was plain that our farther progress towards Cabul was barred, and as there was only one brigade available for the attack the position was not an encouraging one. Fortunately the 92nd Highlanders had been detached from General Macpherson’s brigade for the time being, and this gave us another British regiment to fall back upon. Sir Frederick Roberts deemed it wise to attack without delay, as to remain inactive before the mutinous regiments now facing him would probably encourage a general tribal rising, and instead of 10,000 we should have 50,000 men to deal with. Already the hills to right and left of the camp had a few white-clad men upon them, plainly sentinels sent from the near village to watch the progress of the fight and aid in the pursuit if our army were driven back. General Macpherson had to make his way from Sufed Sang to Charasia, and as his baggage train was seen stretching along the valley, the tribesmen grew bolder and opened a desultory fire upon the escort. This was the signal for many men to join the sentinels I have spoken of, on the hills, and so numerous did the gathering become that a squadron of cavalry was sent back to reinforce General Macpherson, who was further ordered to make all possible haste to Charasia.
In the meantime the camp was astir with preparations for the attack upon the enemy in front, and the men were full of enthusiasm at the prospect of meeting face to face the regiments which had brought about Cavagnari’s murder. The following troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Baker, marched out of camp towards the village of Charasia about eleveno’clocko’clock:—
Four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Captain G. Swinley, R.A.
Two Gatling guns, under Captain A. Broadfoot.
7th Company of Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant C. Nugent, R.A.
72nd Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.
Six companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, under Major A. Fitz-Hugh.
200 of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain C. McK. Hall.
This force was strengthened by 450 of the 23rd Pioneers, withdrawn from the road leading to the Sang-i-Nawishta defile;[11]while at the same time our right attack was also modified. Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, assumed command in this direction, the troops entrusted to his charge being:—
Three guns, G-3, R.A., under Major S. Parry, R.A.
Two squadrons of cavalry, made up of detachments of the 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 12th Bengal Cavalry, commanded by Major Hammond, 5th P.C.
A wing of the 92nd Highlanders, under Major Hay.
100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, under Captain H. Paterson.
This force was to keep the enemy in play at the Sang-i-Nawishta by rapid artillery fire, and so to distract their attention that they would give time for our main attack to be delivered on their right, where they had no guns in position, and had not a narrow gorge to defend. The old tactics of turning their flank and taking their main line in reverse were to be followed; and knowing the Afghan inability, as a rule, to make a counter-attack, General Roberts weakened his right, so as to concentrate a strong infantry force for the outflanking movement over the hills overlooking the Chardeh Valley. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan (son of Dost Mahomed), who was in command of the Afghan troops, seemed to think we should make a determined effort to force the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, and he had accordingly posted on the heights overlooking the road twelve guns, while three or four Armstrong-pattern breech-loaders were on the plain below. The enemy’s disposition seemed to indicate that if we tried to force the Pass their guns would have held us in check, while their right was swung round to take us in flank, the series of ridges which they covered offering a good manœuvring ground for such a movement, while the undulating plain below, with its belt of trees round about Charasia, would have given excellent cover. The accompanying map will show therelative positions, and also make clear the strength of the defending force which was able to cover so much ground.
Plan of Engagement on Heights near Kabul, 6th October, 1879.
Plan of Engagement on Heights near Kabul, 6th October, 1879.
Plan of Engagement on Heights near Kabul, 6th October, 1879.
After leaving the camp, General Baker made for the village of Charasia, which consisted of a number of detached walled enclosures such as are common all over the country. There were numerous orchards and gardens adjoining these, so that his first movements were well concealed from the enemy, whose attention up to this point was directed chiefly to Major White’s movements on the Cabul Road. Seeing how greatly he was outnumbered, General Baker took the precaution of occupying a strong walled enclosure on the outskirts of Charasia, and here he placed his reserve ammunition and his field hospital. The temper of the villagers was so uncertain that he telegraphed to General Roberts for another regiment of infantry to strengthen his reserves, and 100 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry hurried out at once and joined the hospital and reserve ammunition guard. The remainder of the regiment were sent out soon after, although this left the camp very weakly guarded, only 1,000 cavalry and infantry with six 9-pounder guns being left at head-quarters. However, as General Macpherson was coming up with his brigade, the risk was well worth running, as failure on General Baker’s part might have meant disaster to the whole army. The 72nd Highlanders led the way out of Charasia, and bullets soon began to drop among their ranks while the enemy’s picquets were seen to be retiring up the ridges. As the brigade pushed forward with the intention of outflanking the main line of hills lying between Chardeh and the Sang-i-Nawishta, their progress was checked by a strong position on their left front on which the Afghans had raisedsungars, and from which they began to open a heavy musketry fire. Two mountain guns replied to this, and the 72nd extended in skirmishing order, one company under Captain Brooke-Hunt turning off to the left, while the main body of the regiment worked away to the front, the ground affording but slight cover. Captain Hunt’s company scaled a hill 500 or 600 feet high, climbing over difficult rocks, which hindered their rapid advance. The enemy were exceedingly numerous on their extreme right, another and steeper hill enabling them to pour a heavy fire upon the company. Two more mountain guns and the Gatlings wereordered to open fire upon this hill, and upon such bodies of men as were visible on the near ridges; but the Gatlings were in such bad order, owing to their defective make, that after a few rounds the drum “jammed” and they had to be taken out of action. Our true attack had now been recognized by Nek Mahomed and he hastened to reinforce his right; a stream of men was seen pouring along the rearmost ridges from the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta, and standards borne by Ghazis began to thicken on our left. General Baker lost no time in pushing forward part of his reserves, in order to force their first position before it could be strongly reinforced. The 5th Ghoorkas, and 200 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, doubled forward, while the enemy’s fire increased in intensity. Captain Hunt’s company was strengthened by two companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, under Captain John Cook, V.C.; while two more companies of Ghoorkas and 200 of the 5th P.I. joined the advanced skirmishers of the 72nd in the main attack. The skirmishing line was thus extended so as to outflank the left of the ridge, which the Afghans still clung to with great obstinacy, as it was the key of the position on their right flank. This was at 1.30P.M., when our troops had been engaged for an hour and a half without having made much impression upon the enemy. With the strengthening of our advance success was soon declared: the hill on the extreme left, from which a flanking fire had been directed on our skirmishers, was carried in splendid style by the company of the 72nd and the two companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, while the other companies of the two regiments, by a series of gallant rushes, turned the enemy’s left. At two o’clock our advanced line was enabled to direct a cross fire upon the 2,000 men who held the ridge, and who now showed symptoms of wavering. A general advance was ordered, and the 72nd, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th P.I. were in a few minutes in possession of the Afghan’s first line. But not without loss, for the enemy were chiefly armed with Snider and Enfield rifles, and their fire was rapid and continuous. Fortunately they had so little knowledge of the principles of musketry that their bullets mostly passed over our men’s heads as the rush uphill was made. The 72nd Highlanders bore the brunt of the fighting, and their casualties amounted to thirty-six. They had on several occasions to cross open ground, and in spite of theexposure they rushed forward with anélanthat could not have been surpassed. Private MacMahon, one of their number, particularly distinguished himself on the left. Almost single-handed he scaled a hill on the crest of which was asungarfilled with men: loading and firing as he went, his coolness incited four or five Ghoorkas to follow him; and when he finally leaped into thesungarits defenders took to flight and were shot down as they ran. MacMahon is to be recommended by General Baker for the Victoria Cross, his gallantry having been observed by the General and his Staff as well as by the officers engaged in the attack. It was such incidents as these which caused General Baker to express his great satisfaction with the behaviour of the troops under his command.
After their first position had fallen into our hands, the enemy rallied on some low hills 600 yards in rear and re-opened fire, to which our mountain guns replied, while our men were resting on their arms. A company of the 23rd Pioneers, under Lieutenant Chesney, was thrown forward on the right, while two companies of the 92nd, under Captain Oxley, which Major White had detached to hold in check any flanking movement the enemy might attempt on General Baker’s right, also came into action. The enemy’s second position was attacked by the 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Ghoorkas, aided by the three companies just mentioned, and at three o’clock the Afghan right had been broken up, and their regiments were flying towards the village of Indikee. The mountain guns fired shrapnel into their midst, and the Gatling guns, for the few moments they were able to work, also did some execution, while volleys from the 72nd at long ranges caused the fugitives to hasten their flight. Major Stockwell, with a wing of the 72nd, followed them rapidly until he reached the open ground leading down into the Chardeh Valley, when his further advance was stopped by General Baker, as the turning movement along the ridge towards the Sang-i-Nawishta had to be made. The want of cavalry was here painfully apparent, as the retreating masses of the Afghans could easily have been overtaken, the sloping ground between Indikee and the hills being admirably suited for a pursuit. While Major Stockwell had thus been completing the defeat of the enemy’s right, two companies of the 23rd Pioneers had gaineda footing on the main ridge itself, whence the enemy were rapidly retiring as they recognized that their line would in a few minutes be taken in reverse. General Baker swung round his left, ordered a general advance, and at 3.45P.M.the ridge was in our hands without any serious opposition having been met with. Not that they had not shown great determination before, for bands of ghazis had made good their footing behind thesungarsuntil our bayonets had forced them down. The 5th Ghoorkas were charged by a number of these madmen, but they met the rush by a counter bayonet charge and cleared all before them.
Leaving General Baker with the main body of his force sweeping over the high ridge in the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta Gorge, I must now turn to Major White’s movements on our right, where had been done one of the most gallant feats of the day. The feint in this direction had been turned into a successful attack, resulting in the capture of twenty guns, although our infantry numbered only a few hundreds, and our cavalry were unable to act. Skirting the east of Charasia, Major White found the enemy scattered about among the trees, and also holding the hills to right and left of the defile. The three guns of G-3 were soon in action, and a few shells well placed, with the fire of skirmishers thrown out among the trees and gardens, drove back the more venturesome of the enemy to the shelter of thesungarsin the hills, and behind some boulders in the bed of the Pass. Our guns were then moved forward and made beautiful practice, the answering fire from the enemy’s artillery being quite harmless. One of our shells struck an Afghan field-piece, dismounted it, and killed two of the horses standing near, while another struck a standard in a cluster of men. In fact, the 103 rounds fired by G-3 were of the greatest value in preparing the way for the infantry attack. This attack was led personally by Major White, who at the head of only fifty Highlanders charged the first hill on the right, where several hundred Afghans were posted. Our men went up with a rush under a severe musketry fire, and the enemy waited as if to receive them at the point of the bayonet. With such odds in their favour, and asungarto aid them, European troops would have swept back the handful of menattacking with scarcely an effort; but Afghan courage and steadiness are very limited. When the Highlanders were within five or six yards of thesungarthe enemy turned and fled, and were shot in the back as they made for the next hill. The success thus gained was mainly due to Major White’s personal gallantry, one striking instance of which may be quoted. Not caring to expose his men in a particularly steep bit of ground, which was enfiladed by a few Afghans well placed in rear of some rocks, he took a loaded rifle from one of the Highlanders and “stalked” the enemy single-handed. By cautious climbing he reached the rocks behind which they were concealed, and as he showed himself they jumped up and ran, no doubt in the full belief that the single figure they saw was only the leader of a number of others. One man stayed to fire, but missed his aim, and as he turned Major White shot him through the head. Unfortunately, he had no more cartridges with him, or some of the others would have fallen. This hill is to be called “White’s Hill” in memory of his gallantry. The capture of this point enabled the guns to be advanced still further towards the entrance of the Pass, but Major White was not content. Having given his men breathing time, and being reinforced by another fifty men from below, he again went forward and captured two lower hills on the right, in the same grand style, and with only trifling loss. It was by these movements that he was able to send Captain Oxley with two companies well to the left, to co-operate with General Baker’s Brigade. Six Armstrong guns fell into Major White’s hands on the open ground below the hills; and when our turning movement in the Chardeh direction had been completed, and the enemy began to evacuate the main ridge, the cavalry were sent forward, and the infantry occupied the hills commanding the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass on the left. Here twelve more guns were captured in position, while the cavalry found two more abandoned on the road. The twenty guns brought out from Sherpur, therefore, to fortify the Pass have all fallen into our hands. Upon Major White gaining the ridge to the left he could see no further sign of the enemy, who had stampeded to the Bala Hissar. The cavalry could not follow as the Pass narrows, and the narrow paths beyond are not adapted for a body of horse charging. Our information was tothe contrary, it being stated that the road opened into a plain, and our cavalry being accordingly sent to the right to cut off the retreat of the enemy when driven towards Cabul by General Baker. As events occurred, the two squadrons would have been invaluable if they had accompanied the General. The progress of the brigade along the main ridge was very slow, as the ground was rugged and difficult; and it was not until nightfall that a junction was effected with Major White. The 23rd Pioneers and the 5th P.I. moved down into an open bit of ground beyond the Pass, while the 72nd Highlanders, the Ghoorkas, and mountain guns remained above, throwing out strong picquets over the range of hills. Major White’s force bivouacked on the ground they had occupied when their last movement was made.
It is worth mentioning that two elephants, three camels, and 200 mules carrying stores, &c., were safely piloted over the precipitous hills which were taken, and the men were thus able to bivouac in comfort. Not the least important arrangement of the day was that of signalling. Captain Straton had parties of men with General Baker and Major White, and a third batch of signallers was sent to a high hill to watch the Chardeh Valley, and the movements of large bodies of tribesmen, who lined the crests of the range overlooking the camp from the west. Heliograms were exchanged between these points and the head-quarters camp, and General Roberts was kept fully informed of all that was happening in these directions. This focussing of all information upon a common centre enabled the General to make his dispositions with accuracy and effect: without the signallers dangerous delays might have occurred. The heliographing was so thoroughly well done that Sir F. Roberts complimented Captain Straton personally on the success of his arrangements. The only drawback was a succession of small sand storms, which swept across the camp and blotted out everything for the time being.
The attitude of the tribesmen in our immediate neighbourhood,i.e., on the ranges of hills east and west of the camp, was one of expectancy modified by an earnest desire to harass our picquets by spasmodic firing. Their ill-will was first shown by firing upon the signallers on the hill, and the party had eventually to be withdrawn. Two guns were sent down and a few shells pitchedupwards, which caused these guerillas to withdraw to a safe distance. The convoy from our last camp at Sufed Sang, Zahidabad, was also fired upon, and General Macpherson had to throw out skirmishers to protect his baggage animals. At least some hundred men appeared on a high peak to the east of the camp, and fired upon a picquet of the 92nd who were on a lower level. A brisk fire was kept up for some time, and the enemy driven off to higher ground.[12]As they re-opened fire the R.H.A. were ordered to try a shot at the peak. The first shell dropped a little short, but the second burst on the point occupied, and the next instant it was quite clear, its late occupants running in disorder into the valley beyond. There were several of the Amir’s soldiers among them, still wearing his uniform. The camp after this was left undisturbed: tents were struck at sunset in readiness for the early morning march which it had been decided to make to Beni-Hissar, just beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass.
The enemy are believed, in this action, to have had 9,000 or 10,000 men on the ridges, including thirteen regiments of regulars. They left 300 dead on the field, but their total loss in killed and wounded must have been much greater. Our loss was twenty killed and sixty-seven[13]wounded, among the latter being Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders, bullet contusion, left leg, slight; Dr. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers, bullet wound in the chest, severe; and Captain Young, 5th Punjab Infantry, bullet wound in the left thigh, severe. Of the British Infantry regiments the 72nd lost three killed and thirty-four wounded; and the 92nd three killed and six wounded. Among our camp followers five dhoolie-bearers were killed and four wounded, returns which show that thekaharswere well under fire in carrying off the injured.
CHAPTER IV.
Effect of the Action of Charasia—Advance to Beni Hissar—Cavalry Reconnaissance—The Bala Hissar Deserted—The Sherpur Magazine Blown up—Attitude of the Amir—Operations of the 8th and 9th of October—Capture of Sherpur Cantonments—The Affair of the Asmai Heights—Cavalry Pursuit towards Ghazni—The Force moves to Siah Sung—Leaders of the Mutinous Regiments.
Camp Beni Hissar,8th October.
There can be little doubt that the action at Charasia has broken up the combinations against us, and that Cabul is now at our mercy. It cannot be too fully borne in mind that, but for the promptness with which General Roberts decided to attack, instead of allowing the enemy to gather strength by our own inaction, serious consequences might have ensued to our compact little army now within three or four miles of the Bala Hissar. Not that defeat was to be feared in any sense of the term, but that the slightest hesitation or check in our advance would have raised against us crowds of enemies whom we should have had to deal with in, perhaps, as difficult a country as could be fought over. It was a bold bid for all doubtful and wavering hearts to join them—this move of the mutinous regiments seven or eight miles out of Cabul right across our path; and if they had been allowed to hold the hills even for twenty-four hours, there can scarcely be a doubt that their numbers would have been doubled, and our loss in dislodging them proportionately greater than that which even now we have suffered.
I have described the position of our camp at Charasia in my last letter, and from this it would be seen that our best route to Cabul was by way of the Sang-i-Nawishta defile on our right front. At daybreak yesterday we moved out of Charasia camp, and at the mouth of the defile Sir F. Roberts was met by Major White, who explained the positions occupied by the enemy, and the action he had taken in dislodging them. The General congratulated him heartily on his success, and then passed on to where General Baker had bivouacked at the northern end of the defile. High hills shut in the road on either hand, the Logar River, here adeep stream, also running to the right of the path, which at times is very rough. Two or three men had hidden themselves behind rocks on the steep hillsides to the east, and they now fired down as the troops filed along. Their shots were wide of the mark, and our men firing freely back soon silenced them. Rounding the corner of the hill on our left, we came upon General Baker’s bivouacking ground, and here followed more congratulations; Sir F. Roberts hearing in detail from his Brigadier an account of the action upon the success of which so much had depended. General Baker with his brigade was left to keep open the Pass while the baggage and stores were passing through, and he remained there until this morning, by which time the ground at Charasia had been cleared.
In the next three miles to Beni Hissar the road runs among rich corn-fields, irrigated by the diversion of the stream, and the route to the Bala Hissar was followed by our troops until the ground fixed upon for the camp was reached. This was just under the walls of some gardens belonging to the Amir and his Mustaufi (Minister of Finance), where water was plentiful and trees afforded shade. While the Infantry were marching in, General Massy went forward with the cavalry through Beni Hissar village and into the fields beyond. The hills to the left shut out for a mile a view of Cabul, but after ten minutes’ riding the Cabul plain was reached, and before us was the Bala Hissar and the fortified ridge running upwards and commanding it. The heights were crowned by a wall fifteen or twenty feet high, and the line of fortification could be seen following the sky-line, until the hill dipped down to the bed of the Cabul River to the north of the city. Again, the ridge rising on the left bank of the river presented a similar sight, the zig-zag wall being apparently endless. Our videttes rode out well towards the Bala Hissar, and, accompanying them, I had a good view of the fortifications, but could not see a single soldier lining the walls. All was deserted, and we knew that the mutineers, if they meant fighting, were not foolish enough to allow themselves to be caught in a trap such as the Bala Hissar would have proved. The small portion of the city that could be seen also lay as if abandoned by the inhabitants, and we made up our minds that the fortified camp at Sherpur,lying over the low Siah Sung hills which blocked our view to the north-east, was the position taken up by the enemy for a final struggle with our force. The plain on which our cavalry reconnoitred was all under cultivation, rich fields of clover and lucerne relieving the general brownness of the land, the crops of which had been lately reaped. Cultivation extended as far as the eye could reach on the right, while on all other sides high hills blocked the view, the gigantic Hindu Kush lying away in the distance to the north, keeping sentinel over Afghanistan as impassively as the Himalayas look down upon Hindustan.
We returned to camp to speculate upon the chances of further fighting, and in the afternoon we had to listen to the many stories brought in by local friends of the Amir and merchants from Cabul, who came to pay their respects to Sir Frederick Roberts. In the evening the firing of heavy guns was heard in the direction of Sherpur, and it was surmised that the rebels were marking out ranges; but when a tremendous explosion succeeded it soon became known that the magazine at their fortified camp had been blown up, and it was then concluded that they were discharging guns before abandoning them. Accordingly this morning we are not astonished to hear that Sherpur Camp is deserted, and a force of cavalry is now going out under General Massy in search of the enemy. This force I am accompanying, as it is most probable some of the fugitives—if the regiments have really decamped—will be overtaken. To-morrow we move camp to the Siah Sung ridge directly overlooking Cabul.
The attitude of the Amir is not altogether satisfactory, and he is plainly afraid that the soldiery will make a stand in the city, and that Cabul will be stormed and destroyed by our army. He assured us that we should not meet with any resistance at Charasia, and yet it is now believed that Nek Mahomed visited him in our camp, told him of the force ready to fight, and appealed to him to desert the British and head a national rising. All Yakub Khan vouchsafed to tell the General was that the Bala Hissar was no longer in the possession of people whom he could trust, and that his own family had been moved into the city. He now confidently explains that the mutinous regiments have dispersed, and that we have nothing more to expect in the way of opposition.
Camp Siah Sung,10th October.
The force of cavalry sent under General Massy on the 8th instant, to cut off the retreat of the enemy, who was said to have abandoned Sherpur entrenched camp after blowing up the magazine on the previous evening, was made up as follows:—102 men of the 9th Lancers, 140 of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 260 of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 220 of the 14th Bengal Lancers,—in all 722 lances and sabres. I accompanied this force, which left Beni-Hissar camp at eleven o’clock in the morning, passed through the village adjoining, and then took its way across the Cabul plain (leaving the Bala Hissar and the city on the left) to the Siah Sung ridge, on which we are now encamped. This was easy going for the horses, who were pushed on rapidly until the ridge was crested on the extreme right, and a gradual descent led us towards Sherpur. Soon the level plain lying north of Cabul was reached, and rich cultivation was passed through, the ground being everywhere intersected by watercourses and irrigation channels. The Cabul river, at this season a shallow streamlet only a few yards broad, was crossed, and on our right, at a few hundred yards’ distance, was the long line of wall, with bastions for heavy guns at regular intervals, which marked the fortified camp of which we had heard so much. Our scouts found it quite deserted, and their first prize was a heavy gun which had been dragged some distance across the fields, no doubt with the intention of using it in another position. There were no guns at the embrasures in the bastions; but General Massy had the good luck to find seventy-five pieces of various calibre parked within the walls. These guns were in very good order, but little damage having been done to them. There was not much ammunition left with them, the Afghan troops having carried off a large quantity; while the magazine itself had been blown up to prevent the remainder falling into our hands. The guns included four English 18-pounders, one English 8-inch howitzer, and two Afghan imitations of this weapon; and forty-two bronze mountain guns (3-pounders) with part of their equipment.
This fortified camp of Sherpur is built at the base of the low, stony Bemaru hills, running for about two miles at a slight angleto the general direction of the plain itself. It has only three sides fortified, the hill in rear being quite sufficient to shield it from attack in that quarter, as an open plain stretches away to the hills of the Koh-Daman and Kohistan. The main wall is about a mile and a half long, with three strongly-guarded entrance-gates, and from each extremity the fortification is carried at right angles till it reaches the ridge in the rear. There is a fourth gateway on the western flank. The plan followed throughout is a thick mud wall (25 feet in height) built with bastions for guns, and a low parapet to shield troops manning the outer wall. The entrance-gates are lofty structures, with comfortable quarters on either side for officers, and are so wide that four or five men could ride through them abreast. They are each defended by a curtain built in the same way as the outer wall. Inside the cantonment is an open space quite clear of buildings, exactly answering to an English barrack-square, and on this 20,000 men might be paraded with room to spare. To the right, on the hillside, is the small village of Bemaru, with the usual flat-roofed houses, burnt brown by the sun, and with but little sign of life in it. The novel feature in this cantonment is the arrangement of the barrack-rooms. At about 20 feet from the outer wall, and parallel to it, is built a range of rooms, extending along the three sides of the place. Each room would hold at a pinch twenty men, and there are some hundreds of these dormitories, which are snug enough even for a variable climate such as this. Along their front is a narrow verandah-like space, pucca brick pillars and arches supporting the flat mud roof, which rests on strong beams and unhewn poles. This arrangement has a very pleasing effect when viewed from within the cantonment, the regularity of the arches and their supports grouped in threes before each room, with a wider span then following, giving the appearance of a long colonnade. Broad staircases lead at certain intervals to the roof of the barracks, which would give a second line of musketry fire in resisting any attempt to storm. Open spaces are left at rare intervals between the rooms to admit of the passage of men and guns to the outer wall. Altogether this fortified camp could, if properly victualled and garrisoned, be defended for an indefinite period against any force withoutartillery. The water supply is from streams diverted from the fields and carried by low culverts underneath the walls; but if this were cut off, wells, no doubt, could be sunk to supply the deficiency. From the absence of trees and the utter barrenness of the space enclosed by the walls, with the stony hills in the rear, the place must be insufferably hot in summer, though at this time of the year it would be much better than tents. When our cavalry rode through the gates into the middle of the cantonment there was no sign of an enemy, and it must have been deserted many hours before. A few cartridge papers were lying about, and the rude fireplaces of the men were still black with smoke; but beyond this nothing could be seen. In one or two places an attempt had been made to burn the barracks down, but the fire had not obtained sufficient power over the timbers for this to be accomplished. Doors and loose woodwork had been looted by the villagers, who claimed to have put the fire out; but their story was a very questionable one. People were passing freely through the place as we entered, but they did not show much interest in our proceedings. In the north-west corner the wall had been partly blown down, and the ruins of the magazine were strewn in every direction.
It was upon arriving opposite Sherpur Cantonment that we sighted the enemy; the Asmai Heights to the left, overlooking the old Afghan quarter of Cabul, being crowded with men. We were 3,000 or 4,000 yards away, and at that distance they did not consider us worth a shot, though their guns could be distinctly seen. A halt was called, the cavalry forming up at the farther end of the cantonment; while General Massy heliographed back to Sir F. Roberts the news of the enemy having been found occupying a position of strength. We were told, in reply, that General Baker was leaving Beni Hissar with infantry to attack the heights, and we accordingly hurried on, skirting the hills and passing through grain-fields and meadows, with here and there a country villa in its fertile garden surrounded by huge walls. Our object was to reach a break in the hills and to pass over into the Chardeh Valley, so as to cut off the enemy from taking the road which leads to Ghazni, Bamian, and Turkistan. We worked round almost on the arc of a circle, of which Cabul might be the centre,keeping the ridge occupied by the enemy at first on our left rear, then on our left, and, finally, on our left front, when we galloped through the break we had been making for, near the village of Aoshahr, and faced round towards Cabul itself. The rich Chardeh Valley was all before us, and we passed down into it, and could then see the disposition of the men General Baker was to attack. We had learned that they numbered three regiments and had eleven guns in position, and this information was fairly accurate. They had 2,000 regulars, besides 700 or 800 untrained men who had joined them, and had twelve guns. Videttes were thrown out right across the plain, and a rapid reconnaissance made. An old ressaldar of Fane’s Horse, who was accompanying us as guide, stated that three roads led from the valley and united to form the chief road to Bamian. The 5th P.C. were accordingly sent well on to the right to block the road there; two squadrons were sent back into Sherpur plain to watch a path leading down from the hills in that direction; another squadron returned a mile and a half to Aoshahr, so as to prevent the fugitives escaping along the crest of the hills down the dip we had passed through; while the General and Staff remained in the open with the rest of the cavalry, including the 9th Lancers. We had mounted signallers with us, and heliographic communication was opened with the high Takht-i-Shah Peak overlooking the Bala Hissar Ridge. Captain Straton thence signalled down that the enemy’s working parties had been strengthening theirsungaron the Asmai Hill, and that some of General Baker’s troops were on the same side of the ridge as ourselves. We could see the enemy distinctly on the hillside, and at its foot was their camp, made up of forty or fifty tents. These were close to the village of Dehmazung, half-hidden by orchards, and a gun was slued round and pointed at us as soon as we appeared. The 9th Lancers withdrew 1,000 yards just as the enemy fired a few shells at our videttes. The shells buried themselves in the soft ground and never exploded. We could not push farther forward, as deep watercourses cut up the fields at every few score yards, and the rows of closely planted willow-trees along these would have broken any cavalry formation. In the various villages, too, large bodies of the enemy were gathered, who could have shot our horsemen down from the towers and walls withoutat all exposing themselves. A narrow road to the left led along the foot of the hills to the enemy’s camp, but only three men could have gone abreast, and it was commanded on the left and front by the guns, and on the right by the troops in Dehmazung, underneath the walls of which it passed. At a quarter to four we heard the first gun fired, and from that time to dark we watched for the infantry attack to develop. Some of the 92nd Highlanders were seen to our right centre among the trees of a village a mile from Dehmazung, and a small party of the 9th Lancers was sent by General Massy to open communication with them. These found the enemy swarming in the orchards they had to pass through, and after being fired upon from several walls they had to return. The mountain guns with General Baker, posted upon the high ridge commanding the Bala Hissar, were shelling the Asmai Heights lined by the enemy, whose guns returned the fire shot for shot. Having twelve guns to General Baker’s two mountain guns, they had much the best of it, though the range was so long that little real damage was done on either side. The ridges upon which this shell practice was going on form the defences of Cabul from attack from the Bamian direction. Running up from the Bala Hissar, and following every dip and rise of the hillside, is a strong wall ten or twelve feet high, pierced for musketry. This wall is continued at right angles along the crest of the Sherderwaza Ridge and down the precipitous hillside of the gorge through which the Cabul River runs. It ends a few yards from the broken arches of a bridge spanning the stream—at this time reduced to very small dimensions, by being largely drawn upon for irrigation purposes in the Chardeh Valley—but begins at once on the opposite side of the river. A strong tower, with a base of stones fifteen feet high, raised on the solid rock, is the starting point on this, the northern side of the river, and the wall zig-zags up just in the same way as that in continuation of the upper Bala Hissar. The line of fortification extends along the hill top, and then turns down for some distance along a spur facing towards Sherpur. On the crest of this ridge (the Asmai Heights), three white standards were flying near the guns of the enemy, who had one heavy piece on the summit, the report of which made the bark of the mountain guns sound quite contemptible. The line of fire on both sideswas at right angles to the bed of the Cabul River, the shells flying over the gorge and bursting on the opposing heights. From our position in the plain below we could watch the artillery and judge pretty accurately as to the fall of the shells, and it was annoying to see that as it was “end-on” firing, the enemy were receiving but little injury. Their policy was plainly to hold on till nightfall and to attempt to escape under cover of darkness; and as the sun sank slowly behind us, it became obvious that unless the infantry attack was soon delivered, they would succeed only too well. Our chagrin was great that there were not guns with our cavalry, as we could see men in little clusters of 50 or 100 lying under the lee of the rocks on our side of the ridge, perfectly sheltered from General Baker’s shells. General Massy had applied for horse artillery before leaving Beni Hissar; but it was reported that the country he would have to pass over was cut up by deep irrigation channels which would hinder the guns from keeping up with the cavalry. It was decided therefore not to send out artillery. With a couple of R.H.A. guns we could have made the enemy’s camp and the hillside quite untenable, and the 2,800 men gathered there would either have had to come down into the plain, where our cavalry would have chosen their own ground to charge them, or to take refuge in Cabul city, which they could easily have reached. An old native officer, a Cabuli, who saw service in the Mutiny, was much struck with our plan of cutting off the retreat; and when he saw the cavalry debouch into the Chardeh plain, he said in his fervent thankfulness:—“God has delivered thesebudmashesinto your hands even as the Embassy was delivered into theirs.” And it certainly did seem as if these three regiments, which were said to have been chief in the attack upon the handful of men under Sir Louis Cavagnari in the Bala Hissar, were about to be exterminated. But night fell, and still our infantry attack was not delivered. General Massy ordered hisvidettesvidettesand the chain of cavalry to be maintained until it was quite dark, so as to induce the enemy to believe the cordon would be maintained during the night; but he would not run the risk, in such an awkward country, of his men being shot down in detail. He therefore withdrew them eventually within two or three of the rude forts in the plain and waited for daylight. It seemed almost hopeless to interceptin the darkness men who had a valley six or seven miles across, with hills on either side, to escape by. That they did escape is now a cause of much heartburning in the force. If, like Joshua, we could have made the sun stand still, say, for only two hours, the day would have been as grand a success as the 6th at Charasia; as it was, it can only be looked upon as one of great disappointment to all concerned.
The only troops available for despatch with General Baker were 320 of the 92nd Highlanders, two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, and seven companies of the 23rd Pioneers. With these were two mountain guns and one Gatling. The road up to the ridge commanding the Bala Hissar and the passage over the Kotal down into the Chardeh Valley were so difficult, that although this force moved out of Beni Hissar at noon, it was a quarter to four before the mountain guns got into action, and it was some time later before the 92nd Highlanders reached the village to the west of Dehmazung. The enemy were in greater force than was expected, and as the 92nd men were unsupported, they were ordered to wait for reinforcements before making any attack. They were directed to take up a position on a spur of the Sherderwaza Heights, parallel to the Cabul River, and this they did without loss, although the enemy opened fire from two breech-loading field-pieces in their camp. The shells and round shot were pitched too high, and greatly amused our men. Marksmen were posted at sheltered points, and their aim was so good that the Afghans soon retired from these two guns, leaving them in the open. The two companies of the 72nd were at this time on the hillside nearest to Beni Hissar, and the 23rd was in reserve. A gun in the tower I have mentioned fired occasionally, and the Gatling was tried at this; but the drum hitched after a few rounds, and the gun had to cease firing. General Baker had made up his mind to attack the instant his reinforcements—consisting of a wing of the 67th, two companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, and four more mountain guns—arrived. These, however, did not reach him until half-past five, and it was then quite hopeless to think of storming the heights in the dusk. The troops accordingly bivouacked where they stood, and a very cold night they had of it. General Macpherson arrived at 6.30A.M.with the remainder of the 67th, the28th P.N.I, and four horse artillery guns on elephants. He started with some infantry and guns to follow General Massy.
There is no doubt the enemy began evacuating their position as soon as it was dark; and when a strong patrol crept into their camp at midnight they found all had fled. Guns, tents, camp equipage, &c., fell into our hands. Seven bodies were found buried on the heights, and three others were lying on the rocks. Whether the fugitives carried off others, we have no means of telling. There were no casualties on our side. General Baker sent information to General Massy of the flight of the enemy, and the cavalry started off on the Bamian Road at 5.30A.M., but only one small party of twenty-one was overtaken on the Kotal-i-Takht. These took refuge on a low hill and fought desperately, the good luck of surrounding and shooting them down falling to the 5th P.C. The single combat between Rahmat Ali, a native officer, and the leader of the party, was a pretty piece of business. The Afghan tried to escape on a fast pony, but was overtaken by Rahmat Ali, who, after warding off two blows from his opponent’stulwar, got well down upon the man’s head. Unluckily his sword snapped at the hilt, but the blow had knocked the fugitive off his horse, and he was pistolled before he could recover himself. It was the hardest day’s work the cavalry have had for a long time, over thirty-six miles being covered in the day. The men were without food both days they were out, but they behaved splendidly, not a grumble being heard. For instance, the 9th Lancers started on the morning of the 8th, after having received one loaf to every three men. They carried no food, as only a reconnaissance was intended, and at night some sheep were killed for them, and they tried to eat the flesh after roasting the animals whole. They had nothing but their swords to use in cutting up the carcases, and they found it quite impossible to eat the flesh; so on the 8th they went supperless to bed. On the 9th they were in the saddle from 5A.M.to 9P.M.(when they reached this camp), and the pursuit and return were made in such quick time that again there was no chance of their getting food. Horses and men of all the regiments out with General Massy were quite exhausted when they at last reached their quarters here. Some score of horses were lost on the road, having literally died in harness. There was no slacknessin the pursuit when once it began, but the enemy had too great a start to be overtaken, and it now seems probable they dispersed to the hills and made for their homes, many doubtless taking refuge in the city. One piece of experience was certainly gained, and that was that the villagers about Cabul are hostile to us almost to a man. Five of them belonging to Aoshahr were made an example of by Colonel Ross, of the 14th Bengal Lancers. They treacherously fired into the Lancers, after having salaamed to them as they passed. The ruffians were captured with their guns still in their hands, and were shot without further parley. It is only by such severity, and by taking no prisoners in action, than any impression can be made upon the Afghan mind. Such prisoners as are brought in are tried by a military commission, and the great majority are shot. There is just a fear that too much leniency may be shown, as the work is rather distasteful to British officers; but as we are an “avenging army,” scruples must be cast aside.
The army moved into this camp yesterday afternoon. It was only about a four miles’ march from Beni Hissar, and the 72nd were left in charge of all stores that could not be got off by the transport animals in the day. On the night of the 8th there was some lively firing by small bodies ofbudmashes, who tried to shoot down men on picquet and sentry duty; but, as is usual, the bullets did no mischief. Last night there was news of what threatened to be a better organized attack by local villagers and tribesmen. Mounted sowars, it seems, were sent round to the tribes in this neighbourhood asking them to gather in force and to attack the camp, as much loot could be got, and only a few men had been left in camp. The exemplary severity we have shown in shooting all the men caught in arms against us, deterred the villagers from combining together, and no attack was made. The 72nd had drawn in their camp well under the walls of a garden overlooking the ground, and had formed a kind of laager with flour bags, &c., but not a shot was fired all night. The 72nd were ready for any number of assailants, and from behind their barricades of flour bags they would have read the Afghans as sharp a lesson as the Zulus received when trying to storm the mealie redoubt at Rorke’s Drift. The whole of the stores were brought in here to-day. The 5th Ghoorkas hold the ridge overlooking theBala Hissar, and the 5th Punjab Cavalry are in the Sherpur Cantonment, to prevent the barracks there being destroyed by the local peasants for the sake of the woodwork and other material. In two or three days we shall probably move into the Bala Hissar, in which five months’ provisions are to be stored. The city is quiet, and the camp is quite thronged with petty traders, who bring in food, clothing, &c., for sale, and move freely among our troops. Sir Frederick Roberts inspected the Sherpur Camp and the captured guns to-day, but no movement of troops took place. In a short time a small force under General Gough will march back to the Shutargardan to re-open communications in that direction, pending further news of the Khyber Force, whose advance seems to be very slow owing to transport difficulties.
Cabul itself is quite open to us now, and we can enter it whenever we choose. The guns captured on the Asmai ridge were six field-pieces and six mountain guns. Two field-pieces were also found in camp, and an immense store of ammunition. Thirty camels, four elephants, and several mules and ponies also fell into our hands.
It is now well established that the leaders of the mutineers are the Amir’s most trusted friends. Kushdil Khan, who was sent specially by him to meet Cavagnari at Shutargardan, was a prominent leader both at Charasia and on the heights yesterday. Mahomed Jan, a general in Yakub’s army, and of some importance among the powerful Wardak section of the Southern Ghilzais, is also mentioned. There is no doubt of concealed action among the Amir’s officers, and unluckily none of the leaders have been taken. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan is really the head of all. It now appears that only one quarter of the magazine in the Bala Hissah was looted, and there are now in that fortress about twenty-six guns in perfect order and several rockets, old presents of the Indian Government. Nawab Khan, colonel of artillery, came in yesterday to know what orders General Roberts had to give about them, and was told they were to remain there for the present. No one can suppose any captured guns will be given to the Amir, who is still with us.
It was rumoured that 800 sepoys had kept together in a body, but this story is now said to be false, all having dispersed except100 who escorted their leader, Mahomed Jan, towards Turkistan. The three regiments at Ghazni are reported to be only five miles out of that place, while four days ago our force from Candahar was at Makr, four long marches from Ghazni. The enemy has been extremely well informed of all our movements, though their source of information cannot be absolutely fixed upon. Regular news was probably given by some of the Amir’s retainers, who see all that goes on in our camp.
The political situation shows no development; the Amir coinciding in all that is done, now that the flight of the mutineers has removed his apprehension of Cabul being sacked. If the attack on the 8th had been made earlier in the day, the only outlet for Mahomed Jan and his 2,000 troops would have been to Cabul itself.[14]The city would then of course have been taken by storm, and, as Sir Frederick Roberts said in his proclamation, we could not have been held responsible for the consequences. At present the strictest orders prevail against any one entering the city, which perhaps even now may harbour many mutineers.
Visit to the Residency—Description of the Bala Hissar—The Ruins of the Residency—Probable Plan of the Attack and Defence—The Amir’s Palace—Formal Occupation of the Bala Hissar, and Proclamation to the People of Cabul—The Punishment of the City—Arrest of the Amir’s Ministers—Text of the Proclamation.