“Mirza Salahuddin, whom I deputed towards Samarcand and Tashkend to collect news from those directions, has returned and made a statement, to the effect that the Russians intend to induce Abdur Rahman Khan to submit to them a petition, setting forth that he has been putting up there a long time under the protection of the Russian Government; that he has often petitioned them to help him in securing the restitution of his ancestral territory from the Amir of Cabul, but his prayer has not been acceded to; and that he has now heard that the Russians are preparing to fight against the British Government; that they have sent envoys to wait upon the Amir to request him to allow passage through his country to the Russian troops going to India and returning therefrom, should a necessity arise for such a passage; and that, such being the case,he offered his services in case His Highness refuses to grant the request of the Russian Government to capture Balkh with a small assistance from the Czar, and then subdue the whole of Afghanistan, which is not a difficult task.”
“Mirza Salahuddin, whom I deputed towards Samarcand and Tashkend to collect news from those directions, has returned and made a statement, to the effect that the Russians intend to induce Abdur Rahman Khan to submit to them a petition, setting forth that he has been putting up there a long time under the protection of the Russian Government; that he has often petitioned them to help him in securing the restitution of his ancestral territory from the Amir of Cabul, but his prayer has not been acceded to; and that he has now heard that the Russians are preparing to fight against the British Government; that they have sent envoys to wait upon the Amir to request him to allow passage through his country to the Russian troops going to India and returning therefrom, should a necessity arise for such a passage; and that, such being the case,he offered his services in case His Highness refuses to grant the request of the Russian Government to capture Balkh with a small assistance from the Czar, and then subdue the whole of Afghanistan, which is not a difficult task.”
The conditions are certainly altered now, as Russia is not meditating any such Quixotic campaign as an advance upon India; but Abdur Rahman may still be credited with a desire “to capture Balkh with a small assistance from the Czar, and then subdue the whole of Afghanistan.” In any settlement we may intend making, it would be folly to ignore his existence altogether. If we are not prepared to break up his army and drive him back over the Oxus, we had better give him frankly a chance of stating his case. He might by judicious management—say the promise of a large annual subsidy—prove the best man we could place in power as successor of the incapable Yakub Khan.
While on the subject of biography, I may as well give a slight sketch of the lives of some of the men who have recently played a prominent part in Afghan politics. We have been so shut off from Afghanistan for many years, that, except in a few confidential reports furnished to Government by officers on the frontier, but little has been made known of the character and power of Afghan sirdars and chiefs. Even thePeshawur Diary, which has received contributions from men of the stamp of Sir Richard Pollock and Sir Louis Cavagnari, is a sealed book to all but a few favoured officials; and as many of the communications to it are of a secret nature, it would be idle to expect that its contents can ever become generally known. During our present occupation of Cabul, Major Hastings, Chief Political Officer, has been able to collect some data upon which trustworthy biographies have been founded of the chiefs and others who have been hostile to us. Incidentally, it has been found that our Afghan friends have some marvellous pedigrees, one old gentleman claiming direct descent from Adam himself—an ancestor, perhaps, as respectable—all circumstances considered—as any he could have fallen back upon. An Afghan genealogical tree is a fearful instrument of torture to apply to the minds of our young “politicals,” for the same name occurs over and over again generation after generation, and the weakness of the men for taking wives of varied nationality causes obscure relationships, which are most difficult to follow. It would beuseless to give genealogies of men who are only of importance as regards their own acts and personal influence; and in now dealing with several of the best known names in Afghanistan I shall merely summarize their pedigrees. Themoollahwho raised the latejehaddeserves first place, and I will begin with a sketch of his life.
Din Mahomed, known as Muskh-i-Alam (the “Scent of the World”), belongs to the Sayids of Hindustan, but his father’s name is unknown. His ancestors were Khwaja Khel, a section of the Lukhan Khel of the Andar tribe, south of Ghazni. He married and settled in Afghanistan, first studying under Mahomed Wasil, Kakar, resident of the village of Kala Ali, in the Shilgarh district, south-east of Ghazni. In the prosecution of his studies as amoollahhe next went to Lughman, and lived in the house of one Abdul Hakim, a priest, from whom he gained most of his knowledge. In his zeal for learning he travelled to Peshawur and lived with Abdul Malik, Akhundzada. Returning to Afghanistan, he again read with Abdul Hakim for about two years, when his master died, leaving two young sons. Din Mahomed remained with them for a few years, to protect their lives and property, and his devotion had its reward. A learned and influential man, named Mahomed Aslam, Sahibazda, a nephew of the deceasedmoollah, Abdul Karim, took notice of him, and gave him shelter, at the same time teaching him all he knew. In course of time Mahomed Aslam nominated Din Mahomed as his successor. So far his life had been that of an ordinarymoollah, one of great simplicity and occasional hardship. But we now find him showing signs of great zeal and energy. A war broke out against the Kafiristanis, and he joined Haji Taj Mahomed Saib, known as Haji Shahid (a descendant of one Haji Mahomed Said, of Lahore, who had settled in the Surkhrud district of Jellalabad). Taj Mahomed was killed at Pashgarh, and Din Mahomed carried his body on his own shoulders to the shrine of Abdul Karim, in Lughman. Thence he carried it in the same fashion to Taj Mahomed’s own village of Masti Khel, where he buried it. This devotion caused his name to become well known in Western Afghanistan, and his fame as amoollahrose accordingly. He returned to his own part of the country, near Ghazni, and was for years engaged in teaching others. Nearly all themoulvisof the Cabul and Ghaznidistricts are pupils of his, and his influence over such powerful tribes as the Ghilzais, Lughmanis, and Mohmunds, has been and is very great. The latejehad, which was certainly one of the most successful ever preached in Afghanistan, was due to his summoning the tribes to arms; and it is worth noticing that, while Sherpur was being besieged by the tribes in its immediate locality, the Lughmanis, under Asmatullah Khan, tried to block the Passes, and the Mohmunds made a diversion on our lower line of communications. Mushk-i-Alam is now ninety years of age, and has lately shown signs of approaching death. Ten years ago he was still hale and strong, and took to himself a young Mohmund wife, who bore him a son, who is still alive, and is called Abdur Rahman. This son is actually younger than one of his grandsons, who is twenty years of age. Mushk-i-Alam has two sons, Abdul Aziz and Abdul Karim, aged fifty and forty-five respectively, and these men are most active in carrying out their father’s orders, the old man himself being unable to rise from his bed, except when urgent occasion gives him passing strength.
A man of great ability, now at enmity with us, is Mirza Mahomed Hasan Khan, Dabir-ul-Mulk, late Governor of Jellalabad, who is acting as Mahomed Jan’s lieutenant in Logar, and has shown great zeal in his efforts to renew the attack upon Sherpur. He is one of three grandsons of Haji Aka Ashur, called Shamilo Turk-i-Rum. Hasan Khan has long been a prominent figure in the Cabul Court. He first served as an officer under Sirdar Gholam Hyder Khan, and, upon the latter’s death, was transferred to the Amir Shere Ali Khan, whom he accompanied to the Umballa Conference in 1869. The Amir, on returning to Cabul, appointed him “Dabir-ul-Mulk,” or Secretary of State, and for several years he was his sovereign’s chief confidant and counsellor. He was privy to all Shere Ali’s intrigues with the Russians, and seems to have been a most trusted agent. Upon the death of Naib Mahomed Aslem, Governor of Turkistan, who was accidentally killed by the kick of a horse, he was appointed, conjointly with Eshak Akasi (Shaghassi) Sherdil Khan, Governor of Turkistan. The Russian Mission soon afterwards arrived on the banks of the Oxus, and Hasan Khan was deputed to accompany its members to Cabul. Further, when General Stolietoffstarted on his return journey, Hasan Khan accompanied him, and journeyed as far as Tashkend. What his instructions were from Shere Ali may never be known; but it is interesting to learn that, during the first campaign in November and December, 1878, Shere Ali had one of his ministers in Russian Turkistan. Upon the Amir’s arrival in full flight at Mazar-i-Sharif, Hasan Khan joined him. Shere Ali had then great hope that the Russians would aid him, and he sent Hasan Khan, Shere Ali Kandahari, Moollah Shah Mahomed, and Kazi Abdul Kadir to Tashkend. Their mission was a failure, and they returned to Turkistan. When news of the Amir’s death reached Tashkend Yakub Khan recalled Hasan Khan from Balkh, and made him again Dabir-ul-Mulk. He was afterwards sent to Jellalabad as Governor, and remained at his post as long as Yakub Khan was in our camp at Sherpur. Upon the ex-Amir being deported to India, Hasan Khan fled from Jellalabad, taking with him a lakh of rupees—revenue which he had collected for his master. He reached Ghazni in safety, and has since been actively engaged in recruiting for Mahomed Jan. He is a man of great ability and keenness, and is said to be ready to take any views which may suit his purpose. This has been shown of late by his sending in messengers to learn how he would be treated if he made submission to the British. There is no doubt that at heart he is thoroughly Russian, his favourite uniform, when in full dress, being that of the Russian staff. In any dealings we may have with him, it will behove us to be on our guard against this side of his character. He has two brothers; one Ali Ahmed Khan, a colonel in a cavalry regiment, and the other Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, once Governor of Hazara. He has seven sons, who are as yet of no consequence.
A tribal chief, who, on the Jellalabad side and about the Passes has given us great trouble, is Asmatullah Khan, Ghilzai, of Lughman. He has far more influence among the Ghilzais than any other leader, Padshah Khan being a very small person compared with the Lughman chief. Asmatullah Khan’s family history affords a striking instance of the feuds which are so common in Afghanistan, where father fights against son, and brother against brother, as if ties of blood were of no consequence. Asmatullah Khan’s ancestorsare of the Mariam Khel, a subdivision of the Jabbar Khel section of the Ghilzai tribe. They are called Mariam Khel, after the name of the mother, Mariam corresponding to the scriptural Miriam, just as Ibrahim answers to Abraham and Ismail to Ishmael. In the year of the Hejira 1157 (A.D.1740), when Ahmed Shah was Amir, Safa Khan, who had succeeded his father, Ashak Khan, as chief of the Mariam Khel, was dispossessed of his Khanship owing to heterodoxy in his religious views. His nephew, Mahomed Ali Khan, succeeded him. But aboutA.H.1184, when Taimur Shah was King, it was found that this man was such a tyrant that he also had to be thrust out of power. Taimur Shah was anxious for Safa Khan to resume the Khanship, and he did so; but, on the day of his resumption of power, Mahomed Ali Khan murdered him. Taimur Shah seized the assassin and imprisoned him; but, as it was a blood-feud, would not put him to death. It was necessary that a near relative of Safa Khan should kill Mahomed Ali, and this pleasant duty fell upon Ahmad Khan, son of Safa Khan. He was a mere boy at the time; but, as his elder brothers were away, he was fortunate enough to be the executioner. He killed his uncle, Taimur Shah handing the man over to him, and was greatly respected thereafter as being a youth of good parts. After Taimur Shah’s death, Ahmad Khan became very intimate with the Wazir, Futteh Khan, and through his influence was made Khan of the Ghilzais. He met his death at Herat, fighting against the Persians. His son, Abdul Aziz Khan, succeeded him, but being quite a youth, the new Khan entrusted the control of the tribe to his uncle. Abdul Aziz, who was devoted to his religion, had born to him during his Khanship six sons. He was most anxious to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, but was prevented for many years by the elders of his tribe. Taking the matter at last into his own hands, he managed to reach the Ahmadzai and Zurmut country east of Ghazni, and thence escaped to Arabia. He reached Mecca safely, but on a visit to Medina was seized with a fatal illness, which put an end to his wanderings. His eldest son, Niamatullah Khan, became chief of the clan, and was a very popular ruler. Two of his younger brothers, Abdul Hamid and Halim Khan, tried to dispossess him of his inheritance, and some petty fighting followed. The family seem alwaysto have been in a rabid state of parricide or fratricide; and in the month of RamzanA.H.1277 Hamid Khan killed Niamatullah Khan. The second son of Abdul Aziz, the present Asmatullah Khan, then became head of the Ghilzais, and still remains so. During the Amir Shere Ali’s reign he was a member of the Council of State. Asmatullah Khan’s character is thus curtly summed up:—“He is said to be dull, or slow of understanding, and wanting in pluck; he owes his influence more to his birth than to his capacity.” The half-hearted way in which he attacked Jugdulluck a few weeks ago, and his inability to keep his force together, prove that he lacks courage and administrative power, and now that one of our flying columns has marched unopposed through the Lughman Valley, his dignity in the eyes of his followers must have greatly diminished.
My last biographical sketch is of General Daoud Shah, late Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army, who is now a prisoner in India. His father, Mahomed Shah, was of the Lakhan Khel, a branch of the Andar tribe of Sohak Ghilzais (south of Ghazni). Like Nimrod, he was a greatshikari; but not content with the killing of beasts, he quarrelled with his neighbours most persistently, and was never happy unless engaged in tribal warfare. He lived in the village of Mandi Chinar, in the Safi district of Tagao; and upon the British invasion of 1839 he eagerly took up arms against the Kafirs. His career was ended in a fight before Charikar, in which our troops were successful in beating the tribesmen. His son, Daoud Shah, had his father’s warlike instinct, and as a young man took service in the army of the Dost. He was Akhbar Khan’s orderly officer, and gained much experience under that General. His promotion was very slow, until Shere Ali Khan made him captain for services rendered at the battle of Kajbaz, in which Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, eldest son of Shere Ali, was killed. Daoud Shah showed great bravery during the campaign in Khost, and was raised to the rank of General. He it was who won the battle of Zana Khan, in which Shere Ali defeated Azim Khan and Abdur Rahman Khan. His fame as a General was now bruited all over Afghanistan, and his next campaign added to his glory, as, in conjunction with Mahomed Alam Khan, he defeated Abdur Rahman’s forces in Turkistan, and settled the country inShere Ali’s name. Having quarrelled with Mahomed Alam, he was recalled to Cabul and imprisoned by Shere Ali. The latter could not afford to alienate so able a General, and Daoud Shah was soon released, but was given no employment. When Yakub Khan rebelled against his father, Daoud Shah officiated as Commander-in-Chief, General Faramurz Khan, commanding the Amir’s armies in the field, having been killed by Aslam Khan, son of the Dost. Upon the new settlement of Turkistan, Daoud ShahaccompaniedaccompaniedYakub Khan to Cabul, and reverted again to the rank of General. Upon Yakub Khan’s second rebellion, an army was again sent to Herat, in which Daoud Shah was given a command; but Shere Ali, finding that he had no able General at Cabul, recalled him and entrusted to him the management of all army affairs in the capital. When the Amir fled to Turkistan, after the capture of Ali Musjid and the Peiwar Kotal, Daoud Shah was left at Cabul with Yakub Khan, and he accompanied the new Amir to Gundamak. He was at the same time made Commander-in-Chief, and this office he held until the massacre of our Envoy and Yakub’s flight to the British camp at Kushi. Of Daoud Shah’s conduct during the attack upon the Residency nothing very exact is known. He was said to have tried, with 200 or 300 men, to check the mutineers. He certainly rode into the crowd with half a dozen attendants; but it was then too late, and he was pulled off his horse and beaten by the mutinous soldiery. He probably dared to take no action without the Amir’s orders; and these, unfortunately, were not forthcoming. Daoud Shah favourably impressed most of us with whom he came into contact, his striking figure and open manner being very different from the cringing obeisance of the Barakzai sirdars. During the siege it was deemed inadvisable that he should be at liberty in Sherpur; and he was, accordingly, placed under arrest. After such treatment it was, of course, imperative that he should be deported to India, as, if at first inclined to be faithful to the British, his imprisonment must have turned him against us. He was undoubtedly the ablest General in the Afghan army, and his popularity among the soldiers would always have ensured many thousands of men answering to his call to arms. He is between forty and fifty years of age, and is still an active, intelligent soldier.
CHAPTER XXV.
Changes in the Northern Afghanistan Force—Completion of the Chain of Forts about Cabul—Composition of the Force on March 22nd—Arrival of Mr. Lepel Griffin at Sherpur—Declaration of the Government Policy—Candahar and Herat to be separated from Cabul—Discontent among the Barakzai Sirdars—The Future of Herat—Advantages of the Khyber Route—Arguments in favour of the Annexation of the Jellalabad Valley—The Mustaufi’s Mission to the Ghazni Malcontents—His Partial Success—Assembly of the Chiefs at Maidan—The Durbar in Sherpur on April 13th—Speeches by Sir Frederick Roberts and Mr. Lepel Griffin—The Policy of the Government explained—Annexation deprecated—Approval of the Policy in Camp—The Exigency of Party Politics in England—Abdur Rahman’s Movements at Kunduz.
With the near approach of spring there was a recasting of the commands between Cabul and Peshawur, the following being the order of the Commander-in-Chief directing the changes:—
1. The Second Division of the Cabul Field Force, hitherto under the command of Major-General Bright, C.B., will be broken up.2. The Reserve Division, under Major-General Ross, C.B., will also be broken up, and absorbed into the Line of Communications.3. The Force in Cabul, under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, will be divided into two divisions. 1st Division under Sir F. Roberts’s immediate command, and the 2nd Division under Major General Ross, C.B.4. Major-General Bright, C.B., is appointed Inspector-General of the Line of communications, and will command all troops thereon stationery, in movable columns, or passing along the line. Major-General Bright will report direct to Army Head-Quarters.5. The Peshawur District will be temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Hankin, 4th Bengal Cavalry, hitherto in command of the Cavalry Brigade Reserve Division.6. The line of communications will be divided into three sections:—1st.—From Jumrood to Busawul inclusive, under Brigadier-General Gib.2nd.—From Busawul to Sufed Sang, but not inclusive of either, under Brigadier-General Doran, C.B.3rd.—From Sufed Sang to Butkhak inclusive, under Brigadier-General Hill.7. The General Staff for Major-General Bright’s command will consist of:—Colonel Wemyss, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General;Major Thompson, Assistant Adjutant-General;Major Creagh, Assistant Quartermaster-General;Lieutenant Maisey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.8. The Divisional Staff under Major-General Ross, C.B., will consist of:—Major Boyes, Assistant Adjutant-General;Captain the Honourable C. Dutton, Assistant Quartermaster-General;and a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to be detailed by Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts.9. Colonel Evans, Commanding Royal Artillery on Line of communications, will proceed with the Staff to Cabul as commanding Royal Artillery, 2nd Division.Lieutenant-Colonel Purvis, Royal Artillery, taking up the duties of Commanding Royal Artillery, under Major-General Bright.Lieutenant-Colonel Limond will proceed to Cabul as Commanding Royal Engineers, 2nd Division, and Major Hill will assume the duties of Commanding Royal Engineer to Major-General Bright.10. Brigadier-General Roberts (5th Fusiliers) will proceed to Cabul to command a brigade in the 2nd Division.11. Brigadier-General Arbuthnot, C.B., will command the movable columns at Jellalabad and Sufed Sang.12. The Force under Sir F. Roberts in Cabul will be styled the Cabul Field Force, and the Force under Major-General Bright will be styled the Khyber Line Force.
1. The Second Division of the Cabul Field Force, hitherto under the command of Major-General Bright, C.B., will be broken up.
2. The Reserve Division, under Major-General Ross, C.B., will also be broken up, and absorbed into the Line of Communications.
3. The Force in Cabul, under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, will be divided into two divisions. 1st Division under Sir F. Roberts’s immediate command, and the 2nd Division under Major General Ross, C.B.
4. Major-General Bright, C.B., is appointed Inspector-General of the Line of communications, and will command all troops thereon stationery, in movable columns, or passing along the line. Major-General Bright will report direct to Army Head-Quarters.
5. The Peshawur District will be temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Hankin, 4th Bengal Cavalry, hitherto in command of the Cavalry Brigade Reserve Division.
6. The line of communications will be divided into three sections:—
1st.—From Jumrood to Busawul inclusive, under Brigadier-General Gib.
2nd.—From Busawul to Sufed Sang, but not inclusive of either, under Brigadier-General Doran, C.B.
3rd.—From Sufed Sang to Butkhak inclusive, under Brigadier-General Hill.
7. The General Staff for Major-General Bright’s command will consist of:—
Colonel Wemyss, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General;Major Thompson, Assistant Adjutant-General;Major Creagh, Assistant Quartermaster-General;Lieutenant Maisey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Colonel Wemyss, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General;Major Thompson, Assistant Adjutant-General;Major Creagh, Assistant Quartermaster-General;Lieutenant Maisey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Colonel Wemyss, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General;Major Thompson, Assistant Adjutant-General;Major Creagh, Assistant Quartermaster-General;Lieutenant Maisey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Colonel Wemyss, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General;
Major Thompson, Assistant Adjutant-General;
Major Creagh, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
Lieutenant Maisey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
8. The Divisional Staff under Major-General Ross, C.B., will consist of:—
Major Boyes, Assistant Adjutant-General;Captain the Honourable C. Dutton, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
Major Boyes, Assistant Adjutant-General;Captain the Honourable C. Dutton, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
Major Boyes, Assistant Adjutant-General;Captain the Honourable C. Dutton, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
Major Boyes, Assistant Adjutant-General;
Captain the Honourable C. Dutton, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
and a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to be detailed by Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts.
9. Colonel Evans, Commanding Royal Artillery on Line of communications, will proceed with the Staff to Cabul as commanding Royal Artillery, 2nd Division.
Lieutenant-Colonel Purvis, Royal Artillery, taking up the duties of Commanding Royal Artillery, under Major-General Bright.
Lieutenant-Colonel Limond will proceed to Cabul as Commanding Royal Engineers, 2nd Division, and Major Hill will assume the duties of Commanding Royal Engineer to Major-General Bright.
10. Brigadier-General Roberts (5th Fusiliers) will proceed to Cabul to command a brigade in the 2nd Division.
11. Brigadier-General Arbuthnot, C.B., will command the movable columns at Jellalabad and Sufed Sang.
12. The Force under Sir F. Roberts in Cabul will be styled the Cabul Field Force, and the Force under Major-General Bright will be styled the Khyber Line Force.
These arrangements were all carried out; and the following extracts from letters written in March will indicate what was occurring in and about Cabul:—
Sherpur,March 3rd, 1880.
Brigadier-General Dunham Massy left for Peshawur a few days ago, where he will meet the Commander-in-Chief, and offer certain explanations of his course of action on December 11th, which, it is not too much to say, may modify the harsh step of recalling him from Cabul. The greatest sympathy is felt for General Massy in the force here; and the decision to be given on what is purely a question for military critics will be anxiously looked for.[38]Brigadier-General Hugh Gough has taken over charge of the Cavalry Brigade, his duties as Road Commandant being performed by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote.
There is no relaxation of the preparations for defending Sherpur and Cabul against all-comers. Certainly there is not now a weak point in the cantonment: the gap at the north-west corner, defended during the siege by a trench and a parapet made out of Cabuli gun-wheels, has now been closed by a wall six feet high onthe inner side of the old barrier; the bastion at the corner, partially destroyed when the mutinous regiments blew up their magazine on October 7th, has been put in thorough order; a zigzag wall, with traverses, is also being built up on the western slope of the Bemaru hills; and, in addition to the block-house on the top, a platform has been made for guns, guarded by a semi-circular wall, which will eventually be joined to the zig-zag running up the hillside. Looking at these new defences, and also at the block-houses upon the Asmai and Sherderwaza Heights—to say nothing of the strong fort upon Siah Sung—one is tempted to ask, “What will be the fate of all these works when we retire?” We have made Sherpur practically impregnable now against any attack unsupported by heavy guns: shall we leave it so, or shall we order up a few tons of gun-cotton from an Indian arsenal, and have everything in readiness to blow its walls down when it has to be abandoned? Perhaps, as we shall inevitably be forced to annex Cabul in a few years, we may leave the cantonment intact, though it would be cruelty to expect our men to capture it, say in 1883, unless it had been well-pounded by a battery of 40-pounders from Siah Sung. But, for all outsiders may know, there may be a plan lying cut and dry in some secret drawer of our Chief Engineer’s despatch-box, in which the fate of Sherpur and its surroundings has been once for all decided. Colonel Perkins has certainly been indefatigable in creating new defences; perhaps he may show equal energy in destroying the work of his own hand when the time comes.[39]
March 21st.
The garrison of Cabul has been largely reinforced, and we have at last nearly 12,000 troops here. The 45th Sikhs and the 27th Punjabees, who marched in from Butkhak on Friday, are now encamped on the Siah Sung Ridge, and are holding the new fort built thereon. The 45th Sikhs have, for the time being, been attached to General Macpherson’s Brigade, and the 27th Punjab Infantry to General Charles Gough’s. The various forts we have built upon Asmai and Sherderwaza Heights have had theirgarrisons told off to them, and are at present held by half the number of men assigned to guard them in case of a new outbreak. Each fort is being stored with seven days’ provisions and water, and a liberal quantity of ammunition; and the garrisons are warned against using any of the reserve stores until necessity arises. The fort on Asmai is practically impregnable; even our artillery could not hope to make any impression upon it. The walls are twelve feet thick; and to carry it by assault, if at all well defended, would be impossible. Our cavalry are also showing themselves in the country about, to convince the people that we are on the alert, and also to enable the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and the Guides to become thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the ground they may have to act over. Last week all the available troopers and sowars in cantonment went out into Chardeh and over the ground where the 9th Lancers and 14th Bengal Lancers made their gallant charge on December 11th. Our infantry are also marched out occasionally, to get the men a little into condition, and they go swinging along over the dusty roads in the same grand style they have shown since they left Ali Kheyl six months ago. Drafts for the 9th and 72nd are now on their way up from Peshawur, and soon we shall have each regiment mustering about 900 banquets. All the men here are very fit and hardy after the winter, and are quite ready for another bout of fighting to relieve the monotony, which is now becoming rather trying. No. 1 Mountain Battery is to be relieved by the 6-8th, the screw-gun battery which did such good service in the Zaimukht country with General Tytler; and the 3rd Punjab Cavalry and 17th Bengal Cavalry are to come up to make our cavalry brigade complete. The strength of the Cabul garrison (including the outpost at Butkhak) was yesterday about 11,500 officers and men. The details of the force are:—
The two companies of sappers and miners which belong to this division, but are now at Luttabund, are about 150 strong. Staff and departmental officers number 90. The draft for the 9th Foot is 320 men, and for the 72nd Highlanders about 200. The artillery musters twelve 9-pounders and fourteen 7-pounders. I give the details of our strength here, so that, in case of any further operations, the force at General Roberts’s disposal may be estimated at its proper value.
On Friday Sir F. Roberts met Mr. Lepel Griffin on the road to Luttabund, and the General and his new Political Officer rode on to Sherpur together in the afternoon. Sir F. Roberts ordered a guard of honour (one company of the 5th Punjab Infantry) to escort Mr. Lepel Griffin from Siah Sung to the cantonment. This unusual honour was paid to the Political Officer in order that the local sirdars might be duly impressed with a sense of his dignity. The said sirdars turned out in great force, with their usual tag-rag of followers, and formed a picturesquequeuein rear of the General.
25th March.
Mr. Lepel Griffin has made known to the Barakzai sirdars here what is to be the future of Afghanistan; and although many details of the scheme sanctioned by the Government of India cannot, of course, yet be settled, the outline is distinct enough. As to the difficulties to be overcome before the new arrangements mature, they are incidental to our position as conquerors of Cabul, and will be dealt with either diplomatically, or by force of arms, according to the temper of the tribal chiefs and others. As Mr. Griffin’s short speech to Wali Mahomed Khan, Hashim Khan, and the other Barakzai sirdars was of an informal kind—though necessarily carrying weight as an exposition of Government policy—I am only able to give its general purport, about which there can he no manner of doubt. It was to the effect that certain wrong impressions had got abroad concerning Yakub Khan and his possible return to Cabul. Such return the Government had decided could under no conditions take place; tribal chiefs and their followers had believed that if a sufficient turmoil were kept up, and turbulent demands made persistently for Yakub Khan’s return, that end might be gained. This was a total mistake. The ex-Amir would never be allowed to resume the power he had forfeited, and all disturbances with that object would be unavailing. It had also been found that during three generations the Durani sovereigns of Cabul had been unable, or unwilling, to carry out treaty obligations with India, and it had now been decided that their power should be curtailed and certain subdivisions made of Afghanistan. While the British Government had no desire to annex the country, they were resolved that Candahar and Herat must henceforth no longer appertain to the sovereign of Afghanistan. They would be separate and distinct, and the future ruler of Cabul would have to look upon them as removed from his jurisdiction.[40]It had also been determined that the army of occupation should remain in Afghanistan until a new ruler had been appointed strong enough to accept and carry out the obligations to be imposed upon him, and such a ruler would have to be found. He must be strong enough to ensure theprotection of such Afghans as were the friends of the British, in order that, when the army withdrew, there might not be a risk of such men suffering for their fidelity to us. Our friends must be the friends of any ruler placed in power, and he must be prepared to protect them.
Such is the distinct enunciation of what is to happen here, and, as might have been expected, it is not altogether palatable to the Barakzai sirdars. One and all are glad that Yakub Khan is not to return; he has never been a favourite with his kinsmen since Shere Ali’s death, and they would look upon his re-assumption of power as fatal to all their hopes. But they feel, and it is only right they should feel, keenly enough, the curtailment of the power hitherto vested in the hands of the Amir. Hashim Khan, who has been buoyed up with the idea that his chance of the Amirship was a very good one—though I must add, in justice to all our officials, that he has never received even a hint from them of what might be in store for him—showed considerable sullenness when he heard upon what terms the next Amir would have to accept power at our hands. He did not scruple to say openly that it would be impossible to guarantee the safety of any faction friendly to the British when our army had marched back to India. No doubt he holds this view as honestly as an Afghan can be said to have honesty at all; but he might modify it when he sees that such a condition will be insisted upon, and no half-hearted promise accepted. Hashim Khan has further said that, in freeing Candahar and Herat from their suzerainty to Cabul, we are reducing the Amir from the status of a king to that of a Nawab. Herat has always been considered the key of Turkistan and of Southern Afghanistan, and to surrender it either to Persia or to an independent ruler would be a severe blow to the Durani dynasty. Again, Hashim Khan says that to expect a Durani sovereign in Cabul to hold his own against the turbulent tribes in the immediate district, when he has been deprived of the great support he receives from the strong Durani factions about Candahar, is an impossibility. It is true that the Duranis are most numerous in Southern Afghanistan, and at first sight the objection seems tenable enough; but Hashim Khan has forgotten that, by our occupation of Candahar, any Amir of Cabul will receive our countenance andsupport from that quarter, and this will be as well known to the turbulent spirits of Kohistan, Logar, and Wardak, as to the Durani faction itself. Hashim Khan’s sullenness would be of no importance were it not that he is the only man with a spark of ability among the Barakzais now with us in Cabul; and as I have said in previous letters, he has been favourably thought of in our plans for settling the country on a firm basis. If he will not accept our terms, he will inevitably be passed over, as far as the Amirship is concerned, for the work now before us has to be done so thoroughly that all danger of anotherfiasco, such as the treaty of Gundamak proved, must be guarded against.
Taking the broad lines laid down by Mr. Lepel Griffin, a forecast of what is likely to happen in Afghanistan—putting aside purely military complications, which I will turn to afterwards—may fairly be given. That such a forecast must be tinged with conjecture is, of course, unavoidable; but still, perhaps, a fair estimate of the situation may be given. Candahar will be retained in our possession, but Herat will not yet be annexed. Its future will more probably be that of an independent city, with an important mission tofulfilfulfilin Central Asian politics. History is full of instances of cities maintaining their independence, and rising in course of time to the rank of Great Powers. Witness Venice, once one of the first maritime Powers in Europe. Herat is self-supporting, and is situated in so fertile a district that its wealth of produce is a proverb among Asiatics. Its strength as a military post is greater than that of any city in Afghanistan; it could be defended against great odds with almost a certainty of coming out victorious from the struggle. If we were to declare that it is to be independent, and to guarantee such independence against all-comers, its future would be assured. That this may be done is within the bounds of possibility, and we should give it a Governor who could be trusted to carry out our wishes. Being our nominee, and relying upon us for support in time of need, he would jealously guard against encroachments on his privileges; and would scarcely dare to risk loss of authority by disobeying any wishes we might make known to him. To do so would be madness with a British army at Candahar drawing its reinforcements by railway from India; and the Heratis themselves finding security and enormously-increasedtrade resulting from their new position of independence, would probably be on the alert to check intrigues against their autonomy. So far as regards Southern and Western Afghanistan: there remain the eastern and northern provinces to be dealt with, and here conjecture must be indulged in. Cabul will be freed from the presence of our army when a new Afghan Government has been created; but that our forces will retire behind Lundi Kotal is most improbable. By general consent, the Khyber route seems to be recognized as that most adapted for communication, hostile or otherwise, with Cabul; the Kurram route is worthless during several months of the year, and Thull as a base has not a single advantage. It then remains for consideration whether Lundi Kotal is sufficiently advanced for our purpose. To enable our influence to be supreme at Cabul, we must put ourselves in such a position that our army shall always be within hail of the city. Lundi Kotal certainly does not give such a position; Jellalabad is much better, but its climate is so great a drawback that it also drops out of consideration as an advanced post—such a post being on the plan of a large fortified camp, holding a force fully equipped in the matter of ammunition, supplies, andtransport, and ready to move at the shortest notice. Gundamak, or a position on the hills near, would unquestionably give the site for the new outpost on the north-west frontier of India, and its connection with Peshawur might benotby Jellalabad, but by the valleys along the northern slopes of the Safed Koh, viz.,viâviâMaizena and Peshbolak. The Lughman route would involve a strong garrison at Jellalabad, which is to be avoided if possible. Besides, Lughman cannot compare with the fertile valleys in the shadow of the Safed Koh, wherein grain, forage, fuel, and water are abundant. I can speak from personal experience of Maizena and Peshbolak, having visited them during the last campaign; and if the pacification of the Shinwaris were once assured, the route would teem with advantages which cannot be found on the Jellalabad Road. It would not be a task more difficult to reduce the Shinwaris to a state of quietude than it was to convince the Afridis of the uselessness of molesting us in the Khyber. As there is always a great outcry against annexation, it might be worth while to abandon Kurram, merely taking aquid pro quointhe Jellalabad Valley. That this will absolutely be done, is very problematical; but it is to be hoped that the Government will be strong enough to disregard any non-annexation outcry if the preponderance of opinion, both among our military and political experts, is in favour of the holding of Gundamak.[41]
6th April.
The Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, who was sent by General Roberts some weeks ago to negotiate with the Ghazni malcontents, and induce them to state what their demands really were, has returned to Sherpur and reported that he has the majority of the chiefs now at Maidan, and they are willing to attend a Durbar. Young Musa Khan has, however, been left at Ghazni with Mushk-i-Alam. When General Roberts first proposed to Habibulla Khan to go to Ghazni, and sound the temper of the malcontent leaders, with a view to arrange some basis upon which the settlement of Afghanistan could be carried out, the answer was that it would be useless—the irreconcilables would not listen to him. There the matter ended for the time being, but some weeks afterwards the Mustaufi voluntarily visited the General, and said that he was willing to go to his home in Wardak, whence he could judge if it were possible to gather the tribal chiefs together for purposes of consultation. He accordingly set out, and for the past two months we have heard strange rumours of what was happening in Wardak and Ghazni. The Mustaufi now reports that, on arriving at his home in Wardak, he fell ill, and for some time was unable to do anything in the way of negotiation. Upon recovering, he began to sound the various Wardak chiefs as to their views, and was careful to point out the folly of resistance, now that the British had received large reinforcements and had strengthened Sherpur and the heights above Cabul. At first, no one would listen to him, so he proceeded to Ghazni to interview Mahomed Jan, young Tahir Khan (half-brother of Hashim Khan), and finally Mushk-i-Alam. Herealso he met with but little success: Mahomed Jan would not adopt his views, but talked of a newjehad, and the driving of the British out of the country: the success of the first few weeks of December was to be repeated on a larger scale, and every tribesman was to rise from Ghazni to Jellalabad. Against such tall talk the Mustaufi could only urge that thejehadwould come to as bitter and humiliating an end as the previous one had done on December 23rd, when the force sent to attack Sherpur had been beaten off with great loss. Then Mahomed Jan veered round slightly, and said he would abandon all idea of fighting if Yakub Khan were reinstated, or Musa Khan created Amir. The former scheme, he was told, was impossible; the latter might possibly be considered. The Mustaufi was much hindered in his work by young Tahir Khan, who had Musa Khan in his keeping. This young sirdar cordially hates his half-brother, Hashim Khan; and as he knew Habibulla was working solely in the latter’s interest, he tried to thwart him in every way. This game of cross-purposes would have been most interesting to an outsider if all the intricacies of the intrigues could have been understood; but it must sorely have tried the temper of the Mustaufi, who had everything to gain by bringing the malcontents to look at matters from his point of view. He was, however, more than a match for a drunken debauchee, such as Mahomed Jan and an inexperienced youth like Tahir Khan. Turning his attention to Mushk-i-Alam, he used different arguments to those employed with the military leaders of the disaffected. He showed to the oldmoollahthat the only way of getting rid of the infidels (whom he hated just as much as any reckless fanatic) was by negotiation, and not by resistance: the former course might put Cabul once more into a position of importance; the latter only could result in disaster to Afghanistan, as the British forces were daily growing in strength, and it was fully intended to capture Ghazni from the Candahar direction, and punish every tribe showing overt hostility. Themoollahwas half-convinced, and was left in such a frame of mind that good results might be looked for. Then Habibulla Khan turned his attention to the powerful chiefs of his own tribe, and by means which we are ignorant of, won them all over to his side. They, perhaps, scented future rewards and great power in the direction of theState when their kinsman should be Finance Minister of a new Amir, and they announced themselves as prepared to consult with the British upon the subject of a future Government. The example of the Wardak chiefs was contagious, and soon the Logarmaliksmade common cause with them. Mahomed Jan thus saw himself being deserted by the tribes upon whom he had mainly relied, and he at last promised to accompany the Mustaufi to Maidan to take part in a great tribal Durbar, although he refrained from pledging himself to any fixed decision. Just about this time the Hazaras raided upon Nani, south of Ghazni, and the Mustaufi was in fear that all his arrangements would be upset, as Mahomed Jan started to repel the raiders. From that point much uncertainty as to what was really occurring was felt in Sherpur; and as it was known that Mr. Lepel Griffin’s declaration of the partition of Afghanistan had been sullenly received even by Hashim Khan, it was not unnaturally supposed that the Mustaufi would be left in the lurch by the chiefs who had pledged themselves to follow his instructions.
Yesterday Habibulla Khan rode from Maidan to Sherpur, and all doubts, so far as regards the chiefs being at Maidan, are set at rest. He reports that he left there all the headmen of Wardak, Logar, Ahmadzai Ghilzais, and Zurmut (the district east of Ghazni towards Khost), together with Mahomed Jan, Mir Butcha, Kohistani; Mahomed Hasan Khan, ex-Governor of Jellalabad; Sirdars Tahir Khan, Alim Khan, Surwar Khan, and other notables, including Generals Aslam Khan, Gholam Jan, and Kurrim Khan, who fought against us at Charasia.
The news that General Sir Donald Stewart with a large force left Candahar a week ago for Ghazni has undoubtedly had an effect upon these men. It is difficult to see what our own policy will be hereafter, as the change of Government at home may bring about quite a new departure. All General Roberts and Mr. Lepel Griffin can do is to endeavour to gain the ear of the chiefs, and to obtain a knowledge of their wishes in the matter of a settled Government. The chiefs now at Maidan will be asked to attend a Durbar, shortly to be held in Sherpur. Mr. A. C. Lyall, Foreign Secretary, has paid a flying visit to Cabul, and is now on his way back to India.