26th May, 1880.
Yet another minister of Yakub Khan’s has been deported to India. The Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, has broken down in hisprofessions of faithfulness to the British, and on the morning of May 20th he left Cabul in adhoolie, under an escort furnished by the 9th Lancers, which accompanied him as far as Butkhak. Here two companies of the 67th Foot were in readiness to escort him to Luttabund. They had been sent out on the previous afternoon, their sudden march giving rise to rumours of an impending attack upon our communications, a rumour strengthened by the 9th Lancers standing to their horses the whole afternoon, as if ready for a gallop out. What may have been the Mustaufi’s crime I can only conjecture: officially we are told that “he was summoned to Sherpur, and after a long investigation was found guilty of conspiring against the British, and was at once put under arrest.” Camp gossip runs that letters were intercepted, bearing his sign manual, inciting the chiefs to rise again, and that these were produced before Wali Mahomed and other sirdars, who swore to the genuineness of the signature. The old man when found out took the matter quite calmly, and when told that he would be sent at once to India rather welcomed the idea, saying he would go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and afterwards visit England. The Mustaufi seems to have recognized the simple fact that we are bent upon making Abdur Rahman Amir, and this he regards as a breach of faith, as nothing was said of our intention when he was striving so hard to bring the Ghazni malcontents to Sherpur. He knew that he could not hope for power under Abdur Rahman—his partisanship for Shere Ali’s family was too notorious—and hence in his extremity he resorted to fresh intrigues to delay or put altogether out of the question Abdur Rahman’s visit to the British camp. He has been detected, and as Abdur Rahman’s path must be cleared of every obstacle, Habibulla Khan has been summarily sent to India.
Contrary opinions as to the final result of our mission to Abdur Rahman are still afloat both in our camp and in the Cabul bazaars; but so far everything that the most sanguine could have hoped for in the direction of anentente cordialebeing established between the Pretender and the British Government has happily come to pass. Our Mission has reached its destination in safety, has been honourably and even effusively received, and we are on the eve of receiving an answer from the Sirdar himself regarding the proposalswe have made to him. And yet there is a large party in the city who still persist in prophesying that Abdur Rahman will never visit Cabul so long as the British force occupies the city. Their reasons are disjointed and somewhat irrational, but they are repeated with such persistent head-shaking and beard-wagging that, in spite of one’s own better belief, it is difficult at times to avoid thinking as these birds of ill-omen think. Not that they deny either the Sirdar’s anxiety or determination to be Amir (this they admit most unequivocally), but they argue that he is too wise to ruin himself in the eye of the nation by accepting the Amirship from the hands of a British General. When they are reminded that the British are just as determined that the new Amir shall be simply and solely their nominee, as their work would be incomplete if they left the throne to be filled by any candidate who might get a party together, they cry back on their lines of argument, and insist that Abdur Rahmanwillbe Amir, but by virtue of his own popularity and prowess, and not as a man accepting a boon from a conquering army. When it comes to the finer details of ways and means, the prophets can only take refuge in vague hints and inane mumblings which would have shamed even the vilest impostor in the old days, when prophecy had some points to recommend it to the credulous. Perhaps the explanation is that Abdur Rahman has not in Cabul itself a faction worthy of the name. His prestige lies not so much in the sympathy of the citizens as in the support the hardier tribesmen are willing to give him as a soldier and a ruler. There is something in his success in Eastern Turkistan which has drawn the independent and reckless spirits of Kohistan, Koh-Daman, and Logar to him: it may be the boldness with which he has declared himself claimant to the throne, or that his old fame as a successful general still lives in the hearts of the people. Every man born in Afghanistan is born to a soldier’s life, not the life of camps and campaigns so much as the constant struggle of intertribal warfare, or time-honoured family feuds. Every man’s hand is familiar with the use ofjhezailor rifle,tulwaror knife, and a successful leader is far more honoured and more faithfully followed than a chief who lives by intrigue and begs his way to power by lavish bribery. Abdur Rahman ruled in Cabul, after Dost Mahomed’s death and Shere Ali’s usurpation, bymere force of success in arms. He placed his father upon the throne in defiance of Shere Ali, who was never a match for him in the field, even though backed by the support of the Indian Government. Shere Ali won Cabul finally in the absence of his young rival in Turkistan. In an instant his success was magnified, he became the successful warrior, and his power was assured. Abdur Rahman sank out of sight. Later, Yakub Khan blazed into power, a bold leader of armies, full of vigorous life. How success bred success in his case until Herat and Turkistan were practically lost to his father, contemporary history shows; and only when he sank the soldier in the son, and trusted in his father’s rotten honour, did his career come to an end. Yakub, free and holding his own proudly in Herat, was a figure to draw men’s admiration and support: Yakub, a prisoner in the Bala Hissar, was a fallen star which could no longer dazzle men’s eyes. So it has been with Abdur Rahman Khan. In January 1869 he crossed the Oxus a fugitive, and since that eventful year he has been nothing but a lay figure in Afghan politics. Now he is once more clearly outlined before the people, who have been bitterly humiliated by our armies since the murder of our Envoy in the Bala Hissar.
They may at first have looked to the grandson of the Dost to avenge their humiliations by force of arms; but the fall of Ghazni and the appearance of another 7,000 men to swell our numbers in Cabul and the Logar Valley have dashed their hopes once and for all. Now they turn their eyes northward, mayhap their feet also, and await the sign that will free them from the presence of the Kafir armies. So it is that Abdur Rahman seems to them a hero, a deliverer; they are lifted beyond the petty intrigues of the Barakzai sirdars in Cabul, the deep plotting of the Mustaufi, or the empty bombast of Mahomed Jan. Even Mushk-i-Alam, the arch-priest of discontent, is silent for a while: there are no new appeals to their fanaticism, and not 1,000 men are under arms in districts which have been seething with revolt for months. Logar, Kohistan, Wardak, are no longer names to conjure with. Mahomed Jan even has drifted into Kharwar and Zurmut, whose widely-armed tribes are held in contempt by the better trained forces of the provinces about Cabul, the male population of which has been leavened with sepoys carrying firearms equal in part toour own. The Northern Ghilzais are for a moment sobered by the reflection that Afghanistan is likely to be rid of a foreign army sooner by the advent of the Sirdar now in Khanabad than by listening to suggestions of renewed outbreaks and ceaseless harrying of our posts in the Passes. True, factiousmoolahs, like Khalil and Fakir, are stirring up disaffection about Jellalabad; but that district is somewhat removed from the direct effect of the influences at work about Cabul, and we can afford to disregard such petty outbreaks, which only give us a better chance of showing our power to strike in all directions. The little actions which have lately been fought in Beshud and the Shinwari country will bear their own fruit; every additional tower destroyed is another mark of our current supremacy, another warning that our forbearance has limits—wide though they be. Even the towers of Padshah Khan—ally, enemy, friend, traitor, alternately—are at last in ruins, and his crops may yet be reaped by our soldiers. On the one hand, we proffer honest negotiation leading to a stable settlement; on the other, we are firm to punish the restless animosity which seeks to force us out of the country by incessant annoyance and harassing intrigue.
Perhaps the reasoning which I have mentioned as being in vogue in Cabul as to the probable failure of any negotiations with Sirdar Abdur Rahman may be due to the efforts of the Cabul sirdars, who dread the coming of our nominee more than they loathe our own domination over the city. Ambition is not a passion easily foregone, and both Wali Mahomed and Hashim Khan know that the dreams once indulged in of power and pre-eminence in Afghanistan are now at an end. The offer of the Amirship has been formally made to their rival: his claims have thus been declared pre-eminent, and minor pretenders are cast out into the utter darkness of neglect and contempt. The sirdars know they have nothing to expect at the hands of Mahomed Afzul’s son except contumely or even worse; his years of exile have hung heavily upon him; and Shere Ali’s family and partisans are in his black list. Petrovsky, the Russian writer, who saw so much of the Sirdar and professed to know him very intimately, wrote, “To get square some day with the English and Shere Ali was Abdur Rahman’s most cherished thought, his dominant, never-failingpassion.” No doubt Petrovsky believed the hatred towards the English was equal to that against Shere Ali; but time and events have modified the former, particularly as the English are masters of the situation, while it is probable the feeling of revenge against Shere Ali’s family is still as lively as ever. It therefore behoves Hashim Khan, who, by his marriage with Abdulla Jan’s sister, became one of the family, to exert himself to prevent the Sirdar becoming Amir; and this he is doing by intrigues which have, luckily, as yet borne but little fruit. Knowing his own chance has disappeared, he thinks to make Ayub Khan a powerful claimant through the latter’s position in Herat. Hashim, it is believed, has also made attempts to seduce the Kohistanis from Abdur Rahman’s cause, and how much further his intrigues may go we cannot at all estimate. Probably he has sown distrust, by means of agents, in the mind of Abdur Rahman himself, warning him that the British only wish to get possession of his person with a view to sending him a prisoner to India.
From whatever cause it may be, the fact is clear that Abdur Rahman is somewhat distrustful of our overtures, though welcoming them warmly as becomes a pretender who suddenly finds himself first in the running for a throne. The news which has reached Cabul of the progress of our Mission is highly important; and although official reticence is great, the messengers and others who have arrived from Khanabad a few days ago have spread pretty trustworthy reports of what has really occurred. The little party which left Sherpur on May 3rd passed through Kohistan unmolested, and after trying a journey through the Sir-i-Lang Pass, in parts of which the snow was still lying, they found themselves beyond the Hindu Kush and well on their way to Kunduz. For a day they were delayed by stress of weather, but afterwards their journey was unbroken, Ghori being reached, and finally Kunduz, about the 14th or 15th of May. They had been joined by numbers of men from Kohistan anxious to pay their respects to the Sirdar, and they seem never to have been in any danger from marauding bands which are known to infest the country. Abdur Rahman sent a troop of cavalry to escort them to Khanabad, and on their arrival every honour due to the Ambassadors of the British Government was paid to them. A tent near the Sirdar’sown was placed at their service, and they were treated throughout with great courtesy, though always strictly guarded. Then began their real work, the usual public and private interviews, so much in vogue in the East, taking place daily. Finally, in a great Durbar, the letter from the British was presented to the Sirdar, and the contents were read out. My information goes so far in regard to the letter that I am justified in stating its purport to have been an unfettered offer of the Amirship to Abdur Rahman Khan. Whether Herat and Candahar were specified as being detached from the Durani kingdom, I cannot say; but most probably they were, perhaps with the after-idea of gracefully yielding Herat to the Amir, and so giving the appearance of concession on our part. But for official secrecy, this point could be at once cleared up; but the Government of India are the best judges of what should be made known on their part, and until they contradict the belief here that Herat is to be independent, we must go on believing that the proposal to the Sirdar is that he may become Amir of Eastern and Northern Afghanistan, Turkistan and Badakshan, leaving Candahar in our possession, while Herat is to be “independent,”—though in whose charge is not very clear. The effect upon Abdur Rahman of Mr. Lepel Griffin’s letter is described as one of great satisfaction and even joy; he caused alms to be distributed among the poor, and generally rejoiced at the new prospect opened out to him. But he is a cautious and sagacious man, and after eleven years’ waiting is not foolish enough to mar his chance by unseemly haste. For himself he declares that the offer is most tempting and highly pleasing; but, that his power as Amir may be unquestioned, he desires to have the opinion of all the chiefs of the country who shall share with him the responsibility of forming a new Government. Thus he does not hasten to leave Khanabad, to rush to Sherpur, assume power, and trust to his own personal energy to retain it; he methodically takes the best course to secure popular election; and until he has gained the ear of the people, he will not leave the Kattagan country, where his camp is now pitched. That distrust, which is so essentially a part of the Afghan character, is also at work in his mind, as his good fortune seems almost too sudden and too unqualified not to have hidden beneath it somesinister meaning; and until he is convinced of the contrary, and thoroughly reassured, he is not likely to cross the Hindu Kush. He is sending his formal answer by one of the members of the Mission; and upon its arrival we shall, of course, have to take steps to sweep all distrust from the Sirdar’s mind and convince him of the honesty of our intentions. This will not be difficult, and then the negotiations will crystallize into tangible shape, and we may, at last, see our way to unravel the Afghan tangle which has so long irritated and perplexed us. The first signs of the new order of things is that a loan of a lakh of rupees has been advanced to the Sirdar by the Hindus and ryots of Kohistan, who are astute enough to see that the British are the real sureties for repayment, as Abdur Rahman must receive their support if he is to hold his own, in the future, in Cabul.
4th June.
Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, one of the members of our Mission to Abdur Rahman Khan, has returned to Cabul, and has proved the possibility of communicating direct with the Pretender. But still we seem no nearer a settlement than before the Mission started; for the Sirdar, acting, perhaps, at the instigation of the native Russian agent, said to be in his camp, is serenely independent in his attitude, and has given no promise whatever on any specific points connected with the Amirship. He seems to be fully aware of our awkward position in the country, and is not at all anxious to aid us in extricating ourselves. Our military supremacy he does not doubt, but the political dead-lock, he knows, has nonplussed us; and secure in his retreat beyond the Hindu Kush, he is working rather to make the British, and not himself, the grateful party in the current negotiations. What the status of the native representing Russia at Khanabad may be, I have but limited means of knowing; but if native report is to be trusted,—and it is all I have to rely upon,—Abdur Rahman is being guided entirely by this man’s advice. The result is that any speedy settlement is out of the question, for the crooked ways of Russian diplomacy are difficult to follow; and what the Sirdar may be egged on yet to demand, even the greatest diplomat in Sherpur or Simla cannot conjecture. Ibrahim Khan, it is true,brought with him a letter from Abdur Rahman, which was couched in cordial terms. But beyond cordiality, which costs nothing among Eastern nations, the letter contains little of value. The Sirdar, like a precocious child, “wants to know too much.” There is no spontaneous outburst of gratitude, no eager acceptance of our offer of the Amirship: but, on the contrary, a cool, self-possessed tone of inquiry, as if the writer felt himself master of the situation, and meant to dictate his own terms. This is the more unfortunate, because there is no longer a strong power to back our efforts to settle the question with the high hand of conquerors. The change of front in English politics has reacted upon us here with tremendous effect, and we are appearing in the eyes of the people rather as suppliants than dictators to Abdur Rahman. Perhaps the Sirdar himself is of much the same opinion, but he may find himself wofully mistaken in a few weeks. We shallnotyield on every point he raises; simply because we have other cards to play. This he will soon be made to understand; and he must then choose once for all. He is trying our patience a good deal now; but there are limits to our forbearance, and these limits are not far distant.
Cabul has, indeed, proved a white elephant which we cannot afford to feed. We are so anxious to get rid of the beast at any price, that we are thrusting it as a gift upon a man who looks upon it as his lawful property, which we have seriously injured while holding it tethered in our midst. The independent spirit shown by the Sirdar, whether real or affected, cannot but have a bad effect upon the tribal chiefs; and if we allow the negotiations to “drag” much longer, serious mischief may follow. The natural restlessness of the Afghans will not permit them to watch and wait for months; and already there are signs of a turbulent spirit manifesting itself. A large body of fanatical Safis have passed from Tagao into Kohistan, and our only means of counteracting thejehadthey are said to be raising has been to dismiss the Ghilzai and Kohistani deputations hitherto waiting in Cabul. Themalikshave accordingly been sent to their homes, and it is hoped their efforts to maintain peace will be successful. To send a division now into Kohistan would be to cause greater distrust in Turkistan than already exists, and if our negotiations are to cometo any satisfactory point, this distrust must not be excited. I have learnt from Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, that while our Mission was honourably received at Khanabad, Sirdar Abdur Rahman was so mistrustful, either of his own power, or of his followers’ fanaticism, that he had practically to treat our representatives as prisoners. Sirdar Wazirzada Afzul Khan, Ibrahim Khan, and Sher Mahomed Khan were lodged in a large tent adjoining the Sirdar’s, as I mentioned in a previous letter, and a strong guard surrounded both. The members of the Mission were unable to move about of their own free-will, and they had but little, if any, opportunity of consulting together. Abdur Rahman can scarcely be blamed for these precautions, as, in case of insult or violence being offered to the Sirdars, he would have been held personally responsible for the breach of hospitality. He does not seem to have had any very large body of troops with him, the want of money, of course, hindering him in his efforts to collect the army of Turkistan, about him. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan describes him as by far the most civilized, intelligent, and able Afghan he has ever met; and though the knowledge has been gained in a shortintercourseintercourse, it is valuable as bearing out the opinions of Schuyler, Petrovsky, and other writers, who saw the man under the unfavourable conditions of exile and despondency. During his residence in Tashkend Abdur Rahman has kept himself well informed on general Asiatic politics; and this knowledge he is now applying, to the best of his ability, in his negotiations with the British.
Ibrahim Khan saw a number of photographs of the Sirdar on his tent, and one of these was presented to him on his expressing a desire to carry back a copy with him. The portrait is by a photographer of Tashkend, and shows a man of about forty years of age, broad-shouldered and stoutly built, with a face expressing rather stolid self-possession than striking intelligence. A huge black beard covers the lower half of the face, but cannot hide the thick sensual lips, which contrast greatly with the broad forehead and stubborn eyes. The Sirdar is in uniform of Western cut, and wears a curved sword of the kind affected by Afghan nobles. The face shows no marks of trouble or anxiety, and has not that harassed look which was so characteristic of Shere Ali and Yakub Khan. Abdur Rahman is a “well-preserved” man, and, if reportspeaks truly, has still left to him the energy and ambition which made him so dangerous an enemy of Shere Ali twelve years ago.
Sirdar Ibrahim Khan will return to Khanabad in a few days, carrying back with him full explanations of our policy; and these once given, Abdur Rahman will be practically in the position of having received an ultimatum. The local sirdars persist in saying that he will never come in; but the last news from the North is that the Sirdar is establishing posts between Khanabad and Charikar, thus securing rapid and safe communication with Kohistan and Cabul. As he has no army worthy of the name, this step can be scarcely a preparation for a hostile advance, but looks more as if he were making his own passage to Sherpur secure when the time comes for his journey to our camp.
2nd July.
One might well apply the words of the Jewish proverb-monger to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan: “The prince that wanteth understanding is a great oppressor.” The people of Afghanistan are now oppressed with the burden of a Kafir occupation, because the prince to whom we have appealed to take the government of the country off our hands lacks understanding. He is cunning and cautious to a fault, but he is in close danger of over-reaching himself. We have so far lowered our pride as to treat with Abdur Rahman in order to secure peace for Afghanistan, and now we are in the awkward position of finding our words twisted, their meaning perverted, and the Pretender posing before the nation as a patriot of the first water. During the past three months Mr. Lepel Griffin, acting under the orders of the Government of India, has been striving to place himself thoroughlyen rapportwith the Sirdar, who seemed at last to be quite earnest in his expressed wish to become and remain on friendly terms with us. There was, however, such hesitation in all his actions, and so strong a current of vacillation in his replies, that in sheer self-defence we had to pin him down to certain definite conditions, which he could either accept or reject as his inclination dictated. An ultimatum, really, was sent to him, though we have avoided using the term under the peculiar circumstances in which we were placed—viz.,that of being in possession of a kingdom which our armies could easily retain, but which we were most anxious to leave at the earliest moment. In this state document the Indian Government stated clearly and distinctly that the Sirdar would be welcomed as Amir of Afghanistan, and could rely upon our future countenance and support so long as he remained faithful to his engagements with us,butthat Candahar and the Kurram Valley could not be surrendered to him, as their fate had once for all been settled. So distinctly was the latter part of the proposed settlement laid down, that it was added “No discussion is possible on this subject.” Nothing could have been more simple than this: Abdur Rahman could by a word become Amir of Afghanistan less Candahar and Kurram; he had but to say “I accept,” and the matter was at an end. But his perversity is so great, that he has chosen to construe our terms into an offer of a united Afghanistan, such as his grandfather the Dost ruled over, and with calm assurance to say that he accepts such offer. This dishonesty of purpose has been pushed to such extremes that he has sent circulars to all the tribes, proclaiming with more or less insolent triumph that the British have given him the Amirship of the whole country, and that he will shortly arrive among them to take up the reins of power. What sinister motive may have prompted such a course we cannot imagine, unless it be that the Sirdar wishes to assume therôleof a great patriotic leader, to accuse us of treachery in our negotiations, and thus to unite all parties in a supreme effort to force us out of the country. It may be urged with equal consistency that he wishes the people to believe he is no friend of the British, and that he only accepted our real terms after holding out for the restitution of territory acquired by us during the campaign. The effect of his extraordinary action upon the people has been a very unhealthy one: they cannot believe, in the face of our protestations, that we have included Candahar and Kurram in the terms of the settlement, and, on the other hand, they are in a feverish state of expectancy as to whether the Pretender will insist upon such districts being surrendered to him—which would mean a revival of the war—or whether he will, under protest, take Afghanistan shorn of two of its provinces. Take Hashim Khan’s case: he was about to leavefor Candahar, which place, under our protection, would have proved a safe asylum for him, even if his sworn enemy, Abdur Rahman, were ruler of Cabul. But no sooner did he see the Pretender’s circular stating that Candahar was to revert to the new Amir, than he hastened to prepare for flight, suspecting us of having treacherously deceived him regarding the southern province. The circular was received in Cabul fifteen hours before Abdur Rahman’s answer reached Mr. Lepel Griffin, and Hashim Khan made an effort to see the Chief Political Officer to gain knowledge, once for all, of the truth of the Pretender’s assertions. Unluckily, Hashim Khan could not see Mr. Griffin at once, and refusing to wait, he rode off to Cabul, and in company with Abdulla Khan fled in the night to Chakri, in the Ghilzai country beyond Khurd Cabul. The two Sirdars gave out that they were ghazis, probably to blind the tribesmen, and we have since heard that Hashim Khan is trying to gather about him the disbanded sepoys of Yakub Khan’s army. He has two lakhs and a half of treasure with him, and by offering regular payment, both to armed and unarmed men, he has already a little army under his control. As he has so far taken no action against us, a friendly letter was sent by order of General Stewart, inviting him to return, and assuring him that the statement about Candahar was a falsehood. His answer was that he was no enemy of the British, but that under existing circumstances he had been “advised” to leave Cabul and watch events from a safe distance. Abdulla Khan, it is believed, is the “adviser” referred to; that over-fed Sirdar having, like Jeshurun, waxed fat and kicked out savagely. He was apparently tired of playing the part of a nobody in Cabul, and has now incited Hashim Khan to commit himself to a very foolish course of action.
Since penning the above strictures upon Sirdar Abdur Rahman, our envoy, Sirdar Afzul Khan, ressaldar 10th Bengal Lancers, has arrived after a trying journey from Khanabad. Strangely enough, he brings letters of most friendly import from Abdur Rahman, whom he reports to be already on his way southwards. The Pretender marched with 2,000 men and twelve guns from Khanabad on the 28th of June, the day on which he had promised to leave, and on the 29th he was encamped at Chasma, on theIshkamish Road. By this time he is probably at Khinjan, where no doubt he will wait the arrival of our messenger, who left Sherpur three days ago. This time, it is hoped, the negotiations will really end, as Abdur Rahman will learn that his fast-and-loose mode of dealing has exasperated the British Government, which will not give him another chance. The arrival of Afzul Khan is most opportune, as he can explain fully, and without the caution he had to use in his letters, what the Sirdar’s intentions are, and why it is that he has dishonestly perverted the meaning of the terms so generously offered to him. I believe I am right in stating that both General Stewart and Mr. Lepel Griffin incline to the opinion that the Sirdar will shortly cross the Hindu Kush into Kohistan, and will accept the Amirship at our hands. Of course, his circular came upon us as a great surprise, and it was impossible to reconcile it with his previous avowals of friendship and a desire to come to terms, but Afzul Khan has cleared away some of the mistiness hanging about the affair, and what is facetiously called in camp “the political horizon” is once more looking clearer. There are still, however, many conflicting interests to be reconciled, and the news from Logar shows that the supports of Yakub’s Khan’s family—whom, to adopt Cavagnari’s term, I will call “Jacobins”—are actively engaged in stirring up the tribesmen against the British.
Yesterday (July 1st) the tribesmen grew so bold that they advanced to within a few miles of General Hills’ force, and gave our cavalry an opportunity of punishing them, which was not neglected. The Ghazni Field Force had been ordered to march to Charasia, and Mahomed Hasan Khan, the stanchest supporter of Yakub Khan (whose imprisonment in the time of Shere Ali he shared), took advantage of General Hills’ march to Charasia to occupy the Logar Valley with a mixed force of men from Zurmut, Kharwar, Maidan, and Wardak; but the gatherings dispersed upon the Ghazni Field Force again marching southwards. Finding General Hills did not move beyond Zerghun Shahr, Hasan Khan took heart again, and induced 1,000 or 2,000 men to occupy the large village of Padkhao Shana, on the Kushi side of the Logar, only twelve miles from the British camp. Here they remained till yesterday morning, when Palliser’s cavalrybrigade, 550 strong, came down upon them and scattered them in all directions.
The particulars of the action are as follows:—General Hills heard on June 30th that the village had been occupied in force, and he ordered the cavalry brigade to move out at 3.30A.M.yesterday. Brigadier-General Palliser’s instructions were to reconnoitre their position, and if an opportunity occurred, to attack them in the open. His force was made up of 231 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, 158 of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and 188 lances of the 19th Bengal Lancers. Upon nearing the spur which runs down from Kushi towards the Logar River, small parties of the enemy were seen, and the advanced cavalry scouts, on gaining some rising ground from which Padkhao Shana could be seen, reported the main body to be in full retreat in the direction of the Altimour Hills, which separate the Logar district from Zurmut. Their strength appeared to be about 1,500 footmen and a few cavalry. General Palliser detached a troop of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry to watch the village, and with 502 sabres and lance went in pursuit of the enemy. The latter, seeing the cavalry bearing down upon them, broke into detached knots, and took advantage of the difficult ground to make good their flight. The cavalry, however, followed them up very quickly, in spite of the stony nature of the ground and the difficulties presented bynullahsand ravines, and the two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and the 19th Lancers in the front line were soon hotly engaged. The enemy fought with desperation, and tried to reform their line, but without success. They sheered off to right and left, and were cut down by the supporting squadrons of the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry. The pursuit continued for two hours, until the mouth of the Altimour Pass had been reached. Here the cavalry were halted. They were then about eight miles from Padkhao Shana, whither they quickly returned. Two hundred bodies are said to have been counted on the ground. Our casualties are now reported as four sowars killed, twenty-three wounded, and one British officer, Captain Barrow, wounded. The ground was such as to give many opportunities for severe hand-to-hand fighting, in which Major Atkinson, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and Captain Leslie Bishop, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, are specially mentioned by those present as having displayed determined bravery. Therewere many hairbreadth escapes among the officers and men, notably in the case of Colonel Yorke, 19th Bengal Lancers, who received a bullet through his helmet, a second ball grazing his forehead. His orderly was shot dead at his side. This man, Jewand Sing, had distinguished himself earlier in the day, when Captain Barrow was wounded. Captain Barrow, who was acting as orderly officer to General Palliser, engaged single-handed with an Afghanmalik, who fought with great coolness and bravery. He was armed with rifle, shield,tulwar, and the usual long knife. As Captain Barrow rode at him he fired his rifle, wounding the officer’s horse in the neck. He then betook himself to his sword, and warded off all blows with his shield. Captain Barrow received two severe cuts, the first disabling his bridle-hand, and the second cutting deep into his right fore-arm. Just at this moment Jewand Sing and Sowar Gholam Khan, of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, rode up, and the Afghan, who had already been badly wounded, was killed out of hand. In the ranks of the enemy was one of the deserters from the Sappers and Miners, who would not fight, but begged for mercy. He was shot in themêlée, and his Snider rifle recovered. Hasan Khan deserted the tribesmen at the commencement of the action, riding away to a place of safety as soon as our cavalry appeared. The cavalry did not reach camp at Zerghun Shahr until half-past six at night, having been fifteen hours uninterruptedly in the saddle, and having ridden over forty miles since morning. As they rode into camp, all the regiments turned out and cheered them heartily. The results of this brilliant little action cannot fail to be most beneficial for a time at least, as Logar is once more cleared of malcontent tribesmen.
It is said that Hashim Khan intended sending a contingent from Chakri over the Ghilzai Hills, but the prompt action taken by General Hills stopped this, and Hashim Khan has again written in to say he is “no enemy of the British.” He may well be afraid of putting himself at the head of men in the field when he sees how easily our troops scatter the forces opposed to them. Our cavalry have never done so well as at Padkhao Shana during the present campaign; no English cavalry regiment was present, the honours of the fight resting with the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the 19th Bengal Lancers.
CHAPTER XXX.
Arrival of Abdur Rahman at Tutandarra in Kohistan—Preparations for the Evacuation of Cabul—A Deputation sent from Cabul to the Sirdar—The Friends and Enemies of the future Amir—Attitude of the Kohistanis, Ghilzais, and Wardaks—Mahomed Jan and Mushk-i-Alam’s Acceptance of Abdur Rahman—Durbar at Sherpur on July 22nd—Formal Acknowledgment of Abdur Rahman as Amir by the British Government—Mr. Lepel Griffin’s Address to the Chiefs—Sir Donald Stewart’s Appeal to their Patriotism—Abdur Rahman’s Departure from Charikar—Resignation of Wali Mahomed, Governor of Cabul—News of the Maiwand Disaster—Probable Movement of 10,000 Troops to Candahar—Interview between Mr. Lepel Griffin and the Amir—Discussion of Terms—The Amir’s Demeanour—Second Interview—A Satisfactory Settlement arrived at.
Early in July Sir Donald Stewart sent a final message to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan, requesting him to come to Cabul to discuss the terms of a settlement, and on the 15th of July the Sirdar reached Tutandarra, near Charikar, in Kohistan. His passage over the Hindu Kush had been a very trying one. On the 9th of July we had sent a deputation of Cabul gentlemen to Kohistan to pay their respects to the future Amir. Among these men were Abdul Kadir, the head Kazi of the city, who was the bearer of a letter to Abdur from the chief Political Officer; the Ghilzai Chief of Tezin, and Sirdar Yusuf Khan, Barakzai. The negotiations seemed to be progressing so well that all preparations were made for evacuating Cabul by the 16th of August, and large convoys started daily from the Bala Hissar with stores and surplus ammunition for India.[44]The following letters describe the close of the negotiations:—
19th July, 1880.
There now seems every prospect of a satisfactory settlement being made with Abdur Rahman, who will shortly leave Tutandarra for Charikar, thence coming to any place which the British representatives at Cabul may name. He raises no objection to this; expresses his strong wish to make a firm and friendlyarrangement with the British, and is more anxious for personal interviews than even we could be. Since his arrival in Kohistan the tone of his messages, and his reception of the deputation of Cabul gentlemen sent to him at Tutandarra, have been more than cordial; and there can be no reasonable doubt that he has finally determined to unreservedly accept the English conditions, and find his strength in an English alliance. This being the case, it is of some importance to know what the strength and party of Abdur Rahman in Northern Afghanistan are; and on this subject we have a good deal to guide us. It may be presumed that the Government did not blindly pin its faith to Abdur Rahman before it had ascertained that there was a sufficiently large party in Afghanistan to ensure some promise of stability if the Sirdar himself was capable and considerate to his political opponents. It is understood that Mr. Lepel Griffin came to Cabul with instructions from the late viceroy (Lord Lytton) to enter into communication with Abdur Rahman, and ascertain if he were a chief suited to the Government purposes, and that communications were accordingly opened with the Sirdar within a few days of the arrival of the Chief Political Officer in Cabul. These have been continued without interruption since, until Abdur Rahman has now felt himself strong enough to respond to the Government invitation; and unless unforeseen accidents occur within the next month, it would seem certain that he will be Amir of Cabul.
Some critics have assumed that, as in the first Durbar held after Mr. Griffin’s arrival at Cabul the only candidates for the Amirship actually named were Wali Mahomed Khan, Hashim, Musa Jan, and Ayub Khan, the question of the possibility of Abdur Rahman had then not been considered by the Government. But a comparison of dates shows that this must be incorrect, and it is consequently probable that, looking at the formidable character of the armed opposition at that time, and the ignorance of the Sirdar’s character and intentions, his name was expressly excluded, not because negotiations with him had not commenced, but that Yakub Khan’s faction—who were then assembling in immense numbers, and would have become far more formidable but for their defeat at Ahmed Khel and Charasia—might not be rendered desperate and be strengthened by the knowledge that the person towhom they were most opposed had been selected by Government, while it was uncertain whether he would, after all, prove suitable. The delay which had taken place in coming to an understanding with Abdur Rahman is indeed small when the magnitude of the interests at stake is considered, and the distance at which the Sirdar was residing on the other side of the Hindu Kush. It will have been no more than four months from the arrival of Mr. Griffin at Cabul, and the opening of negotiations with Abdur Rahman, before these are virtually completed, and the army can then be withdrawn as quickly as military exigencies or regard for the life and health of the troops will permit.
It is very difficult to say what strength Abdur Rahman possesses in Afghanistan, as it was difficult to know what really constituted the party of Yakub Khan or Musa Jan. One thing certain is that a very large number of undecided persons of all tribes will accept any Amir who may be chosen by the Government, and formally notified according to the Mahomedan religion. Constant efforts have been directed by the Political Department at Cabul to break up all the strong opposition parties; to enlist on the side of the Government nominee the religious feeling of the country, and especially the assistance of the great religious leaders (which has been successfully done); and to break up those great tribes which are under the control of chiefs of more or less importance, so that no formidable organized resistance might be offered to the new Amir. The most important tribe in Afghanistan is undoubtedly the Ghilzais. The Andaris, one of the most important of the southern sections of the tribe, are entirely in favour of Abdur Rahman, as are a great majority of the Tarakis. The northern Ghilzais are very much under the control of their chiefs, the most important of whom is Asmatullah Khan, of Hisarak and Lughman. He, it has just been announced, has addressed Mr. Griffin, and expressed his entire willingness to accept the Amir chosen by the English, even if this should be Abdur Rahman. Another important Ghilzai chief, Khan Mahomed Khan, of Tezin, is with the deputation sent to Charikar to welcome Abdur Rahman. Padshah Khan will be opposed to the Sirdar; Maizullah Khan will probably join him; Faiz Mahomed Khan has openly declared that he will be in opposition. On the whole, it may be said that about half ofthe important Ghilzai tribe will be in favour of the new Amir. Others, should his conduct be conciliatory, would be doubtless won over later. The Kohistanis, who are almost entirely Tajiks, and between whom and the Afghans there is not much love lost, can also be counted upon.
There is, however, a strong party in favour of Shere Ali’s family; but, roughly speaking, two-thirds of Kohistan and Koh-Daman may be estimated on the side of the Sirdar. It is worth noting, in spite of the reports to the contrary, that General Mir Said Khan, of Istalif, and Mir Butcha Khan have not yet visited Abdur Rahman. They are doubtful of their reception, and with excellent reason, as they have been illegitimately collecting Government revenue, which they know any organized Government at Cabul would compel them to disgorge. The Wardaks, between Logar and Ghazni, are unfriendly, but may be won over by good treatment. They will very much follow the example of Mahomed Jan and Mushk-i-Alam. The latter has for some time past been working honestly in the interests of peace, and has written that he, together with all the important chiefs assembled in Maidan, are ready to accept the choice of the British Government. The Sirdars of the ruling house are naturally unfriendly, as the adherents of the party of Azim Khan and Afzul Khan have long been banished or reduced by Shere Ali to impotence. A good many of the smaller sirdars belong to this party, and are on Abdur Rahman’s side; but the men who have money—like Hashim Khan, Wali Mahomed, Ibrahim Khan, Karim Khan—are, as a matter of course, in opposition.
The future depends very much on the Sirdar’s own conduct. If he chooses to take a conciliatory course, he may help his own against the strong opposition against him. If he becomes as unpopular in Cabul as he is in Turkistan, by oppressing the people and exacting money from the traders, he will not last very long. Already the news of his exactions has caused the wholesale flight from the city of the Indian merchants of Cabul—twokafilasof whom have already marched to India with their families; while trade is almost entirely stopped between Cabul, Turkistan, and Bokhara. The necessities of the Sirdar’s position, and his almost absolute want of funds, are, to a certain extent, an excuse for this;but unless he desires to alienate the trading classes, which will be a very great blow to the prosperity of his kingdom, he will have to entirely change his policy with them.
22nd July.
To-day the first step in the settlement of Afghanistan has been taken, and a new page turned in the history of our relations with Cabul. We have formally acknowledged the Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan, son of Mir Afzul Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, as Amir of Cabul, and have promised him our support so long as he remains friendly to the British Government. Events have marched so rapidly within the last few days that many of us can scarcely realize the importance of to-day’s proceedings. Mahomed Jan and the chiefs assembled in Maidan, sent in a friendly deputation, and this was a piece of good fortune which we scarcely anticipated. The oldmoollah, Mushk-i-Alam, had, it is true, written to say he would accept the ruler whom we favoured, but it was not expected that secessions from the Jacobin party would follow so rapidly. The deputation sent by Mahomed Jan to Sherpur offered to make unconditional submission to the British authorities, but this was a proceeding deemed impolitic by Sir Donald Stewart and Mr. Lepel Griffin. Our object is to strengthen Abdur Rahman’s hands as much as possible, not to gather a party about ourselves, and the proffered submission was diverted to the Sirdar. This gives the latter the appearance of being chosen of the people rather than forced upon them by our dictation, and our anxiety is to ally ourselves openly with no party, though we are quite willing to acknowledge the strongest man. Two sons of Mushk-i-Alam and seven Wardak chiefs are now at Charikar, where they will be far more useful than in Sherpur, and the effect upon the popular mind is proportionately great. If the champion of Yakub and Musa Khan’s claims considers the chances of a restoration to power of Shere Ali’s family at an end, it is not likely the lesser lights will continue in factious opposition. My last letter explained at length the then strength of Abdur Rahman’s party, and it will be seen that he is now quite powerful enough, with his new allies from Maidan, to hold his own in Cabul. His promise to the traders not to raise forced loans and to repay atonce the money he has extorted from merchants in Turkistan has soothed the feelings of the Cabul people, who have hitherto looked with dismay upon the prospect of his coming to rule over them. It would have been a fatal piece of folly if, as Amir, he renewed his tyranny, and there are already signs on the part of the rich citizens here of readiness to advance him money on the security of future revenue. Once he has funds wherewith to raise and equip an army, the Amir elect may reasonably hope to scatter the remnants of the Jacobin faction and to disperse Ayub Khan’s army if it turns away from Candahar and reaches Ghazni. Abdur Rahman will inevitably have to fight some of the malcontents remaining after our armies have withdrawn over the Shutargardan and beyond Jugdulluck, and our belief is that he will be strong enough to crush all other pretenders, though he himself may exhaust his means in the struggle. He must then turn to the British for countenance and support, as there is a strong feeling against Russian interference with the country, and we shall probably revert to the old policy of a liberal annual subsidy. What conditions will be imposed if the subsidy is granted only the Home Government perhaps at present knows; but unless the war is to be fruitless, they must be somewhat on the lines laid down in the Gundamak Treaty—the presence of a British Envoy in Cabul being waived for the present.
The Durbar was held at five o’clock this evening, three large tents having been pitched in the Cantonment, about 150 yards from the Head-quarters’ Gate. All the afternoon, sirdars and persons of lesser note came streaming through the 72nd Gateway, with their wild-looking retainers on horseback and on foot. The order against the carrying of arms, so wisely enacted by Sir Frederick Roberts in October, is still in force; but privileged persons, such as Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan and the three representatives sent by Abdur Rahman from Charikar, were to-day allowed small escorts of armed men. With carbines, or Enfield rifles, slung at their back, a sword dangling from their waist-belt, pistols and knives stuck in theirkummerbunds, these horsemen trotted about full of their own importance, evidently looking upon the Durbar as held for the special honour of their masters. The said masters were, as usual, gorgeous in crimson,purple, and gold; but I have so often described the greasy Cabul Sirdar in all his glory that I am loth to trot him out again, even on such an historic occasion as the present. We missed the handsome Arab Hashim Khan used to ride, and that mountain of flesh, Abdulla Khan, awed us no more; the two Sirdars are brooding over their wrongs in Kharwar or Zurmut, and their hearts will be full of bitterness when they learn of the success Abdur Rahman has scored. Wali Mahomed, as Governor of Cabul, was a person of some importance in his own eyes, though his tenure of power is now a very weak one, for he will be scarcely rash enough to court death by remaining at his post when our army files out of Sherpur. Sirdars and servants were the chief living features in cantonments, between the Club and the Head-quarters, all the afternoon, for in his anxiety to secure a “good place” each petty member of the Barakzai family took time by the forelock, and hastened to the Durbar tents an hour or two before the hour fixed for the solemn proceedings. The guard of honour of 100 men, furnished by the 72nd Highlanders, under the command of Captain Garnett, fell in about half-past four o’clock, and to the cheery quick-step of “Scotland yet,” marched off to where the gathering crowd of British officers and Afghan notabilities had begun to arrange itself. We have not the means wherewith to arrange a grand spectacle, and nothing could have been more commonplace than the three tents in which the Durbar was to be held. Facing Bemaru Heights was the largest of all, towering above its near neighbour, which again dwarfed the Durbar tent proper, an old weather-beaten canvas affair, dull red in colour, once the property of the Amir. The guard of honour formed up at the entrance to the northernmost tent, the lines of bayonets shining out in the sunshine, and duly impressing certain weak-kneed sirdars, who shuffled along to their places in very undignified fashion. There had been an effort made to give some picturesque colouring to the interior of the small tent wherein sirdars knelt on one side while British officers sat comfortably on their own particular chairs and camp-stools on the other. Persian carpets covered the dusty floor, shawls were thrown over the chairs of state reserved for the representatives of the British Government, while the very shabby tent-poles were swathed inkinkobwork.The dusky faces of the sirdars showed no more sensibility, after once the crowd had settled or wriggled itself into something like order, than would so many masks on lay figures: our policy is so inscrutable to men like Wali Mahomed that any new declaration is placidly awaited with almost benevolent indifference. The rows of turbans, many-coloured and full of strange peculiarities in shape and folding, covered the shaven scalps of men whose thoughts turned, doubtless, upon what new phase the affairs of Afghanistan were about to take. Sirdar Wali Mahomed looked anxious and dispirited, as must a man whose power is slipping rapidly away; the stuttering Shahbaz Khan, our whilom Governor of Kohistan; Ibrahim Khan, who has worked all along heartily in our cause; Sher Mahomed Khan, a man who has studied Western politics and knows which of our Generals hails from Ireland, which from Scotland, and which from England; Yusuf Khan, who has unreservedly thrown in his lot with Abdur Rahman Khan; Sarwar Khan, who fought against us in December; all these princes of the Barakzai dynasty were hiding whatever curiosity they felt with a kind of listless dignity which deceived no one but themselves. Three strangers were in the first row of the sirdars: these were General Katol Khan, Mahomed Amin Khan, and “the Saiad Sahib,” sent by Abdur Rahman to represent him at the Durbar. They were rather sorrily arrayed for such an occasion, their long residence in Tashkend having perhaps made them indifferent to the beauties of oriental attire, but as the representatives of the future Amir they had to be treated with every consideration. Contrasting with the flowing white robes or richly-coloured coats of the Afghan portion of the assembly were the quieter uniforms of the officers of the garrison, lighted up here and there by the gold and glitter of the Staff, always the “show-men” on occasions of this kind, A few of our friends from Logar and “down the line” had come in on leave, so that the force in Northern Afghanistan was well represented. With military punctuality, Sir Donald Stewart, accompanied by Sir Frederick Roberts, Mr. Lepel Griffin, and the members of the Head-quarters’ Staff in Sherpur, reached the Durbar tents; the usual formalities of presenting arms, &c., were gone through, and then the three men with whose names the present settlementwill henceforth be most closely associated took their seats in solemn Durbar. The representatives of Abdur Rahman were presented, hand-shakings exchanged in Western fashion, and the proceedings began.
Sir Donald Stewart, with a soldier’s brevity, said he wished to explain to the Sirdars, Chiefs, and people assembled, the reason for holding the Durbar and requesting their presence and that of the English officers stationed in Cabul. It was that the public recognition by the Government of England of Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan as Amir of Cabul should be made known with as much honour as possible. Mr. Lepel Griffin would explain more in detail the views and wishes of the Government on this important subject. Major Euan Smith, Political Officer with General Hills’ Division, translated this short preamble into Persian, after which Mr. Griffin read the following speech in the same language:—