CHAPTER XXIII
Navalaction now shifts almost entirely to the Caribbean. Until in the last days of the war there was to be in the Pacific no further special naval movement beyond the seizure of Guam by theCharlestonon June 11th and the sending to Manila the monitorsMontereyandMonadnockto reinforce Dewey. The first of the army sailed from San Francisco on May 28th.
The departure of Cervera from the Cape Verdes caused Admiral Sampson to move from Havana east 970 miles to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with the expectancy of finding there the Spanish fleet. This move was based upon the view that as it was but from 1,200 to 1,400 miles from San Juan to important points on our coast, it was an absolute necessity to make sure that if the Spanish squadron arrived there it should not be allowed to leave and be free to raid our seaboard. Sampson’s prescience was right. Cervera’s orders were to go there and then do ashe thought best. Had he not himself been so slow in crossing the Atlantic, Sampson would have found him at San Juan, and the Spanish fleet would have been destroyed on May 12th instead of July 3d.
Continuous breakdowns of the two monitors accompanying Sampson caused such delay that his squadron was not off San Juan until May 12th. An attack on the fortifications began at 5A.M., and continued for three hours, when Sampson withdrew with no damage to the ships and with the loss of one man killed and four wounded aboard theNew York. As Cervera was clearly not in port, and as it was necessary not to risk overmuch the American ships before he could be met, it was thought inadvisable to continue the action, though as known later the place was ready to surrender to another attack. As Cervera was much overdue and no word had as yet been received of his whereabouts, the American squadron stood west (with a view to covering Havana), sending into St. Thomas, only sixty miles to the east, for news.
It was not until in the early morning of May 15th, off Puerto Plata, that word came of Cervera’s having reached Curaçao. At the same time a dispatch from Washington was receivedby Sampson informing him that the Flying Squadron was en route to Key West and directing Sampson himself to proceed there with all possible dispatch.
Cervera had arrived off Martinique on the evening of May 11th and had sent in a destroyer for news, which brought next morning the word of Sampson’s being off Puerto Rico. Unable now to go to San Juan without meeting the American fleet, a council of war was called, and on its decision Cervera shaped his course for Curaçao in search of coal, leaving the destroyerTerror, whose boilers had given out, at Martinique. Leaving Curaçao in the evening of May 15th, he entered the harbor of Santiago de Cuba at dawn on May 19th.
Sampson was now, as mentioned, standing at full speed for Key West. It is very remarkable that he had the same instinct as to Cervera’s second destination as to his first; as in a telegram to the scoutHarvard(theNew Yorkof the American line of steamers) he mentioned Santiago or San Juan as the ports likely to be entered. The peremptory orders from Washington left no freedom of action, however, and on May 18th Key West was reached. There were found theships of the Flying Squadron, theBrooklyn,Massachusetts, andTexas, just arrived from Hampton Roads and coaling.
On May 11th, the day before Sampson’s attack at San Juan, there were two affairs of great gallantry: the one the cable-cutting at Cienfuegos; the other an action at Cardenas. The former was carried out by two sailing launches for lifting and cutting the cables and two steam launches carrying marines to “stand off” the Spaniards. TheMarbleheadandNashvillekept up a fire against the forces entrenched on the edge of the low bluff which finally had to be approached within 150 feet before the work was accomplished. Grappling for the cables was long and tedious, and the operation of sawing through each took nearly half an hour. To perform such work under a constant fire from the Spaniards in trenches not more than 200 yards away showed a cool courage of which Americans can be proud. The boats were back to their ships in a little over three hours, with two killed and seven wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant Winslow in command.
The action on the same day at Cardenas on the north side of Cuba, but seventy-five miles from Cienfuegos by land, but 500 by sea, wasbetween theWilmington, theMachias, the revenue cutterHudson, and the torpedo boatWinslowagainst three Spanish gunboats which lay well within the harbor in water which could not be entered by our heavier draft vessels. The torpedo boat, which of course was never intended for such service, ventured in too far and was severely handled. Ensign Bagley and four of the men were killed, and three, one being Lieutenant Bernadou in command, were wounded. TheWinslow, wholly disabled, was towed out of her dangerous position by the intrepid handling of theHudson.
We return to Key West, where all was movement to take measures to intercept Cervera.
The Navy Department had become convinced from information received that Cervera had imperative orders to go either to Cienfuegos or Havana to land material necessary for the defence of Havana, and urged the utmost dispatch in blockading both ports. Thus next morning, May 19th, Commodore Schley sailed with the three ships of his squadron mentioned, to be followed next day by theIowa, our newest battleship of the time, and which reached Cienfuegos only seven hours after Commodore Schley. There followed the torpedo boatDupont, thecollierMerrimac, the cruisersMarblehead,Castine, and two auxiliary vessels; an ample force, should Cervera be met.
Events were now following one another with the utmost rapidity. To deal with these in detail is quite beyond our scope. One must look to the larger histories of the war for the full account of the happenings of this stirring time.[54]One can give here but a running mention of the reception on the late afternoon of May 19th of the news by the way of Havana of Cervera’s arrival that morning at Santiago de Cuba; the repetition of this news with an expression of doubt in the telegram from Washington to Sampson during that night; its verification next day, the 20th; the dispatch of the news to Schley with orders, if convinced that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos Bay,[55]to go to Santiago and blockade; Sampson’s movement 300 miles east with the rest of the fleet available into the narrow waters of Nicholas Channel, to intercept Cervera should he leave Santiago and attempt to reach Havana; the delay of Schley at Cienfuegos,not being satisfied that Cervera was not there; the final assurance that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos received from insurgents on May 24th, and the departure that evening of Commodore Schley’s squadron for Santiago; his arrival twenty-two miles south of the entrance on May 26th; Cervera’s intention (but given up through vacillation) to leave Santiago that evening at almost the same moment when Schley started with intention to return to Key West on the plea of inability to coal his ships; his change of mind on May 28th and arrival that evening off Santiago; the arrival of theOregonat Key West on May 26th, completing her remarkable journey of 14,000 miles from the west coast; Sampson’s finally determining to go to Santiago on account of Schley’s dispatch that he could not blockade for want of coal; the recognition of theColónin the harbor entrance on May 29th; the ineffectual attack on theColónon May 30th; the arrival of Sampson on June 1st with theNew York,Oregon,Mayflower, and torpedo boatPorter; the establishment of a close blockade; the sinking of theMerrimacin the entrance channel; the stationing every evening of a battleship with searchlights upon the harbor entrance; the occupancy of GuantánamoBay; the driving off, by the battalion of marines established there in camp, of the Spanish troops in the vicinity; the frequent bombardment of the Spanish batteries at Santiago entrance; the arrival on June 20th of the army under General Shafter; its debarkation and movement against Santiago; the attack of July 1st on El Caney and San Juan Hill; the sortie of Cervera’s squadron; its destruction: these are but the chief events of the many which happened between May 18th and July 3d. On the forenoon of Sunday, this latter date, was decided the fate of Spain in America.
More than half the crews of the Spanish ships had been used ashore on July 1st in the defence of Santiago, and the commander of these, Captain Bustamante, Cervera’s chief-of-staff, had, to the great grief of all who knew him both in the Spanish and American services, been mortally wounded. Cervera had, after the battle of July 1st, received orders to leave the harbor and endeavor to save his squadron. He and his captains accepted the situation with calm courage and prepared to leave the evening of July 2d. The slow work of returning the crews aboard ship caused delay until the next morning.
At 9:30 the crews of the American ships werejust falling in for the usual Sunday “inspection.” The admiral had started a little before nine in theNew Yorkunder easy steam to arrange with General Shafter a plan of combined attack. TheNew Yorkhad gone about five miles when a shot was heard from the battery at the entrance and a ship almost immediately after seen coming out. TheNew Yorkat once turned.
In accord with the admiral’s standing order, all the ships immediately started to close in on the entrance. The flagshipInfanta Maria Teresa, which was the ship first sighted, was naturally exposed for some little time to the fire of all, and was quickly a mass of flames and heading in for the land. She was run ashore about six miles west of the harbor entrance; theOquendo, though she was the last of the large ships to come out, was beached, also burning, soon after theMaria Teresa, about a quarter of a mile west of the latter; theVizcaya, afire, went on to the reef fifteen miles west of Santiago about 11:30, shortly after which her forward magazine exploded. The destroyerFurorhad been sunk, and thePlutonwas ashore destroyed, having made only three miles to the west. TheColónonly was left, in full flightand practically uninjured, pursued by theOregon,Brooklyn,New York, andTexas. At 1:15 she turned ashore, the 13-inch shell of theOregon, fired at 9,000 yards, going over her. Her sea-valves had been opened, and though she was pushed on to the beach stern foremost by theNew York, her bow overhung into deep water and as she filled she turned on her side. She was never raised. The heroic efforts of the American crews in saving life from the burning ships are deserving every praise.
The Spanish loss may be taken as about 264 killed and drowned and 151 wounded; the prisoners, including officers, numbered 1,813. The Americans lost 1 killed, 1 wounded, both in theBrooklyn.
The Spanish could not have expected to escape, nor did they. They went to their death like heroes. There has been nothing finer than the calm bravery of their exit from the narrow harbor entrance without accident or delay on the part of any ship. We had against them six heavy ships to four; fourteen 12-inch and 13-inch guns against six 11-inch; thirty 8-inch against none of that calibre; forty-four 6, 5, and 4 inch against thirty-six 5.5 and 4.7 inch, and ninety-six 6-pounders against thirty-eight Spanish.We had a like superiority in armor. In one point, speed, the Spanish were, nominally at least, decidedly superior, all their ships being of twenty knots. Only two of the Americans: theNew YorkandBrooklyn, had such.
There remained now only the question of reducing the city of Santiago, in which the navy took an active part in bombardment of the city from the sea. On July 17th it surrendered.
The success of the navy at Santiago was due to the circular blockade instituted by Admiral Sampson on his arrival, and to the lighting up the harbor entrance nightly with the searchlights of the battleships, which were relieved every two hours. Escape at night was thus, by Cervera’s own report, made impossible. The circular form of Sampson’s blockade during the day and night left no such chance of finding an extensive unguarded space, such as existed in steaming in column to and fro across the entrance. The whole is summed up in the report of Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Clark of theOregonto Admiral Sampson: “We went ahead at full speed with the determination of carrying out to the utmost your order: ‘If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engageas soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore.’”
With their only battle fleet destroyed, the preservation by the Spanish of communication with Cuba was now impossible and the fall of the island certain. Thus an expedition under the command of Admiral Cámara left Cadiz on June 17th for the Philippines. It reached Port Said on June 25th. A strong force was detailed from Admiral Sampson’s fleet to go to the Philippines under Commodore Watson, to be accompanied through the Mediterranean by the rest of the available ships of the fleet under Sampson himself. The news of the 3d of July, and also of the preparation of this fleet, caused Spain to recall Cámara’s force before it had left the vicinity of Suez. Meanwhile a large number of ships had taken a prominent part in the convoying of part of General Miles’s force to Puerto Rico and in the seizure of the south coast of that island.
Spain, with full recognition of the meaning of her loss, opened negotiations for peace, and on August 12, 1898, the protocol was signed by which she relinquished all sovereignty over Cuba, ceded to the United States Puerto Ricoand an island in the Ladrones to be selected, and agreed to our occupancy of the city of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which would determine the future of the Philippines.
At the moment of the signing of the protocol our fleet and troops were preparing for the assault at Manila. By noon the city had surrendered and was in our possession. The date at Manila, owing to difference in time, was August 13th. Thus there were but a few hours between the surrender and the signing, but the latter had preceded the surrender and Manila could not be claimed as ours by right of conquest. Although the claim was put forward, it was soon withdrawn, and we now possess the archipelago by right of purchase, though indeed it must be said that the sale by Spain was an enforced one. The war thus ended with Puerto Rico and Guam as possessions by conquest, with the Hawaiian Islands a United States territory by annexation, with Cuba a protectorate, and the Philippines a purchased possession. We had gone far afield and had incurred heavy responsibilities which stretched eight thousand miles westward from California, and had taken up a naval base adjacent to what issure to be one of the great fields of future world action—Eastern Asia.
It is difficult to leave the subject of the Philippines without a word as to the continuation of naval action among the islands and the share taken by the navy in the release of Spaniards held by the natives, in frequent punitive expeditions, and in the general pacification of the region. For several years our ships were active equally with the army in this work. In February, 1899, the important point of Ilo-Ilo was bombarded and captured by the small cruiserPetrel. Constant work of patrol and blockade was carried out, not always without loss. Throughout there was active coöperation with the army in transporting troops and in attack and defence, with for some years separate expeditions by the marines of great hardship and courage.