Chapter 13

[78]Isa. lx. 21.[79]P.109.[80]P.110, &c.[81]P.111, &c.[82]P.118, &c.[83]See this proof drawn out briefly,ch. vi.[84][This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity,MusæiDisput.:HoltzsfusiiDisp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum:Seldende Laps. Angelorum:StapferiInst.:WitsiiEconom. Fœd.:Bate’sHarmony of the Divine Attrib.:Calcotton the Fall:Shuckfordon the Creation of Man:Manton’sSermons:South’sdo.:Toplady’sdo.:Pearsonon the Creed:Le Clerc’sDiss.:Henly’sDissert.:Kennicotton the Tree of Life: andFabriciusde Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.][85][Theevilsof life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures show thatallsuffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.][86]Chap. ii.[87]See Sermons preached at theRolle, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.[88][“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”—Dr.Chalmers.][89][Shallwebe of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present,but still ourselves. Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!][90]Part II. chap. v.[91][This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man asChalmers. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here:—that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh findeth.’”][92][It comes to this:—good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as theresultsof self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.][93][Theyarean answer, but a cavil remains,—viz.: “the difference between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only indegree, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small one.Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies couldteachthis, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?][94][That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.][95][ConsultMillman’sHist. of Christ, vol. i.:Priestley’sInstitutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: andWhately’sPol. Econ., sec. 5.][96][We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.][97][“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. Buthabitsof veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving theprinciplesof love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends uponthe ratiobetween our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c.,must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites. Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”—Prof. Fitzgerald.][98]It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by asense of interestis meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by asense of interestis meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.—See p.131.[99][Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole destiny!It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. Ascetic acts are only useful asmeans, and so long as they areascetic(askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good onlyasdiscipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.][100][Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butlerof coursedoes not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fellsuddenly, no less in his state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason outhow muchdisorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be gainsayed.Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner “lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship with God.][101][A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote ourfuturehappiness. It will notlongmar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a personhabituallyvirtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.][102]P.145.[103][The student should learn to distinguish between thekindsof necessity. There is—1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by them we govern ourselves.But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:—1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. SeeCollingson Providence,Price’sDissertations,Rutherfordon Providence,Charnock’sSermons, andWhately’sLogic.][104]P.157.[105]P.158.[106][Humesays, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.”Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume found him out!][107]Bywillandcharacteris meant that which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the wordstemper,taste,dispositions,practical principles:that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another.[108]Chap. ii.[109]P.157, &c.[110]Chap. ii.[111]Dissert. II.[112]Serm. 2, at theRolls.[113]Dissert. II.[114]However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, thatit is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, thenfitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.[115]P.118.[116]P.110, &c.[117]Chap. ii.[118]Dissertation II.[119]Pp.68,71.[120]Serm. 8th, at theRolls.[121][Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake—also,Belsham’sEssays,Collinson Liberty,Crombieon Phil. Necessity,Hobbes’Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan,Priestleyon Liberty,Hartleyon Man, andEdwardson the Will.Against the doctrine, seeBeattie’sWorks, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes byBramhallandLawson; Replies to Priestley byPalmerandBryant;Groveon Liberty;Clarke’sSermons at the Boyle Lectures;Gibb’sContemplations;King’sOrigin of Evil;Reidon the Mind;Wattson Liberty;Harris’Boyle Lectures;Jackson’sDefence;Butterworthon Moral Government.][122][Maimonidesmakes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it isimpossibleman should come into existence in such a manner.”][123][Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age to eternity.The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against theproofsof religion, as it is againstobjectionsto it.][124][No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are best.][125]Pp.177,178.[126]P.173, &c.[127]P.175.[128]Pp.72,73.[129]P.68, andPart II. chap. vi.[130]Serm. at theRolls, p. 312, 2d ed.[131]P.172, &c.[132]SeePart II. ch. ii.[133]P.173.[134][The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.][135]Part II. ch. vi.[136]P.108.[137][There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses theimportancerather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves thenecessityof revelation, if we would know any thing ofsuchtruths. And it is such truths which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach theway of salvation, for the sinful and helpless.][138][No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point,Leland’sAdv. and Necess.:Chalmers’Nat. Theol.:McCosh’sDiv. Gov.:Pascal’sThoughts:Warburton’sDiv. Legation.][139]Invenis multos——propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum.Aug. in Psal.xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one. “What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian.”][140][The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation, is well laid down byWayland,Mor. Sci.ch. ix. sec. 2.][141][Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.][142][“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There was however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana intovisible churches, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.”Butler’ssermon before the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.][143]Rev. xxii. 11.[144][“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say that since Christianity is aremedialsystem, designed to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to beliableto the same perversions. Because—1. Christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the defects ofnature, but of an unnatural state of ruin into which men were brought bythe Fall. And 2. It is remedial of the defects of nature in agreat degree, by its giving additional advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”—Fitzgerald’sNotes.][145][Chalmers(Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows theethicsof natural religion to be one thing and itsobjectsanother. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by therelationin which we of course stand to him. How we are toexpressthat love and obedience it cannot teach.][146]See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, &c., [byWaterland,] andColliberof Revealed Religion, as there quoted.[147][If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.][148]P.94.[149]Ch. v.[150]John iii. 5.[151]This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p.189, &c.[152][Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of baptism or the Lord’s supper.][153]Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.[154]Hosea vi. 6.[155]See Matt. xii. 7.[156]Seech. iii.[157][Dr.Angusjudiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree withallknown truth, whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, andknown truth. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to hisassumed hypothesis.][158]P.203.[159]Chaps.iii.,iv.,v.,vi.

[78]Isa. lx. 21.

[79]P.109.

[80]P.110, &c.

[81]P.111, &c.

[82]P.118, &c.

[83]See this proof drawn out briefly,ch. vi.

[84][This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity,MusæiDisput.:HoltzsfusiiDisp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum:Seldende Laps. Angelorum:StapferiInst.:WitsiiEconom. Fœd.:Bate’sHarmony of the Divine Attrib.:Calcotton the Fall:Shuckfordon the Creation of Man:Manton’sSermons:South’sdo.:Toplady’sdo.:Pearsonon the Creed:Le Clerc’sDiss.:Henly’sDissert.:Kennicotton the Tree of Life: andFabriciusde Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]

[85][Theevilsof life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures show thatallsuffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]

[86]Chap. ii.

[87]See Sermons preached at theRolle, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.

[88][“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”—Dr.Chalmers.]

[89][Shallwebe of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present,but still ourselves. Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]

[90]Part II. chap. v.

[91][This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man asChalmers. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here:—that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh findeth.’”]

[92][It comes to this:—good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as theresultsof self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]

[93][Theyarean answer, but a cavil remains,—viz.: “the difference between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only indegree, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small one.Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies couldteachthis, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]

[94][That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]

[95][ConsultMillman’sHist. of Christ, vol. i.:Priestley’sInstitutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: andWhately’sPol. Econ., sec. 5.]

[96][We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.]

[97][“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. Buthabitsof veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving theprinciplesof love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends uponthe ratiobetween our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c.,must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites. Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”—Prof. Fitzgerald.]

[98]It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by asense of interestis meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by asense of interestis meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.—See p.131.

[99][Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole destiny!It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. Ascetic acts are only useful asmeans, and so long as they areascetic(askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good onlyasdiscipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.]

[100][Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butlerof coursedoes not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fellsuddenly, no less in his state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason outhow muchdisorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be gainsayed.Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner “lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship with God.]

[101][A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote ourfuturehappiness. It will notlongmar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a personhabituallyvirtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.]

[102]P.145.

[103][The student should learn to distinguish between thekindsof necessity. There is—1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by them we govern ourselves.But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:—1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. SeeCollingson Providence,Price’sDissertations,Rutherfordon Providence,Charnock’sSermons, andWhately’sLogic.]

[104]P.157.

[105]P.158.

[106][Humesays, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.”Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume found him out!]

[107]Bywillandcharacteris meant that which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the wordstemper,taste,dispositions,practical principles:that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another.

[108]Chap. ii.

[109]P.157, &c.

[110]Chap. ii.

[111]Dissert. II.

[112]Serm. 2, at theRolls.

[113]Dissert. II.

[114]However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, thatit is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, thenfitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.

[115]P.118.

[116]P.110, &c.

[117]Chap. ii.

[118]Dissertation II.

[119]Pp.68,71.

[120]Serm. 8th, at theRolls.

[121][Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake—also,Belsham’sEssays,Collinson Liberty,Crombieon Phil. Necessity,Hobbes’Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan,Priestleyon Liberty,Hartleyon Man, andEdwardson the Will.Against the doctrine, seeBeattie’sWorks, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes byBramhallandLawson; Replies to Priestley byPalmerandBryant;Groveon Liberty;Clarke’sSermons at the Boyle Lectures;Gibb’sContemplations;King’sOrigin of Evil;Reidon the Mind;Wattson Liberty;Harris’Boyle Lectures;Jackson’sDefence;Butterworthon Moral Government.]

[122][Maimonidesmakes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it isimpossibleman should come into existence in such a manner.”]

[123][Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age to eternity.The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against theproofsof religion, as it is againstobjectionsto it.]

[124][No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are best.]

[125]Pp.177,178.

[126]P.173, &c.

[127]P.175.

[128]Pp.72,73.

[129]P.68, andPart II. chap. vi.

[130]Serm. at theRolls, p. 312, 2d ed.

[131]P.172, &c.

[132]SeePart II. ch. ii.

[133]P.173.

[134][The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]

[135]Part II. ch. vi.

[136]P.108.

[137][There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses theimportancerather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves thenecessityof revelation, if we would know any thing ofsuchtruths. And it is such truths which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach theway of salvation, for the sinful and helpless.]

[138][No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point,Leland’sAdv. and Necess.:Chalmers’Nat. Theol.:McCosh’sDiv. Gov.:Pascal’sThoughts:Warburton’sDiv. Legation.]

[139]Invenis multos——propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum.Aug. in Psal.xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one. “What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian.”]

[140][The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation, is well laid down byWayland,Mor. Sci.ch. ix. sec. 2.]

[141][Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.]

[142][“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There was however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana intovisible churches, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.”Butler’ssermon before the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.]

[143]Rev. xxii. 11.

[144][“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say that since Christianity is aremedialsystem, designed to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to beliableto the same perversions. Because—1. Christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the defects ofnature, but of an unnatural state of ruin into which men were brought bythe Fall. And 2. It is remedial of the defects of nature in agreat degree, by its giving additional advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”—Fitzgerald’sNotes.]

[145][Chalmers(Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows theethicsof natural religion to be one thing and itsobjectsanother. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by therelationin which we of course stand to him. How we are toexpressthat love and obedience it cannot teach.]

[146]See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, &c., [byWaterland,] andColliberof Revealed Religion, as there quoted.

[147][If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.]

[148]P.94.

[149]Ch. v.

[150]John iii. 5.

[151]This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p.189, &c.

[152][Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of baptism or the Lord’s supper.]

[153]Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.

[154]Hosea vi. 6.

[155]See Matt. xii. 7.

[156]Seech. iii.

[157][Dr.Angusjudiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree withallknown truth, whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, andknown truth. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to hisassumed hypothesis.]

[158]P.203.

[159]Chaps.iii.,iv.,v.,vi.

Back to Index Next