Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.
[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in as condensed a form as possible.]
The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most common notion is that our future interests aredepending; and depending onourselves. And that we haveopportunitiesfor both good and bad conduct, andtemptationsto each.
This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.
Hence needs to be considered by itself.
Doctrine.The natural government of God, in this world, puts us on trial as to the things of this world; and so implies, what religion teaches, that his moral government puts us on trial as to a future world.
This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,
Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government.
Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for a better state.
This, though a very partial answer to the inquirywhywe are so placed, answers an infinitely more important question,—viz.:What is our business here?
Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.
The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.
To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.
Conclusion.—It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is false.
Moral government,as a fact, has now been considered; it remains for us to remove objections against itswisdom and goodness. A thing being true does not prove it to be good.
In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice.
This we shall find to be the case.
Doctrine.On the supposition that God exercises moral government, the analogy of nature teaches that it must be a scheme, and one quite beyond our comprehension.
[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]
Every one must admit that weneeda revelation. Few, if any, could reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy.
No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small importance.
If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. This we cannot know.
The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it
This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the Scriptures.
Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions against it.
The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against miracles.
They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.
Beside the objectors to theevidencesof Christianity, there are many who object to itsnature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it containedimmoralitiesorcontradictionsthey would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.
Let the student look to theforceof the proofs, rather than anyconsequenceswhich may be drawn from them.
Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.
For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.
All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.
In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.
This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.
But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, or credible.
It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course of nature, that it was ascheme, imperfectly comprehended.
If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.
[In studying this chapter, letchap. vii. part i.be kept in view.]
Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianityas a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question ofwisdom and goodness, the next thing is to discussobjections in particular.
As one of these is directed againstthe scheme, as just now described, it will be considered here.
Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.