A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy[pg 194]had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more[pg 195]secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage[pg 196]to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe,“I bring here,”says he, in a haughty tone,“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.”The senate answering, that they left the choice to him:“I give you war then,”says he, unfolding his robe.“And we,”replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness,“as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.”Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722lies upon the[pg 197]Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this[pg 198]expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727were sixteen hundred furlongs.728From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country[pg 199]lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738the next day without the least opposition.They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest[pg 200]of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a[pg 201]hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to[pg 202]the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the[pg 203]Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the[pg 204]loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such[pg 205]pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by[pg 206]good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for[pg 207]action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy,[pg 208]but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward,viz.the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops[pg 209]over it. Two ill omens750had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.[pg 210]The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated,[pg 211]and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or[pg 212]one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that[pg 213]of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of[pg 214]all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy[pg 194]had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more[pg 195]secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage[pg 196]to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe,“I bring here,”says he, in a haughty tone,“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.”The senate answering, that they left the choice to him:“I give you war then,”says he, unfolding his robe.“And we,”replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness,“as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.”Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722lies upon the[pg 197]Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this[pg 198]expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727were sixteen hundred furlongs.728From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country[pg 199]lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738the next day without the least opposition.They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest[pg 200]of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a[pg 201]hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to[pg 202]the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the[pg 203]Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the[pg 204]loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such[pg 205]pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by[pg 206]good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for[pg 207]action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy,[pg 208]but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward,viz.the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops[pg 209]over it. Two ill omens750had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.[pg 210]The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated,[pg 211]and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or[pg 212]one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that[pg 213]of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of[pg 214]all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy[pg 194]had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more[pg 195]secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage[pg 196]to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe,“I bring here,”says he, in a haughty tone,“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.”The senate answering, that they left the choice to him:“I give you war then,”says he, unfolding his robe.“And we,”replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness,“as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.”Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722lies upon the[pg 197]Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this[pg 198]expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727were sixteen hundred furlongs.728From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country[pg 199]lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738the next day without the least opposition.They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest[pg 200]of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a[pg 201]hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to[pg 202]the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the[pg 203]Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the[pg 204]loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such[pg 205]pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by[pg 206]good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for[pg 207]action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy,[pg 208]but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward,viz.the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops[pg 209]over it. Two ill omens750had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.[pg 210]The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated,[pg 211]and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or[pg 212]one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that[pg 213]of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of[pg 214]all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy[pg 194]had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more[pg 195]secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage[pg 196]to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe,“I bring here,”says he, in a haughty tone,“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.”The senate answering, that they left the choice to him:“I give you war then,”says he, unfolding his robe.“And we,”replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness,“as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.”Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722lies upon the[pg 197]Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this[pg 198]expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727were sixteen hundred furlongs.728From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country[pg 199]lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738the next day without the least opposition.They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest[pg 200]of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a[pg 201]hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to[pg 202]the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the[pg 203]Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the[pg 204]loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such[pg 205]pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by[pg 206]good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for[pg 207]action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy,[pg 208]but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward,viz.the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops[pg 209]over it. Two ill omens750had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.[pg 210]The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated,[pg 211]and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or[pg 212]one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that[pg 213]of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of[pg 214]all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy[pg 194]had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more[pg 195]secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage[pg 196]to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe,“I bring here,”says he, in a haughty tone,“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.”The senate answering, that they left the choice to him:“I give you war then,”says he, unfolding his robe.“And we,”replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness,“as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.”Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722lies upon the[pg 197]Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this[pg 198]expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727were sixteen hundred furlongs.728From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country[pg 199]lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738the next day without the least opposition.They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest[pg 200]of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a[pg 201]hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to[pg 202]the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the[pg 203]Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the[pg 204]loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such[pg 205]pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by[pg 206]good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for[pg 207]action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy,[pg 208]but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward,viz.the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops[pg 209]over it. Two ill omens750had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.[pg 210]The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated,[pg 211]and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or[pg 212]one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that[pg 213]of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of[pg 214]all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.
A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.
Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715
The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy[pg 194]had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.
The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.
In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more[pg 195]secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.
News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.
During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage[pg 196]to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.
Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.
War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe,“I bring here,”says he, in a haughty tone,“either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.”The senate answering, that they left the choice to him:“I give you war then,”says he, unfolding his robe.“And we,”replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness,“as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.”Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.
If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722lies upon the[pg 197]Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.
The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.
A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.
A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.
The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.
Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this[pg 198]expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727were sixteen hundred furlongs.728From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732
Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.
Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country[pg 199]lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.
Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738the next day without the least opposition.
They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest[pg 200]of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.
The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.
The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a[pg 201]hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.
At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.
Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to[pg 202]the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.
Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.
Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.
The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the[pg 203]Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.
The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the[pg 204]loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.
After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.
At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such[pg 205]pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.
They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.
Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by[pg 206]good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.
Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.
His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for[pg 207]action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.
The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748
Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy,[pg 208]but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.
Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward,viz.the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.
After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops[pg 209]over it. Two ill omens750had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.
Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.
The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.
It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.
Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.
Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.
This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated,[pg 211]and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.
These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.
This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or[pg 212]one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.
They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that[pg 213]of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.
In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.
Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.
The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of[pg 214]all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.
Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.