Notes

“Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, and when he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybānī, one ofHārith’s followers, who was in Bādhkar (the citadel of Zamm), saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ...nor to the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand. Now I am on my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God that no harm shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall have friendly and honourable treatment and pardon, you and those with you....”So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the condition of pardon which he had given him, and Asad pardoned him, and Al-Haytham marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave them double pay.”

The expedition therefore was obviously against unbelievers. That the whole ofSughd was lost to the Arabs is clear from the fact that Asad found it necessary to take provisions for the army with him from Bukhārā. He was not successful in recapturing the city, however, and attempted no more than the damming of the canal sluices at Waraghsar.

The fate of the garrison of Samarqand has thus been passed over in silence, unless, perhaps, it is hinted at in Asad’s reference to the capture of Muslim women. Whether Ghūrak recaptured it with his own troops or with the aid of the Türgesh, it can scarcely be doubted that he had taken advantage of the dissensions in Khurāsān to realise his ambition and at last drive the Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conquests of Qutayba beyond the Oxus, Bukhārā, Chaghāniān, and perhaps Kish alone remained to the Arabs. A confirmatory detail is the cessation ofSughdian embassies to China between 731 and 740: now that independence (even if under Türgesh suzerainty) had been won again, there was no need to invoke Chinese support. Negative evidence of the same kind is afforded by the absence of any Arab embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs been in possession ofSughd, it is practically certain that Asad, as he had done before, would have renewed relations with the Chinese court. Against this view may be set the statement inTab. 1613. 5 that Khāqān was preparing an army to invest Samarqand at the time of his assassination. This report is, however, from its nature untrustworthy, and is contradicted by the presence of the king ofSughd withSughdian troops in the Türgesh army in 119/737 as well as by Nasr b. Sayyār’s expedition to Samarqand two years later.Sughd thus enjoyed once more a brief period of independence. In 737 or 738 Ghūrak died and his kingdom was divided amongst hisheirs. He was succeeded at Samarqand by his son Tu-ho (?Tarkhūn), formerly prince of Kabudhān. Another son Me-chuʾo (? Mukhtār) was already king of Māyamurgh, while the king of Ishtīkhan in 742 was a certain Ko-lo-pu-lo who may perhaps be identified with Ghūrak’s brother Afarūn[91].

The year after the campaigns againstHārith, 118/736, was devoted by Asad to the re-organisation of his province, including a measure which, it seems, he had already projected in his first term of office. This was the removal of the provincial capital from Merv to Balkh[92]. Since no other governor of Khurāsān followed his example we must seek the motive for the innovation either in the contemporary situation in Khurāsān and Transoxania or in Asad’s personal views. Explanations based on the former are not hard to find. Asad, on taking office, had been faced with a serious situation both in LowerTukhāristān and across the river. He had obviously to establish a strong pointd’appui. The loyalty of the garrison at Merv was not above suspicion but the garrison at Balkh was composed of Syrian troops, who could be trusted to the uttermost[93]. Merv was also less convenient for reachingTukhāristān, which was at the moment the main area of operations. More important still, perhaps, Balkh was the centre from which all disturbances spread in Eastern Khurāsān, as in the revolt of Nēzak and the recent attempt ofHārith. As the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall Nēzak, it is possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would be in a position to check all similar movements at the beginning. Other considerations may also have disposed him to take this view. Balkh was the traditional capital and on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment of Eastern Khurāsān. Merv, on the other hand, had always been the capital of the foreigners, of the Sāsānians before the Arabs. Asad’s personal friendship with the dihqāns may have given him some insight into the moral effect which would follow from the transferenceof the administration to the centre of the national life. Still greater would this effect be when the rebuilding was carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by their own people under the supervision of the Barmak, the hereditary priest-ruler of the ancient shrine. Quite apart from this, however, the rebuilding of Balkh was an event of the greatest significance, and once restored it soon equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and importance. While the new city was being built, the army was employed in expeditions intoTukhāristān, for the most part under the command of Judayʿ al-Karmānī, who achieved some successes against the followers ofHārith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress in Badakhshān. Other raids were undertaken by the governor himself, but without results of military importance.

Asad now planned a more ambitious expedition against Khuttal, partly in retaliation for the assistance given toHārith, partly, it may be, to wipe off an old score. The chronology presents some difficulties at this point.Tabarī relates two expeditions into Khuttal in the same year 119/737, both from the same source, but that which is undoubtedly the earlier is dated towards the close of the year (Ramadān = September). Wellhausen avoids the difficulty by referring this expedition to 118, reckoning back from the appointment of Nasr b. Sayyār, the data for which are full and unimpeachable. This would seem the obvious solution were it not that the date given in the Chinese records for the assassination of Su-Lu, 738[94], agrees perfectly withTabarī’s dating of the Battle of Kharīstān in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad on the second expedition would then hang together with the “somewhat legendary” narrative of the Mihrjān feast. There seems reason, therefore, for dating this expedition in 120/738 and regarding it as having been despatched by Asad, though not actually accompanied by him.Tabarī fortunately preserves also a short notice of the situation in Khuttal. The heir of as-Sabal,whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the Chinese transcription Lo-kin-tsie[95], had fled to China, possibly on account of factional disturbances. On his deathbed as-Sabal appointed a regent, Ibn As-Sāʿijī, to govern the country until Al-Hanash could be restored. The moment was certainly opportune for making an expedition and Asad at first carried all before him. On his first appearance, however, Ibn As-Sāʿijī had appealed for aid to Su-Lu, who was at his capital Nawākath (on the Chu). The Khāqān, with a small mounted force including theSughdian refugees, marched from Sūyāb (near Tokmak, on the Chu) to Khuttal in seventeen days, only to find Asad, warned of his approach by the regent, who was endeavouring to play both sides off against each other, in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had been despatched in advance under Ibrāhīm b. ʿĀsim with a guard of Arabs and native troops from Chaghāniān but the main body was overtaken by the Turks as it was crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, considering himself safe with the river between his army and the enemy, encamped and sent orders to Ibrāhīm to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however, were able to effect a crossing; after an unsuccessful assault on Asad’s camp, they hastened to overtake the richer prize while the governor’s troops were too worn out to protect it. By sending a party under cover to fall on the troops of Chaghāniān from the rear while he himself attacked in front, the Khāqān forced an entrance into Ibrāhīm’s camp. Chāghān Khudāh, faithful to the last, himself fell with the greater part of his forces but the remainder of the garrison were saved by the timely arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the Arabs were allowed to withdraw to Balkh without further serious fighting. A variant account given byTabarī relates an unsuccessful assault by the Türgesh on Asad’s camp on the morning following the “Battle of the Baggage,” which happened to be the feast of Fitr (1st October 737). On the retiral of the Arabs, theKhāqān, instead of returning to his capital with the honours of the day, remained inTukhāristān.

Here he was joined byHārith, who advised him to undertake a winter raid into LowerTukhāristān while the Arab troops were disbanded, undoubtedly in the expectation that the local princes would again unite with him against Asad. The governor retained his army at Balkh until the winter had set in, and in the meantime the Khāqān summoned forces to join him fromSughd and the territories subject toTukhāristān. The enumeration whichTabarī gives of the troops accompanying the Khāqān on this expedition shows very clearly how completely Arab rule in Transoxania and the Oxus basin had been supplanted by that of the Turks. We are told that besides the Khāqān’s own Turkish troops andHārith with his followers there were present the Jabghu, the king ofSughd, the prince of Usrūshana, and the rulers of Shāsh and Khuttal. It is fairly certain, of course, that the list is exaggerated in so far as the actual presence of the princes is concerned (it is in fact partially contradicted in other parts of the narrative), but it can scarcely be doubted that forces from some, if not all, of these principalities were engaged. On the evening of the 9th Dhuʾl-Hijja (7th Dec.) news reached Balkh that the Türgesh with their auxiliaries, numbering some 30,000, were at Jazza. Asad ordered signal fires to be lit and with the Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops he could muster from the district marched out against them. The governor of Khulm sent in a second report that the Khāqān, having been repulsed in an attack on the town, had marched on towards Pērōz Nakhshēr, in the neighbourhood of Balkh. From this point the enemy, avoiding Balkh, moved on Jūzjān and occupied the capital[96]. Instead of continuing his advance immediately, the Khāqān halted here and sent out raiding parties of cavalry in all directions, an action which put it beyond doubt that the immediate object of the expedition was not the capture of Merv but the rousing of LowerTukhāristān against the Arabs. Contrary toHārith’s expectations, however, the king of Jūzjān joined with the Arabs, who marched towards Shubūrqān by way of Sidra and Kharīstān. From the conflicting narratives inTabarī, it seems that Asad surprised the Khāqān in the neighbourhood of Kharīstān (or Sān) at a moment when his available forces amounted only to 4,000. A furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of the Arabs by an assault on the Khāqān from the rear, on the initiative of the king of Jūzjān. It is in connection with the battle, which he describes as if it were a set engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces were engaged, thatTabarī gives his list of the combatants. But as only 4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the Khāqān were involved, the list is obviously out of place and the whole narrative shows the marks of rehandling. The Muslims gained an overwhelming success: the Khāqān andHārith, having narrowly escaped capture in the confusion, were closely followed by Asad as far as Jazza, when a storm of rain and snow prevented further pursuit. They were thus able to regain the Jabghu inTukhāristān, with happier fortune than the raiding parties, whose retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al-Karmānī, and of whom only a single band ofSughdians made good their escape.

On this skirmish at Kharīstān, for it was little more, hung the fate of Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but possibly even in Khurāsān, at least for the immediate future. Though the princes of LowerTukhāristān fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt that a victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to the side ofHārith and the Turks, who would then have been in a position to follow up their attacks with the advantage of a base at Balkh, solidly supported by the Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were saved only by Asad’s resolution and fortunate selection of Balkh as his residence. The account given of Hishām’s incredulity on hearing the report shows how very seriousthe outlook had been and the extent to which the name of the Khāqān had become an omen of disaster. Kharīstān was not only the turning point in the fortunes of the Arabs in Central Asia, but gave the signal for the downfall of the Türgesh power, which was bound up with the personal prestige of Su-Lu. The princes ofTukhāristān and Transoxania found it expedient to treat him with respect as he was returning to Nawākath, but in his own country the dissensions long fomented in secret by the Chinese broke out. Su-Lu was assassinated by the Baga Tarkhan (Kūrsūl); the kingdom fell to pieces. “The Turks split up and began to raid one another,” and thecoup de grâceof the Khanate was delivered at Sūyāb in 739 by the faction of Kūrsūl, supported by the Chinese and with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from Shāsh and Farghāna[97][98]. With the collapse of the Türgesh kingdom disappeared the last great Turkish confederation in Western Asia for more than two centuries to come. The battle of Kharīstān assured the supremacy of the Muslim civilisation in Sogdiana, but it could not have attained the richness of its full development there unless all danger from the steppes had been removed. That this security was attained was due not to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, which, by breaking down the greatest external obstacle to the Muhammadan penetration of Central Asia, brought itself face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have been realised at once, however, by the Arab government, whose immediate task was to restore its lost authority in Transoxania.

[74]As the history of this and the following period has been given in considerable detail by Wellhausen (Arab. Reich 280 ff.) from the Arab point of view, it is intended in these chapters to follow only the situation in Transoxania and the course of the Türgesh conquests, avoiding as far as possible a simple recapitulation of familiar matter. Thus little reference is made to the factional strife among the Arabs, though it naturally played a very important part in limiting their power to deal with the insurgents.

[75]See Chavannes, Documents 285, n. 3.

[76]Cf.Tab. II. 1718. 3 ff.

[77]Tab. 1462. 11;cf.1688. 10, 1481 f.

[78]Tab. 1690. 16.

[79]Chav. Doc. 206 f., 293 f.

[80]Van Vloten, La Domination Arabe 28.

[81]Tab. 1533. 15.

[82]Tab. 1501. 2.

[83]Wellhausen 284 f.: van Vloten 22 f.:Tab. 1507 f.: Bal. 428 f.

[84]See Wellhausen 218.

[85]The variant readings inTab. 1509. 11. (cf.Ibn al-Athīr) make it doubtful whether the taxes were reimposed on them or not.

[86]Tab. 1514. 11.

[87]See Yāqūt s.v.: Barthold, Turkestan 127: andcf.Tab. 1523. 3. The chief difficulty inTabarī’s text is the abrupt change at the last word of l. 14 on p. 1516: thumma tahawwala (ashrashu) ilā marjin yuqālu lahu bawādaratunfaʿatāhumsabābatun ... wahum nuzūlun bikamarjata. The context shows that it was not to Ashras that Sabāba came but to the garrison of Kamarja with the news that the Khāqān was retiring past them (mārrun bikum).

[88]The chronological difficulties are explained by Wellhausen 285 ff. They are of small importance however, and it seems preferable to follow his dates for these campaigns.

[89]Cf.Tab. 1528. 9. with 1529. 5 f. 14 f.

[90]Van Vloten,op. cit.29 ff.: Wellhausen 289 ff. (cf.302 f.). Another account ofHārith is given by Gardīzī ap. Barthold Turkestan, Texts pp. 1-2.

[91]Chav. Doc. 210, 136, 140; Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21. n. 8.

[92]Tab. 1490, 1591. 18: Wellhausen 292 and 284 n.: Barthold in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) 261.

[93]Tab. 1590. 5. There does not seem to be any record of when these Syrians were settled at Balkh.

[94]Wieger 1643: Chav. Doc. 284 f.

[95]Chav. Doc. 168.

[96]As Jūzjān is distinguished from Shubūrqān inTab. 1608. 17, it is probable that this was the town Kundurm or Qurzumān mentioned in Yaʿqūbī’s Geog. 287.

[97]Tab. 1613: Chav. Doc. 83 f., 122 n. As regards the adjective Kharlukhī applied to the Jabghu in 1612. 16, the most satisfactory explanation is that given by Marquart, Hist. Glossen 183 f.

[98]The frequent references in the Chinese annals to the association of Se-kin-tʾi, king of Kish, with the Türgesh raise an interesting problem. There can be no doubt that he is the same prince as Al-Ishkand, ruler of Nasaf, in the Arabic records. The name is Iranian and personal, not dynastic. (See Justi’s Iranisches Namenbuch.) Al-Ishkand is first mentioned in the account of the Battle of the Pass, (Tab. 1542. 8) where he appears in command of a cavalry force on the side of the Khāqān, though Kish and Nasaf were both in the hands of the Arabs (1545. 1). The forces which he commanded were therefore not the ordinary local troops. DuringHārith’s siege of Tirmidh he received reinforcements from Al-Ishkand, but no statement is made on the composition of his forces. He is mentioned again as accompanying the Khāqān and theSughdians in the attack on Asad before the “Battle of the Baggage” (1597. 17-18,) where the reading ‘Ispahbadh of Nasā’ is probably an error in the tradition. Again there can be no question here of local troops from Nasaf or Kish. In the Chinese records Se-kin-tʾi appears as the commander of an independent force, not merely a detachment of Turks or levies from Shāsh or Farghāna. The most reasonable conclusion is that Al-Ishkand was the commander of the corps ofSughdian refugees. This would explain the title “King of the Warriors” by which he is sometimes mentioned in the Chinese records (Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). The actual term (Chākar) from which the title was derived does not appear in the Arabic histories in this connection, but it is perhaps possible that a variant of the name (derived fromrazm) is to be read inTab. 1614. 2 for the meaningless “razābin al-Kissī.” In 1609. 15 a force of “Bābīya” is mentioned along with theSughdians, and the name, though unrecognisable, probably refers to some forces connected withSughd. Wellhausen’s conclusion that theSughdians and “Bābīya” formed part of the personal following ofHārith b. Surayj seems to force the connection in the text too far (hamala ʾl-hārithu waman maʿahu min ahliʾs-sughdi wal-bābīyati). On the other hand, since al-Ishkand appears as the ally ofHārith, we may conclude that some understanding existed between the latter and theSughdians (and therefore the Turks) at the time of his revolt. It is probable that theSughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand from the Arabs.

The reaction produced by the downfall of the Türgesh power was manifested in Transoxania in the first place by an increased regard for China. The princes had found the Türgesh yoke no less galling in the end than that of the Arabs[99]; the country was as wasted and impoverished by their continual raids as it had been under the latter. The profitable native and transit trade, the source of the entire wealth of the cities, must have shrunk to negligible proportions if it had not wholly ceased. All classes of the people therefore were weary of war and sought only a peace consonant with their self-respect. For the attainment of these aims it was vain to look to China; the granting of bombastic titles to a few princes brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity was thus offered to wise statesmanship to swing the whole country round to the Arabs almost without a blow. For two years, however, the situation seemed to remain much as it was, except for an expedition into Khuttal, probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house against a usurper from Bamiyān. Nevertheless some progress had been made by the administration in regaining the prestige it had lost. This was due not merely to the effect of the victories overHārith and the Türgesh, but even more to Asad’s personal relations with the dihqāns. He had, as we have seen, gratified the national pride of the people ofTukhāristān by transferring the seat of power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners, to Balkh, the centre of their national life. As had been the case even in his first term of office, he was able to attract to his side many of the more influential elements in LowerTukhāristān and the Ephthalite lands—to this, in fact, was largely due his success in the struggle with the Turks. More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversionof the dihqāns at this period, amongst them the minor chief Sāmān-Khudāh and probably also the Barmak. By this means Asad laid the foundations for a true reconciliation and Narshakhī’s work amply attests the honour which later generations attached to his name. His work was of course incomplete in that it was practically confined to the ruling classes and naturally did not extend to the now independent dihqāns ofSughd.

Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of some months the governorship was conferred by Hishām on Nasr b. Sayyār. For the subject peoples no choice could have been more opportunely made. Nasr was one of the few men who had come with honour and reputation through the external and internal conflicts of the last thirty years. Belonging to the small and almost neutral tribe of Kināna, his position bore a strong similarity to that of Qutayba in that both were more dependent on the support of a powerful patron than on their tribal connexions, and therefore, though favouring Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast to Qutayba, however, Nasr, after thirty years of active leadership, knew the situation in Khurāsān, Transoxania, and Central Asia as no Arab governor had ever done. He had seen the futility of trying to hold the country by mere brute force, and the equal futility of trying to dispense with force. While he held the support of Hishām, therefore, he set himself to restore Arab authority in Transoxania. The appointment of Qatan b. Qutayba, who had inherited much of his father’s ability, to command the forces beyond the river gave earnest of an aggressive policy. The appointment was not to Samarqand, as Wellhausen says, but “overSughd,”i.e., the garrisons in Bukhārā and probably Kish, who were responsible in the first place for keeping the surrounding districts in subjection. The governor himself then carried out a brief expedition, intended apparently to punish some rebels in the neighbourhood of the Iron Gate, possibly in Shūmān. Having thus vindicated theauthority of the administration, Nasr returned to Merv and delivered the famous Khutba in which the system of taxation and conditions of amnesty were at last laid down in a form satisfactory to the mawālī and the subject peoples[100]. The results were as he had foreseen. The princes and people of Transoxania submitted, as far as we can judge, without opposition when Nasr with his army marched throughSughd to re-establish the Arab garrison and administration in Samarqand.

This expedition may in all probability be dated in 121/739. A year or two later, Nasr collected his forces, which included levies from Transoxania, for an attack on Shāsh. Wellhausen considers that the first two expeditions were only stages of the third, but the expedition to Shāsh can hardly have taken place earlier than 122/740, in view of the fact that the armies of Shāsh and Farghāna were engaged with the Türgesh in 739, and of Narshakhī’s statement[101], which there is no reason to dispute, thatTughshāda was assassinated in the thirty-second year of his reign. Reckoning in lunar years this gives 122 (91-122), in solar years 123 (710-741), as the date. This is confirmed by the Chinese record of an embassy from Shāsh in 741 complaining that “Now that the Turks have become subject to China, it is only the Arabs that are a curse to the Kingdoms”[102]. 123 is also the date given for the return of theSughdians[103]. It is most unlikely that the intervening year or years passed without expeditions altogether, and the most reasonable supposition is that they were occupied in the pacification ofSughd. The expedition marched eastward through Ushrūsana, whose prince, as usual, paid his allegiance to the victor on his passage, but on reaching the Jaxartes Nasr found his crossing opposed by the army of Shāsh, together withHārith b. Surayj and some Turkish troops. It would seem that he was unable to come to blows with the main body of the enemy, but made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed to accept an Arab resident and to expelHārith, who wasaccordingly deported to Fārāb. As usual, later tradition magnified the exploits of the Arabs by crediting Nasr with the capture and execution of Kūrsūl, the Türgesh leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than the Khāqān himself. If the story has any foundation it is probably a legendary development from the capture of a Turkish chief Al-Akhram, related byTabarī in a variant account. The presence of Kūrsūl with a Türgesh force on this occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his identification with Baga Tarkhan is sound, we know that he was executed by the Chinese in 744/126[104]. The expulsion ofHārith was probably the object for which the expedition had been undertaken; before returning, however, the Arabs entered Farghāna and pursued its king as far as Qubā before bringing him to terms. The negotiations were carried out between Sulaymān b.Sūl, one of the princes of Jūrjān, and the Queen-Mother. This invasion of Farghāna is related in three (or four) different versions, some of which may possibly refer to a second expedition mentioned byTabarī later. In the same year, on returning from the expedition to Shāsh, Nasr was met at Samarqand by the Bukhār KhudāhTughshāda and two of his dihqāns. The nobles laid a complaint against the prince, but as Nasr seemed indisposed to redress their grievance, they attempted to assassinate both the Bukhār Khudāh and the Arab intendant at Bukhārā, Wāsil b. ʿAmr. The former was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his son Qutayba, so named in honour of the conqueror. The incident is related also by Narshakhī with some additional details which profess to explain the assassination. The two narratives present such a remarkable similarity of phrase, however, even though they are in different languages, that it is rather more likely that the Persian version has elaborated the story than thatTabarī deliberately suppressed any offensive statements, as argued by van Vloten[105].

Except for a possible second expedition to Farghāna,no other campaigns into Transoxania are recorded of Nasr, unless Balādhurī’s tradition (from Abū ʿUbayda) of an unsuccessful attack on Ushrūsana refers to a separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account conflicts with that given inTabarī. Ushrūsana, however, was never really subdued until nearly a century later.Tukhāristān, if it had not already been recovered by Asad, may have made submission of its own accord. Since the defeat of the Türgesh and the flight ofHārith it had ceased to hold any menace to the Arabs, and Nasr had accordingly retransferred the capital to Merv on his appointment.

The governor now turned his attention to restoring the prosperity of the country and developing a policy of co-operation with the subject peoples. Nasr was the first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the government depended for support in the last resort on the middle classes and agriculturalists. Both these classes were of greater political importance perhaps in Transoxania, with its centuries of mercantile tradition, than any other were in the Empire. It was in the same way that in later years theTāhirids and Sāmānids established their ascendancy[106]. He was thus able not only to complete the work begun by Asad b. ʿAbdullah, but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly after his recapture of Samarqand he had sent an embassy to China. This was followed up in 126/744 by a much more elaborate embassy, obviously intended to regulate commercial relations in the most complete manner possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by ambassadors not only from the Sogdian cities andTukhāristān, but even from Zābulistān, Shāsh, and the Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded in 745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not so much the justice of Nasr’s rule as his personal influence and honesty that reconciled the peoples of Transoxania. Even theSughdian refugees, stranded after the dissolution of the Türgesh confederacy, trusted him to honourthe conditions upon which they had agreed to return, and were not deceived although his concessions raised a storm of protest, and the Caliph himself was brought to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace.

It is not surprising, however, that the princes were dissatisfied with the success which had attended the pacification of Transoxania. The people were “becoming Arabs” too rapidly and their own authority was menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of regaining their independence, especially when Nasr’s position became less secure after the death of Hishām. We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China, such as that sent from Ishtīkhan in 745 asking for annexation to China “like a little circumscription.” That the governor was aware of this undercurrent may be judged from the fact that he felt it necessary to haveHārith b. Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the Turks to attack the government[107]. But the people as a whole held for Nasr. The respect and even affection which he inspired held all Transoxania true to him during the last troubled years. No tribute could be more eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania took advantage of the revolutionary movements in Khurāsān to withdraw its allegiance, that Abū Muslim’s missionaries went no further than the Arab colonies at Āmul, Bukhārā, and Khwārizm, and that the loyal garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in Chaghāniān andTukhāristān. On these facts the various authorities whose narratives are related byTabarī completely agree, and by their agreement disprove the exaggerated account given by Dīnawarī (359 f.) that “Abū Muslim sent his envoys (duʿāt) to all quarters of Khurāsān, and the people rallieden masseto Abū Muslim from Herāt, Būshanj, Merv-Rūdh,Tālaqān, Merv, Nasā, Abīward,Tūs, Naysābūr, Sarakhs, Balkh, Chaghāniān,Tukhāristān, Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf.” Dīnawarī himself states a little later that Samarqand joined Abū Muslim only after the death of Nasr. Abū Muslim’smain strength, in fact, was drawn from LowerTukhāristān and the neighbourhood of Merv-Rūdh, several of the princes of which, including the ruler of Būshanj and Khālid b. Barmak, declared for him. But even here the people were not solidly against the administration. We are told that a camp was established at Jīranj (south of Merv) “to cut off the reinforcements of Nasr b. Sayyār from Merv-Rūdh, Balkh, and the districts of (Lower)Tukhāristān.” Herāt fell to Abū Muslim by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together with the Mudarite party, were supported by the rulers of both Upper and LowerTukhāristān, and twice recaptured the city from their stronghold at Tirmidh. An example of Abū Muslim’s efforts to gain over the Iranians is afforded by an incident when, having taken 300 Khwārizmian prisoners in an engagement, he treated them well and set them free[108].

The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abū Muslim is true only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed. His following was at first comparatively so small that had the Arabs been more willing to support Nasr at the outset, it is practically certain that it would have melted away as rapidly as the following ofHārith b. Surayj at the first reverse. “Nothing succeeds like success,” and Abū Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that with the aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among the peoples of Eastern Khurāsān. The legend penetrated but slowly into Transoxania. When by 130/748, however, the whole of Eastern Khurāsān had fallen to Abū Muslim and Nasr no longer held authority, his governors in Transoxania were replaced by the nominees of Abū Muslim without outward disturbance. But the recrudescence of embassies to China shows that under the surface currents were stirring. Shāsh had already thrown off its allegiance and the Sogdian princes had by no means lost all hope of regaining independence inspite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part but by the Arab garrison of Bukhārā under Sharīk b. Shaykh in 133/750-751. The rising, which was due to their resentment at the seizure of the Caliphate by the ʿAbbāsids and the passing over of the ʿAlid house, was suppressed with some difficulty by Abū Muslim’s lieutenant Ziyād b. Sālihassisted by the Bukhār Khudāh. The fact that the Bukhār-Khudāh assisted the troops of Abū Muslim against Sharīk might be regarded as an indication that he belonged to the party of the former. This inference is more than doubtful, however. Of the 30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the rebels, probably the greater part were the townsmen, or “popular party,” of Bukhārā. The revolt thus assumed the domestic character of a movement against the aristocratic party, who, led by the Bukhār-Khudāh, naturally cooperated with the Government in its suppression. The events of the following year are sufficient evidence against any other explanation. According to Narshakhī, who gives by far the fullest account of this revolt, Ziyād had also to suppress a similar movement in Samarqand. In the same year an expedition was sent into Khuttal by Abū Dāwud, the governor of Balkh. Al-Hanash at first offered no opposition; later in the campaign he attempted to hold out against the Arabs but was forced to fly to the Turks and thence to China where he was given the title of Jabghu in recompense for his resistance[109]. By this expedition Khuttal was effectively annexed to the Arab government for the first time.

Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importance were the results of an expedition under Ziyād b. Sālihinto the Turkish lands beyond the Jaxartes. It is surprising to find no reference to this either inTabarī or any other of the early historians. A short notice is given by Ibn al-Athīr, drawn from some source which is now apparently lost. The earliest reference which we find in the Arabic histories seems to be a passing mention of Ziyād b.Sālih’s expedition “intoSīn” in a monograph on Baghdād by IbnTayfūr (d. 250/983)[110]. For a detailed account of the battle we are therefore dependent on the Chinese sources[111]. In 747 and 749 the Jabghu ofTukhāristān had appealed to China for aid against certain petty chiefs who were giving trouble in the Gilghit and Chitral valleys. The governor of Kucha despatched on this duty a Corean officer, Kao-hsien-shih, who punished the offenders in a series of amazing campaigns over the high passes of the Karakorum. Before returning to Kucha after the last campaign he was called in by the King of Farghāna to assist him against the king of Shāsh. Kao-hsien-shih at first came to terms with the king of Shāsh but when on some pretext he broke his word and seized the city, the heir to the kingdom fled toSughd for assistance and persuaded Abū Muslim to intervene. A strong force was accordingly despatched under Ziyād b. Sālih. The Chinese, with the army of Farghāna and the Karluks (who had succeeded the Türgesh in the hegemony of the Western Turks), gave battle at Athlakh, nearTarāz, in July 751 (Dhuʾl-hijja 133). During the engagement the Karluks deserted and Kao-hsien-shih, caught between them and the Arabs, suffered a crushing defeat. Though this battle marks the end of Chinese power in the West, it was in consequence of internal disruption rather than external pressure. Nothing was further at first from the minds of the princes ofSughd than the passing of the long tradition of Chinese sovereignty, indeed it blazed up more strongly than ever. For had not a Chinese army actually visited Shāsh on their very borders; even if the Arabs had won the first battle, would they not return to avenge the defeat? For the last time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted rising in Bukhārā, Kish,Sughd, and Ushrūsana. But China gave neither aid nor encouragement; the presence of Abū Muslim at Samarqand overawed theSughdians, and only at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions. Abū Dāwud’s army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitchedbattle at Kandak, near Kish, killing the king Al-Ikhrīd and many of the other dihqāns. Amongst the treasures of the royal palace which were sent to Samarqand were “many articles of rare Chinese workmanship, vessels inlaid with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects d’art.” The Bukhār-Khudāh Qutayba and the dihqāns ofSughd also paid for their complicity with their lives[112].

So ended the last attempt at restoring an independent Sogdiana under the old régime. For some years yet the princes ofSughd, Khwārizm, andTukhāristān continued to send appeals to China. The Emperor, however, “preoccupied with maintaining peace, praised them all and gave them consolation, then having warned them sent them back to assure tranquillity in the Western lands.” Abū Muslim had also, it would seem, realised the importance of maintaining relations with the Chinese court, for a succession of embassies from “the Arabs with black garments” is reported, beginning in the year following the battle of the Talas. As many as three are mentioned in a single year. It is possible that these embassies were in part intended to keep the government informed on the progress of the civil wars in China, though the active interest of the new administration in their commerce would, as before, tend to reconcile the influential mercantile communities to ʿAbbāsid rule. The actual deathblow to the tradition of Chinese overlordship in Western Central Asia was given, not by any such isolated incident as the battle of the Talas, but by the participation of Central Asian contingents in the restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757[113]. Men from the distant lands to whom China had seemed an immeasurably powerful and unconquerable Empire now saw with their own eyes the fatal weaknesses that Chinese diplomacy had so skilfully concealed. From this blow Chinese prestige never recovered.

The complete shattering of the Western Turkish empires by the Chinese policy had also put an end to allpossibility of intervention from that side. Transoxania, therefore, was unable to look for outside support, while the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early ʿAbbāsid Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though sometimes serious risings, but any repetition of the concerted efforts at national independence. The Shao-wu princes and the more important dihqāns continued to exercise a nominal rule until the advent of the Sāmānids, but many of them found that the new policy of the Empire offered them an opportunity of honourable and lucrative service in its behalf and were quick to take advantage of it. On the other hand the frequent revolts in Eastern Khurāsān under the guise of religious movements show that the mass of the people remained unalterably hostile to their conquerors[114]. In none of these, however, was the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising organized by Rāfiʿ b. Layth three years after the fall of the Barmakids. The extraordinary success of his movement may partly be ascribed to resentment at their disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that he was the grandson of Nasr b. Sayyār. Though the revolt failed it led directly to the only solution by which Transoxania could ever become reconciled to inclusion in the Empire of the ʿAbbāsids. Whether by wise judgment or happy chance, to Maʿmūn belongs the credit of laying the foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation which the Iranian peoples of Central Asia were to enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of their own race.

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