In civilian society, what amounts to a cult has developed around the idea that the average person has a natural bent for some particular job or profession, which if thwarted will fill him with those frustrations which are conceded to be the cause of most of the mental and moral disorders of mankind.
Therefore if all men could become rightly placed, we would have Utopia tomorrow.
This theory of what humanity mainly cries for is perforce rejected by the military establishment, for several eminently practical as well as ideal reasons.
It discounts man, his plastic and impressionable nature, his response to all that goes on around him and his marked ability to adjust to any environment. He is not like a bolt fitted into a hole by a riveter, nor merely clay in the hands of the potter. What he becomes is mainly of his own making.
Further, the theory does not meet the needs of the situation, since in the services, as elsewhere, there are not enough better holes to go around, and no man is ready to say that he is good for nothing but life as a file-closer.
But the last and main reason why the theory is no good is that it doesn't square with human experience. A narrow classification system invites the danger of overspecialization and lessens the team play which is so indispensable to all military enterprise. It is possible for the machine to break down totally from lack of interchangeability in its parts.
We learn much from war, but some of the most obvious lessons are disregarded. One of the things that it should teach us is the tremendous adaptability of the average intelligent man, his ability to take hold of work altogether remote from any prior experience, master it, and find satisfaction in it, provided he is given help and encouragement by those who already know.
This is the great phenomenon of war—greater than theatomic bomb or supersonic flight. Former bookkeepers emerge as demolitions men. Divinity students become pharmacist's mates. School teachers operate tanks. Writing men turn into navigators. Woodsmen become lecturers. Longshoremen specialize in tactics. And all goes well.
Then when it is all over, and everyone gets back in his well-worn groove, the social scientists explain that these miracles occurred because under the stimulus of great fear and excitement which attends a period of national emergency, individuals will sublimate their main drives, and adjust temporarily to what would be otherwise an onerous personal difficulty. Sheer poppycock! Normal men do not feel pressed by fear simply because a state of war exists; their chief emotions change scarcely at all. These transformations occur only because the man had the potential all along, and with someone backing him upand giving him the feeling of success, his incentives became equal, at least, to anything he had known in his peacetime occupation.
That is the long-and-short of it. If our average man couldn't become a jack of many trades, and a master of several, the United States would never be able to meet a major war emergency.
For these reasons, service concepts of how men should be fitted to jobs do not develop around the simple notion that it is all a matter of putting a square peg in a square hole—which is the one best way to deny the peg any room for expansion. The doctrine is thatmen are many sided, that they learn their own powers and likes through experiment, that they are entitled to find what is best for them, and that having found it, their satisfactions will still derive mainly from intelligent and interested treatment by their superiors.
Every officer arrives sooner or later at the point where he has a direct hand in the placement of men. By way of preparation for that responsibility he should do two things mainly—learn all that he can from his superiors about its technical aspects, and in his own thinking, concentrate on principles to the exclusion of detail.
The fundamental purpose of all training today is to developthe natural faculties and stimulate the brain of the individual rather than to treat him as a cog which has to be fitted into a great machine.
The true purpose ofallrules covering the conduct of warfare and all regulations pertaining to the conduct of its individuals is to bring about order in the fighting machine rather than to strangle the mind of the man who reads them.
Thus in the assignment of men to work within any military organization, no amount of perfection in the analysis of skills and aptitudes can compensate for carelessness in their subsequent administration. The uniformed ranks are not mechanics, storekeepers and clerks primarily, but fighting men. This makes a difference. The optimum over-all results do not come from the care exercised in seeing that every man is placed at exactly the right job but from the concern taken that in whatever job he fills, he will feel that he is supported and that his efforts are appreciated. There is scarcely a good man who has served long within the profession without filling a half-dozen roles requiring vastly different skills. And looking back, what would the average one say about it? Not that he was happiest where the nature of the task best suited his hand, but happiest where his relations with his superiors gave him the greatest sense of accomplishment.
That is the human nature of the equation. We can let the economist argue that what a man puts into a job is largely dependent on what he takes out of it. And we can let the philosopher answer him that the fault in his proposition is that he has turned it the wrong way 'round. Regardless of which man has put the cart before the horse, there are two basic truths which outweigh the merits of the argument.
First.All human progress has come of the willingness of a man at a particular time to undertake a job which no one had ever done before.
Second.The main reward of any job is the knowledge that worthwhile work has been accomplished.
This last may sound like a corny maxim, but it's true. The reason maxims become corny is because they're true.
Despite all of the present-day emphasis on paycheck security as the mainspring of human action, the far stronger force which moves man as a social being is his desire for a secure place in the respect and affections of his associates, including his chief or his employer. Gary Cooper, playing in "The Cowboy and the Lady," used the line, "I aims, ma'm, to be high-regarded." Except for the few wrong-headed people, he was speaking for the whole human family.
The man who can get along without wanting or needing words of approval from other people is fit for a cell by himself, either padded or barred.
Loyalty in the masses of men waxes strong in the degree that they are made to believe that real importance is attached to their work and to their ability to think about their work. It weakens at every point where they consider that there is a negative respect for their intelligence; the dignity in any work is not inherent in the job itself but in the attitude of others toward it. Cabinet ministers, college presidents and industrial magnates will quit their jobs when they feel they no longer have the confidence of those to whom they are responsible. That experience is as demoralizing to great men as to the mine-run. Equally, the feeling of compensation which comes with any token of recognition is one of those touches of human nature which make all men akin. If men of genius and good works did not find Nobel prizes and honorary college degrees highly gratifying, this custom would have faded long ago. It is as rewarding to them to be called good at their job as it was to the New Jersey street sweeper who pushed his broom so diligently that he swept halfway into the next town before discovering his mistake.
The far inferences of these things should be reasonably clear to every officer of the fighting establishment. It makes little difference whether a man is digging a ditch or is working up a loading table for an invasion: what he thinks about his work will depend in large measure upon the attitude of his superiors. He will develop no great conviction about what he is doing except as it is transmitted to him.The fundamental cause of anybreakdown of morale and discipline within the armed service usually comes of this, that a commander or his subordinates transgress by treating men as if they were children or serfs instead of showing respect for their adulthood.
The requirements of modern war are such that we certainly do not want to turn out one man exactly like another, or turn the majority into mechanical men, capable of one set function. But the rule applies to officers as well as men. The greater freedom which is needed has nothing to do with social behavior or privilege. It is the freedom to think boldly and originally for the common good, for, to quote Kant again: "What one learns the most fixedly and remembers the best is what one learns more or less by oneself."
Thus in the matter of sizing up men, judging of their capacities and trying to get them rightly placed, the need is not a formula, since no formula will work. It is only by keeping principles uppermost in our thoughts that the greatest measure of common sense will prevail in our actions. That is what is needed, rather than clairvoyant powers, or a master's degree in psychology, if the service officer is to handle personnel efficiently. There are no great wizards in this field: there are only men who know more about the human nature of the problem than others because they have had a zest for meeting humanity and have built a text out of what others have told them.
The job begins by the search for data on the individual—all of the data that may be obtained. It goes on from that to sitting down with the subject, getting him to open up and talk freely about himself, what he has done, what he would like to do with his life, and his reasons for so feeling, et cetera. But the information from all sources has to be balanced against one's impression of the outer man, not just what he says but how he talks, the degree of his attentiveness, his bearing, his eye, his self-control. The decision is made on the basis of all these reckonings. This is common sense in action, and the only alternatives to it are to act upon a hunch or purely emotional grounds; one might, with better reason, determine another man's fortune by the flip of a coin.
Let's see briefly how the method works out in practice.
If the record shows that a man is a bad speller, careless about punctuation, not interested in writing, non-experienced at clerkship, and something of a rough diamond in his nature, he would be a bad bet for the administrative side, or in supply work, or in a communications role, though with a little polishing, and provided that he seems self-assured and is what we would call a "likeable" man, he might become a capital leader of a tactical group.
On the other hand, the man who says he had tried in vain to develop a manual skill, but has always been clumsy with his hands, and is supported in what he says by the records of his service, isn't necessarily excluded from becoming a good weapons or demolitions man, if he seems strong in body and nerve, though he would hardly do for a mechanic's berth, or a carpenter's assistant or as a radio repairman. Weapons and demolitions require strength, carefulness and good sense rather than great dexterity.
Take the man who is uncommunicative, or morose or unusually shy. From the day that he starts his service, his superiors should do their best to help him to change his ways; these ingrown men are roadblocks to group cooperation. But if he does not pick up and become outgiving, he hasn't the quality of a junior leader and there is no point in wasting space by sending him to any school or course out of which it would be expected that duties as an instructor would devolve upon him.
However, there is one word of extreme caution on this point. For as long as 6 months after entering service, some men are under abnormal constraint because they are in a new element, and feel a little frightened inside. Whether this is the case is to be judged best by getting full information on the man. If the record shows that he had led his class in college, managed an athletic team, headed a debating team in high school, been the main wheel in a boy's club or a Scout troop, or led any kind of group, this is to be taken as a sign that the potential is there and that he is a sleeper. The most common error made in the services is that we are prone to underscore that a man was alieutenant in a cadet company while taking no note of the file who had greater prestige in other activities because of his natural qualities as a leader.
These are only a few average samples of personnel handling, and of elementary reasoning. As Mother Goose might say, if the list had been longer, the case still wouldn't have been stronger. Far more profitably, we can dig a little deeper into the subject of principles.
In two senses, every decision as to the placing of men in the armed service is a moral decision, and therein it differs from average civilian responsibility. What is best for the man has always to be measured against the ultimate security and fighting objects of the establishment.
For example, it is dead wrong, even in time of peace, to commit tactical leadership to the hands of the man whose moral force clearly falls short of what is required on the field of war, no matter how congenial he may be. And it is just as wrong to let a blabbermouth work his way into security channels, even though the hour is such that he can do no immediate harm.
What importance should be attached to a man's estimate of his own capabilities? It is always pertinent, but it is by no means decisive. This is so for two reasons, the first being that the majority of men tend to over-sell themselves on the thing they like to do, and the second, that very few men know their own dimensions. Almost consciously, men resist the thing that they do not know, because of premonitory fears of failure. When the Armored Force School was first organized in 1941, a private from a unit stationed in Georgia was arbitrarily assigned to take the radio course. He protested, saying that he did not like anything about the field and therefore had no talent for it. But his commander sent him along. Within 1 week after arriving at Fort Knox, he was operating at a faster rate than any man in the history of the Army. Every service could tell stories of this kind; they are not miracles; they are regular features of the daily show.
At the same time, the man who volunteers for a particularline of duty—especially if it is a hard duty—already has one mark in his favor. The fact that he wants to do it is one-half of success. Before turning him down, there must be a substantially clear showing that he lacks the main qualifications. It must be acompellingreason, rather than the overweening excuse that it is more convenient to keep him where he is. In any case, he should be thanked for coming forward, and earmarked as a good prospect for the next likely opening.
There is a slack saying in the services that "the good man never volunteers." That is an outright canard. The best men still do.
In job placement, mistakes are inevitable. Any authority in this work will say so. Every experienced man who has had conspicuous success in picking the right men, and in getting scores of individuals started up the right ladder, will also shudder a little as he recalls his particularly atrocious blunders. Outward appearances are so greatly deceiving! The prior estimates placed on men are so frequently highly colored or outright dishonest!
As to the making of mistakes, it is just not enough to comment that they have value, provided one has sufficient breadth to learn from hard experience. What is vastly more important is that the mistake, once made, will not be needlessly compounded. That is a normal, human temptation. The attitude, "I don't care if he is a chump; he's my chump," has nothing in its favor. Yet it becomes a point of pride in some men that they will not admit their judgments are fallible. Consequently, having chosen the wrong man for a given responsibility, they will sustain him there, come hell or high water, rather than make public acknowledgement of error.
With what result? Mainly this, that for the sake of the point, they win, with it, the contempt of their other subordinates. For there is something very childish about this form of weakness, though it is a failing not unknown in many men otherwise qualified for high responsibility. To put it plainly,no manhas the moral right to suffer this upon any organization he is professing to serve.
The advice of one's subordinates, as to the placement and promotion of men with whom they are in close contact, is not to be followed undeviatingly. Men play favorites: they will sometimes back an individual for no better reason than that they "like the guy." Too, each small group leader, even the best one, will work to advance the interests of his own men, because so doing is part of his own buildup. Unless decisions are made from a central point of view, the subordinate who talks the most convincingly will get an extra portion of favor for his men, and jealousies will wrack the organization.
There is one last point. No officer can progress in fitting men to jobs except as he becomes better informed about job requirements. This is an essential part of his education. There is no administrative technique which is separate and apart from knowledge of how basic work is performed in the fields which have to be administered. A great many officers resist this truth, but it is nonetheless valid.
What is eternally surprising in the fighting services is how the aggressive questing for knowledge continues to pay large dividends, and leads, in the average case, to a general forgiveness of one's little sins and vices.
The command and control of men in combatcanbe mastered by the junior leaders of American forces short of actual experience under enemy fire.
It is altogether possible for a young officer his first time in battle to be in total possession of his faculties and moving by instinct to do the right thing, provided that he has made the most of his training opportunities.
Exercise in the maneuvering of men is only an elementary introduction to this educational process. The basic requirement is a continuing study, first of the nature of men, second of the techniques which produce unified action, and last, of the history of past operations, which are covered by an abundant literature.
Provided always that this collateral study is sedulously carried forward by the individual officer, at least 90 percent of all that is given him during the training period becomes applicable to his personal action and his power to lead other men when under fire.
Each service has its separate character. The fighting problem of each differs in some measure from those of all others. In the nature of things, the task of successfully leading men in battle is partly conditioned by the unique character and mission of each service.
It would therefore be gratuitous, and indeed impossible, to attempt to outline a doctrine which would be of general application, stipulating methods, techniques, etc., which would apply to all Americans in combat, no matter in what element they engaged.
There are, however, a few simple and fundamental propositions to which the Armed Services subscribe in saying to the officer corps what may be expected of the average man of the United States under the conditions of battle. Generally speaking, they have held true of Americans in times past from Lexington to Okinawa. The fighting establishment builds its discipline, training, code of conduct and public policy around these ideas, believing that what served yesterday will also be the one best way tomorrow, and for so long as our traditions and our system of freedoms survive. These propositions are:
I
When led with courage and intelligence, an American will fight as willingly and as efficiently as any fighter in world history.
II
His keenness and endurance in war will be in proportion to the zeal and inspiration of his leadership.
III
He is resourceful and imaginative, and the best results will always flow from encouraging him to use his brain along with his spirit.
IV
Under combat conditions he will reserve his greatest loyalty for the officer who is most resourceful in the tactical employment of his forces and most careful to avoid unnecessary losses.
V
He is to a certain extent machine-bound because the nature of our civilization has made him so. In an emergency, he tends to look around for a motor car, a radio or some other gadget that will facilitate his purpose, instead of thinking about using his muscle power toward the given end. In combat, this is a weakness which thwarts contact and limits communications. Therefore it needs to be anticipated and guarded against.
VI
War does not require that the American be brutalized or bullied in any measure whatever. His need is an alert mind and a toughened body. Hate and bloodlust are not the attributes of a sound training under the American system. To develop clearly a line of duty is sufficient to point Americans toward the doing of it.
VII
Except on a Hollywood lot, there is no such thing as an American fighter "type." Our best men come in all colors, shapes, and sizes. They appear from every section of the Nation, including the territories.
VIII
Presupposing soundness in their officer leadership, the majority of Americans in any group or unit can be depended upon to fight loyally and obediently, and will give a good account of themselves.
IX
In battle, Americans do not tend to fluctuate between emotional extremes, in complete dejection one day and in exultation the next, according to changes in the situation. They continue, on the whole, on a fairly even keel, when the going is tough and when things are breaking their way. Even when heavily shocked by battle losses, they tend to bound back quickly. Though their griping is incessant, their natural outlook is on the optimistic side, and they react unfavorably to the officer who looks eternally on the dark side.
X
During battle, American officers are not expected either to drive their men or to be forever in the van, as if praying to be shot. So long as they are with their men, taking the same chances as their men, and showing a firm grasp of the situation and of the line of action which should be followed, the men will go forward.
XI
In any situation of extreme pressure, or moral exhaustion, where men cannot otherwise be rallied and led forward, officers are expected to do the actual physical act of leading, such as performing as first scout, or point, even though this means taking over what normally would be an enlisted man's function.
XII
The normal, gregarious American is not at his best when playing a lone-handed or tactically isolated part in battle. He is not a kamikaze or a one-man torpedo. Consequently, the besttactical results obtain from those dispositions and methods which link the power of one man to that of another. Men who feel strange with their unit, having been carelessly received by it, and indifferently handled, will rarely, if ever, fight strongly and courageously. But if treated with common decency and respect, they will perform like men.
XIII
Within our school of military thought, higher authority does not consider itself infallible. Either in combat or out, in any situation where a majority of militarily-trained Americans become undutiful, that is sufficient reason for higher authority to resurvey its own judgments, disciplines and line of action.
XIV
To lie to American troops to cover up a blunder in combat rarely serves any valid purpose. They have a good sense of combat and an uncanny instinct for ferreting out the truth when anything goes wrong tactically. They will excuse mistakes but they will not forgive being treated like children.
XV
When spit-and-polish are laid on so heavily that they become onerous, and the ranks cannot see any legitimate connection between the requirements and the development of an attitude which will serve a clear fighting purpose, it is to be questioned that the exactions serve any good object whatever.
XVI
On the other hand, because standards of discipline and courtesy are designed for the express purpose of furthering control under the extraordinary frictions and pressures of the battlefield, their maintenance under combat conditions is as necessary as during training. Smartness and respect are the marks of military alertness, no matter how trying the circumstances. But courtesy starts at the top, in the dealing of any officer with his subordinates, and in his decent regard for their loyalty, intelligence, and manhood.
XVII
Though Americans enjoy relatively a bountiful, and even luxurious standard of living in their home environment, theydo not have to be pampered, spoon-fed and surfeited with every comfort and convenience to keep them steadfast and devoted, once war comes. They are by nature rugged men, and in the field will respond most perfectly when called on to play a rugged part. Soft handling will soften even the best men. But even the weak man will develop a new vigor and confidence in the face of necessary hardship, if moved by a leadership which is courageously making the best of a bad situation.
XVIII
Extravagance and wastefulness is somewhat rooted in the American character, because of our mode of life. When our men enter military service, there is a strong holdover of their prodigal civilian habits. Even under fighting conditions, they tend to be wasteful of drinking water, food, munitionment and other vital supply. When such things are madetooaccessible, they tend to throw them away, rather than to conserve them in the general interests. This is a distinct weakness during combat, when conservation of all supply is the touchstone of success. The regulating of all supply, and the preventing of waste in any form, is the prime obligation of every officer.
XIX
Under the conditions of battle, any extra work, exercise, maneuver ormarching which does not serve a clear and direct operational purposeis unjustifiable. The supreme object is to keep men as physically fresh and mentally alert as possible. Tired men take fright and are half-whipped before the battle opens. Worn-out officers cannot make clear decisions. The conservation of men's powers, not the exhaustion thereof, is the way of successful operation.
XX
When forces are committed to combat, it is vital that not one unnecessary pound be put on any man's back. Lightness of foot is the key to speed of movement and the increase of firepower. In judging of these things, every officer's thought should be on the optimistic side. It is better to take the chance that men will manage to get by on a little less than to overload them, through an over-cautious reckoning of every possible contingency, thereby destroying their power to do anything effectively.
XXI
Even a thorough training and long practice in weapons handling will not always insure that a majority of men will use their weapons freely and consistently when engaging the enemy. This is particularly true of Americans. In youth they are taught that the taking of human life is wrong. This feeling is deep-rooted in their emotions. Many of them cannot shake it off when the hour comes that their own lives are in danger. They fail to fire, though they do not know exactly why. In war, firing at an enemy target can be made a habit. Once required to make the start, because he is given personal and intelligent direction, any man will find it easier to fire the second and third time, and soon thereafter his response will become automatic in any tactical situation. When engaging the enemy, the most decisive task of all junior leaders is to make certain thatallmen along the line are employing their weapons, even if this means spending some time with each man and directing his fire. Reconnaissance and inspection toward this end, particularly in the early stages of initial engagement, are far more important than the employment of weapons by junior leaders themselves, since this latter tends to distract their attention from what the men are doing.
XXII
Unity of action develops from fullness of information. In combat, all ranks have to know what is being done, and why it is being done, if confusion is to be kept to a minimum. This holds true in all types of operation, whatever the service. However, a surfeit of information clouds the mind and may sometimes depress the spirit. We can take one example. A commander might be confronted by a complex situation, and his solution may comprise a continuing operation in three distinct phases. It would be advisable that all hands be told the complete detail of "phase A." But it might be equally sensible that only his subordinates who are closest to him be made fully informed about "phase B," and "phase C." All plans in combat are subject to modification as circumstances dictate; this being the case, it is better not to muddle men by filling their minds with a seeming conflict in ideas. More important still, if the grand object seems too vast and formidable, even the first step toward it may appear doubly difficult. Fullness of information does not void the other principle that one thing at a time, carefully organized all down the line, is the surest way.
XXIII
There is no excuse for malingering or cowardice during battle. It is the task of leadership to stop it, by whatever means would seem to be the surest cure, always making certain that in so doing it will not make a bad matter worse.
XXIV
The Armed Services recognize that there are occasional individuals whose nervous and spiritual makeup may be such that, though they erode rapidly and may suffer complete breakdown under combat conditions, they still may be wholly loyal and conscientious men, capable of doing high duty elsewhere. Men are not alike. In some, however willing the spirit, the flesh may still be weak. To punish, degrade or in any way humiliate such men is not more cruel than ignorant. When the good faith of any individual has been repeatedly demonstrated in his earlier service, he deserves the benefit of the doubt from his superior, pending study of his case by medical authority. But if the man has been a bad actor consistently, his officer is warranted in proceeding on the assumption that his combat failure is just one more grave moral dereliction. To fail to take proper action against such a man can only work unusual hardship on the majority trying to do duty.
XXV
The United States abides by the laws of war. Its armed forces, in their dealing with all other peoples, are expected to comply with the laws of war, in the spirit and to the letter. In waging war, we do not terrorize helpless non-combatants, if it is within our power to avoid so doing. Wanton killing, torture, cruelty or the working of unusual and unnecessary hardship on enemy prisoners or populations is not justified in any circumstance. Likewise, respect for the reign of law,as that term is understood in the United States, is expected to follow the flag wherever it goes. Pillaging, looting and other excesses are as unmoral where Americans are operating under military law as when they are living together under the civil code. None the less, some men in the American services will loot and destroy property, unless they are restrained by fear of punishment. War looses violence and disorder; it inflames passions and makes it relatively easy for the individual to get away with unlawful actions. But it does not lessen the gravity of his offense or make it less necessary that constituted authority put him down. The main safeguard against lawlessness and hooliganism in any armed body is the integrity of its officers. When men know that their commander is absolutely opposed to such excesses, and will take forceful action to repress any breach of discipline, they will conform. But when an officer winks at any depradation by his men, it is no different than if he had committed the act.
XXVI
On the field of sport Americans always "talk it up" to keep nerves steady and to generate confidence. The need is even greater on the field of war, and the same treatment will have no less effect. When men are afraid, they go silent; silence of itself further intensifies their fear. The resumption of speech is the beginning of thoughtful, collected action, for self-evidently, two or more men cannot join strength and work intelligently together until they know one another's thoughts.Consequently, all training is an exercise in getting men to open up and become articulate even as it is a process in conditioning them physically to move strongly and together.
XXVII
Inspection is more important in the face of the enemy than during training because a fouled piece may mean a lost battle, an overlooked sick man may infect a fortress and a mislaid message can cost a war. In virtue of his position, every junior leader is an inspector, and the obligation to make certain that his force at all times is inspection proof is unremitting.
XXVIII
In battle crisis, a majority of Americans present will respondto any man who has the will and the brains to give them a clear, intelligent order. They will follow the lowest-ranking man present if he obviously knows what he is doing and is morally the master of the situation, but they will not obey a chuckle-head if he has nothing in his favor but his rank.
XXIX
In any action in which the several services are joined, any American officer may expect the same measure of respect from the ranks of any other service as from his own, provided he conducts himself with a dignity and manner becoming an American officer.
For all officers, due reflection on these points, relating to the character of our men in war, is not more important than a continuing study of how they may be applied to all aspects of training, toward the end that we may further strengthen our own system. This is the grand object in all military studies. That service is most perfect which best holds itself, at all times and at all levels, in a state of readiness to move against and destroy any declared enemy of the United States.
Army Historical Division—Okinawa: The Last Battle, 1949.Omaha Beachhead, 1946.H. H. Arnold—Global Mission, 1949.Basil Bartlett—My First War, 1941.William Liscum Borden—There Will Be No Time, 1946.David L. Brainard—The Outpost of the Lost, 1929.Bernard Brodie—A Guide to Navy Strategy, 1944.The Absolute Weapon, 1946.Vannevar Bush—Modern Arms and Free Men, 1949.Winston S. Churchill—The World Crisis, 1931.The Unknown War, 1931.The River War, 1933.Marlborough: His Life and Times, 1933–35.A Roving Commission, 1939.The Second World War, 1948—.Hugh M. Cole—The Lorraine Campaign, 1950.W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate—The Army Air Forces in World War II, 1948—.Edward S. Creasy—Decisive Battles of the World, 1862.James P. S. Devereux—The Story of Wake Island, 1947.Giulio Douhet—Command of the Air, 1927.Clifford Dowdey—Experiment in Rebellion, 1946.Theodore Draper—The Six Weeks' War, 1944.Dwight D. Eisenhower—Crusade in Europe, 1948.Report by the Supreme Commander, 1946.George Fielding Eliot—The Ramparts We Watch, 1938.If Russia Strikes, 1949.Charles W. Elliott—Winfield Scott, 1937.Cyril Falls—The Nature of Modern Warfare, 1941.Ferdinand Foch—The Principles of Warfare, 1913.J. F. C. Fuller—Decisive Battles, 1940.The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, 1929.Armament and History, 1946.The Second World War, 1948.Armored Warfare, 1943.Douglas F. Freeman—R. E. Lee, 1934.William A. Ganoe—History of the United States Army, 1942.James M. Gavin—Airborne Warfare, 1947.Joseph I. Greene—The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz, 1943.Russell Grenfell—The Bismarck Episode, 1949.U. S. Grant—Personal Memoirs, 1885.Augustin Guillaume—Soviet Arms and Soviet Power, 1949.Francis de Guingand—Operation Victory, 1947.W. F. Halsey—Admiral Halsey's Story, 1947.Gordon A. Harrison—The Cross-Channel Attack, 1950.B. H. Liddell Hart—Sherman, 1934.The Future of Infantry, 1934.The German Generals Talk, 1949.G. F. R. Henderson—Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 1898.The Science of War, 1905.Pendleton Herring—The Impact of War, 1941.R. D. Heinl, Jr.—The Defense of Wake, 1947.Marines at Midway, 1948.John Hersey—Into the Valley, 1943.Russell Hill—Desert War, 1942.Max von Hoffmann—The War of Lost Opportunities, 1925.Ralph Ingersoll—The Battle Is the Pay-Off, 1943.Douglas Wilson Johnson—Topography and Strategy in the War, 1917.Melvin M. Johnson and Charles T. Haven—Automatic Arms, 1941.Walter Karig, Russell L. Harris and Frank A. Manson—Battle Report, 1944–1949.George C. Kenney—General Kenney Reports, 1949.Roger Keyes—Naval Memoirs, 1933.Alexiei Kuropatkin—The Russian Army and the Japanese War, 1909.Lee J. Levert—Fundamentals of Naval Warfare, 1947.Bert Levy—Guerilla Warfare, 1942.Charles B. MacDonald—Company Commander, 1947.A. T. Mahan—Influence of Seapower Upon History.George McMillan—The Old Breed, 1949.George C. Marshall—General Marshall's Report, 1946.S. L. A. Marshall—Island Victory, 1944.Bastogne: The First Eight Days, 1946.Men Against Fire, 1948.Giffard Martel—An Outspoken Soldier, 1944.Walter Millis—The Last Phase, 1946.This Is Pearl, 1947.John Miller, Jr.—Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, 1949.Drew Middleton—Our Share of Night, 1946.Samuel Taylor Moore—America and the World War, 1937.Samuel Eliot Morison—History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (14 vols.), 1947—.W. F. P. Napier—History of the War in the Peninsula (6 vols.) 1828.James R. Newman—The Tools of War, 1942.Frederick Palmer—America in France, 1921.John J. Pershing, 1921.George S. Patton, Jr.—War As I Knew It, 1947.Thomas R. Phillips—Roots of Strategy, 1940.Frederick Pile—Ack-Ack, 1949.Fletcher Pratt—Ordeal by Fire, 1935.Road to Empire, 1939.The Marine's War, 1948.Navy: A History.Leonard Rapport and Arthur Northwood—Rendezvous With Destiny, 1948.Roland Ruppenthal—Utah Beach to Cherbourg, 1947.W. T. Sherman—Memoirs, 1886.Robert E. Sherwood—Roosevelt and Hopkins, 1948.Milton Shulman—Defeat in the West, 1948.Holland M. Smith—Coral and Brass, 1949.E. L. Spears—Liaison 1914, 1930.Prelude to Victory, 1939.Joseph W. Stilwell—The Stilwell Papers, 1948.Alfred Vagts—The History of Militarism, 1937.Yorck von Wartenburg—Napoleon as a General.Archibald Wavell—Allenby, 1941.Generals and Generalship, 1941.John W. Wheeler Bennett—The Forgotten Peace, 1939.Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, 1948.Kenneth P. Williams—Lincoln Finds a General, 1949.
Army Historical Division—
Okinawa: The Last Battle, 1949.Omaha Beachhead, 1946.
H. H. Arnold—
Global Mission, 1949.
Basil Bartlett—
My First War, 1941.
William Liscum Borden—
There Will Be No Time, 1946.
David L. Brainard—
The Outpost of the Lost, 1929.
Bernard Brodie—
A Guide to Navy Strategy, 1944.The Absolute Weapon, 1946.
Vannevar Bush—
Modern Arms and Free Men, 1949.
Winston S. Churchill—
The World Crisis, 1931.The Unknown War, 1931.The River War, 1933.Marlborough: His Life and Times, 1933–35.A Roving Commission, 1939.The Second World War, 1948—.
Hugh M. Cole—
The Lorraine Campaign, 1950.
W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate—
The Army Air Forces in World War II, 1948—.
Edward S. Creasy—
Decisive Battles of the World, 1862.
James P. S. Devereux—
The Story of Wake Island, 1947.
Giulio Douhet—
Command of the Air, 1927.
Clifford Dowdey—
Experiment in Rebellion, 1946.
Theodore Draper—
The Six Weeks' War, 1944.
Dwight D. Eisenhower—
Crusade in Europe, 1948.Report by the Supreme Commander, 1946.
George Fielding Eliot—
The Ramparts We Watch, 1938.If Russia Strikes, 1949.
Charles W. Elliott—
Winfield Scott, 1937.
Cyril Falls—
The Nature of Modern Warfare, 1941.
Ferdinand Foch—
The Principles of Warfare, 1913.
J. F. C. Fuller—
Decisive Battles, 1940.The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, 1929.Armament and History, 1946.The Second World War, 1948.Armored Warfare, 1943.
Douglas F. Freeman—
R. E. Lee, 1934.
William A. Ganoe—
History of the United States Army, 1942.
James M. Gavin—
Airborne Warfare, 1947.
Joseph I. Greene—
The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz, 1943.
Russell Grenfell—
The Bismarck Episode, 1949.
U. S. Grant—
Personal Memoirs, 1885.
Augustin Guillaume—
Soviet Arms and Soviet Power, 1949.
Francis de Guingand—
Operation Victory, 1947.
W. F. Halsey—
Admiral Halsey's Story, 1947.
Gordon A. Harrison—
The Cross-Channel Attack, 1950.
B. H. Liddell Hart—
Sherman, 1934.The Future of Infantry, 1934.The German Generals Talk, 1949.
G. F. R. Henderson—
Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 1898.The Science of War, 1905.
Pendleton Herring—
The Impact of War, 1941.
R. D. Heinl, Jr.—
The Defense of Wake, 1947.Marines at Midway, 1948.
John Hersey—
Into the Valley, 1943.
Russell Hill—
Desert War, 1942.
Max von Hoffmann—
The War of Lost Opportunities, 1925.
Ralph Ingersoll—
The Battle Is the Pay-Off, 1943.
Douglas Wilson Johnson—
Topography and Strategy in the War, 1917.
Melvin M. Johnson and Charles T. Haven—
Automatic Arms, 1941.
Walter Karig, Russell L. Harris and Frank A. Manson—
Battle Report, 1944–1949.
George C. Kenney—
General Kenney Reports, 1949.
Roger Keyes—
Naval Memoirs, 1933.
Alexiei Kuropatkin—
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, 1909.
Lee J. Levert—
Fundamentals of Naval Warfare, 1947.
Bert Levy—
Guerilla Warfare, 1942.
Charles B. MacDonald—
Company Commander, 1947.
A. T. Mahan—
Influence of Seapower Upon History.
George McMillan—
The Old Breed, 1949.
George C. Marshall—
General Marshall's Report, 1946.
S. L. A. Marshall—
Island Victory, 1944.Bastogne: The First Eight Days, 1946.Men Against Fire, 1948.
Giffard Martel—
An Outspoken Soldier, 1944.
Walter Millis—
The Last Phase, 1946.This Is Pearl, 1947.
John Miller, Jr.—
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, 1949.
Drew Middleton—
Our Share of Night, 1946.
Samuel Taylor Moore—
America and the World War, 1937.
Samuel Eliot Morison—
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (14 vols.), 1947—.
W. F. P. Napier—
History of the War in the Peninsula (6 vols.) 1828.
James R. Newman—
The Tools of War, 1942.
Frederick Palmer—
America in France, 1921.John J. Pershing, 1921.
George S. Patton, Jr.—
War As I Knew It, 1947.
Thomas R. Phillips—
Roots of Strategy, 1940.
Frederick Pile—
Ack-Ack, 1949.
Fletcher Pratt—
Ordeal by Fire, 1935.Road to Empire, 1939.The Marine's War, 1948.Navy: A History.
Leonard Rapport and Arthur Northwood—
Rendezvous With Destiny, 1948.
Roland Ruppenthal—
Utah Beach to Cherbourg, 1947.
W. T. Sherman—
Memoirs, 1886.
Robert E. Sherwood—
Roosevelt and Hopkins, 1948.
Milton Shulman—
Defeat in the West, 1948.
Holland M. Smith—
Coral and Brass, 1949.
E. L. Spears—
Liaison 1914, 1930.Prelude to Victory, 1939.
Joseph W. Stilwell—
The Stilwell Papers, 1948.
Alfred Vagts—
The History of Militarism, 1937.
Yorck von Wartenburg—
Napoleon as a General.
Archibald Wavell—
Allenby, 1941.Generals and Generalship, 1941.
John W. Wheeler Bennett—
The Forgotten Peace, 1939.Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, 1948.
Kenneth P. Williams—
Lincoln Finds a General, 1949.