III.Form of Attack.[6]
To create a complete gap, it is necessary:
(a)To take the first line of the hostile defense (zone of the first trenches and centers of resistance);
(b)To take the second line of defense;
(c)To prevent the enemy from reestablishing a barrier by the aid of reinforcements brought up in haste beyond the zone already fortified.
To overcome successively these difficulties, one must have:
(a) A first line of attack composed of several waves of assault with (as an element of preparation) a formidable artillery (field, heavy, and torpedo guns) minutely regulated.
(b) A second line of attack as strong as the first, except perhaps in front of the centers of resistance, sent straight to the front allin one piece exactly like the first line. The same precise and effective artillery preparation is not here present, but it is compensated for by groups of light guns and machine guns destined rapidly to destroy all resistance. Accompanying batteries (batteries d’accompagnement) start as soon as the first trenches are taken.
(c) A reserve without initial assignment, destined to reinforce any point and conquer any irreducible or hindering resistance. This reserve is entirely at the disposition of the superior commander, while the first and second lines are no longer in his hands after they are in their parallel of departure. On the 9th of May, this reserve was made up of the troops which should have normally composed the second line of attack, which did not exist. This explains the disastrous delay of its engagement, which was furthermore very hesitating, because it tried to maneuver before having broken through and waited for the mêlée to clear away in order to maneuver.
(d) Cavalry, auto-cannon, auto-machine guns, battalions of infantry on automobiles with pioneer crews to clear the roads.—Large units, ready to commence new combats, capable of being brought up within two or three hours.—Do not, after the hole has been pierced, depend any longer upon the regiments who made it.
The first line is composed of two or three waves. The features of the assault vary according to the distance to be crossed in getting at the enemy.
Distance Less than 100 Metres.—The first wave, composed of entire companies in line, the men at half-pace interval, rushes to the assault without pause as soon as the artillery fire ceases. It should endeavor to reach the enemy before he can get out of his shelters. It does not generally have to fire, except perhaps at the last moment in order to cross the entanglement if the enemy opens fire (see second case).
Distance Greater than 100 Metres.—Attack by waves of companies, in which those in front are divided into two parts:
1. A line of skirmishers at 5 paces, formed either by one sectiondeployed or by groups of skirmishers furnished by each section (calm and resolute men).
2. Fifty metres behind comes the line of attack, men in one rank, elbow to elbow or at one pace; the company and section[8]commanders in front of the line; four metres behind the line of attack, the rank formed by the file closers.
In this case, one cannot count on surprising the enemy; he will open a more or less violent fire, especially during the crossing of the wire entanglement. It is very illusory to imagine that any company is stoical enough to allow itself to be fired on at point blank without replying when it distinctly sees the enemy; it will be necessary to open fire, and this will throw the assaulting line into disorder.
The thin line of skirmishers is intended to give this protection by fire in order that the line of attack may keep its elbow-to-elbow formation without firing until almost the last.
At Neuville-Saint-Vaast, I was obliged personally to act as a skirmisher, and I have since then strongly felt that something was lacking in our line of attack. We arrived at the first entanglement at 80 metres from the enemy without firing, but there on account of the violence of the adverse fire, our fusillade broke out. I myself recall that I marched straight ahead under the protection of my rifle. Every time a “flat cap” raised up and aimed at me, I threw the rifle to my shoulder rapidly; my shot came near enough to make him duck; I profited by this short respite to advance into the wire or dash ahead some 20 metres, always watching and firing whenever a “flat cap” reappeared. Thus, emptying the magazine on the march, I was able to mount the parapet of the German trench without having permitted the enemy to fire a single aimed shot at me. If the man who marches unprotected in the spaces swept by bullets scorns the danger, the one who is sheltered is inclined to exaggerate toward the side of protection, and the men who are in the trenches when the bullets pass cannot keep from instinctively ducking. It is a sensation which the attack should take advantage of.
The skirmishers should be calm and resolute men, and good shots (often old reserve soldiers, well seasoned and less susceptibleof losing their nerve and intent upon preserving their own lives).
They should each march upon a particular point of the hostile trench and watch it closely. They open fire only when they get the order from the company commander marching between the two echelons.
This manner of making the assault strongly resembles that brought out by De Wet in “Three Years of War.” It is the individual assault where each soldier shows himself as a real fighter.
The March on the Line of Attack.—Each echelon starts out successively at a single bound and moves at a walk (even in cadence, if it were possible). It is curious to observe how much this pace conduces to cold resolution and fierce scorn of the adversary. At Neuville,all units instinctively started at a walk. Afterwards take the double time at slow cadence, in order to maintain the cohesion; make several rushes, if necessary, of 80 to 100 metres. They should not be multiplied, at the risk of breaking theélan.
When a great effort has been made to scorn the fire of the adversary, it should not be destroyed by a change to an attitude signifying fear.
At 60 metres from the enemy, break into charge.
The Alignment.—To march in line is a capital point, the importance of which one must have experienced in tragic moments to tell how prodigious is its influence. Moreover, the march in line is as old as war itself. The alignment holds each in his place, carries along those who hesitate, holds back the enthusiasts, and gives to everyone the warm and irresistible feeling of mutual confidence. At Neuville, we marched at first at a walk, then at a slow double time, aligned as on parade. I constantly heard behind me through the rattling of the machine guns, the epic, splendid shout of supreme encouragement running all along the line, “Keep in line! Keep in line!” down to the humble reservist, C—, who in spite of the bullets making gaps all about in the ranks, kept all of his young and agitated comrades on the line.
Thus rushing like a wall, we were irresistible.
Crossing the Wire Entanglements.—From the moment the entanglement is reached, the period of charge and individual combat begins. The men can no longer be kept from firing; each one tries to protect himself with his own rifle.
At Neuville, we arrived at a first entanglement at 80 metresfrom the trenches almost in line and without firing. At the entanglement we lay down, and fire was opened; each one crossed the entanglement individually, lay down on the other side, and recommenced firing. The line reformed without interruption of fire. I then wished to cease firing in order to charge, but they did not hear me. Then I stood up, ran alone toward the enemy, and seeing me thus, the company immediately arose and dashed across the second entanglement.
Taking the Other Trenches.—The first trench taken, it should be cleaned out, not a man capable of doing harm should be left behind; it will not do to leave to others, for instance to the grenadiers, the task of destroying those who can still harm us. At Neuville, we crossed the first trench in one rush and marched on without stopping; it was then that we were shot at from behind and obliged to turn back to massacre them all.
The first trench conquered, the line should be reformed lying down ten metres beyond the trench. Each man arriving on this new line should open fire against the defenders of the second trench. When the line is reformed, it should start the attack again as before.
The following trenches are crossed without interruption, always advancing.
For the first wave,there is no limit; let it go through as far as possible. On the 9th of May, the first line ran without stopping as far as the cemetery of Neuville, La Folie Woods, and the first houses of Souchez.
The second wave should start forward at the moment the first line reaches the hostile trenches. If it starts sooner, it will unite with the first at the entanglement and be involved in the fight for the first trench; it will be broken up prematurely, and from the moment that it is no longer a separate mass, it cannot be considered as a reinforcement.
While the first wave drives straight ahead, and can do nothing against the surprises of the enemy, the second and third waves, warned by what happens to the first, can thus take certain precautions without diminishing theirélan, such as obliquing the sections that would be exposed to the fire of machine guns not yet out of action.
The reinforcement by successive waves of entire companies leads to a vexatious mixture of units. It is necessary that thesurviving officers and noncommissioned officers group around them men of their own company but not miscellaneous units.
The assault being the most severe phase of the combat, it is necessary, in order to face it and push it through, that the will of each individual be transformed largely by habits and reflexes. Therefore, hold each day an assault exercise over ground which resembles in detail that over which the real assault will have to be made.
The points which should be borne in mind are as follows:
The Alignment.—Be particularly strict on this question; its extreme importance is recognized. See that the line is extremely well dressed during the execution of the rushes.
The Charge.—The company, kept in line, is thus led to a short distance from the enemy and there released. Then all together along the whole line, lower the bayonets to the height of the waist; this has an extremely impressive effect.
The charge should be frenzied and furious, and this the men should well understand.
The File Closers.—The file closers should form a rank four metres behind the line, repeating the commands, watching especially the alignment, and maintaining each man in his place by calling to him by name. One can hardly realize the effectiveness of these personal observations in the midst of the bullets. We have no file closers; our noncommissioned officers have a general tendency to run out in front like the bravest soldiers to get into the individual fight, forgetting their men; their training and duties as file closers should receive constant attention during the exercises in the assault.
Taking the Next Trenches.—Pursuit over Free Ground.—Generally in assaulting exercises, everything stops after the first trench is taken; everyone is out of breath, and only a few men here and there, generally noncommissioned officers, try to push on shouting, but soon, being absolutely alone, they have to lie down panting and spent. This is what always happens in our battalion exercises.
The exercise means nothing unless there is impressed on the mind of everyone the deep-rooted idea of routing all the defenders in one sweep. Each man should know that after having crossed the first trench, he should go on a few paces, lie down, open fireon the hostile groups who occupy the second trench, then get ready to start forward as before, and charge again with the same vigor in spite of fatigue.
We always did this in our exercises, and it was done the same way on the 9th of May. I know men who were shot in the back by German wounded after having crossed the first trench to reform beyond it as had been prescribed. In spite of frightful gaps, a line of men kneeling was, however, reformed beyond the conquered trench and by its fire drove the defenders of the second trench back into their holes.
As long as there remains a trench to conquer,prohibit absolutely all advance through theboyaux(communicating trenches); always reform in line. But the trenches having been taken, the zone of open ground is reached where the enemy will try to reestablish some resistance here and there; it will be necessary to advance with more precautionand to try and creep through inside his lines and throw him into disorder by surprise. Form in each section patrols, each one having at least one noncommissioned officer; they should be trained to start out spontaneously as soon as the defenses of the enemy have been passed, and to spread out in front of the company, trying to creep through theboyauxto get possession of important points without being seen. These patrols, equipped with revolvers and grenades, should be practised in exercises involving combats inboyaux.
Skirmish Formation.—In close combat, men fight much more by shooting at point blank and very often from the hip than with the bayonet. The man should therefore be trained to use his rifle in close fighting.
First teach him to watch that part of the parapet and the loopholes on which he marches in order to forestall the shots of the enemy; then to aim rapidly, throwing the piece to the shoulder to get the first shot at the enemy who is aiming at him; begin by bringing up the piece and aiming slowly, and then increase the rapidity of movement; the man should observe each time where his line of sight strikes. He should have his magazine filled for hand-to-hand fighting and know how to refill it lying down or while running. Thanks to this precaution, after having emptied my magazine at the first entanglement, I was able to hold my own with full magazine against three Germans who got in my way.
RÔLE OF THE SECOND LINE, THE “REINFORCEMENTS.”[9]
The most important question concerning the penetration of the enemy’s line is perhaps the action of the reinforcements (renforts), and as that action has always fallen short, we have never been able to attain the victory which has seemed so nearly within our reach.
The inertia of the second line and its expenditure without effect arise from two causes.
To take the first trenches is a task relatively easy; the artillery preparation is minutely regulated; the terrain is well known, and the attack is therefore free and open and is pushed through without reservation. But when the first lines have been crossed, one enters thenceforth into the domain of the unknown, one is on the lookout for ambushes and apprehends an unexpected trap at each step; this disquietude slows up the march and quickly transforms into a surprise the least activity of the enemy. A resistance which starts up suddenly intimidates and paralyses the second line immediately, because the fear of the enemy leads to exaggeration of his strength and the mental disturbance prevents locating and estimating him rapidly. In addition, the reinforcements have during long hours of waiting been subjected to a very demoralizing artillery fire.
All these causes so influence the second line that when it goes into action, it attacks without spirit and soon stops.
The second cause arises, as I have previously mentioned, from a faulty conception of the action of the second line.
In place of having a second line of attack analogous to the first, coming into the fight in one body and marching straight on to the assigned objectives, the superior commander uses these troops as reinforcements, which he throws in at the point where he judges their employment necessary.Now it is impossible for this commander to see clearly in the mêlée, he must wait a long time for the situation to unravel, and as it is necessary for him to be properly informed to send in his reinforcements opportunely, they always arrive too late.Having generally received orders which are ill definedand not having been able to prepare beforehand for the rôle that falls to them, their attitude is necessarily weak and hesitating.[10]
It is absolutely necessary to keep pushing on in a brutal, preconceived, and almost unintelligent manner until the last link is broken, otherwise hostile reinforcements will suddenly arrive and shatter the supreme effort.
Choice of Troops for the Second Line.—This line being subject to the severe trial of bombardment and of the rifle fire directed on the first line sweeping the ground behind, and being obliged to act with as much decision as the troops of the first line, it should be particularly well officered and be composed of troops of excellent spirit; now it often happens that less reliable troops are placed in this line, and far from pushing the first line forward, they stop short of it.
Location of the Troops of the Second Line. The Moment for Putting Them in Action.—During the preparation, the troops of the second line await their turn in the shelters which open into the approachboyaux. It would be very advantageous if they could be placed as close as possible to the parallel of departure[11]in order to profit from the more or less complete protection against hostile artillery fire which comes from being close to the hostile trenches; but in general this will not be possible, except where the German and French trenches are separated by a considerable distance; in this case, there will be enough space between the parallel of departure and the old trench to install several support trenches.
When the first line has entirely departed, the units of the second line take their place in the parallel of departure and form there.While not waiting there too long, it is absolutely necessary that the second-line troops entirely separate their effort from the effort of the troops preceding them.They should start forward when the latter have almost taken the first zone of defense. A premature departure would mix their action with that of the first waves, and they would be absorbed in the same combat. Thus prematurely consumed and broken up, they would be incapable of continuing their action and would add nothing to the effort of the preceding troops.
Taking the Formation for Combat.—The units of the second line should take their combat formation from the parallel of departure and from there be oriented on a well fixed objective; in fact, they risk coming unexpectedly under fire and should be ready for it at any time. There is, moreover, a reason of a moral order for it, which has been very often tested out. When taking the formation for combat, that is to say, when getting ready to fight the enemy before even having seen him, it seems that each one becomes imbued with a cold and silent resolution, which is alone irresistible. Taking formation under the pressure of danger, however, seems more like a check, and there comes out of it a demoralizing sensation of sudden fear and disorder.
Formation.—The conditions which the formation should fulfil are the following: to be supple in order to adapt itself immediately to the exigencies of the situation; to be as invulnerable as possible so that it may escape the effects of a sudden destructive fire.
For a company, the formation seems to be that of two lines about 150 metres apart, the skirmishers three or four paces apart, the company commander marching between the two lines so that he can see what the first line sees without being entirely involved in its combat.
The march has been generally conducted in small columns at deploying intervals, as it seems that this formation is the more supple and permits of a better utilization of the terrain. This is true only in time of peace, but in war one must deploy a long time before the bullets arrive.
March and Use of Ground.—Each company marchesat a walkstraight toward its objective andin lineas long as it is not subjected to direct fire; it thus avoids the irregularities which arisefrom the anxiety to make use of the ground, when from now on, only one anxiety should prevail, that of routing the enemy.
There is generally a tendency to try to make use of the hostileboyauxand trenches as lines of advance. Even if they should permit approach by surprise and without loss, they divide up the company and break the formations for attack; furthermore an extraordinary difficulty is experienced in leaving them when the bullets whistle and the moment comes for getting out on the open field.
I shall always remember Fonquevillers, where I persisted in following with my company a narrow approach which brought me near the enemy, and I know that we had much trouble in leaving it. I have often thought since that it would have been preferable to take a combat position in a hollow road a little further to the rear parallel to the enemy’s front, at 400 metres.
Combat of Units of the Second Line.—The units of the first line, having made their effort, have been finally stopped on the whole front by a series of resistances. The troops of the second line have received as their mission only the two following objects:
To master a well-defined zone up to a certain point;
To master the borders of a center of resistance on the flank of troops that have pushed into the intervals.
Eventually they may at certain points receive the order to throw back a counter-offensive and to pursue.
When the troops of the second line arrive in the proximity of the troops of the first line who have been stopped, there should be no idea of maneuvering nor of consultation, but as in the case of the first enemy trench, they must carry throughthe assault without hesitation.
Two cases are presented according to the distance that separates the fractions of the halted first line from the hostile resistance:
1. Distance less than 200 metres:
If the stopped first line can maintain itself at the limit of its progression, it is generally not in an open field. Its line will serve as a parallel of departure for the units of the second line. These units at first try to reach the line of shelter where they will be formed. Their assaulting formation results from the march formation, and the waves will be composed of half companies.
The first wave rushes out of cover at the double to at least half the distance and opens fire; fire being opened, the second wave rushesin lineand carries along the first.
Here the firing cannot be prevented, as artillery support, now faulty, has to be replaced by rifle fire, to which is joined the fire of machine guns and light cannon, which alone can make possible so fearful an assault.
2. Distance more than 200 metres—Progression and Assault:
The new difficulty is to build up at assaulting distance from the enemy a line of assault in a sort of parallel of departure.
To arrive at assaulting distance, advance by thin lines formed by halving the skirmish lines already deployed; these lines, at least 100 metres apart, advance successively by alternate rushes, then unite on the line designated as the starting point for the assault.
A natural parallel of departure may exist or may partially exist, or it may not exist at all. In the second case, the line of shelters must be adapted, and in the third case it must be created in order to be able to stay a few moments at a short distance from the enemy without being destroyed. To facilitate this extremely difficult and dangerous construction, it is a good thing to have each man fill a sand bag at the last shelter and put in some stones, which, while not bulky, stop the bullets. Each man makes his rushes with his sand bag, which protects him partially during the halts. Having reached the line fixed upon for the parallel, this sand bag serves him as a cover, which he has only to complete rapidly. Each man then enlarges his shelter so as to accommodate near comrades.
The first wave, reformed at the assaulting distance, makes the assault as before. At times, the losses and the confusion of units may lead to an assault by entire companies.
The second and third waves follow and imitate the movements of the first.
The artillery can only give the second line a support which is often partial and not very effective; its action must be replaced at whatever cost by other means, such as machine guns for sweeping the hostile firing line and light cannon to instantly destroy the hostile machine guns.
Location of the Machine-Gun and Gun Crews during the Assault.—These detachments follow the last waves of the first line, and they therefore are not directly taken under fire and can profit by theindications of the fight of the first line and so be in a way to act effectively when the second line comes into action.
Machine Guns.—The machine gun is an element of attack and the most terrible arm of close fighting. However, it is employed in the attack only to man the positions taken or to support the infantry elements from a distance. This is nonsense: to give it such a rôle, one could never have trembled with rage and impotence at a few paces from the enemy, whom he could not get at.
The machine gun should be pushed as far as possible in front of the halted line of fire. If it remains behind or abreast of the fighting line, its field of fire is generally blocked or masked by the slightest movement; in advance of the line, it will enable the infantry line to advance for some time under the cover of its fire; it is the tooth of the attack. It can move forward, its crew of a few men can creep along the smallest pathway, and a shell hole is sufficient for its shelter; in the skirmish chain a whole ditch is necessary. Will it lack ammunition, having only the boxes that the gun crew carries sometimes incomplete? No, for it has only to fire on rare occasions, for example, at the moment of assault. If it is taken, what does that matter—we will take ten from the enemy. The problem would be much simplifiedwith a few automatic rifles.
Light Cannon.—We have spoken of the rôle of light cannon in the paragraph relating to the destruction of machine guns.
This instruction proposes to create the reflex of immediately attacking all resistance that appears and of developing presence of mind by inventing sudden incidents requiring the taking of a rapid decision. In a word, to add a spirit of prompt decision in the troops of the second line to the irresistibleélanwhich one tries to develop in all assaulting troops.
The troops of the second line when facing a resistance should have only one idea: to assault as soon as possible and for that purpose to try to bring about the two following conditions:
To create a sort of parallel of departure at assaulting distance;
To obtain superiority of fire by all means at their disposal.
We will study by means of examples the two preceding cases cited. Troops of the second line should know them by heart, because all cases resemble them more or less.
First Case.—We reach the first line, halted under cover at 150 metres from the enemy; this is a case of organizing a long-distance assault.
Attention should be focussed on the following points:
1. Reestablishment of Order and Calm.
The line of cover is an extemporized parallel, the men are crowded into uncomfortable positions, several units are mixed. These are conditions likely to create disorder, the worst enemy of the assault. Think well as long as you are under cover because amid the bullets you march straight ahead without thinking. Transmit simple indications from man to man and orders to the chiefs of section by note.
Have all cease firing except the best shots; firing unnerves and distracts the noncommissioned officers and soldiers. On the contrary, silence is at once a mark of order; it impresses the men who collect themselves and make the appeal for a supreme resolution to their inner selves.
2. Gaining Superiority of Fire.
It can be obtained in the two following ways:
The execution of an intense fire by the whole line;
The execution of a slow, deadly, and precise fire by the best shots, well concealed.
The men are under cover, consequently it is possible to avoid the first plan, which is noisy and not particularly effective but which circumstances beyond our control sometimes make necessary.
The best shots are designated by the chiefs of section. They construct masks in front of themselves, behind which they fire obliquely, that is to say, under excellent conditions of security and calm. They locate an adversary, keep aiming at him and firing each time that he appears, and they go successively from right to left. This method is very effective; the enemy does not dare to fire any more, and it soon seems as if his trench were empty.
In addition if possible, get a small group to the front or on the flank, who will protect a forward movement by their fire.
3. Execution of the Assault.
“The first and second sections will move out under command of Lieutenant X and will make a rush of 80 metres. Open fire after the rush.”
The movement should be simultaneous and without warning to the enemy; the following suggestions are made:
“Prepare to rush, look toward Lieutenant X, hide your bayonets.”
The movement having been executed by the first echelon and fire opened, the second echelon rushes in its turn, aligned at a quick pace, then at double time, and carries along the first.
From the moment of the charge, each man rushes on the enemy and fires if necessary.
Second Case.—The units of the first line have been stopped at more than 200 metres from the enemy, say at 500 metres.
Move forward, executing short, rapid rushes without firing, in thin lines which are united at assaulting distance from the enemy.
The formation of successive lines for rushing is extremely simple. The company having arrived at a sheltered line beyond which extends an open space, the company commander commands:
“In thin lines by half section, at 100 metres distance by short rushes: 1st and 3d Sections, forward.”
He personally goes out with the first line to select the emplacement where he will halt it.
Each of the 1st and 3d Sections sends out two squads (1, 3, 9, 11). The men immediately take 6 pace intervals. This forms the first line, which is followed by a second, and so on, the rushes of each line alternating with those of the preceding one.
The construction of the parallel of departure is accomplished as has been indicated above.
The machine-gun sections should participate in the exercises with the infantry. They should be accustomed to grasp the idea of the situation rapidly and to replace the fire of the attacking infantry either by taking a position in rear or on the flanks which will permit them to fire up to the end of the action without being hindered by the movement to the front, or by going squarely out in advance of the halted line.
This last case should be particularly studied; the Germans have shown it to us, and it is therefore possible; I know that it is very effective (25th of August at Crevic).
Therefore train them to get used to picking out cover, however insignificant, as a position for a machine gun and to utilize theground skilfully and rush rapidly with the matériel in order to make themselves invisible or indiscernible;
To arrange shelter rapidly, to create a mask in front, and arrange for oblique fire, in order that the personnel may not be rapidly destroyed;
To keep still and try to be forgotten until the moment of assault.
The crews of the light guns should be attached to the infantry and learn to cooperate with it instead of being independent.
In front of any resistance whatever, the units of the second line should have but two ideas:
To take positions rapidly for the assault;
To assault.
The dispositions for the assault are:
The creation or adaptation of a line of a shelter at assaulting distance;
The rapid gaining of superiority of fire.
All the work of maneuver is reduced to the realization of these two ideas. It is a question of applying in slightly varying circumstances the two classic studies above indicated, and one should know them perfectly.
To develop presence of mind in the noncommissioned officers and suppleness in the organization, situations analogous to those formerly used on the drill ground such as, “Cavalry to the right—in rear” should be devised.
Choose a parallel of departure and have the troops of the second line take their formation and march on the objectives designated in advance. Suddenly call out, “Enemy resistance on such a line, our first elements are stopped at such a point ... hostile machine guns in such a region.” Then everybody, infantry, machine guns, light canon, instantly take up their dispositions.
By representing the enemy and having him fire blank cartridges, one becomes accustomed to making rapid reconnaissance of resistances.