FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[10]These figures are given on the authority of M. de Broqueville, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of War, who has stated that the total here quoted was officially admitted by the German Government.[11]There are usually two machine guns to each section of infantry.[12]"At daybreak on the 24th (Aug.) the Second Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of the first and second divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second (Army) Corps retired on the line Dour—Quarouble—Frameries."—Despatch of Sir John French of September 7.[13]The reported extraordinary Army Order issued by the German Emperor commanding "extermination" of the British force has since been officially disavowed as a fiction.

[10]These figures are given on the authority of M. de Broqueville, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of War, who has stated that the total here quoted was officially admitted by the German Government.

[11]There are usually two machine guns to each section of infantry.

[12]"At daybreak on the 24th (Aug.) the Second Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of the first and second divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second (Army) Corps retired on the line Dour—Quarouble—Frameries."—Despatch of Sir John French of September 7.

[13]The reported extraordinary Army Order issued by the German Emperor commanding "extermination" of the British force has since been officially disavowed as a fiction.

From the strategy on the German side let us now turn to that on the side of the French. Between them a fundamental distinction at once appears.

Of both the aim was similar—to compel the other side to fight under a disadvantage. In that way strategy helps to ensure victory, or to lessen the consequences of defeat.

The strategy of the German General Staff, however, was from the outset obvious. The strategy of General Joffre was at the outset a mystery. Only as the campaign went on did the French scheme of operations become apparent. Even then the part of the scheme still to come remained unfathomable.

It has been assumed that with the employment of armies formed of millions of men the element of surprise must be banished. That was a German theory. The theory is unsound. Now, as ever, intellect is the ultimate commanding quality in war.

In truth, the factor of intellect was never morecommanding than under conditions of war carried on with mass armies.

Reflect upon the difference between an opponent who, under such conditions, is able to fathom and to provide against hostile moves, and the opponent who has to take his measures in the dark as to hostile intentions.

The former can issue his orders with the reasonable certainty that they are what the situation will call for. Never were orders and instructions more complex than with modern armies numbering millions; never were there more contingencies to provide against and to foresee. To move and to manipulate these vast masses with effect, accurateanticipationis essential. Such complicated machines cannot be pushed about on the spur of the moment when a general suddenly wakes up to a discovery.

It follows that to conduct a campaign with mass armies there must either be a plan which you judge yourself strong enough in any event to realise or a plan which, because your opponent cannot fathom it, must throw him into complete confusion. The former was the German way; the latter the French.

That General Joffre wouldtryin the first place to defeat the German armies in detail was not, of course, one of the surprises, because it is elementary, but that he should have so largelysucceededin defeating them was a surprise.

In these encounters, as during later battles of the campaign, the French troops discovered a cohesion and steadiness and a military habit ofdiscipline assumed to be foreign to their temperament. But their units had been trained to act together in masses on practical lines. Of the value of that training General Joffre was well aware.

He knew also that success in the earlier encounters, which that training would go far to ensure, must give his troops an invaluable confidence in their own quality.

There were, however, two surprises even more marked. One of these was the quite unexpected use made of the fortified frontier; the other, associated with it, was that of allowing the Germans to advance upon Paris with an insufficient force, in the belief that French movements were being conformed to their own.

Undoubtedly as regards the fortified frontier the belief prevailed that the chief difficulty would be that of destroying its works with heavy guns. It had never been anticipated that the Germans might be prevented from getting near enough for the purpose. But in the French strategy Verdun, Toul, and Belfort were not employed as obstacles. They were employed as the fortified bases of armies. Being fortified, these bases were safe even if close to the scene of operations. Consequently the lines of communication could be correspondingly shortened, and the power and activity of the armies dependent on them correspondingly increased. So long as these armies remained afoot, the fortresses were unattackable. Used in that way, a fortress reaches its highest military value.

The strategy adopted by General Joffre in association with the German advance upon Paris is one of the most interesting phases of the war. Histacticswere to delay and weaken the first and driving formation of the German chain of armies; hisstrategywas, while holding the tail of that chain of armies fast upon the fortified frontier, to attract the head of it south-west. In that way he at once weakened the chain and lengthened out the German communications. Not merely was the position of the first German army the worse, and its effective strength the less, the further it advanced, thus ensuring its eventual defeat, but in the event of defeat retirement became proportionally more difficult. The means employed were the illusion that this army was driving before it, not a wing of the Allied forces engaged merely in operations of delay, but forces which, through defeat, were unable to withstand its march onward.

It cannot now be doubted that the Germans had believed themselves strong enough to undertake the investment of Paris concurrently with successful hostilities against the French forces in the field. But by the time General von Kluck's army arrived at Creil, the fact had become manifest that those two objectives could not be attempted concurrently. The necessity had therefore arisen of attempting themsuccessively.

In face of that necessity the choice as to which of the two should be attempted first was not a choice which admitted of debate. Defeat of theFrench forces in the field must be first. Without it, the investment of Paris had clearly become an impossibility. How far it had become an impossibility will be realised by looking at the position of the German armies.

Five of them were echeloned across France from Creil, north-east of Paris, to near the southern point of the Argonne.

The army of von Kluck was between Creil and Soissons, with advanced posts extended to Meaux on the Marne.

The army of von Bülow was between Soissons and Rheims, with advanced posts pushed to Château-Thierry, also on the Marne.

The army of von Hausen held Rheims and the country between Rheims and Chalons, with advanced posts at Epernay.

The army of Duke Albert, with headquarters at Chalons, occupied the valley of the Marne as far as the Argonne.

The army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, with headquarters at St. Menehould, held the Argonne north of that place, with communications passing round Verdun to Metz.

If the line formed by these armies be traced on the map, it will be found to present from Creil to the southern part of the Argonne a great but somewhat flattened arc, its curvature northwards. Then from the southern part of the Argonne the line will present a sharp bend to the north-east.

Now these five armies, refortified by reserves, comprised nineteen army corps, plus divisionsof cavalry—a vast force aggregating well over one million men, with more than 3,000 guns. Powerful as it appeared, however, this chain of armies was hampered by that capital disadvantage of being held fast by the tail. Held as it was, the chain could not be stretched to attempt an investment of Paris without peril of being broken, and the great project of defeating and enveloping the Allied forces was impossible.

No question was during the first weeks of the war more repeatedly asked than why, instead of drafting larger forces to the frontier of Belgium, General Joffre should have made what seemed to be a purposeless diversion into Upper Alsace, the Vosges, and Lorraine.

The operations of the French in those parts of the theatre of war were neither purposeless nor a diversion.

On the contrary, those operations formed the crux of the French General's counter-scheme.

Their object was, as shown, to prevent the Germans from making an effective attack on the fortified frontier. General Joffre well knew that in the absence of that effective attack, and so long as the German echelon of armies was pinned upon the frontier, Paris could not be invested. In short, the effect of General Joffre's strategy was torob the Germans of the advantages arising from their main body having taken the Belgian route.

On September 3, then, the scale of advantage had begun to dip on the side of the defence. It remained to make that advantage decisive. Theopportunity speedily offered. Since the opportunity had been looked for, General Joffre had made his dispositions accordingly, and was ready to seize it.

Let it be recalled that the most vulnerable and at the same time the most vital point of the German echelon was the outside or right flank of the leading formation, the force led by General von Kluck. Obviously that was the point against which the weight of the French and British attack was primarily directed.

To grasp clearly the operations which followed, it is necessary here to outline the natural features of the terrain and its roads and railways. For that purpose it will probably be best to start from the Vosges and take the country westward as far as Paris.

On their western side the Vosges are buttressed by a succession of wooded spurs divided by upland valleys, often narrowing into mere clefts called "rupts." These valleys, as we move away from the Vosges, widen out and fall in level until they merge with the upper valley of the Moselle. If we think of this part of the valley of the Moselle as a main street, and these side valleys and "rupts" asculs-de-sacopening off it, we form a fairly accurate notion of the region.

From the valley of the upper Moselle the valley of the upper Meuse, roughly parallel to it farther west, is divided by a ridge of wooded country. Though not high, this ridge is continuous.

On the points of greatest natural strength commanding the roads and railways running across the ridge, and mostly on the east side of the valley of the Meuse, had been built the defence works of the fortified frontier.

Crossing the valley of the Meuse we come into a similar region of hills and woods, but this region is, on the whole, much wilder, the hills higher, and the forests more extensive and dense. The hills here, too, form a nearly continuous ridge, running north-north-west. The highlands east of the Meuse sink, as we go north, into the undulating country of Lorraine, but the ridge on the west side of the Meuse extends a good many miles farther. This ridge, with the Meuse flowing along the east side of it and the river Aire flowing along its west side, is the Argonne. It is divided by two main clefts. Through the more northerly runs the main road from Verdun to Chalons; through the more southerly the main road from St. Mihiel on the Meuse to Bar-le-Duc, on the Marne.

Thus from the Vosges to the Aire we have three nearly parallel rivers divided by two hilly ridges.

North of Verdun the undulating Lorraine country east of the Meuse again rises into a stretch of upland forest. This is the Woevre.

Now, westward of the Argonne and across the Aire there is a region in character very like the South Downs in England. It extends all the way from the upper reaches of the Marne north-west beyond the Aisne and the Oise toSt. Quentin. In this open country, where the principal occupation is sheep grazing, the lonely main roads run across the downs for mile after mile straight as an arrow. Villages are far between. The few towns lie along the intersecting valleys.

But descending from the downs into the wide valley of the Marne we come into the region which has been not unaptly called the orchard of France, the land of vineyards and plantations, and flourishing, picturesque towns; in short, one of the most beautiful spots in Europe. The change from the wide horizons of the solitary downs to the populous and highly-cultivated lowlands is like coming into another world.

From the military point of view, however, the important features of all this part of France are its roads and rivers, and most of all its rivers.

The three main waterways, the Oise, the Marne, and the Seine, converge as they approach Paris. Between the Oise and the Marne flows the main tributary of the Oise, the Aisne. Also north of the Marne is its tributary, the Ourcq; south of the Marne flows its tributaries, the Petit Morin and the Grand Morin. All join the Marne in the lower part of the valley not far from Paris. Between the Marne and the Seine flows the Aube, a tributary of the Seine. The country between the Marne and the Seine forms a wide swell of land. It was along the plateaux forming the backbone of this broad ridge that the Battle of the Marne was, for the most part, fought.

That brings us to the question of the roads.

Eastward from Paris, along the valley of the Marne, run three great highways. The most northerly, passing through Meaux, La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Château Thierry, and Epernay to Chalons, follows nearly the same course as the river, crossing it at several points to avoid bends. The next branches off at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and also runs to Chalons by way of Montmirail. The third, passing through La Ferté-Gaucher, Sezanne, Fère Champenoise, and Sommesons to Vitry-le-François, follows the backbone of country already alluded to. All these great roads lead farther east into Germany, the northerly and the middle roads to Metz and the valley of the Moselle, the third road to Nancy and Strasburg.

Now, it must be manifest to anybody that command of these routes, with command of the railways corresponding with them, meant mastery of the communications between Paris and the French forces holding the fortified frontier all the way from Toul to Verdun.

If, consequently, the invading forces could seize and hold these routes and railways, and, as a result, which would to all intents follow, could seize and hold the great main routes and the railways running eastward through the valley of the Seine from Paris to Belfort, the fortified frontier—the key to the whole situation—would in military phrase, be completely "turned." Its defence consequently would have to be abandoned.

Not only must its defence have been abandoned, with the effect of giving freedom of movement to the German echelon, but, that barrier removed, the German armies would no longer be dependent for munitions and supplies on the route through Belgium. They could receive them just as conveniently by the route through Metz. Their facilities of supply would be doubled.

It will be seen, therefore, to what an extent the whole course of the war hung upon this great clash of arms on the Marne. German success must have affected the future of operations alike in the western theatre and in the eastern.

But there is another feature of the roads in the valley of the Marne which is of consequence. Great roads converge into it from the north. Sezanne has already been mentioned. It is half-way along the broad backbone dividing the valley of the Marne from the valley of the Seine. Five great roads meet there from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Soissons, Rheims, Chalons, Verdun, and Nancy. Hence the facility for massing at that place a huge body of troops.

It will be seen, therefore, that in making Sezanne the point at which they aimed their main blow at the whole French scheme of defence, the Germans had selected the spot where the blow would, in all probability, be at once decisive and possibly fatal. Clearly they had now grasped, at all events in its main intention, the strategy of the French general.They saw that he wasusing the fortified frontier to checkmate their Belgian plan.

Summing up the consequences, had success attended the stroke we find that it would have:

Opened to the invaders the valley of the Seine.

Turned the defence of the fortified frontier.

Released the whole of the German armies.

Given them additional, as well as safer, lines of supply from Germany.

Enabled the German armies to sweep westward along the valley of the Seine, enveloping or threatening to envelop the greater part of the French forces in the field.

Why, then, if it was so necessary and the object of it so important, was the move begun by General von Kluck on September 3 a false move?

It was a false move because he ought to have stood against the forces opposed to him. The defeat of those forces was necessary before the attack against Sezanne could be successful. Conversely, his own defeat involved failure of the great enterprise.

Instead, however, of facing and continuing his offensive against the forces opposed to him, he turned towards Sezanne. By doing that he exposed his flank to the Allied counter-stroke.

This blunder can only be attributed to the combined influences of, firstly, hurry; secondly, bad information as to the strength and positions of the Allied forces; thirdly, the false impression formed from reports of victories unaccompanied by exact statements as to losses; and fourthly, and perhaps of most consequence, the failure of the Crown Prince of Germany in the Argonne.

General von Kluck doubtless acted upon imperative orders. His incomplete information and the false impression his advance had created probably also led him to accept those orders without protest. But it should not be forgotten that the Commander primarily responsible for the blunder, and for the disasters it involved, was the Crown Prince of Germany.

Primarily the Crown Prince of Germany was responsible, but not wholly. In the responsibility General von Kluck had no small share. He was misled. When the British force arrived at Creil General Joffre resolved upon and carried out a masterly and remarkable piece of strategy. The British army was withdrawn from the extreme left of the Allied line on the north-east of Paris, and transferred to the south-east, and its former place taken by the 6th French army. This move, carried out with both secrecy and rapidity, was designed to give General von Kluck the impression that the British troops had been withdrawn from the front. That the ruse succeeded is now clear. So far from being withdrawn, the British army was brought up by reinforcements to the strength of three army corps. Leaving out of account a force of that strength, the calculations of the German Commander were fatally wrong.

Let us now see what generally were the movements of the German and of the Allied forces between September 3 and September 6 when the Battle of the Marne began.

Leaving two army corps, the 2nd and the4th Reserve corps, on the Ourcq to cover his flank and rear, General von Kluck struck south-east across the Marne with the 3rd, 4th, and 7th corps. The main body crossed the river at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and took the main route to Sezanne. Others crossed higher up between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Château-Thierry. For this purpose they threw bridges across the river. The Marne is deep and for 120 miles of its course navigable.

These movements were covered and screened by the 2nd division of cavalry, which advanced towards Coulommiers, and the 9th division, which pushed on to the west of Crecy. Both places are south of the Marne and east of Paris.

Writing of these events at the time, Mr. W. T. Massey, special correspondent of theDaily Telegraph, observed that:—

The beginning of the alteration of German plans was noticeable at Creil. Hidden by a thick screen of troops from the army in the field, but observed by aerial squadrons, the enemy were seen to be on the move. Ground won at Senlis was given up, and the German troops, which at that point were nearer Paris than any other men of the Kaiser's army, were marched to the rear. Only the commandants in the field can say whether the movement was expected, but it is the fact that immediately the enemy began their strategic movement British and French dispositions were changed.

The movementwasexpected. Indeed, as we have seen, the whole strategy of the campaignon the French side had been designed to bring it about.

The Germans must have observed that their new intentions had been noticed, but they steadily pursued their policy. Their right was withdrawn from before Beauvais, and that pretty cathedral town has now been relieved of the danger of Teuton invasion. The shuttered houses are safe, temporarily at any rate.The ponderous machine did not turn at right angles with any rapidity. Its movements were slow, but they were not uncertain, and the change was made just where it was anticipated the driving wedge would meet with least resistance.In the main the German right is a tired army. It is a great fighting force still. The advance has been rapid, and some big tasks have been accomplished. But the men have learnt many things which have surprised them. They thought they were invincible, that they could sweep away opposition like a tidal wave. Instead of a progress as easy as modern warfare would allow, their way has had to be fought step by step at a staggering sacrifice, and in place of an army which took the field full of confidence in the speedy ending of the war and taught that nothing could prevent a triumph for German arms, you have an army thoroughly disillusioned.

The ponderous machine did not turn at right angles with any rapidity. Its movements were slow, but they were not uncertain, and the change was made just where it was anticipated the driving wedge would meet with least resistance.

In the main the German right is a tired army. It is a great fighting force still. The advance has been rapid, and some big tasks have been accomplished. But the men have learnt many things which have surprised them. They thought they were invincible, that they could sweep away opposition like a tidal wave. Instead of a progress as easy as modern warfare would allow, their way has had to be fought step by step at a staggering sacrifice, and in place of an army which took the field full of confidence in the speedy ending of the war and taught that nothing could prevent a triumph for German arms, you have an army thoroughly disillusioned.

In this connection the service of the British Flying Corps proved invaluable. Covering though they did a vast area, and carefully as they were screened by ordinary military precautions, the movements of the Germans were watched and notified in detail. Upon this, as far as the dispositions of the Allied forces wereconcerned, everything depended, and no one knew that better than General Joffre. On September 9 he acknowledged it in a message to the British headquarters:—

Please express most particularly to Marshal French my thanks for services rendered on every day by the English Flying Corps. The precision, exactitude, and regularity of the news brought in by its members are evidence of their perfect organisation, and also of the perfect training of pilots and observers.

Farther east the army of General von Bülow (the 9th, 10th, 10th Reserve corps, and the Army corps of the Prussian Guard), advancing from Soissons through Château-Thierry, and crossing the Marne at that place as well as at points higher up towards Epernay, was following the main road to Montmirail on the Petit Morin.

The army of General von Hausen (the 11th, 12th, and 19th corps), advancing from Rheims, had crossed the Marne at Epernay and at other points towards Chalons, and was following the road towards Sezanne by way of Champaubert.

The army of Duke Albert, having passed the Marne above Chalons, was moving along the roads to Sommesous.

The army of the Crown Prince of Germany was endeavouring to move from St. Menehould to Vitry-le-François, also on the Marne.

On the side of the Allies,

General Maunoury, with the 6th French army, advanced from Paris upon the Ourcq. The right of this army rested on Meaux on the Marne.

General French with the British army, pivoting on its left, formed a new front extending south-east to north-west from Jouey, through Le Chatel and Faremoutiers, to Villeneuve-le-Comte.

General Conneau with the French cavalry was on the British right, between Coulommiers and La Ferté Gaucher.

General Desperey with the 5th French army held the line from Courtagon to Esternay, barring the roads from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Montmirail to Sezanne.

General Foch, with headquarters at La Fère Champenoise, barred with his army the roads from Epernay and Chalons.

General de Langle, holding Vitry-le-François, barred the approaches to that place and to Sommesous.

General Serrail, with the French army operating in the Argonne, held Revigny. His line extended north-east across the Argonne to Verdun, and was linked up with the positions held by the French army base on that fortress.

General Pau held the line on the east of the fortified frontier.

Some observations on these dispositions of the Allies will elucidate their tactical intention.

The position of the Allied armies formed a great bow, with the western end of it bent sharply inwards.

Theweightof the Allied forces was massed round that western bend against the now exposedflank of von Kluck's army. Here lay the most vulnerable point of the German line.

The tactical scheme of the Allied Commander-in-Chief was simple—a great military merit. He aimed first at defeating the German right led by Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. Having by that uncovered the flank of General von Hausen's army, his intention was to attack it also in both front and flank and defeat it. The same tactic was to be repeated with each of the other German armies in succession.

For that purpose the allied armies were not posted directly on the front of the German armies, but between them. Consequently the left of one German army and the right of another was attacked by the same French army. In that way two German Generals would have to resist an attack directed by one French General, and every German General would have to resist two independent French attacks. Hence, too, if a German army was forced back the French could at once double round the flank of the German army next in the line if that army was still standing its ground.

Choice of the battle ground and command of the roads leading to it ensured that this would happen. As a fact, it did.

Finally, all the way behind the French line ran the great road leading across the plateaux from Paris to the fortified frontier. This, with railway communication, gave the needed facilities for the movement of reserves and the transport of munitions and food supplies.

Now let us glance at the tactical scheme on the German side.

The fact that General von Kluck had left two out of the five corps forming his army on the Ourcq, and was covering his movement to the south of the Marne with his cavalry, proves that he did not, as was supposed, intend to lose contact with Paris. His scheme was to establish an echelon of troops from the Ourcq to La Ferté Gaucher on the great eastern road, believing that to be meanwhile a quite sufficient defence.

With the rest of his force he was to join with von Bülow and von Hausen in smashing through the French position at Sezanne. Against that position there was to be the overwhelming concentration of ten army corps.

To assist the stroke against Sezanne there was a concurrent intention to break the French line at Vitry-le-François. The French line between Sezanne and Vitry-le-François would then be swept away.

Assuming the success of these operations, the German forces would be echeloned south-east from the Ourcq across the valley of the Marne and the plateau south of it to Troyes on the Aube. The Germans would then be in a position to attack in flank the French retreating from the frontier, and ready, when these French troops fell back, pursued by the armies of the Crown Princes of Germany and Bavaria and by von Heeringen's army of the Vosges, to join in the great sweep along the valley of the Seineand round to the south of Paris. By this time, remember, the long lines of communication through Belgium would have ceased to be vital.

It was a bold scheme.

There are, however, other factors to be taken into account besides tactical plans.

Not less a surprise than the apparently sudden change in the German movements had been, during the preceding week or more, the seemingly hardly less precipitate falling back of the French upon the Marne. All the world believed that the French were "on the run," and all the world thought they would keep on running. Day by day during that exciting time the inhabitants of the valley of the Marne witnessed column after column of their defenders apparently in full retreat. The marching qualities of the French are, as everybody knows, remarkable. They showed the enemy a clean pair of heels. Few could understand it.

Then came the Germans, hot on the scent, confident that the French could never withstand them. From over the highlands by every road they poured into the peaceful Marne valley like a destroying flood. In front of them swept a multitude of fugitives.

"Champagne," wrote a special correspondent of theDaily Telegraph, "is now overrun with fugitive villagers from the neighbourhood of Rethel, Laon, and Soissons. It is painful to see these unfortunate people hurrying away with a few household goods on carts, or with bundles, and walking along the country roads in regularragged processions, not knowing whither they are going. Château-Thierry and all the beautiful country of the Marne is by this time in the hands of the Germans. When I last drove through the place a few weeks ago, and lunched with a few amiable French officers at the best hotel in the place, "L'Eléphant," Château-Thierry was teeming with cattle and army horses requisitioned for the campaign. Four times I passed through it, and each time the great assemblage of horses, trucks, and army material had increased, although the horses and cattle were driven away each day, and fresh ones were led in from the great pastoral country round about. Little did I think then that the Germans would now be bivouacking on the great market place and stacking their rifles on the banks of the Marne."

It was by just this over-confidence in themselves that General Joffre had intended the enemy should be misled. He had foreseen that the Germans would come on in a hurry. On the other hand, the French retreat had apparently been precipitous because it was essential to make ready for the rebound. The retreat had rendered the French troops, still unbeaten, only the more dangerous. Describing the effect from his own observation, Mr. Massey wrote:—

The French eastern army has been on the move for days, and if the Germans were not in such strong force they would be in grave danger. The French have made such a strenuous effort to cope with the new condition of things that one of theirinfantry brigades marched continuously for three days, the men never resting for more than an hour at a time.One who has seen only the Allied armies may be a bad judge, and less able to form an opinion than an armchair critic, who sums up the possibilities with the aid of maps and the knowledge of past achievements of German forces. But there is one guide which the stay-at-home strategist cannot possibly have, and that is the spirit of the Allied soldiery. I have seen far more of the French than of the English troops in this campaign, but anyone who has talked to the soldier must be infected with his cheery optimism.His faith in his country and in the power of the army is stupendous, his patriotism is unquestionable, his confidence grows as the enemy approaches. With a smile he accepts the news of the German march southwards, and tells you nothing could be better; the further the line penetrates the more remote is the chance that it will continue unbroken. He will not believe that the German advance would have got so far if it had not been the plan of General Joffre to lure the enemy forwards, and so to weaken his line. The French soldier to-day is more confident of victory than ever.These things, which a soldier can appreciate at their proper value, explain why the dash of the French troops has rivalled their attitude in the previous part of the campaign. Reinforced by great battalions, stiffened by reserves composed mainly of men with a stake in the country, and fighting for all they hold most dear—for France, for hearth, and home—they have offered a magnificent, resolute front to the machine-like advance.

One who has seen only the Allied armies may be a bad judge, and less able to form an opinion than an armchair critic, who sums up the possibilities with the aid of maps and the knowledge of past achievements of German forces. But there is one guide which the stay-at-home strategist cannot possibly have, and that is the spirit of the Allied soldiery. I have seen far more of the French than of the English troops in this campaign, but anyone who has talked to the soldier must be infected with his cheery optimism.

His faith in his country and in the power of the army is stupendous, his patriotism is unquestionable, his confidence grows as the enemy approaches. With a smile he accepts the news of the German march southwards, and tells you nothing could be better; the further the line penetrates the more remote is the chance that it will continue unbroken. He will not believe that the German advance would have got so far if it had not been the plan of General Joffre to lure the enemy forwards, and so to weaken his line. The French soldier to-day is more confident of victory than ever.

These things, which a soldier can appreciate at their proper value, explain why the dash of the French troops has rivalled their attitude in the previous part of the campaign. Reinforced by great battalions, stiffened by reserves composed mainly of men with a stake in the country, and fighting for all they hold most dear—for France, for hearth, and home—they have offered a magnificent, resolute front to the machine-like advance.

General Joffre, therefore, had handled his machine with skill. He had used it for his design without impairing its spirit. On the contrary, he had stiffened its "form." And on the eve of the great encounter on which the fortunes of the campaign, and the future of France alike hung, he issued to the troops his now famous Order:—

At the moment, when a battle on which the welfare of the country depends is about to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind you all that this is no longer the time to look behind. All our efforts must be directed towards attacking and driving back the enemy. An army which can no longer advance must at all costs keep the ground it has won and allow itself to be killed on the spot rather than give way. In the present circumstances no faltering can be tolerated.

That the Germans on their side equally realised how momentous was the impending battle is shown by their Army Order. A copy of it was, after the battle, found in a house at Vitry-le-François, which for a time had been used as a headquarters of the 8th German army corps. In the haste of flight the document was left behind. Signed by Lieut.-General Tulff von Tscheppe und Wendenbach, commandant of the 8th corps, and dated September 7, it ran:—

The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The principal French troopshave been forced to accept battle after having been continually forced back. The great decision is undoubtedly at hand.To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well as of all that of our army corps, is bound to be engaged all along the line from Paris to Verdun.To save the welfare and honour of Germany I expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly, and to the last breath.Everything depends on the result of to-morrow.

To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well as of all that of our army corps, is bound to be engaged all along the line from Paris to Verdun.

To save the welfare and honour of Germany I expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly, and to the last breath.

Everything depends on the result of to-morrow.

This, then, was the spirit in which, on both sides, the mightiest clash of arms until then known to history was entered upon. Across France the battle front stretched for 150 miles. The fight raged, too, for another forty miles along the frontier, for coincidently with the main conflict from Paris to Verdun, the Germans made yet another great effort to break upon the frontier from the east. Fourteen great armies took part in the battle. They numbered altogether more than two millions of men. Taking the two great hosts each as a whole, the numbers were not very unequal. True, the Germans had but six armies as against the eight on the side of the Allies. The German armies, however, were larger. Their strength ranged from 160,000 to 180,000 men as against, on the side of the Allies, an average strength of 120,000.[14]

During nearly six days there was, along that far extended battle line, the flash and thunder of more than 7,000 guns. Shells rose and burst like flights of warring meteorites. Masses ofinfantry moved to the attack. Incessant rifle fire accompanied the bolder bass of the artillery. In and through woods, across fields, in and round blazing villages and burning farms and chateaux they fought; an incessant movement to and fro, amid an unceasing roar—the rage of nations locked in deadly embrace. There were bayonet fights on a vast scale; there were charges by clouds of horsemen; there were furious and murderous combats for points of vantage; there was the capture and recapture of towns; the rush of fire-spitting automobiles below, and the flight of bomb-dropping aeroplanes above. There was the hurried movement of troops and the wild gallop of batteries of guns along the roads. There was, too, the ever-changing kaleidoscope of the masses of transport. Along the great road from Paris to Germany a spectator might have travelled from sunrise to sunset during the whole week of battle, and yet still have found himself in the midst of this seemingly unbounded fury of a world at war.

FOOTNOTE:[14]The following may be taken as theapproximatestrength of the armies engaged, allowing on the one hand for war wastage, and on the other for a filling up from reserves, which on the part of the Allies had been completed:—Germans.General von Kluck's Army (5 corps, Prussians)245,0002nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions23,000General von Bülow's Army (4 corps, Prussians)180,000Cavalry of the Prussian Guard6,000General von Hausen's Army (3 corps, Saxons)165,000Duke Albert's Army (3 corps, Wurtembergers)150,000Crown Prince of Germany's Army (3 corps, Prussians)175,000Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army (3 corps, Bavarians)160,000————Approximate total1,104,000Allies.General Maunoury's Army (3 corps and reserves)140,000General French's Army (3 corps)110,000British Cavalry Divisions8,000General Conneau's Cavalry23,000General Desperey's Army (3 corps and reserves)150,000General Foch's Army (3 corps)120,000General de Langle's Army (3 corps and reserves)150,000General Serrail's Army (3 corps)120,000General Pau's Army (3 corps and reserves)140,000————Approximate total961,000Grand approximate total of combatants2,065,000————Approximate guns and mortars, Germans3,610Approximate guns and mortars, Allies3,680———Total7,290The Allies were superior in field-guns, but had fewer howitzers, especially of the heavy type, and the aggregateweightof the German artillery was on the whole greater. The estimate given of the number of combatants is rather below than above the actual.

[14]The following may be taken as theapproximatestrength of the armies engaged, allowing on the one hand for war wastage, and on the other for a filling up from reserves, which on the part of the Allies had been completed:—Germans.General von Kluck's Army (5 corps, Prussians)245,0002nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions23,000General von Bülow's Army (4 corps, Prussians)180,000Cavalry of the Prussian Guard6,000General von Hausen's Army (3 corps, Saxons)165,000Duke Albert's Army (3 corps, Wurtembergers)150,000Crown Prince of Germany's Army (3 corps, Prussians)175,000Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army (3 corps, Bavarians)160,000————Approximate total1,104,000Allies.General Maunoury's Army (3 corps and reserves)140,000General French's Army (3 corps)110,000British Cavalry Divisions8,000General Conneau's Cavalry23,000General Desperey's Army (3 corps and reserves)150,000General Foch's Army (3 corps)120,000General de Langle's Army (3 corps and reserves)150,000General Serrail's Army (3 corps)120,000General Pau's Army (3 corps and reserves)140,000————Approximate total961,000Grand approximate total of combatants2,065,000————Approximate guns and mortars, Germans3,610Approximate guns and mortars, Allies3,680———Total7,290The Allies were superior in field-guns, but had fewer howitzers, especially of the heavy type, and the aggregateweightof the German artillery was on the whole greater. The estimate given of the number of combatants is rather below than above the actual.

The Allies were superior in field-guns, but had fewer howitzers, especially of the heavy type, and the aggregateweightof the German artillery was on the whole greater. The estimate given of the number of combatants is rather below than above the actual.

Such were the spectacular aspects of the battle. It remains to sketch its phases as, first sullenly, then swiftly, the tide of conflict rolled backward across the miles of country between Sezanne and Rheims.

These developments can best be followed day by day.

September 5.—General movement of the German armies across the Marne. The troops of von Kluck crossed at Trilport, Sommery, and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; those of von Bülow at Château-Thierry; those of von Hausen at Epernay, and Duke Albert's at Chalons. Simultaneously columns of von Kluck's 2nd and 4th Reserve corps began to cross the Ourcq.

From the Marne the Germans pushed on without delay to the south. The 3rd, 4th, and 7th corps of von Kluck's army were on the march diagonally across the British near Coulommiers. They were making for La Ferté Gaucher. In face of this advance the 5th French army fell back on the latter place. This movelengthened the German flank and laid it more completely open to a British attack.

September 6.—General Joffre gave orders for a general advance. Before daybreak the 6th French, British, and 5th French armies began a combined offensive. While the 6th French army advanced eastward towards the line of the Ourcq, the British advanced north-east to the line of the Grand Morin, and the 5th French army north from east of La Ferté Gaucher upon Montmirail.

The 6th French army, driving in the German advance posts, reached Nanteuil.

The British fell upon the flank of the divisions of von Kluck's army still crossing the Grand Morin, and drove them back upon the Petit Morin.

By this unexpected and swiftly delivered blow von Kluck's army, extending from the Marne to La Ferté Gaucher, was cut into two parts.

Coincidently with the British advance the 5th French army had, in a night attack and at the point of the bayonet, driven the leading German divisions out of three villages near La Ferté Gaucher, where they had bivouacked.

In view of these attacks General von Kluck had no alternative save to retreat. To escape the British he fell back on the Petit Morin in the direction of Montmirail.

His retreat was assisted by the right of von Bülow's army, and covered by his divisions of cavalry, reinforced by von Bülow's cavalry of the Prussian Guard. The German cavalry, attacked by the French and British, was cut up withheavy loss. More than 60,000 horsemen were engaged in this gigantic combat.

September 7.—To assist the retreat, the centre divisions of von Kluck's army opposing the British made a stand upon the Petit Morin, and the army of von Bülow a stand from Montmirail to Le Petit Sompius. Along that line the 5th French army was all day heavily engaged against the left wing of von Kluck's army and the right of von Bülow's.

On the Ourcq the Germans launched a general assault against the 6th French army.

On the Petit Morin they occupied a strong position on the high north bank. This river flows during part of its course through marshes. A frontal attack on the position was out of the question, but the 1st British army corps and the British cavalry found "a way round" higher up stream. Simultaneously the 3rd British corps crossed lower down. Threatened on both flanks, the Germans fled precipitately towards the Marne. Though they covered their retreat by a counter-attack, they lost many prisoners and some guns.

The armies of von Hausen and Duke Albert and the Crown Prince of Germany were now engaged against the armies of General Foch, General Langle, and General Serrail from the north of Sezanne to Sermaise-les-Bains in the south of the Argonne. The fighting north of Sezanne was obstinate, but the Wurtembergers at Vitry-le-François met with a repulse.

On this day the battle extended for more than120 miles, from the line of the Ourcq across the country to Montmirail, from that place to Sezanne, and then along the plateaux into the Argonne. There was also a German attack upon Luneville designed to aid their operations west of the fortified frontier.

September 8.—Heavy fighting between the 6th French army and the Germans on the Ourcq.

The British attacked the passages of the Marne. At La Ferté Gaucher, where the bridge had been destroyed, the Germans, supported by machine guns, obstinately disputed the passage against the British 3rd corps. The 1st and 2nd corps, however, succeeded in bridging the river higher up, and dislodged them. In their retreat the Germans again met with heavy losses.

At Montmirail the battle was continued with great severity. The French carried several of the German positions at the point of the bayonet. Von Bülow's troops began a general retirement, and were driven over the river.

Taking the offensive, General Foch's army attacked the troops of von Hausen in flank. The left of von Hausen's army north of Sezanne was forced back, but his right at Le Fère Champenoise made an obstinate stand.

To meet this, General Langle also began a general advance, and drove the Germans from Vitry-le-François.

A heavy German attack was directed against Clermont-en-Argonne. Beyond the fortified frontier there was a renewed effort to capture Nancy said to have been watched by the Kaiser.

September 9.—Reinforced, the Germans on the Ourcq made a great effort to break through the 6th French army.

The British, having crossed the Marne, fell upon the Germans fighting on the Ourcq, and drove them northwards. Many guns, caissons, and large quantities of transport were captured.

The 5th French army pursued the defeated troops of von Bülow from Montmirail to Château-Thierry. At that place the Germans are thrown across the Marne in disorder and with huge losses.

The German line had now been completely broken. Between the wreck of von Bülow's troops, north of the Marne, and von Hausen's positions, north of Sezanne, there was a gap of some fifteen miles.

From Sezanne eastward the battle from this time continued with more marked advantage to the Allies.

September 10.—The 6th French army and the British continued the pursuit. On this day the British captured, besides further quantities of transport abandoned in the flight or surrounded, 13 guns, 19 machine guns, and 2,000 prisoners. German infantry, left behind in the hurried march of their army, were found hiding in the woods. There were evidences of general looting by the enemy and of his demoralisation.

In the pursuit of von Bülow's troops by the 5th French army, the Prussian Guard were driven into the marshes of St. Gond.

Covered with tall reeds and rank grass, these marshes, drained by the Petit Morin, are a stretch of low-lying land lying between the Marne and a range of hills. They are probably the bed of an ancient lake. Safe in the dry season, they become in wet weather a dangerous swamp. They were at this time saturated with heavy rains. The Prussian Guards, who had borne the brunt of the recent fighting, had already suffered heavily. They now lost the greater part of their artillery, and a heavy proportion of the surviving force either perished in the quagmires or were killed by the French shells.

An effort nevertheless was made to retrieve the general disaster by a violent German attack from Sezanne to Vitry-le-François, accompanied by an energetic offensive in the Argonne, and by a renewed attempt against Nancy.

In the Argonne the Germans captured Revigny and Brabant-le-Roi, but west of Vitry were forced into retreat. The attack on Nancy was again unsuccessful.

September 11.—The 5th and 6th French armies and the British pursued the troops of von Kluck and von Bülow to the Aisne.

The armies of von Hausen and Duke Albert were now in full flight at Epernay and Chalons. Both incurred very heavy losses. The French captured 6,000 prisoners and 175 guns.

The Germans were driven by General Serrail's troops out of Revigny and Brabant-le-Roi. East of the frontier there was also a general falling back, notably from St. Die and roundLuneville. The French seized Pont-a-Mousson, commanding one of the main passes across the Vosges.

Of the decisive character of the overthrow there could now be no doubt. On September 11, in an Order to the French armies, General Joffre, summing up the situation with soldierly brevity, said:—

The battle which has been taking place for five days is finishing in an incontestable victory.The retreat of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd German armies is being accentuated before our left and our centre.The enemy's 4th army, in its turn, is beginning to fall back to the north of Vitry and Sermaize.Everywhere the enemy is leaving on the field numbers of wounded and quantities of munitions. On all hands prisoners are being taken.Our troops, as they gain ground, are finding proofs of the intensity of the struggle and of the extent of the means employed by the Germans in attempting to resist ourélan.The vigorous resumption of the offensive has brought about success. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men! you have all of you responded to my appeal, and all of you have deserved well of your country.—Joffre.

The battle which has been taking place for five days is finishing in an incontestable victory.

The retreat of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd German armies is being accentuated before our left and our centre.

The enemy's 4th army, in its turn, is beginning to fall back to the north of Vitry and Sermaize.

Everywhere the enemy is leaving on the field numbers of wounded and quantities of munitions. On all hands prisoners are being taken.

Our troops, as they gain ground, are finding proofs of the intensity of the struggle and of the extent of the means employed by the Germans in attempting to resist ourélan.

The vigorous resumption of the offensive has brought about success. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men! you have all of you responded to my appeal, and all of you have deserved well of your country.—Joffre.

It had been no easy victory. The huge forces of Generals von Kluck, von Bülow, and von Hausen, comprising the flower of the German first line army, fought with stubborn and even reckless courage. During the opening days of the battle they contested the ground foot by foot. The character of the fighting in which the Britishtroops were engaged, gathered from men who had taken part in it, was disclosed by the Paris correspondent of theDaily Telegraph:—

"The more we killed the more they seemed to become," said an officer who described to me some of the earlier phases. "They swarmed like ants, coming on in masses, though rarely seeking close contact, for they have learned to respect our rifles and our bayonets."On this point there is unprejudiced testimony. A non-commissioned officer of Hussars asked me to translate a letter found on a German officer killed while defending his battery. In the letter are these sentences:—"German infantry and cavalry will not attack English infantry and cavalry at close quarters. Their fire is murderous. The only way to attack them is with artillery."Upon this advice the enemy seem to act. They make the best use of their guns, and keep up an incessant fire, which is often well directed, though the effect is not nearly so deadly as they imagine. Their machine guns—of which they have great numbers—are also handled with skill, and make many gaps in our ranks. But the enemy rarely charge with the bayonet. Under cover of artillery they advanceen masse, pour out volleys without taking aim, and retire when threatened. This is the general method of attack, and it is one in which numbers undoubtedly count. But numbers are not everything; spirit and dash count for more in the end, and these qualities our soldiers have beyond all others in this war. Every officer with whom I have spoken says the same thing. Nothing could be finer than the steadiness and the enterprise of our troops. They remember and obey the order given byWellington at Waterloo—they stand fast—to the death. Before this insistent and vigorous offensive the enemy have fallen back every day, pressed hard on front and on flank.

On this point there is unprejudiced testimony. A non-commissioned officer of Hussars asked me to translate a letter found on a German officer killed while defending his battery. In the letter are these sentences:—

"German infantry and cavalry will not attack English infantry and cavalry at close quarters. Their fire is murderous. The only way to attack them is with artillery."

Upon this advice the enemy seem to act. They make the best use of their guns, and keep up an incessant fire, which is often well directed, though the effect is not nearly so deadly as they imagine. Their machine guns—of which they have great numbers—are also handled with skill, and make many gaps in our ranks. But the enemy rarely charge with the bayonet. Under cover of artillery they advanceen masse, pour out volleys without taking aim, and retire when threatened. This is the general method of attack, and it is one in which numbers undoubtedly count. But numbers are not everything; spirit and dash count for more in the end, and these qualities our soldiers have beyond all others in this war. Every officer with whom I have spoken says the same thing. Nothing could be finer than the steadiness and the enterprise of our troops. They remember and obey the order given byWellington at Waterloo—they stand fast—to the death. Before this insistent and vigorous offensive the enemy have fallen back every day, pressed hard on front and on flank.

Realising that the whole future of the campaign, if not of the war, hung upon the issue, the army of General von Hausen stood to the last. There was a hope that the German right might yet rally against the staggering attack thrown upon it. Mr. Massey wrote:—

The fighting on the line of the French centre has, from all accounts, been of a most terrific description. Neither side would give ground except under the heaviest pressure. Long-continued artillery duels paved the way for infantry attacks, and positions had to be carried at the point of the bayonet. Often when bayonet charges had cleared trenches the men driven out were rallied and reinforced, and retook the positions. Here was the most strenuous fighting of the campaign, and as the enemy's casualties are certain to have exceeded those of the French, the total of German killed, wounded, and prisoners must reach an enormous figure. The French losses were very heavy.An infantryman wounded within sight of Vitry-le-François told me that the French bayonet fighting was performed with an irresistible dash. The men were always eager—sometimes too eager—to get to close quarters. The weary waiting in trenches too hastily dug to give more than poor shelter from artillery fire caused many a murmur, and there was no attempt to move forward stealthily when the word to advance was given. Often a rushing line was severely torn by mitrailleuse fire, but the heart's desire to settlematters with cold steel could not be checked merely because comrades to the right and left were put out of action. The bayonet work of French infantry gave the enemy a terrible time.

An infantryman wounded within sight of Vitry-le-François told me that the French bayonet fighting was performed with an irresistible dash. The men were always eager—sometimes too eager—to get to close quarters. The weary waiting in trenches too hastily dug to give more than poor shelter from artillery fire caused many a murmur, and there was no attempt to move forward stealthily when the word to advance was given. Often a rushing line was severely torn by mitrailleuse fire, but the heart's desire to settlematters with cold steel could not be checked merely because comrades to the right and left were put out of action. The bayonet work of French infantry gave the enemy a terrible time.

Of the struggle on the left of von Hausen's army against the troops of General Langle, a graphic picture is given in the diary of a Saxon officer of infantry found later among the German dead. The army of von Hausen had arrived by forced marches, the left from Rethel, the right from Rheims:—

Sept. 1.—We marched to Rethel. Our battalion stayed there as escort to headquarters.Sept. 2.—The French burnt half the town, probably to cut our lines of communications. It can't hurt us for long, of course, but it's a nuisance, as our field artillery is short of ammunition.However, our division advanced. The burning of Rethel was dreadful. All the little houses with wooden beams in their roofs, and their stacks of furniture, fed the flames to the full. The Aisne was only a feeble protection; the sparks were soon carried over to the other side. Next day the town was nothing but a heap of ashes.Sept. 3.—Still at Rethel, on guard over prisoners. The houses are charming inside. The middle-class in France has magnificent furniture. We found stylish pieces everywhere, and beautiful silk, but in what a state!... Good God!... Every bit of furniture broken, mirrors smashed. The vandals themselves could not have done more damage.This place is a disgrace to our army. Theinhabitants who fled could not have expected, of course, that all their goods would have been left in full after so many troops had passed. But the column commanders are responsible for the greater part of the damage, as they could have prevented the looting and destruction. The damage amounts to millions of marks; even the safes have been attacked.In a solicitor's house, in which, as luck would have it, everything was in excellent taste, including a collection of old lace, and Eastern works of art, everything was smashed to bits.I couldn't resist taking a little memento myself here and there.... One house was particularly elegant, everything in the best taste. The hall was of light oak; near the staircase I found a splendid aquascutum and a camera by Felix.The sappers have been ordered to march with the divisional bridging train. We shall start to-morrow. Yesterday at Chalons-sur-Marne a French aviator (officer) was taken prisoner. He imagined the village was held by French troops and so landed there. He was awfully disgusted at being taken prisoner.Sept. 4.—To Tuniville, Pont-Fauerger, where we billeted.Sept. 5.—Les Petites Loges, Tours-sur-Marne. I never want to make such marches again; simply tests of endurance. We crossed the Marne canal on Sept. 6. On our left the 19th corps marched straight on Chalons. On our right front the Guard corps was hotly engaged. When we reached Villeneuve we heard that the Guard corps had thrown the enemy back and that our division was to take up the pursuit. We were in a wood, which the enemy searched with shell fire.Left and right it simply rained bullets, but the one I'm fated to stop was not among them.We could not advance any further, the enemy was too strong for us. On our left the 19th corps came up in time to give us a little breathing space. An infernal shell fire. We had a dreadful thirst, a glass of Pilsener would have been a godsend.... A shell suddenly fell in the wood and killed six of my section; a second fell right in the middle of us; we couldn't hang on any longer, so we retired.We made several attempts to reach the village of Lenharree, but the enemy's artillery swept the whole wood, so that we could not make any headway. And we never got a sight of the enemy's guns. We soon had the answer to the riddle as to why the enemy's shooting was so wonderfully accurate. We were actually on the enemy's practice range. Lenharree was the chief pointd'appuion the right wing.The situation was as follows: The Guard corps was on a ground which the enemy knew like the back of his hand, and so was in an extremely critical position. It was just like St. Privat, except that we were all in woods under a terrible shell fire. Our artillery could do nothing, as there was nothing to be seen.We found an order from General Joffre to the commander of the 2nd French corps, telling him to hold the position at all costs, and saying that it was the last card. It was probably the best one, too. As we knew later, the artillery opposed to us had an immense reserve of ammunition.... Absolutely exhausted, we waited for the night. In front of us all was still.Sept. 8.—We went forward again to the attack against an enemy perfectly entrenched. In spite of his artillery fire, which nothing could silence, we passed through the wood again. As soon as we reached the northern edge, a perfectly insanefire opened on us, infantry and shell fire with redoubled intensity.A magnificent spectacle lay before us; in the far background Lenharree was in flames, and we saw the enemy retreating, beaten at last. The enemy withdrew from one wood to another, but shelled us furiously and scattered us with his machine guns. We got to the village at last, but were driven out of it again with heavy loss. Our losses were enormous. The 178th Regiment alone had 1,700 men wounded, besides those killed. It was hell itself. There were practically no officers left.One word more about this artillery range; there were telephone wires everywhere. It is thought that French officers hidden in trees were telephoning our exact situation in the woods.Sept. 9.—We marched to Oeuvry. The enemy was apparently two kilometres in front of us. Where was our intelligence branch? Our artillery arrived half an hour too late, unfortunately. The French are indefatigable in digging trenches. We passed through a wood and lost touch altogether. We saw companies retiring, and we ourselves received the order to withdraw.We passed through Lenharree once more, where we found piles of bodies, and we billeted at Germinon. There was a rumour that the 1st army had had some disastrous fighting. Our sappers prepared the bridges for demolition. We passed through Chalons-sur-Marne. I am terribly depressed. Everybody thinks the situation is critical. The uncertainty is worst of all.I think we advanced too quickly and were worn out by marching too rapidly and fighting incessantly. So we must wait for the other armies. We went on to Mourmelon-le-Petit, where we dug ourselves in thoroughly. Four of ouraviators are said to have been brought down by the enemy.

Sept. 1.—We marched to Rethel. Our battalion stayed there as escort to headquarters.

Sept. 2.—The French burnt half the town, probably to cut our lines of communications. It can't hurt us for long, of course, but it's a nuisance, as our field artillery is short of ammunition.

However, our division advanced. The burning of Rethel was dreadful. All the little houses with wooden beams in their roofs, and their stacks of furniture, fed the flames to the full. The Aisne was only a feeble protection; the sparks were soon carried over to the other side. Next day the town was nothing but a heap of ashes.

Sept. 3.—Still at Rethel, on guard over prisoners. The houses are charming inside. The middle-class in France has magnificent furniture. We found stylish pieces everywhere, and beautiful silk, but in what a state!... Good God!... Every bit of furniture broken, mirrors smashed. The vandals themselves could not have done more damage.

This place is a disgrace to our army. Theinhabitants who fled could not have expected, of course, that all their goods would have been left in full after so many troops had passed. But the column commanders are responsible for the greater part of the damage, as they could have prevented the looting and destruction. The damage amounts to millions of marks; even the safes have been attacked.

In a solicitor's house, in which, as luck would have it, everything was in excellent taste, including a collection of old lace, and Eastern works of art, everything was smashed to bits.

I couldn't resist taking a little memento myself here and there.... One house was particularly elegant, everything in the best taste. The hall was of light oak; near the staircase I found a splendid aquascutum and a camera by Felix.

The sappers have been ordered to march with the divisional bridging train. We shall start to-morrow. Yesterday at Chalons-sur-Marne a French aviator (officer) was taken prisoner. He imagined the village was held by French troops and so landed there. He was awfully disgusted at being taken prisoner.

Sept. 4.—To Tuniville, Pont-Fauerger, where we billeted.

Sept. 5.—Les Petites Loges, Tours-sur-Marne. I never want to make such marches again; simply tests of endurance. We crossed the Marne canal on Sept. 6. On our left the 19th corps marched straight on Chalons. On our right front the Guard corps was hotly engaged. When we reached Villeneuve we heard that the Guard corps had thrown the enemy back and that our division was to take up the pursuit. We were in a wood, which the enemy searched with shell fire.

Left and right it simply rained bullets, but the one I'm fated to stop was not among them.We could not advance any further, the enemy was too strong for us. On our left the 19th corps came up in time to give us a little breathing space. An infernal shell fire. We had a dreadful thirst, a glass of Pilsener would have been a godsend.... A shell suddenly fell in the wood and killed six of my section; a second fell right in the middle of us; we couldn't hang on any longer, so we retired.

We made several attempts to reach the village of Lenharree, but the enemy's artillery swept the whole wood, so that we could not make any headway. And we never got a sight of the enemy's guns. We soon had the answer to the riddle as to why the enemy's shooting was so wonderfully accurate. We were actually on the enemy's practice range. Lenharree was the chief pointd'appuion the right wing.

The situation was as follows: The Guard corps was on a ground which the enemy knew like the back of his hand, and so was in an extremely critical position. It was just like St. Privat, except that we were all in woods under a terrible shell fire. Our artillery could do nothing, as there was nothing to be seen.

We found an order from General Joffre to the commander of the 2nd French corps, telling him to hold the position at all costs, and saying that it was the last card. It was probably the best one, too. As we knew later, the artillery opposed to us had an immense reserve of ammunition.... Absolutely exhausted, we waited for the night. In front of us all was still.

Sept. 8.—We went forward again to the attack against an enemy perfectly entrenched. In spite of his artillery fire, which nothing could silence, we passed through the wood again. As soon as we reached the northern edge, a perfectly insanefire opened on us, infantry and shell fire with redoubled intensity.

A magnificent spectacle lay before us; in the far background Lenharree was in flames, and we saw the enemy retreating, beaten at last. The enemy withdrew from one wood to another, but shelled us furiously and scattered us with his machine guns. We got to the village at last, but were driven out of it again with heavy loss. Our losses were enormous. The 178th Regiment alone had 1,700 men wounded, besides those killed. It was hell itself. There were practically no officers left.

One word more about this artillery range; there were telephone wires everywhere. It is thought that French officers hidden in trees were telephoning our exact situation in the woods.

Sept. 9.—We marched to Oeuvry. The enemy was apparently two kilometres in front of us. Where was our intelligence branch? Our artillery arrived half an hour too late, unfortunately. The French are indefatigable in digging trenches. We passed through a wood and lost touch altogether. We saw companies retiring, and we ourselves received the order to withdraw.

We passed through Lenharree once more, where we found piles of bodies, and we billeted at Germinon. There was a rumour that the 1st army had had some disastrous fighting. Our sappers prepared the bridges for demolition. We passed through Chalons-sur-Marne. I am terribly depressed. Everybody thinks the situation is critical. The uncertainty is worst of all.

I think we advanced too quickly and were worn out by marching too rapidly and fighting incessantly. So we must wait for the other armies. We went on to Mourmelon-le-Petit, where we dug ourselves in thoroughly. Four of ouraviators are said to have been brought down by the enemy.

Finally, when forced back to the Marne, after three days of incessant fighting—pounded by the French guns, broken by the fury of the French infantry, ripped by slashing onslaughts of the French horse—the Germans still made effort after effort to recover and to re-form. Of the struggle on the Marne, Mr. William Maxwell says:—

I was fortunate enough to meet a non-commissioned officer who watched from an eminence the critical phase of the battle which routed the German centre. This is the substance of his story, which has since been corroborated by officers of my acquaintance. The enemy had been driven back fighting for three days, until they came to the river. There they made a desperate stand. Masses of them appeared on the flat and in the undulations of the ground—they seemed like the sands on the sea shore for numbers. They came on in masses and kept up a terrible fire from rifle and machine-gun. But our infantry were not to be denied; they advanced in short rushes and in open order, while shells rained down upon the enemy, and rifles opened great gaps in their ranks."I began," said the sergeant, "to count the dead, but I soon found that impossible. Suddenly I heard a great shout, and turning to my left I saw a sight that made my heart stand still. Our cavalry were charging down on the enemy's cavalry."In the bright sunshine their lances and sabres looked like a shower of falling stars. There wasan avalanche of men and horses and cold steel. Huge gaps were torn in the enemy's ranks—and the whole thing was over in a few minutes. The German horsemen seemed to vanish into the earth.

"I began," said the sergeant, "to count the dead, but I soon found that impossible. Suddenly I heard a great shout, and turning to my left I saw a sight that made my heart stand still. Our cavalry were charging down on the enemy's cavalry."

In the bright sunshine their lances and sabres looked like a shower of falling stars. There wasan avalanche of men and horses and cold steel. Huge gaps were torn in the enemy's ranks—and the whole thing was over in a few minutes. The German horsemen seemed to vanish into the earth.

Stubborn courage, however, was of no avail. In a brief six days that mighty host had been reduced to a military ruin. They had advanced in the confidence that they were irresistible. Down the valley of the Oise, over the highlands of Champagne they had streamed, in endless columns of men and guns. The earth had shaken beneath the rumble of their artillery and trembled under the hoofs of their horsemen; every road had re-echoed the united tread of their battalions; every horizon had bristled with the flash of their bayonets and sabres; every town and village had felt their arrogance as they "requisitioned" its foodstuffs, consumed its wines, slept in its beds, laid hands on whatever they fancied, and summoned mayors and officials before them to learn their will, and collect their "fines." On the substance of this country of the Marne they had revelled, imagining that the world was theirs.

And now they were a battered mass of fugitives, hiding in woods and orchards; littering the roads with the wrecks of their equipment; fagged and footsore; driven by hunger to tear up the crops from the fields, and devour roots and vegetables raw; their discipline replaced by brutal savagery. Not even the liveliest imagination can adequately picture the state of an armyin flight after a heavy defeat. The bigger the army the worse that state becomes. The organisation of food supply is thrown out of gear. No man knows where the supplies may be, or whether they may not be lost. Guns become separated from their ammunition columns. Wagons break down or are disabled and have to be left behind. The horses drop from famine and overwork. Men grow sullen and intractable. The boom of guns bespeaking the pursuit alone gives the stimulus to cover the lengthening miles of weary road.

Without time to bury their dead, yet anxious to hide their losses from the enemy, the Germans, where they could, formed large pyres of timber, which they soaked with oil. On to these they threw the bodies of the slain. Across the country the smoke from such pyramids by day and the glare of flames by night added to the strangeness and tragedy of a scene removed even from what had been thought civilised war.

The sufferings of the beaten host were severe. Starving and depressed, or at the last point of exhaustion, men fell out or hid themselves in the thick woods which clothe the long undulating slopes on the northern side of the Marne valley.[15]Here they were found by the pursuing Frenchand British. Most, when discovered, had been without food for two days. Partly to satisfy the pangs of hunger, partly out of mere senseless revenge, general and indiscriminate pillage was resorted to. Chateaux, country houses, and villages were ransacked, and pictures or pieces of furniture which could not be carried off destroyed. Though their military spirit had been broken, the ruthlessness of the invaders remained. They traversed the country like a horde of bandits.

Loss of horses forced them to leave behind whole batteries of heavy howitzers and trains of ammunition wagons, for these days of the retreat were days of heavy rain. To shorten the length of their columns, as well as to gain time, the hurrying troops plunged into by-roads. These, cut up by the weight of the guns, speedily became impassable. How hasty was the retreat is proved by the headquarters staff of the 2nd army leaving behind them at Montmirail maps, documents, and personal papers, as well as letters and parcels received by or waiting for the military post.

Following the track of General von Kluck's army, Mr. Gerald Morgan, another special correspondent of theDaily Telegraph, wrote:—

At Vareddes horses and men littered the ground. Semi-permanent entrenchments had been suddenly abandoned. Alongside the German artillery positions I saw piles of unexploded shells which the Germans had abandoned in their hurry. These shells were in wicker baskets,three to a basket. The Germans had had there many batteries of field guns, both three-inch and five-inch, and had meant evidently to make a determined resistance. But their artillery positions were plainly so badly placed that the French were able to blow them, literally to drench them, out. An avenue of large trees along the roadside, trees which the Germans hoped to use as a shelter, had been torn to pieces and flung to the ground by the French artillery as by strokes of lightning. The German dead had almost all been hit by shells or by shrapnel. A German aeroplane, brought down during the engagement, lay in the fields like a big dead bird.I followed the line of the German retreat as far as a village called May. From the number of accoutrements thrown away along the road I judged the retreat was in bad order and greatly hurried.The scene on the battlefield was rather terrible. There was no one to bury the dead, for the French army had gone on in pursuit, and the villagers had almost all left the country some days before.The German infantry position was in a valley. The entrenchments had undoubtedly been dug with a view to maintaining them permanently, but the fault lay in the artillery position. The German guns—evidently a large number—had been placed on a ridge behind the infantry position. This ridge was exposed to a fire from the French artillery on a ridge opposite, a fire which completely silenced the German guns, and left the German infantry to its fate. Few of the infantry escaped.

I followed the line of the German retreat as far as a village called May. From the number of accoutrements thrown away along the road I judged the retreat was in bad order and greatly hurried.

The scene on the battlefield was rather terrible. There was no one to bury the dead, for the French army had gone on in pursuit, and the villagers had almost all left the country some days before.

The German infantry position was in a valley. The entrenchments had undoubtedly been dug with a view to maintaining them permanently, but the fault lay in the artillery position. The German guns—evidently a large number—had been placed on a ridge behind the infantry position. This ridge was exposed to a fire from the French artillery on a ridge opposite, a fire which completely silenced the German guns, and left the German infantry to its fate. Few of the infantry escaped.

On the day after the Germans had been driven across the Marne, Mr. Wm. Maxwell, drivinginto the, at ordinary times, pleasant little town of Meaux, found it deserted:—

Its houses are standing; its churches and public buildings are untouched, yet its streets are silent, its windows shuttered, and its doors closed. It might be a plague-stricken city, forsaken by all except a few Red Cross nurses, who wait for the ambulances bringing the wounded from the battlefield.Leaving the town with a feeling akin to awe, I came upon a new surprise. Walking calmly along the public road in broad day were men in Prussian uniform, and—more amazing still—women in the darkgellabor cloak of the Moors. This was certainly startling, but the explanation was waiting on the road to the east, and it was written in gruesome signs—dead men lying in the ditches—Zouaves in their Oriental dress, Moors in their cloaks, French soldiers in their long blue coats, and Germans in their grey. Every hundred yards or so lay a disembowelled horse with a bloody saddle. This was the ragged edge of the battlefield of the Marne, and the men and women in Prussian and Moorish dress were harmless civilians who had gone to bury the dead and to succour the wounded. It was raining torrents; the wind was bitterly cold, and they had covered themselves with the garments of the dead.Passing along this road I came to a wood, where one of these civilian burial parties had dug a pit in which they laid the friend and foe side by side. Fresh mounds of earth that told their own story guided me to a path, where the battle had blazed, a trail of splintered shells, broken rifles, bullet-riddled helmets, blood-stained rags, with which the dying had stoppedtheir wounds, tiny bags in which the German soldier had hoarded his crumbs of biscuit, letters with the crimson imprint of fingers, showing how in the hour of agony and death men's thoughts turn to the beloved ones they are leaving for ever.Four miles east of Meaux the hills rise sharply to the north, and are covered with trees. Beyond this wood a broad undulating plain stretches northward over cultivated fields dotted with farmsteads. A hundred paces in front, on a gentle slope, the earth has been levelled in several places that are sown with brass cylinders, whose charge sent the shells on their deadly flight.In these emplacements lie some gunners; their heads have been shattered by shells. Under an apple-tree, laden with green fruit, two livid faces turn to the pitiless sky; one man grasps a letter in his hand—it is a woman's writing. Dark huddled patches among the cabbages and the trampled wheat, brown stains on the path, fragments of blood-stained lint, broken rifles and bayonets, bullet-pierced helmets and rent cloaks—all thedébrisof battle show where the fight was fiercest.On the crest of the rise are the trenches; they extend for nearly a mile parallel with the edge of the wood, and are thrown back on the west. They are deep trenches, protected with mounds of earth, and were not made hurriedly. About them lie the dead.The position of the trenches and gun emplacements shows that here the enemy met a flanking attack from the west and north, and covered the retreat of their centre. It is not difficult to picture what happened.

Leaving the town with a feeling akin to awe, I came upon a new surprise. Walking calmly along the public road in broad day were men in Prussian uniform, and—more amazing still—women in the darkgellabor cloak of the Moors. This was certainly startling, but the explanation was waiting on the road to the east, and it was written in gruesome signs—dead men lying in the ditches—Zouaves in their Oriental dress, Moors in their cloaks, French soldiers in their long blue coats, and Germans in their grey. Every hundred yards or so lay a disembowelled horse with a bloody saddle. This was the ragged edge of the battlefield of the Marne, and the men and women in Prussian and Moorish dress were harmless civilians who had gone to bury the dead and to succour the wounded. It was raining torrents; the wind was bitterly cold, and they had covered themselves with the garments of the dead.

Passing along this road I came to a wood, where one of these civilian burial parties had dug a pit in which they laid the friend and foe side by side. Fresh mounds of earth that told their own story guided me to a path, where the battle had blazed, a trail of splintered shells, broken rifles, bullet-riddled helmets, blood-stained rags, with which the dying had stoppedtheir wounds, tiny bags in which the German soldier had hoarded his crumbs of biscuit, letters with the crimson imprint of fingers, showing how in the hour of agony and death men's thoughts turn to the beloved ones they are leaving for ever.

Four miles east of Meaux the hills rise sharply to the north, and are covered with trees. Beyond this wood a broad undulating plain stretches northward over cultivated fields dotted with farmsteads. A hundred paces in front, on a gentle slope, the earth has been levelled in several places that are sown with brass cylinders, whose charge sent the shells on their deadly flight.

In these emplacements lie some gunners; their heads have been shattered by shells. Under an apple-tree, laden with green fruit, two livid faces turn to the pitiless sky; one man grasps a letter in his hand—it is a woman's writing. Dark huddled patches among the cabbages and the trampled wheat, brown stains on the path, fragments of blood-stained lint, broken rifles and bayonets, bullet-pierced helmets and rent cloaks—all thedébrisof battle show where the fight was fiercest.

On the crest of the rise are the trenches; they extend for nearly a mile parallel with the edge of the wood, and are thrown back on the west. They are deep trenches, protected with mounds of earth, and were not made hurriedly. About them lie the dead.

The position of the trenches and gun emplacements shows that here the enemy met a flanking attack from the west and north, and covered the retreat of their centre. It is not difficult to picture what happened.

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