Having treated this subject somewhat lengthily and critically in "The World's Sixteen Crucified Saviors," we shall devote but a brief space to its elucidation here. Nearly all religious nations have attached great importance to the act of repentance; but such an act does not repair the injury or wrong repented of.
The repentance of a murderer does not restore his murdered victim to life; nor does the repentance and tears of the incendiary rebuild the dwelling he has destroyed by fire. What, then, is its practical value?
We would ask, also, what moral value or merit can attach to an act of repentance when it is not claimed to be an act of the sinner, but "the power of God upon the soul"? (Luther.) It appears then, according to orthodox logic,—1. That God won't save the sinner unless he repents. 2. That he can't repent only as God moves him to do so. This places him in a bad predicament. Hence, when he does repent, it is an act of God. 3. And then God saves him because he makes him repent. Here is a jumble of logical incongruities and moral contradictions that can find no lodgment in a scientific mind. A few brief questions will set the doctrine of repentance in its true light.
4. Repentance consists in merely a revival of early impressions, that may be either right or wrong, true or false, and almost as likely to be one as the other.
5. Who ever knew a person to embrace more rational doctrines, or become more intelligent, or have a stronger taste for scientific pursuits, by repentance?
6. Is it not a fact that repentance usually causes a person to cling more tenaciously to the errors and superstitions in which he was educated?
7. Who ever knew a person by repenting, either in health or sickness, to condemn one wrong act which he had erroneously been taught to believe was right? If not, does it not prove that repentance always conforms to education, whether that education is right or wrong, and hence does nothing toward enlightening the convert or anybody else?
8. On the contrary, when a man repents with his mind full of religious errors, is it not evident that the act of repentance will have the effect to rivet these errors more strongly upon his mind, and thus effect a moral injury instead of a moral benefit?
9. If a man may abandon some of his immoral habits, which he has been taught to believe are wrong, by an act of repentance, are not the good effects to some extent counterbalanced by his clinging more strongly to his religious errors?
10. Who ever knew a person to abandon a false religion by repentance? Does a Hindoo or Mahomedan ever embrace Christianity by repenting?
11. Who ever knew a Roman Catholic to become a Protestant, or a Protestant a Catholic, by repentance? And yet orthodox Christians will cite the belief and testimony of a dying man as an evidence of the truth of their doctrines.
12. How can an act of repentance do any thing toward proving what is right and what is wrong in any case, when one person repents for doing what another repents for not doing? We have such cases recorded in history.
We have known a Campbellite to leave his dying testimony in favor of water baptism, and a Quaker to leave his dying testimony against it. Does one case prove it to be wrong, and the other right? If not, why do Christians cite such cases? What do they prove?
For a further illustration of this subject, see "The World's Sixteen Crucified Saviors."
If there is any class of people who need to repent for misspent time, and for leading false and foolish lives, it is the colporteurs who travel over the country distributing pious tracts, containing doleful accounts of death-bed repentance, which, whether right or wrong, prove nothing.
Such cases of repentance as are reported do not appertain to the moral conduct, but to the religious belief, of the sinner. It is the abandonment and condemnation of his past creeds, and not of his past conduct, which makes the tract so valuable. Such a case contains no moral instruction whatever.
If his early education was Mahomedan, his repentance will establish that religion again in his mind; but, if Mormonism was the religion of his childhood, he would again have full faith in that religion. What nonsense!
Who ever knew repentance to divorce or emancipate a man from all or any of the religious errors of his past life, and plant in his soul a better and more rational religion, or lead him to advocate any religion only that in which he had been educated?
Such repentance is worth nothing, and absolutely foolish. Let us assume that the numerous cases of death-bed repentance published in religious tracts are all true; and what would it prove? Why, simply this: that the converts had all been educated to believe in Christianity, and had gone back to that religion. Had Budhism or Mahomedanism been their early religion, they would have returned to that. It is merely old errors and old truths revived and re-established in the mind. But many facts afterwards gathered by honest investigation, appertaining to some of these cases, show that they have either been manufactured or greatly exaggerated. As for example, the case of Thomas Paine is proved to be without foundation. His close was calm and peaceful. Many times has it been declared, in the pulpit and elsewhere, that "Tom Paine repented, and died a miserable death." And yet we have the testimony of those Christian professors who were present with him almost constantly during his last illness, that he never manifested the least compunction of conscience, or the least disposition to condemn any thing he had said or written in opposition to Christianity or the Bible. Take, for example, the testimony of Willet Hicks, a reliable Quaker preacher. On being interrogated by a neighbor of the author of this work as to the truth of the statement that he repented, he replied, "I was with Paine every day during the latter part of his sickness, and can affirm that he did not express any regret for having written 'The Age of Reason,' as has been reported, nor for any thing he had said or written in opposition to the Bible, nor ask forgiveness of God. He died as easy as any one I ever saw die; and I have seen a great many die." And yet this Mr. Hicks was in hopes he would repent. Other similar testimony might be adduced; but this is sufficient. The story of Ethan Allen's daughter calling upon her father during her last illness, and asking him if he would recommend her to die in his religious belief, and his feeling so conscience-smitten by the question, that he exclaimed, "No: die in the belief of your mother!" (who was a Christian) has gone the rounds of the Christian pulpits. And yet we have the statement of his nephew, Col. Hitchcock, that he had no daughter to die during his lifetime.
There is not one word of truth in the report. These two cases furnish samples of the manner in which a dying cause will grasp at straws.
We will subjoin here the testimony of a clergyman, in proof that infidels are not more likely to die in a state of mental distress than Christians: The Rev. Theodore Clap, in his autobiography, says, "In all my experience I never saw an unbeliever die in fear. I have seen them expire without any hope or expectation of the future, but never in agitation from dread or misgiving as to what might befall them hereafter. We know that the idea is prevalent that this final event passes with some dreadful terror or agony of soul. It is imagined, that, in the infidel's case, the pangs of dissolution are greatly augmented by the upbraidings of a guilty conscience, and by the reluctance of the spirit to be torn from its mortal tenement, and hurried into the presence of an avenging Judge; but this is all a superstitious fancy. It is a superstitious fear, from a false education, that causes any one to die in fear."
The Rev. W. H. Spenser, of the First Parish Church (Massachusetts), says, "Some of the men most bitterly stigmatized as infidels have been among the most brilliant and useful minds the world has ever known, and, when dying and suffering from calumny and scorn, have only to wait for time to do them justice, and place them in history with the world's benefactors or saviors. There is not to be found on record one purely infidel man, in the sense now referred to, whose death-bed was attended by recantations and remorse." Thus testifies a clergyman.
We will now show from reliable authority that the most ardent faith in Christ and the Bible, and the most rigid and conscientious observance of their doctrines and precepts, do not guarantee permanent acquiescence or satisfaction, or protect the mind from the most violent mental perturbation in the hour of death. John Calvin stood in the first ranks of the Church militant in his time, and was considered by many the leading clergyman in Christendom. Hear what Martin Luther, his co-laborer, says with respect to his mortal exit: "He died forlorn and forsaken of God, blaspheming to the very end.... He died of scarlet fever, overrun and eaten up by ulcerous abscesses, the stench of which drove every person away. He gave up the ghost, despairing of salvation, and evoking devils from the abyss, and uttering oaths most horrible, and blasphemies most frightful." Then tell us no more about infidels recanting and dying unhappy, after reading this case. Yet all the cases and evidences cited above only tend to show that no forms of religious belief have any thing specially to do with the condition of mind in the hour of mortal dissolution, except so far as that belief has been invested with groundless, superstitious fears. Hence persons who distribute death-bed tracts are in rather small business. We like the answer of a liberal-minded man, who, when in his dying moments he was asked by a priest if he had made his peace with his God, replied, "We have never had any unfriendly words." We don't believe there can be a case found in all Christendom of an infidel repenting whose parents were unbelievers, so that he was not educated and biased in favor of any form of religious faith or belief.
The doctrine of divine forgiveness for sin is another illogical and immoral doctrine of the orthodox school, as well as that of heathen nations, which a logical analysis and the practical experience of nearly all religious countries show has been pernicious in its effects upon the morals of society. A little reflection must convince any unbiased mind that, while men and women are taught to believe that the consequences of sin or crime can be arrested or mitigated by an act of forgiveness by the divine Law-maker, they will feel the less restrained from the commission of crime and wickedness. They naturally look upon it as a sort of license for the indulgence of their passions and propensities. They are taught that none of the evil consequences of wrong-doing can follow them to another world if they repent in time, and ask forgiveness. This they accept as a broad license to take their swing in vice and villainy. And thus they are partially demoralized by the doctrine. Much more rational is the doctrine of the Swedenborgians and Harmonialists, that every sin or wrong act we commit makes its impress upon the soul, or immortal spirit, which will be carried with it to the life eternal, and will there long operate to impair the happiness, and retard the spiritual growth, of every person who in this life indulges in crime or immoral conduct. They teach us that the character we form for ourselves on this plane of existence will be carried with us to the spirit-world; that our character undergoes no radical change by merely passing through the gates of death. Hence, whatever defective moral qualities we permit to de incorporated into our characters here will operate to sink us to a lower plane of happiness in the after-death world. This is a plausible and rational doctrine, to say the least, and can have no effect to demoralize the community, as the sentiments breathed forth by some of the orthodox hymns have evidently done.
"There is a fountain filled with blood,Drawn from Immanuel's veins;And sinners plunged beneath that floodLose all their guilty stains."
Could any doctrine be more demoralizing than that here set forth,—that the deep-dyed stains of a life of crime, debauchery, and wickedness can all be wiped out by the simple act of plunging into a pool of blood, or rather by believing that the atoning blood of Christ will cleanse from all sin? The same idea is incorporated into Watts's well-known hymn,—
"While the lamp holds out to burn,The vilest sinner may return."
The idea here set forth is shocking to the moralist, as well as demoralizing in its effects on the community. "The vilest sinner" must feel very little concern about "returning" to the path of virtue, or abandoning his wicked deeds, while the conviction is established in his mind that he is losing nothing by leading such a life, and will have nothing to do at the end of a long life of the most shocking crimes, villainies, and vices, to escape entirely their legitimate punitive consequences, but to take a flip in "the blood of Jesus." Every scientific moralist can see very plainly that the world can never be reformed while such license for sin and wickedness is issued from the Christian pulpit. Practically speaking, God could not forgive a sin. An act of forgiveness implies that the legitimate consequence of the evil deed or sinful act can be set aside, and escaped. The principles of moral science teach us that this is impossible. It demonstrates that the moral law is a part of our being; and, consequently, an act of forgiveness for the violation or that law could not suspend its operation, or stop the infliction of its penalty upon the perpetrator. It could then, of course, effect nothing. Hence it will be seen that no sin can be forgiven, but must work out its legitimate consequences. Scientifically speaking, the law is the cause, and the penalty the effect: when the cause is set in operation, the effect must follow. It would be as easy to arrest the thunderbolt in its descent from the clouds as to evade the penalty of this law. God could not if he would, and would not if he could, forgive the violation of his laws. He could not, because he has wisely arranged those laws to operate without his interference. On the other hand, he would not if he could, because it would encourage their future and further violation. And then a God who would confer on us an inclination to commit certain acts, and then require us to ask his forgiveness for committing them, would not be a very consistent being. Forgiveness is, theologically speaking, "a free ticket to Heaven." Buy a through ticket of the priest, and you can go on "the strait-line" road, direct to the orthodox "house of many mansions," without having to switch off at any station to unload your burden of sins. "All is well that ends well" is their motto. The orthodox clergy tell the most vile and debauched villain and bloody assassin, after he has inhumanly butchered and murdered his innocent and virtuous wife, can, by an act of repentance and forgiveness, swing from the end of the hangman's rope directly into a heaven of pure and unalloyed bliss, and, with his fingers all dripping with human blood, join the white-robed saints in shouting, "Glory hallelujah to the Lord God and the Lamb for ever and ever!" Spare me, oh, spare me, from ever believing in such a demoralizing religion as this!
All Bibles, and nearly every religious nation known to history, have taught that God often gets angry at the creatures of his own creation. But, in the light of modern science, nothing could be more transcendently absurd, or more absolutely impossible, than that a being possessing all knowledge—a being infinite in power, infinite in wisdom, and filling all space throughout the boundless universe—should be a victim to the weakness and ungovernable impulse of passion. The very idea is revolting and blasphemous, and presents to every reflecting and unbiased mind a self-evident impossibility. The emotion of anger can only be the weakness of finite and imperfect beings. It is self-evidently impossible for a being possessing infinite perfection, and consequently infinite self-government, to cherish the feeling of anger for a moment, as the following consideration will show:—
1. The modern study of mental philosophy has demonstrated anger to be a species of moral weakness; and hence it could not, for a single moment, occupy a mind possessing infinite perfection. A being, therefore, who is assumed to possess such a weakness is self-evidently not a God, but merely an imaginary being, fit only to be worshiped by ignorant slaves.
2. The practical experience of every person demonstrates anger to be a species of unhappiness, and often of absolute misery; and the indulgence of this passion not only makes the possessor unhappy, but destroys the happiness of every one around him. If, therefore, God were an angry being, instead of heaven being a place or state of happiness, it would be the most miserable place imaginable; for God is represented by the Christian Bible as getting angry every day (see Ps. vii. 11), and so angry that the "fury comes up in his face." As a Yankee would say, "He gets mad all over." I frankly confess I don't want to live in such a heaven, or with such a God. Indeed, it would be no heaven at all for anybody; for heaven is a state of happiness.
3. In the third place, the modern study of the science of philosophy has discovered that anger is a species of disease, which may result in mental and even physical suicide if carried far enough. It produces a congested state of the blood-vessels of the brain, which, if not arrested in its progress, will produce death. Dr. Gunn, in his work on domestic medicine, reports several cases in which an inquest was held over a dead body by a coroner's jury, and the verdict rendered, "Came to his death in a fit of anger." However irreverent, the thought forces itself upon us, that such a verdict might be given over the dead body of Jehovah if we were compelled to believe all we read of his getting angry; for it is a scientific deduction that can not be resisted, that, if anger can produce death in one being, it may in all beings subject to its influence.
4. Again: as the result of the study of mental philosophy, anger is now known to be a species of insanity. It deranges, more or less, all the faculties of the mind, and often disqualifies the possessor for doing any thing right, or acting rationally, while under its influence. It often causes him to act without reason or judgment, and is liable to drive him to the commission of crime. As well think of entering the cage of a tiger as to take up our abode in a heaven ruled by such a God,—a heaven controlled by a God bereft of reason by the ungovernable action of his own passions. We could not be happy in such a heaven: we should be constantly under the influence of fear and apprehension, lest he should become enraged, and his vengeance fall upon us. Where there is fear there is no heaven or happiness. If, as the Bible tells us, he is liable to repent, he might experience this mental perturbation at any time, and repent for having admitted us into the heavenly kingdom, and consequently expel us. Under such circumstances our motives would be very much weakened for laboring to reach such a heaven, not knowing that we should be permitted to remain there a single hour. How supremely ridiculous, when logically analyzed, is the conception of an angry God! It is entirely behind the age, and adapted only to the lowest stages of barbarism; and yet thousands of Christian clergymen preach this demoralizing doctrine from the pulpit every sabbath day. It is demoralizing, because no person can believe in an angry, sin-punishing God, without cherishing such feelings in his own bosom. It is impossible for him to avoid it. Indeed, he has no motives for trying to avoid it; but, on the contrary, he possesses the strongest motives for cultivating such feelings. For Archbishop Whately says, "Religious people always try to be like the God they worship." They consider it not only their privilege, but their duty, to imitate him. Hence, if they believe he gets mad occasionally, and pours out his vengeance upon his offending children (his disobedient subjects), they will naturally feel like following his example, and be cruel and revengeful to those who excite their anger. This preaching the doctrine of an angry God has a tendency to foster vengeful and vindictive feelings amongst the people; when, if the clergy would preach only a God of infinite love, infinite goodness, infinite perfection in all his attributes, we should soon see a marked change in society. Kindness, love, and good-will would be manifested between man and man; and cruel, vengeful, and vindictive feelings would gradually die out, and be numbered amongst the things which have been and are not. Then would the kingdom of peace be established on earth, and the millennium be ushered in. But we can not expect the priests to be better than their God, nor the people to be better than their priests. "Like God like priest, and like priest like people." The priest deals out damnation upon the people to be like his God; and the people follow in his foot steps, and exercise cruel and revengeful feelings toward each other. It seems astonishing that such an immoral and blasphemous doctrine should have been so long and so extensively tolerated in professedly enlightened countries, as it is evident it must have had a bad effect; and past experience proves it has had a demoralizing effect upon the people where the doctrine has been preached. It furnishes an illustration of the omnipotent power of custom.
Having appropriated a portion of two chapters in "The World's Sixteen Crucified Saviors" to an exposition of the doctrine of the atonement, we shall treat the subject but briefly in this work.
1. It is shown in the work above mentioned, that the doctrine of the atonement is of heathen origin, and that it is predicated upon the assumption that no sin can be fully expiated without the shedding of blood. In the language of Paul, "Without the shedding of blood, there can be no remission for sin." A barbarous and bloody doctrine truly! But this doctrine was almost universally prevalent amongst the Orientals long before Paul's time.
2. Christians predicate the dogma of atonement for sin upon the assumption that Christ's death and sufferings were a substitute for Adam's death, incurred by the fall. But as Adam's sentence was death, and he suffered that penalty, this assumption can not be true.
3. If the penalty for sin was death, as taught in Gen. iii., and Christ suffered that penalty for man, then man should not die; but, as he does, it makes the doctrine preposterous. It could not have meant spiritual death, as some argue, because a part of the penalty was that of being doomed to return to dust (Gen. r. 19).
4. If crucifixion was indispensably necessary as a penalty, then the punishment should have been inflicted either upon the instigator or perpetrator of the deed: either the serpent or Adam should have been nailed to the cross.
5. We are told in reply, that, as an infinite sin was committed, it required an infinite sacrifice. But Adam, being a finite being, could not commit an infinite sin; and Christ's sacrifice and sufferings could not be infinite, unless he had continued to suffer to all eternity. Therefore the assumption is false.
6. An all-wise God would not let things get into such a condition as to require the murder of his only son from any consideration whatever.
7. And no father, cherishing a proper regard and love for his son, could have required him to be, or consented to have him, put to death in a cruel manner; for the claims of mercy and paternal affection are as imperative as justice.
8. To put an intelligent and innocent being to death for any purpose is a violation of the moral law, and as great a sin as that for which he died. Hecatombs of victims can not atone for the infraction of the moral law which is engraven upon our souls.
9. If it were necessary for Christ to be put to death, then Judas is entitled to one-half the merit of it for inaugurating the act, as it could not have taken place without his aid; and no one who took part in it should be censured, but praised.
10. It is evident, that, if everybody had been Quakers, no atonement would have been made, as their religion is opposed to bloodshed.
11. The atonement is either one God putting another to death, or God putting himself to death to appease his own wrath; but both assumptions are monstrous absurdities, which no person distinguished for science or reason can indorse.
12. Anger and murder are the two principal features in the doctrine of the atonement; and both are repugnant to our moral sense and feelings of refinement, and indicate a barbarous and heathen origin.
13. The atonement punishes the innocent for the guilty; which is a double or twofold crime, and a reversal of the spirit of justice. If a father should catch four of his children steeling, and the fifth one standing by and remonstrating against the act, and should seize on the innocent one and administer a severe flagellation, he would commit a double crime: 1st, that of punishing an innocent child; 2d, that of exonerating and encouraging the four guilty children in the commission of crime. The atonement involves the same principle.
14. No person with true moral manhood would consent to be saved on any such terms; but would prefer to suffer for his own sins, rather than let an innocent being suffer for them. And the man who would accept salvation upon such terms must be a sneak and a coward, with a soul not worth saving.
15. Who that possesses any sense of justice would want to swim through blood to get to the heavenly mansion? I want neither animals, men, nor Gods murdered to save my soul.
16. If there is any virtue in the atonement in the way of expiating crime, then there is now another atonement demanded by the principles of moral justice to cancel the sin committed by the first atonement,—that of murdering an innocent being, "in whose mouth was no guile;" and then another atonement to wipe out the sin of this atonement, and so on. And thus it would be atonement after atonement, murder after murder,ad infinitum. What shocking consequences and absurdities are involved in this ancient heathen superstition!
17. It seems strange that any person can cherish the thought for a moment that the Infinite Father would require a sacrificial offering for the trifling act of eating a little fruit, and require no atonement for the infinitely greater sin of murdering "his only-begotten son." Another monstrous absurdity!
18. The advocates of the atonement tell us that man stands toward his Creator in the relation of a debtor; and the atonement cancels the debt. To be sure! How does it do it? We will illustrate: A man says to his neighbor, "I owe you a thousand dollars; but I won't pay it."—"Very well," says the creditor, "I will tell you what I will do: I will forgive the debt by seizing on my own son, strip him of all he has, and then put him to death. The claims of justice will then be satisfied." A monstrous idea of justice!
19. The Jewish and Chaldean law of atonement required the offender to place his hand on the head of the beast while being consumed in sacrifice; and this was accepted as an atonement for his transgressions. Such a conception is both senseless and demoralizing. He was thereby taught that he would escape the legitimate consequences of his crime. And the Christian atonement is no better. The sin-atoning offering of Christ furnishes an open door through which the sinner escapes the just punishment of law. It is at least a partial liquidation of his sins. When one being is punished for another, this is, to the latter, an immunity from punishment; and the ends of justice are thus completely thwarted, and the moral law broken and trampled under foot. If a culprit were sentenced to the penalty of death for murder, and the punishment of another man were accepted in his stead, every court in the civilized world would decide that two wrongs were committed,—the punishment of the innocent, and the pardon of the guilty. Such doctrines are repugnant to ali ideas of justice, and are most certainly demoralizing.
20. The wrong-doer should be taught that he is just as guilty, and just as certain of punishment for his crime, as if all the Gods in heaven were put to death to atone for his sin; the penalty being inseparable from the act.
21. What would be thought of the government that should punish the law-maker instead of the law-breaker? This is exactly what the atonement amounts to; so that the law-maker falls a victim to the penalty of his own laws. It is God the law-maker dying for man the law-breaker. Such ideas and such doctrines are monstrous, and completely overthrow every principle of civil jurisprudence.
22. A God who could resort to such desperate expedients to appease his anger, and satisfy the demands of justice, is not a God, but merely an imaginary being which was conjured up in an age of ignorance and superstition. The belief in such a God is, nevertheless, demoralizing.
We will here relate an anecdote, showing that such ideas of the Supreme Being are repulsive even to the unenlightened heathen: In Smith's "Gulf of Guinea" it is stated, that, as a Christian missionary was presenting the doctrine of the Christian religion to Pepples, King of Bonny, and told him that God gave his only-begotten son to die for us,—to be put to death for our sins,—the king stopped him by saying, "Do you think me a fool to believe such palaver as that,—that God would kill his own son to please himself; get mad at man, and then kill his own son, instead of killing him? Never! never can I believe such fool palaver as that, It is a big fool lie." "I tried," says the missionary, "to impress upon his mind that nothing would satisfy divine justice but such a sacrifice; but he cut me short by exclaiming, 'That will do; that will do: I have got enough of such fool palaver.'" Quite a sensible "heathen" was King Pepples.
All the holy books, and nearly all holy men who have figured in the world, have cherished a belief in what is termed "special providences,"—a doctrine which teaches that God individually and personally superintends the affairs, not only of all nations, but of each individual human being, now amounting in number to about fourteen hundred millions. It seems strange that the striking absurdity of such an assumption has not struck every mind possessing the power to reflect or investigate. The thought of his looking after the affairs and happiness of fourteen hundred millions of human beings at a time, besides running several thousand millions of worlds, far excels any of the astounding feats of the evil genii of Gulliver. In the sublimity of its absurdity and impossibility, it stands without a rival. It expands beyond the utmost stretch of human credulity. Like all the other doctrines of the popular creed, it sprang up in an age of the world when the human mind accepted every thing presented to it without investigation,—when nothing was rejected on the ground of its being too absurd to be believed. And an absurdity, when once established, no matter how monstrous or how stultifying to the intellectual or reasoning faculties, can bid defiance to the efforts of the few men of the world whose minds are too much expanded and enlightened to accept such gross absurdities. There are several objections to the doctrine of "special providences," both of a logical or scientific character, and also upon moral grounds, which shows that it should have no place in an age of scientific intelligence.
One of these objections is the one just brought to notice,—that of its extreme absurdity and practical impossibility. It does not require a great mind, but only a reflecting one, to see that no rational conception of the Supreme Being could render it practicable for one mind, however boundless in knowledge and infinite in power, to be so divided as to look after the interest of each individual of a countless number, scattered over a world of more than a hundred and seventy-five thousand millions of miles in extent. A scientific investigation of the operations of nature has settled the conviction in every scientific mind that the life, actions, and destiny of every human being are under the control of fixed and immutable laws, which need only to be studied and observed to guard him effectually from personal accidents, and those physical disasters to which he often falls a victim through ignorance of the proper means of avoiding them. It is now patent to all critical observers that the serious disasters and numerous causes of physical suffering to which the larger portion of the human family were so frequently subjected in past ages, have largely diminished, and are constantly decreasing as the march of science dispels the ignorance of the people,—such as the sinking of ships, attributable to imperfect mechanical construction; pestilential diseases, caused by the general ignorance of the causes of and means of preventing; the explosion of steam-boilers on rivers, railroads, &c. And, from the present rates of improvement in these respects, we may reasonably calculate that the time is not far in the future when such disasters will be unknown. Then we will have no need of "special providence" to save the people from the fatal consequences of their ignorance. The conviction seems now to be generally established in the public mind, that when a boat is wrecked, or a locomotive strays from the track, and a few persons escape with their lives from the general wreck and ruin, it is to be ascribed to the interposition of the hand of Providence. But common sense would suggest, that, if Providence had any thing to do with it, he should have commenced a little sooner, and put some more brains or common sense into the heads of the managers of these cargoes of human beings, or kept the whiskey out of their stomachs till they reached their point of destination. In the thousands of cases annually reported of Providence interposing his aid to save some reckless mariners, or some heedless passengers on a pleasure-boat, from a watery grave, or rescuing a few persons from the wreck of a railroad bridge, or some similar calamity, the disasters might all have been avoided by Providence simply acting upon the wisdom of the proverb, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." It would be considered an act of criminal neglect on the part of a father who could stand by and see his children, from ignorance of the danger of such a situation, fall from a precipice, and get crippled: for which his diligence in taking care of them, and trying to heal their bruises, would by no means excuse him, as he should have commenced sooner, and prevented the accident from taking place. And nearly all the cases of providential interposition are liable to the same objection: the assistance is too long delayed. A collision of two ships recently occurred on the Atlantic, by which both vessels were reduced almost to wrecks; but "providentially but few lives were lost," though most of the passengers were injured. Now the question naturally arises, Why did not God, when he perceived the vessels were approaching each other, interpose his providential care, and prevent the disaster? He either could not, or would not; and, in either case, he is not infinite in all his attributes, according to the general ideas of the matter. If he could not, he is either not omnipresent or not infinite in power; and, if he could and would not, he is not infinite in kindness and benevolence, or he would have put forth his hand, and saved his children from such a terrible fate. It is time mankind would learn that God governs the universe by general laws, fixed and unalterable, and ever harmonious, and that he never interferes immediately or personally in the affairs of men.
That finite human spirits do, in many cases, aid in human affairs by warning of danger, &c., is fully believed by many persons. If this be true, their interposition would be liable to be mistaken for that of the Infinite Spirit. But that any being can perform millions of finite acts at once, or that God should suspend the operation of his laws, which control the universe, for the purpose of attending personally to the wants and prayers of each and every individual the world over,—many of the petitions running counter to, or in direct conflict with, each other,—is an idea too absurd to find lodgment in any truly enlightened mind. But we entertain the pleasing thought that men are beginning to learn that God governs by general laws, and not by personal or special agency. These laws are so perfect in their operations that no special laws or personal interference is necessary in any case. A critical investigation of any case of special providences would satisfy any scientific investigator that it was governed entirely by natural causes; but such scrutinizing investigations are seldom made.
The great mass of pious people in all past ages have been so ignorant, and so little accustomed to reasoning or observation, that they have never observed, that, although many cases are reported of Providence interfering to save the life of a child who fell from the window of a basement-story, none are recorded of his saving a child that fell from the fifth story. Why is this? Does not this fact suggest a scientific lesson? But the heads of the great mass of the people have been so filled with creeds and catechisms that they have no room for science. It will be time enough to talk about special providences after a case is known of a man escaping with his life after a cannonball has passed through his head, or a bullet through his heart. The belief in special providences is calculated to paralyze human effort in times of danger, and thus suffer the consequences to be more frequently fatal. Let a man believe, while a ship is being wrecked in a storm, dashing against rocks and billows, and her deck overflowed with water, that there is a Providence in the case, and he will naturally labor with less zeal and effort to save the vessel. If the case is in the hands of God, and it is his good pleasure that they should be lost, it is of but little use to work the pumps; and, if it is his will that they should be saved, they will be saved without much effort on their part. There can be no doubt but that millions of pious people have been restrained on various occasions from putting forth their strongest efforts to arrest a threatening disaster, from the conviction that the hand of God was in it, and that no human efforts could change the fate he had decreed for them. And thus the doctrine, in its practical consequences, has been pernicious. But, in this age of reason and scientific illumination, men are beginning to learn, that, in cases of threatening danger and destruction, muscle is more necessary than "Providence;" that, when a ship is sinking in mid-ocean, pumps are more efficacious than prayers; and, when a building is on fire, they can better do without the assistance of Providence than without water, firemen, and engines.
"Faith" and "belief" seem to be among the most important words in the Christian New Testament. No words are much more frequently used. They occur in nearly every chapter, and are used more than two hundred times. The following is a specimen of the manner in which these words are used:—
"He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." This text, and the sentiment it contains, have caused more misery, cruelty, and more butchery than all the edicts of any king that ever sat on the throne of England. Never did a more delusive and fatal error find lodgment in the human mind than the idea couched in this text. Terrible have been the denunciations, punishments, and cruelties poured upon the unbelievers in the popular creed, though that creed has been one thing one day, and something else the next. No matter how honest, how upright, how benevolent, or how righteous a man proved himself in his practical life, he was doomed to the dungeon, the fagot, and the halter, if his creed was not conformable to the orthodox faith then in power. Men and women have been condemned and punished for assuming the right to doubt the truth of any doctrine of the popular creed,—an egregious mistake, showing a profound ignorance of the nature of the human mind. All persons versed in the science of mental philosophy now know that a man has no more control over his doubts and beliefs than he has over the blood that courses through his veins: for, without evidence, he can not believe; and, with it, he can not disbelieve, as every one will find who will examine this matter critically. Consequently it is as unreasonable to condemn a man for his belief or disbelief, as to condemn him for the color of his hair. Doubt, so far from being restrained, should be cultivated, as being the first step toward the attainment of knowledge and progress; for a man never makes any advancement or improvement in his views on any subject till he begins to doubt the correctness of his present views, or, at least, doubts their being perfect, or being incapable of improvement.
Who, then, can not see that to threaten a man for disbelief is tyranny and injustice, inasmuch as it has a tendency to make him a slave, and to repress the growth of his mind? Condemning a man for disbelief is virtually offering a premium for hypocrisy, as it has the effect to make thousandsprofessto believe doctrines which they do not, and which their consciences really condemn, in order to avoid the frowns and ill-will of their neighbors. And, as hypocrisy is a greater evil in its practical effects upon society than unbelief, it can be seen that the practice of erecting a standard for belief and disbelief is wrong, and mischievous in its effects.
The Bible declares that "faith is the gift of God." It is evident, that, if this be true, no responsibility can attach to faith or religious belief; but all responsibility rests with the being who gives it.
Two great blunders have been committed by faith-dealers: First, in assuming that belief is of the nature of a coat, which can be put on and off at pleasure,—i.e., that a man can believe what he pleases or wishes to believe. The second is, that knowledge and belief are synonymous terms, which is very far from being true. Knowledge begins where faith and belief end. Belief is that uncertain state of the mind which is experienced in the absence of knowledge; and, when that knowledge is obtained, the belief may prove to have been entirely erroneous. Belief impliesuncertainty; knowledge impliescertainty. There is this wide difference between them. We believe a thing when we do not know whether it is so or not; consequently the belief may be true or false. How egregious, then, the blunder of the orthodox world in condemning for disbelief! Belief, then, is a state of guessing. We will illustrate the position of orthodox Christendom: A boy throws up a copper coin, and cries, "Heads, or tails?" A by-stander, believing from its construction that "heads" will come up, cries out, "Heads!" Now, according to the logic of the orthodox, if he guesses wrong, he should be damned eternally for it.
When you say to a man, "You shall believe this, or you shall believe that," you bind his soul in chains, and reverse the wheels of his progress, and push him toward the "dark ages."
The fear that it would be a sin to doubt, causes religious ignorance; and a man will never abandon his religious errors and superstitions while he fears to doubt their truth. A man's belief and creed grow shorter as his knowledge increases. And the time is not far distant when philosophers and men of science will have no religious belief: all will be knowledge.
It can be seen from the above exposition, that it is folly and consummate ignorance to attach so much importance to religious belief, inasmuch as it is impossible to know whether it is right or wrong.
As the doctrine that belief is a virtue, and unbelief a crime has inundated the world with persecution, misery, and blood, it is time to abandon it.
Those Christians who assume that belief is under the control of the will can settle the matter by trying the following experiment upon themselves: Let them try to believe, for only five minutes, that Mahomet was a true prophet, and Jesus Christ was an impostor. If they can do this, it will settle the question, and prove that man is responsible for his belief: otherwise he is not.
Some persons adhere to the Bible upon the plea that "it is safest to believe it, and unsafe to disbelieve it." But he who can believe an error or absurdity, or, rather, profess to believe it because he is afraid to disbelieve it, has not a soul big enough to be saved, and will be certain to miss it; or, if he could be saved, no man of sense would want to live in a heaven made up of such moral cowards and moral dwarfs. And, besides, the only way to make a safe thing of being saved on this ground, is to swallow all the two thousand systems of religion in the world,—six hundred Christian creeds, and fourteen hundred heathen traditions; and, to do this, a person must have a very capacious stomach.