Chapter 17

"The entire Confederate force was brought into action at once. We kept no reserves; every movement was quickly planned and executed with the greatest celerity. A potent factor which made the battle far bloodier than it would have been, was it being reported, and with some degree of truth, that the negroes had been sworn on their knees in line before leaving Memphis to show 'no quarter to Forrest's men,' and badges were worn upon which were inscribed, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' General Washburn, commanding the district of West Tennessee, distinctly admits that the negro troops with Sturgis had gone into this fight with the declared intention to give no quarter to Forrest's men."

The fate of the black soldiers taken in these fights is unknown, which is even worse than of those who are known to have been massacred.

The details of the massacre at Fort Pillow have been reserved for this portion of the present chapter in order to state them more at length, and in connection with important movements which soon after took place against the same confederate force.

The most atrocious of all inhuman acts perpetrated upon a brave soldiery, took place at Fort Pillow, Kentucky, on the 13th of April, 1864. No cause can be assigned for the shocking crime of wanton, indiscriminate murder of some three hundred soldiers, other than that they were "niggers," and "fighting with niggers."

On the 12th, General Forrest suddenly appeared before Fort Pillow with a large force, and demanded its surrender. The fort was garrisoned by 557 men in command of Major L. F. Booth, consisting of the 13th Tennessee Cavalry, Major Bradford, and the 6th Phalanx Battery of heavy artillery, numbering 262 men, and six guns. At sunrise on the 13th, General Forrest's forces advanced and attacked the fort. The garrison maintained a steady brisk fire, and kept the enemy at bay from an outer line of intrenchments. About 9a. m.Major Booth was killed, and Major Bradford taking command, drew the troops back into the Fort, situated on a high, steep and partiallytimbered bluff on the Mississippi river, with a ravine on either hand. A federal gunboat, the "New Era," assisted in the defence, but the height of the bluff prevented her giving material support to the garrison. In the afternoon both sides ceased firing, to cool and clean their guns. During this time, Forrest, under a flag of truce, summoned the federals to surrender within a half hour. Major Bradford refused to comply with the demand. Meantime the confederates taking advantage of the truce to secret themselves down in a ravine, from whence they could rush upon the Fort at a given signal. No sooner was Bradford's refusal to surrender received, than the confederates rushed simultaneously into the Fort. In a moment almost the place was in their possession. The garrison, throwing away their arms fled down the steep banks, endeavoring to hide from the promised "no quarter," which Forrest had embodied in his demand for surrender: "If I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter." The confederates followed, "butchering black and white soldiers and non-combatants, men, women and children. Disabled men were made to stand up and be shot; others were burned within the tents wherein they had been nailed to the floor." This carnival of murder continued until dark, and was even renewed the next morning. Major Bradford was not murdered until he had been carried as a prisoner several miles on the retreat.

It is best that the evidence in this matter, as given in previous pages of this chapter, should be read. It is unimpeachable, though Forrest, S. D. Lee and Chalmers have attempted to deny the infernal work. The last named, under whose command these barbarous acts were committed, offered on the floor of the United States Congress, fifteen years afterward, an apologetic denial of what appears from the evidence of those who escaped,—taken by the Congressional Committee,—and also contradictory to the confederate General S. D. Lee's report, in which he fails to convince himself even of the inaccuracy of the reports of brutality, as made by the few who escaped being murdered. Lee says:

THE MASSACRE AT FORT PILLOW.—April 12th, 1864.THE MASSACRE AT FORT PILLOW.—April 12th, 1864.

"The garrison was summoned in the usual manner, and its commanding officer assumed the responsibility of refusing to surrender after having been informed by General Forrest of his ability to take the Fort, and of his fears of what the result would be in case the demand was not complied with. The assault was made under a heavy fire, and with considerable loss to the attacking party. Your colors were never lowered, and your garrison never surrendered, but retreated under cover of a gunboat, with arms in their hands and constantly using them. This was true particularly of your colored troops, who had been firmly convinced by your teaching of the certainty of slaughter, in case of capture. Even under these circumstances, many of your men, white and black, were taken prisoners."

Continuing, he says:

"The case under consideration is almost an extreme one. You had a servile race armed against us. I assert that our officers with all the circumstances against them endeavored to prevent the effusion of blood."

This is an admission that the massacre of the garrison actually occurred, and because Phalanx troops were a part of the garrison. That the black soldiers had been taught that no quarter would be shown them if captured, or if they surrendered, is doubtless true. It is also too true that the teaching was thetruth. One has but to read the summons for the surrender to be satisfied of the fact, and then recollect that the President of the Confederate States, in declaring General Butler an outlaw, also decreed that negroes captured with arms in their hands, their officers as well, should be turned over to the State authorities wherein they were captured, to be dealt with according to the laws of that State and the Confederacy.

The sentiment of the chief confederate commander regarding the employment of negroes in the Union army, notwithstanding the Confederate Government was the first to arm and muster them into service, as shown in previous and later chapters, is manifested by the following dispatch, though at the time of writing it, that General had hundreds of blacks under his command at Charleston building fortifications.

"Charleston, S. C., Oct. 13th, 1862."Hon. Wm. P. Miles, Richmond, Va.

"Charleston, S. C., Oct. 13th, 1862.

"Hon. Wm. P. Miles, Richmond, Va.

"Has the bill for the execution of abolition prisoners, after January next, been passed? Do it, and England will be stirred into action. It is high time to proclaim the black flag after that period: let the execution be with the garrote.G. T. Beauregard."

The confederate thirst for "nigger" blood seemed to have been no stronger in Kentucky than in other Departments, but it does appear, for some reason, that Kentucky and northern Mississippi were selected by the confederate generals, Pillow and Forrest, as appropriate sections in which to particularly vent their spite. The success of Forrest at Fort Pillow rather strengthened General Beauford's inhumanity. He commanded a portion of Pillow's forces which appeared before Columbus the day after the Fort Pillow massacre, and in the following summons demanded its surrender:

"To the Commander of the United States Forces, Columbus, Ky.:"Fully capable of taking Columbus and its garrison, I desire to avoid shedding blood. I therefore demand the unconditional surrender of the forces under your command. Should you surrender, the negroes in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I be compelled to take the place by force,no quarter will be shown negro troops whatever; white troops will be treated as prisoners of war.

"To the Commander of the United States Forces, Columbus, Ky.:

"Fully capable of taking Columbus and its garrison, I desire to avoid shedding blood. I therefore demand the unconditional surrender of the forces under your command. Should you surrender, the negroes in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I be compelled to take the place by force,no quarter will be shown negro troops whatever; white troops will be treated as prisoners of war.

"I am, sir, yours,A. Beauford, Brig. Gen."

Colonel Lawrence, of the 34th New Jersey, declined to surrender, and drove the enemy off, who next appeared in Paducah, but retired without making an assault upon the garrison.

These occurrences, with the mysterious surrender of Union City to Forrest, on the 16th of March, so incensed the commander of the Department that a strong force was organized, and in command of General S. D. Sturgis, started, on the 30th of April, in pursuit of Forrest and his men, but did not succeed in overtaking him. A few weeks later, General Sturgis, with a portion of his former force, combined with that of General Smith's,—just returning from the Red River (Banks)fiasco,—again went in pursuit of General Forrest. At Guntown, on the 10th of June, Sturgis' cavalry, under General Grierson, came up with the enemy, charged upon them, and drove them back upon their infantry posted near Brice's Cross Roads. General Grierson, needing support, sent back for the infantry, which was several miles in his rear. The day was intensely hot, and the roads, from constant rains, in very badcondition. However, Sturgis marched the troops up at double-quick to the position where General Grierson was holding the confederates in check. The infantry had become so exhausted when they reached the scene of action, that they were unable to fight as they otherwise would have done. Sturgis, either ignorant of what was going on or incapacitated for the work, heightened the disorder at the front by permitting his train of over two hundred wagons to be pushed up close to the troops, thus blocking their rear, and obstructing their manœuvring; finally the wagons were parked a short distance from the lines and in sight of the foe. The troops exhausted by the rapid march, without proper formation or commanders, had been brought up to the support of the cavalry, who were hotly engaged with the enemy, whose desperation was increased at the sight of the Phalanx regiments. General Beauford had joined Forrest, augmenting his force 4,000. Sturgis' force numbered about 12,000, in cavalry, artillery and infantry. Forrest was well provided with artillery, which was up early and took a position in an open field enfilading the Federal line, which fought with a determination worthy of a better fate than that which befel it.

A confederate writer says:

"At early dawn on the 10th Lyon took the advance, with Morton's artillery close behind, Rucker and Johnson following. Meanwhile, Bell, as we have stated, at Rienzi, eight miles further north, was ordered to move up at a trot. The roads, soaked with water from recent continuous heavy rains and so much cut up by the previous passage of cavalry and trains, greatly retarded the progress of the artillery, so that Rucker and Johnson soon passed us. On reaching old Carrollville, five miles northeast of Brice's Cross Roads, heavy firing could be heard just on ahead. Forrest, as was his custom, had passed to the front of the entire column with his escort."He had, however, ordered Lieutenant R. J. Black, a dashing young officer, temporarily attached to his staff, to take a detachment of men from the Seventh Tennessee Cavalry and move forward and develop the enemy. Black soon reported that he had met the advance of the Federal cavalry one and a half miles from Brice's Cross Roads and there was skirmishing with them. General Forrest ordered Lyon to press forward with his brigade. A courier hastening back to the artillery said: 'General Forrest says, 'Tell Captain Morton to fetch up the artillery at a gallop.' Lyon in the meantime had reached the enemy's outposts, dismountedhis brigade and thrown it into line and had warmly opposed a strong line of infantry or dismounted cavalry, which, after stubborn resistance, had been driven back to within half a mile of Brice's Cross Roads."

"He had, however, ordered Lieutenant R. J. Black, a dashing young officer, temporarily attached to his staff, to take a detachment of men from the Seventh Tennessee Cavalry and move forward and develop the enemy. Black soon reported that he had met the advance of the Federal cavalry one and a half miles from Brice's Cross Roads and there was skirmishing with them. General Forrest ordered Lyon to press forward with his brigade. A courier hastening back to the artillery said: 'General Forrest says, 'Tell Captain Morton to fetch up the artillery at a gallop.' Lyon in the meantime had reached the enemy's outposts, dismountedhis brigade and thrown it into line and had warmly opposed a strong line of infantry or dismounted cavalry, which, after stubborn resistance, had been driven back to within half a mile of Brice's Cross Roads."

The columns of the Federals could not do more than retreat, and if they had been able to do this in any order, and recover from their exhaustion, they would have been ready to drive the foe, but they were hotly pursued by the confederates, who were continually receiving re-enforcements. It was soon evident that the confederates intended to gain the rear and capture the whole of the Union troops. The Federals, therefore, began to retire leisurely.

Says the confederate account:

"General Forrest directed General Buford to open vigorously when he heard Bell on the left, and, taking with him his escort and Bell's Brigade, moved rapidly around southeastward to the Guntown-Ripley road. He formed Wilson's and Russel's Regiments on the right of the road, extending to Rucker's left, and placed Newsom's Regiment on the left of the road; Duffs Regiment, of Rucker's Brigade, was placed on the left of Newsom; Captain H. A. Tyler, commanding Company A, Twelfth Kentucky, was ordered by Lyon and subsequently by Forrest to take his company, with Company C, Seventh Kentucky, and keep mounted on the extreme left of the line. The escort, under Captain Jackson, moved around the extreme left of the line, and on striking the Baldwyn and Pontotoc road about two miles south of the cross roads had a sharp skirmish and pressed the enemy's cavalry back to where Tishamingo creek crosses that road; here it was joined by Captain Gartrell's Georgia company and a Kentucky company. By mutual agreement Captain Jackson, of the escort, was placed in command of the three companies and Lieutenant George L. Cowan in command of the escort. Meanwhile General Buford had ordered Barteau's Second Tennessee Cavalry to move across the country and gain the Federal rear, and if possible destroy their trains and then strike them in flank."

The gallant conduct of the Federal cavalry inspired the other troops. They made a stand, and for awhile advanced, driving the confederate line before them on the right, doubling it up and gaining the rear.

The same writer says:

"It was at this critical moment an officer of Bell's staff dashed up to General Forrest, very much excited, and said: 'General Forrest, the enemy flanked us and are now in our rear. What shall be done?' Forrest, turning in his saddle, very coolly replied: 'We'll whip these in ourfront and then turn around, and wont we be in their rear? And then we'll whip them fellows!' pointing in the direction of the force said to be in his rear. Jackson and Tyler, charging on the extreme left, drove back two colored regiments of infantry upon their main line at the cross roads. In this charge the gallant Captain Tyler was severely wounded."Meanwhile the Federals, with desperation, hurled a double line of battle, with the four guns at Brice's house concentrated upon Rucker and Bell, which for a moment seemed to stagger and make them waver. In this terrible onslaught the accomplished Adjutant, Lieutenant W. S. Pope, of the Seventh Tennessee, was killed, and a third of his regiment was killed and wounded. Soon another charge was sounded. Lieutenant Tully Brown was ordered, with his section of three-inch rifles, close on the front at the Porter house, from which position he hurled a thousand pounds of cold iron into their stubborn lines. A section of twelve-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenant B. F. Haller, pressed still further to the front and within a stone's throw almost of the enemy's line. Mayson's section of three-inch rifles were quickly placed in line with Haller's. Just then, General Buford, riding up and seeing no support to the artillery, called General Forrest's attention to the fact, when Forrest remarked: 'Support, h—l; let it support itself; all the d—n Yankees in the country can't take it."'

"Meanwhile the Federals, with desperation, hurled a double line of battle, with the four guns at Brice's house concentrated upon Rucker and Bell, which for a moment seemed to stagger and make them waver. In this terrible onslaught the accomplished Adjutant, Lieutenant W. S. Pope, of the Seventh Tennessee, was killed, and a third of his regiment was killed and wounded. Soon another charge was sounded. Lieutenant Tully Brown was ordered, with his section of three-inch rifles, close on the front at the Porter house, from which position he hurled a thousand pounds of cold iron into their stubborn lines. A section of twelve-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenant B. F. Haller, pressed still further to the front and within a stone's throw almost of the enemy's line. Mayson's section of three-inch rifles were quickly placed in line with Haller's. Just then, General Buford, riding up and seeing no support to the artillery, called General Forrest's attention to the fact, when Forrest remarked: 'Support, h—l; let it support itself; all the d—n Yankees in the country can't take it."'

The lines were now closing upon each other, and the confederates began to feel the effect of the Union fire. The dash of the Phalanx, charging the enemy's flank, gave renewed courage to the troops, now pouring deadly volleys into the confederate's faces, and their guns had gained a position, from which they began to sweep the enemy's lines.

Says the same account:

"Now rose the regular incessant volleys of musketry and artillery. The lines in many places were not over thirty paces apart and pistols were freely used. The smoke of battle almost hid the combatants. The underbrush and dense black-jack thickets impeded the advance of the dismounted cavalry as the awful musketry fire blazed and gushed in the face of these gallant men. Every tree and brush was barked or cut to the ground by this hail of deadly missiles. It was here the accomplished and gallant William H. Porter, brother of Major Thomas K. and Governor James D. Porter, fell mortally wounded. This promising young officer had not attained his manhood. He was a cadet in the regular Confederate States army and had been ordered to report to General Bell, who assigned him to duty as A. D. C. Captain J. L. Bell, General Bell's Assistant Inspector-General, had just been killed from his horse, and almost at the same moment young Porter lost his own horse and just mounted Captain Bell's when he received the fatal shot. Lieutenant Isaac Bell, aide-de-camp of Bell's staff, was severely wounded.The loss in officers right here was very heavy; sixteen were killed and sixty-one wounded. Captain Ab Hust, a mere boy, who commanded Bell's escort, rendered most efficient service at this critical juncture, and Major Tom Allison, the fighting Quartermaster of Bell's Brigade, was constantly by the side of his fearless commander, and in this terrible loss in staff officers his presence was most opportune."Like a prairie on fire the battle raged and the volleying thunder can be likened in my mind to nothing else than the fire of Cleburne's Division at Chickamauga, on that terrible Saturday at dusk. At length the enemy's lines wavered, Haller and Mayson pressed their guns by hand to within a short distance of Brice's house, firing as they advanced. Bell, Lyon and Rucker now closed in on the cross roads and the Federals gave way in disorder, abandoning three guns near Brice's house. General Sturgis, in his official report of the fight, says: 'We had four pieces of artillery at the cross roads. * * * Finding our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.' A shell from one of the Confederate guns struck the table in Brice's porch, was used by General Sturgis, stunning that officer."

"Like a prairie on fire the battle raged and the volleying thunder can be likened in my mind to nothing else than the fire of Cleburne's Division at Chickamauga, on that terrible Saturday at dusk. At length the enemy's lines wavered, Haller and Mayson pressed their guns by hand to within a short distance of Brice's house, firing as they advanced. Bell, Lyon and Rucker now closed in on the cross roads and the Federals gave way in disorder, abandoning three guns near Brice's house. General Sturgis, in his official report of the fight, says: 'We had four pieces of artillery at the cross roads. * * * Finding our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.' A shell from one of the Confederate guns struck the table in Brice's porch, was used by General Sturgis, stunning that officer."

The terrible struggle which now ensued was not surpassed, according to an eye-witness, by the fighting of any troops. The Phalanx were determined, if courage could do it, to whip the men who had so dastardly massacred the garrison of Fort Pillow. This fact was known to Forrest, Buford and their troops, who fought like men realizing that anything short of victory was death, and well may they have thus thought, for every charge the Phalanx made meant annihilation. They, too, accepted the portentous fiat, victory or death.

Though more than twenty years have passed since this bloody fight, yet the chief of the confederate artillery portrays the situation in these words:

"Is was soon evident that another strong line had formed behind the fence by the skirt of woods just westward of Phillips' branch. General Forrest riding up, dismounted and approached our guns, which were now plying shell and solid shot. With his field glasses he took in the situation. The enemy's shot were coming thick and fast; leaden balls were seen to flatten as they would strike the axles and tires of our gun carriages; trees were barked and the air was ladened with the familiar but unpleasant sound of these death messengers."Realizing General Forrest's exposure, we involuntarily ventured the suggestion that, 'You had better get lower down the hill, General.' Instantlywe apologized, as we expected the General to intimate that it was none of our business where he went. He, however, stepped down the hill out of danger and seating himself behind a tree, seemed for a few moments in deep study, but soon the head of our cavalry column arriving, he turned to me and said: 'Captain, as soon as you hear me open on the right and flank of the enemy over yonder,' pointing to the enemy's position, 'charge with your artillery down that lane and cross the branch.' The genial and gallant Captain Rice coming up at this time and hearing the order, turned to me and said: 'By G—d! whoever heard of artillery charging?' Captain Brice's Battery had been stationed at Columbus, Miss., and other points on local duty, and only a few months previous had been ordered and assigned to our command. He accepted his initiation into the ways and methods of horse artillery with much spirit and good grace."Meanwhile, watching Forrest at the head of the cavalry moving through the woods and across the field in the direction of the enemy's right, I directed Lieutenants Tully, Brown and H. H. Briggs, whose sections had been held in the road below the Hadden house for an emergency, to be ready to move into action at a moments notice. The enemy, observing our cavalry passing to their right, began to break and retire through the woods. Forrest, seeing this, dashed upon them in column of fours. At the same moment Lieutenant Brown pressed his section down the road, even in advance of the skirmish line, and opened a terrific fire upon the enemy, now breaking up and in full retreat. Lieutenant Briggs also took an advanced position and got in a few well-directed shots. Brown's section and a section of Rice's Battery were pushed forward across Phillips' branch and up the hill under a sharp fire, the former taking position on the right of the road and the latter in the road just where the road turns before reaching Dr. Agnew's house."Our skirmishers had driven the enemy's skirmishers upon their main line, when we were about to make another artillery charge, but distinctly hearing the Federal officers giving orders to their men to stand steady and yell, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' 'Charge! charge! charge!' ran along their lines, and on they came. Our right was pressed back on the 'negro avengers of Fort Pillow.' They moved steadily upon our guns and for a moment their loss seemed imminent. Our cannoneers, standing firm and taking in the situation, drove double-shotted cannister into this advancing line. The cavalry rallying on our guns sent death volleys into their ranks, which staggered the enemy and drove them back, but only to give place to a new line that now moved down upon us with wild shouts and got almost within hand-shaking distance of our guns."Lyon coming up opportunely at this moment formed his brigade on our right, and springing forward with loud cheers, hurled them back with so stormful an onset that their entire line gave way in utter rout and confusion. Lieutenant Brown's horse was shot under him. The gallant young soldier, Henry King, of Rice's Battery, fell with his rammerstaff in hand, mortally wounded. His grave now marks the spot where he fell. Several members of the artillery were wounded and a great many battery horses were killed. The reason for this desperate stand was soon discovered. The road was filled with their wagons, ambulances and many caissons, the dying and wounded. Cast-away arms, accoutrements, baggage, dead animals and other evidences of a routed army were conspicuous on every side. The sun had set, but the weary and over-spent Confederates maintained the pursuit for some five or six miles beyond and until it became quite too dark to go further. A temporary halt was ordered, when a section from each battery was directed to be equipped with ammunition and the best horses from their respective batteries and be ready to continue the pursuit at daylight."

"Realizing General Forrest's exposure, we involuntarily ventured the suggestion that, 'You had better get lower down the hill, General.' Instantlywe apologized, as we expected the General to intimate that it was none of our business where he went. He, however, stepped down the hill out of danger and seating himself behind a tree, seemed for a few moments in deep study, but soon the head of our cavalry column arriving, he turned to me and said: 'Captain, as soon as you hear me open on the right and flank of the enemy over yonder,' pointing to the enemy's position, 'charge with your artillery down that lane and cross the branch.' The genial and gallant Captain Rice coming up at this time and hearing the order, turned to me and said: 'By G—d! whoever heard of artillery charging?' Captain Brice's Battery had been stationed at Columbus, Miss., and other points on local duty, and only a few months previous had been ordered and assigned to our command. He accepted his initiation into the ways and methods of horse artillery with much spirit and good grace.

"Meanwhile, watching Forrest at the head of the cavalry moving through the woods and across the field in the direction of the enemy's right, I directed Lieutenants Tully, Brown and H. H. Briggs, whose sections had been held in the road below the Hadden house for an emergency, to be ready to move into action at a moments notice. The enemy, observing our cavalry passing to their right, began to break and retire through the woods. Forrest, seeing this, dashed upon them in column of fours. At the same moment Lieutenant Brown pressed his section down the road, even in advance of the skirmish line, and opened a terrific fire upon the enemy, now breaking up and in full retreat. Lieutenant Briggs also took an advanced position and got in a few well-directed shots. Brown's section and a section of Rice's Battery were pushed forward across Phillips' branch and up the hill under a sharp fire, the former taking position on the right of the road and the latter in the road just where the road turns before reaching Dr. Agnew's house.

"Our skirmishers had driven the enemy's skirmishers upon their main line, when we were about to make another artillery charge, but distinctly hearing the Federal officers giving orders to their men to stand steady and yell, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' 'Charge! charge! charge!' ran along their lines, and on they came. Our right was pressed back on the 'negro avengers of Fort Pillow.' They moved steadily upon our guns and for a moment their loss seemed imminent. Our cannoneers, standing firm and taking in the situation, drove double-shotted cannister into this advancing line. The cavalry rallying on our guns sent death volleys into their ranks, which staggered the enemy and drove them back, but only to give place to a new line that now moved down upon us with wild shouts and got almost within hand-shaking distance of our guns.

"Lyon coming up opportunely at this moment formed his brigade on our right, and springing forward with loud cheers, hurled them back with so stormful an onset that their entire line gave way in utter rout and confusion. Lieutenant Brown's horse was shot under him. The gallant young soldier, Henry King, of Rice's Battery, fell with his rammerstaff in hand, mortally wounded. His grave now marks the spot where he fell. Several members of the artillery were wounded and a great many battery horses were killed. The reason for this desperate stand was soon discovered. The road was filled with their wagons, ambulances and many caissons, the dying and wounded. Cast-away arms, accoutrements, baggage, dead animals and other evidences of a routed army were conspicuous on every side. The sun had set, but the weary and over-spent Confederates maintained the pursuit for some five or six miles beyond and until it became quite too dark to go further. A temporary halt was ordered, when a section from each battery was directed to be equipped with ammunition and the best horses from their respective batteries and be ready to continue the pursuit at daylight."

The rout was all the enemy could desire, the Federals fought with a valor creditable to any troops, but were badly worsted, through the incompetency of Sturgis. They were driven back to Ripley, in a most disastrously confused state, leaving behind their trains, artillery, dead and wounded. But for the gallantry of the Phalanx, the enemy would have captured the entire force.

The same writer describes the rout:

"Johnson, pressing his brigade forward upon the enemy's position at Brice's Quarter, with Lyon supporting the artillery in the road below Brice's house, the position was soon captured with many prisoners and three pieces of artillery. Hallers and Mayson's sections were moved up at a gallop and established on the hill at Brice's Quarter and opened a destructive fire with double-shotted cannister upon the enemy's fleeing columns and wagon trains. The bridge over Tishamingo creek, still standing, was blocked up with wagons, some of whose teams had been killed. Finding the bridge thus obstructed the enemy rushed wildly into the creek, and as they emerged from the water on the opposite bank in an open field, our artillery played upon them for half a mile, killing and disabling large numbers. Forrests escort, under the dashing Lieutenant Cowan, having become detached in the meantime, had pressed around to the west side of the creek and south of the Ripley road, and here made one of its characteristic charges across an open field near the gin house, upon the enemy's wagon train, capturing several wagons."Meanwhile Barteau was not idle. He had moved his regiment, as we have stated, across to get in the enemy's rear, and in his own language says: 'I took my regiment across the country westward, to reach the Ripley road, on which the enemy was moving, and being delayed somewhat in passing through a swampy bottom, I did not reach that road, at Lyon's gin, three miles from Brice's Cross Roads, until probably 1 o'clock. I then learned that the last of the Federal regiments, with all their train, had passed by rapid march, and as there was now alull in the engagement (for I had been hearing sharp firing in front), I greatly feared that Forrest was defeated and that the Federals were pushing him back, so I moved rapidly down the road till I reached the open field near the bridge.'"This could not have been the Ripley Guntown road, as that road was filled with Federal troops, wagons and artillery from Dr. Agnew's house to the cross roads, a distance of two miles. 'Having placed some sharpshooters, whose sole attention was to be directed to the bridge,' he continues, 'I extended my line nearly half a mile, and began an attack by scattering shots at the same time. Sounding my bugle from various points along the line, almost immediately a reconnoitering force of the enemy appeared at the bridge, and being fired upon returned. This was followed, perhaps, by a regiment, and then a whole brigade came down to the creek. My men, taking good aim, fired upon them coolly and steady. Soon I saw wagons, artillery, etc., pushing for the bridge. These were shot at by my sharpshooters. I now began to contract my line and collect my regiment, for the Federals came pouring in immense numbers across the creek. Your artillery was doing good work. Even the bullets from the small arms of the Confederates reached my men. I operated upon the flank of the enemy until after dark.'"The wagons blockading the bridge were soon removed by being thrown into the stream and a section from each battery was worked across by hand, supported by the escort, and brought to bear upon a negro brigade with fearful loss; the other two sections were quickly to the front, ahead of any support for the moment, and drove the enemy from the ridge back of Holland's house across Dry creek. The cavalry in the meantime had halted, reorganized and soon joined in the pursuit. The road was narrow, with dense woods on each side, so that it was impossible to use more than four pieces at a time, but that number were kept close upon the heels of the retreating enemy and a murderous fire prevented them from forming to make a stand."The ridge extending southward from the Hadden house offered a strong natural position for defensive operations. Upon this ridge the Federals had established a line of battle, but a few well directed shots from the artillery stationed near the Holland house and a charge by our cavalry across Dry creek readily put them to flight. A section of each battery was ordered at a gallop to this ridge, which was reached in time to open with a few rounds of double-shotted cannister upon their demoralized ranks as they hastily retreated through the open fields on either side of Phillips branch. Our cannoneers were greatly blown and well nigh exhausted from excessive heat and continuous labor at their guns for full five hours. We noticed a number drink with apparant relish the black powder water from the sponge buckets."

"Meanwhile Barteau was not idle. He had moved his regiment, as we have stated, across to get in the enemy's rear, and in his own language says: 'I took my regiment across the country westward, to reach the Ripley road, on which the enemy was moving, and being delayed somewhat in passing through a swampy bottom, I did not reach that road, at Lyon's gin, three miles from Brice's Cross Roads, until probably 1 o'clock. I then learned that the last of the Federal regiments, with all their train, had passed by rapid march, and as there was now alull in the engagement (for I had been hearing sharp firing in front), I greatly feared that Forrest was defeated and that the Federals were pushing him back, so I moved rapidly down the road till I reached the open field near the bridge.'

"This could not have been the Ripley Guntown road, as that road was filled with Federal troops, wagons and artillery from Dr. Agnew's house to the cross roads, a distance of two miles. 'Having placed some sharpshooters, whose sole attention was to be directed to the bridge,' he continues, 'I extended my line nearly half a mile, and began an attack by scattering shots at the same time. Sounding my bugle from various points along the line, almost immediately a reconnoitering force of the enemy appeared at the bridge, and being fired upon returned. This was followed, perhaps, by a regiment, and then a whole brigade came down to the creek. My men, taking good aim, fired upon them coolly and steady. Soon I saw wagons, artillery, etc., pushing for the bridge. These were shot at by my sharpshooters. I now began to contract my line and collect my regiment, for the Federals came pouring in immense numbers across the creek. Your artillery was doing good work. Even the bullets from the small arms of the Confederates reached my men. I operated upon the flank of the enemy until after dark.'

"The wagons blockading the bridge were soon removed by being thrown into the stream and a section from each battery was worked across by hand, supported by the escort, and brought to bear upon a negro brigade with fearful loss; the other two sections were quickly to the front, ahead of any support for the moment, and drove the enemy from the ridge back of Holland's house across Dry creek. The cavalry in the meantime had halted, reorganized and soon joined in the pursuit. The road was narrow, with dense woods on each side, so that it was impossible to use more than four pieces at a time, but that number were kept close upon the heels of the retreating enemy and a murderous fire prevented them from forming to make a stand.

"The ridge extending southward from the Hadden house offered a strong natural position for defensive operations. Upon this ridge the Federals had established a line of battle, but a few well directed shots from the artillery stationed near the Holland house and a charge by our cavalry across Dry creek readily put them to flight. A section of each battery was ordered at a gallop to this ridge, which was reached in time to open with a few rounds of double-shotted cannister upon their demoralized ranks as they hastily retreated through the open fields on either side of Phillips branch. Our cannoneers were greatly blown and well nigh exhausted from excessive heat and continuous labor at their guns for full five hours. We noticed a number drink with apparant relish the black powder water from the sponge buckets."

The enemy followed the fleeing column, capturing and wounding many at the town of Ripley. Next morning the Federals made a stand. Again the Phalanx bore thebrunt of the battle, and when finally the troops stampeded, held the confederates in check until the white troops were beyond capture. But this was all they could do, and this was indeed an heroic act.

The confederate says:

"Long before daylight found us moving rapidly to overtake the flying foe. We had changed positions. The cavalry now being in advance, overtook the enemy at Stubb's farm; a sharp skirmish ensued, when they broke, leaving the remainder of their wagon train. Fourteen pieces of artillery and some twenty-five ambulances, with a number of wounded, were left in Little Hatchie bottom, further on. The discomfited Federals were badly scattered throughout the country. Forrest, therefore, threw out his regiment on either side of the roads to sweep the vicinity. A number were killed and many prisoners captured before reaching Ripley, twenty-five miles from Brice's Cross Roads. At this point two strong lines were formed across the road. After a spirited onset the Federals broke, leaving one piece of artillery, two caissons, two ambulances. Twenty-one killed and seventy wounded were also left on the field. Colonel G. M. McCraig, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois Infantry, was among the killed; also Captain W. J. Tate, Seventh Tennessee Cavalry. This was accomplished just as the artillery reached the front."Lieutenant Frank Rodgers, of Rucker's staff, the night previous, with a small, select detachment of men, assisted by Captain Gooch, with the remnant of his company, hung constantly upon the Federal rear, with a daring never surpassed. Their series of attacks greatly harrassed and annoyed the enemy, numbers of whom were killed and wounded. The artillery followed to Salem, twenty-five miles distant from Ripley."

"Lieutenant Frank Rodgers, of Rucker's staff, the night previous, with a small, select detachment of men, assisted by Captain Gooch, with the remnant of his company, hung constantly upon the Federal rear, with a daring never surpassed. Their series of attacks greatly harrassed and annoyed the enemy, numbers of whom were killed and wounded. The artillery followed to Salem, twenty-five miles distant from Ripley."

The Phalanx regiments would not consent to be whipped, even with the black flag flying in their front, and deserted by their white comrades. A correspondent of the ClevelandLeader, in giving an account of this "miserable affair," writes:

"About sunrise, June 11, the enemy advanced on the town of Ripley, and threatened our right, intending to cut us off from the Salem Road. Again the colored troops were the only ones that could be brought into line; the Fifty-ninth being on the right, and the Fifty-fifth on the left, holding the streets. At this time, the men had not more than ten rounds of ammunition, and the enemy were crowding closer and still closer, when the Fifty-ninth were ordered to charge on them, which they did in good style, while singing,

"'We'll rally round the flag, boys.'

"This charge drove the enemy back, so that both regiments retreated to a pine grove about two hundred yards distant."By this time, all the white troops, except one squadron of cavalry, that formed in the rear, were on the road to Salem and, when this brigade came up, they, too, wheeled and left, and in less than ten minutes this now little band of colored troops found themselves flanked. They then divided themselves into three squads, and charged the enemy's lines; one squad taking the old Corinth Road, then a by-road, to the left. After a few miles, they came to a road leading to Grand Junction. After some skirmishing, they arrived, with the loss of one killed and one wounded."Another and the largest squad covered the retreat of the white troops, completely defending them by picking up the ammunition thrown away by them, and with it repelling the numerous assaults made by the rebel cavalry, until they reached Collierville, a distance of sixty miles. When the command reached Dan's Mills, the enemy attempted to cut it off by a charge; but the colored boys in the rear formed, and repelled the attack, allowing the whole command to pass safely on, when they tore up the bridge. Passing on to an open country, the officers halted, and re-organized the brigade into an effective force. They then moved forward until about four,p. m.; when some Indian flank skirmishers discovered the enemy, who came up to the left, and in the rear, and halted. Soon a portion advanced, when a company faced about and fired, emptying three saddles. From this time until dark, the skirmishing was constant."A corporal in Company C, Fifty-ninth, was ordered to surrender. He let his would-be captor come close to him; when he struck him with the butt of his gun."While the regiment was fighting in a ditch, and the order came to retreat, the color-bearer threw out the flag, designing to jump out and get it; but the rebels rushed for it, and in the struggle one of the boys knocked down with his gun the reb who had the flag, caught it, and ran."A rebel, with an oath, ordered one of our men to surrender. He, thinking the reb's gun was loaded, dropped his gun; but, on seeing the reb commence loading, our colored soldier jumped for his gun, and with it struck his captor dead."Capt. H., being surrounded by about a dozen rebels, was seen by one of his men, who called several of his companions; they rushed forward and fired, killing several of the enemy, and rescued their captain."A rebel came up to one, and said, 'Come my good fellow, go with me and wait on me.' In an instant, the boy shot his would-be master dead."Once when the men charged on the enemy, they rushed forth with the cry, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' The rebs called back, and said, 'Lee's men killed no prisoners.'"One man in a charge threw his antagonist to the ground, and pinned him fast; and, as he attempted to withdraw his bayonet, it came off his gun, and, as he was very busy just then, he left him transfixed to mother earth."One man killed a rebel by striking him with the butt of his gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work, he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his gun badly cut his lip."When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could bayonet the third, he turned the butt of his gun, and knocked him down."

"This charge drove the enemy back, so that both regiments retreated to a pine grove about two hundred yards distant.

"By this time, all the white troops, except one squadron of cavalry, that formed in the rear, were on the road to Salem and, when this brigade came up, they, too, wheeled and left, and in less than ten minutes this now little band of colored troops found themselves flanked. They then divided themselves into three squads, and charged the enemy's lines; one squad taking the old Corinth Road, then a by-road, to the left. After a few miles, they came to a road leading to Grand Junction. After some skirmishing, they arrived, with the loss of one killed and one wounded.

"Another and the largest squad covered the retreat of the white troops, completely defending them by picking up the ammunition thrown away by them, and with it repelling the numerous assaults made by the rebel cavalry, until they reached Collierville, a distance of sixty miles. When the command reached Dan's Mills, the enemy attempted to cut it off by a charge; but the colored boys in the rear formed, and repelled the attack, allowing the whole command to pass safely on, when they tore up the bridge. Passing on to an open country, the officers halted, and re-organized the brigade into an effective force. They then moved forward until about four,p. m.; when some Indian flank skirmishers discovered the enemy, who came up to the left, and in the rear, and halted. Soon a portion advanced, when a company faced about and fired, emptying three saddles. From this time until dark, the skirmishing was constant.

"A corporal in Company C, Fifty-ninth, was ordered to surrender. He let his would-be captor come close to him; when he struck him with the butt of his gun.

"While the regiment was fighting in a ditch, and the order came to retreat, the color-bearer threw out the flag, designing to jump out and get it; but the rebels rushed for it, and in the struggle one of the boys knocked down with his gun the reb who had the flag, caught it, and ran.

"A rebel, with an oath, ordered one of our men to surrender. He, thinking the reb's gun was loaded, dropped his gun; but, on seeing the reb commence loading, our colored soldier jumped for his gun, and with it struck his captor dead.

"Capt. H., being surrounded by about a dozen rebels, was seen by one of his men, who called several of his companions; they rushed forward and fired, killing several of the enemy, and rescued their captain.

"A rebel came up to one, and said, 'Come my good fellow, go with me and wait on me.' In an instant, the boy shot his would-be master dead.

"Once when the men charged on the enemy, they rushed forth with the cry, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' The rebs called back, and said, 'Lee's men killed no prisoners.'

"One man in a charge threw his antagonist to the ground, and pinned him fast; and, as he attempted to withdraw his bayonet, it came off his gun, and, as he was very busy just then, he left him transfixed to mother earth.

"One man killed a rebel by striking him with the butt of his gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work, he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his gun badly cut his lip.

"When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could bayonet the third, he turned the butt of his gun, and knocked him down."

General Sturgis was severely criticised by the press immediately after the affair. Historians since the war have followed up these criticisms. He has been accused of incompetency, rashness and drunkenness, none of which it is the purpose of this volume to endorse. Possibly his reports furnish a sufficient explanation for the disaster, which it is hoped they do, inasmuch as he is not charged with either treason or cowardice.

[General Sturgis' Report, No. 1.]"Headquarters United States Forces,Colliersville, Tenn., June 12, 1864.

[General Sturgis' Report, No. 1.]

"Headquarters United States Forces,Colliersville, Tenn., June 12, 1864.

"General:—I have the honor to report that we met the enemy in position and in heavy force about 10a. m.on the 10th instant at Brice's Cross-Roads on the Ripley and Fulton road and about six miles northwest of Guntown, Miss. A severe battle ensued which lasted until about 4p. m., when I regret to say my lines were compelled to give way before the overwhelming numbers by which they were assailed at every point. To fall back at this point was more than ordinarily difficult as there was a narrow valley in our rear through which ran a small creek crossed by a single narrow bridge. The road was almost impassable by reason of the heavy rains which had fallen for the previous ten days and the consequence was that the road soon became jammed by the artillery and ordnance wagons. This gradually led to confusion and disorder."In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establishing two colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops were seized with a panic and became absolutely uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in checking up the flying column and placing it in line of battle."This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes only, when it again gave way and my whole army became literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly dark, the roads almost impassable and the hope of savingmy artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7a. m.next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7 o'clock this morning."My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear, however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I think the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will not fall short of our own."This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the result of a series of unfortunate circumstances over which human ingenuity could have no control."The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a desert country that the enemy had ample time to accumulate an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery from the mud."So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to their work."This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon as the official reports can be received from division commanders."I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establishing two colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops were seized with a panic and became absolutely uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in checking up the flying column and placing it in line of battle.

"This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes only, when it again gave way and my whole army became literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly dark, the roads almost impassable and the hope of savingmy artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7a. m.next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7 o'clock this morning.

"My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear, however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I think the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will not fall short of our own.

"This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the result of a series of unfortunate circumstances over which human ingenuity could have no control.

"The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a desert country that the enemy had ample time to accumulate an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery from the mud.

"So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to their work.

"This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon as the official reports can be received from division commanders.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"S. D. STURGIS,"Brig.-Gen. Commanding."To Maj.-Gen.C. C. Washburn, Commanding District W. Tenn."

"S. D. STURGIS,

"Brig.-Gen. Commanding.

"To Maj.-Gen.C. C. Washburn, Commanding District W. Tenn."

An extract from a letter from Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the 55th Colored Infantry in this fight, reads:

"Our (the Federal) command having been moved up on double-quick—a distance of about five miles—immediately before their arrival on the field and the consequent fact that this arm of our force went into the engagement very seriously blown, in fact, very nearly exhausted by heat and fatigue, with their ranks very much drawn out, were whipped in detail and overwhelmed by the very brilliant and vigorous assaults of your forces. When the engagement first began I was at the rear of theFederal column, in command of the train guard, and hence passed over the ground on the way to the battle-field after the balance of the army had passed, and am able to speak advisedly of the extreme exhaustion of the infantry, as I passed large numbers entirely prostrated by heat and fatigue, who did not reach the field of battle and must have fallen into your hands after the engagement."

[General Sturgis' Report, No. 2.]"Memphis, Tenn., June 24, 1864.

[General Sturgis' Report, No. 2.]

"Memphis, Tenn., June 24, 1864.

"Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the expedition which marched from near La Fayette, Tenn., under my command on the 2nd instant. This expedition was organized and fitted out under the supervision of the major general commanding the District of West Tennessee and I assumed command of it on the morning of the 2nd of June, near the town of La Fayette, Tenn., in pursuance of Special Orders, No. 38, dated Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which were received by me on the 1st inst. The strength of the command in round numbers was about 8,000 men,' (which included the following Phalanx regiments: 59th Regt., 61st Regt., 68th Regt., Battery I, 2nd Artillery, (Light,) 2 pieces.)"My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of 181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force, thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was allowed me as to the details of the movement where circumstances might arise which could not have been anticipated in my instructions. Owing to some misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was some little delay occasioned in getting the column in motion."The following incidents of the march are taken from the journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:"'Wednesday, June 1st.—Expedition started from Memphis and White's Station toward La Fayette."'Thursday, June 2nd.—The general and staff left Memphis on the 5 o'clocka. m.train and established headquarters at Leaks' House, near La Fayette, and assumed command. Cavalry moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all day and part of the night."'Friday, June 3rd.—Ordered the cavalry to move to within three four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, 18 miles from La Fayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the day and the bad condition ofthe roads and bridges, the train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did not get into park until 11 o'clockp. m., the colored brigade remaining with the train as a guard."'Saturday, June 4th.—Informed General Grierson that the infantry and train under the most favorable circumstances could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained heavily until 1 o'clockp. m., making the roads almost impassable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright's house, two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem."'Sunday, June 5th.—Infantry and train started at half past four o'clocka. m., and joined the cavalry, two miles east of Salem. At 10 o'clocka. m., issued rations to the cavalry and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men, started at 6p. m., with instructions to move via Ripley to Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy bridge over Tuscumbia and to join General Grierson at Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon."'Monday, June 6th.—Infantry and train moved at 4 o'clocka. m., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5a. m., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow, marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville. The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La Grange and Ripley roads."'Tuesday, June 7th.—Upon information received from General Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south. Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very bad."Wednesday, June 8th.—Received information at 4 o'clocka. m.that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements. Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road. Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o'clockp. m., having swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night."'Thursday, June 9th.—Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to Stubbs', fourteenmiles from Ripley; issued five days' rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening."'Friday, June 10th.—Encountered the enemy at Brice's Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from Guntown.'"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with difficulty drag them along. Under these circumstances, I called together my division commanders and placed before them my views of our condition. At this interview, one brigade commander and two members of my staff were, incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however, (and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we were again sent through the same country, it would be ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General Washburn had acquired, therecould be no considerableforce in our front and all my own information led to the same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have been totally unable to present any facts to justify my cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been successfully carried forward. All I could have presented would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would naturally do under the circumstances and these would have availed but little against the idea that the enemy was scattered and had no considerable force in our front."Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force as compact as possible and ready for action at all times; hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so large an extent."On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline intheir camps; keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved us to move and act constantly as though in his presence. That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment, and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven, thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance; infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building bridges, &c., &c."On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp, when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that would require considerable time and labor to render practicable. While halted here to await the head of the column, I received a message from General Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few minutes more I received another message from him, saying the enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That he was himself at Brice's Cross-Roads and that his position was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however, that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns."Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority,and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding, that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess, behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began to arrive. Col. Hodge's brigade was the first to reach the field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train, which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear, arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on the right of the line was now becoming very great and General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being made on the left. Another section of artillery was now placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way, and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required re-enforcements in the centre.I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train. While traversing the short distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing him that I was unable to render him any additional assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had to hold his position until I could form a line to protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find. This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid to Colonel McMillen,who was soon after compelled to withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in rear. It was now 5 o'clockp. m.For seven hours, these gallant officers and men had held their ground against overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my assistance, with pistols in their hands we at length succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was placed in command. About this time it was reported to me that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud became inextricable and added to the general confusion which now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o'clockp. m., I reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally, as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in position until all should have passed. I also informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men. In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away. By 7 o'clocka. m., of the 11th, we had reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge boxes were wellnigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o'clock a. m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening, that the commander at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the general commanding the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, at 9 p. m., the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning. This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the 95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him."The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we, as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by actually fighting for the information; and in that case the knowledge often comes too late."While I will not prolong this already extended report by recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of many brave officersand men who deserve mention, but will respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by that excellent and dashing officer, Col. Joseph Karge, of the 2nd New Jersey Vols., in his reconnoissance to Corinth and his subsequent management of the rear-guard, during a part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during one whole afternoon and throughout the entire night following."To the officers of my staff,—Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hess, 19th Pa. Cavalry, commanding escort, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.; Capt. W. C. Belden, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. E. Caulkins 7th Indiana Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Samuel (name illegible) 19th Penn. Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieut. W. H. Stratton, 7th Ills. Cavalry, A. A. C. S.,—whose names appear in no other report, I am especially grateful, for the promptness and zeal with which my orders were executed at all times and often under trying and hazardous circumstances."I am, major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

"My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of 181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force, thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was allowed me as to the details of the movement where circumstances might arise which could not have been anticipated in my instructions. Owing to some misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was some little delay occasioned in getting the column in motion.

"The following incidents of the march are taken from the journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:

"'Wednesday, June 1st.—Expedition started from Memphis and White's Station toward La Fayette.

"'Thursday, June 2nd.—The general and staff left Memphis on the 5 o'clocka. m.train and established headquarters at Leaks' House, near La Fayette, and assumed command. Cavalry moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all day and part of the night.

"'Friday, June 3rd.—Ordered the cavalry to move to within three four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, 18 miles from La Fayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the day and the bad condition ofthe roads and bridges, the train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did not get into park until 11 o'clockp. m., the colored brigade remaining with the train as a guard.

"'Saturday, June 4th.—Informed General Grierson that the infantry and train under the most favorable circumstances could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained heavily until 1 o'clockp. m., making the roads almost impassable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright's house, two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem.

"'Sunday, June 5th.—Infantry and train started at half past four o'clocka. m., and joined the cavalry, two miles east of Salem. At 10 o'clocka. m., issued rations to the cavalry and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men, started at 6p. m., with instructions to move via Ripley to Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy bridge over Tuscumbia and to join General Grierson at Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.

"'Monday, June 6th.—Infantry and train moved at 4 o'clocka. m., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5a. m., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow, marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville. The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La Grange and Ripley roads.

"'Tuesday, June 7th.—Upon information received from General Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south. Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very bad.

"Wednesday, June 8th.—Received information at 4 o'clocka. m.that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements. Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road. Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o'clockp. m., having swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.

"'Thursday, June 9th.—Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to Stubbs', fourteenmiles from Ripley; issued five days' rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening.

"'Friday, June 10th.—Encountered the enemy at Brice's Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from Guntown.'

"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with difficulty drag them along. Under these circumstances, I called together my division commanders and placed before them my views of our condition. At this interview, one brigade commander and two members of my staff were, incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however, (and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we were again sent through the same country, it would be ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General Washburn had acquired, therecould be no considerableforce in our front and all my own information led to the same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have been totally unable to present any facts to justify my cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been successfully carried forward. All I could have presented would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would naturally do under the circumstances and these would have availed but little against the idea that the enemy was scattered and had no considerable force in our front.

"Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force as compact as possible and ready for action at all times; hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so large an extent.

"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline intheir camps; keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved us to move and act constantly as though in his presence. That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment, and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven, thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance; infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building bridges, &c., &c.

"On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp, when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that would require considerable time and labor to render practicable. While halted here to await the head of the column, I received a message from General Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few minutes more I received another message from him, saying the enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That he was himself at Brice's Cross-Roads and that his position was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however, that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.

"Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority,and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding, that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess, behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began to arrive. Col. Hodge's brigade was the first to reach the field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train, which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear, arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on the right of the line was now becoming very great and General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being made on the left. Another section of artillery was now placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way, and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required re-enforcements in the centre.I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train. While traversing the short distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing him that I was unable to render him any additional assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had to hold his position until I could form a line to protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find. This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid to Colonel McMillen,who was soon after compelled to withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in rear. It was now 5 o'clockp. m.For seven hours, these gallant officers and men had held their ground against overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my assistance, with pistols in their hands we at length succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was placed in command. About this time it was reported to me that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud became inextricable and added to the general confusion which now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o'clockp. m., I reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally, as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in position until all should have passed. I also informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men. In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away. By 7 o'clocka. m., of the 11th, we had reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge boxes were wellnigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o'clock a. m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening, that the commander at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the general commanding the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, at 9 p. m., the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning. This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:

"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the 95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him.

"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we, as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by actually fighting for the information; and in that case the knowledge often comes too late.

"While I will not prolong this already extended report by recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of many brave officersand men who deserve mention, but will respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by that excellent and dashing officer, Col. Joseph Karge, of the 2nd New Jersey Vols., in his reconnoissance to Corinth and his subsequent management of the rear-guard, during a part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during one whole afternoon and throughout the entire night following.

"To the officers of my staff,—Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hess, 19th Pa. Cavalry, commanding escort, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.; Capt. W. C. Belden, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. E. Caulkins 7th Indiana Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Samuel (name illegible) 19th Penn. Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieut. W. H. Stratton, 7th Ills. Cavalry, A. A. C. S.,—whose names appear in no other report, I am especially grateful, for the promptness and zeal with which my orders were executed at all times and often under trying and hazardous circumstances.

"I am, major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

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