From the day of their arrival the Americans had been actuated with but one purpose, namely, that of leaving no stone unturned to enhance their value as a reënforcement. Admiral Rodman, who commanded the Sixth Battle Squadron, was ever in close touch with Admiral Beatty. The genuine friendship between his squadron and the rest of the fleet will never be forgotten in our service. There was but one fleet. But the question of utilising their personnel for our immediate affair was governed by something more than cordiality and co-operation. Secrecy had to bemaintained. If we had transferred a few score American officers and men to Chatham, where there were no American ships, for special training with our own, curiosity would have been aroused at once, comment would have followed and, in a very short while, the secret might have been public property.
Admiral Beatty and Admiral Rodman had discussed the whole subject and decided that American assistance was inadvisable for the reason given. I was also asked if it was true that an American officer had come over to Zeebrugge inVindictiveas a stowaway. It was not true.
Admiral Rodman had previously held an important post in connection with the Panama Canal, and he let us have the benefit of his experiences with regard to questions of salvage. Nearly a year later he was kind enough to attend a large meeting with the author in New York, where, in no uncertain language, he nailed the pro-German insinuations to the board.
Captains of Blockships
Amongst the first officers to leave the Grand Fleet were those destined to command the blockships; the fitting out of the latter had already commenced. The usual custom concerning seniority for command of light cruisers was waived, these officers, whose ranks varied from a Commander to a Lieutenant of less than three years' standing, being selected from those available mainly by virtue of their character and capability. Those selected to commandIrisandDaffodilwere also sent south as early as practicable. On arrival at Dover they were told the "secret." It was probably self-control combined with the somewhat artificial reserve arising from good discipline which enabled them to refrain from giving vent totheir feelings of elation. One of them told me that he had the sensation of being released from prison; the opportunity of being able to show his worth had come at last. Each officer read through the "plan" so as to make himself acquainted with the broad outlines of the whole enterprise. One of the blockship commanders expressed the opinion that the blocking of Ostende would be "easy meat" compared to the undertaking at Zeebrugge, and he earnestly requested that he might command a blockship destined for the latter place. This request was granted. Incidentally his opinion was wrong. Subsequently, thanks to his own splendid efforts, he caused his comparison between the two places to appear all the more erroneous by assisting to make the blocking of Zeebrugge seem relatively simple.
The main ideas governing the preparatory work, as already stated, had been evolved under the direction of Admiral Keyes. Many questions, however, of a more local description remained to be decided on the spot. The blockship officers, therefore, thoroughly investigated every detail which bore on their duties and devised many local improvements, especially in connection with the handling of the vessels.
They left nothing undone to ensure a successful issue of their efforts. No other subject held any interest for them in those days. Just how to take their ships to their allotted positions—that was their one consideration. The question of being rescued after their work was completed held a very secondary place. Perhaps the rescue vessels might be able to do something towards it. Perhaps not. Anyway, that mattered nothing in comparison with the crucialpoint. And so they schemed and discussed and organised and tested. And what a grand reward they obtained for their labours!
I should like to mention in passing that the first blockship officer to come south was Lieutenant Ivor B. Franks, in whose hands much of the early work connected with fitting out the blockships was placed, with splendid results which reflected great credit on him. He commandedIphigeniaduring the first two attempts made against Zeebrugge, but, most unluckily for him, he developed appendicitis just before the final attempt. It was largely due to his earnest entreaties that Admiral Keyes gave the command to the previous second-in-command, who was a Lieutenant of only one year standing. Once again Lieutenant Franks, for whom we all felt the greatest sympathy, had shown the value of his judgment.
During this period the constructive work on the ships proceeded apace.
TheVindictiverapidly changed her appearance. Every unessential fitting that could be removed in the time at our disposal was wafted away. The foremast was cut off just above the fighting-top. The mainmast was removed altogether and a large portion of it was fitted horizontally across the deck, extending several feet over the port side of the ship, as a bumpkin designed to prevent the port propeller from bumping against the Mole at Zeebrugge.
Special fenders were fitted on the ship's side to prevent damage to the latter when secured to the Mole, and a fender of colossal proportions was added to the port side of the forecastle for the express purpose of bumping the Mole on arrival.
Other alterations and additions have been described in Chapter V.
H.M.S.Hindustan, Captain A. P. Davidson, D.S.O., was lent as a depot vessel for our officers and men who had been concentrated at Chatham. There was then no living accommodation on boardVindictiveor in the blockships.
Informing the Officers
The Vice-Admiral took an early opportunity of assembling all the officers and making the whole plan known to them collectively. The secret was to be kept from the men until later, in accordance with the principle of never divulging a secret to anybody except those to whom the information is indispensable.
The personnel specially required for storming the Mole at Zeebrugge were divided into three main parties, viz., Seamen storming parties under the command of Captain Henry C. Halahan, D.S.O., R.N., Marine storming parties (drawn from the 4th Battalion) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N. Elliot, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., and a demolition party consisting of both Seamen and Marines under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Cecil C. Dickinson, R.N.
The Marine Infantrymen were put through intensive training at one of the southern depots; this training was arranged and personally supervised by Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, whose powers of imagination and organisation were of a high order and whose optimism was very encouraging. He was tremendously enthusiastic from the first moment when he was let into the secret. As second-in-command of the Naval Forces in Servia he had previously rendered splendid service and had been awarded the D.S.O.After the fall of Belgrade I believe that he had traversed the entire country on foot in his endeavour to help his force to safety. I remember a lady telling me that she and her friends had been much interested on recent nights in watching a large party of Marines indulging in peculiar antics on a hill opposite her house; also that the hill was partly covered with strips of canvas in a seemingly aimless fashion. I expressed my astonishment at the strange proceeding. Incidentally the canvas strips were laid out to represent different portions of Zeebrugge Mole, though, at that period, the men believed they represented some enemy position elsewhere.
Intensive Training
The Marine Artillerymen, destined to man the howitzers and some other guns inVindictive, were trained at another depot.
The seamen were largely trained at Chatham under military supervision and advice; the excellence of this training received a well-deserved tribute in the official despatch. The demolition parties were also trained at Chatham.
Training in night fighting was the main idea. Instruction in bombing, bayonet fighting, and all types of trench raiding was given. The men believed that they were required for some special service in France; their enthusiasm was unbounded.
LIEUT.-COL. BERTRAM N. ELLIOT, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., LIEUT.-COM. ARTHUR L. HARRISON, R.N., WING-COM. FRANK A. BROCK, R.N.A.S., CAPTAIN HENRY C. HALAHAN, D.S.O., R.N.LIEUT.-COL. BERTRAM N. ELLIOT, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., LIEUT.-COM. ARTHUR L. HARRISON, R.N., WING-COM. FRANK A. BROCK, R.N.A.S., CAPTAIN HENRY C. HALAHAN, D.S.O., R.N.
Taking everything into consideration and looking at the operation of attacking the Mole from a general point of view, it was not dissimilar to a trench raid on a large scale. The preparatory bombardment, the rush "over the top," the probability of encountering barbed wire, the descent to the main level of the Mole, the hand-to-hand fighting in the dark, andfinally the clearing of dug-outs, all combined to liken that phase of the operation to one of the many night raids with which the military were so well acquainted on the western front. The senior officers of the Seamen and Marine storming parties had both gained much experience of such fighting ashore. It was to be a raid of the first water, a super-raid. The military officers were most enthusiastic about our men. They declared that these men could carry any position. For they were all picked men; and even so some of them were weeded out as not quite reaching high-water mark at the game. It was generally conceded that the Hun, wherever he was to come to close quarters with such antagonists, would have an uncomfortable evening.
It has been mentioned above that special personnel were not required for the large majority of vessels which were already in full commission and employed on active duty in the Dover Command. The personnel required for the blockships and storming vessels and for other special purposes amounted to eighty-six officers and sixteen hundred and ninety-eight men; of these, seven hundred and fifty, in the aggregate, were drawn from the Royal Marines.
Having been working in the Plans Department of the Admiralty when the operation was originally thought out under Admiral Keyes, my further services had been lent to him, after he took over the Command at Dover, in connection with the operational staff work. Very much to my delight I had then been offered the billet of navigator of the expedition, and my duties were to include those of placingVindictivealongside the Mole. The Vice-Admiral originallyproposed to direct the operation from on boardVindictive, but was forced to the conclusion that he could do so more satisfactorily from a destroyer, thus avoiding the possibility of being confined to any single position in the area of the attack. In the Vice-Admiral's absence Captain Halahan, appointed in command of the seamen storming parties, became the Senior Executive Officer in the ship. It was pointed out that that fact would result in the unusual case of the Senior Officer on board not being responsible for the handling of the ship. Captain Halahan would not even listen to any suggestion of difficulty arising from such a situation, and, I am anxious to record this fact, he proposed that his acting rank of Captain should be transferred from himself to me, so that the officer responsible for handling the vessel should also be the Senior Executive Officer on board in accordance with the usual service custom; in other words that he should be made junior to myself. This proposal was typical of Halahan, who, in my opinion, was one of the finest fellows that our Service ever knew. His death brought an irreparable loss to the Navy. Throughout the greater part of the war he had been in command of the naval guns on the northern front and within field-gun range of the enemy for no less than three years. He had fought in most of the great battles on that part of the Allied lines. A more efficient, earnest, upright, and altogether large-minded officer never fought for his country or paid the supreme sacrifice more readily. The days which we spent together working at the details of the enterprise, his wonderful enthusiasm, and his certainty of success are unforgettable. I feel that I could notcontinue this story without recording my unqualified admiration for this splendid officer.
Needless to say, it was unnecessary to carry his proposal into effect, for his unselfishness had served to guarantee that all questions of rank were immaterial where the only thing that really mattered was the attainment of our object.
I regret that my lack of literary ability prevents my doing justice to such men.
Wing-Commander Brock
It would be difficult for anybody to speak too highly of Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock. He was a rare personality. An inventive genius, than whom the country had no better, it was his brain that differentiated this blocking enterprise from all previous attempts in history in one most important particular. The difficulty of reaching the destination in the face of a strenuous opposition had hitherto brought failure, but he provided an antidote in the form of a satisfactory artificial fog designed to protect the blockships from the enemy's guns during the critical period of approach. That in itself was a wonderful achievement, but his inventive mind was not satisfied therewith. To him we owed the special flares intended for turning darkness into light.
A special buoy was wanted—one that would automatically provide its own light on being thrown into the water. Brock made so little of the problem that he produced such a buoy, designed, constructed, and ready for use in less than twenty-four hours. Special signal lights were required. Brock produced them. Flame projectors, far exceeding anything hitherto known, were mooted. Brock produced them also. No matter what our requirements were Brock wasundefeated. With a highly scientific brain he possessed extraordinary knowledge of almost any subject. He had travelled much and could tell you all that was worth knowing of any country from Patagonia to Spitzbergen. He was no mean authority on old prints and books, was also a keen philatelist, and was blessed with a remarkable memory. Wherever he went he carried with him a pocket edition of the New Testament, which was his favourite possession; his knowledge of the contents was quite unique. And with it all he was a great shot and an all-round sportsman. His fine physique was well remembered by many a Rugby footballer from the days when he played in the pack of one of the leading club fifteens. His geniality and humour were hard to beat. But of all his qualities, optimism perhaps held first place. At times we, who were far from being pessimistic, thought his optimism excessive, but it was justified absolutely with regard to the success of the enterprise.
Sad to relate, the only occasion on which I can remember his optimism failing to carry him through was connected with his own personal safety. He had telephoned up to Halahan in our office and mentioned having broken a looking-glass. "That means seven years bad luck," said Halahan, in a jocular spirit. "Never mind," came the instant reply, "it shows that I'm going to live for another seven years, anyway."
Both Brock and Halahan had done so much to ensure our success, it was indeed sad that they did not survive long enough to see the results.
My readers will excuse me, I feel sure, for bringing such personalities to their notice. It is very difficultto continue the story without writing of many others to whom we owed so much in the preparatory work. But there will be a chance of mentioning some of them later on, when we come to the actual description of the fight.
THE WAITING PERIOD. THE VOLUNTEERING SPIRIT.
At last all constructive preparations were completed; the various ships and small craft were commissioned and concentrated at their respective starting-points. The blockships andVindictivesteamed out to the loneliest of anchorages in the Swin Deep, situated about eight miles south of Clacton, Essex. It was a curious looking squadron that steamed down the Medway that day, the blockships with their funnels looming extra large in the absence of masts and theVindictivewith her gangways protruding into mid-air like almonds in the side of a tipsy cake. TheHindustanlooked respectable enough. She was mother to us all and her captain was a very tolerant and helpful father.
Embarkation of Marines
TheIrisandDaffodiljoined us almost immediately. The Marines embarked a few days later. They had been sent to a southern port on the understanding that they were off to France; the officers alone knew the truth. They duly boarded the waiting transport with stores, ammunition, and baggage, the latter labelled to a French port. They must have wondered where they would sleep that night. The transport duly left harbour and headed for the French coast, but presently altered course in a most unusual manner. Word was passed round that the course was peculiar; all crowded on deck in their endeavour to solve the problem. It was a misty day with the raincoming down in torrents; the land was soon obscured. The officers chuckled at the general bewilderment, but held their peace. At last the transport eased down and finally stopped engines. Out of the mist loomed theIrisandDaffodil, into which vessels the Marines were transferred.
A second voyage was then commenced, but it was not of long duration. Other ships presently hove in sight, and strange craft they appeared. Cruisers without masts and another looking like a home for lost coal-tips. These were the blockships andVindictive. Then appeared a recognisable vessel—theHindustan. Some of the Marines went to the latter, the remainder toVindictive. I can well remember the astonished look on their faces as these men boarded my ship. Even the heavy downpour of rain seemed to be unnoticed. One man remarked as he came on board, "Well, it's darned good to be aboard a blessed something, but I'm blowed if I know what she is."
That day and the next were spent in settling down. On the evening of the second day the men were told the secret. InVindictivethey all mustered on the quarter-deck and after bridge. Sunset had long since been heralded by the time-Honoured bugle call. The evening twilight was fading rapidly. There was a stillness in the air which seemed to be reflected from the tense attitude of the assembled men. One could have heard the proverbial pin drop. It was my duty to take them into our confidence. After the nature of the enterprise had been outlined a few sentences were sufficient to illustrate the task allotted to theVindictive. It seemed advisable to point out that many other operations of a hectic nature, besides those ofthe blockships and storming vessels, were to be attempted. I emphasised this by mentioning that if, during our visit to Zeebrugge Mole, they heard a thunderous explosion they could say to themselves, "That's one of them." These words came back to me afterwards, as I shall relate in due course.
As soon as the business in hand had been promulgated it was considered advisable to exert a very rigid censorship on outgoing mails. Correspondence was permitted, but strictly on the understanding that the letters would be retained at one of the mail offices until the operation had been completed. This regulation was modified later owing to the waiting period being unexpectedly prolonged. Field post-cards were then issued and could be posted in the ordinary manner. There were the usual sentences, such as "I am quite well," "I am not quite well," "I have received your letter," "I have not received your letter," etc., in the style of the French exercise books of one's youth. Such post-cards were familiar enough amongst the military, but were a novelty to most of us; they caused a good deal of amusement, especially when the sender omitted to delete the sentences which misrepresented his feelings towards the intended recipient.
All shore leave was stopped; even cases of serious illness or accident would have to go toHindustan, and remain there, instead of to a shore hospital.
Concerning Secrecy
Secrecy was absolutely essential, but not always easy to ensure. At our anchorage it was comparatively simple, but elsewhere we had to depend more upon trust in our fellow men than rigid regulation. The secret was well kept, and fortunately so. Surprise is mainly dependent upon secrecy. For if informationof an impending attack becomes known there can be no hope of taking the enemy unawares.
I wonder how many people realise the necessity for keeping rumours to themselves during war. Rumours must be either true or untrue. If untrue they are not worth passing on. If true, then untold harm may result from repetition. Suppose for a moment that the impending operation at Zeebrugge had become a topic of general conversation. In due course the information would have reached our enemies and the expedition would almost certainly have met with complete disaster. The lives of many picked officers and men would have been lost, and the whole affair would have gone down to history as a fiasco. Under such circumstances each person who had repeated the rumour on its way to the enemy would have been morally guilty of manslaughter—surely that is not an exaggerated deduction.
Alas, human nature is often weak. There is some modicum of satisfaction in showing superior knowledge to one's neighbour.
The Japanese, in their war with Russia, set the world a wonderful example of silence. After losing a high percentage of their battleship strength not a word was spoken and the world remained in ignorance for many months.
A writer—I think it was Chesterton—once suggested that memorials should be erected in recognition of negative qualities. If that idea were adopted I wonder how many tablets would be found to state that "Here Mr. So-and-so heard a rumour and did not repeat it to his friends."
When dealing, in Chapter VIII, with the questionof the type of personnel required for an enterprise of this description, I mentioned that they should be volunteers as far as that was practicable. The reader may perhaps consider that the meaning of the word "volunteer" was being unduly "stretched" if the men were to be unaware of the real nature of the operation until they were already trained and actually standing by to go across. Nevertheless, the men were volunteers in the true meaning of the word. Let me explain. It was of great importance that no officer or man should take part in the enterprise unless he was "for it," heart and soul. So, as soon as the secret had been made known and the men were thoroughly aware of all the difficulties and risks involved, it was given out that any officers or men who wished to withdraw could do so. It was fully recognised that they might have private reasons for wishing to avoid risks of an unusually high degree. We were not concerned with the nature of such private reasons and we wished to make certain that no pressure was brought to bear for the sake of influencing their decision. They were, therefore, informed that any individual who desired to withdraw should merely give in his name and remain behind. They were further told that no reasons would be asked and, to make doubly certain, that no reasons or explanations of any description would be allowed under any circumstances whatever. That was fair enough. Not a single officer or man withdrew.
Volunteering Spirit
InVindictivethere were several men, of non-combatant rating, who, in the ordinary course of events, were destined to be left behind when the expedition started. They comprised cooks, stewards, canteen-servers, and the like. Some of them were not evennaval men, but merely there as representatives of, or workers for, the firm which provided the canteen. They naturally knew the secret and they openly expressed their desire to remain in the ship so as not to miss the fun. We decided to consider such requests. Extra men would come in handy for dealing with the wounded as well as for assisting with the commissariat. Eventually it was decreed that those who volunteered to come over with us should give in their names. As far as I can remember every one of them volunteered. It must be realised that these were not fighting men; their sole training had been that of the camp follower. Small chance of meeting the enemy in hand-to-hand combat would come their way. The work of tending wounded between decks—we already had our full quota of stretcher bearers for working in more exposed positions—and that of providing the necessary sustenance carries little glory or excitement. Nevertheless, these men volunteered and they afterwards rendered splendid service.
Take another case. When theVindictivewas fitting out at Chatham there was an officer on board, remaining from the previous commission, for temporary duty. He knew nothing definite of the coming operation, but evidently thought a good deal. His method of volunteering was to remark: "I don't know, sir, what the old ship is going to do, but it looks like dirty work and I should like to be there." It was vulgar, but expressive. That officer remained with us, and afterwards covered himself with glory.
In the blockships there were also incidents which served to illustrate this thirst for dangerous employment.
Owing to the difficulties of rescue work, as has already been explained, it was decided to send each blockship to her final destination with the smallest possible number of crew; the number in each case amounted to fifty-three. Thirty-four extra men, however, were required for getting each ship to the edge of the danger zone, whilst the fifty-three on whom the final run depended were resting. That meant that in each ship thirty-four men, who knew all about the coming event, who had experienced much hard work and considerable discomfort, were to be disembarked just when the fight was about to begin. One can imagine their feelings, but questions of individual disappointment could not be allowed to affect the plan of action. The disembarkation of these "surplus" crews was to be carried out with the aid of small craft specially detailed for the purpose. In theIntrepidone day there was a minor edition of a mutiny. Several men demanded to see their captain. The latter ordered them to state their business. "Well, sir," said the spokesman, "me and my mates understands as how some of the crew have got to leave the ship on the way across to Zeebruggy. The 'jaunty'[1] says it's us lot and we ain't a-goin' to leave."
[1] Master-at-arms.
Their captain explained the situation. He pointed out that there would be too many for one rescue boat and that overloading might lead to the loss of everybody. But the men were inclined to be adamant. Finally their captain decided to take a spare gun's crew and ordered the "mutineers" to draw lots for the honour. The sequel is worth recording even if itnecessitates anticipating the main story. When this particular blockship stopped during the oversea voyage, the craft detailed to take off her surplus crew failed to appear alongside—she had broken down. So the whole crew went to Zeebrugge and, extraordinary to relate, every soul of them was rescued.
This voluntary spirit was very heartening to all concerned. I have only mentioned a few specific cases, but there were many others of a similar description. It is no exaggeration to say that once the men knew the secret they were more than mere volunteers—they weredeterminedto come across with us.
First Waiting Period
It must not be assumed that all was in readiness as soon as the ships, having been duly fitted out, had assembled at the Swin and embarked their personnel. Much remained to be done. Steam trials, gunnery practices, adjustment of compasses, and tests of all the special material were indulged in. Handling the ships from both the main and auxiliary conning positions, testing communications, manipulating the grappling irons and Mole gangways, drilling the guns' crews and ammunition parties, training the stretcher parties, and giving instruction in first-aid also helped to keep us fully occupied.
Of course it was impossible to practise sinking blockships or taking storming vessels alongside breakwaters. Breakwaters are only to be found in such public places as Dover, Portland, etc.; it would have been inadvisable to publish our intentions in such a manner. Thus, as far as these special vessels were concerned, the seamanship difficulties could not be lessened by proper realistic practice. The suggestion that we might useHindustanas the Mole did notappeal to us much, especially as theVindictivewas originally built for ramming and consequently had a very large ram; we had no desire to start badly by sinking one of our own battleships.
The life on boardVindictive, uncomfortable as it was owing to our numbers greatly exceeding the normal complement, was not altogether devoid of humour. As one walked round the ship there would be a blood-curdling yell and a party of men with fixed bayonets would charge round a corner and hurl themselves upon an imaginary foe. The steel helmets, gas masks, and respirators gave these men a weird appearance, such as one is unaccustomed to see on board ship. Some carried knob-kerries—loaded ash sticks; others grenades, flame projectors, or machine-guns. There was no half-heartedness about the men. Clearly enough they meant business; we had no misgivings about the result. Those days were busy indeed. When work had finished for the day opportunities for sports arose, and there were occasional concerts in the evenings. The tugs-of-war evoked much friendly rivalry between the various sea regiments—the seamen, stokers, Marine Light Infantry, and Marine Artillery. One afternoon a boxing tournament took place and the fighting augured well for the near future.
One day, two officers from a blockship paid a call on theVindictive. Visiting cards were not required; we were obviously At Home. But we were quite mystified when one of the officers produced a small chunk of iron and remarked that he had brought it on board in case we ran short of ammunition. He then explained that, during the passage from hisvessel, some description of explosive missile had burst within a few yards of his dinghey, and the piece produced had fallen into the boat. Incidentally he accusedVindictiveof firing the missile, but we pleaded not guilty or alternatively, as the lawyers say, asserted that he had no right to cross the firing line! Apparently it was a portion of a bomb of sorts fired from one of the ships, fortunately without any other result than to cause considerable merriment to the occupants of the dinghey. Such an incident in the ordinary course of events would have led to very pertinent enquiries, but we were too much preoccupied with the business in hand to worry about such trifles.
The thoughts uppermost in our minds concerned the chances of favourable weather conditions. The barometers came in for an amount of tapping which was not calculated to improve the instruments. We all became weather prophets those days. Many and varied were the daily forecasts.
One night we rolled unpleasantly in a heavy gale and soon after midnight a small vessel was seen firing distress signals. This provided an excellent opportunity for testing our illuminating rockets, by the aid of which we observed a tug struggling to grapple a lighter which was dragging its anchors. The worst aspect of heavy weather was the consequent expenditure of fuel which we could ill spare. Thanks to the Captain ofHindustanour period of waiting was made as comfortable as we could have hoped. He was indefatigable in arranging diversions for our amusement and in keeping us informed of the latest war news. Each day brought more serious reports from the battle front in France and made us all the more anxiousto give the enemy a nasty shock whilst cheering up our own troops. During the late evenings most of us sought for quiet corners where we could write letters. I think we all found those letters were very difficult, but one's feelings at such a time are of too private a nature to bear analysis.
The Coming Event
Captain Halahan used to discuss every point of the coming enterprise with me; his insight and keenness were most marked. We often talked far on into the night and always came to the conclusion that however difficult the operation might be for our forces we would not be in the German's shoes for anything. We had a plasticine model of the Mole chiefly constructed from the data obtainable from aerial photographs. Colonel Elliot, commanding the Marine storming parties, and his officers often joined us. We all realised the difficulty of berthing the storming vessels at exactly the desired position alongside the Mole and endeavoured to make the storming plan as elastic as possible. The primary consideration—as far as that phase of the operation was concerned—appeared to be that the ships should secure to the Molesomewhere. The mere presence of the ships, combined with all the attendant noise and fireworks, would create a diversion of no mean order. The actual landing on the Mole and the occurrences that followed would increase the diversion which had already commenced. With regard toVindictivewe originally aimed at securing her alongside the Mole, heading to the westward, with her stern seventy yards westward of the three-gun battery. It was realised that there might be considerable difficulty in recognising one's exact position alongside the outerwall relative to objects on the Mole itself. Eventually, as will be described later, the ship secured to the westward of the designed position, but, though the actual fighting on the Mole was affected, the main object of the diversion was attained.
The blockship officers paid us many visits and we were all very cheery. No less than four old shipmates had come down from my late ship in the Grand Fleet—H.M.S.Emperor of India. It was a curious fact that all five of us were in the thick of the affair and all survived. One commanded theIntrepidwith another as one of his officers. One commanded theDaffodil. One was on boardIris. Their services will be mentioned later.
One night we had anEmperor of Indiadinner on board theIntrepid. A storeroom of sorts did duty for a mess and I think the sub-lieutenant cooked the dinner. There was no serious talk that evening and I don't think we forgot to drink confusion to the enemy. When we broke up the party we little knew that we should be conveying that confusion within twenty-four hours.
I have described our life at the Swin in some detail, but what of the other one hundred and fifty-four craft which were not with us? They were busily preparing too, but, for the most part, were actively engaged in their ordinary Dover Patrol duties at the same time. Little peace can have come their way. The aircraft, too, were very actively employed. Day after day they brought us back photographs of Ostende and Zeebrugge, taken at great risk with a fine contempt for danger. If we wanted the details of any portion of the Mole it was forthcoming, in the shape of anaerial photograph, in a few hours. This work was carried out by the 61st Wing of the Royal Air Force. Special cameras were used for this purpose; I believe that they had been designed by the previous Vice-Admiral at Dover. We studied those photographs with the aid of stereoscopes and magnifying glasses by the hour. But photography was not the only thing required of the aircraft. They had to prepare for the bombing attacks which would provide further diversions; preparation required much observational work both by day and by night. The aircraft detailed for the bombing attacks were drawn from the 65th Wing of the Royal Air Force. These flyers were fine fellows and no less determined to make the affair successful than the rest of us.
Many of the smaller craft were commanded by officers of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. I have mentioned elsewhere that the whole success of the operation might, at a critical period, depend upon the action of a single unit. Instructions leaving a high degree of initiative to the recipient were, therefore, necessary. Clear appreciations followed by rapid decisions were required. The Vice-Admiral emphasised that point most strongly. He trusted his men, whether Reserve or Volunteer or otherwise. His trust was not misplaced; all these officers commanding the small craft behaved most admirably, exactly as was expected by those who knew their worth.
METEOROLOGICAL AND TIDAL CONDITIONS. VISIBILITY
The periods during which the conditions would be favourable for our enterprise depended upon various factors. The extent to which we could make use of any particular date during one of those periods depended, in turn, upon meteorological conditions.
It has been shown elsewhere that, for the purpose of utilising the artificial fog, we required a wind blowing more or less toward the Belgian coast from seaward. It was also necessary for the wind to be light so that the small craft would not be hampered by rough seas. Light winds are often accompanied by fog, especially in the North Sea, and fog would be a serious obstacle. Rain would be detrimental to the use of aircraft.
The depths in the entrances to the canals at Zeebrugge and Ostende were such that the blockships could only navigate during the period around high water. It was, therefore, necessary for the vessels to arrive at about that state of the tide.
Again, it was essential to carry out the operation during the night for reasons already mentioned. In this respect, however, the word operation must not be used too loosely; the periods of approach to the objectives and of retirement therefrom must both be included in that term. The approach had to beundiscovered till the latest possible moment. That necessitated darkness throughout the approach, which latter may be considered as comprising the passage during the last twenty miles of the oversea voyage. Obviously the greater part of the whole passage conducted during darkness the less would be the chance of losing the element of surprise.
Likewise the retirement must be made before daylight if the concentration of the shore batteries was to be avoided. I have already stated that the German guns could make things very uncomfortable for ships up to a maximum distance of fifteen to twenty miles, provided that the ships could be seen. The retiring forces should, therefore, be outside that range before there was sufficient daylight to see so far; the latter state of visibility would obtain at least half an hour before sunrise. Allowing a speed of about ten knots for retirement, this meant that the ships must leave the coast about two and a half hours before sunrise after completing the operation. The attack itself was expected to continue for about one and a half hours. The reader does not require to be an advanced mathematician to realise that the attack must commence not later than about four hours before sunrise, that is, during the middle portion of the night. Of course, the attack was the all-important matter; any question of safe retirement must be a secondary consideration. Nevertheless, the question of retirement, similarly to that of rescuing the blockships' crews, had to be taken into account.
Specimen Diagram for ascertaining Available Period. (Transcriber's note: this diagram occupied page 133 of the source book)Specimen Diagram for ascertaining Available Period. (Transcriber's note: this diagram occupied page 133 of the source book)
From the foregoing it will be seen that the attack should be preceded and followed by a considerable period of darkness, and should more or less coincidewith the time of high tide. The latter only occurs about every twelve hours and takes place roughly fifty minutes later each day. The number of consecutive days on which high tide would occur in the middle portion of the night was, therefore, very limited.
With regard to visibility, as far as naval operations are concerned, strong moonlight is almost as disadvantageous as daylight. Half the nights per month may be termed moonlight nights in that respect. The state of the moon on any particular night is known beforehand, the state of the clouds affecting moonlight may change from hour to hour.
Just one more calculation. In mid-April the period sunset to sunrise is about eleven hours in length. Allowing two hours for the approach-passage through the danger zone, one and a half hours for the attack, and two hours for the retirement (to be completed half an hour before sunrise), it follows that the maximum number of after-sunset hours available for the open sea passage would amount to five. That was the best possible condition for us, but could only be utilised if high water occurred about four hours before sunrise. If high tide occurred any later our time of arrival would necessarily be later and our retirement could not be completed before daylight. If high tide occurred any earlier our time of arrival must be earlier, in which case there would be less dark hours available for our open sea passage on the way across. The length of the open sea passage would be approximately six hours. Thus even on the most favourable date, some of the open sea passage would have to be made in broad daylight. Six days before that (the tide being five hours earlier) the whole of the open seapassage would have to be made in daylight, only the approach-passage, i.e., the last two hours of the whole trip, taking place after sunset.
A rather complicated set of conditions, astronomical, tidal, and meteorological, was thus required.
It was almost too much to expect that everything would be favourable during the possible period; it is practically certain that a commander who refused to move until all conditions were exactly as desired would never accomplish anything. Nevertheless we sincerely hoped that fortune would be kind to us.
Keenness of the Men
The men were kept informed of the chances as forecast from the current weather conditions; their eagerness for favourable predictions was manifest. There is much advantage to be gained by a commander taking his men into his confidence. In this particular case the men realised that leakage of information would entail disaster; that was sufficient to ensure that the confidence would be respected; the rigorous censorship was there to make doubly certain. It is always more irksome for those who wait in ignorance than for those who know the reasons for delay. So after prayers each morning the latest forecast was divulged, other items of interest were made known, and the keenness of the men was maintained.
THE ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS. THE TIME FACTOR
The work of drafting, reproducing, and distributing the necessary orders and instructions to the large number of craft concerned was not so simple as it may sound. The amount of instructions required in an operation of this sort can only be appreciated by those who have had experience of staff work during war. The command to "carry on" is only applicable when the means have been provided and the manner of its use has been made known.
Synchronizing the Events
To mention a few of the items: Separate orders for the oversea voyage were required for each squadron destined to make the passage independently of the remainder. Others were needed for the voyage of the main force, others to cover the aerial attacks and the long-range bombardments. The supporting squadrons must have their instructions. Still further orders were designed to deal with the period of "approach." Then there were those for the main attack on the Mole, for the demolition work, for the destruction of the railway viaduct, and for the proceedings of the artificial-fog craft; also those for the blockships and the rescue work. The retirement required its own share. Even now we have not mentioned those designed to meet possible eventualities, such as encountering enemy vesselsen route, or returning to harbour if postponement of the enterprise was necessary.
Having decidedwhereandhowthings should be done, the remaining question waswhenthey should take place. The operation with its various phases and diversions could not be carried out on the go-as-you-please principle. Every item needed to be carefully fitted in to suit the remainder. The timing of each event was of paramount importance. A long-range bombardment or an aerial attack, if delayed, might destroy our own vessels. The blowing up of the viaduct was calculated to renderhors de combatall human beings within a certain distance—our own men on the Mole must not be endangered by it. It would be useless for the blockships to arrive before the fire of the Mole batteries had been suitably diverted. Aerial bombers flying at a hundred miles per hour could not accompany the ships steaming at about one-tenth of that speed. The line of fire from the bombarding vessels could not very well coincide with our approach course, hence the necessity for the monitors to take up independent positions. And so on. How could a satisfactory synchronisation of events be arranged?—that was the problem.
There were only two methods to consider: firstly, that of centralised command by signal; secondly, that of working in accordance with a prearranged time table.
The former method was obviously impracticable. Signals passed by either the wireless or visual method, during the approach, would make our presence known to the enemy and thus preclude all chance of taking the latter by surprise. After the attack had commenced signals would be impracticable for obvious reasons, chief amongst them being the deafening noiseand the presence of artificial fog. So direction by signal could be ruled out.
The Timing Question
Recourse was had to the time-table method. A table was made out showing the exact times (by clock) that the main force was to pass through various positions and to arrive at the several destinations. All other movements were to synchronise according to plan. The time table naturally varied for each day according to the projected time of arrival of the blockships, this, in turn, depending on the time of high tide. But that was not all. It was necessary to guard against unexpected delays due to accident, and against vagaries of the tidal stream. Every unit should know, at a late stage of the oversea trip, if the blockships were likely to be late or early, and the probable difference between actual and projected time involved.
We would not be satisfied with the degree of punctuality usually associated with certain railways. A few minutes out, one way or the other, might be serious; an error of half an hour would probably be disastrous. But the oversea passage involved a journey of approximately a hundred miles for the blockships and storming vessels, though rather less for the Dover contingents. That fact, combined with the usual unwieldiness of a fleet comprising over one hundred and fifty vessels, was not likely to render punctuality very easy of attainment. The disadvantages of daylight made it inadvisable to leave our bases extra early for the sake of having plenty of time to spare. Careful calculations were necessary and the resulting time table was circulated to all concerned.
Before leaving this consideration of the timingquestion it may be of interest to mention that the storming vessels were to be twenty minutes ahead of the Zeebrugge blockships on arrival in the vicinity of the Mole. In that twenty minutes we were to get alongside and land the storming parties; the latter were to take the necessary steps to put the batteries out of action as far as the safety of the blockships was concerned. At the expiration of the twenty minutes the blockships were to pass round the end of the Mole and make their dash for the canal entrance. The reader may wonder why twenty minutes was the chosen interval. Too long a time might allow the German defences to recover from the initial surprise; too short a time might not enable the storming vessels to complete their work before the blockships were seen by the enemy. Twenty minutes, short though it was, was chosen as a compromise.
All this operational staff work was carried out at Dover under the direction of the Vice-Admiral, who, as previously stated, was already overloaded with duties and responsibilities arising from the work of the Dover Patrol.
The office accommodation was hardly palatial; the building might certainly have been satisfactory as a small apartment house in pre-war days, but, as the Admiral's office of our busiest naval command outside the Grand Fleet, it was not quite up to standard. The small staff were pretty busy for a few weeks. Meals were either bolted down or missed. The night hours did not bring over-much sleep.
Visits to the Grand Fleet were also necessary; one grudged the hours spent in the train. Conferences and discussions, visits to the ships fitting out at thedockyards, inspection of special material, trials of the artificial fog, and the above-mentioned expenditure of stationery helped to keep one occupied. Occasional aerial trips assisted to clear away the cobwebs from one's brain; they constituted a first-class tonic.
We had no printing-press. All orders had to be typed and reproduced by a duplicating machine. Secrecy was as essential in this work as elsewhere; information had to be confined to the minimum number of persons. The ordinary office staff had all the Dover Patrol work to attend to; that was as heavy as it was unceasing. It was a new experience to turn the handle of the duplicator, and, in shirt-sleeve garb, to clip up the pages. We obtained the assistance of a civilian clerk from the Admiralty, and I vow that individual discovered the real meaning of "overtime"; incidentally he was a very rapid and accurate worker and helped us enormously.
At last the office work was more or less completed. Improvements were thought out from time to time and had to be embodied, even up to the eleventh hour. That was natural enough, seeing that we had very little previous experience to guide us in the detailed planning of the Mole attack and blockship work. It was a great relief when the paper work was finished; those of us who had other business in hand could then turn our attention to preparations of a more material nature, much of which has already been described.
THE FIRST ATTEMPT. THE RETURN TO HARBOUR
The first period, during which the tidal and astronomical conditions would be favourable, approached. The period was limited to about half a dozen days for the reasons stated in a previous chapter. The weather looked ominous; none of us were very hopeful of an early start. Those last few days of waiting were rather trying. So many things might happen to prevent the operation from taking place. Some of us were inclined to be apprehensive, not of the result if we once came to grips with the enemy, but of the operation being cancelled, or of its being indefinitely postponed, which generally means the same thing. Another great attack on the Belgian coast had previously been planned and prepared, but had never come off. I hesitate to think of the effect on the general morale of the personnel if our enterprise had suffered the same fate. Disappointment is hard enough to bear at any time, but on such an occasion as this it would have just about broken one's heart.
On the eve of the first day of the first period our anxiety about the weather was tremendous. The wind blew hard that night. The morning had nearly dawned before some of us could make ourselves realise that looking at the weather would not do any good. We endeavoured not to offend it by saying unkind words. We touched wood many times when we gavevent to our hopes bred of optimism. Patience is a virtue indeed. But the first day was obviously unfavourable, so we commenced to wait for the second.
Carry On
At last there was a decided improvement. A state of readiness was ordered. The wind had fallen very light and we were as hopeful as we were anxious to be "up and doing." The order to raise steam was next received and followed shortly after by the order to "carry on" as previously laid down in the time table. All was bustle then. Unnecessary baggage was transhipped to a harbour vessel against the day when some of us might require it. In due course the final arrangements were made and we shortened in our cables. Then we weighed anchors and started off. The officers and men ofHindustancheered us vigorously; answering cheers were given as we steamed close past her.Vindictiveand the blockships all cheered each other, enthusiasm was in the air. Thank goodness we were off at last. Thank goodness, also, that nothing had occurred to prevent our showing what we could do. Those were the thoughts uppermost in our minds.
IrisandDaffodilwere sent on ahead so thatVindictivecould take them in tow when we were clear of the shoals. It will be remembered thatIrisandDaffodildid not possess a high degree of steaming power, either in the way of speed or reliability.
It had, therefore, been decided thatVindictiveshould tow both these vessels across the sea until in the near vicinity of Zeebrugge Mole; that would help to ensure their arrival. I read afterwards in one account of this affair thatIrisandDaffodiltowedVindictiveinto action!
The squadron formed into "line ahead" in the orderVindictive, Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant, andSirius. The wind was blowing rather weakly, but from a favourable direction. The sea was very calm and, altogether, conditions appeared to be most promising. There were no glum faces in our little community just then. As soon as we had cleared the shoals we all stopped for a few minutes whileVindictivetookIrisandDaffodilin tow; that accomplished, we set course for Rendezvous A, where we had to meet the Vice-Admiral and the remaining vessels from Dover. During our passage through the various channels between sandbanks we passed a large number of homeward-bound merchant ships. The contrast between them and our vessels was not merely confined to the matter of appearance.
Each of these merchant ships was just completing a successful operation, namely, that of bringing necessities of life to this country after running the gantlet of the enemy submarines and mines. On the other hand, we were just setting out for the purpose of reducing such risks in the future. One could not help realising the fact that these mercantile mariners had risked their lives over and over again without ostentation, with small hope of glory, with practically no reward. Fine fellows indeed! What a debt of gratitude we all owed them! Some of them, doubtless, had been torpedoed three and four times, losing all their effects each time, but here they were again with yet another voyage to their credit. We overtook a few vessels outward bound with their troubles to come. Some of these ships were neutrals. We wondered what they thought of us and how they would describe us when they arrived at their destinations. We couldreckon on the enemy having agents at all the neutral ports with their "ears well trimmed to the wind" when in the presence of neutral mariners from British ports. We also wondered if these neutrals could fail to recognise the difference between British and German treatment of merchantmen at sea, and whether such recognition would not make them chary of talking too much.
Presently we sighted a large number of small craft. They seemed to be dashing up from every direction, at first in an apparently aimless fashion, but presently one recognised the method in their madness. At schedule time we stopped, heading towards our goal. The crowd soon sorted themselves out.
The Vice-Admiral with his flag flying in the destroyerWarwicktook up a position of advantage. Destroyers and blockships took small motor craft in tow. Other vessels acted as tugs for the submarines. Motor launches, puffing for all the world as if they lacked training, thus acting an untruth, assembled according to their ultimate duties. Somebody remarked that we resembled a sea-circus, there were so many turns taking place simultaneously. One hardly knew which to admire most. The destroyers throbbing with latent energy, some of them shouting through their safety valves that they were in a hurry to get to business. The motor launches, pretending the sea was rough and often rolling heavily in their pretence, producing a similar impression to that of a certain famous automobile which, though cheap, always "gets there" even if some parts are missing at the end of the journey. The C.M.B.'s (which, being interpreted, signifies Coastal Motor Boats, thoughthe word "coastal" hardly seems appropriate) were tearing through the water and almost leaping into the other element as if to emulate the flying-fish. Perhaps the word "crowd" was most suited to the appearance of this heterogeneous collection of craft, but they were very different from a crowd in their behaviour.
The Signal to Proceed
Punctually at the scheduled hour the signal was hoisted to proceed. The expedition, making its debut as such, set course for the eastward. Enthusiasm was at its highest pitch. Final preparations were then the order of the day. InVindictiveemergency rations and field dressings were distributed. Small arms were inspected, ammunition was stowed ready for use. Demolition charges were placed in a handy position for rapid removal to the Mole, gangways were triced up, bombs were fused, howitzers and flame-throwers were prepared. Hoses were flaked down for fire brigade uses, fire extinguishers were provided in specially dangerous corners, duplicate charts were placed in the conning tower. To guard against the eventuality of all the navigating personnel being renderedhors de combatduring the fight or the charts being destroyed, the retirement courses were painted up on the armour inside the conning tower. A year later I found this painting untouched, although the ship had been in the Germans' hands (after being sunk by us at Ostende in May, 1918) for many months—I wondered if they understood its signification. All the other craft in company were equally busy.
We passed through further rendezvous, B and C and D, etc., carefully checking our progress at each so as to ensure working to the time table.
The bombarding and supporting squadrons had proceeded independently. We were accompanied by aircraft during the daylight hours of our passage; their special duty was that of scouting for German aircraft and preventing those that might have seen us from giving any warning of our approach.
The wind gradually became very fitful and made us rather apprehensive of its changing to an unsuitable direction. Surely we were not to be robbed of our long-awaited opportunity at the eleventh hour. Daylight faded into twilight and the latter gave way to darkness. It was a clear night, but as black as india ink. Presently a distant flash of light was seen away to starboard. Then another and another. A compass bearing laid from our charted position gave evidence of something happening at Ostende. Then searchlight beams were seen searching the heavens in an uneasy manner. What could it mean? A hurried glance at the time table explained everything.
A Difficult Decision
Our aircraft had opened the ball. The booming of guns was heard quite plainly and the glare of the flashes was distinctly visible. Zeebrugge then joined in the game. In a little while we could make out the trail of the "flaming onions," rushing heavenwards, hanging stationary for a few seconds, and then slowly falling in their curiously serpentine manner, for all the world like colossal snakes writhing in their death agony. The firing became more intense and we were more anxious than ever to get to work. It was obvious enough that our aircraft—the 65th Wing of the Royal Air Force from Dunkerque—were setting about the enemy in determined fashion. Our turn was to come shortly, according to plan. Alas, "the best laidschemes of mice and men gang aft agley." We had stopped to disembark the surplus blockship crews—if they could be found, and to slip the small craft from their towing hawsers in readiness to penetrate the danger zone. The wind seemed to have died away for a moment and then commenced to blow from asoutherlydirection.
Seldom has an admiral been faced with such a difficult situation. A decision had to be given, and quickly. The nature of the operation admitted of no delay. The wind at the moment was hopelessly unfavourable for our use of artificial fog. The latter was essential. It would mean sheer slaughter if there were no cover from the shore batteries during the approach. On the other hand, the wind might change again. Here was the whole expedition within a short distance of our objectives. The major part of the passage had been completed in spite of all the difficulties and practically without incident. The aerial attack had commenced. The monitors were shortly to send their messages of destruction hurtling on their way to the enemy. We had been seen by all sorts of neutral vessels. Most of the conditions were favourable—the wind alone was seriously against us. Another chance might never come. He who risks nothing attains nothing. Discretion is the better part of valour. What was it to be?
In all the pages of naval history I cannot remember having come across any occasion where a more difficult decision had to be made. After Teneriffe Nelson had realised his mistake of allowing impetuosity to influence sound reasoning to the extent of attacking when the conditions were unfavourable. Not onlywas that first attack a failure, but it had foredoomed the second attempt to failure also. The Vice-Admiral avoided the same mistake—he ordered the operation to be cancelled for that night. Much has been written of the attack which eventually took place. References to the Nelson touch have not been unknown. But this latter comparison, as I have shown, was curiously inapt if intended to cover the whole direction of the enterprise.
There was no time for feelings of disappointment. We had to return at utmost speed so as to be ready to start again next day if the conditions allowed. Our bases lay many miles to the westward, but we were heading in an easterly direction. "Course West" was signalled immediately.Vindictiveheld the honoured post of "Guide of the Fleet." Complete instructions had been laid down for turning round at night. It must be remembered that we had seventy-seven craft in close, very close, company. We duly turned round, hoping that all craft had received the signal. Our hopes were not entirely realised. In a few moments the close company became too close for comfort. Small craft shaved across our bows so narrowly that they left the impression of having gone through us. Shouts were heard, mingled with the puffing and spluttering of internal-combustion engines. We wondered which particular vessel we should sink first. But out of chaos came some semblance of order and presently we were homeward bound without any very serious casualties.
Away in the distance there were occasional gun and searchlight flashes, but the monitors had received the cancellation news in time to preserve their silence.During the turn to the westward one of the small craft, in imminent danger of collision, had momentarily switched on her navigation lights. Others followed suit until our force resembled Brighton Esplanade indulging in a Venetian fete as viewed from the sea. "Out Lights" was immediately ordered and passed from one craft to another by megaphone or flash-lamp; darkness reigned once more as we sped homeward. Although we had shown a blaze of lights, the enemy patrols, we heard afterwards, failed to see us; this was scarcely a token of their efficiency.
Value of the Attempt
So it was a case of "if at first you don't succeed, try, try again." This abortive attempt was by no means without value. We had rehearsed the concentration and the oversea passage of the main force; the other vessels had practised reaching their various destinations; the aircraft had carried out their attack; the routes and navigational aids had been severely tested. Naturally enough much valuable experience had been gained and, after all, no harm had resulted provided that the enemy remained ignorant of our efforts and intentions. But certain incidents had occurred to increase our reliance on the small craft. During the turn to the westward disentanglement without serious accident was only achieved as a result of fine seamanship and initiative on the part of those in command; these qualities had thus been evidenced under most realistic and difficult conditions. We felt that, if they could deal successfully with such a situation asthat, they could be relied upon to tackle any situation, however difficult or unexpected.
A couple of incidents that occurred may illustrate the point. During the turning manoeuvre one of thecoastal motor boats received a heavy blow in the bows from another craft. A hole resulted and the water commenced to pour through it. She would probably have sunk in a minute or two but for the resource of her commanding officer. He ordered one of the men to sit in the hole. This reduced the inflow of water, but can hardly have been a comfortable proceeding for the individual concerned. The boat was then worked up to high speed. The reader probably knows that the bow of one of these fast motor boats gradually raises itself as speed is increased until the fore part of the boat is completely clear of the water. In this case the hole was above the sea when twenty-seven knots had been attained. The man who had found a new use for his anatomy then withdrew himself. Whether the commanding officer of the boat desired to remain with the guide of the fleet out of sheer friendship or whether he was uncertain of his geographical position, I know not. But he evidently decided to remain in company.Vindictivewas steaming at a modest ten knots or so; the motor boat could not afford to proceed at less than twenty-seven knots; so he steamed round and round the remaining seventy-six vessels until daylight, when he was detached to his base.
A Belated Motor Boat
Another coastal motor boat, soon after leaving Dover on the outward trip, developed some defect which put the engines out of action. The young officer in command obtained the services of a trawler to tow him back to Dover, where, on arrival, he had the matter put right. All that took time. He started off again about five hours late. Now, the occupants of this boat had no intention of missing the affair for which theyhad prepared so long. They decided to get to Zeebrugge as soon as possible—at full speed they might yet be in time. So at full speed they went, straight as a die for their goal, right across nets, mines, and shoals. The sixty miles were covered in less than two hours. The aerial attack was in full swing. Searchlight beams were passing dangerously near them, the heavens were filled with bursting shell and flaming onions. Suddenly out of the darkness loomed some black shapes—"Houses ahead!" shouted somebody. "Hard-a-starboard and stop her!" As she turned round to seaward they made out the town of Blankenberghe; they had escaped running ashore by the narrowest of margins.
On they went again for Zeebrugge Mole. Things were quieter now. That was strange in itself. What had happened to the long-range bombardment? Where were the smoke screens and why was nothing happening at the Mole? Our ships must be much overdue. Whatever could it mean? Presently some strange craft were seen and a moment later the motor boat was under fire. So she sheered off and the commanding officer did some hard thinking. There was only one possible explanation—the operation must have been postponed. So the next item on her programme was to return to Dover. It wouldn't do to be late getting back, so away they went—hell for leather—straight across everything once more. And they arrived back at Dover, after having completed the whole voyage both ways, before their confrères who were with the main force!
At dawn we had completed most of the open-sea passage on the return journey. The force split up—the various units deconcentrated.