In spite of the many hundreds of times that I must previously have instructed young officers that no iron should be placed within five feet of the compass, I havemy first lieutenant to thank for pointing out that the presence of so many steel helmets in the conning tower was inadvisable.
Daffodilwas ordered to towVindictive'sbow away from the wall. Lieutenant Campbell obeyed at once; our anchor cable was slipped overboard. Directly after the strain came on theDaffodil'shawser the latter broke, but it had served its purpose. "Full speed ahead" was ordered and the ship moved forward almost immediately. This was at 1.11 A.M.
A large steel boom—the original mainmast of the ship—had been rigged over the port side of the quarter-deck, jutting out rather further than the port propeller with the object of saving the latter from hitting the wall. WhenVindictive'shelm was put over to port, her stern swung towards the Mole, but the boom saved the situation as a result of a heavy blow against the wall.
As soon asVindictivehad moved a few feet the gangways slipped off the wall and fell overboard with a resounding crash. For a few moments the wreckage fouled and stopped the port propeller, but quickly cleared again without having done any serious damage.
The German's Last Straw
It is not difficult to gauge the feelings of the enemy when they first noticed the ship moving off. We had taken them more or less by surprise on arrival and had managed to storm the Mole in spite of every effort to prevent us. The enemy could not have been over-pleased about that. The ship had been able to remain at the Mole for one hour and ten minutes without sustaining any vital damage. That fact was not calculated to engender a pleasant frame of mindamongst the enemy. Butthey knewexactly where we were.They knewwe should endeavour to leave sooner or later;they knewthat any attempt to do so would inevitably expose the vitals of the ship to their batteries at point-blank range;they thought they knewthat our fate was sealed immediately we were clear of the wall; there could be no surprise about leaving. But all such matters had been carefully thought out beforehand.Vindictive,Iris, andDaffodileach carried several sets of artificial smoke apparatus for use on retirement. Immediately we started to go ahead orders were given for the smoke to be turned on. In less than a minute all previous fog records were beaten beyond comparison. Thus in place of a victim the enemy found a fog.
We steamed away to the northwestward at utmost speed. The flames were pouring through the holes in the funnels; the ship had the appearance of being heavily on fire. The wind being now offshore brought the fog along with us; fortunately for the navigation we had a clear lookout ahead. The enemy cannot have seen much more than the vivid glare of our funnel flames illuminating the upper part of the fog. From all accounts their batteries were far from idle. As the ship sped seaward we had the sensation of the ship jumping at irregular but frequent intervals. This may have been due to the concussion of heavy shell striking the water near the ship. Whether any shell hit us or not during the retirement is unlikely to be known. One could hardly see one's own feet. The ship had already been hit so often that any further damage of the same description would hardly have been noticed. Suffice it to say that no vital damage to the hull was received.
After steaming for twenty minutes the first lieutenant reported a light off the starboard bow. It was the Blankenberghe buoy, which we had passed during the approach. We altered course to pass close to the buoy and then for our line of retirement.
Homeward Bound
Presently the dark form of a vessel was sighted ahead. Our guns' crews were ready for any emergency, but the vessel proved to be H.M.S.Moorsom, one of the patrolling destroyers. All the bridge signalling lamps had been destroyed. With an ordinary pocket torch we flashed a signal requestingMoorsomto lead us as our compass was hopeless.
On the way across to Zeebrugge my anxiety with regard to accuracy of compass course had led me to criticise the steering of one of the quartermasters. Now, on the return voyage, I had become quartermaster, in the absence of Petty Officer Youlton, and am afraid the steering was execrable. That fact was officially recorded by the Commanding Officer ofMoorsomwho, knowing nothing about our amateur steersmanship, reported, "...Vindictiveappeared ... steering a very erratic course!" Fortunately the services of another petty officer, as steersman, were obtained later on.
Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman combined the duties of lookout and navigator; his advice was most helpful. A visit from the stretcher parties relieved the congestion in the conning tower. Another memorable incident was the arrival of the Paymaster with a jug full of a certain stimulating beverage which put new life into us; I shallnotcomplete the testimonial.
Several signals were interchanged withMoorsomon the subject of shoals; it was a great relief whenwe eventually located a buoy marking a danger spot.
Vindictivewas steaming nearly seventeen knots until daylight—a great achievement on the part of Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Bury and his department.
Soon after daylight a destroyer was observed to be racing up from astern at high speed. She quickly ranged up alongside and proved to be H.M.S.Warwick. The first signal from her, "Well done,Vindictive," cheered us up immensely, not because of its actual import, but because it looked very much as if the Vice-Admiral were alive. To make sure we enquired if that surmise was correct and, greatly to our relief, received a reply in the affirmative.
H.M.S.Warwickhad continued throughout the operation to patrol in a central position, namely, near the Mole lighthouse. She had come under a heavy fire and altogether experienced a couple of hectic hours. Soon after one o'clock she had moved towardsVindictiveand suddenly came upon the latter leaving the Mole.Vindictive'ssmoke screen made it impossible to keep touch, so the Vice-Admiral decided to search forIrisandDaffodilin case they should require assistance. Shortly after this M.L. 282 was met and transferred her blockship survivors toWarwick, who was also informed thatIrisandDaffodilhad left the Mole.Warwickthen escorted some motor launches out of the danger zone, and, after rallying several other craft at a prearranged rendezvous, she steered for Dover and overtookVindictiveas mentioned above.
Admiral Keyes orderedMoorsomto leadVindictiveto Dover, to which placeWarwickproceeded athigh speed to land her wounded and to arrange for the arrival of the casualties from the remaining vessels.
The weather being misty, we did not sight Dover until within a mile or so. Our reception was wonderful, the result of the operation being already known at Dover. I think everybody cheered himself hoarse that morning. Presently we were ordered to proceed alongside the railway jetty. Within me there was some feeling of satisfaction at having berthed the ship at Zeebrugge, a place which I had never seen, in face of certain difficulties additional to the tide. Any feeling of pride, however, was quickly dispelled when, in accordance with the routine of the port, on my ship being ordered to proceed alongside Dover jetty in broad daylight, with no opposition from the enemy, and with every convenience in the way of hawsers and bollards,a pilot was sent on board to handle her!
On arrival alongside the wounded were disembarked into a Red Cross train, which immediately took them off to hospital. Those who had laid down their lives were then carried ashore; this, indeed, was a sad parting. Finally we moved out to a buoy to make room for other vessels.
A Souvenir from the Mole
After our arrival at Dover it was discovered that a large block of concrete was jambed between a fender and a ledge on the port side of the ship. Apparently a German shell fired from one of the heavy land batteries had struck the upper part of the outer wall and had torn away this block, which fell into the position mentioned. This concrete block, weighing nearly half a ton, was hoisted on board. A few pieces were taken as souvenirs. The main portion waspresented to the Imperial War Museum and formed rather a unique piece of evidence, not only of the fact thatVindictivelay alongside the Mole, but of the exact position at which the Mole was stormed. The illustration facing page 74 shows the damaged portion of the wall from which this block of concrete was torn.
H.M.S. VINDICTIVE AT DOVER AFTER THE ATTACK. A large piece of the Mole was found resting on the ledge shown at the bottom right-hand corner of the photographH.M.S. VINDICTIVE AT DOVER AFTER THE ATTACK.A large piece of the Mole was found resting on the ledgeshown at the bottom right-hand corner of the photograph
Daffodilwas exceedingly fortunate in having escaped serious damage. Her hull had been exposed to the fire of the German batteries throughout the whole hour and the odd minutes during which she had been keepingVindictivealongside the Mole. On the retirement signal being made everything was prepared for towing the bows ofVindictiveaway from the wall. Immediately the order was received, Lieutenant Campbell turned his ship and commenced to tow. The hawser had parted almost at once, but that was of no consequence.Daffodilthen steamed away to the northward under cover of her own artificial smoke and eventually spoke H.M.S.Trident. The latter took her in tow and brought her safely to Dover, which was reached at 1 P.M. The enthusiastic reception commenced all over again. It must be realised that the fate of each vessel was unknown to the majority of the remainder until some hours after the completion of the operation.
It has already been described howIris, after leavingVindictiveand suffering severe damage from hostile gun-fire, had been smoke-screened by a motor boat and had disappeared from view. This smoke screen, augmented by further smoke from their own apparatus, undoubtedly savedIrisfrom destruction. Under the directions of Lieutenant Oscar Henderson, R.N., who had assumed command after his captainhad been mortally wounded,Irissteamed away to seaward and eventually proceeded to Dover under her own steam, whilst being escorted by other vessels met with in the small hours. She arrived at Dover at 2.45 P.M. and, once more, everybody cheered himself hoarse.
At intervals throughout the forenoon and afternoon of the 23d the several vessels and craft arrived at Dover. We then had the opportunity of piecing together the information obtained from each unit and were thus able to gauge the probable results attained.
The air force had been requested to obtain new photographs of Zeebrugge as early as practicable, but the sky was so clouded over that no absolutely indisputable evidence was obtained until 2 P.M., when a photograph was taken through a chink in the clouds. This photograph showed the positions of the inner blockships and the break in the railway viaduct. The operation had been an unqualified success.
The Operation at Ostende
The operation at Ostende had unfortunately failed. The difficulties of navigation had been accentuated by the change of wind which brought the artificial fog back to seaward. The consequent obscuration of the harbour entrance made it necessary to place some dependence on a buoy which had, unknown to us and by the merest coincidence, just been moved a mile or so to the eastward by the enemy. In spite of the most gallant attempt by Commander A. E. Godsal in H.M.S.Brilliantand Lieutenant-Commander H. N. M. Hardy in H.M.S.Sirius, ably assisted as they were by their officers and men and by a large number of other craft, the blocking attempt had not achieved success. The Vice-Admiral decided, therefore, tomake another attempt at the earliest possible moment.Vindictive, being the only suitable vessel available, was immediately prepared for this further service. Owing to a continuation of impossible weather conditions the operation could not be carried out until May 10th; thus it is clear that if our expedition had not started on their journey on April 22d the operation at Zeebrugge could not have taken place during the allotted period.
Just one other reference to the further use ofVindictivecannot be omitted. Immediately on their return, after the failure to block Ostende, both officers who have been mentioned above as commanding the blockships at that place, begged to be given ships for a further attempt. They had failed through no fault of their own and had gone through some terrible experiences. Nothing could curb their ardour, and I believe they gave the Vice-Admiral no peace until he consented to give them another chance. Poor Godsal. Nothing could have been finer than his handling of the oldVindictiveon the night of May 9th-10th, but he was killed at the very moment when complete success seemed to be assured; Ostende was partially blocked.
It was with considerable feelings of regret that, on April 25th, we made way inVindictivefor the new crew destined to take her to Ostende. It was a sad farewell.
The behaviour of the wounded had been splendid; their cheerfulness was unbounded. One poor fellow who had suffered severe internal injuries as well as the loss of both legs was asked if he was sorry that he went over to Zeebrugge. He replied, "No, sir,because I got on the Mole." That was all that mattered to him. There was practically no chance of saving his life, but "he had got on the Mole."
The spirit of all the men inVindictivewas fine. Nevertheless, I do not deceive myself into imagining that these men were exceptional. They only represented one small contingent of many which fought at Zeebrugge and Ostende on St. George's Day; the combined crews of all the vessels in the operation only represented a trifling percentage of our total naval personnel; the behaviour of my men was merely typical of all those others.
Those of our survivors who had not been sent to hospital with wounds proceeded on a few days' leave before rejoining their depots or their ships in the Grand Fleet. What a piratical appearance the crew presented on their departure! Many of them had lost all their clothes, except those in which they stood during the action. Those others whose clothes had survived the fight were not much better off. The souvenir hunters had raided my ship, had "picked up" some of the men's belongings, and had even been inconsiderate enough to break into my cabin and make a complete clearance of the officers' handbags placed there for safety.
H.M.S. VINDICTIVE ON HER RETURN TO DOVER AFTER THE ATTACKH.M.S. VINDICTIVE ON HER RETURN TO DOVER AFTER THE ATTACK
One last story of a personal nature. On receipt of the news at Dover a young officer, in his desire to do me a kindness, decided to wire the good news to my wife. He forgot that she would know nothing of the enterprise or even of its preparation, and he worded the telegram: "Operation successful. Husband quite all right." The recipient's feelings may be easily imagined; she guessed it was appendicitis!
THE MATERIAL RESULTS
The results of the operations on the night of April 22-23, 1918, were undoubtedly important. They can be classified under the two headings of "material" and "moral."
The degree of moral effect cannot usually be assessed until long after an operation has been completed. Recognisable evidence comes to hand very gradually. The actual results of moral effect may be early experienced without being recognised, especially in the case of effect on the enemy's morale.
Material results are more easily gauged. In this particular case photographic evidence was soon obtainable.
I must recall to the reader's mind the description of the entrance channel of the canal. It was shown in Part I, Chapter II, how very narrow the navigable channel had become owing to the silting of the sand, and how rapidly the latter process would accentuate the obstructive quality of a sunken vessel. It was also shown why the channel at the shore end of the two curved piers was the ideal position at which to place the blockships.IntrepidandIphigeniahad been sunk by us exactly at their selected positions. Each vessel spanned right across the dredged channel, and therefore blocked it effectually. For the first time in naval history a blocking operation had been carried out successfully in the face of up-to-date defence measures.
Some of the photographs, taken at high tide, appear to show sufficient space through which vessels could pass on either side of the blockships. But the presence of water does not signify the presence of sufficient water to float such craft as submarines and destroyers even at high tide. Two other photographs show clearly that the ends of the vessels were practically on the edges of the sandbanks.
The Work of Salvage
The Germans, as prompt in propaganda as they were unenterprising in sea-fighting, at once published a communiqué to the effect that the operation had utterly failed, adding that the blockships had been sunk by the German batteries before reaching their goal. Curiously enough, their official statements were strangely silent on the subject of prisoners. They also averred that the attack on the Mole had been driven back. Not content with these "terminological inexactitudes," they went so far as to take a photograph to prove their contention. The photograph was taken with the camera pointed inland. The land was eliminated from the background in the original so as to give the impression that the camera was pointing out to sea. A line was drawn between, and parallel to, the blockships and marked "The line of the channel," whereas it was a line nearly at right angles to the channel. Words were added to the effect that the photograph proved clearly that the channel was not blocked, and copies of the photograph were circulated all over Germany and neutral countries. What wonderful liars!—but clumsy! The amusing part of it was that we knew the German naval authorities reported "Zeebrugge is blocked" to their craft stationed elsewhere, and, further, our airmenobtained photographs day after day showing some twenty-three torpedo craft and twelve submarines bottled up at Bruges.
From the morning after the operation until the Germans finally evacuated Zeebrugge, our aerial bombers dropped, on the average, four tons of bombs daily on that place. Our special measures with regard to constructive work in each blockship, designed to hamper the work of salvage, must have presented the enemy with a formidable problem. The work of clearing the channel was certainly not assisted by the dropping of bombs upon the salvors. To what extent the Germans attempted to remove the vessels is unknown to me, but we do know well enough that none of the three was moved a foot nor were they cut away to allow vessels to pass over them. Thanks to our airmen, we knew, almost from hour to hour, what measures were being taken to dredge a new channel. I believe that no torpedo craft or submarines could use the exit for a considerable time, and that about five months elapsed before they could enter or leave the canal at any other period than the top of high tide.
Having contrived that each blockship should embody all the main obstacles to salvage work, we were more or less confident that, if once placed in position, these ships could not be easily removed. Subsequently, at the earliest opportunity, our own salvage service commenced their endeavours to clear the canal. In January, 1921,two years and three monthsafter Zeebrugge was again in the hands of the Allies, the last of the three blockships was moved sufficiently to enable the channel to be used with freedom. Agreat amount of labour and money had already been expended, but still further efforts were required before the canal could be altogether freed from obstructions. One may certainly remark that the canal was "well and truly blocked."
Information reached us afterwards that the Kaiser personally visited Zeebrugge shortly after the operation so that he could discover the actual truth for himself. What his remarks were on arrival is not known to me, but a photograph in my possession, taken on that occasion, certainly does not give him an air of affability.
The Reckoning
The main material result, then, was that the canal was blocked and that the services of twelve submarines and twenty-three torpedo craft were unavailable for a considerable period. As long as the canal remained blocked, German submarines detailed for operating against Allied commerce in the English Channel and other waters outside the North Sea were, for the most part, compelled to do so from the Heligoland Bight. This increased the length of voyage to and from their areas of operation and consequently reduced the duration of their stay in such waters.
But there were other material results. Firstly, the German High Command considered it necessary to send reënforcements to Ostende in the shape of modern destroyers. Now vessels, like individuals, cannot be in two places at once. Those sent to Ostende had to be drawn away from the Heligoland Bight, consequently the forces in the latter area were weakened in strengthpro rata.
The loss of German lives and vessels and thedamage sustained during the action were by no means negligible.
Then again the efficiency of Bruges as a naval base was greatly lessened because the canal exit to Ostende proved to be too shallow for the larger craft. The fuel, dockyard, and stores at Bruges were also rendered comparatively useless as means of support for sea-going vessels.
The Mole, as a seaplane base, must have lost much of its value owing to the severance of the railway communication, heavy stores having to be transported to the Mole by sea-carriers. Finally, the work of "locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen," as practised by the enemy on this occasion, entailed extra mining at sea, mounting additional guns on the outer wall, and covering the floor of the Mole with such an abundance of barbed wire as to make the place exceedingly uncomfortable for themselves.
Our own losses consisted of one destroyer and two motor launches; no other vessel was rendered unfit for further services. Our casualties at Zeebrugge amounted to approximately one hundred and seventy killed, four hundred wounded, and forty-five missing; the majority of the latter were believed to have been killed. The casualties inVindictive, including her storming parties, were sixty killed and one hundred and seventy-one wounded.
With regard to the loss of material we had not paid a high price considering the results achieved. The loss of personnel was small in comparison with losses sustained in military fighting, but was none the less keenly felt by those of us who had been in personaltouch with these splendid fellows. They had all realised the danger and had been perfectly willing to lay down their lives in the attainment of the desired end. They did not die in vain.
THE MORAL EFFECT
The moral effect on the enemy was shown, to a certain degree, almost at once. The fact that they thought it necessary to indulge in falsehood to appease their own countrymen, although they must have realised that the truth would inevitably become known, was clear enough proof that their morale was badly shaken.
Their earliest report stated that the attack had failed and that three British cruisers had been sunk at Zeebrugge. The latter portion of the statement was correct. The ships had, indeed, been sunk—by ourselves. All reference to the destruction of the viaduct was withheld until later. The fact of no prisoners being captured from any of the three British cruisers was never mentioned. As soon as our own reports had been circulated, the German authorities apparently considered it necessary to account for our success by stating that some Belgian fishermen had been arrested for piloting our vessels into position! Imagine, for a moment, the effect on our own public if they heard that the enemy had attacked Dover, stormed the breakwater and remained in possession of it for over an hour, destroyed the railway jetty, and blocked the entrance. Even such a case as that would not be wholly analogous, for the blockships at Zeebrugge had sunk themselves nearly a mileinsidethe outer entrance. Imagine the outcry and thequestion, "What is the Navy doing?" It is not difficult to conceive the downfall of highly placed personages and the feeling of insecurity that would pervade the atmosphere in our own country. Not only would the public be shaken by such news, but the loss of morale would be felt in the fighting services, firstly as a result of their own ineptitude, and secondly because of the visions of further enemy operations which would be conjured up.
Some such effect as described above was inevitable amongst both the German civilian element and their fighting services. We know that the operation caused a great scare at Bruges. Many of the German officials there hurriedly collected their effects ready for evacuating the city; it had been reported that the allies were landing an immense force on the coast of Flanders.
It is not generally known that friendship between the German Navy and Army was conspicuous by its absence. They had been at daggers drawn for some years; the Crown Prince himself was in the habit of being openly rude to naval officers of high rank. This antagonism was evidenced recently in a letter written by a certain German general to his brother-in-law, a young officer in our Navy. Apparently the general hated the German Navy to such an extent that his letter remarked that there were two British officers with whom he particularly desired to shake hands—one was the officer in charge of our siege guns on the Flanders coast and the other was the officer commanding the attack on Zeebrugge; his friendly feelings arose from the fact that these two officers had "put it across" that sectionof the German Navy which had charge of the Flanders coast defences.
The German Information Bureau had never ceased to sing the praises of their Navy; that fact was conducive to increasing the shock received by the enemy when they learned the truth. Many excuses have been invented in Germany to account for the fact that the final breakdown of morale which immediately preceded the ignominious flight of their War Lord emanated from the so-called High Seas Fleet, and that this breakdown coincided with the receipt of orders to try conclusions with our fleet. It can hardly be styled far-fetched if one suggests that the loss of morale was intimately connected with the situation at sea. It is also not outside the bounds of possibility that, in some measure, the events of St. George's Day, 1918, assisted towards thedébâcle. A certain highly placed German official at Bruges certainly exaggerated when he averred that "the hopes of the Fatherland were buried at Zeebrugge," but such a statement as that clearly indicates the weakening of confidence.
The other aspect of the effect on morale may be worthy of mention. I refer to the effect on our own public, on our fighting services, and on neutral and Allied countries.
The great German military offensive, which everybody realised indicated the supreme effort on the part of the enemy, was in full swing in the month of April. The Allied troops were stubbornly contesting every inch of ground, but were being steadily pushed back on important sections of the main battle front. The British Fifth Army had suffered appalling losses.The Allies had their backs to the wall. The tension at home was apparent in all walks of life, and the extremely anxious days of 1914 were being repeated. Future generations will never be able to realise the depression and anxiety which pervaded the public mind. Everybody was wondering what the outcome would be, and there were days when one hardly dared to scan the morning paper. That very fact had provided us with an additional reason for wishing to register a success.
There is very little doubt that the success attained had a marked effect on the public; the latter fairly jumped at the opportunity to show enthusiasm. In addition to that, the public palate was tickled by the unusual and apparently spectacular nature of the attack.
This sudden rise of the "moralometer" served a good purpose. The pessimist changed his tune, the optimist earned the qualification "cheery." To those ignorant of naval matters the operation seemed to have bordered on the accomplishment of the impossible. "We always knew," they declared, "that our fighting men were invincible." Their old certainty of ultimate victory was re-born. That was all to the good. Modern war is national war. War is not merely a struggle between fighting forces, but between the opposing "crowds." The destruction of an enemy's Army or Navy is of primary importance as a means to an end, but the ultimate end and aim of each belligerent is to exert influence on the "crowd," to nourish the will to win amongst their own public and to bring about a feeling of hopeless despair, a complete loss of morale, throughout the enemy's country.It is for that important reason that the sentiments of one's own public must ever be borne in mind by the Higher Command.
The receipt of the news on the western front is reported to have been beneficial. Every fighting force must occasionally have its dark days; they are never so dark that news of success on another front will fail to bring a ray of light. Those of us in the fleet itself had often experienced such feelings of elation when our military brothers had brought off a "coup." The Navy and Army, and the Air Force with them, are one at heart. The fighting services are interdependent. Our Navy cannot win a war unaided any more than our Army can prevent Great Britain from being defeated by starvation. The waging of war, in the case of a maritime country which is unselfsupporting, cannot rightly be divided into naval warfare, military warfare, and combined naval and military operations, though the three types are commonly referred to and in that order. All war in which the British Empire is involved is in the nature of combined naval and military warfare. The actions of one arm are inevitably reflected in the other.
The Grand Fleet, from which so many of our officers and men were drawn for the operation on St. George's Day, was naturally elated at the result. Certainly the morale in the fleet had always been of a high order, but an extra touch of enthusiasm was not without value.
Of the effect in neutral countries I am not competent to speak, but I have some personal knowledge of the manner in which the news was received in the United States. The enthusiasm in that part of theworld was genuine enough and undoubtedly assisted to cement the friendship between that country and our own Empire, a friendship which has a firm foundation even if the latter be occasionally hidden beneath a political superstructure which we are apt to mistake for the foundation itself.
SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE
This book would be incomplete if I omitted to append some general remarks on the operation and on the factors which led to success.
First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in comparisons. The enterprise described in this book attracted attention owing to its somewhat unusual type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless, there are many points of similarity between the attack on Zeebrugge and the military trench raids which took place night after night on the Allied fronts. The preliminary bombardment, the advance under cover of darkness and smoke, the wild firing of star shell, the rush across No Man's Land, the encounter with barbed wire and other defence material, the leap down into the enemy's trench, the hand-to-hand fighting, the holding of the position whilst demolition work was in progress, and the final withdrawal when the object had been attained; such was a trench raid as carried out again and again by our brothers in the Army. In their case the following day brought a two-line communiqué, e.g., "Last night in the Ypres salient our troops carried out a trench raid; they captured seven prisoners." In our case the communiqué and unofficial reports filled many pages. I would warn the reader not to be misled into thinking that the military raids were any less hazardous than our own.
The story provides just one more illustration of the fact that, however large may loom the difficulties with which one is confronted, the means to overcome them can usually be found if one possesses the "will to win through."
The fundamental principles of war demand the Offensive and Concentration. The all-important element of strategy to be utilised against a strongly entrenched enemy is that of Surprise. From the latter spring Diversion and Mystification.
An attempt has been made to describe the manner in which the seemingly impossible was accomplished without very great difficulty.
The plan was built up on the foundation of surprise—not surprise in the sense that something would suddenly occur where all had been quiet up to that moment, but surprise in that the real object of the enterprise would be concealed up to the latest possible moment, the concealment to be brought about by mystifying the enemy and diverting his attention.
Whilst concentrating all available powers of offence against the enemy, and allowing nothing to divert us from our main object, we took every step to bewilder the defence and to shift the weight of the difficulties upon the shoulders of our opponents. But that was only the foundation. The material brought into use was the best available at the moment; it is not suggested that, given further time, it would have been incapable of improvement.
Earlier in this book a few remarks were offered on the importance of the personnel. Many further remarks could now be added after the story has been told. I only propose, however, to deal with certainaspects which, by their nature, are less likely to be realised by the man-in-the-street.
It has already been mentioned that a considerable percentage of the vessels and craft engaged in the attack were commanded and manned by officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The majority of the smoke-screening craft and rescue craft came under that heading. Without the smoke the operation must have failed. Without the rescue work the price paid for success would have been excessive. These representatives of the auxiliary naval services earned a full measure of admiration. Their daring in the face of danger, their coolness in situations which lacked nothing in excitement, their initiative when confronted with the unexpected, and their perfect co-operation with the remaining forces engaged in the enterprise, were worthy of the best traditions of the Navy. The more that one considers the dependence upon seamanship, the practical use of technical knowledge, the mental and physical strain, the value of perfect discipline, and the initiative called for on such an occasion, the greater is one's admiration for these fine fellows of whom the majority had seen comparatively little of sea life and had lacked that severity of training which is inseparable from the naval profession.
The reports of all Commanding Officers contained one particular similarity—I refer to the behaviour of the men. The cynic who might be inclined to discount such unqualified praise, on the plea that the men were specially chosen, could easily be silenced. The specially selected personnel were certainly pickedwith difficulty, not because the desired qualities were rare, but for exactly the opposite reason. The Grand Fleet and naval bases contained many thousands of such men; the embarrassment lay in deciding who of these thousands should be taken to make up the seventeen hundred and eighty personnel required. But the latter were only required for some ten vessels out of one hundred and sixty-two; required because those ten vessels were out of commission and therefore had no crews. The remaining one hundred and fifty-two vessels and craft took part in the operation with their ordinary crews, and I repeat that the behaviour of the crews ofallunits was exemplary.
But co-operation between units, and efficiency of individuals, are not alone sufficient to ensure success. Absolute confidence and perfect co-operation between officers and men, founded on true discipline, is of vital importance. Without these, little or nothing can be achieved in war. The seeds of these vital requirements were sown by our forefathers. Those of our predecessors who, although too old to serve in the Great War, were still in the land of the living had reason to feel proud at the success attained by their pupils.
There is one other human aspect which cannot be omitted without leaving a serious blank in these pages. That aspect is the one of Leadership.
Leadership has been defined as that power in a man which causes others to follow him irrespective of the direction in which he leads.
It would be a presumption, almost amounting to an impertinence, for me to endeavour to measure out the praise which is due to the Vice-Admiral in command of the enterprise, now Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.The reader will understand my difficulty. In past history, again and again, it was manifest that some of the outstanding factors which led to success were the personality of the leader, the supreme confidence in him held by all ranks, his realisation of the powers and limits of his subordinates, his personal courage, and his intensity of purpose. The outstanding factors which brought success on the particular occasion described in this book have served to repeat and illustrate these old historical lessons.
A few more words and I shall have finished.
I venture to suggest that this particular exploit provides just one more example, such as are recorded again and again in the histories of most civilised countries, of what can be accomplished in the face of difficulty. Unfortunately, when hostilities cease, we are prone to forget, not only the sacrifices by which successes were achieved, but also the principles which guided us in the achievement. We are all ready enough to admit that confidence and co-operation are of prime necessity for the preservation of our lives and our interests when danger threatens us in war, but, somehow, when the welfare of communities is threatened in days of so-called peace, by international suspicions, by revolutionary doctrines, by economic difficulties, by unemployment, and by political schisms, we weaken ourselves as a result of deconcentrating into numberless camps, one against the other, in direct opposition to those fundamental principles which are the root cause of our existence.
It is all very strange, and, I suppose, very human, for nothing is stranger than humanity. How many of us realise that our superiority over the rest of theanimal world is directly attributable to the fact that human beings, alone, have sufficient understanding to combine when danger threatens? Having successfully combined for the greatest of all causes, are we now to revert to the instincts of the inferior animals? Are we to persuade ourselves that co-operation merely results from paper treaties rather than from a common spirit, forgetting that officers and men, armies and navies, needed no signed agreements between them for the overthrow of the greatest menace to civilisation that the world has ever seen?
The Great War is over; is a Great Peace to follow?
What is our object? Surely it is the welfare of civilised communities and the progress of those who are less enlightened.
There will always be secondary objects calculated to divert us from our purpose. There will always be individuals who, for their own ends, will endeavour to sow discord and confuse the issue. It is of paramount importance that we keep our object in view, and that we cultivate intensity of purpose and wholeheartedness, without which our object is unattainable.
We know that the right spirit exists, but it is of little value if we keep it locked away within us until disaster is imminent; the mere fact of its existence cannot keep us free from danger any more than the existence of medicine stored at the apothecary's can protect us from infection and illness.
Let each one of us, each class, each sect, each nation, each group of nations, do all that is humanly possible to foster that spirit, to further mutualunderstanding, to breed confidence in one another, and to co-operate for the weal of all.
Without such confidence and co-operation success is impossible; with them, our well-being is assured.
THE END
The following vessels and craft took part in the simultaneous blocking operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende.
THE ZEEBRUGGE ENTERPRISE
(a)Special services during the oversea voyage
Aerial Escort—61st Wing of Royal Air Force.Other services—Special service vessel Lingfield. Motor Launches Nos. 555, 557.
(b)Off shore forces
Outer Patrol—Scout—Attentive.Destroyers—Scott, Ulleswater, Teazer, Stork.Long-range Bombardment—Monitors—Erebus, Terror.Destroyers—Termagant, Truculent, Manly.
(c)Inshore forces
Flagship—Destroyer—Warwick(Flag of Vice-Admiral R. J. B. Keyes).Blockships—Light Cruisers—Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia.Storming Vessels—Light Cruiser—Vindictive.Special vessels—Iris, Daffodil.Attack on Viaduct—Submarines—C1, C3, and one picket boat.Aerial Attack—Aircraft—65th Wing, Royal Air Force.Other Operations—Destroyers—Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield,Whirlwind, Myngs, Felox, Morris, Moorsom, Melpomene.
Motor Launches—Nos. 79, 110, 121, 128, 223, 239,241, 252, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308, 314, 345, 397,416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533, 549, 552, 558,560, 561, 562.Coastal Motor Boats—Nos. 5, 7, 15, 16A, 17A, 21B,226, 236, 24A, 25BD, 266, 27A, 28A, 306, 32A, 35A.
THE OSTENDE ENTERPRISE
(a)Bombarding forces
Monitors—Marshall Soult, Lord Clive, Prince Eugene, General Craufurd,M. 24, M. 26, M. 21.Destroyers—Mentor, Lightfoot, Zubian.Motor Launches—Nos. 249, 448, 538, and three others.French Destroyers and Torpedo Boats—Lestin, Roux, Bouclier, and Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 34.French Motor Launches—Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34.British Siege Guns in Flanders.
(b)Inshore forces
Blockships—Light Cruisers—Sirius, Brilliant.Destroyers—Swift, Faulknor, Matchless, Mastiff, Afridi, Tempest, Tetrarch.Motor Launches—Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279,283, 429, 512, 532, 551, 556.Coastal Motor Boats—Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 20A, 34A.
COVERING SQUADRON FOR BOTH ENTERPRISES
Forces from Harwich—Light Cruisers, seven.Leaders, two.Destroyers, fourteen.