ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARKET.
Before the disembarkation had concluded for the day, signal was made for all ships to "land tents." It need not be said that this order was most gratefully received. But alas! the order was countermanded, and the tents which had been landed were sent back to the ships again. Our French allies, deficient as they had been in means of accommodation and stowage and transport, had yet managed to land their little scraps of tents the day they disembarked. Whilst our poor fellows were soaked through and through, their blankets and greatcoats saturated with wet, and without any change of raiment, the French close at hand, and the Turks, whose tents were much more bulky than our own, were lying snugly undercover. The most serious result of the wetting was, however, a great increase in illness among the troops.
Sad scenes—French foragers—Order for the advance—First view of the enemy—Skirmish at Bouljanak.
Sad scenes—French foragers—Order for the advance—First view of the enemy—Skirmish at Bouljanak.
ITwas decided to garrison Eupatoria, and Captain Brock and 500 Marines were sent away for the purpose, in conjunction with a French, force. On the 15th of September, signal had been made from theEmperorfor all ships to send their sick on board theKangaroo. Before evening she had about 1500 invalids in all stages of suffering on board. When the time for sailing arrived, theKangaroohoisted, in reply to orders to proceed, this signal—"It is a dangerous experiment." TheEmperorthen signalled—"What do you mean?" The reply was—"The ship is unmanageable." All the day she was lying with the signal up—"Send boats to assistance;" and at last orders were given to transfer some of her melancholy freight to other vessels also proceeding to Constantinople. Many deaths occurred on board—many miserable scenes took place which it would be useless to describe. It was clear, however, that neither afloat nor on shore was the medical staff sufficient. More surgeons were required, both in the fleet and in the army. Often—too often—medical aid could not be obtained at all; and it frequently came too late.
Provisions were at first plentiful. Sixty arabas, laden with flour for Sebastopol, were seized on the 15th of September. More came in for sale or hire the next day: horses also were brought in, and men offered themselves as servants. A market was established for meat and vegetables, and the confidence of the country people in their new customers was confirmed by prompt payment and good treatment. A village near the head-quarters of the Light Division was sacked by some Zouaves, who deprived the inhabitants of everything they could lay their hands upon, in spite of the exertions of the Rifles who were stationed in the place. Lord Raglan gave strict orders that no French soldiers should be permitted to enter the village.
On the evening of Saturday, September 16th, a lengthened dark line was seen approaching along the sea coast. As it came nearer, it was resolved by the telescope into a train of Spahis, under the command of some cavalry officers, driving in immense flocks of sheep and cattle for the use of their troops in the camp situated on the extreme right of our lines. First came a drove of some hundreds of sheep captured, natives, drivers, and all guarded in the rear by some Spahis, flourishing their long lances in high delight.Close after them appeared a mighty herd of cattle, tossing their horns and bellowing, as the remorseless Spahis goaded them on over the hard shingle, and circled like drovers' dogs around them. Next came the French officers in command of the party. They were followed by a string of country carts driven by sad-looking Cimmerians, who seemed very anxious to be out of the hands of their Arab captors. Lastly appeared, with all the gravity of their race, a few camels, which the Spahis had laden heavily with grain. Such razzias caused an amount of evil quite disproportionate to any paltry gains made by plundering those poor people. They frightened them from our markets, and, though for the moment successful, threatened to deprive us of the vast supplies to be obtained from their goodwill. The much-abused Turks remained quietly in their well-ordered camp, living contentedly on the slender rations supplied from their fleet. Their appearance was very acceptable to the large Mussulman population, and they were very proud of serving on equal terms with their French and English allies.
On the 17th the disembarkation of stores continued and was completed, and the tents were carried up to the various divisions with great labour by large fatigue parties. The siege train still remained on board ship, and it was intended to land it at the mouth of the river Belbeck, close to Sebastopol, as we could not stay to put it ashore at Old Fort. The Cossacks came round our outposts, and the sky at night was reddened by the glare of their burnings. The Tartars said the Russians had 15,000 men posted in an entrenched camp on the Alma river, about twelve miles distant, on the road to Sebastopol. A troop of the 11th Hussars, who went out reconnoitring, were pursued by a regiment of Cossacks, but retired in order without any casualty. Captain Creswell, an officer of the regiment, who was a great favourite with his comrades, died of cholera in the little village in which his troop was quartered.
At twelve o'clock on the night of Monday, September 18th, orders were given by Lord Raglan that the troops should strike tents at daybreak, and that all tents should be sent on board the ships of the fleet. M. de Bazancourt asserts that the French Marshal was ready to march on the 17th, and that he all along hoped to do so, but that the English were not prepared, as they had an immense quantity ofimpedimenta. He further says that it was arranged between the Generals to defer the march till 11A.M.on the 18th, but that we again delayed the movement when the time came, and that Marshal St. Arnaud wrote to Lord Raglan to say he would move without him if he was not ready the following morning.
ADVANCE OF THE ARMIES.
At three o'clock in the morning of the 19th, the camp was roused by theréveil, and the 50,000 sleepers woke into active life. The boats from the ships lined the beach to receive the tents which were again returned to the ships. The English commissariat officers struggled in vain with the very deficient means at their disposal to meet the enormous requirements of an army of 26,000 men, for the transport of baggage, ammunition, and food; and ascene, which to an unpractised eye seemed one of utter confusion, began and continued for several hours, relieved only by the steadiness and order of the regiments as they paraded previous to marching.
The right of the allied forces was covered by the fleet, which moved along with it in magnificent order, darkening the air with innumerable columns of smoke, ready to shell the enemy should they threaten to attack our right, and commanding the land for nearly two miles from the shore.
It was nine o'clock ere the whole of our army was ready. The day was warm. On the extreme right and in advance, next the sea, was the 1st Division of the French army, under Bosquet, marching by battalion in columnspar peloton, the artillery being in the centre. The 2nd Division, under Canrobert, marching in column by division, protected the right flank, which, however, was in no need of such defence, as it was covered by the allied fleets. The 3rd Division was on the left flank of the French army. The 4th Division and the Turks formed the rear guard. The formation of our allies was of a lozenge shape, with the 1st Division at the salient angle, the 2nd and 3rd Divisions at the lateral angles, and the 4th Division at the other angle, the baggage being in the centre. Next to Prince Napoleon's Division was the 2nd British, under Sir De Lacy Evans, with Sir Richard England's (the 3rd) Division in his rear in support. On a parallel line with the 2nd Division marched the Light Division, under Sir George Brown, with the 1st Division under the Duke of Cambridge in support in his rear. The order of the English advance was by double columns of companies from the centre of divisions. The 8th Hussars and 17th Lancers moved on our left flank, to protect it, and the 13th Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars, in extended order, preceded the infantry, so as to cover our front. The commissariat and baggage followed behind the 3rd and 1st Divisions, and were covered by the 4th Division as a rear guard. Part of the 4th Division and of the 4th Light Dragoons were left to protect and clear the beach of stores. They joined the army late on the evening of the 20th.
The country beyond the salt lake, near which we were encamped, was entirely destitute of tree or shrub, and consisted of wide plains, marked at intervals of two or three miles with hillocks and long irregular ridges of hills running down towards the sea at right angles to the beach. It was but little cultivated, except in the patches of land around the unfrequent villages built in the higher recesses of the valleys. Hares were started in abundance, and afforded great sport to the soldiers whenever they halted, and several were fairly hunted down among the lines. All oxen, horses, or cattle, had been driven off by the Cossacks. The soil was hard and elastic, and was in excellent order for artillery. The troops presented a splendid appearance. The effect of these grand masses of soldiery descending the ridges of the hills, rank after rank, with the sun playing over forests of glittering steel, can never be forgotten by those who witnessed it. Onward the torrent of war swept; wave after wave, hugestately billows of armed men, while the rumble of the artillery and tramp of cavalry accompanied their progress.
After a march of an hour a halt took place for fifty minutes, during which Lord Raglan, accompanied by a very large staff, Marshal St. Arnaud, Generals Bosquet, Forey, and a number of French officers, rode along the front of the columns. The men of their own accord got up from the ground, rushed forward, and column after column rent the air with three thundering English cheers. It was a good omen. As the Marshal passed the 55th Regiment, he exclaimed, "English, I hope you will fight well to-day!" "Hope!" exclaimed a voice from the ranks, "sure you know we will!" Many sick men fell out, and were carried to the rear. It was a painful sight—a sad contrast to the magnificent appearance of the army in front, to behold litter after litter borne past to the carts, with the poor sufferers who had dropped from illness and fatigue. However, the march went on, grand and irresistible. At last, the smoke of burning villages and farm-houses announced that the enemy in front were aware of our march. It was melancholy to see the white walls of the houses blackened with smoke—the flames ascending through the roofs of peaceful homesteads—and the ruined outlines of deserted hamlets.
Presently, from the top of a hill, a wide plain was visible, beyond which rose a ridge darkened here and there by masses which the practised eye recognised as cavalry. It was our first view of the enemy, and we soon lost sight of them again. On the left of the plain, up in a recess formed by the inward sweep of the two ridges, lay a large village in flames; right before us was a neat white house unburnt, though the outhouses and farm-yard were burning. This was the Imperial Post-house of Bouljanak, just twenty miles from Sebastopol, and some of our officers and myself were soon busily engaged in exploring the place.
FIRST SKIRMISH WITH THE COSSACKS.
The house was deserted and gutted. Only a picture of a saint, bunches of herbs in the kitchen, and a few household utensils, were left; and a solitary pea-hen stalked sadly about the threshold, which soon fell a victim to a revolver. A small stream ran past us, which was an object of delight to our thirsty soldiers who had marched more than eight miles from their late camp. After a short halt for men and horses by the stream, over which the post-road was carried by a bridge which the enemy had left unbroken for the passage of our artillery, the army pushed on again. The cavalry (about 500 men of the 8th Hussars, the 11th Hussars, and 13th Light Dragoons) pushed on in front, and on arriving about a mile beyond the post-house, we clearly made out the Cossack Lancers on the hills in front. Lord Cardigan threw out skirmishers in line, who covered the front at intervals of ten or twelve yards from each other. The Cossacks advanced to meet us in like order, man for man, the steel of their long lances glittering in the sun. They were rough-looking fellows, mounted on sturdy little horses; but the regularity of their order and the celerity of their movements showed that they were by no means despicable foes. As our skirmishers advanced, theCossacks halted at the foot of the hill. From time to time a clump of lances rose over the summit of the hill and disappeared.
Lord Cardigan was eager to try their strength, and permission was given to him to advance somewhat nearer; but as he did so, dark columns of cavalry appeared in the recesses of the hills. Lord Lucan therefore ordered the cavalry to halt, gather in their skirmishers, and retire slowly. When our skirmishers halted, the Cossacks commenced a fire of carabines from their line of vedettes, which was quite harmless. Few of the balls came near enough to let the whiz be heard. I was riding between the cavalry and the skirmishers, with Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, R.A., Captain Fellowes, 12th Lancers, Dr. Elliott, R.A., and we were looking out anxiously for the arrival of Maude's Troop, when the Russians, emboldened by our halt, came over the brow of the hill, and descended the slope in three columns, the centre of which advanced nearer than the others.
"Now," said Dickson, "we'll catch it. These fellows mean mischief." I conceived that it would be a very pleasant thing to look at, whatever they meant. Our skirmishers, who had replied smartly to the fire of the Cossacks, but without effect, retired and joined their squadrons. At every fifty paces our cavalry faced. Fellowes rode off to quicken the advance of the artillery. Suddenly one of the Russian squares opened—a spurt of white smoke rose out of the gap, and a round shot, which first pitched close to my horse and covered me with dust, tore over the column of cavalry behind, and rolled away between the ranks of the riflemen in the rear, just as they came in view. In another instant a second shot bowled right through the 11th Hussars, and knocked over a horse, taking off his rider's leg above the ankle. Another and another followed. Meantime the C Troop followed by the I Troop, galloped over the hillock, but were halted by Lord Raglan's order at the base in rear of the cavalry on the left flank.
Our cavalry was drawn up as targets for the enemy's guns, and had they been of iron they could not have been more solid and immovable. The Russian gunners were rather slow, but their balls came bounding along, quite visible as they passed, right from the centre of the cavalry columns. After some thirty rounds from the enemy, our artillery, having cleared their front, opened fire. Captain Brandling laid the first gun, No. 5, and fired with so true an aim that the shell was seen to burst right over a Russian gun, and apparently to shut it up. All our shells were not so successful as the first, but one, better directed than the rest, burst right in the centre of a column of light infantry, which the Russians had advanced to support their cavalry. Our fire became so hot that the enemy retired in fifteen minutes after we opened on them, and manœuvring on our left with their light cavalry, seemed to threaten us in that direction; but Captains Maude and Henry having shifted their guns so as to meet their front, the enemy finally withdrew over the hills, and seemed to fall back on the Alma.
While this affair was going on the French had crept up on the right, and surprised a body of Russian cavalry with a roundfrom a battery of nine-pounders, which scattered them in all directions.
It is impossible to form an accurate notion of the effect of our fire, but it must have caused the Russians a greater loss than they inflicted on us. There is reason to believe they lost about twelve men killed, thirty-five wounded, and thirty-two horseshors de combat. We lost six horses, and four men were wounded. Two men lost their legs. The others, up to yesterday, though injured severely, were not in danger. A sergeant in the 11th Hussars rode coolly to the rear with his foot dangling by a piece of skin to the bone, and told the doctor he had just come to have his leg dressed. Another trooper behaved with equal fortitude, and refused the use of a litter to carry him to the rear, though his leg was broken into splinters.
When the Russians had retired beyond the heights orders were given to halt and bivouac for the night, and our tired men set to work to gather weeds for fuel. So ended the affair of the Bouljanak. Lord Cardigan was, it is said, anxious to charge, but received most positive orders from Lord Lucan not to do so. Lord Raglan was anxious not to bring on any serious affair in the position in which the army was placed, and the cavalry were ordered to retire towards the Bouljanak, their retreat being supported by the 1st Brigade Light Division, and part of the 2nd Division.
As our skirmishers retired and formed, the Cossacks raised a derisive yell, but did not attempt to pursue or molest them. It is now known that this was areconnaissancemade by the General Kiriakoff with the 2nd Brigade of the 17th Division, No. 4 Light Field Battery, the 2nd Brigade of the 6th Division of Cavalry, consisting of the Saxe Weimar and another Regiment of Hussars, 900 Don Cossacks, and one Cossack battery. The infantry kept out of sight behind the ridge, and we were not aware of their presence in such force.
As soon as the rations of rum and meat had been served out, the casks were broken up, and the staves used to make fires for cooking, aided by nettles and long grass. At night the watch-fires of the Russians were visible on our left and front. It was cold and dreary, and if I could intrude the recital of the sorrows of a tentless, baggageless man wandering about in the dark from regiment to regiment in hope of finding his missing traps,[12]I might tell a tale amusing enough to read, the incidents of which were very distressing to the individual concerned. The night was damp, the watch-fires were mere flashes, which gave little heat, and barely sufficed to warm the rations; but the camp of British soldiers is ever animated by the very soul of hospitality; and the wanderer was lucky enough to get a lodging on the ground beside Colonel Yea, of the 7th Fusileers, who was fortunate enough to have a little field-tent, and a bit of bread and biscuit to spare after a march of ten miles and a fast of ten hours.
EXPECTATION OF AN ATTACK.
All night arabas continued to arrive, and soldiers who had fallen out or gone astray. Sir George Brown, Sir De Lacy Evans, the Brigadier-Generals, and staff-officers, went about among their divisions ere the men lay down. It was admitted that, as a military spectacle, the advance of our troops, and the little affair of our artillery, as well as the management of the cavalry, formed one of the most picturesque and beautiful that could be imagined.
All night we could see the Russian position on the Alma clearly defined by the watch-fires, which illuminated the sky. A heavy dew fell, but the night was clear, and many a debate did we hold as to the strength of the enemy—of the ground they occupied—of their qualities as soldiers. It was by no means sure that the Russian cavalry might not beat up our quarters during the night, and the cavalry were placed in advance, and the 1st Brigade Light Division supported them, lying down in rear. There is every reason to be thankful that they gave us a quiet night, for an alarm on the part of an enemy who knew the ground might have greatly distressed us, at little risk to them. Lord Raglan and part of his staff occupied the rooms of the deserted post-house at Bouljanak, which were tolerably comfortable. Colonel Lagondie, of the Head-quarters Staff, who had been sent by Lord Raglan to take a message to Prince Napoleon, to place his division nearer to Sir De Lacy Evans, was taken prisoner, owing to his having mistaken a party of Cossacks for English cavalry. When the armies halted, the French had their right resting a good deal in advance towards the Alma, so that they were nearer to it than we were. The line of the armies was in an oblique position, the English on the left being thrown back on the Bouljanak, and the French on the right being a good deal in advance of it.
M. de Bazancourt's Strictures—The Advance—French Attack—A Delicate Question—Advance of the British—The Light Division—The Guards—The Victory—Russian Account—Humane Efforts—Advance from the Alma—Eskel.
M. de Bazancourt's Strictures—The Advance—French Attack—A Delicate Question—Advance of the British—The Light Division—The Guards—The Victory—Russian Account—Humane Efforts—Advance from the Alma—Eskel.
WITHearly morning on Tuesday, September 20th, the troops were up and stirring; but the march did not begin for some hours afterwards, and this circumstance has given rise to severe strictures by several French writers on the conduct of our generals on the occasion. At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 19th, says M. de Bazancourt, M. St. Arnaud convened the French Generals before his tent, and explained to them verbally his plan of battle, concerted with the English Commander-in-Chief. This plan was that the English army should execute "a turning movement on the Russian right, whilst its attention was seriously drawn on its left by a French division, and that the bulk of the army should make a powerfuleffort to force the Russian centre." General Bosquet, who had charge of the French right, consisting of the 2nd Division, supported by the Turks, was to turn the Russian left by the abrupt slopes, "judged (by the Russians) to be inaccessible," and therefore not defended by artillery. The 1st and 3rd Divisions were to assault the centre of the position—the 4th Division forming the reserve. The hour of starting was fixed as follows:—The French right wing at 5.30A.M.; the left wing, formed by the English, at 6A.M.; the centre at 7A.M.Having given these explanations to his generals, M. St. Arnaud sent Colonel Trochu, with General Rose, across to Lord Raglan, to inform him of the plan, and the hours fixed for the march of the troops, which Lord Raglan "accepted entirely" in detail. On this statement it may be remarked, that if the plan had been "concerted" between the Generals, as the French writer declares, there was no necessity for Lord Raglan's acceptance of a proposition which he had, conjointly with another, previously agreed to. In order to obtain unity of action in the allied movements Prince Napoleon and General Canrobert received orders to communicate with Lord Raglan and with Sir De Lacy Evans, who commanded the 2nd Division, immediately in proximity with the French.
PLAN OF ATTACK.
The French writer proceeds:—"At 5.30 the 2nd Division quitted its bivouac, and descended into the plain towards the Alma, which it reached at 6.30, but no movement was visible among the English army. General Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, astonished at this immobility, so contrary to the instructions, went in all haste to Sir De Lacy Evans, whom they found in his tent, and expressed their astonishment at a delay which might gravely compromise the success of the day. 'I have not received the order,' replied Sir De Lacy Evans. They were at once obliged to arrest the march of Bosquet's division, and on informing the Marshal, who was already mounted, of what had passed, he sent over a staff officer, Major Renson, to order them to wait for the English troops, who wereen retard, and despatched Colonel Trochu in all haste to Lord Raglan, whom he found on horseback, although the English troops were still in the encampment as he passed the lines, and not at all prepared for the march as agreed upon. It was half-past 7 o'clock when Colonel Trochu reached the head-quarters of our army; and when Lord Raglan had received the message which the Marshal sent, to the effect that he thought, after what his lordship said to the Colonel the night before, that the English should push on in front at 6 o'clock, he said with that calm which distinguished him,—'I am giving orders at this moment, and we are just about to start. Part of my troops did not arrive at their bivouac till late at night. Tell the Marshal that at this moment the orders are being carried all along the line.'" It will be observed that General Evans was not only not asked for his opinion in concerting the plan of attack, but that he was not even made acquainted with it. This is the more inexplicable, that General Evans' Division, from its position, would necessarily have to co-operate with the French. As it is desirable that the point of order as to this march shouldbe fully illustrated, I think it best to let Sir De Lacy Evans speak for himself.
"Shortly after daybreak on the morning of this battle his Imperial Highness Prince Napoleon and General Canrobert did me the honour to come into my tent to confer on the co-operation of my division with that of the Prince in the ensuing conflict. They informed me that this co-operation had been agreed to the previous evening between the two commanders-in-chief, expressed surprise that I had not been made acquainted with it, and showed me a well-executed plan by the French staff of the Russian position, and of the proposed lines of movement of the allied columns of attack.
"According to this plan, General Bosquet's troops and the Turks, supported by the powerful fire of the shipping, were to turn the enemy's left. The second British division, that of the Prince, and two other French divisions, were to attack their centre. The whole of the remainder of the British army was to turn the enemy's right.
"I expressed the very great pleasure I should have in fulfilling my share of these operations, and with this view sent forthwith to Lord Raglan for permission—which was given—to place at once my right as proposed, in contact with the left of the Prince, which was promptly done.
"About three hours, however, elapsed before the armies (excepting the corps of General Bosquet) received orders to advance. To the unavoidable want of unity in command this delay was probably attributable.
"But before moving off, both head-quarter staffs passed along the front. On reaching my division Lord Raglan expressed to me a dissent from part of the plan alluded to, not necessary to observe on here; mentioning also, in the course of his remarks, a disposition he supposed to exist on the part of the Marshal or the French chiefs to appropriate me and my division altogether, which he could not allow; that he had no objection to my communicating and co-operating with and regulating my advance by that of the Prince's division, but could not consent to my receiving orders through any one but himself.
"On hearing this, I requested him to send to acquaint the Marshal that such was his lordship's desire, as I believed a different expectation was entertained, which, if not removed, might lead during the action to misunderstanding. This his lordship immediately did. And it was arranged that Major Claremont, one of the British commissioners with the French army, was to be the medium of any communications to me which the French chiefs might find it desirable to make.
"The armies advanced. After about three miles a halt for a short interval took place by order of the commander of the force. On the arrival of the Second Division in front of the village of Bourliouk, which, having been prepared for conflagration by the Russians, became suddenly, for some hundred yards, an impenetrable blaze, Major Claremont came to me in great haste, to sayfrom the Marshal that a part of the French army, having ascended the heights on the south of the river, became threatened by large bodies of Russians, and might be compromised, unless the attention of the enemy were immediately drawn away by pressing them in our front.
"I made instant dispositions to conform to this wish—sending at the same time, as was my duty, an officer of my staff (Colonel the Hon. P. Herbert) to Lord Raglan, who was then a short distance in our rear, for his lordship's approval—which was instantly granted."
"It was," says M. de Bazancourt, in the next paragraph, "10.30 before Colonel Trochu announced that the English were ready to march, and the result was that it was impossible to execute the original plan of battle," for the enemy had full time to counteract the dispositions of the army, and Menschikoff, seeing that Bosquet's attack was of secondary importance, weakened his left wing to reinforce his centre and his right. At 11 o'clock Bosquet received the order to march, which was countermanded soon afterwards, as he was still too far in advance, and whilst the halt took place, that active and able general made areconnaissance, the first of the day, of the enemy's position, and discovered two passes to the heights in front—one a mere path on the mountain side, close to the sea; the second about two-thirds of a mile to the left of that path, running from the burning village of Almatamak, and ascending the heights by a very narrow ravine. It was plain that infantry could get up, but it seemed very doubtful if guns could be brought up the second of these passes to the heights, and the first was utterly impracticable for artillery. One of the Russian officers, speaking of this battle, says that the French, in making thisreconnaissance, brought up a large white stone, and fixed it on the north bank of the river; but I think it much more likely that it was the white cart belonging to Colonel Desaint, the topographical officer attached to the French army, for it is not likely that our allies would have taken such trouble as to move down an enormous stone for no possible object.
SCALING THE ALMA HEIGHTS.
It appears somewhat strange that noreconnaissancewas made of the Russian position by the generals. They did not reconnoitre the Alma, nor did they procure any information respecting the strength of the enemy or of the ground they occupied. They even concerted their plan before they had seen the enemy at all, relying on the bravery of the troops, not only to force the Russians from their lines, but, if necessary, to swim, or to ford a stream of unknown depth, with steep rotten banks, the bridges across which might, for all they knew, and certainly ought, according to the practice of war, to have been effectually destroyed by the enemy, so as to make the passage of guns all but impossible. We shall first follow the French attack. On returning to his troops, Bosquet, with the brigade of d'Autemarre, followed by its artillery, moved on the village, whilst the brigade of General Bouat was directed to march to the very mouth of the river, and to ascend by the first of the paths indicated, after having crossed the shallow bar, in singlefile, up to their waists on a sort of narrow rib of hard sand which had been discovered by the officers of theRoland. The artillery of the brigade, being unable to pass, was sent back to join that of d'Autemarre's brigade; and the soldiers of Bouat's brigade, having crossed the river, commenced to climb up the steep paths to the top of the opposite height without meeting any obstruction from the enemy, who had, indeed, been driven away from the seaside by the heavy guns of the steamers.
The brigade of d'Autemarre, which passed the Alma without any difficulty, by the bridge close to the burnt village of Almatamak, moving forward at the same time with great celerity, swarmed up the very steep cliffs on the opposite side, and gaining the heights in a few minutes, after immense exertions, crowned the summit, and dispersed a feeble troop of Cossacks who were posted there. It will be seen that the French right had thus been permitted to ascend the very difficult heights in front of them without opposition from the enemy; and although the cliffs were so precipitous as to create considerable difficulties to even the most active, hardy, and intelligent troops in scaling their rugged face, yet it would seem very bad generalship on the part of Prince Menschikoff to have permitted them to have established themselves on the plateau, if we did not know, by the angry controversy which has taken place between him, General Kiriakoff, and Prince Gortschakoff I., that it was part of his plan to allow a certain number of battalions to gain the edge of the cliffs, and then, relying on the bayonet, to send heavy masses of infantry against them and hurl them down into the Alma, and the ravines which run towards its banks. General Bosquet, when he observed this success, at once spurred up the steep road of which mention has already been made; and Major Barral, who commanded the artillery, having satisfied himself that the guns could just be brought up by the most tremendous exertions, orders were given for their advance, and they were, by prodigious efforts of horses and infantry soldiers, urged up the incline, and placed on the plateau at right angles to the line of the cliffs, so as to enfilade the Russians, on whom, protected by the 3rd Zouaves, who lay down in a small ravine about a hundred yards in front, they at once opened fire.
Prince Menschikoff, surprised by the extraordinary rapidity of this advance, and apprized of its success by the roar of the French guns, ordered up three batteries of eight pieces each to silence the French fire, and to cover an advance of his infantry against the two brigades which were forming on his left; and finding that the French maintained themselves against this superior fire, in a rage despatched two field batteries to crush them utterly. These guns were badly managed, and opened in line at the distance of 900 yards, and the fire, for nearly an hour, was confined to a duel of artillery, in which the French, though suffering severely, kept their ground with great intrepidity and courage. All at once the Russians ordered some cavalry and a field battery to menace the right of the line of French guns; but Bouat's brigade having pushed on to meet them, and a few well-directed shells having burst amongthe horsemen, they turned round and retired with alacrity. According to the concerted plan, the Division Canrobert and the Division Napoleon were not to attack till the Division Bosquet had gained the heights, and were engaged with the enemy. The directions given by the Marshal to the Generals ere they advanced were simply, "Keep straight before you, and follow your own inspiration for your manœuvres. We must gain these heights. I have no other instructions to give to men on whom I rely." On hearing the first guns of Bosquet's artillery, the French, in the centre and in the left, deployed and advanced, covered by a number of riflemen. The 1st Zouaves, under Colonel Bourbaki, at once rushed to the front, driving before them a line of Russian riflemen and skirmishers placed among the orchard trees and rivers which skirted the deep banks of the Alma, and availing themselves of the branches of these trees to swing themselves across the narrow stream into which others plunged up to the waist. The Russian regiment of Moscow came down the opposite slopes to support their skirmishers, but were driven back with loss by the sudden fire of the batteries of the First Division, that had just come into action. Having thus cleared the way, the 1st and 9th battalions of Chasseurs, the 7th of the line, and the 1st Zouaves advanced amid a storm of grape, round shot, and musketry up the high banks before them, at the other side of which were deployed masses of the enemy, concealed from view in the ravines and by the inequalities of the ground.
A SHARP ENCOUNTER.
At the same time, the Prince's division advancing towards Bourliouk, which was in flames, was met by a very serious fire of riflemen and skirmishing parties of infantry from the vineyards and rugged ground on the other side of the stream, and by a plunging fire of artillery, which was answered by the batteries of his division; but, after a short pause, the first line, consisting of Cler's Zouaves and the infantry of marine, supported by the second line under General Thomas, passed the Alma and drove back the enemy, who opened a masked battery upon them, which occasioned considerable loss. Canrobert's division, meantime, was compelled to attack without the aid of its artillery; for the river in their front was not practicable for guns, and they were obliged to be carried round to the right to follow the road by which Bosquet's batteries had already reached the summit; but the column pushed on energetically, and forming on the crest of the plateau by battalions, in double columns on two lines, ready to form square under the fire of the enemy's artillery, which had been engaged with that of the French second division, drove back the Russian regiments in front, which, on retiring, formed in square in front of their right flank. It was then that the officers perceived a white stone tower, about 800 yards on their left, behind which was formed a dense mass of the enemy's infantry. These with great precision advanced, at the same time pouring in a tremendous fire, at the distance of 200 yards, upon Canrobert's division, which was, as we have seen, left without its artillery. The general, perceiving his danger, sent off a staff-officer to Bosquet's division, and a battery, commanded by Captain. Fievet, coming up to his assistance in all haste, opened fire withgrape on the ponderous mass of the enemy, checking their fire, whilst Bosquet, by a flank movement, threatened to take its battalions in the rear.
The third division, with equal success and greater losses, attacking a mamelon occupied in force by the enemy, drove them back with great intrepidity: but it was evident by the movements of the Russians that they were about to make a great effort to save their centre, and M. St. Arnaud sent off orders to General Forey, who commanded the reserve, to move one of his brigades (de Lourmel's) to General Canrobert's support, and to proceed with the other (d'Aurelle's) to the extreme right of the battle. This was a happy inspiration: d'Aurelle's brigade, with great speed, crossed the river, and arrived to the support of Canrobert's division at a most critical moment. The Russians seemed to consider the Telegraph Tower as the key of the centre of their position. Sharpshooters, within the low wall outside the work, and batteries on its flanks, directed a steady fire on the French, who were checked for a moment by its severity: but the two batteries of the reserve came up and drew off some of the enemy's fire. The Russians, however, still continued a serious fusillade, and directed volleys of grape against the French, who were lying down in the ravine till the decisive moment should arrive for them to charge the enemy. The losses of our allies were sensible; it was evident that the Russian cavalry, says, M. de Bazancourt,[13]were preparing for a rush in upon them from the flank of the Russian square, which, partially covered by the Telegraph Tower, kept up an incessant fire from two faces upon the French. Colonel Cler, at this critical moment, perceiving that the 1st and 2nd Zouaves, the Chasseurs, and the 39th Regiment had arrived, calling to his men to charge, dashed at the tower, which, after a short but sanguinary combat, they carried at the point of the bayonet, driving out the Russians in confusion, and at the very moment General Canrobert, with his division, advanced at the double to support the movement. Struck down for a moment by a fragment of a shell which wounded him on the chest and shoulder, the gallant officer insisted upon leading on his men to complete the success obtained against the Russian left and left-centre; and Generals Bosquet and Canrobert, wheeling round their divisions from left to right, drove back the enemy towards the rear of the troops, which were still contending with the English, or forced them to seek for safety in flight. It was at this moment that M. St. Arnaud, riding up to the Generals, congratulated them on the day, and directed them to proceed to the aid of the English. Thanks be to the valour of our soldiers—thanks be to Heaven—we required no French aid that day. We received none, except that which was rendered by one battery of French artillery of the reserve, under M. de la Boussiniere, which fired a few rounds on some broken Russian columns from a spot close to the two English guns, of which I shall have to speak hereafter. Such is the part, according to their account, which the French had in the victory ofthe Alma. Their masses crossed the river and crowded the plateau ere they were seriously engaged, and their activity and courage, aided by the feeble generalship of the commander of the Russian left, and by many happy chances, enabled them to carry the position with comparatively little loss.
Having thus far given the French version of the action, let us return to our countrymen, and see what was their share in this great battle, which was not decisive, so far as the fate of Sebastopol was concerned, merely because we lacked either the means or the military genius to make it so. There is one question which has often been asked in our army and in the tents of our allies, which is supposed to decide the controversy respecting the military merits of St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan: "Would Napoleon have allowed the Russians three days' respite after such a battle?" The only reply that could be made if Napoleon commanded the victorious army, and was not hampered with a colleague of equal power, was, and is, that the notion is preposterous. "But," say the French, "the English were not ready to move next day." "Ay, it is true," reply the English, "because we were far from the sea; but still we offered to assist you to pursue the very night of the battle." "Then," rejoin the French, "we were too much exhausted, and it would have been foolish to have attempted such a movement, and to have divided our army." Posterity, which cares but little for ephemeral political cliquerie, family connexion, or personal amiability, will pass a verdict in this cause which none of us can hope to influence or evade.
ANOTHER ADVANCE
The reason of the extraordinary delay in executing our plan of attack has never yet been explained. Lord Raglan's excuse, as given by M. de Bazancourt, is not worth any notice but this—it is not true. The Staff-officer says that "the army was under arms soon after 6A.M., and on the move" Where?—a mile or two too much inland? What were we doing for five hours? For this same authority further on says, "It was 11A.M.before we came in sight of the Alma." Now, the distance between the Bouljanak and the Alma is barely six miles. Were we five hours marching six miles? This is indeed a feeble statement; but it is not quite so weak as that which follows, namely, that it was not tillafter11 o'clock "the plan of attack was finally settled." This statement is made to cover Lord Raglan, and to prevent there being any suspicion that a plan had been arranged the night before, for the disregard and non-performance of which the Staff-officer's uncle was responsible. That Lord Raglan was brave as a hero of antiquity, that he was kind to his friends and to his staff, that he was unmoved under fire, and unaffected by personal danger, that he was noble in manner, gracious in demeanour, of dignified bearing, and of simple and natural habits, I am, and ever have been, ready not only to admit, but to state with pleasure; that he had many and great difficulties to contend with,domi militiæque, I believe; but that this brave, high-spirited, and gallant nobleman had been so long subservient to the power of a superior mind—that he had lost, if he ever possessed, the ability to conceive andexecute large military plans—and that he had lost, if he ever possessed, the faculty of handling great bodies of men, I am firmly persuaded. He was a fine English gentleman—a splendid soldier—perhaps an unexceptionable lieutenant under a great chief; but that he was a great chief, or even a moderately able general, I have every reason to doubt, and I look in vain for any proof of it whilst he commanded the English army in the Crimea.
It was 10 o'clock ere the British line moved towards the Alma. A gentle rise in the plain enabled us to see the Russian position for some time after, but the distance was too great to make out details, and we got into a long low bottom between the ridge and another elevation in front.
Our army advanced in columns of brigades in deploying distance, our left protected by a line of skirmishers, the brigade of cavalry, and horse artillery. The army, in case of attack on the left or rear, could form a hollow square, with the baggage in the centre.
Sir De Lacy Evans's division, on the extreme right, was in contact with the French left, under Prince Napoleon, which was of course furthest from the sea. At the distance of two miles we halted, and then the troops steadily advanced, with our left frittered into a foam of skirmishers of the Rifle Brigade, Major Northcott covered by the 11th and 8th Hussars, 13th Light Dragoons, and 17th Lancers. This was a sight of inexpressible grandeur, and one was struck with the splendid appearance of our infantry in line as seen from the front. The bright scarlet, the white facings, and cross belts, rendering a man conspicuous, gave him an appearance of size which other uniforms do not produce. The French columns looked small compared to our battalions, though we knew they were quite as strong; but the marching of our allies, laden as they were, was wonderful. Our staff was more showy and numerous than that of the French. Nothing strikes the eye so much as a cocked hat and bunch of white feathers; several officers doffed the latter adornment, thinking that they were quite conspicuous on horseback. When the regiments halted, I went past the Light Division, part of the 2nd Division, the Guards, and the Highlanders. Many a laugh did I hear from lips which in two hours more were closed for ever. The officers and men made the most of the delay, and ate what they had with them; but there was a want of water, and the salt pork made them so thirsty that in the passage of the Alma the men stopped to drink and fill their canteens under the heaviest fire.
The plan of attack has been already described, as well as the circumstances of our early march. As we advanced we could see the enemy very distinctly—their grey-coated masses resembling patches of wood on the hill-sides. The ravines held them occasionally, but still we could see that from within a mile of the sea coast, up to the left of the Tartar village, towards which we were advancing, a strong force of infantry was posted, and now and then, as the Russian made his last disposition to meet our advance, the sun's rays flashed brightly in diamond-like points from bright steel. The line of the river below the heights they occupied was indicated by patches of the richest verdure, and by belts of fine fruit trees andvineyards. The Alma is a tortuous little stream, which has worked its way down through a red clay soil, deepening its course as it proceeds seawards, and which drains the steppe-like lands on its right bank, making at times pools and eddies too deep to be forded, though it can generally be crossed by waders who do not fear to wet their knees. The high banks formed by the action of the stream in cutting through the rich soil vary from the right side to the left, according to the course of the stream—the corresponding bank on the opposite side being generally of a slope, more or less abrupt, as the bank is high. The drop from the edge to the water varies also from two to six or eight feet. Along the right or north bank of the Alma there is a number of Tartar houses, at times numerous and close enough to form a cluster of habitations deserving the name of a hamlet, at times scattered wide apart amid little vineyards, surrounded by walls of mud and stone of three feet in height. The bridge over which the post road passes from Bouljanak to Sebastopol runs close to one of these hamlets—a village, in fact, of some fifty houses. This village is approached from the north by a road winding through a plain nearly level till it comes near to the village, where the ground dips, so that at the distance of three hundred yards a man on horseback can hardly see the tops of the nearer and more elevated houses, and can only ascertain the position of the stream by the willows and verdure along its banks. At the left or south side of the Alma the ground assumes a very different character—it rises at once from the water in steep banks up to plateaux at the top of varying height and extent. The general surface is pierced here and there by the course of the winter's torrents, which have formed small ravines, commanded by the heights above. A remarkable ridge of tumuli and hillocks, varying in height from 100 to 400 feet, runs along the course of the Alma on the left side, assuming the form of cliffs when close to the sea, and rising in a gentle slope a little to the left of the village I have mentioned, which is called by the Tartar, and marked on the maps as Burliuk. At its commencement on the left this ridge recedes from the course of the river for several hundred yards, the ground sloping gradually from the bank up to the knolls and tumuli into which the ridge is broken. It then strikes downwards at a sharp angle to its former course, till it sinks into the high ground over the river below the village. There is then a sort of of which the base is the river, and the sides the elevated terrace of the ridge. This terrace, or the succession of terraces, is commanded by higher ground in the rear, but is separated from the position on its proper left by a ravine. It is marked by deep gullies towards the river. If the reader will place himself on the top of Richmond-hill, dwarf the Thames to the size of a rivulet, and imagine the hill to be deprived of vegetation, he may form some notion of the position occupied by the Russians, the plains on the left bank of the Thames will bear some similitude to the land over which the British and French advanced, barring only the verdure. On the slope of the rising ground, to the right of the bridge, the Russians had thrown up two epaulements, armed with 32-pounder batteries and 24-pound howitzers.
PLAN OF THE HEIGHTS and BAY of ALMA.PLAN OF THE HEIGHTS and BAY of ALMA.