This is the earliest record we possess of the appearance of an English ship in the waters of Spanish America. Others, however, soon followed. In 1530 William Hawkins, father of the famous John Hawkins, ventured in "a tall and goodly ship ... called the 'Polo of Plymouth,'" down to the coast of Guinea, trafficked with the natives for gold-dust and ivory, and then crossed the ocean to Brazil, "where he behaved himself so wisely with those savage people" that one of the kings of the country took ship with him to England and was presented to Henry VIII. at Whitehall.44The real occasion, however, for the appearance of foreign ships in Spanish-American waters was the new occupation of carrying negroes from the African coast to the Spanish colonies to be sold as slaves. The rapid depopulation of the Indies, and the really serious concern of the Spanish crown for the preservation of the indigenes, had compelled the Spanish government to permit the introduction of negro slaves from an early period. At first restricted to Christian slaves carried from Spain, after 1510 licences to take over a certain number, subject of course to governmental imposts, were given to private individuals; and in August 1518, owing to the incessant clamour of the colonists for more negroes, Laurent de Gouvenot, Governor of Bresa and one of the foreign favourites ofCharles V., obtained the first regular contract to carry 4000 slaves directly from Africa to the West Indies.45With slight modifications the contract system became permanent, and with it, as a natural consequence, came contraband trade. Cargoes of negroes were frequently "run" from Africa by Spaniards and Portuguese, and as early as 1506 an order was issued to expel all contraband slaves from Hispaniola.46The supply never equalled the demand, however, and this explains why John Hawkins found it so profitable to carry ship-loads of blacks across from the Guinea coast, and why Spanish colonists could not resist the temptation to buy them, notwithstanding the stringent laws against trading with foreigners.
The first voyage of John Hawkins was made in 1562-63. In conjunction with Thomas Hampton he fitted out three vessels and sailed for Sierra Leone. There he collected, "partly by the sword and partly by other means," some 300 negroes, and with this valuable human freight crossed the Atlantic to San Domingo in Hispaniola. Uncertain as to his reception, Hawkins on his arrival pretended that he had been driven in by foul weather, and was in need of provisions, but without ready money to pay for them. He therefore requested permission to sell "certain slaves he had with him." The opportunity was eagerly welcomed by the planters, and the governor, not thinking it necessary to construe his orders from home too stringently, allowed two-thirds of the cargo to be sold. As neither Hawkins nor the Spanish colonists anticipated any serious displeasure on the part of Philip II., the remaining 100 slaves were left as adeposit with the Council of the island. Hawkins invested the proceeds in a return cargo of hides, half of which he sent in Spanish vessels to Spain under the care of his partner, while he returned with the rest to England. The Spanish Government, however, was not going to sanction for a moment the intrusion of the English into the Indies. On Hampton's arrival at Cadiz his cargo was confiscated and he himself narrowly escaped the Inquisition. The slaves left in San Domingo were forfeited, and Hawkins, although he "cursed, threatened and implored," could not obtain a farthing for his lost hides and negroes. The only result of his demands was the dispatch of a peremptory order to the West Indies that no English vessel should be allowed under any pretext to trade there.47
The second of the great Elizabethan sea-captains to beard the Spanish lion was Hawkins' friend and pupil, Francis Drake. In 1567 he accompanied Hawkins on his third expedition. With six ships, one of which was lent by the Queen herself, they sailed from Plymouth in October, picked up about 450 slaves on the Guinea coast, sighted Dominica in the West Indies in March, and coasted along the mainland of South America past Margarita and Cape de la Vela, carrying on a "tolerable good trade." Rio de la Hacha they stormed with 200 men, losing only two in the encounter; but they were scattered by a tempest near Cartagena and driven into the Gulf of Mexico, where, on 16th September, they entered the narrow port of S. Juan d'Ulloa or Vera Cruz. The next day the fleet of New Spain, consisting of thirteen large ships, appeared outside, and after an exchange of pledges of peace and amity with the Englishintruders, entered on the 20th. On the morning of the 24th, however, a fierce encounter was begun, and Hawkins and Drake, stubbornly defending themselves against tremendous odds, were glad to escape with two shattered vessels and the loss of £100,000 treasure. After a voyage of terrible suffering, Drake, in the "Judith," succeeded in reaching England on 20th January 1569, and Hawkins followed five days later.48Within a few years, however, Drake was away again, this time alone and with the sole, unblushing purpose of robbing the Dons. With only two ships and seventy-three men he prowled about the waters of the West Indies for almost a year, capturing and rifling Spanish vessels, plundering towns on the Main and intercepting convoys of treasure across the Isthmus of Darien. In 1577 he sailed on the voyage which carried him round the world, a feat for which he was knighted, promoted to the rank of admiral, and visited by the Queen on board his ship, the "Golden Hind." While Drake was being feted in London as the hero of the hour, Philip of Spain from his cell in the Escorial must have execrated these English sea-rovers whose visits brought ruin to his colonies and menaced the safety of his treasure galleons.
In the autumn of 1585 Drake was again in command of a formidable armament intended against the West Indies. Supported by 2000 troops under General Carleill, and by Martin Frobisher and Francis Knollys in the fleet, he took and plundered San Domingo, and after occupying Cartagena for six weeks ransomed the city for 110,000 ducats. This fearless old Elizabethan sailed from Plymouth on his last voyage in August 1595. Though under the joint command of Drake and Hawkins, theexpedition seemed doomed to disaster throughout its course. One vessel, the "Francis," fell into the hands of the Spaniards. While the fleet was passing through the Virgin Isles, Hawkins fell ill and died. A desperate attack was made on S. Juan de Porto Rico, but the English, after losing forty or fifty men, were compelled to retire. Drake then proceeded to the Main, where in turn he captured and plundered Rancherias, Rio de la Hacha, Santa Marta and Nombre de Dios. With 750 soldiers he made a bold attempt to cross the isthmus to the city of Panama, but turned back after the loss of eighty or ninety of his followers. A few days later, on 15th January 1596, he too fell ill, died on the 28th, and was buried in a leaden coffin off the coast of Darien.49
Hawkins and Drake, however, were by no means the only English privateers of that century in American waters. Names like Oxenham, Grenville, Raleigh and Clifford, and others of lesser fame, such as Winter, Knollys and Barker, helped to swell the roll of these Elizabethan sea-rovers. To many a gallant sailor the Caribbean Sea was a happy hunting-ground where he might indulge at his pleasure any propensities to lawless adventure. If in 1588 he had helped to scatter the Invincible Armada, he now pillaged treasure ships on the coasts of the Spanish Main; if he had been with Drake to flout his Catholic Majesty at Cadiz, he now closed with the Spaniards within their distant cities beyond the seas. Thus he lined his own pockets with Spanish doubloons, and incidentally curbed Philip's power of invading England. Nor must we think these mariners the same as the lawless buccaneers of a later period. The men of this generation were of asterner and more fanatical mould, men who for their wildest acts often claimed the sanction of religious convictions. Whether they carried off the heathen from Africa, or plundered the fleets of Romish Spain, they were but entering upon "the heritage of the saints." Judged by the standards of our own century they were pirates and freebooters, but in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen their attacks upon the Spaniards seemed fair and honourable.
The last of the great privateering voyages for which Drake had set the example was the armament which Lord George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, sent against Porto Rico in 1598. The ill-starred expeditions of Raleigh to Guiana in 1595 and again in 1617 belong rather to the history of exploration and colonization. Clifford, "courtier, gambler and buccaneer," having run through a great part of his very considerable fortune, had seized the opportunity offered him by the plunder of the Spanish colonies to re-coup himself; and during a period of twelve years, from 1586 to 1598, almost every year fitted out, and often himself commanded, an expedition against the Spaniards. In his last and most ambitious effort, in 1598, he equipped twenty vessels entirely at his own cost, sailed from Plymouth in March, and on 6th June laid siege to the city of San Juan, which he proposed to clear of Spaniards and establish as an English stronghold. Although the place was captured, the expedition proved a fiasco. A violent sickness broke out among the troops, and as Clifford had already sailed away with some of the ships to Flores to lie in wait for the treasure fleet, Sir Thomas Berkeley, who was left in command in Porto Rico, abandoned the island and returned to rejoin the Earl.50
The English in the sixteenth century, however, had no monopoly of this piratical game. The French did something in their own way, and the Dutch were not far behind. Indeed, the French may claim to have set the example for the Elizabethan freebooters, for in the first half of the sixteenth century privateers flocked to the Spanish Indies from Dieppe, Brest and the towns of the Basque coast. The gleam of the golden lingots of Peru, and the pale lights of the emeralds from the mountains of New Granada, exercised a hypnotic influence not only on ordinary seamen but on merchants and on seigneurs with depleted fortunes. Names like Jean Terrier, Jacques Sore and François le Clerc, the latter popularly called "Pie de Palo," or "wooden-leg," by the Spaniards, were as detestable in Spanish ears as those of the great English captains. Even before 1500 French corsairs hovered about Cape St Vincent and among the Azores and the Canaries; and their prowess and audacity were so feared that Columbus, on returning from his third voyage in 1498, declared that he had sailed for the island of Madeira by a new route to avoid meeting a French fleet which was awaiting him near St Vincent.51With the establishment of the system of armed convoys, however, and the presence of Spanish fleets on the coast of Europe, the corsairs suffered some painful reverses which impelled them to transfer their operations to American waters. Thereafter Spanish records are full of references to attacks by Frenchmen on Havana, St. Jago de Cuba, San Domingo and towns onthe mainland of South and Central America; full of appeals, too, from the colonies to the neglectful authorities in Spain, urging them to send artillery, cruisers and munitions of war for their defence.52
A letter dated 8th April 1537, written by Gonzalo de Guzman to the Empress, furnishes us with some interesting details of the exploits of an anonymous French corsair in that year. In November 1536 this Frenchman had seized in the port of Chagre, on the Isthmus of Darien, a Spanish vessel laden with horses from San Domingo, had cast the cargo into the sea, put the crew on shore and sailed away with his prize. A month or two later he appeared off the coast of Havana and dropped anchor in a small bay a few leagues from the city. As there were then five Spanish ships lying in the harbour, the inhabitants compelled the captains to attempt the seizure of the pirate, promising to pay for the ships if they were lost. Three vessels of 200 tons each sailed out to the attack, and for several days they fired at the French corsair, which, being a patache of light draught, had run up the bay beyond their reach. Finally one morning the Frenchmen were seen pressing with both sail and oar to escape from the port. A Spanish vessel cut her cables to follow in pursuit, but encountering a heavy sea and contrary winds was abandoned by her crew, who made for shore in boats. The other two Spanish ships were deserted in similar fashion, whereupon the French, observing this new turn of affairs, re-entered the bay and easily recovered the three drifting vessels. Two of the prizes they burnt, and arming the third sailed away to cruise in the Floridastraits, in the route of ships returning from the West Indies to Spain.53
The corsairs, however, were not always so uniformly successful. A band of eighty, who attempted to plunder the town of St. Jago de Cuba, were repulsed with some loss by a certain Diego Perez of Seville, captain of an armed merchant ship then in the harbour, who later petitioned for the grant of a coat-of-arms in recognition of his services.54In October 1544 six French vessels attacked the town of Santa Maria de los Remedios, near Cape de la Vela, but failed to take it in face of the stubborn resistance of the inhabitants. Yet the latter a few months earlier had been unable to preserve their homes from pillage, and had been obliged to flee to La Granjeria de las Perlas on the Rio de la Hacha.55There is small wonder, indeed, that the defenders were so rarely victorious. The Spanish towns were ill-provided with forts and guns, and often entirely without ammunition or any regular soldiers. The distance between the settlements as a rule was great, and the inhabitants, as soon as informed of the presence of the enemy, knowing that they had no means of resistance and little hope of succour, left their homes to the mercy of the freebooters and fled to the hills and woods with their families and most precious belongings. Thus when, in October 1554, another band of three hundred French privateers swooped down upon the unfortunate town of St. Jago de Cuba, they were able to hold it for thirty days, and plundered it to the value of 80,000 pieces of eight.56The following year, however, witnessed an even more remarkable action. In July 1555 the celebratedcaptain, Jacques Sore, landed two hundred men from a caravel a half-league from the city of Havana, and before daybreak marched on the town and forced the surrender of the castle. The Spanish governor had time to retire to the country, where he gathered a small force of Spaniards and negroes, and returned to surprise the French by night. Fifteen or sixteen of the latter were killed, and Sore, who himself was wounded, in a rage gave orders for the massacre of all the prisoners. He burned the cathedral and the hospital, pillaged the houses and razed most of the city to the ground. After transferring all the artillery to his vessel, he made several forays into the country, burned a few plantations, and finally sailed away in the beginning of August. No record remains of the amount of the booty, but it must have been enormous. To fill the cup of bitterness for the poor inhabitants, on 4th October there appeared on the coast another French ship, which had learned of Sore's visit and of the helpless state of the Spaniards. Several hundred men disembarked, sacked a few plantations neglected by their predecessors, tore down or burned the houses which the Spaniards had begun to rebuild, and seized a caravel loaded with leather which had recently entered the harbour.57It is true that during these years there was almost constant war in Europe between the Emperor and France; yet this does not entirely explain the activity of the French privateers in Spanish America, for we find them busy there in the years when peace reigned at home. Once unleash the sea-dogs and it was extremely difficult to bring them again under restraint.
With the seventeenth century began a new era in the history of the West Indies. If in the sixteenth theEnglish, French and Dutch came to tropical America as piratical intruders into seas and countries which belonged to others, in the following century they came as permanent colonisers and settlers. The Spaniards, who had explored the whole ring of the West Indian islands before 1500, from the beginning neglected the lesser for the larger Antilles—Cuba, Hispaniola, Porto Rico and Jamaica—and for those islands like Trinidad, which lie close to the mainland. And when in 1519 Cortez sailed from Cuba for the conquest of Mexico, and twelve years later Pizarro entered Peru, the emigrants who left Spain to seek their fortunes in the New World flocked to the vast territories which theConquistadoresand their lieutenants had subdued on the Continent. It was consequently to the smaller islands which compose the Leeward and Windward groups that the English, French and Dutch first resorted as colonists. Small, and therefore "easy to settle, easy to depopulate and to re-people, attractive not only on account of their own wealth, but also as a starting-point for the vast and rich continent off which they lie," these islands became the pawns in a game of diplomacy and colonization which continued for 150 years.
In the seventeenth century, moreover, the Spanish monarchy was declining rapidly both in power and prestige, and its empire, though still formidable, no longer overshadowed the other nations of Europe as in the days of Charles V. and Philip II. France, with the Bourbons on the throne, was entering upon an era of rapid expansion at home and abroad, while the Dutch, by the truce of 1609, virtually obtained the freedom for which they had struggled so long. In England Queen Elizabeth had died in 1603, and her Stuart successor exchanged her policy of dalliance,of balance between France and Spain, for one of peace and conciliation. The aristocratic free-booters who had enriched themselves by harassing the Spanish Indies were succeeded by a less romantic but more business-like generation, which devoted itself to trade and planting. Abortive attempts at colonization had been made in the sixteenth century. The Dutch, who were trading in the West Indies as early as 1542, by 1580 seem to have gained some foothold in Guiana;58and the French Huguenots, under the patronage of the Admiral de Coligny, made three unsuccessful efforts to form settlements on the American continent, one in Brazil in 1555, another near Port Royal in South Carolina in 1562, and two years later a third on the St. John's River in Florida. The only English effort in the sixteenth century was the vain attempt of Sir Walter Raleigh between 1585 and 1590 to plant a colony on Roanoke Island, on the coast of what is now North Carolina. It was not till 1607 that the first permanent English settlement in America was made at Jamestown in Virginia. Between 1609 and 1619 numerous stations were established by English, Dutch and French in Guiana between the mouth of the Orinoco and that of the Amazon. In 1621 the Dutch West India Company was incorporated, and a few years later proposals for a similar company were broached in England. Among the West Indian Islands, St. Kitts received its first English settlers in 1623; and two years later the island was formally divided with the French, thus becoming the earliest nucleus of English and French colonization in those regions. Barbadoes was colonized in 1624-25. In 1628 English settlers from St. Kitts spread to Nevis andBarbuda, and within another four years to Antigua and Montserrat; while as early as 1625 English and Dutch took joint possession of Santa Cruz. The founders of the French settlement on St. Kitts induced Richelieu to incorporate a French West India Company with the title, "The Company of the Isles of America," and under its auspices Guadeloupe, Martinique and other islands of the Windward group were colonized in 1635 and succeeding years. Meanwhile between 1632 and 1634 the Dutch had established trading stations on St. Eustatius in the north, and on Tobago and Curaçao in the south near the Spanish mainland.
While these centres of trade and population were being formed in the very heart of the Spanish seas, the privateers were not altogether idle. To the treaty of Vervins between France and Spain in 1598 had been added a secret restrictive article whereby it was agreed that the peace should not hold good south of the Tropic of Cancer and west of the meridian of the Azores. Beyond these two lines (called "les lignes de l'enclos des Amitiés") French and Spanish ships might attack each other and take fair prize as in open war. The ministers of Henry IV. communicated this restriction verbally to the merchants of the ports, and soon private men-of-war from Dieppe, Havre and St. Malo flocked to the western seas.59Ships loaded with contraband goods no longer sailed for the Indies unless armed ready to engage all comers, and many ship-captains renounced trade altogether for the more profitable and exciting occupation of privateering. In the early years of the seventeenth century, moreover, Dutch fleets harassed the coasts of Chile and Peru,60whilein Brazil61and the West Indies a second "Pie de Palo," this time the Dutch admiral, Piet Heyn, was proving a scourge to the Spaniards. Heyn was employed by the Dutch West India Company, which from the year 1623 onwards, carried the Spanish war into the transmarine possessions of Spain and Portugal. With a fleet composed of twenty-six ships and 3300 men, of which he was vice-admiral, he greatly distinguished himself at the capture of Bahia, the seat of Portuguese power in Brazil. Similar expeditions were sent out annually, and brought back the rich spoils of the South American colonies. Within two years the extraordinary number of eighty ships, with 1500 cannon and over 9000 sailors and soldiers, were despatched to American seas, and although Bahia was soon retaken, the Dutch for a time occupied Pernambuco, as well as San Juan de Porto Rico in the West Indies.62In 1628 Piet Heyn was in command of a squadron designed to intercept the plate fleet which sailed every year from Vera Cruz to Spain. With thirty-one ships, 700 cannon and nearly 3000 men he cruised along the northern coast of Cuba, and on 8th September fell in with his quarry near Cape San Antonio. The Spaniards made a running fight along the coast until they reached the Matanzas River near Havana, into which they turned with the object of running the great-bellied galleons aground and escaping with what treasure they could. The Dutch followed, however, and most of the rich cargo was diverted into the coffers of the Dutch West India Company. The gold, silver, indigo, sugar and logwood were sold in the Netherlands for fifteen million guilders,and the company was enabled to distribute to its shareholders the unprecedented dividend of 50 per cent. It was an exploit which two generations of English mariners had attempted in vain, and the unfortunate Spanish general, Don Juan de Benavides, on his return to Spain was imprisoned for his defeat and later beheaded.63
In 1639 we find the Spanish Council of War for the Indies conferring with the King on measures to be taken against English piratical ships in the Caribbean;64and in 1642 Captain William Jackson, provided with an ample commission from the Earl of Warwick65and duplicates under the Great Seal, made a raid in which he emulated the exploits of Sir Francis Drake and his contemporaries. Starting out with three ships and about 1100 men, mostly picked up in St. Kitts and Barbadoes, he cruised along the Main from Caracas to Honduras and plundered the towns of Maracaibo and Truxillo. On 25th March 1643 he dropped anchor in what is now Kingston Harbour in Jamaica, landed about 500 men, and after some sharp fighting and the loss of forty of his followers, entered the town of St. Jago de la Vega, which he ransomed for 200 beeves, 10,000 lbs. of cassava bread and 7000 pieces of eight. Many of the English were so captivated by the beauty and fertility of the island that twenty-three deserted in one night to the Spaniards.66
The first two Stuart Kings, like the great Queen who preceded them, and in spite of the presence of apowerful Spanish faction at the English Court, looked upon the Indies with envious eyes, as a source of perennial wealth to whichever nation could secure them. James I., to be sure, was a man of peace, and soon after his accession patched up a treaty with the Spaniards; but he had no intention of giving up any English claims, however shadowy they might be, to America. Cornwallis, the new ambassador at Madrid, from a vantage ground where he could easily see the financial and administrative confusion into which Spain, in spite of her colonial wealth, had fallen, was most dissatisfied with the treaty. In a letter to Cranborne, dated 2nd July 1605, he suggested that England never lost so great an opportunity of winning honour and wealth as by relinquishing the war with Spain, and that Philip and his kingdom "were reduced to such a state as they could not in all likelihood have endured for the space of two years more."67This opinion we find repeated in his letters in the following years, with covert hints that an attack upon the Indies might after all be the most profitable and politic thing to do. When, in October 1607, Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador in London, complained to James of the establishment of the new colony in Virginia, James replied that Virginia was land discovered by the English and therefore not within the jurisdiction of Philip; and a week later Salisbury, while confiding to Zuniga that he thought the English might not justly go to Virginia, still refused to prohibit their going or command their return, for it would be an acknowledgment, he said, that the King of Spain was lord of all the Indies.68In 1609,in the truce concluded between Spain and the Netherlands, one of the stipulations provided that for nine years the Dutch were to be free to trade in all places in the East and West Indies except those in actual possession of the Spaniards on the date of cessation of hostilities; and thereafter the English and French governments endeavoured with all the more persistence to obtain a similar privilege. Attorney-General Heath, in 1625, presented a memorial to the Crown on the advantages derived by the Spaniards and Dutch in the West Indies, maintaining that it was neither safe nor profitable for them to be absolute lords of those regions; and he suggested that his Majesty openly interpose or permit it to be done underhand.69In September 1637 proposals were renewed in England for a West India Company as the only method of obtaining a share in the wealth of America. It was suggested that some convenient port be seized as a safe retreat from which to plunder Spanish trade on land and sea, and that the officers of the company be empowered to conquer and occupy any part of the West Indies, build ships, levy soldiers and munitions of war, and make reprisals.70The temper of Englishmen at this time was again illustrated in 1640 when the Spanish ambassador, Alonzo de Cardenas, protested to Charles I. against certain ships which the Earls of Warwick and Marlborough were sending to the West Indies with the intention, Cardenas declared, of committing hostilities against the Spaniards. The Earl of Warwick, it seems, pretended to have received great injuries from the latter and threatened to recoup his losses at their expense. He procured from the king a broad commission which gavehim the right to trade in the West Indies, and to "offend" such as opposed him. Under shelter of this commission the Earl of Marlborough was now going to sea with three or four armed ships, and Cardenas prayed the king to restrain him until he gave security not to commit any acts of violence against the Spanish nation. The petition was referred to a committee of the Lords, who concluded that as the peace had never been strictly observed by either nation in the Indies they would not demand any security of the Earl. "Whether the Spaniards will think this reasonable or not," concludes Secretary Windebank in his letter to Sir Arthur Hopton, "is no great matter."71
During this century and a half between 1500 and 1650, the Spaniards were by no means passive or indifferent to the attacks made upon their authority and prestige in the New World. The hostility of the mariners from the north they repaid with interest, and woe to the foreign interloper or privateer who fell into their clutches. When Henry II. of France in 1557 issued an order that Spanish prisoners be condemned to the galleys, the Spanish government retaliated by commanding its sea-captains to mete out the same treatment to their French captives, except that captains, masters and officers taken in the navigation of the Indies were to be hung or cast into the sea.72In December 1600 the governor of Cumana had suggested to the King, as a means of keeping Dutch and English ships from the salt mines of Araya, the ingenious scheme of poisoning the salt. This advice, it seems, was not followed, but a few years later, in 1605, a Spanish fleetof fourteen galleons sent from Lisbon surprised and burnt nineteen Dutch vessels found loading salt at Araya, and murdered most of the prisoners.73In December 1604 the Venetian ambassador in London wrote of "news that the Spanish in the West Indies captured two English vessels, cut off the hands, feet, noses and ears of the crews and smeared them with honey and tied them to trees to be tortured by flies and other insects. The Spanish here plead," he continued, "that they were pirates, not merchants, and that they did not know of the peace. But the barbarity makes people here cry out."74On 22nd June 1606, Edmondes, the English Ambassador at Brussels, in a letter to Cornwallis, speaks of a London ship which was sent to trade in Virginia, and putting into a river in Florida to obtain water, was surprised there by Spanish vessels from Havana, the men ill-treated and the cargo confiscated.75And it was but shortly after that Captain Chaloner's ship on its way to Virginia was seized by the Spaniards in the West Indies, and the crew sent to languish in the dungeons of Seville or condemned to the galleys.
By attacks upon some of the English settlements, too, the Spaniards gave their threats a more effective form. Frequent raids were made upon the English and Dutch plantations in Guiana;76and on 8th-18th September 1629 a Spanish fleet of over thirty sail, commanded by Don Federico de Toledo, nearly annihilated the joint French and English colony on St. Kitts. Nine English ships were captured and the settlements burnt. The French inhabitants temporarily evacuated the island and sailedfor Antigua; but of the English some 550 were carried to Cartagena and Havana, whence they were shipped to England, and all the rest fled to the mountains and woods.77Within three months' time, however, after the departure of the Spaniards, the scattered settlers had returned and re-established the colony. Providence Island and its neighbour, Henrietta, being situated near the Mosquito Coast, were peculiarly exposed to Spanish attack;78while near the north shore of Hispaniola the island of Tortuga, which was colonized by the same English company, suffered repeatedly from the assaults of its hostile neighbours. In July 1635 a Spanish fleet from the Main assailed the island of Providence, but unable to land among the rocks, was after five days beaten off "considerably torn" by the shot from the fort.79On the strength of these injuries received and of others anticipated, the Providence Company obtained from the king the liberty "to right themselves" by making reprisals, and during the next six years kept numerous vessels preying upon Spanish commerce in those waters. King Philip was therefore all the more intent upon destroying the plantation.80He bided his time, however, until the early summer of 1641, when the general of the galleons, Don Francisco Diaz Pimienta, with twelve sail and 2000 men, fell upon the colony, razed the forts and carried off all the English, about 770 in number, together with forty cannon and half a million of plunder.81It was just ten years later that aforce of 800 men from Porto Rico invaded Santa Cruz, whence the Dutch had been expelled by the English in 1646, killed the English governor and more than 100 settlers, seized two ships in the harbour and burnt and pillaged most of the plantations. The rest of the inhabitants escaped to the woods, and after the departure of the Spaniards deserted the colony for St. Kitts and other islands.82
Footnote 1:(return)Herrera: Decades II. 1, p. 4, cited in Scelle: la Traite Négrière, I. p. 6. Note 2.
Herrera: Decades II. 1, p. 4, cited in Scelle: la Traite Négrière, I. p. 6. Note 2.
Footnote 2:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. pp. 6-9.
Scelle,op. cit., i. pp. 6-9.
Footnote 3:(return)"Por cuanto los pacificaciones no se han de hacer con ruido de armas, sino con caridad y buen modo."—Recop. de leyes ... de las Indias, lib. vii. tit. 1.
"Por cuanto los pacificaciones no se han de hacer con ruido de armas, sino con caridad y buen modo."—Recop. de leyes ... de las Indias, lib. vii. tit. 1.
Footnote 4:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 35.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 35.
Footnote 5:(return)Weiss: L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons., II. pp. 204 and 215. Not till 1722 was legislative sanction given to this practice.M. Lemonnet wrote to Colbert in 1670 concerning this commerce:—"Quelque perquisition qu'on ait faite dans ce dernier temps aux Indes pour découvrir les biens des François, ils ont plustost souffert la prison que de rien déclarer ... toute les merchandises qu'on leur donne à porter aux Indes sont chargées sous le nom d'Espagnols, que bien souvent n'en ont pas connaissance, ne jugeant pas à propos de leur en parler, afin de tenir les affaires plus secrètes et qu'il n'y ait que le commissionaire à le savoir, lequel en rend compte à son retour des Indes, directement à celui qui en a donne la cargaison en confiance sans avoir nul egard pour ceux au nom desquels le chargement à été fait, et lorsque ces commissionaires reviennent des Indes soit sur le flottes galions ou navires particuliers, ils apportent leur argent dans leurs coffres, la pluspart entre pont et sans connoissement." (Margry: Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outremer, p. 185.)The importance to the maritime powers of preserving and protecting this clandestine trade is evident, especially as the Spanish government frequently found it a convenient instrument for retaliating upon those nations against which it harboured some grudge. All that was necessary was to sequester the vessels and goods of merchants belonging to the nation at which it wished to strike. This happened frequently in the course of the seventeenth century. Thus Lerma in 1601 arrested the French merchants in Spain to revenge himself on Henry IV. In 1624 Olivares seized 160 Dutch vessels. The goods of Genoese merchants were sequestered by Philip IV. in 1644; and in 1684 French merchandize was again seized, and Mexican traders whose storehouses contained such goods were fined 500,000 ecus, although the same storehouses contained English and Dutch goods which were left unnoticed. The fine was later restored upon Admiral d'Estrées' threat to bombard Cadiz. The solicitude of the French government for this trade is expressed in a letter of Colbert to the Marquis de Villars, ambassador at Madrid, dated 5th February 1672:—"Il est tellement necessaire d'avoir soin d'assister les particuliers qui font leur trafic en Espagne, pour maintenir le plus important commerce que nous ayons, que je suis persuadé que vous ferez toutes les instances qui pourront dépendre de vous ... en sorte que cette protection produira des avantages considérables au commerce des sujets de Sa Majesté" (ibid., p. 188).Cf.also the instructions of Louis XIV. to the Comte d'Estrées, 1st April 1680. The French admiral was to visit all the ports of the Spaniards in the West Indies, especially Cartagena and San Domingo; and to be always informed of the situation and advantages of these ports, and of the facilities and difficulties to be met with in case of an attack upon them; so that the Spaniards might realise that if they failed to do justice to the French merchants on the return of the galleons, his Majesty was always ready to force them to do so, either by attacking these galleons, or by capturing one of their West Indian ports (ibid.).
Weiss: L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons., II. pp. 204 and 215. Not till 1722 was legislative sanction given to this practice.
M. Lemonnet wrote to Colbert in 1670 concerning this commerce:—"Quelque perquisition qu'on ait faite dans ce dernier temps aux Indes pour découvrir les biens des François, ils ont plustost souffert la prison que de rien déclarer ... toute les merchandises qu'on leur donne à porter aux Indes sont chargées sous le nom d'Espagnols, que bien souvent n'en ont pas connaissance, ne jugeant pas à propos de leur en parler, afin de tenir les affaires plus secrètes et qu'il n'y ait que le commissionaire à le savoir, lequel en rend compte à son retour des Indes, directement à celui qui en a donne la cargaison en confiance sans avoir nul egard pour ceux au nom desquels le chargement à été fait, et lorsque ces commissionaires reviennent des Indes soit sur le flottes galions ou navires particuliers, ils apportent leur argent dans leurs coffres, la pluspart entre pont et sans connoissement." (Margry: Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outremer, p. 185.)
The importance to the maritime powers of preserving and protecting this clandestine trade is evident, especially as the Spanish government frequently found it a convenient instrument for retaliating upon those nations against which it harboured some grudge. All that was necessary was to sequester the vessels and goods of merchants belonging to the nation at which it wished to strike. This happened frequently in the course of the seventeenth century. Thus Lerma in 1601 arrested the French merchants in Spain to revenge himself on Henry IV. In 1624 Olivares seized 160 Dutch vessels. The goods of Genoese merchants were sequestered by Philip IV. in 1644; and in 1684 French merchandize was again seized, and Mexican traders whose storehouses contained such goods were fined 500,000 ecus, although the same storehouses contained English and Dutch goods which were left unnoticed. The fine was later restored upon Admiral d'Estrées' threat to bombard Cadiz. The solicitude of the French government for this trade is expressed in a letter of Colbert to the Marquis de Villars, ambassador at Madrid, dated 5th February 1672:—"Il est tellement necessaire d'avoir soin d'assister les particuliers qui font leur trafic en Espagne, pour maintenir le plus important commerce que nous ayons, que je suis persuadé que vous ferez toutes les instances qui pourront dépendre de vous ... en sorte que cette protection produira des avantages considérables au commerce des sujets de Sa Majesté" (ibid., p. 188).
Cf.also the instructions of Louis XIV. to the Comte d'Estrées, 1st April 1680. The French admiral was to visit all the ports of the Spaniards in the West Indies, especially Cartagena and San Domingo; and to be always informed of the situation and advantages of these ports, and of the facilities and difficulties to be met with in case of an attack upon them; so that the Spaniards might realise that if they failed to do justice to the French merchants on the return of the galleons, his Majesty was always ready to force them to do so, either by attacking these galleons, or by capturing one of their West Indian ports (ibid.).
Footnote 6:(return)Weiss,op. cit., II. p. 205.
Weiss,op. cit., II. p. 205.
Footnote 7:(return)Ibid., II. p. 206.
Ibid., II. p. 206.
Footnote 8:(return)Oppenheim: The Naval Tracts of Sir Wm. Monson. Vol. II. Appendix B., p. 316.
Oppenheim: The Naval Tracts of Sir Wm. Monson. Vol. II. Appendix B., p. 316.
Footnote 9:(return)In 1509, owing to the difficulties experienced by merchants in ascending the Guadalquivir, ships were given permission to load and register at Cadiz under the supervision of an inspector or "visitador," and thereafter commerce and navigation tended more and more to gravitate to that port. After 1529, in order to facilitate emigration to America, vessels were allowed to sail from certain other ports, notably San Sebastian, Bilboa, Coruna, Cartagena and Malaga. The ships might register in these ports, but were obliged always to make their return voyage to Seville. But either thecedulawas revoked, or was never made use of, for, according to Scelle, there are no known instances of vessels sailing to America from those towns. The only other exceptions were in favour of the Company of Guipuzcoa in 1728, to send ships from San Sebastian to Caracas, and of the Company of Galicia in 1734, to send two vessels annually to Campeache and Vera Cruz. (Scelle,op. cit., i. pp. 48-49 and notes.)
In 1509, owing to the difficulties experienced by merchants in ascending the Guadalquivir, ships were given permission to load and register at Cadiz under the supervision of an inspector or "visitador," and thereafter commerce and navigation tended more and more to gravitate to that port. After 1529, in order to facilitate emigration to America, vessels were allowed to sail from certain other ports, notably San Sebastian, Bilboa, Coruna, Cartagena and Malaga. The ships might register in these ports, but were obliged always to make their return voyage to Seville. But either thecedulawas revoked, or was never made use of, for, according to Scelle, there are no known instances of vessels sailing to America from those towns. The only other exceptions were in favour of the Company of Guipuzcoa in 1728, to send ships from San Sebastian to Caracas, and of the Company of Galicia in 1734, to send two vessels annually to Campeache and Vera Cruz. (Scelle,op. cit., i. pp. 48-49 and notes.)
Footnote 10:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 36ff.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 36ff.
Footnote 11:(return)In Nov. 1530 Charles V., against the opposition of theContratacion, ordered the Council of the Indies to appoint a resident judge at Cadiz to replace the officers of theCasathere. This institution, called the "Juzgado de Indias," was, until the removal of theCasato Cadiz in 1717, the source of constant disputes and irritation.
In Nov. 1530 Charles V., against the opposition of theContratacion, ordered the Council of the Indies to appoint a resident judge at Cadiz to replace the officers of theCasathere. This institution, called the "Juzgado de Indias," was, until the removal of theCasato Cadiz in 1717, the source of constant disputes and irritation.
Footnote 12:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 52 and note; Duro: Armada Espanola, I. p. 204.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 52 and note; Duro: Armada Espanola, I. p. 204.
Footnote 13:(return)The distinction between the Flota or fleet for New Spain and the galleons intended for Terra Firma only began with the opening of the great silver mines of Potosi, the rich yields of which after 1557 made advisable an especial fleet for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. (Oppenheim, II. Appendix B., p. 322.)
The distinction between the Flota or fleet for New Spain and the galleons intended for Terra Firma only began with the opening of the great silver mines of Potosi, the rich yields of which after 1557 made advisable an especial fleet for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. (Oppenheim, II. Appendix B., p. 322.)
Footnote 14:(return)Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry,op. cit., p. 192ff.).
Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry,op. cit., p. 192ff.).
Footnote 15:(return)Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry,op. cit., p. 192ff.)
Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry,op. cit., p. 192ff.)
Footnote 16:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 64; Dampier: Voyages,ed.1906, i. p. 200.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 64; Dampier: Voyages,ed.1906, i. p. 200.
Footnote 17:(return)Gage: A New Survey of the West Indies,ed.1655, pp. 185-6. When Gage was at Granada, in February 1637, strict orders were received from Gautemala that the ships were not to sail that year, because the President and Audiencia were informed of some Dutch and English ships lying in wait at the mouth of the river.
Gage: A New Survey of the West Indies,ed.1655, pp. 185-6. When Gage was at Granada, in February 1637, strict orders were received from Gautemala that the ships were not to sail that year, because the President and Audiencia were informed of some Dutch and English ships lying in wait at the mouth of the river.
Footnote 18:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. pp. 64-5; Duhalde and de Rochefort. There were two ways of sending goods from Panama to Porto Bello. One was an overland route of 18 leagues, and was used only during the summer. The other was by land as far as Venta Cruz, 7 leagues from Panama, and thence by water on the river Chagre to its mouth, a distance of 26 leagues. When the river was high the transit might be accomplished in two or three days, but at other times from six to twelve days were required. To transfer goods from Chagre to Porto Bello was a matter of only eight or nine hours. This route was used in winter when the roads were rendered impassable by the great rains and floods. The overland journey, though shorter, was also more difficult and expensive. The goods were carried on long mule-trains, and the "roads, so-called, were merely bridle paths ... running through swamps and jungles, over hills and rocks, broken by unbridged rivers, and situated in one of the deadliest climates in the world." The project of a canal to be cut through the isthmus was often proposed to the Councils in Spain, but was never acted upon. (Descript. ... of Cartagena; Oppenheim, i. p. 333.)
Scelle,op. cit., i. pp. 64-5; Duhalde and de Rochefort. There were two ways of sending goods from Panama to Porto Bello. One was an overland route of 18 leagues, and was used only during the summer. The other was by land as far as Venta Cruz, 7 leagues from Panama, and thence by water on the river Chagre to its mouth, a distance of 26 leagues. When the river was high the transit might be accomplished in two or three days, but at other times from six to twelve days were required. To transfer goods from Chagre to Porto Bello was a matter of only eight or nine hours. This route was used in winter when the roads were rendered impassable by the great rains and floods. The overland journey, though shorter, was also more difficult and expensive. The goods were carried on long mule-trains, and the "roads, so-called, were merely bridle paths ... running through swamps and jungles, over hills and rocks, broken by unbridged rivers, and situated in one of the deadliest climates in the world." The project of a canal to be cut through the isthmus was often proposed to the Councils in Spain, but was never acted upon. (Descript. ... of Cartagena; Oppenheim, i. p. 333.)
Footnote 19:(return)Nombre de Dios, a few leagues to the east of Porto Bello, had formerly been the port where the galleons received the treasure brought from Panama, but in 1584 the King of Spain ordered the settlement to be abandoned on account of its unhealthiness, and because the harbour, being open to the sea, afforded little shelter to shipping. Gage says that in his time Nombre de Dios was almost forsaken because of its climate. Dampier, writing thirty years later, describes the site as a waste. "Nombre de Dios," he says, "is now nothing but a name. For I have lain ashore in the place where that City stood, but it is all overgrown with Wood, so as to have no sign that any Town hath been there." (Voyages,ed.1906, i. p. 81.)
Nombre de Dios, a few leagues to the east of Porto Bello, had formerly been the port where the galleons received the treasure brought from Panama, but in 1584 the King of Spain ordered the settlement to be abandoned on account of its unhealthiness, and because the harbour, being open to the sea, afforded little shelter to shipping. Gage says that in his time Nombre de Dios was almost forsaken because of its climate. Dampier, writing thirty years later, describes the site as a waste. "Nombre de Dios," he says, "is now nothing but a name. For I have lain ashore in the place where that City stood, but it is all overgrown with Wood, so as to have no sign that any Town hath been there." (Voyages,ed.1906, i. p. 81.)
Footnote 20:(return)Gage,ed.1655, pp. 196-8.
Gage,ed.1655, pp. 196-8.
Footnote 21:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 65.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 65.
Footnote 22:(return)Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.
Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.
Footnote 23:(return)When the Margarita patache failed to meet the galleons at Cartagena, it was given its clearance and allowed to sail alone to Havana—a tempting prey to buccaneers hovering in those seas.
When the Margarita patache failed to meet the galleons at Cartagena, it was given its clearance and allowed to sail alone to Havana—a tempting prey to buccaneers hovering in those seas.
Footnote 24:(return)Duhalde and de Rochefort.
Duhalde and de Rochefort.
Footnote 25:(return)Rawl. MSS., A. 175, 313 b; Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.
Rawl. MSS., A. 175, 313 b; Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.
Footnote 26:(return)Here I am following the MSS. quoted by Oppenheim (ii. pp. 335ff.). Instead of watering in Hispaniola, the fleet sometimes stopped at Dominica, or at Aguada in Porto Rico.
Here I am following the MSS. quoted by Oppenheim (ii. pp. 335ff.). Instead of watering in Hispaniola, the fleet sometimes stopped at Dominica, or at Aguada in Porto Rico.
Footnote 27:(return)Duhalde and de Rochefort.
Duhalde and de Rochefort.
Footnote 28:(return)Quintal=about 100 pounds.
Quintal=about 100 pounds.
Footnote 29:(return)These "vaisseaux de registre" were supposed not to exceed 300 tons, but through fraud were often double that burden.
These "vaisseaux de registre" were supposed not to exceed 300 tons, but through fraud were often double that burden.
Footnote 30:(return)Duhalde and de Rochefort; Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 54.
Duhalde and de Rochefort; Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 54.
Footnote 31:(return)Gage,ed.1655, pp. 199-200.
Gage,ed.1655, pp. 199-200.
Footnote 32:(return)Duhalde and de Rochefort; Oppenheim, ii. p. 318.
Duhalde and de Rochefort; Oppenheim, ii. p. 318.
Footnote 33:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 45; Recop., t. i. lib. iii. tit. viii.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. 45; Recop., t. i. lib. iii. tit. viii.
Footnote 34:(return)There seems to have been a contraband trade carried on at Cadiz itself. Foreign merchants embarked their goods upon the galleons directly from their own vessels in the harbour, without registering them with theContratacion; and on the return of the fleets received the price of their goods in ingots of gold and silver by the same fraud. It is scarcely possible that this was done without the tacit authorization of the Council of the Indies at Madrid, for if the Council had insisted upon a rigid execution of the laws regarding registration, detection would have been inevitable.
There seems to have been a contraband trade carried on at Cadiz itself. Foreign merchants embarked their goods upon the galleons directly from their own vessels in the harbour, without registering them with theContratacion; and on the return of the fleets received the price of their goods in ingots of gold and silver by the same fraud. It is scarcely possible that this was done without the tacit authorization of the Council of the Indies at Madrid, for if the Council had insisted upon a rigid execution of the laws regarding registration, detection would have been inevitable.
Footnote 35:(return)Weiss,op. cit., ii. p. 226.
Weiss,op. cit., ii. p. 226.
Footnote 36:(return)Most of the offices in the Spanish Indies were venal. No one obtained a post without paying dearly for it, except the viceroys of Mexico and Peru, who were grandees, and received their places through favour at court. The governors of the ports, and the presidents of the Audiencias established at Panama, San Domingo, and Gautemala, bought their posts in Spain. The offices in the interior were in the gift of the viceroys and sold to the highest bidder. Although each port had three corregidors who audited the finances, as they also paid for their places, they connived with the governors. The consequence was inevitable. Each official during his tenure of office expected to recover his initial outlay, and amass a small fortune besides. So not only were the bribes of interlopers acceptable, but the officials often themselves bought and sold the contraband articles.
Most of the offices in the Spanish Indies were venal. No one obtained a post without paying dearly for it, except the viceroys of Mexico and Peru, who were grandees, and received their places through favour at court. The governors of the ports, and the presidents of the Audiencias established at Panama, San Domingo, and Gautemala, bought their posts in Spain. The offices in the interior were in the gift of the viceroys and sold to the highest bidder. Although each port had three corregidors who audited the finances, as they also paid for their places, they connived with the governors. The consequence was inevitable. Each official during his tenure of office expected to recover his initial outlay, and amass a small fortune besides. So not only were the bribes of interlopers acceptable, but the officials often themselves bought and sold the contraband articles.
Footnote 37:(return)Froude: History of England, viii. p. 436ff.
Froude: History of England, viii. p. 436ff.
Footnote 38:(return)1585, August 12th. Ralph Lane to Sir Philip Sidney. Port Ferdinando, Virginia.—He has discovered the infinite riches of St. John (Porto Rico?) and Hispaniola by dwelling on the islands five weeks. He thinks that if the Queen finds herself burdened with the King of Spain, to attempt them would be most honourable, feasible and profitable. He exhorts him not to refuse this good opportunity of rendering so great a service to the Church of Christ. The strength of the Spaniards doth altogether grow from the mines of her treasure. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
1585, August 12th. Ralph Lane to Sir Philip Sidney. Port Ferdinando, Virginia.—He has discovered the infinite riches of St. John (Porto Rico?) and Hispaniola by dwelling on the islands five weeks. He thinks that if the Queen finds herself burdened with the King of Spain, to attempt them would be most honourable, feasible and profitable. He exhorts him not to refuse this good opportunity of rendering so great a service to the Church of Christ. The strength of the Spaniards doth altogether grow from the mines of her treasure. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
Footnote 39:(return)Scelle,op. cit., ii. p. xiii.
Scelle,op. cit., ii. p. xiii.
Footnote 40:(return)Scelle,op. cit., i. p. ix.
Scelle,op. cit., i. p. ix.
Footnote 41:(return)1611, February 28. Sir Thos. Roe to Salisbury. Port d'Espaigne, Trinidad.—He has seen more of the coast from the River Amazon to the Orinoco than any other Englishman alive. The Spaniards here are proud and insolent, yet needy and weak, their force is reputation, their safety is opinion. The Spaniards treat the English worse than Moors. The government is lazy and has more skill in planting and selling tobacco than in erecting colonies and marching armies. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660. (Roe was sent by Prince Henry upon a voyage of discovery to the Indies.)
1611, February 28. Sir Thos. Roe to Salisbury. Port d'Espaigne, Trinidad.—He has seen more of the coast from the River Amazon to the Orinoco than any other Englishman alive. The Spaniards here are proud and insolent, yet needy and weak, their force is reputation, their safety is opinion. The Spaniards treat the English worse than Moors. The government is lazy and has more skill in planting and selling tobacco than in erecting colonies and marching armies. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660. (Roe was sent by Prince Henry upon a voyage of discovery to the Indies.)
Footnote 42:(return)"An historical account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies." By Dalby Thomas, Lond., 1690. (Harl. Miscell., 1808, ii. 357.)
"An historical account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies." By Dalby Thomas, Lond., 1690. (Harl. Miscell., 1808, ii. 357.)
Footnote 43:(return)Oviedo: Historia general de las Indias, lib. xix. cap. xiii.; Coleccion de documentos ... de ultramar, tom. iv. p. 57 (deposition of the Spanish captain at the Isle of Mona); Pacheco, etc.: Coleccion de documentos ... de las posesiones espanoles en America y Oceania, tom. xl. p. 305 (cross-examination of witnesses by officers of the Royal Audiencia in San Domingo just after the visit of the English ship to that place); English Historical Review, XX. p. 115.The ship is identified with the "Samson" dispatched by Henry VIII. in 1527 "with divers cunning men to seek strange regions," which sailed from the Thames on 20th May in company with the "Mary of Guildford," was lost by her consort in a storm on the night of 1st July, and was believed to have foundered with all on board. (Ibid.)
Oviedo: Historia general de las Indias, lib. xix. cap. xiii.; Coleccion de documentos ... de ultramar, tom. iv. p. 57 (deposition of the Spanish captain at the Isle of Mona); Pacheco, etc.: Coleccion de documentos ... de las posesiones espanoles en America y Oceania, tom. xl. p. 305 (cross-examination of witnesses by officers of the Royal Audiencia in San Domingo just after the visit of the English ship to that place); English Historical Review, XX. p. 115.
The ship is identified with the "Samson" dispatched by Henry VIII. in 1527 "with divers cunning men to seek strange regions," which sailed from the Thames on 20th May in company with the "Mary of Guildford," was lost by her consort in a storm on the night of 1st July, and was believed to have foundered with all on board. (Ibid.)
Footnote 44:(return)Hakluyt,ed.1600, iii. p. 700; Froude,op. cit., viii. p. 427.
Hakluyt,ed.1600, iii. p. 700; Froude,op. cit., viii. p. 427.
Footnote 45:(return)Scelle.,op. cit., i. pp. 123-25, 139-61.
Scelle.,op. cit., i. pp. 123-25, 139-61.
Footnote 46:(return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar. tom. vi. p. 15.
Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar. tom. vi. p. 15.
Footnote 47:(return)Froude,op. cit., viii. pp. 470-72.
Froude,op. cit., viii. pp. 470-72.
Footnote 48:(return)Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. ch. 3.
Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. ch. 3.
Footnote 49:(return)Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. chs. 1, 2, 11.
Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. chs. 1, 2, 11.
Footnote 50:(return)Corbett: The Successors of Drake, ch. x.
Corbett: The Successors of Drake, ch. x.
Footnote 51:(return)Marcel: Les corsaires français au XVIe siècle, p. 7. As early as 1501 a royal ordinance in Spain prescribed the construction of carracks to pursue the privateers, and in 1513 royalcedulaswere sent to the officials of theCasa de Contratacionordering them to send two caravels to guard the coasts of Cuba and protect Spanish navigation from the assaults of French corsairs. (Ibid., p. 8).
Marcel: Les corsaires français au XVIe siècle, p. 7. As early as 1501 a royal ordinance in Spain prescribed the construction of carracks to pursue the privateers, and in 1513 royalcedulaswere sent to the officials of theCasa de Contratacionordering them to send two caravels to guard the coasts of Cuba and protect Spanish navigation from the assaults of French corsairs. (Ibid., p. 8).
Footnote 52:(return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tomos i., iv., vi.; Ducéré: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime. Append. II.; Duro.,op. cit., i. Append. XIV.
Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tomos i., iv., vi.; Ducéré: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime. Append. II.; Duro.,op. cit., i. Append. XIV.
Footnote 53:(return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 22.
Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 22.
Footnote 54:(return)Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 23.
Footnote 55:(return)Marcel,op. cit., p. 16.
Marcel,op. cit., p. 16.
Footnote 56:(return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.
Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.
Footnote 57:(return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.
Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.
Footnote 58:(return)Lucas: A Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. ii. pp. 37, 50.
Lucas: A Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. ii. pp. 37, 50.
Footnote 59:(return)Weiss,op. cit., ii. p. 292.
Weiss,op. cit., ii. p. 292.
Footnote 60:(return)Duro,op. cit., iii. ch. xvi.; iv. chs. iii., viii.
Duro,op. cit., iii. ch. xvi.; iv. chs. iii., viii.
Footnote 61:(return)Portugal between 1581 and 1640 was subject to the Crown of Spain, and Brazil, a Portuguese colony, was consequently within the pale of Spanish influence and administration.
Portugal between 1581 and 1640 was subject to the Crown of Spain, and Brazil, a Portuguese colony, was consequently within the pale of Spanish influence and administration.
Footnote 62:(return)Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 36.
Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 36.
Footnote 63:(return)Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 37; Duro,op. cit., iv. p. 99; Gage,ed.1655, p. 80.
Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 37; Duro,op. cit., iv. p. 99; Gage,ed.1655, p. 80.
Footnote 64:(return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,325, No. 10.
Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,325, No. 10.
Footnote 65:(return)Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, was created admiral of the fleet by order of Parliament in March 1642, and although removed by Charles I. was reinstated by Parliament on 1st July.
Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, was created admiral of the fleet by order of Parliament in March 1642, and although removed by Charles I. was reinstated by Parliament on 1st July.
Footnote 66:(return)Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS., 793 or 894; Add. MSS., 36,327, No. 9.
Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS., 793 or 894; Add. MSS., 36,327, No. 9.
Footnote 67:(return)Winwood Papers, ii. pp. 75-77.
Winwood Papers, ii. pp. 75-77.
Footnote 68:(return)Brown: Genesis of the United States, i. pp. 120-25, 172.
Brown: Genesis of the United States, i. pp. 120-25, 172.
Footnote 69:(return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
Footnote 70:(return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
Footnote 71:(return)Clarendon State Papers, ii. p. 87; Rymer: Fœdera, xx. p. 416.
Clarendon State Papers, ii. p. 87; Rymer: Fœdera, xx. p. 416.
Footnote 72:(return)Duro,op. cit., ii. p. 462.
Duro,op. cit., ii. p. 462.
Footnote 73:(return)Duro,op. cit., iii. pp. 236-37.
Duro,op. cit., iii. pp. 236-37.
Footnote 74:(return)C.S.P. Venet., 1603-07, p. 199.
C.S.P. Venet., 1603-07, p. 199.
Footnote 75:(return)Winwood Papers, ii. p. 233.
Winwood Papers, ii. p. 233.
Footnote 76:(return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,319, No. 7; 36,320, No. 8; 36,321, No. 24; 36,322, No. 23.
Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,319, No. 7; 36,320, No. 8; 36,321, No. 24; 36,322, No. 23.
Footnote 77:(return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1629, 5th and 30th Nov.; 1630, 29th July.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1629, 5th and 30th Nov.; 1630, 29th July.
Footnote 78:(return)Gage saw at Cartagena about a dozen English prisoners captured by the Spaniards at sea, and belonging to the settlement on Providence Island.
Gage saw at Cartagena about a dozen English prisoners captured by the Spaniards at sea, and belonging to the settlement on Providence Island.
Footnote 79:(return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1635, 19th March; 1636, 26th March.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1635, 19th March; 1636, 26th March.
Footnote 80:(return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,323, No. 10.
Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,323, No. 10.
Footnote 81:(return)Duro, Tomo., iv. p. 339;cf.also in Bodleian Library:—"A letter written upon occasion in the Low Countries, etc. Whereunto is added avisos from several places, of the taking of the Island of Providence, by the Spaniards from the English. London. Printed for Nath. Butter, Mar. 22, 1641."I have letter by an aviso from Cartagena, dated the 14th of September, wherein they advise that the galleons were ready laden with the silver, and would depart thence the 6th of October. The general of the galleons, named Francisco Dias Pimienta, had beene formerly in the moneth of July with above 3000 men, and the least of his ships, in the island of S. Catalina, where he had taken and carried away with all the English, and razed the forts, wherein they found 600 negroes, much gold and indigo, so that the prize is esteemed worth above halfe a million."
Duro, Tomo., iv. p. 339;cf.also in Bodleian Library:—"A letter written upon occasion in the Low Countries, etc. Whereunto is added avisos from several places, of the taking of the Island of Providence, by the Spaniards from the English. London. Printed for Nath. Butter, Mar. 22, 1641.
"I have letter by an aviso from Cartagena, dated the 14th of September, wherein they advise that the galleons were ready laden with the silver, and would depart thence the 6th of October. The general of the galleons, named Francisco Dias Pimienta, had beene formerly in the moneth of July with above 3000 men, and the least of his ships, in the island of S. Catalina, where he had taken and carried away with all the English, and razed the forts, wherein they found 600 negroes, much gold and indigo, so that the prize is esteemed worth above halfe a million."
Footnote 82:(return)Rawl. MSS., A. 32,297; 31, 121.
Rawl. MSS., A. 32,297; 31, 121.