And so I find it well to comeFor deeper rest to this still room,
And so I find it well to come
For deeper rest to this still room,
For here the habit of the soulFeels less the outer world’s control;
For here the habit of the soul
Feels less the outer world’s control;
The strength of mutual purpose pleadsMore earnestly our common needs,
The strength of mutual purpose pleads
More earnestly our common needs,
And in the silence multipliedBy these still forms on either side,
And in the silence multiplied
By these still forms on either side,
The world that time and space have knownFalls off and leaves us God alone.Whittier.
The world that time and space have known
Falls off and leaves us God alone.Whittier.
Sources other than acknowledged in the text: Henry B. Taylor, Howell S. Brown, Mabel N. Lybolt, L. H. Taylor, for minutes, notes, articles, manuscripts, and consultation;Landmarks of Old Prince William; Briscoe Goodhart,The Loudoun Rangers; James Head,The History of Loudoun County; Loudoun Historical SocietyBulletin, 1958; Samuel M. Janney,Memoirs and History of Friends; Hopewell Friends,History of Hopewell Friends Meeting; Hinshaw,Quaker Genealogy; Frederick Gutheim,The Potomac, from “Rivers of America” series.
A Lecture Delivered Before Members of the Society, January 15, 1965By Col. Trevor N. Dupuy
At the outset I should make clear that I have no credentials in historiography. In fact I do not have even have the so-called Union Card for the professional academic historian—a Ph. D. degree—but I do believe that I have enough practical experience in the writing of history, and in teaching it at three universities, to warrant having some thoughts on the nature of history, and of its uses. And I have another reason, as well, as you will see.
Let me start by explaining how I intend to treat this important topic: The uses of history. First I shall give you my interpretation of what thenatureof history is. Next I will offer some verygeneralthoughts on theusesof history. Then I would like to make one or two comments on how I visualize history being currently useful for Loudoun County. Finally, I shall tell you a little bit about my own day-to-day involvement in several very specific uses of history.
First, then, for my views on what history is—and what it is not. Several months ago there was an interesting debate in the New YorkTimes Magazineabout the nature of history, provoked by an article written by Barbara Tuchman, the historian whose public reputation is based primarily upon her magnificent book,The Guns of August. The essence of the debate was whether history is whatactually happenedin the past, or is merely therecordof what happened. The subtle distinction, of course, is comparable to that involved in the question of whether there can be noise—as from a tree falling in the middle of an impenetrable forest—if there is no ear to hear the sound waves. I don’t intend to revive the debate; I merely want to suggest that there are various ways of looking at the nature of history. You are about to be exposed tomyway of looking at it.
As I see it, recorded history is society’s memory. For society as a whole, as well as for an individual, memory can provide insights, wisdom,and the recollection of past experiences which are in some way relevant to every new experience—no matter how unanticipated the manifestation of that new experience may be. And of course each new experience adds to the information stored in that amazing electronic computer—the human brain. Sometimes the new experience reinforces the information already stored there, sometimes it qualifies the existing information, but always the new experience is in some way relevant to events in the past which are already recorded in the memory. This same process is to some degree true of society as a whole.
Every event of significance in mankind’s past can enrich the memory of human society, and can be used to the future benefit of mankind—if some way can be found to relate that experience to current issues and problems, without distortion, through some kind of memory process. The historian, of course, is the essential element of this memory process.
In considering this relationship of experience to memory, it is pertinent to point out that even the most startling new scientific development invariably has had a historical background of its own. New wonders of technology and science all have a direct connection with the past, not only through the evaluation and analysis of empirical records, but also through discontinuities or continuities which exist between the new development and what has happened in the past.
If there is anything to my suggestion that historical experience is the basic material for the memory of society, then the record of past experience is a natural resource, which can and should be mined for the present and future benefit of mankind. Save possibly in the area of science, human society has never come near to efficiently exploiting this resource of its own experience.
When itismined, this natural resource can make its principal contribution to social memory by enriching wisdom. We have a tendency to speak of the “lessons” of history, as though they were immutable—I do this as much as anyone—but I realize that in a literal sense this is impossible. One can never recreate, in every detail and particular, the exact circumstances of a past event. History can neverexactlyrepeat itself, and so its so-called lessons cannot be applied blindly or automatically.
But if history doesn’t repeat itself it does, in the words of Herman Kahn, paraphrase itself. Kahn, incidentally, is a scientist and not a historian, but he, like Toynbee and other historians, recognizes that human and institutional relationships in modern times can often bear a close resemblance to events of the past. One can discern many parallel patterns in history, and both trends and specific events are often directly comparable between these patterns. The rise and fall of nations and dynasties, for instance. And since human reactions to circumstances and stimuli are not ever likely to change radically, it is easy to note danger signals from certain circumstances in related patterns of events, and to see what kinds of actions have been successful in certain circumstances in the past, and which have failed, in similar patterns.
Thus, while rejecting the idea that history teaches us lessons from the past, I am convinced that history will widen our horizons, revealing new perspective, providing insights, and generally enriching wisdom in using good judgment in dealing with the present. There is still one caution,however. If there isanyimmutable lesson which history teaches, it is that no quantity of insights can ever replace or substitute for good judgement or the basic intellectual capacity which experience transforms into wisdom.
I have tried to indicate what I think the nature of history is, and in the process I have given you some very general thoughts about the use and utility of history. I would like to pursue this question of uses of history a bit further.
What really do any of us have in mind in speaking of the “Uses of History?” Is it history for the enrichment of one’s life? For the lessons (so-called) to be gained from experience? For developing patriotism or a sense of one’s heritage? For making money?
At this point it might be useful to recall that a number of ancient and not-so-ancient philosophers have commented on the value and importance of history. Let me simply refresh your memory on four that I happen to like:
Polybius: For it is history and history alone, which will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.Shakespeare: The past is prologue.Santayana: Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.John Gardner: “In the renewing society the historian consults the past in the service of the present and the future.”
Polybius: For it is history and history alone, which will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.
Shakespeare: The past is prologue.
Santayana: Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
John Gardner: “In the renewing society the historian consults the past in the service of the present and the future.”
But, like so many philosophical sayings, these aphorisms are somewhat cryptic. We understand them, but they require some elaboration, and possibly some interpretation.
Many academic historians would insist that history doesn’t need to have a use. Its existence is as inevitable as life itself; as last night’s sunset, this morning’s sunrise. These scholars feel that the study of the events which make up history is rewarding in itself without any further direct use. It is a part of the well-educated man or woman.
There are other people, of course, who would insist that—save for the scholars who teach it—history has no more utility than knowledge of Latin and Greek. Having found no adult use for the contents of their history textbooks, such people might be pardoned for feeling that history is merely the useless foible of educators. (I leave it up to you whether it is appropriate to apply the same logic to the so-called dead languages.)
Yet, if there is any validity to what I said earlier about history being the memory of human society—and of individual humans as well—I suspect that history has had some utility—direct and indirect—to even the most pragmatic amongst us. Certainlysomethingof what was taught us in our history courses has entered our memories, even if subconsciously so. Otherwise we could not have any opinions about it. It is even more certain that the reader of a daily newspaper will retainsomerecollection of what he has read in that paper, and then will relate these recalled events to what he does, what he thinks, what he talks about, and what he reads in the next day’s newspaper. These events, recorded in the newspaper, are as much history as events which happened in the days ofRoman power, as recorded by Julius Caesar, Livy, and other writers of those times. Thus the man who reads a daily newspaper, or a weekly newsmagazine, is making definite use of history—otherwise he wouldn’t bother to read!
Equally, events which happened to us in our daily work last year, last week, even today, are as much historical events as things which occurred centuries ago. These events are experience, and our recollection of these day to day events are used by all of us in planning and doing things in subsequent days. Deprived of this memory, we would be both useless and helpless. The same is true of society as a whole. Recognizing this, there are economic and social historians who concentrate their efforts on events of the very recent past, in order to provide useful inputs to the memories of scholars, policy makers, and others who are concerned with modern economic or social affairs. It is beside the point whether or not we believe the job could be done more systematically.
Even more basically, some of us believe that a sense of history, and a consciousness of participation in history, is a basic human need. Now there are, of course, different kinds of basic human needs—there are the powerful and elemental forces of life and the preservation and continuation of life; instincts and drives relating to food, shelter, sex, parenthood and survival. Then there are the other, more social, needs—as for recreation, privacy, living space, and the like. It is in this latter category that I would place the need for a sense of history. Aside from the memory aspect, to which I have already alluded, there is an enrichment and humanizing effect on peoples’ lives resulting from a consciousness of making history as they vote in an election, testify at a local hearing, help create a local institution, or work at responsible jobs. Essential to this enrichment is some kind of prior realization of what history is, and how these personal activities can contribute to it.
What I have been saying so far has all been rather theoretical and ethereal. I believe it is probably time for me to come down to earth with some practical uses of history, as I see them, and as I have personally experienced them.
First let me say a few words about how the use of history can be directly relevant to Loudoun County. Before going further I should explain to you that, even though I am not a resident, I am no stranger to the County or to Leesburg. For about twenty years the Dupuys have been property-owners in Loudoun County. As my father used to comment, we are thus modern recruits of the Army of Northern Virginia. My wife and I even have plans for a house which we someday expect to build on our property on the banks of Goose Creek.
So I know something about the county, and something about its history. Not enough to discuss in any detail withthisgroup—but enough to know that it is an appropriate place to settle for one who (like myself) has forebears who fought on both sides in the Civil War (a conflict which, as most of you know, my friends, Pat Andrews, always refers to as the War of Northern Aggression; I won’t bother you with the details of my many Civil War controversies with Pat; I’ll simply mention the fact that our principal dispute centers over the question whether McClellan was a greater detriment to the Union cause than BraxtonBragg was to that of the Confederacy.)
To return to history and Loudoun County.
A number among you know my father—who is still at heart a recruit in the Army of Northern Virginia, and who left Loudoun County only because of pressure on him from those of the family who felt that his age and health required a less rigorous life and a more accessible home than conditions permitted in their isolated house on Goose Creek. While he lived here, he took the time to immerse himself in Loudoun County History; in fact, he probably should be talking to you tonight instead of me.
Anyway, I recall his telling me about the old canal locks in front of his house—long since inundated by the dam built largely on what used to be their property. These canal lock ruins clearly demonstrated the relationship of past events to the present—and of the usefulness of being able to interpret such relevance. Even submerged, they are mute evidence of a dream of mass transportation—movement of Loudoun County produce to the Potomac. This dream was a bubble pricked by the unexpectedly rapid growth of the railroads. The local railroad, in turn, has given way to the equally unexpected rapid growth of road transportation, which has not only brought this rural region into the suburban circle of the nearby metropolis, but has actually brought about the appearance within the county of the major metropolitan terminus for a still newer means of mass transportation—and of course I am speaking of Dulles Airport.
This is only one of the many manifestations of the fact that history is certainly sweeping Loudoun County into the Eastern Seaboard Megalopolis. This historical fact has great relevance and use to this county—and I should think poses a challenge to this Historical Society.
I am sure the county must have some plans for coping with this historical fact, and I imagine that this Society has probably done much thinking about its role in these plans. But let me mention anyhow, at the risk of telling you things you have already thought of, how I visualize using history for planning purposes in Loudoun County right now.
I understand that Fairfax County has recently begun to prepare to identify its historical landmarks. There are several reasons for such identification, particularly to permit the county to preserve the essentials of its past history, as embodied in places, objects and memories, while still participating in present history. I would hope that Loudoun County has done, or will do, the same, relying upon this Society for advice and counsel.
I should like to spend the next few minutes in telling you about some examples of practical use of history by an organization created for the specific purpose of making use of history.
This is the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization—which we modestly call HERO. HERO is dedicated to stimulating improved use of historical experience—as well as improved use of the professional historians who are most competent to marshal and to evaluate historical experience—in the development of national security policy.
Interestingly, and not surprisingly, we have encountered some skepticism amongst Government officials and others who had some doubtsabout the need for or the utility of our principal function: The application of historical experience to the development of current and future national security policy. There were two principal reasons for the skepticism. First, there are a number of people who feel that the tremendous technological advances of our times have totally invalidated any possible relevance of the past experience which is the stuff of history. Secondly, there are those who feel that the competent Government specialist has no need for the services of the historian; he is usually far more conversant with his field of interest than any academic scholar can be; he has his files available for documentation; he knows what facts can be considered relevant, and he will include these in any statement which may be required of “Facts Bearing on the Problem.”
As to the first of these doubts, as I shall show, we have clearly demonstrated the relevance of history to current policy issues. For the second, we believe that the dangers of the concept of “every man his own historian” are becoming apparent to many Government officials. The historical background of Government specialists, even in their own area of specialty, is not only spotty, but their recollection of historical experience is limited mostly to those examples which tend to support their own pre-conceived ideas. Furthermore, their own Governmental documentation is often inadequate in most areas other than in classified documents. More and more people are beginning to recognize the ability of the trained historian to bring outallof the pertinent facts, and to weigh their relative value far more objectively than is possible for the average person without historical training.
Thus, HERO is convinced of the utility of our primary mission of mining the rich natural resource which we think history is, and also of refining the ore so as to permit history to serve mankind, as philosophers have always said it should. This has never been done before, either here or in any other country, to the best of my knowledge—though, as a historian, I am aware of the danger of using such absolute terms as “never,” or “the first ever.”
Rather than going into any generalized explanation of how we go about mining and refining this resource, I think I can demonstrate how we do it—and at the same time give concrete examples of some uses of history—by talking about some of HERO’s past and current work.
The first study which HERO completed was done for the Sandia Corporation—a special contracting agency for the Atomic Energy Commission. The purpose of this study—which we dubbed “Pre-Alert”—was to ascertain the extent to which historical example and experience could be useful in the area of military command and control. The Sandia Corporation had the responsibility for developing the so-called “black box” to provide foolproof, automatic controls which will prevent accidental or unauthorized employment of nuclear weapons systems. Our study was unclassified, so we didn’t get into the classified details of these foolproof, automatic controls. Our task was to assess the likelihood that such controls might be so complicated, or might be so inhibiting to individual initiative, as to preclude adequate military response in the event of unforeseen emergency conditions or circumstances.
Sandia had, of course, called upon the psychologists and sociologiststo study this problem but the results of these scientific studies were not completely satisfactory in synthetic “model” environments. So we were asked to see if anything could be learned from historical experience.
After surveying the history of weapon systems, and the sometimes divergent history of command and control systems, we came to the conclusion that muchcouldbe learned from history about the human aspects of command and control. We laid out a program for a detailed investigation of a number of pertinent case studies, and some general areas for intensive research. We don’t know how useful our study was to the Sandia Corporation. We do know, however, that it aroused considerable interest in the Army. And it proved to us, without question, that our thesis about the relevance of history to current and future problems was as sound in the nuclear era, and with respect to nuclear weapon systems, as we had believed would be the case.
Our next study was for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Entitled “Riposte,” the purpose of this study was to survey historical experience in the field of international treaties, to analyze this experience, and to point out lessons applicable to current and future treaty negotiations and treaty enforcement, particularly as this experience might be relevant to arms control treaties.
For over a year we surveyed and analyzed modern treaty experience, particularly looking at instances of violations of treaties, and enforcement measures that were taken, or that could have been taken, in response to these violations. We gave special attention to the enforcement (and non-enforcement) of the Treaty of Versailles; to sanctions and treaty enforcement experience of international organizations like the League of Nations, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations; and to the details of experience in negotiating and enforcing agreements with the Communists since World War II, such as those dealing with access rights to Berlin, the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1961 on Southeast Asia, and the Korean Armistice.
We were very pleased with the results of this study, and we understand that the Arms Control Agency was, also. We demonstrated how our Government may profit from its own experience and from that of others in the fields of treaty negotiation and enforcement.
Perhaps the most significant study we have done to date, and the one which gives promise of having the greatest impact upon policy makers, is one which we completed for the Army last fall, entitled “Historical Trends Related to Weapon Lethality.” The purpose of the study was to provide useful insights to men who are trying to develop new doctrines, and new organizations, for the most efficient possible employment of the terribly destructive new weapons which are available to the Army today. In the process we surveyed the history of weapons development from the Fourth Century B. C. to the end of the Korean War.
This comprehensive survey provided us with a formidable mass of data on weapon experience in the history of war. We grouped related facts according to novel schemes of classification and analysis, and then tried to ascertain what these groupings meant. From this we derived a number of most interesting conclusions. Let me mention a few:
We learned that the mere invention of a new weapon has almostnever affected the course of world events, or altered the balance of power. The real impact of weapons on events comes from the assimilation of weapons into an effective military system. (By assimilation of a weapon we mean its integration into the nation’s milita organization and doctrine in such a way that it is employed effectively and confidently, and that its employment usually results in a relative decrease in the user’s casualties, while permitting the user to inflict higher casualties on military forces that have not assimilated it.) One interesting pattern which emerged from our analysis of assimilation, incidentally, is the fact that it has almost always, through history, taken at least one full generation, or about 20 years, for a weapon to become assimilated after its first adoption. This time lag of about 20 years seems still to be with us today, despite the accelerating trends of technological weapon development. Nuclear weapons, first employed in 1945, have not yet been effectively assimilated into a tactical system by our army or—to the best of our knowledge—any other army—though of course the weapons are available, and can be used.
Of the many significant conclusions that emerged from this study, however, one seemed to us to be especially important: New and effective tactical systems in history seem to have been more the result of new ideas than of new or improved weapons. New and imaginative concepts have often permitted inferior forces to overcome handicaps in numbers and/or equipment. We suspect that Vietnam is no exception to this.
Another thing which we did in this report was to develop a basis for calculating what we term “lethality indices” for all weapons in history, from hand-to-hand implements of antiquity to nuclear explosives. Using data derived from history, we have been able to calculate the relative theoretical efficiency of weapons, and have discovered that these lethality indices are consistent with actual combat experience in a number of wars which we analyzed in depth. This, in turn, permitted us to develop a quantitative relationship between lethality, mobility, and dispersion in combat.
As a military historian, what we did, and what we ended up with, in that study are particularly fascinating to me. I might add that we have also stimulated very gratifying interest in the Army. This very afternoon I presented a briefing of the study report to the Army staff, and discussed some new, and we think potentially important, tactical concepts which the results of the study seem to point out to us.
Before leaving the subject of this study, I wish to mention that one of the members of your Society—Mr. Marshall Andrews—was a very important contributor to that study.
HERO has also done quite a bit of work in a rather different field of historical research—in which we have concerned ourselves with the teaching of history in American schools—which also demonstrates how history can be used.
We became interested in the subject of the teaching of American history in our schools for two reasons. First, because we have reason to think that the teaching of history has not been as good or as effective as it can be and should be. Too often children think of history as one of the dullest of their subjects, instead of one which can provide endless,dramatic fascination. And, as historians, we saw in this situation the possibility that historians could make a direct contribution to one of the great social problems of our time: the alienation of important minority groups, particularly in our large urban areas, from the rest of American society.
It is our hypothesis that improvement in the teaching of history will not only be a contribution to American education in general, but may also be a start toward the building of a bridge between these alienated minorities and the main stream of American society. This will be no easy task. The imaginations of Negro, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-American children will not be stimulated by such simple methods as teaching them about great American heroes—nor teaching them about Negro, Puerto Rican or Mexican-American heroes. History and historians can play only a contributory role in this task, which will require the cooperation of many different specialists. We know that two apparently divergent results must be achieved by this cooperation: improvement of the self-concept and self-respect of these minority children, who have been largely second-class citizens, while at the same time stimulating their feeling of association with the larger white majority.
As a start toward testing—and we hope proving—our hypothesis that history can help in the effort to achieve these apparently divergent goals, we developed a five-city survey plan to see how history is being taught in five major cities, and particularly how it is being taught to the underprivileged minority groups in those cities. We developed these plans with the cooperation of the school authorities in New York, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Phoenix, and Los Angeles. We are currently seeking funds which will permit us to undertake this planned survey which, in turn, will provide the basis for long-range research and experimentation in the teaching of history to underprivileged minority groups.
Without waiting for the survey, we have already begun one small experimental program ourselves. We came to the conclusion, while we were developing our survey plans, that if History is to have any effective impact on these minority group children, they should be exposed to it as early as possible, and as effectively as possible, before they have become embittered and alienated in their reaction to the social conditions in which they live. We accordingly developed a teachers’ source-book for teachers of kindergarten and the early elementary grades. The book comprises 27 separate essays on important holidays commemorating events of significance in American history. I can perhaps best describe the book, and what we hope it will accomplish, by reading two paragraphs from its introduction:
“‘Holidays’ has been written primarily for elementary school teachers who are searching for ways to communicate meaningfully and with balanced perspective to very young children those values inherent in American history: patriotism, heroism, self-reliance, and tolerance, to name but a few. The book is intended to help busy teachers who need brief, pithy, scrupulously-researched essays that are laced with ideas for presentation. The authors are specialists, whose experience and scholarship have particularly qualified them to write with authority and accuracy on their subjects.
“Included in this book are regularly celebrated American holidays for all races, creeds, and regions across the entire nation. Among these are: Alamo Day, celebrating the memory both of valiant Mexican-Texans and Anglo-Americans who died together for the principle of self-government; United Nations Day and Pan-American Day, which both symbolize world unity and peace; American Indian Day and Commonwealth Day, neither widely celebrated, but both undeniably American. From these and the other stories youngsters can start to learn about their privileges and responsibilities as members of a pluralistic, democratic society. They will also begin to establish a useful base of historical knowledge upon which they can build in subsequent school years.”
In this endeavor, and in some related educational-historical projects, we believe that we are indeed making some very good use of history in the national interest.
I have one last HERO project which I should like to mention as being relevant to the uses of history.
You will recall my concept of history as society’s memory. Several of us, through long and bitter experience, have come to the conclusion that the memory of the Government is not very good. We are dismayed by the duplication of effort in Government research and in policy-making; by the lack of communication which exists between people doing related work in different Government offices, and by the lack of communication within individual Government offices—which is another way of saying lack of continuity.
We have also been struck by the fact that the richest single source of material for the Government’s memory has been almost ignored, and never organized or utilized systematically. This is the mass of information on all of the varied activities of the Government which is available in unclassified publications prepared in and for the Congress. For all practical purposes, this material is not even usefully available, in organized form, to members of Congress or its committees. Accordingly, HERO has decided to do something about this.
We are in the process of developing what we call a “Defense Memory System.” This comprises the collection of all Congressional documents dealing with national defense, abstracting them, then indexing the abstracts so that queries on any aspects of national defense can be answered by going directly—via the index—to the abstract or abstracts which deal with the topic in question, and—if necessary—going to the basic document itself. What we are doing, essentially, is to apply to the conceptual field of non-technical, non-scientific policy-type information the same kind of modern storage and retrieval methods which have been so successfully applied to the physical sciences, to engineering data, and to hardware information.
We are in the process of preparing a prototype of this system for demonstration next month to Congress and to possible private users of this historical data. In this project, then, we at HERO are not only making use of history, we are organizing it so that others can use it as well.
Which is, I think, about as much as I can say about the uses of history.
By Col. A. B. JohnsonU.S. Army (Ret.)
Following the battle of Second Manassas General Lee brought his Army of Northern Virginia through Loudoun County for the first invasion of the North. One of Lee’s prime considerations for the movement through Loudoun is best described in a letter from Lee to President Davis dated September 4, 1862: “I did not think it advantageous to follow the enemy into his fortifications. If I had possessed the necessary ammunition I should be unable to supply provisions for the troops. I therefore determined to draw troops into Loudoun County where forage and provisions could be obtained.”
White’s Ford, a low water crossing of the Potomac, offered his best access to the Maryland shore. (White’s Ford is not to be confused with present day White’s Ferry. The ford is about three miles upstream, and can be reached via Routes 661 and 656, east of Route 15).
General J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry was to screen the advance, and in doing so he sent Colonel T. T. Munford with the 2nd Virginia Cavalry toward Leesburg. Munford’s mission was to clear the enemy from the river crossings, and in so doing he was to strike the “notorious Means” who was thought to be at or near Leesburg.
Captain Samuel C. Means of Waterford had organized a company of Union cavalry known as the Loudoun Rangers from the northern part of Loudoun. This act had embittered the Confederates and at every opportunity they tried to annihilate these Virginians who would not supportthe State. The Rangers had been roughly handled a few days before at the Waterford Baptist Church by Major E. V. White’s 35th Battalion, Virginia Cavalry.
On September 1, Munford left the army and bivouaced at Goose Creek near where it crosses Route 7. In the meantime, Cole’s Independent Maryland Cavalry (3 companies) and Means’ depleted company were in Leesburg.
On the 2nd as Munford approached Leesburg he divided his command, sending Captain Irvine of Company C with a squadron to drive through the town. With the remainder of the regiment, Munford turned off Route 7 in a northerly direction, crossing the Edwards Ferry road and the Trundle plantation (Exeter). While Munford was making this flanking movement, Captain Irvine charged into the town wounding four of the Loudoun Rangers and causing Means to withdraw north on present day Route 15.
Cole’s three companies had taken position on a slight eminence about a mile north of town. In taking up this position Cole had dismounted his troopers and sent the horses to the rear near Big Spring; one holder was in charge of four horses, thus depleting his fighting strength by one fourth. (Cole’s line was in the “V” between old Route 15 and the new part that has been recently straightened, and approximately on the ridge at the entrance to Ball’s Bluff.)
Fences bordered the road and a wheat field in shocks was on the southeast side. Irvine’s squadron had followed Means from the town and was firing from behind the shocks as they drove the Loudoun Rangers back on Cole’s line.
Irvine had performed his work well, for in attacking from the front he had allowed Munford with the rest of the regiment to circle around behind Cole unnoticed. Suddenly from the rear came the horseholders at a full gallop shouting, “Here come the Rebs.” Munford with most of his regiment riding boot to boot and shouting at the top of their lungs was upon them. No time was lost in formal maneuvers as Cole shouted to his men to mount up and charge to the right—the melee was on. Some of the blue troopers were shot down and sabred before they could mount, others were captured on foot; many with blood streaming down their faces from sabre cuts on the head.
The melee developed into a running fight as Cole led his men toward the mountain road that runs past the Burdett Wright farm toward Waterford. Again the sabre was freely used as it was impossible to reload revolvers on moving horses. The pursuit continued for about two milesuntil Munford called a halt to secure horses and prisoners that had been passed in the chase.
From existing reports it is difficult to reconcile either the strength or the casualties for the opposing forces in this engagement. Munford officially reported his strength at 163. This figure seems low, for at this early date in the war a company of only 16 men was the exception rather than the rule. Munford adds further that: “A squadron of 40 men under Captain H. Clay Dickinson disgraced itself, having run as far as Goose Creek and failed to support the regiment in the fight.” The usual Confederate system for reporting strength was to count only those on the field with musket in hand; thus, it is possible that the 2nd Virginia Cavalry had a pre-battle strength of 203 of all ranks.
The Confederates list only 2 killed and 5 badly wounded; evidently there were no slightly wounded or they failed to report them.
The Union strength was not reported officially. Goodhart, the company historian, estimates the Loudoun Rangers had 30 men on the field. Its casualties were 1 killed, 6 wounded and 4 captured; four of the wounded also fell into the hands of the enemy. Cole’s strength may be placed at 150 or an average of 50 men per company for his three companies. The battalion historian gives the names, which total 6 killed, 27 wounded, of whom 11 were captured, as the losses sustained.
Goodhart says that this engagement coming in such close succession after the debacle at Waterford, and before the company had attained proficiency in discipline and drill, seriously affected recruiting and nearly broke up the company.
It is interesting to note the high percentage of officers among the casualties; this is no doubt due to the fact that in cavalry the officers rode in front and led the charge.
The psychological effect of a mounted charge, particularly when a surprise, is powerful. In this instance the 2nd Virginia Cavalry with about 200 men was reported by Cole as an entire brigade.
Cole’s great mistake was of course in not posting pickets at his rear and flanks to prevent just what happened, a surprise attack. He left the Smart’s Mill road, less than a half mile from his flank, entirely unguarded; a fatal mistake as it left open a road mostly sheltered from view for Munford to follow to his rear.
Munford appears to have handled his operations without flaw. He kept his men well under control, even in pursuit of Cole, which so often broke up commands and caused the men to scatter and not answer recall.He was completely successful in clearing the enemy from the area to allow Lee’s infantry and artillery to make uninterrupted marches to the river crossings.
Source material has been drawn from the following sources: