ColonelJoseph Read,Massachusetts505[95]"Ebenezer Learned,"521"John Bailey,"503"Loammi Baldwin,"468
Scott's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN MORIN SCOTT.
Brigade-Major, Nicholas Fish.
ColonelJohn Lasher,New York510"William Malcom,"297"Samuel Drake,"459"Cornelius Humphrey,"261
Fellows' Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN FELLOWS.
Brigade-Major, Mark Hopkins.
ColonelJonathan Holman,Massachusetts606"Simeon Cary,"569"Jonathan Smith,"551"John Glover,[96]"365
Heath's Division.
MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM HEATH.
Aides-de-Camp.
Major Thomas Henly, Major Israel Keith.
Mifflin's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS MIFFLIN.
Brigade-Major, Jonathan Mifflin.
ColonelRobert Magaw,Pennsylvania480"John Shee,"496"Israel Hutchinson,Massachusetts513"Paul Dudley Sargent,[97]"527"Andrew Ward,Connecticut437
Clinton's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE CLINTON.
Brigade-Major, Albert Pawling.
ColonelIsaac Nichol,New York289"Thomas Thomas,"354"James Swartwout"364"Levi Paulding,"368"Morris Graham,"437
Spencer's Division.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH SPENCER.
Aides-de-Camp.
Major William Peck, Major Charles Whiting.
Parsons' Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SAMUEL HOLDEN PARSONS.
Brigade-Major, Thomas Dyer.
ColonelJedediah Huntington,Connecticut348"Samuel Wyllys,"530"John Durkee,"520"John Tyler,"569"Jonathan Ward,Massachusetts502
Wadsworth's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES WADSWORTH.
Brigade-Major, John Palsgrave Wyllys.
ColonelGold Selleck Silliman,Connecticut415"Fisher Gay,"449"Comfort Sage,"482"Samuel Selden,"464"William Douglas,"506"John Chester,"535"Phillip Burr Bradley,"569
Sullivan's Division.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN SULLIVAN.
Aides-de-Camp.
Major Alexander Scammell, Major Lewis Morris, Jr.
Stirling's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL LORD STIRLING.
Brigade-Major, W.S. Livingston.
ColonelWilliam Smallwood,Maryland600"John Haslet,Delaware750"Samuel Miles,Pennsylvania650"Samuel John Atlee,"300Lieutenant-ColonelNicholas Lutz,"200" "Peter Kachlein,"200MajorHay,"200
McDougall's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER MCDOUGALL.
Brigade-Major, Richard Platt.
Late McDougall's, New York428Colonel Rudolph Ritzema, New York434" Charles Webb, Connecticut542" Jonathan Brewer (Artificers)584
Greene's Division.
MAJOR-GENERAL NATHANIEL GREENE.
Aides-de-Camp.
Major William Blodgett, Major William S. Livingston.
Nixon's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NIXON.
Brigade-Major, Daniel Box.
ColonelEdward Hand,Pennsylvania288"James Mitchell Varnum,Rhode Island391"Daniel Hitchcock,"368"Late Nixon's,Massachusetts419"William Prescott,"399"Moses Little,"453
Heard's Brigade.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL HEARD.
Brigade-Major, Peter Gordon.
ColonelDavid Forman,New Jersey372"Phillip Johnston,"235"Ephraim Martin,"382"Silas Newcomb,"336"Phillip Van Cortlandt,"269
Connecticut Militia.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL OLIVER WOLCOTT.
ColonelThompson,Connecticut350"Hinman,"""Pettibone,"""Cooke,"""Talcott,"""Chapman,"""Baldwin,""Lieutenant-ColonelMead,""" "Lewis,""" "Pitkin,""MajorStrong,"""Newberry,""
Long Island Militia.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL WOODHULL.[98]
Brigade-Major, Jonathan Lawrence.
ColonelJosiah Smith,Long Island250"Jeronimus Remsen,"200
Artillery.
Colonel Henry Knox, Massachusetts 406
As appears from a document among the papers of General Knox, the encampments and posts of these brigades, before the advance of the enemy, were fixed as follows: Scott's, in the city; Wadsworth's, along the East River,in the city; Parsons', from the ship-yards on the East River to Jones' Hill, and including one of the redoubts to the west of it; Stirling's and McDougall's, still further west as a reserve near Bayard's Hill; Fellows', on the Hudson, from Greenwich down to the "Glass House," about half-way to Canal Street; and James Clinton's, from that point down to the "Furnace," opposite the Grenadier Battery. These brigades, forming Putnam's, Spencer's, and Sullivan's divisions, with the Connecticut militia, were retained within the city and its immediate vicinity. Of Heath's division, Mifflin's brigade was posted at Fort Washington, at the upper end of the island, and George Clinton's at King's Bridge. Greene's division—Nixon's and Heard's brigades—with the exception of Prescott's regiment and Nixon's, now under his brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Nixon, which were on Governor's Island, occupied the Long Island front.[99]
A far more perfect and formidable army was that which lay encamped on Staten Island, seven miles down the bay. It was the best officered, disciplined, and equipped that Great Britain could then have mustered for any service. The fact that she found it difficult to raise new troops to conquer America only made it necessary to send forward all her available old soldiers. The greater part of Howe's army, accordingly, consisted of experienced regulars. He had with him twenty-seven regiments of the line, four battalions of light infantry and four of grenadiers, two battalions of the king's guards, three brigades of artillery, and a regiment of light dragoons, numbering in the aggregate about twenty-three thousand officers and men. The six thousand or more that camefrom Halifax were the Boston "veterans." These had been joined by regiments from the West Indies; and among the reinforcements from Britain were troops that had garrisoned Gibraltar and posts in Ireland and England, with men from Scotland who had won a name in the Seven Years' War.[100]Howe's generals were men who showed their fitness to command by their subsequent conduct during the war. Next to the commander-in-chief ranked Lieutenant-Generals Clinton, Percy, and Cornwallis; Major-Generals Mathews, Robertson, Pigot, Grant, Jones, Vaughan, and Agnew; and Brigadier-Generals Leslie, Cleveland, Smith, and Erskine.
The Hessians or "foreigners" formed more than one fourth of the enemy's strength. They numbered eight thousand officers and men, which, added to the distinctively British force, raised Howe's total to over thirty-one thousand. His total of effectives on the 27th of August was something more than twenty-four thousand.[101]
Drawn up in complete array upon the field this army would have confronted Washington's in the following order:[102]
ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE BRITISH.
[SIR WILLIAM HOWE.]
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
LIEUT GENLL CLINTON.
BRIGADIER GENLL LESSLIE.
2dBatnLt. Infty. 3dBrigade[103]Lt. Infty. 1stBatnLt. Infty.
Major of Brigade Lewis.
BRIGADIER GENLL CLEVELAND.
2ndBrig. of Art'lly. 3dBrigade of Art. 1stBrigade of Art.
Major of Brigade Farrington.
First Line.
M.G. Pigot.M.G. Agnew.B.G. Smith.M.G. Robertson.M.G. Mathews.Cavalry.5th, 35th, 49th, 28th.23d, 57th, 64th, 44th.43d, 63d, 54th, 23d.15th, 45th, 27th, 4th.Guards.2dBrigade.M.B. Disney.6thBrigade.M.B. Leslie.5thBrigade.M.B. McKenzie.1 Brigade.M.B. Smith.2 Battalions.
Second Line.
LIEUT GENLL.EARL PERCY.
M.G. Grant.B.G. Erskine.M.G. Jones.17th, 46th, 55th, 40th.71stRegiment.37th, 52d, 38th, 10th.4thBrigade.M.B. Brown.3 Battalions.M.B. Erskine.3dBrigade.M.B. Baker.
Corps de Reserve.
LIEUT GENLL EARL CORNWALLIS.
Major Genll Vaughan.
2 B. Grendrs4thB. Grendrs3 Batt. Grendrs1stBattln Grendrs
42 Regmt. 33dRegt.
Hessian Division.[104]
LIEUT-GENERAL DE HEISTER.
Mirbach's Brigade.
MAJOR GENERAL VON MIRBACH.
Regiments.
Kniphausen. Rall. Lossberg.
Stirn's Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL VON STIRN.
Regiments.
Donop. Mirbach. Hereditary Prince.
Donop's Brigade.
COLONEL VON DONOP.
Grenadiers.
Block. Minegerode. Lisingen.
Yagers.
Lossberg's Brigade.
COLONEL VON LOSSBERG.
Regiments.
Von Ditfurth. Von Trumbach.
When and where, now, will these two armies meet? Or rather, the question was narrowed down to this: When and where will the British attack? With Washington there was no choice left but to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. The command which the enemy had of the waters was alone sufficient to make their encampment on Staten Island perfectly secure. As to assuming the offensive, Washington wrote to his brother, John Augustine, on July 22d: "Our situation at present, both in regard to men and other matters, is such as not to make it advisable to attempt any thing against them, surrounded as they are by water and covered with ships, lest a miscarriage should be productive of unhappy and fatal consequences. It is provoking, nevertheless, to have them so near, without being able to give them any disturbance." Earlier in the season an expedition had been organized under Mercer, in which Knowlton was to take an active part, to attack the enemy's outposts on Staten Island from the Jersey shore, but the weather twice interfered with the plan. All that the Americans hoped to do was to hold their own at and around New York. Washington tells us that he fully expected to be able to defend the city.[105]Even the passage of the Rose and Phœnix did not shake his faith. None of his letters written during the summer disclose any such misgivings asLee expressed, respecting the possibility of maintaining this base, and in attempting to hold it he followed out his own best military judgment.
What occasioned the principal anxiety in the mind of the commander-in-chief was the number of points at which the British could make an attack and their distance from one another. They could advance into New Jersey from Staten Island; they could make a direct attack upon the city with their fleet, while the transports sailed up the Hudson and the troops effected a landing in his rear; they could cross to Long Island and fall upon Greene in force; or they could make landings at different points as feints, and then concentrate more rapidly than Washington, as their water carriage would enable them to do, and strike where he was weakest.[106]
The summer and the campaign season were passing, and still the uncertainty was protracted—when and where will the enemy attack?
map
[Enlarge]
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLANDAND OF THE BROOKLYN DEFENCESAUGUST 27TH1776.
Compiled by HENRY P. JOHNSTON.
F. von Egloffstein del.JULIUS BIEN, PHOTO-LITH.
Atlength, upon the twenty-second of August, after days of expectation and suspense in the American camp, the British moved forward. Thoroughly informed of Washington's position, the strength of his army, and the condition of his lines at every point,[107]Lord Howe matured his plan of action deliberately, and decided to advance by way of Long Island. An attack from this quarter promised the speediest success and at the least cost, for, should he be able to force the defences of Brooklyn, New York would be at his mercy; or, failing in this, he could threaten Washington's flank from Hell Gate or beyond, where part of the fleet had been sent through the Sound, and by a push into Westchester County compel the evacuation of the city. Preparations were accordingly made to transport the troops from Staten Islandacross to the Long Island coast and debark them at Gravesend Bay, a mile to the eastward of the Narrows. A thunder-storm of great violence on the previous evening, which had fallen with fatal effect on more than one of Washington's soldiers, threatened to delay the movement, but a still atmosphere followed, and the morning of the 22d broke favorably.[108]At dawn the three frigates Phœnix, Greyhound and Rose, with the bomb-ketches Thunder and Carcass, took their stations close into the Bay as covering ships for the landing, while Sir George Collier placed the Rainbow within the Narrows, opposite De Nyse's Ferry, now Fort Hamilton, to silence a battery supposed to be at that point. Upon the Staten Island shore fifteen thousand British and Hessian troops, fully equipped, and forty pieces of artillery had been drawn up during the day and evening before, and a part of them embarked upon transports lying near at anchor. At the beach were moored seventy-five flat-boats, eleven batteaux, and two galleys, built expressly for the present service, and manned by sailors from the ships of war, which, with the rest of the naval armament, were placed under the direction of Commodore Hotham.
As soon as the covering frigates were in position, the brigade of light infantry and the reserves of grenadiers and foot, forming an advance corps four thousand strong and headed by Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, entered the flotilla and were rowed in ten divisions to the Gravesend landing, where they formed upon the plainwithout opposition.[109]Then followed the remaining troops from the transports, and before noon the fifteen thousand, with guns and baggage, had been safely transferred to Long Island. All who witnessed this naval spectacle that morning were the enemy themselves, a few Dutch farmers in the vicinity, and the pickets of Hand's riflemen, who at once reported the movement at camp.
The landing successfully effected, Cornwallis was immediately detached with the reserves, Donop's corps of chasseurs and grenadiers, and six field-pieces, to occupy the village of Flatbush, but with orders not to attempt the "pass" beyond, if he found it held by the rebels; and the main force encamped nearer the coast, from the Narrows to Flatlands. As Cornwallis advanced, Colonel Hand and his two hundred riflemen hurried down from their outpost camp above Utrecht, and, keeping close to the enemy's front, marched part of the way "alongside of them, in the edge of the woods," but avoided an open fight in the field with superior numbers.[110]Captain Hamilton andtwenty men of the battalion fell back on the road in advance, burning grain and stacks of hay, and killing cattle, which, says Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, he did "very cleverly." Among the inhabitants along the coast, confusion, excitement, and distress prevailed,[111]and many moved off their goods in great haste to find refuge in the American lines or farther east on the island; while others remained to welcome the enemy, for whose success they had been secretly praying from the outset.
The section of Long Island which the enemy now occupied was a broad low plain, stretching northward from the coast from four to six miles, and eastward a still further distance. Scattered over its level surface were four villages, surrounded with farms. Nearest to the Narrows, and nearly a mile from the coast, stood New Utrecht; another mile south-east of this was Gravesend; north-east from Gravesend, nearly three miles, the road led through Flatlands, and directly north from Flatlands, and about half-way to Brooklyn Church, lay Flatbush. Between this plain and the Brooklyn lines ran a ridge of hills, which extended from New York Bay midway through the island to its eastern extremity. The ridge varied in height from one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet above the sea, and from the plain it rose somewhat abruptly from forty to eighty feet, but fell off more gradually in its descent on the other side. Its entire surface was covered with a dense growth of woods and thickets,and to an enemy advancing from below it presented a continuous barrier, a huge natural abattis, impassable to artillery, where with proportionate numbers a successful defence could be sustained.
The roads across the ridge passed through its natural depressions, of which there were four within a distance of six miles from the harbor. The main highway, or Jamaica Road—that which led up from Brooklyn Ferry—after passing through Bedford, kept on still north of the hills, and crossed them at the "Jamaica Pass," about four miles from the fortified line. From this branched three roads leading to the villages in the plain. The most direct was that to Flatbush, which cut through the ridge a mile and a half from the works. Three quarters of a mile to the left, towards the Jamaica Pass, a road from Bedford led also to Flatbush; and near the coast ran the Gowanus Road to the Narrows. Where the Red Lion Tavern stood on this road, about three miles from Brooklyn Church, a narrow lane, known as the Martense Lane, now marking the southern boundary of Greenwood Cemetery, diverged to the left through a hollow in the ridge and connected with roads on the plain. To clearly understand succeeding movements on Long Island, it is necessary to have in mind the relative situation of these several routes and passes.
When word of the enemy's landing reached Sullivan and Washington the troops were immediately put under arms. The commander-in-chief had already been prepared for the intelligence by a dispatch from Governor Livingston, of New Jersey, the night before, to the effect that he had certain information from the British camp that they were then embarking troops and would move tothe attack on the following day.[112]As the report came in that the enemy intended to march at once upon Sullivan, Washington promptly sent him a reinforcement of six regiments, which included Miles' and Atlee's from Stirling's brigade, Chester's and Silliman's from Wadsworth's, and probably Lasher's and Drake's from Scott's, numbering together some eighteen hundred men. They crossed with light spirits, and were marched to alarm-posts. Miles' two battalions went on to the Bedford Pass; Silliman was ordered down into "a woody hill near Red Hook, to prevent any more troops from landing thereabout."[113]Hand's riflemen, supported by oneof the Eastern regiments, watched and annoyed the Hessians under Donop at Flatbush, and detachments were sent to guard the lower roads near the Red Lion.[114]Within the Brooklyn lines the troops stood to their alarm-posts. Colonel Little, expecting that "morning would bring us to battle," and remembering his promise to defend Fort Greene to the last extremity, enclosed his will to his son, and directed him in a certain event to take proper charge at home.
The morning of the 23d, however, brought no battle, nor did the enemy attempt any advance for three days. Washington made Sullivan an early visit, saw the situation there for himself, and during the day issued another of his fervent orders to the army. He formally announced the landing of the British, and again reminded his troops that the moment was approaching on which their honor and success and the safety of the country depended. "Remember, officers and soldiers," he said, "that you are freemen, fighting for the blessings of liberty; that slavery will be your portion, and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit yourselves like men. Remember how your courage and spirit have been despised and traduced by your cruel invaders; though they have found by dear experience at Boston, Charleston, and other places what a few brave men, contending in their own land and in the best of causes, can do against base hirelings and mercenaries." He urged them, too, to be cool, but determined; not to fire at a distance, but wait for the word from their officers; and gave express orders that if anyman attempted to skulk, lie down, or retreat, he must be instantly shot down as an example. Those who should distinguish themselves for gallantry and good conduct were assured that they might depend upon being honorably noticed and suitably rewarded. Strict orders as to other matters were also issued. The commissary-general was to have five days' baked bread on hand for distribution; the men were to have constantly ready with them two days' hard bread and pork, and the officers were to see not only that they had it, but kept it. The officers of the newly arrived militiamen were instructed also to see that the cartridges fitted their soldiers' muskets, and that each man had twenty-four rounds and two flints.
On the Long Island front, Sullivan was alert, and kept his division in readiness for the attack, which was now hourly expected. He ordered his command that afternoon, the 23d, to prepare two days' provisions and turn out the next morning at three o'clock. For the night, he assigned Hitchcock's and Little's regiments to guard the Flatbush Pass, Johnston's and Martin's to the coast road, and Remsen's Long Island militia to support Miles on the Bedford Road. They were all to be at their posts at six o'clock, and the regiments they relieved were to return to their encampments and, like the rest, "get two days' provisions dressed, and be ready for action."
Meanwhile some brisk skirmishing occurred in front of Flatbush. In the afternoon of this day, the enemy, as Sullivan reported, formed, and attempted to pass the road by Bedford, but meeting a warm reception from the riflemen, some "musketry" sent to their support, and two or three of our field pieces, they fell back. "Our men," wrote Sullivan to Washington, "followed them to the house of Judge Lefferts (where a number of them hadtaken lodgings), drove them out, and burnt the house and a number of other buildings contiguous. They think they killed a number; and, as evidence of it, they produced three officers' hangers, a carbine, and one dead body, with a considerable sum of money in pocket. I have ordered a party out for prisoners to-night."[115]The enemy returned in force, and the American skirmishers, having but two wounded, withdrew to the hills; but their conduct in the affair was so highly appreciated by Sullivan, that he issued a congratulatory order in the following terms:
"The general returns his thanks to the brave officers and soldiers who, with so much spirit and intrepidity, repulsed the enemy and defeated their designs of taking possession of the woods near our lines. He is now convinced that the troops he has the honor to command will not, in point of bravery, yield to any troops in the universe. The cheerfulness with which they do their duty, and the patience with which they undergo fatigue, evince exalted sentiments of freedom and love of country, and gives him most satisfactory evidence that when called upon they will prove themselves worthy of that freedom for which they are now contending."[116]
On the 24th, Washington was still in doubt as to the intentions of the enemy. Reports represented their numbers on Long Island at not more than eight thousand, whereas they were double this estimate; and it was suspected at headquarters that their landing might only be a feint to draw off our troops to that side, while the real attack should be made on New York. But the imprudence of running any risks on the Brooklyn side was obvious, and Washington sent over a further reinforcement of four regiments, which appear to have been Wyllys's, Huntington's, and Tyler's of Parsons' brigade (his entire command was there on the next day) together with the Pennsylvania detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel Lutz and Major Hay. On this date Brigadier-General Lord Stirling crossed over, where more than half his brigade had preceded him; and Brigadier-General John Nixon, whose name now first appears in connection with the operations on Long Island, was detailed as field officer of the day, with orders to take command of the outer line and post his men "in the edge of the woods next the enemy."[117]
But the principal event of the 24th was the change made in the chief command on Long Island. Sullivan was superseded by Putnam. There were now on that side the whole of Nixon's and Heard's brigades (the two regiments on Governor's Island excepted), the larger part of Stirling's and Parson's, and half of Scott's and Wadsworth's. As this roster included one third of the army's effective force, the command could properly be assignedto Putnam as the senior major-general present; but it does not appear that the question of his rank entered into the reasons for the change. In a letter to Governor Livingston from Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, dated August 30th, 1776, the statement is made that Washington, "finding a great force going to Long Island, sent over Putnam;" leaving the inference to be drawn that, apart from his rank, Putnam was considered the proper officer, or an officer competent, to command such a force. Reed states further that some movements had been made on Long Island of which the commander-in-chief did not entirely approve, and this also called for a change. Sullivan, too, was wholly unacquainted with the ground; although, as to this, Putnam's knowledge of it was not extensive, as he had been over it only "occasionally." That Sullivan was a brave, zealous, and active officer, his military career abundantly proves. Appointed a brigadier-general from New Hampshire, he commanded a brigade under Lee throughout the Boston siege, and had been sent, as already stated, in the spring of this year to help repair the misfortunes attending our force on the Canada border; but success was not to be met with there, and Sullivan, finding Gates promoted to the chief command in that quarter, returned, after visiting Congress, to the New York army. Like most of our general officers at that date, he as yet lacked military experience, especially in an independent capacity, for which his ambition to succeed was not a sufficient equivalent. How far Putnam was more competent to assume the command on Long Island, is a point which the issue there, at least, did not determine. His record before this was all in his favor. A veteran of the old war, a man of known personal courage, blunt, honest, practical, and devoted to theAmerican cause, he had the confidence of at least the older part of the army, with which he had been identified from the beginning of the struggle. As he had never been tried in a separate department, Washington could not say how he would manage it, but he could say, from his experience with him at Boston, that Putnam was "a most valuable man and fine executive officer,"[118]and such he continued to prove himself through the present campaign. He seconded Washington heartily and efficiently in all his plans and preparations, and when he was sent to Long Island the commander-in-chief had reason to feel that whatever directions he might give as to operations there, Putnam would follow them out to the letter. But if Putnam took the general command across the river, Sullivan continued in active subordinate control, as second in command.[119]
On the 25th, Putnam received written instructions from Washington. He was directed to form a proper line of defence around his encampment and works on the most advantageous ground; to have a brigadier of the day constantly upon the lines that he might be on the spot to command; to have field-officers go the rounds and report the situation of the guards; to have the guards particularly instructed in their duty; and to compel all the men on duty to remain at their camps or quarters and be ready to turn out at a moment's warning. The wood next to Red Hook bordering Gowanus Creek was to be well attended to, and the woods elsewhere secured by abattis, if necessary, to make the enemy's progress as difficult as possible. The militia, or troops which were least disciplined and had seen the least service, were to man the interior lines, while the best men were "at all hazards" to prevent the enemy's passing the woods and approaching the works. He disapproved also of the unmeaning picket firing and the burning of houses, and warned the general finally that when the attack came it was certain to be "sudden and violent."[120]
For brigadier for the day, General Lord Stirling was assigned to duty on this date.[121]
In the skirmishing that continued from the 24th to the 26th the Americans showed skill and bravery, although at times indulging in desultory firing. The riflemen, supported by field-pieces, made occasioned dashes upon the enemy and picked off their men with almost no loss to themselves. Among the troops on picket near Flatbush, on the 25th, were Colonel Silliman and his Connecticut battalion; and from the colonel, who wrote from there, on a drum-head, to his wife, we get a glimpse of the situation at that point during his tour of duty. "I am now posted," he says, "within about half a mile from the Regulars with my Regt. under the covert of a woody hill to stop their passage into the country. There are a number of Regts. posted all around the town within about the same distance and for the same purpose. The Regulars keep up an almost constant fire from their Cannon and Mortars at some or other of us, but neither shott nor shell has come near my Regt. as yet and they are at too great a distance to fire muskets at. I have a scouting party going out now to see if they can't pick up some or get something from them.... They have wounded in all of our men in 3 days skirmish about 8 or 9, one or two mortally, which is not half the number that we have killed for them besides wounded." On the 26th a considerable party with artillery attacked the Hessians and drove them in, killing several men belonging to the Von Lossberg regiment, which later in the day advanced in turn and compelled our skirmishers to fall back. In this affair Colonel Ephraim Martin, of New Jersey, was severely wounded.
On the morning of the 26th, Washington again crossed to Long Island, where he remained until night. The records are quite silent as to how he passed themost of his time, but judging from his letter to Congress of this date, in which he expressed his belief that the enemy had landed nearly all their force on that side, and that it was there they would make their "grand push," it was doubtless a busy, watchful, and anxious day with him. To suppose that he did not inform himself of all the preparations made to meet the enemy, that he did not know what number of men were posted on the hills and at what points, that he did not study the several modes and directions of attack possible for the enemy to adopt, and that he did not himself give personal directions, would be to charge that at the most important moment of the campaign he failed to exercise that care and attention to detail which he exercised on so many occasions both before and after. Indeed, although Putnam and Sullivan were in immediate command on Long Island, Washington never shifted the final responsibility from his own shoulders, and as a matter of fact was probably as well acquainted with the ground as either of these generals. Towards evening, in company with Putnam, Sullivan, and other officers, he rode down to the outposts near Flatbush and examined the position of the enemy. How long he remained, or what information he was able to gather, does not appear; but both the other generals, Putnam and Sullivan, made a detour of the pickets either at this time or at an earlier hour in the day, visited Miles and Brodhead on the extreme left, took their opinion as to the movements and intentions of the British, so far as one could be formed by them, and then rode off to the right "to reconnoitre the enemies lines."[122]
On this day also, the 26th, additional regiments were sent over. Two of these were the remainder of Stirling's brigade—Haslet's Delaware battalion, the largest in the army, as we have seen, and Smallwood's Marylanders, one of the choicest and best equipped. Either on this or one of the two previous days, Lieutenant-Colonel Kachlein's incomplete battalion of Pennsylvania riflemen, with two or three independent companies from Maryland, crossed; and among the last to go over were one hundred picked men, the nucleus of the "Rangers," from Durkee's Connecticut Continentals at Bergen, with Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Knowlton at their head.[123]These additions raised the force on Long Island on the night of the 26th to a total of about seven thousand men fit for duty.[124]
Following in turn after Nixon and Stirling, Brigadier-General Parsons was detailed as field officer of the day[125]for the next twenty-four hours—the day of the engagement.
At about the time that Washington started to return to his headquarters at New York, on this evening, Sir William Howe began to set his columns in motion for the attack, and on the next morning, at the passes in the hills and along their inner slopes, was fought what is known in our Revolutionary history as the battle of Long Island.
Fortunately, a point so essential to the comprehension of the progress of any engagement, the position of both armies on Long Island, just before the attack, is now known nearly to the last detail. The record here is clear and satisfactory. On the night of the 26th, the various regiments and detachments on guard at the American outposts numbered not far from twenty-eight hundred men. At the important Flatbush Pass, supporting the two or three gun battery there, and with strong pickets thrown out to the edge of the woods nearest the enemy, were posted Hitchcock's and Little's Continental regiments, and Johnston's New Jersey battalion, the two former being commanded by their lieutenant-colonels, Cornell and Henshaw. To this point, also, Knowlton and his rangers appear to have been sent. The battery or redoubt here stood about where the Flatbush and narrowPort Road united, and was apparently no more than a plain breastwork, with felled trees in front of it, thrown up across the road, and perhaps extending to the rising ground on the left.[126]At the coast road, around and beyond the Red Lion, the guards consisted of Hand's riflemen, half of Atlee's musketry, detachments of New York troops, and part of Lutz's Pennsylvanians under Major Burd. At the Bedford Pass, to the left of the Flatbush Road, were stationed Colonel Samuel Wyllys's Connecticut Continentals, and Colonel Chester's regiment from the same State, under Lieutenant-Colonel Solomon Wills, of Tolland, who had seen service in the French war and at Havana. Still further to the left, Colonel Miles was now encamped a short distance beyond, in the woods. Between these several passes, sentinels were stationed at intervals along the crest of the ridge, to keep communication open from one end of the line to the other.[127]
As far, then, to the left as Miles' position the hills were as well guarded as seemed possible with the limited force that could be spared, and at the passes themselves a stout resistance could have been offered. But it was still an attenuated line, more than four miles long, not parallel but oblique to the line of works at Brooklyn, and distant from it not less than one and a half, and at the farthest posts nearly three miles. Should the enemy pierce it at any one point, an immediate retreat would have been necessary from every other. The line could have been defended with confidence only on the supposition that the British would not venture to penetrate the thick woods, but advance along the roads through the passes.
It will be noticed that in this disposition no provision was made for holding the fourth or Jamaica Pass far overto the left. That the enemy could approach or make a diversion by that route, must have been well understood. But the posting of a permanent guard there would obviously have been attended with hazard, for the distance from the lines to this pass was four miles, and from the Bedford Pass two miles and a half through the woods. The position was thus extremely isolated, if the troops stationed there were expected to make the fortified line their point of retreat. None were stationed there during the five days since the British landed, and it nowhere appears that any were intended or ordered to be so stationed by either Sullivan, Putnam, or the commander-in-chief. There was but one effective way of preventing surprise from that quarter, and that was to have squads of cavalry or troops constantly patrolling the road, who on the appearance of an enemy could carry the word immediately and rapidly to the outposts and the camp. But in all Washington's army there was not a single company of horsemen, except the few Long Island troopers from Kings and Queens counties, and these were now engaged miles away in driving off stock out of reach of the enemy. The duty, accordingly, of looking after the open left flank fell, in part, upon Colonel Miles' two battalions. Lieutenant-Colonel Brodhead leaves it on record that it was "hard duty." The regiment sent out scouting parties every day a distance of four or five miles; one hundred men were mounted for guard daily, and thirty more with a lieutenant were kept on duty on the left, evidently in the direction of the Jamaica Road. General Parsons reports that "in the wood was placed Colonel Miles with his Battalion to watch the motion of the Enemy on that part, with orders to keep a party constantly reconnoitering to and across the Jamaicaroad." Should he discover the enemy at any time, it would have been expected of him to report the fact at once, oppose them vigorously, and retreat obstinately in order to give time for the other detachments to govern their movements accordingly.
One other circumstance is to be noticed in regard to this Jamaica Pass. General Sullivan, subsequently referring to his connection with this battle, claimed that while he was in sole command he paid horsemen out of his own purse to patrol the road, and that he predicted the approach of the enemy by that road. Whatever inferences may be drawn from this is not now to the point; but we have the fact that upon the evening of the 26th he exercised the same authority he had exercised in making other details, and sent out a special patrol of five commissioned officers to watch the Jamaica Pass. Three of these officers belonged to Colonel Lasher's New York City battalion—Adjutant Jeronimus Hoogland and Lieutenants Robert Troup and Edward Dunscomb; and the other two were Lieutenant Gerrit Van Wagenen, a detached officer of McDougall's old regiment, and a Lieutenant Gilliland, who with Van Wagenen had crossed to Long Island, as a volunteer. What part this patrol played in the incidents of the following morning will presently appear.
Thus on the night of the 26th the American outposts stretched along the hills from the harbor to the Jamaica Pass, with unguarded intervals, a distance of more than six miles, while in the plains below lay the enemy, nearly ten times their number, ready to fall upon them with "a sudden and violent" shock. During the night one change was made in the picket guard. Colonel Hand's riflemen, who had been on almost constant duty since the arrival of the British, were relieved at two o'clock in the morningby a detachment from the flying camp, which may have been a part of Hay's and Kachlein's men, and returning to the lines, dropped down to sleep.[128]
If we leave our outposts now upon the hills and pass into the enemy's camp on the plain below, we shall find them on the eve of carrying out a great plan of attack. The four days since the 22d had been given to preparation. On the 25th, Lieutenant-General De Heister crossed from Staten Island with the two Hessian brigades of Von Stirn and Von Mirbach, leaving behind Von Lossberg's brigade, with some detachments and recruits, for the security of that island. With this addition, Howe's force on Long Island was swelled to a total of about twenty-one thousand officers and men, fit for duty and in the best condition for active service.[129]As disposed on the 26th, the army lay with the Hessians and the reserves under Cornwallis at Flatbush, the main body under Clinton and Percy massed at Flatlands, and Grant's division of the fourth and sixth brigades nearer the Narrows.
Outnumbering the Americans three to one on the island, Howe could lay his plans with assurance of almost absolute success. He proposed to advance upon the "rebels" in three columns. Grant was ordered to move up from the Narrows along the lower road, and De Heister was to engage the attention of the Americans at theFlatbush Pass, while Clinton, Percy, and Cornwallis, with Howe himself, were to conduct the main body as a flanking force around the American left by way of the Jamaica Pass. A previous reconnoissance made by Clinton and Erskine, and information gathered from the Tories, showed the practicability of this latter movement.[130]Grant and De Heister were simply to make a show of an attack until they were assured by the sound of the firing that the flanking column had accomplished its design, when their demonstrations were to be turned into serious fighting. It was expected that by this plan the Americans stationed at the hills and passes would be entirely enveloped and thoroughly beaten if not captured in a body. With what nice precision this piece of strategy was executed, events will show.
The first collision was ominous. Grant's advance-guard, marching up from the Narrows, struck the American pickets in the vicinity of the Red Lion about two o'clock on the morning of the 27th. Whether because they were all new troops, a part of whom had but just come upon the ground, and were alarmed by the night attack, or because they were surprised at their posts and put in danger of capture, or whatever the reason, our picket guard at that point retreated before the enemy without checking their march. There was hardly more than an exchange of fire with Major Burd's detachment, as the major himself writes, and in the confusion or darkness he, with many others probably, was taken prisoner. This was an unfortunate beginning, so far as our men had abandoned one of the very posts which it had been proposed to hold; but otherwise, there being other positions available, it was not necessarily fatal to the plan of defending the hills.[131]
Word of the attack was quickly carried to General Parsons at his quarters and to General Putnam in camp. Parsons, as the brigadier on duty, rode at once to the spot, and found "by fair daylight" not only that the guards had "fled," but that the enemy were through the woods and already on this side of the main hills. Hastily collecting some twenty of the scattered pickets, he made a show of resistance, which temporarily halted the enemy's column.[132]At the same time Putnam, whose instructions were to hold the outposts "at all hazards" with his best men, called up Stirling and directed him in person to take the two regiments nearest at hand and march down to meet the enemy.[133]Stirling promptlyturned out Haslet's and Smallwood's battalions and marched down. Colonel Atlee, who was also ordered forward, was on the road before him, with that part of his regiment, about one hundred and twenty men, not already on picket; and Huntington's Connecticut Continentals, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clark (Huntington himself being sick),[134]and Kachlein's Pennsylvania riflemen were soon after started in the same direction. Meanwhile, within the lines, the alarm-guns were fired, the whole camp roused, and the troops drawn up at the forts and breastworks. Hand's riflemen, who had but just lain down, "almost dead with fatigue," were turned out to take post in Fort Putnam and the redoubt on its left.[135]
When Stirling reached a point within half a mile of the Red Lion he found, as Parsons had before him, that the enemy had met with little opposition or delay at the outposts on that road, and were now on the full march towards the Brooklyn lines. As there were still good positions which he could occupy, he immediately made adisposition of his force to offer resistance. The road here ran in a winding course along the line of the present Third Avenue, but a short distance from the bay, with here and there a dwelling which together constituted the Gowanus village or settlement. Where the present Twenty-third Street intersects the avenue there was a small bridge on the old road which crossed a ditch or creek setting up from the bay to a low and marshy piece of ground on the left, looking south; and just the other side of the bridge, the land rose to quite a bluff at the water's edge, which was known among the Dutch villagers as "Blockje's Bergh." From the bluff the low hill fell gradually to the marsh or morass just mentioned, the road continuing along between them.[136]Right here, therefore, the approach by the road was narrow, and at the corner of Twenty-third Street was confined to the crossing at the bridge.
Jed Huntington
Jed Huntington
COLONEL SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT (CONN.)BRIGADIER GENERAL 1777.
Steel Engr. F. von Egloffstein N.Y.
According to his own account, and from our present knowledge of the topography, Stirling evidently came to a halt on or just this side of "Blockje's Bergh." Seeing the British not far in his front, and taking in the situation at a glance, he ordered Atlee to post his men on the left of the road and wait the enemy's coming up, while he himself retired with Smallwood's and Haslet's to form line on a piece of "very advantageous ground" further back. Atlee reports this preliminary move as follows: "I received orders from Lord Stirling to advance with my battalion and oppose the enemy's passing a morass or swamp at the foot of a fine rising ground, upon whichthey were first discovered, and thereby give time to our brigade to form upon the heights. This order I immediately obeyed, notwithstanding we must be exposed without any kind of cover to the great fire of the enemy's musketry and field-pieces, charged with round and grapeshot, and finely situated upon the eminence above mentioned, having entire command of the ground I was ordered to occupy. My battalion, although new and never before having the opportunity of facing an enemy, sustained their fire until the brigade had formed; but finding we could not possibly prevent their crossing the swamp, I ordered my detachment to file off to the left and take post in a wood upon the left of the brigade."[137]General Parsons says: "We took possession of a hill about two miles from camp, and detached Colonel Atlee to meet them further on the road; in about sixty rods he drew up and received the enemy's fire and gave them a well-directed fire from his regiment, which did great execution, and then retreated to the hill."
This advantageous site, where Stirling had now drawn up his brigade to dispute Grant's progress, was the crest of the slope which rose northerly from the marsh and low ground around "Blockje's Bergh," and which to-day is represented by about the line of Twentieth Street.[138]Herewas an elevation or ridge favorable for defence, and here Stirling proposed to make a stand. On the right, next to the road, he posted Smallwood's battalion, under Major Gist; further along up the hillside were the Delawares, under Major MacDonough;[139]and on their left, in the woods above, Atlee's men formed after falling back from their attempt to stop the enemy.
When Kachlein's[140]riflemen came up, the general stationed part of them along hedges near the foot of the hill in front of the Marylanders, and part in front of the woods near Atlee. The line had hardly been formed before it was observed that the enemy threatened to overlap it on the left, and Parsons was accordingly ordered to take Atlee's and Huntington's regiments and move still further into the woods to defeat the designs on that flank.
Finding Stirling thus thrown across their path, the British also drew up in line and disposed their force as if intending to attack him at once. About opposite to the Marylanders, possibly on Blockje's Bergh, Grant posted the sixth brigade in two lines, while the fourth brigade was extended in a single line from the low ground to the top of the hills in Greenwood Cemetery.
Here, then, was a regular battle formation—Grant and Stirling opposing each other—and we may regard it with interest not only as the only line of battle preserved, onthe American side at least, during this day's struggle, but as being the first instance in the Revolution where we met the British in the open field. Before this it had been fighting under different conditions—the regulars mowed down at Bunker Hill, Montgomery attempting to storm Quebec, or Moultrie bravely holding a fort against a fleet; now the soldiers on either side stood face to face, and the opportunity seemed at hand to fairly test their native courage. Greatly disproportionate, however, was the strength of these two lines. Stirling's, all told, contained not more than sixteen hundred men; while Grant's, which besides the two brigades included the Forty-second Highlanders and two companies of American loyalists, was little less than seven thousand strong. But if we find here a threatening attitude, let us not expect any desperate fighting. It was not Grant's object to bring on an engagement at this early hour, now seven o'clock in the morning, for he wished to keep Stirling where he was until the other movements of the day were developed. He contented himself with appearing to be on the point of attack, and Stirling could do no more than prepare for a stubborn defence of his ground.
The first move of the British was to send forward a small body of light troops from their left, which advanced to within one hundred and fifty yards of Stirling's right. This would bring them not far from the little bridge on the road, where, from behind hedges and apple-trees, they opened fire on our advanced riflemen, who replied with spirit.
In the mean time, Stirling was reinforced by a two-gun battery from Knox's artillery, under Captain-Lieutenant Benajah Carpenter, of Providence, R.I., which was at once placed on the hillside to command the road, and,according to Stirling, "the only approach for some hundred yards," which must have been that part of the road running over the bridge. The skirmishing was kept up at a lively rate for about two hours, and occasionally, it would appear, our entire line engaged in the fire. Of the particular incidents which occurred at this point we have almost nothing; but perhaps, from one or two mere references that have been preserved, the whole scene can be imagined. "The enemy," writes one of the Maryland soldiers, "advanced towards us, upon which Lord Stirling, who commanded, drew up in a line and offered them battle in true English taste. The British then advanced within about 200 yards of us, and began a heavy fire from their cannon and mortars, for both the Balls and Shells flew very fast, now and then taking off a head. Our men stood it amazingly well; not even one of them shewed a Disposition to shrink. Our orders were not to fire until the Enemy came within fifty yards of us, but when they perceived we stood their fire so cooly and resolutely they declined coming any nearer, altho' treble our number."[141]Colonel Haslet, although not with his regiment, reported to his friend Cæsar Rodney that "the Delawares drew up on the side of a hill, and stood upwards of four hours, with a firm, determined countenance, in close array, their colors flying, the enemy's artillery playing on them all the while, not daring to advance and attack them;"[142]and his ensign, Stephens, pointed with pride to the standard "torn with shot" while held in his hands.