So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, he made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river, and to shield the bridges.
"Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthest in the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place." Brooks had so extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw with extreme caution. "This necessarily consumed a considerable time, and before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at Chancellorsville had ceased." (Warren.)
This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under the stringency of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the then leading division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate assistance to Hooker at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming columns assaulted Marye's heights, Hooker had already been driven into his lines at White House. And though none of his strictures upon Sedgwick's tardiness, as affecting his own situation, will bear the test of examination, time will not be considered wholly ill-spent in determining where Sedgwick might have been more expeditious. It no doubt accords with military precedents, to alternate in honoring the successive divisions of a corps with the post of danger; but it may often be highly improper to arrest an urgent progress in order to accommodate this principle. And it was certainly inexpedient in this case, despite the fact that Newton and Howe had fought their divisions, while Brooks had not yet been under fire.
"The country being open, Gen. Brooks's division was formed in a column of brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the front and flank in advance, and the artillery on the road." (Warren.) The New Jersey brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett's brigade on the left, of the road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might be attacked as soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoid the usual manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, or from an extended order of march.
Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This "greatly extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, and put it out of support, in a measure, of the division in advance." (Warren.) Howe brought up the rear.
Meanwhile Wilcox, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest's, as long as his slender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River road near Taylor's. But Sedgwick's cautious advance gave him the opportunity of sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish along the plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery by cross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. Here he took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance to Sedgwick, until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at that place, he withdrew to the position assigned him in the line of battle now formed by that officer.
When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plank road, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring to reach the depots at Hamilton's, he concentrated at Cox's all his forces, now including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word to McLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that he would on the morrow attack Marye's heights with his right, and extend his left over to join the main line.
It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured his stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee and Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at first Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purpose to destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early. The nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, and there is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. And it was not long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out towards the battle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilcox in his front.
McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson's, was accordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilcox; while Anderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns, was sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold that important position. McLaws arrived about two P.M., and found Wilcox skirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a few hundred yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilcox's right, and Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late, as he had been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plank roads to guard them. McLaws's guns were concentrated on the road, but were soon withdrawn for lack of ammunition.
Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse near by, in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederate line was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where a clearing lay at their back.
When Sedgwick's column reached the summit along the road, about a mile from Salem Church, Wilcox's cavalry skirmishers were met, and a section of artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, where Wilcox was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground was quite open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are not considerable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, and as far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, and the woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road.
Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his division being on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, so soon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries (Rigby, Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the road, not far from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the caissons and limbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling fire, and, passing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods where lay Wilcox and Semmes and Mahone. Wilcox's skirmishers and part of his line gave way before Brooks's sturdy onset, which created no little confusion; but Wilcox and Semmes in person headed some reserve regiments, and led them to the charge. An obstinate combat ensues. Bartlett has captured the schoolhouse east of the church, advances, and again breaks for a moment the Confederate line. Wilcox throws in an Alabama regiment, which delivers a fire at close quarters, and makes a counter-charge, while the rest of his brigade rallies on its colors, and again presses forward. The church and the schoolhouse are fought for with desperation, but only after a heroic defence can the Confederates recapture them. Bartlett withdraws with a loss of two-fifths of his brigade, after the most stubborn contest. The line on the north of the road is likewise forced back. A series of wavering combats, over this entire ground, continues for the better part of an hour; but the enemy has the upper hand, and forces our line back towards the toll-house.
Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks had thus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a loss of nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton has meanwhile formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe's division later falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorously followed up his retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister at short range, the distance of our batteries from the woods being not much over five hundred yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLaws states, that it is impossible to make head against this new line; and the Confederates sullenly retire to their position near the church, which they had so successfully held against our gallant assaults, followed, but not seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks's and Newton's regiments.
Wheaton's brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position on the right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford's line; but our left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advanced ground from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile from Salem Church.
The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable to engage seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined to the infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable share in the day's work, and had earned their laurels well.
It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle.
Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line.
The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg.
Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, passes the following comment upon this action:—
"Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on about three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could not carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights differently, we might have won that place also."
"Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough supported by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was just one of those wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been stronger at that moment, we would have won; not being so, they won."
It is probable, that, had Brooks's attack been delayed until Newton and Howe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keep possession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed. But it was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtful whether the capture of Salem heights would have materially altered the event. It was the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing which determined the result of this campaign. Sedgwick's corps could effect nothing by its own unaided efforts.
So soon as Wilcox had retired from Banks's Ford to oppose Sedgwick's advance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, and established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who up to this time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, reaching Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, telegraphed Sedgwick as follows:—
"I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, and repulsed the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with Gen. Benham at Banks's Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks's Ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg."
And later:—
"I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that we contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good position. Gen. Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at five P.M. Look to the safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks's Ford: the latter would enable you to join us more readily."
The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P.M. next day, and was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, rather apologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on the score of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflects the ideas of Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence, fathered by Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that there was then no idea of retiring across the river.
And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not, in tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick, either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his mind plainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet failings. And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in good-will, ability, or conduct, it is strange that there should not be some apparent expression of it. It was only when he was driven to extremity in explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit suggested Sedgwick as an available scapegoat.
During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid himself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker's defences. And, trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his opponent's lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson's remaining three brigades to the forces opposing Sedgwick's wing, leaving only Jackson's corps, now numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with his eighty thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself repaired to the battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the intention of driving Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again concentrate all his powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville.
By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox's, and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only a few of Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and instructed to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to join McLaws, feeling our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining the left of our line to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down to the plank road.
At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge, that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut him off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as a possible outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to throw a force about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford; but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this affair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any serious movement to cut him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had already formed Howe's division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, from the river to the plank road.
In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from Sedgwick only general—in fact, vague—and rare instructions, as to the dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line, over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men.
The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across Banks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick had scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five thousand, and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with the left on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's Ford, running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south side for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which Wheaton had held the night before. This was a long, weak position, depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under the circumstances, well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen. Newton's division held the right of this line, facing west; Gen. Brooks had Russell's brigade, also posted so as to face west, on the left of Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert faced south, the former resting his left somewhere near Howe's right brigade. This portion of the line was, on Monday afternoon, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade of Newton's division, withdrawn from the extreme right; and here it rendered effective service at the time the attack was made on Howe, and captured a number of prisoners. The bulk of Howe's division lay facing east, from near Guest's house to the river. The whole line of battle may be characterized, therefore, as a rough convex order,—or, to describe it more accurately, lay on three sides of a square, of which the Rappahannock formed the fourth. This line protected our pontoon-bridges at Scott's Dam, a mile below Banks's Ford.
No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks's Ford, and attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight.
Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker's caution to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the information that he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far away to direct him with intelligence.
Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, till Tuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later page.
Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall's brigade of Gibbon's division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated with McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; but McLaws, not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the troops Early and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of Anderson, whom he knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem Church.
Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been making preparations for a demonstration against Hooker's left at Chancellorsville, and had there amused himself by shelling a park of supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at the crossing of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived about eleven A.M. at the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he was got into line on Early's left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so stubbornly defended against Brooks.
Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg.
The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick's centre by a vigorous assault; and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch of the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in our front.
"Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of ascertaining the disposition of the enemy's forces." (Lee.) But more or less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day,—to cover the disposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately to ascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held by Sedgwick's divisions.
Not until six were Lee's preparations completed to his satisfaction; but about that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a general advance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of the line, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill on which Downman's house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up the hills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre.
On Early's left came Anderson, whose brigades extended—in order, Wright, Posey, Perry—to a point nearly as far as, but not joining, McLaws's right at about Shed's farm; Mahone of Anderson's division remained on McLaws's extreme left, where he had been placed on account of his familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilcox occupied his ground of Sunday.
Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command the Union artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws's line. It was Alexander's opening fire which was the signal for the general assault.
The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and was held in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. "The speedy approach of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the success of the attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river." "His right brigades, under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the direction of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they could only join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity, and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our own troops. Their movements were consequently slow." (Lee.)
Early's assault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns, and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began, and Hays's and Hoke's brigades (says Early) were thrown into some confusion by coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, below Guest's house. Barksdale remained at Marye's hill, with Smith on his left in reserve.
The weakness of Howe's long line, obliged that officer carefully to study his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to an interior line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed his reserves accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line, held by Gen. Neill's brigade, and two regiments of Grant's, was a small covering of woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficient artillery, were concentrated. The main assault was made upon his left by Hoke and Hays. Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe's firm front, though made with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous attack upon his right was by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed back, and, by suddenly advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturing nearly all the Eighth Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by the over-advance of our eager troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon's brigade, which was enabled to move down a ravine in rear of Howe's right, and compelled its hasty withdrawal.
Meanwhile Neill's brigade, on Howe's left, was overpowered by Early's fierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we had lost nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to the previously selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hoke and Hays, the Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and Butler's regular battery, sent to Howe's support by Sedgwick, opened upon them so sharp a fire, that they retired in headlong confusion, largely increased by the approaching darkness. This terminated the fight on the left, and Howe's line was no further molested during the night.
Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked by McLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has been laid down. It is one of those frequent assertions, made in the best of faith, but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of a recent combat and from unreliable evidence.
Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee's attack the necessity of contracting his lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks's divisions and the Light Brigade (Col. Burnham's), were ordered to fall rapidly back upon Banks's Ford, where they took position on the heights in the vicinity, and in Wilcox's rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, and disposed on Newton's right.
In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Howe appears to think that he was unfairly dealt with by Sedgwick; in fact, that his division was intentionally left behind to be sacrificed. But this opinion is scarcely justified by the condition of affairs and subsequent events.
Following are the important despatches which passed, during the latter part of these operations, between Hooker and Sedgwick:—
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,May 4, 1863, 9 A.M.MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday morning was twenty-two thousand men. I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I cannot use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BANKS'S FORD, VA.,May 4, 1863, 9.45 A.M.GEN. HOOKER.
The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river wherever (? whenever) necessary.
J. SEDGWICK, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,May 4, 1863, 10.30 A.M.GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps.
The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow P.M. Please let the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by telegraph from Banks's Ford as soon as possible.
S. WILLIAMS,Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11 A.M.MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK.
The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish you to cross the river at Banks's Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The batteries at Banks's Ford command the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, near Banks's Ford, you will do so. It is very important that we retain position at Banks's Ford. Gen. Tyler commands the reserve artillery there.
J. H. VAN ALEN,Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 11 A.M.MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD AND GEN. HOOKER.
I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can hold until night, I shall cross at Banks's Ford, under instructions from Gen. Hooker, given by Brig.-Gen. Warren.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863, 11.15 A.M.MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not improbable that bridges at Banks's Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked?
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
P. S.—My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them above and below from attack, with the additional assistance of Gen. Benham's brigade alone.
J. S.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11.50 A.M.MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK.
If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall be of the character he anticipates, it is the intention of the general to advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the south side of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could desire. It is for this reason he desires that your troops may not cross the Rappahannock.
J. H. VAN ALEN,Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,May 4, 1863, 1.20 P.M.GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps.
I expect to advance to-morrow morning, which will be likely to relieve you. You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing. Tell Gen. Benham to put down the other bridge if you desire it.
J. HOOKER, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,May 4, 1863, 1.40 P.M.MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
I occupy the same position as yesterday when Gen. Warren left me. I have no means of judging enemy's force about me—deserters say forty thousand. I shall take a position near Banks's Ford, and near the Taylor house, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren; officers have already gone to select a position. It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the enemy.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
May 4, 1863. (Hour not stated.)MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK, Banks's Ford, Va.
It is of vital importance that you should take a commanding position near Fredericksburg, which you can hold to a certainty till to-morrow. Please advise me what you can do in this respect. I enclose substance of a communication sent last night. Its suggestions are highly important, and meet my full approval. There are positions on your side commanded by our batteries on the other side I think you could take and hold. The general would recommend as one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor's is situated.
GEN. HOOKER (?)
May 4, 1863, 2.15 P.M.
GEN. HOOKER.
I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the Rappahannock until to-morrow.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
BANKS'S FORD, VA.,May 4, 1863, 11.50 P.M. (Received 1 A.M., May 5.)
GEN. HOOKER,
United-States Ford.
My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north side of Banks's Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
BANKS'S FORD, VA.,May 5, 1863. (Received 1 A.M.)GEN. HOOKER.
I shall hold my position as ordered on south of Rappahannock.
SEDGWICK.
HEADQUARTERS,May 5, 1863, 1 A.M. (Received 2 A.M.)GEN. SEDGWICK.
Despatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this.
By command of Major-Gen. Hooker.DANL. BUTTERFIELD
HEADQUARTERS,May 5, 1863, 1.20 A.M.GEN. SEDGWICK.
Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.
GEN. HOOKER
BANKS'S FORD, VA.,May 5, 1863, 2 P.M. (should be 2 A.M.).MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD.
Gen. Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,May 5, 1863, 7 A.M.
GEN. BUTTERFIELD.
I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, with the hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can be imputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the one could not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of the despatches is explained by the difficulty of communication between headquarters and the Sixth Corps.
The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt of Sedgwick's despatch saying he would hold the corps south of the river, was received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which was exceptionally delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circumstances, put into course of execution.
As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander's artillery began dropping shells in the neighborhood of the bridges and river banks; and Gen. Wilcox, with his own and Kershaw's brigades, followed up Sedgwick's movements to the crossing, and used his artillery freely.
When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwick was taken aback by the receipt of Hooker's despatch of 1.20 A.M., countermanding the order to withdraw as above quoted.
The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, the corps could not now re-cross, except by forcing the passage, as the Confederates absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with a heavy body of troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid of Sedgwick, upon conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk of his army upon Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any event have successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice but to go into camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the ford, and guard the river.
The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days' engagements were 4,925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags, fifteen guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundred prisoners, and lost no material. These captures are not conceded by the Confederate authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped in such confusion as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements, and material of all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of all facts, and the due weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothing was lost by the Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the dead and wounded.
Gibbon's division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of the river, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy's was taken up. Warren says, "Gen. Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, and retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsville pretty nearly all day." This Warren plainly esteems a poor sample of generalship, and he does not understand why Hooker did not order an assault. "I think it very probable we could have succeeded if it had been made." "Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted,"—"'tired' would express it."
Lee's one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so as to be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he could now again turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who lay listlessly expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently oblivious of his maxim enjoined upon Stoneman, "that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in war."
Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate lines at and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at once ordered back to the old battle-field. "They reached their destination during the afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm, which continued throughout the night, and most of the following day." (Lee.)
Wilcox and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road; Mahone, Posey, and Perry, along the plank road.
Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mine roads, and the latter rejoined his division.
The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to assault Hooker's position at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by no means idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its details, was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to develop his plans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the terrain would have yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous blow would disable his antagonist for this campaign, and he was unwilling to delay in striking it.
Let us now examine into Hooker's various criticisms upon Sedgwick's conduct.
Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised of his movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby from intelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick the despatch to join him at Chancellorsville, "it was written under the impression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock." But could Hooker rationally assume this to be the case when he had, five hours before, ordered Sedgwick to cross and pursue a flying enemy, and well knew that he had a portion of his forces already guarding the bridge-heads on the Fredericksburg side?
"The night was so bright that... no special difficulty was apprehended in executing the order." In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, shortly after midnight, a fog appears to have arisen from the river, which considerably impeded the movements of the Sixth Corps. This Hooker knew from Sedgwick's report, which he was bound to believe, unless evidence existed to show the contrary. "As will be seen, the order was peremptory, and would have justified him in losing every man of his command in its execution."
Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account of his familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter the necessity of strict compliance with the order.
"I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick's men had shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have encountered less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, it was late when he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in readiness to attack the heights in rear of the town, which was about eleven o'clock A.M. on the 3d, the enemy had observed his movement, and concentrated almost their entire force at that point to oppose him." "He had the whole force of the enemy there to run against in carrying the heights beyond Fredericksburg, but he carried them with ease; and, by his movements after that, I think no one would infer that he was confident in himself, and the enemy took advantage of it. I knew Gen. Sedgwick very well: he was a classmate of mine, and I had been through a great deal of service with him. He was a perfectly brave man, and a good one; but when it came to manoeuvring troops, or judging of positions for them, in my judgment he was not able or expert. Had Gen. Reynolds been left with that independent command, I have no doubt the result would have been very different." "When the attack was made, it had to be upon the greater part of the enemy's force left on the right: nevertheless the troops advanced, carried the heights without heavy loss, and leisurely took up their line of march on the plank road, advancing two or three miles that day."
Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were all spread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon. No doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, to obey that order; but, as in "losing every man in his command" in its execution, he would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to his chief, he did the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion as to the method of attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker's assumption that Sedgwick was on the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, and not Sedgwick's fault. Hooker might certainly have supposed that Sedgwick had obeyed his previous orders, in part at least.
Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I have understood that evidence has appeared before the Committee censuring me very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, in accordance with the order of Gen. Hooker. I now affirm that it was impossible to have made the movement, if there had not been a rebel soldier in front of me."
"I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg."
Sedgwick did "shoulder arms and advance" as soon as he received the order; but the reports show plainly enough that he encountered annoying opposition so soon as he struck the outskirts of the town; that he threw forward assaulting columns at once; and that these fought as well as the conditions warranted, but were repulsed.
It is not intended to convey the impression that there was no loss of time on Sedgwick's part. On the contrary, he might certainly have been more active in some of his movements. No doubt there were other general officers who would have been. But it is no exaggeration to insist that his dispositions were fully as speedy as those of any other portion of the army in this campaign.
Hooker not only alleges that "in his judgment, Gen. Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of his order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it," but quotes Warren as saying that Sedgwick "would not have moved at all if he [Warren] had not been there; and that, when he did move, it was not with sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre his troops." It is very doubtful whether Warren ever put his opinion in so strong a way as thus quoted by Hooker from memory. His report does speak of Gibbon's slowness in coming up, and of his thus losing the chance of crossing the canals and taking the breastworks before the Confederates filed into them. But beyond a word to the effect that giving the advance to Brooks's division, after the capture of the heights, "necessarily consumed a considerable time," Warren does not in his report particularly criticise Sedgwick's movements. And in another place he does speak of the order of ten P.M. as an "impossible" one.
Gen. Warren's testimony on this subject is of the highest importance, as representing Gen. Hooker in person. As before stated, he carried a duplicate of Hooker's order of ten P.M., to Sedgwick, with instructions from the general to urge upon Sedgwick the importance of the utmost celerity. Moreover, Warren knew the country better than any one else, and was more generally conversant with Hooker's plans, ideas, and methods, being constantly at his side. "Gen. Sedgwick was ordered to be in his position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could be there."
"If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we ought to have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with his twenty thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became isolated."
Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: "Early in the campaign I had come to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would be impossible to carry works by an assault in front, provided they were properly constructed and properly manned;" and refers to the Fredericksburg assault of Dec. 13, to illustrate this position, saying that they (the enemy) "could destroy men faster than I could throw them on the works;" and, "I do not know of an instance when rifle-pits, properly constructed and properly manned, have been taken by front assaults alone."
And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly to throw himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in his command rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waiting properly to dispose his men, or feel the enemy.
As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have seen how Brooks's march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how his attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men.
There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after the campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point and nothing more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his superior. It has but one error of consequence, viz., the assumption that the three divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under command of Gen. Lee, attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks and Newton. It was Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade of Anderson, who attacked Howe.
But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and contains serious errors. Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards Chancellorsville was received "just after dark, say eight o'clock," whereas it was not sent until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten P.M. from Falmouth; nor did Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.M. Howe evidently remembered the order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, as the one to march to Chancellorsville,—when speaking of time of delivery. The deductions Gen. Howe makes from errors like this are necessarily somewhat warped. But let us give all due weight to the testimony of an able soldier. He states that his attack on Marye's heights was made on a mere notice from Sedgwick, that he was about to attack, and desired Howe to assist; that he received on Sunday evening a bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the left of the corps must be protected, and that he consequently moved his own left round to the river; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to strengthen his position for defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not properly look after his division. "Not receiving any instruction or assistance from Gen. Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of ourselves. It seemed to me, from the movements or arrangements made during the day, that there was a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of the position which we held." Sedgwick's entire confidence in Howe's ability to handle his division, upon general instructions of the object to be attained, might account fully for a large part of this apparent vagueness. But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was, that no necessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the river.
Gen. Howe's testimony is very positive as to the possibility of the Sixth Corps complying with Hooker's order as given. He thinks a night attack could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that they could have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on the road to Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinion that Brooks's division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, with proper support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooks made to do this very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding to failure.
It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he has certainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded on errors of fact.
The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe's before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which the report of the commander of a brigade is entitled, whose duties allowed him to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. Though his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe's, he, too, mistakes the hour of the urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summoned before the Committee, unless as a partisan.
"My object" (continues Hooker) "in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at the time named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May." This statement is not only characteristic of Hooker's illogical method, but disingenuous to the degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, was a strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armed and equipped, having in their front less than half their number of Confederates. In view of Hooker's above-quoted opinion about rifle-pits; of the fact that in his testimony he says: "Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;" of the fact that the enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would so remain if he only kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and Pleasonton, at the angle south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the fact that he had unused reserves greater in number than the entire force of the enemy,—is it not remarkable that, in Hooker's opinion, nothing short of a countermarch of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture of formidable and sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the Army of Northern Virginia during an entire half year,) and an advance of nearly twelve miles,—all of which was to be accomplished between eleven and daylight of a day in May,—could operate to "relieve him from the position in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May"?
"I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee's rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville." Well enough, but was Sedgwick's corps the only one to accomplish this? Where were Reynolds, and Meade, and Howard, forsooth?
There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick's authority to withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his so doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick had really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons existed, and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to do so. But Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick retain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I might leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks's Ford, and turn the enemy's position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I was thwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to withdraw and cover Banks's Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who bore the order countermanding the withdrawal."
Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a position at Taylor's, the point where the Fredericksburg heights approach the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights were by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, with two-thirds of Lee's whole army surrounding his one corps, though he did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief's suggestions.
But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson's corps in his front,—some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,—to move upon his enemy, "attack and destroy him," and himself fall upon Lee's rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks's Ford? And Hooker had all Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange for attempting this simplest of manoeuvres.
It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one indicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the inertia and daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yet Hooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied himself that he did all that was to be expected of an active and intelligent commander.
The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "Question.—Can you tell why it was not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy? Answer.—I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were."
"Question.—Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a victory there? Answer.—I think we should have taken the offensive when the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick."
Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the other, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attack him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained."
Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state of facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson's corps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time enough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses himself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four to one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that at the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before him? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and revocatory evidence.
Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt the enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force on our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been done with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not strange that the purposelessness of the commander should result in half-hearted work by the subordinates.
The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker's and the actual facts, shows palpably who is in the right.
"At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: 'I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I can't use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg.'
"Question.—When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?
"Answer.—I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A.M. of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the bridges. This is the despatch: 'Despatch this moment received. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt.'
"This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, between three and four o'clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch was dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:—
"'Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.'
"In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me to cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced the movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over, when the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was wholly impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker."
To place in juxtaposition Hooker's testimony and Sedgwick's, in no wise militates against the latter.
There is one broad criticism which may fairly he passed upon Sedgwick's withdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge that his remaining in position might be of some assistance to his chief, instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyond danger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubborn flghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks's Ford, against even Lee with his twenty-four thousand.
But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could have destroyed his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, with the advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. Moreover, to demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, which, in this campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac was able to make.
Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, or himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, might have, accomplished so much. But if we assume, that having an eye to the numbers and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well as to the character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick was bound to dispute further the possession of Banks's Ford, in order to lend a questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear by comparison the conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the general commanding, bottled up behind their defences at Chancellorsville!