FOOTNOTES:[1]SeeMap 1.[2]Though troops from several of the small German States dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as an "Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops composing it were Austrians.[3]Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion of the hostile forces.—Wagner.
FOOTNOTES:
[1]SeeMap 1.
[1]SeeMap 1.
[2]Though troops from several of the small German States dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as an "Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops composing it were Austrians.
[2]Though troops from several of the small German States dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as an "Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops composing it were Austrians.
[3]Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion of the hostile forces.—Wagner.
[3]Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion of the hostile forces.—Wagner.
CHAPTER II.
GENOA.[4]
Inthe fertile valley of the Po, the Austrian army, commanded by Melas, found supplies in abundance for both men and animals. The equipment, discipline, and morale of the Austrians were good. The successes of the preceding year had encouraged them. They had that confidence in their commander so necessary to secure success. Filled with the enthusiasm of victory and looking hopefully forward to new triumphs, they were ready and anxious to be led against the French.
On the other hand, the Army of Italy, extending along the Apennines and Maritime Alps, found difficulty in obtaining supplies. Cut off from the productive basin of the Po by the Austrians on the north, and from the commerce of the sea by the British fleet on the south, this army had to depend almost entirely upon such supplies as could be sent from France over the Nice-Genoa road. The French soldiers were in a deplorable condition. Neglected by the French government, they were ragged, half-starved, discouraged. They had been defeated again and again. They lackedthe discipline and morale so essential to success. A few soldiers had already deserted; many were so emaciated that they could hardly bear arms, and a number were sick with fever.
On assuming command of the Army of Italy, Masséna took steps to improve the condition of his men. With money furnished by Bonaparte he supplied his troops with wheat, and by his energetic measures soon brought about better discipline. In Bonaparte's name, he published a spirited proclamation, which did much to renew the courage of his soldiers and to inspire in them the hope of victory.
Notwithstanding the efforts of Masséna, his soldiers were in a destitute condition. Only the bare necessaries of life were furnished them. Ammunition alone was sent them in abundance. Though the Army of Italy numbered but forty thousand men and was opposed to one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, Bonaparte would not re-enforce it by a single soldier. In fact, all the men andmatérielcollected in France were used to strengthen Moreau's army and the Army of Reserve. The Army of Italy was left to fight, as best it could, a force overwhelmingly superior in numbers,matériel, and equipment.
At the opening of the campaign, the condition of the Army of Italy was such that but thirty-six thousand men were fit for active service. Of this force, four thousand under Thurreau were in the MontCenis Pass, so that there remained but thirty-two thousand with which to hold the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. Masséna's right wing, numbering eight thousand under Miollis, held the fortified city of Genoa, which, owing to the outlying works and natural obstacles surrounding it, was an exceedingly strong place; his centre, twelve thousand strong, commanded by Soult, defended the Bochetta Pass, which opens upon Genoa, and the Cadibona Pass, which opens upon Savona; his left, consisting of twelve thousand under Suchet, occupied the Col di Tenda, Nice, and the line of the Var.
Inasmuch as the active French army directly in front of Melas numbered only thirty-two thousand soldiers, and was spread out from Genoa to Nice, he calculated that by directing twenty-five thousand men upon Genoa and a column of forty thousand upon the centre of the French line, he could hold in check the French right, while he broke through their centre and cut the Army of Italy in two. This feat accomplished, he expected that his left wing of twenty-five thousand, with the aid of the British fleet, would be able to enclose, blockade, and capture Genoa, while his right wing of forty thousand was forcing the remainder of the Army of Italy across the Var.
On the French side, the plan of campaign that offered the best results was one that Bonaparte himself had originated. He ordered Masséna toleave only small detachments at the passes of Tenda, Ormea, and Cadibona, and to concentrate twenty-five or thirty thousand men at Genoa. In written instructions to Masséna, the First Consul set forth his views as follows:—
"Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Put but few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tenda, where the snow will protect you. Leave some detachments around Nice and in the forts in its vicinity; keep four fifths of your force in Genoa and its neighborhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself with all your forces united upon one of the enemy's columns. The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favored by the nature of the place, it may make up for the deficiency in number. In that broken country, if you manœuvre well, with 30,000 men you may give battle to 60,000. In order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of 120,000 at least. Melas possesses neither your talents nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from your position; he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in Piedmont."
"Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Put but few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tenda, where the snow will protect you. Leave some detachments around Nice and in the forts in its vicinity; keep four fifths of your force in Genoa and its neighborhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself with all your forces united upon one of the enemy's columns. The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favored by the nature of the place, it may make up for the deficiency in number. In that broken country, if you manœuvre well, with 30,000 men you may give battle to 60,000. In order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of 120,000 at least. Melas possesses neither your talents nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from your position; he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in Piedmont."
Though this plan was excellent for holding in check the Austrians for a time, unfortunately itwas beyond the execution of Masséna. Provisions were so scarce in Genoa that it would have been foolish to concentrate nearly the whole of the Army of Italy there. To feed his army was the difficulty that confronted Masséna. For this reason he scattered his troops along the Apennines, and occupied the seaboard from Genoa to Nice. In this position, his soldiers could seize the meagre supplies that the barren country afforded, and could more easily obtain provisions direct from France. Though it is doubtful whether Masséna fully appreciated the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, nevertheless, he would probably have carried it out, had he not been prevented from doing so by a lack of provisions, and by the beginning of hostilities much earlier than either he or Bonaparte expected.
On the 5th of April, Melas, leaving thirty-five thousand Austrians under General Kaim to occupy the fortresses of northwestern Italy and to watch the passes of the Alps, advanced with sixty-five thousand[5]to attack Masséna. His forces were divided into three columns: General Ott with fifteen thousand men ascended the Trebbia and presented himself before the defiles of the mountains which shoot off from the main chain of the Apennines and extend along the east side ofGenoa; General Hohenzollern with ten thousand marched upon the Bochetta Pass on the north side of the city; and Melas himself with forty thousand ascended the Bormida, and attacked the forces of Soult and Suchet along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. Confining his principal attack to the centre of the French line, Melas succeeded, after hard fighting, in forcing his way through the Cadibona Pass, which movement cut in two the Army of Italy and separated Soult from Suchet. The former fell back towards Genoa; the latter, towards Nice. In these engagements both sides fought fiercely. Though the French had the advantage of position, they were compelled to give way before the onslaughts of superior numbers.
At the Bochetta Pass, the attack made by General Hohenzollern was repulsed; but on the east side of Genoa the French, numbering less than four thousand, could not hold the defiles and crest of the Apennines against General Ott's force of fifteen thousand. The Austrians drove the French across the mountains, then surrounded and invested the French forts that protected the city on that side. By this successful attack, General Ott gained a foothold within cannon-shot of the walls of Genoa.
Thus far Melas had been successful. The first great step in his undertaking had been accomplished. Now he could close in upon Massénawith his left wing, force him back into Genoa, and hold him there as in a vise; while with his right, strongly re-enforced, he could advance against Suchet, perhaps crush him or drive him across the Var into France.
Meanwhile Masséna was in a precarious situation. His army was cut in two; his communications with France were severed. In the face of superior numbers, Suchet was being driven back towards Nice, and Soult was withdrawing the shattered remains of his forces towards Genoa. In front of the city and along the Italian shore, the British fleet was actively supporting the operations of Melas. On the east side of the city, the Austrians had gained the crests of the mountains; and at the Bochetta Pass they were ready to make another attack, which would prove successful. In fact, Masséna was surrounded. The allies were closing in upon him. Already their guns could be heard at Genoa; soon they might force him inside the walls of the city.
But it was the want of provisions that gave Masséna the greatest anxiety. Food was already scarce, and there was but little hope of receiving any more. Though defeat and famine were staring him in the face, yet he did not allow himself to be discouraged. He realized that it was his duty to maintain a stubborn resistance, and to engage actively as many of the Austrians as possible, in order that Bonaparte could cross theAlps and strike the Austrian rear. By prolonging the conflict he would gain time; and time was of the greatest importance to the success of Bonaparte.
In order to understand how Masséna attempted to carry out his purposes, it is necessary to describe briefly the situation of Genoa and its fortifications. The city lies at the foot of a spur of the Apennines, on the shore of the gulf that bears its name. This spur, running south from the main chain towards the sea, divides into two ridges which extend to the water's edge, one along the east side, the other along the west side of the city. Upon the crests of the ridges, which form two sides of a triangle, having its base on the sea, a number of forts had been constructed and were occupied by the French. Within the triangle was the walled city of Genoa, containing about one hundred thousand inhabitants. Thus the city had two lines of fortifications surrounding it: one along the ridges and crests of the Apennines, the other along the walls of the city.
Masséna had but eighteen thousand soldiers to defend Genoa. But with this force in so strongly fortified a place, he knew that he could hold out as long as his provisions lasted. Perhaps, by vigorous fighting, he might be able to unite with Suchet, and in this way re-establish his communications with France.
For the purpose of carrying out these views,Masséna resolved to drive the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines on the east side of the city; then, if possible, to effect a junction with Suchet by a movement along the Genoa-Nice road. Accordingly, on the 7th of April, at the head of a strong force, he issued from the city and vigorously attacked General Ott. The French drove the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines, and, after desperate fighting, seized and reoccupied the Austrian positions.
Having been successful in this attack, Masséna then made preparations for a movement towards Nice. For this purpose, he divided his command into two parts: he left Miollis with eight thousand men to defend Genoa; and with the remaining ten thousand, divided into two columns, one of which was commanded by Soult, the other by himself, he began his westward march. At the same time, Suchet, who had been informed of Masséna's plan, marched eastward from Nice to attack the Austrians from that side. Both Masséna and Suchet met with fierce opposition. Neither could make much headway against the overwhelming forces of Melas. For several days the fighting was furious, desperate, and bloody. Though Masséna captured several thousand Austrians, he was finally repulsed and driven back. On the 18th of April he re-entered Genoa; and Suchet again fell back towards the Var.
Masséna was now enclosed in the city. Fromthis time dates the beginning of the siege of Genoa,—one of the most memorable and stubbornly contested struggles mentioned in history. In this brief account of these operations, we shall not attempt to describe the sufferings of the French soldiers who fought and starved and died here; nor to dwell upon the heroic deeds of their commander,—as stubborn a soldier and fierce a fighter as ever trod a battle-field; but rather to point out the important facts that had a bearing upon the operations of Bonaparte, and to show why Masséna, in the midst of a starving army and a starving city, still continued to fight on.
The Army of Italy having been cut in two, Melas gave orders that General Ott should take command of the thirty thousand Austrians then surrounding Genoa, and, if possible, force Masséna to capitulate; and that General Elsnitz, with twenty-five thousand, should proceed vigorously against Suchet, whose active force at this time numbered but ten thousand men. Masséna himself had but fifteen thousand; but nevertheless he had resolved to hold out to the last extremity. He sent an aid-de-camp to the First Consul to apprise him of the situation of the Army of Italy, and to urge him to hasten the movement of the Army of Reserve. Realizing that the scarcity of provisions would prevent a long resistance, Masséna took possession of all the wheat he could find in the city. Even the grain of inferior quality,such as rye and oats, was seized and made into bread. Though the quantity of bread thus obtained was small, and the quality poor, it sufficed to keep alive the soldiers and the poor of Genoa during the first two weeks of the siege. But ten days passed, and the supply of bread was almost exhausted. Moreover, its bad quality was already causing sickness. A number of soldiers were in the hospitals; and many were so weak and emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their arms.
Though the outlook was gloomy to Masséna's soldiers, some hope yet remained in his rugged soul. Perhaps a storm or adverse winds might drive the English fleet off the Italian shore, and thus allow the French ships to bring in provisions; perhaps Bonaparte, now that he understood the situation, would hurry across the Alps into Italy, and strike a blow that would cause Melas to raise the siege of Genoa and set free Masséna's perishing army.
Masséna's force, exclusive of the sick, now numbered but twelve thousand men; part of whom were occupying the outlying works, and the remainder, within the city, were acting as a reserve. His purpose was to attack the Austrians, whenever they advanced towards the city, and to exhaust them as much as possible by partial engagements. By this means he expected to prevent Melas from sending away a force, either to aid the Austriansin front of Suchet, or to oppose the projected march of Bonaparte across the Alps.
On the 30th of April General Ott, supported by English gun-boats in the Gulf of Genoa, made simultaneous attacks on the east, north, and west sides of the city. In these attacks, he met with considerable success. On all three sides the Austrian columns advanced and occupied more favorable positions. In fact, they gained the crests of several mountain ridges within cannon-shot of the city, and succeeded in capturing several French forts.
Masséna fought fiercely. Throwing his reserve first on one side of the city and then on the other, in order to re-enforce his troops occupying the outlying works, he finally forced back the Austrians from their commanding positions and recovered the lost forts. The success of Masséna at this time was discouraging to General Ott; for he knew that he could not lay close siege to the place until his troops gained the crests of the Apennines and invested, or captured, the outlying works.
Meanwhile the twenty-five thousand Austrians under Elsnitz had, by vigorous fighting, driven Suchet from position to position. They had even forced him to abandon Nice, and to fall back on the Var. On this river, which had been strongly fortified, Suchet rallied his scattered forces. Having received from the departments of southern France a considerable re-enforcement, which increased his total strength to fourteen thousand men, he was able, in this position, to make a successful stand, and to stop the onward rush of the victorious Austrians.
As soon as Bonaparte learned of the hopeless condition of affairs at Genoa, he saw the necessity of hurrying across the Alps with the Army of Reserve. But since the successful execution of his plan depended upon his receiving a large re-enforcement from the Army of the Rhine, and since Moreau could not safely detach this force till he had defeated Kray and pushed him back from Lake Constance, Bonaparte was compelled to delay his own movement. Moreau was slow to begin; and his lingering inactivity gave Bonaparte intense anxiety, for it not only paralyzed the operations of the Army of Reserve, but prolonged the sufferings of the Army of Italy. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged Moreau to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. "Hasten," said the First Consul, "hasten by your success to accelerate the arrival of the moment at which Masséna can be disengaged. That general wants provisions. For fifteen days he has been enduring with his debilitated soldiers a struggle of despair. Your patriotism is addressed, your self-interest; for if Masséna shall be compelled to capitulate, it will be necessary to take from you a part of your forces, for the purpose of hurrying down the Rhone, in order to assist the departments of the south."
Finally, on the 25th of April, Moreau began his advance against Kray. It is not the intention at this time to describe in detail these operations. At present it is sufficient to say that Moreau executed vigorously his part in Bonaparte's great plan. Having defeated Kray in two battles, he detached, on the 11th of May, a corps of fifteen thousand men from his army, gave the command of it to General Moncey, and ordered him to march by way of the St. Gothard into Italy.
The time had come for Bonaparte to move forward the Army of Reserve. Accordingly, on the 15th of May, he began his advance by way of the Great St. Bernard into Italy. While this army of forty thousand and this corps of fifteen thousand are marching hopefully forward across the Alps, from France and Germany respectively, let us again turn our attention to Masséna, who, amidst famine and death, is desperately fighting on.
On the 5th of May a small vessel, containing grain sufficient to last the besieged garrison for five days, ran the blockade and entered Genoa. Masséna felt encouraged, and shortly afterwards made a sortie on the east side of the city. Though he drove the Austrians from their positions, this assault was the last of his successes. On the 13th of May he attempted another assault, but was badly defeated. Henceforth his soldiers were so weak that they lacked the strength to undertake any movement beyond the walls of Genoa. In fact,many, not being able to bear the weight of their arms, were compelled to sit down while doing guard duty. Consequently, Masséna was obliged to limit his efforts to the defence of the city, and to the task of providing food for his men.
By the 20th of May the bread and meat were exhausted; even the horses had all been consumed. All the linseed, starch, and cacao found in the city were then collected and made into a kind of bread, which was all but indigestible. This wretched and repulsive food, and a soup made of herbs were all that remained to sustain life. Nevertheless, Masséna would not capitulate. Stubborn and courageous to the last, he seemed bent on defying even starvation and death. Possibly Bonaparte might yet come; for word had been brought that he had crossed the Alps. It was reported that, on the 20th of May, his army had been seen descending the Great St. Bernard into Italy. If so, why did he not come? It was now the 30th of May, and not another word had been heard of him. Could he have met with defeat? Could he, whose movements were usually so rapid, whose blows were so terrible and unexpected—could he have been ten days in Italy, and not yet have struck the blow that was to shatter the Austrian rear and bring relief to Masséna's perishing soldiers?
With intense anxiety these despairing men looked for the coming of Bonaparte. But he camenot. Already discouraged, they now lost all hope. A few went so far as to destroy their arms. Some plotted; others talked wildly of the sufferings and horrors that they were called upon to endure. All urged Masséna to surrender; but he would not yield. He begged his soldiers to hold out a little longer. He told them that the First Consul was advancing to their relief; that if they capitulated now, they would lose the results of all their heroism, all their sufferings. "Yet a few days," said he, "nay, a few hours, and you will be delivered."
Thus, for a brief time, Masséna succeeded in raising the hopes of his soldiers. Again they looked expectantly towards the Apennines. Never was anxiety more intense. In every sound, in every echo, in every flash of light along the northern horizon, they thought that they saw signs of the coming of Bonaparte. But they were mistaken. Despair seized them; no hope remained. Even Masséna saw that the end had come; for the last ounce of that wretched food composed of linseed, starch, and cacao, had been consumed. It was now absolutely necessary to surrender. Yet Masséna's inflexible nature would not wholly yield. He declared that he would never capitulate, unless his soldiers should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, and with the liberty to fight again when beyond the enemy's line. And he kept his resolution. The Austrians were compelled to accept these terms.
That the reader may understand why General Ott did not continue the struggle a few days longer, and thus force Masséna to surrender unconditionally, let us consider for a moment the situation at this time in the valley of the Po.
On the 2d of June, two days before Masséna capitulated, Bonaparte entered Milan, and there awaited Moncey's corps, which did not arrive till the 6th of June.
On the 29th of May Melas learned that Bonaparte was advancing on Milan. On the 31st he learned that Moreau had defeated Kray, and that Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. Gothard into Italy. At once he comprehended the vast plan of the First Consul. Melas was in consternation; he had been surprised. To him the Army of Reserve was no longer imaginary; it was a reality. Moreover, it was rapidly approaching a favorable position from which it could strike a formidable blow at the Austrian communications. Melas saw the necessity of concentrating immediately his scattered forces. He must, if possible, break through the French Army before it closed in upon him. Accordingly, on the 31st of May, he sent orders to General Elsnitz to quit the Var and march on Alessandria; and instructed General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to defend the line of the Po.
General Ott received this order on the 2d of June, during the negotiations for the capitulationof Genoa. He realized that he must either raise at once the siege of the city or else accept Masséna's terms.
On the 4th of June Masséna surrendered. On the 5th his active force, numbering eight thousand men, set out over the Genoa-Nice road to join Suchet, who at this time was following closely upon the rear of the Austrians in his front, as they withdrew towards Alessandria. In addition to his active force, Masséna surrendered four thousand sick soldiers at Genoa; but it was stipulated that they should be cared for, and upon their recovery should be sent back to join the French army. Having made these arrangements, Masséna himself proceeded by sea to join Suchet.
During these operations the English fleet in the Gulf of Genoa actively supported the Austrians; but the English corps in Minorca remained inactive. No effort was made to land it either at Genoa or at any other point along the Italian or French coast.
During these engagements the fighting on both sides was desperate, the loss heavy. In prisoners, killed, and wounded, the Austrians lost about twenty thousand; the French, about fourteen thousand. But the loss of the latter was in reality much greater; for out of Masséna's active force of eight thousand that had marched out of Genoa to join Suchet, probably six thousand were unfit for arduous service. The total number, therefore,on the French side puthors de combat, for the time being, may be reckoned at about twenty thousand men.
The active operations of the Army of Italy were ended. They had begun on the 5th of April, and had terminated on the 4th of June. For two months Masséna had shown himself firm as a rock,—had gloriously performed his part in Bonaparte's great plan.
COMMENTS.
At the outset the Austrian forces were greatly scattered. A few thousand were in Tuscany and in the Papal States; an Austrian garrison was occupying the fortress of Mantua, which is situated on the Mincio about twenty miles south of Lake Garda; twenty-five thousand were moving forward in two columns to attack Genoa; forty thousand were being directed on the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and thirty-five thousand were occupying the fortresses of northwestern Italy, and guarding the Italian entrances to the passes of the Alps.
The purpose of Melas was to push forward across the Apennines and Maritime Alps, force the line of the Var, and invade France. How best to accomplish this project was the problem before him. Having an army of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers and being opposed tobut forty thousand, he believed that his force was sufficiently large to undertake the invasion of France. Since the French line directly in his front extended along the mountains from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, Melas could easily overwhelm the French centre and cut the Army of Italy in two; then, by leaving a sufficient force to surround Genoa, he could push forward vigorously to the Var with the bulk of his forces, and perhaps carry the position there before the French had time to make the necessary dispositions for defending it. Had he adopted this plan, and made arrangements with Admiral Keith and General Abercromby to have the English corps in Minorca landed at the same time on the coast of Italy or France, he would doubtless have been successful.
He was not successful because he did not thoroughly appreciate the situation. He did not know how to handle his army. He scattered his forces, and thus dissipated his strength. He spent too much energy at Genoa, and not enough along the Var. His rear guard, which consisted of the thirty-five thousand soldiers under General Kaim in Piedmont, and of twenty thousand scattered throughout Italy, was unnecessarily large, and yet was so divided, subdivided, and dispersed that it was weak at all points. In short, Melas committed many errors.
First: In advancing against Genoa with twenty-five thousand men, divided into two columns, andagainst the centre of the French line with a third column of forty thousand, Melas gave to Masséna the opportunity of holding in check with small forces two of the columns, while he concentrated his remaining forces against the third. In fact, this was exactly what Masséna did. He left eight thousand soldiers in and around Genoa to hold the place, then united the rest of his troops near Savona to attack Melas. When it is remembered that these three Austrian columns of attack were separated by impassable obstacles, and could not support one another, the errors of Melas become apparent to every soldier. That, in spite of such errors, he was successful in cutting the Army of Italy in two and in gaining the crest of the mountains on the east side of Genoa was due to his great superiority in numbers. His attacking force numbered sixty-five thousand men, while Masséna had but thirty-two thousand.
In this connection it is worthy of notice that numbers alone can neutralize and finally overcome any advantage of position or of generalship. Thus mediocrity may triumph over genius. Even a Napoleon cannot conquer in the face of odds sufficiently great. At Leipsic one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, commanded by him, were defeated by two hundred and ninety thousand allies. In the Waterloo campaign, which, from a strategical point of view, is a masterpiece in generalship, his army of one hundred and twenty-fivethousand men was crushed and overwhelmed by the armies of England and Prussia, numbering two hundred and eighteen thousand soldiers. Hence follows the first principle of war:Be as strong as possible at the vital point.
Second: A victory on the Var was of much greater importance to Melas than was the capitulation of Genoa; for should this river be once forced, there would be no further obstacle to the invasion of France; and, besides, a successful attack on Suchet would hopelessly deprive Masséna of all support, and would in time force him to surrender. In truth, the great effort for success should have been made on the Var. But Melas failed to appreciate this fact. After he had separated Masséna from Suchet by forcing the centre of the French line, he directed his greatest efforts to the capture of Genoa. For this purpose the troops surrounding the place were increased to thirty thousand men, and were kept at or about this strength till Masséna surrendered; while on the Var the Austrian forces actively engaged during these operations numbered but twenty-five thousand. Since, at the outset, Masséna had only eighteen thousand combatants at Genoa, and since this number was rapidly reduced from day to day by casualties and sickness, it is evident that Melas could have surrounded the place and have maintained the siege there with less than thirty thousand soldiers. The increase of his troops beyondthe number necessary to hold securely the place was injudicious; for the surplus could have been used with greater effect on the Var. Moreover, the surplus did not hasten the surrender of Masséna; for he was able to hold out against thirty thousand till his provisions were exhausted. Against ten thousand less he could have held out no longer. Again and again Melas assaulted the works surrounding the city, but his efforts were, to a great extent, a waste of energy; for they resulted in a greater loss to the Austrians than to the French, and had little or no effect in hastening the surrender of Masséna.
In the treatment of fortresses, it is worth while to compare the methods of Bonaparte with those of Melas. In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, the strong fortresses which were held by the allies, and which were on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did not stop his progress for a moment. Though from a lack of siege artillery, he could not completely invest them, he pushed forward past them to decide, if possible, their fate upon the open battle-field. In that campaign he invested the fortress of Mantua, containing twelve thousand combatants, with ten thousand men; and though the besieged were finally increased to twenty thousand soldiers, he continued with ten thousand or less to hold them in check for seven months, while he won the battles of Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, San Georgio, Arcole,and Rivoli. "It is upon the open field of battle," said Napoleon, "that the fate of fortresses and empires is decided."
Third: The Austrian rear guard was unnecessarily large. It consisted of fifty-five thousand soldiers. At present it is not the purpose to point out in detail the errors that Melas committed by leaving so large a force inactive in Italy, but rather to show that this force was larger than necessary, and that the surplus troops composing it could have been used to much greater advantage along the Var. The necessity for a strong rear guard in northwestern Italy becomes apparent when it is remembered that Thurreau was occupying the Mont Cenis Pass with four thousand men, and might at any time attempt to issue therefrom upon the flank and rear of Melas as he advanced towards the Var. Inasmuch as Thurreau's detachment occupied a favorable position from which to attack the Austrians, it was necessary, perhaps, that Melas should leave ten or twelve thousand men to hold this force in check. There was, too, some likelihood that French troops might issue into Italy from Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass or the Simplon; a few thousand troops were therefore needed in that vicinity to give warning in case the French attempted to enter Italy from that direction. At this time Melas doubted the existence of the Army of Reserve; but, had he believed it to be a reality, doubtless he would not have expected Bonaparte to cross the Great St. Bernard. And even had he expected him from that direction, perhaps no better arrangement of his rear guard could have been made than to leave five thousand men before the St. Gothard, five thousand before the Great St. Bernard, and twenty thousand near Turin with their left flank well extended towards the Mont Cenis Pass. In this central position the rear guard could march rapidly to attack the French, should they enter Italy by any one of these passes, and could hold them in check till a larger Austrian force could be concentrated. Had Melas known that Bonaparte expected to cross the Alps with the Army of Reserve, no better method could have been devised to prevent the projected march of Bonaparte than to force the Var and invade France. This undertaking being accomplished, there would be no further danger of Bonaparte's crossing the Alps; for he must then fight on the west side of the mountains to save France from invasion. The surest way to protect the Austrian rear was to force the Var. Every spare man should have been directed there. Twenty thousand could have held Genoa; thirty thousand would have sufficed for a rear guard; and of the remaining seventy thousand, probably fifty or sixty thousand could have united in an attack upon Suchet.
Fourth: Had the English corps of twelve thousand men been thrown upon the coast of Francejust in rear of Suchet, while sixty thousand Austrians were attacking him in front, who can doubt what the result would have been? Suchet had but fourteen thousand men; and against such overwhelming odds he would have been compelled to yield.
With a large and brave army, capable of doing great things, if it had been properly led, Melas so scattered it and dissipated his strength that he virtually accomplished nothing. Though he commanded one hundred and twenty thousand men, he brought but twenty-five thousand upon the vital point. In short, he committed blunder upon blunder, and finally failed in his undertaking.
The problem before Masséna was to hold in check the Austrians in Italy until Bonaparte could perfect his arrangements, cross the Alps, and strike the Austrian rear. Masséna could not expect to do more than this; for he could not take the offensive single-handed against an Austrian army three times the size of his own. Moreover, he was in possession of the strong defensive positions of Genoa, of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and of the line of the Var, where inferior numbers could make a vigorous resistance against greatly superior forces. Masséna could not know how soon Bonaparte would cross the Alps. His object, therefore, was so to arrange his troops as to enable them to hold out as long as possible.
At the outset of the campaign the Army of Italywas stationed as follows: eight thousand were at Genoa; twelve thousand, in the vicinity of Savona; twelve thousand, at the Tenda Pass, at Nice, and along the Var; and four thousand, in the Mont Cenis Pass. By examining the several positions on the map, it will be seen that the French forces were greatly scattered. Thirty-two thousand, under the direct command of Masséna, were defending the line of the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, a distance of about seventy-five miles; and four thousand, under Thurreau, were holding the Mont Cenis Pass, which lies in the French Alps about one hundred and twenty miles north of Nice.
Inasmuch as the direct road from Italy into France crossed the Alps over this pass, it was necessary to leave Thurreau's detachment there. Otherwise an Austrian corps of several thousand could have crossed the Alps at this point, thence have marched south along the west side of the mountains, and have attacked the French on the Var in rear, while Melas with his main forces was advancing across the Apennines to attack them in front. Moreover, in this favorable position, Thurreau, unless strongly opposed, could descend the Alps and fall upon the flank and rear of the Austrians as they advanced towards Nice. It was necessary, therefore, for Melas to leave ten or twelve thousand soldiers of the Austrian rear guard near the Italian entrance to the Mont Cenis Passin order to hold Thurreau in check. Thus, though this French detachment could take no active part in the engagements along the Apennines and Maritime Alps, its four thousand men did good service in the struggle by rendering nugatory the fighting power of a much larger Austrian force.
Since the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps occupied a front of about seventy-five miles in extent, they could not concentrate rapidly. Consequently, Melas could throw a strong force against some point of their long line with great hope of success. In fact, by attacking the centre of their line with superior numbers, he could cut the Army of Italy in two. Having in this way separated Masséna from Suchet, Melas could concentrate an overwhelming force against each in succession, and thus defeat them separately. Moreover, this movement would cut the communications of Masséna with France, and compel him to seek safety in Genoa, where the opposition of superior numbers and the scarcity of provisions must eventually force him to surrender.
Strategically, therefore, the situation of the Army of Italy was faulty; yet it must be remembered that the lack of provisions was the principal cause that led Masséna to adopt this plan. In order better to subsist his troops, he had scattered them. But was there no other course that offered him greater advantages? A discussion of the subject should throw light on this question.
First: He might have left detachments to hold the Cadibona and Ormea passes, and have concentrated the bulk of his army in rear of the Tenda Pass in the vicinity of Nice. Had he adopted this course, his troops would have been united, and could have drawn their provisions direct from France. But no other advantages would have resulted. With the French in this position, Melas could have attacked the passes of the Apennines in force, and have gained possession of the Genoa-Nice road; which operation would have compelled Masséna to fall back on the Var. There he might have been able to make a successful stand for a time. But should the Austrians once force this position, there would be no further obstacle to the invasion of France. To adopt this plan would undoubtedly have been a mistake; for it involved the abandonment of Genoa, which was so strong, both naturally and artificially, that a small force could hold it for a long time against superior numbers. Moreover, in a defensive campaign, when the odds are greatly in favor of the attacking army, and when the object is to gain time, advantage should be taken of every strong position.
Second: Masséna might have left small detachments to hold the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and have concentrated the rest of his army at Genoa. Indeed this was the plan that Bonaparte had ordered Masséna to carry out; butit presented great difficulties. Provisions were scarce at Genoa. Had Masséna increased his strength there to thirty thousand soldiers, starvation and disease would sooner have done their deadly work. Moreover, the greater fighting power thus obtained would have availed him nothing; for with half the number he in fact held the city till the food was exhausted. Had Masséna adopted this course, undoubtedly he must have surrendered at least three weeks earlier. In that case, the Austrians would have crossed the Var into France, and Bonaparte would have abandoned his march into Italy. In that case, the decisive struggle between Melas and Bonaparte would doubtless have taken place in the valley of the Rhone instead of in the valley of the Po. Indeed, it is not improbable to assume that, had Masséna attempted to carry out either one of the plans mentioned, Bonaparte would have been obliged to change the entire conduct of the campaign. In war small matters often determine great events.
Under the circumstances then existing, Masséna was justified in not carrying out Bonaparte's instructions; nevertheless, had he fully appreciated the advantages of the plan, he would undoubtedly have made a greater effort to collect supplies at Genoa. Inasmuch as he took command of the Army of Italy before the arrival of the British fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, possibly he might have shipped sufficient grain from Toulon tosupply the Army of Italy during a siege of several months. For the purpose of this discussion, let us assume that he had done so; and that, in accordance with Bonaparte's orders, he had left a few thousand men to hold the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and had collected about thirty thousand at Genoa. What would have been the result? What are the advantages of this situation? Surely, they are many; for Bonaparte himself originated the plan.
Since the mountains and outlying works surrounding Genoa made it a veritable stronghold, Bonaparte calculated that the Army of Italy could maintain itself there against greatly outnumbering forces; and that the Austrians would hardly dare to force the Apennines and push forward in order to invade France while thirty thousand men remained undefeated in their rear. In this position, too, Masséna could, at any time, leave a small force to hold Genoa, then march rapidly westward along the south side of the Apennines, and arrive before any one of the threatened passes with almost his entire army; or should the Austrians force the Apennines and advance towards France, he could fall upon their flank and rear, and perhaps sever their communications, while his own communications with Genoa would be protected by the mountains on one side and by the sea on the other. In fact, this position would enable him to take advantage of the topographyof the country to the fullest extent. If he should make an attack in force upon the Austrians from one of the passes in his possession, the mountains would protect him during his concentration, and would give strength to his position after his forces had united. If he should remain at Genoa, the fortifications and natural obstacles there would increase enormously his fighting power. It is evident, too, that he might march out of the city, force his way through the Apennines, and cut the communications of the Austrians in the valley of the Po. If, while holding the Apennines, he should advance with his main army over the Genoa-Nice road to attack the Austrians, he would be in a position where a victory would bring him great results, and where a defeat would do him but little harm. Should he be successful, he could sever the Austrian communications and perhaps ruin their army; should he be repulsed, he could fall back and seek safety in Genoa. "If," says Bonaparte in his instructions to Masséna, "Melas appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from your position: he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in Piedmont."
In short, Bonaparte's design was so to make use of the works of nature and of art as to prolong the conflict and increase the effectiveness of Masséna's small army. Thus it was that Bonaparteexpected thirty thousand French to defeat sixty thousand Austrians. Thus it was that he expected the Army of Italy to hold out against overwhelming odds till he himself could strike the decisive blow.
Though from a strategical point of view the plan set forth in Bonaparte's instructions to Masséna possessed many advantages, yet it had one great defect. With the main bulk of Masséna's forces concentrated at Genoa, and with small detachments holding the line of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, it is evident that Melas could force his way across the mountains between Genoa and the Tenda Pass, and thus cut the communications of Masséna and enclose him in Genoa. It is evident, too, that Melas could surround Masséna and eventually force him to capitulate. The French might fight desperately and hold out for months; yet, in time, they would be compelled to yield. The histories of wars and of sieges show that, when a commander allows himself to be enclosed in a fortification, he is doomed to defeat in the end. "Great armies," says Von der Goltz, "which are shut up in a fortress after lost battles, are, as the history of investments from Alesia down to Metz proves, almost always lost." Again he says: "Among all the relations between fortress and field army, the latter must make it a supreme rulenever to allow itself to be thrown into a fortress. Even to pass through it is dangerous, because the army may be kept prisoner there against its will.Fortresses protect the troops they contain, but, at the same time, anchor them to the spot. An army can easily be got behind fortifications, but only with difficulty back again into the open field, unless it be that strong help from without lends it a hand." When the commander of an army is hard pressed, and there is near at hand a strongly fortified place with outlying works of great strength, and provisions and water within, the temptation is great to seek security there. Second rate generals accept such opportunities, but in doing so they make fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art of war manœuvre for position, and become themselves the besiegers, or decide upon the open battle-field the fate of their fortresses and their armies.
During all Napoleon's military operations he never allowed himself to be besieged in any place. How, then, are we to reconcile this fact with the instructions that he sent to Masséna? Why should he order Masséna to take up a position which would allow his army to be besieged, and finally to be captured or destroyed? To answer satisfactorily these questions, it is necessary to consider the operations of Masséna in connection with the projected operations of Bonaparte. The Army of Italy was essentially a containing force. Its duty was to hold Melas in check for a time. How Masséna could bestprolongthe conflict was theproblem that Bonaparte was solving. That the Army of Italy should finally be defeated was of small consequence; that it should not be defeated before Bonaparte had time to effect the destruction of Melas was of great consequence. If it could hold out till then, the victory of Bonaparte over Melas would render nugatory the triumph of Melas over Masséna. If it could hold out till then, the success of Melas at Genoa would avail him nothing; for it would be swallowed up by a greater success, which was destined to produce far greater results.
Bonaparte believed that Masséna was strong enough to hold Melas in check; and since every spare man was needed to strengthen Moreau's army and the Army of Reserve, he would not send any re-enforcements to the Army of Italy. Doubtless an ordinary general would have marched the entire Army of Reserve to the support of Masséna. What would have been the result? With only eighty thousand Frenchmen to oppose one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, there would have been a long struggle in Italy. Guided by the genius of Bonaparte the French might have repeated the successes of 1796-97; but even had they done so, months of hard fighting would have been necessary in order to drive the Austrians out of northern Italy. In the Marengo campaign Bonaparte expected to accomplish as great results in less time. The struggle for the mastery was totake place, not along the Apennines, but in the valley of the Po. Thus it was that no re-enforcements were sent to Masséna, and that little or nothing was done to improve the condition of the Army of Italy. "It must be admitted," says Thiers, "that the army of Liguria[6]was treated a little as a sacrificed army. Not a man was sent to it. Materials of war only were supplied to it; and even under that head such only as were absolutely needful. It was in a different direction that the great efforts of the government were exerted, because it was in a different direction that the great blows were to be dealt. The army of Liguria was exposed to destruction in order to gain the time which should render the others victorious. Such is the hard necessity of war, which passes over the heads of these to strike the heads of those; obliging those to die that these may live and conquer."
It seems hard that Masséna's soldiers should have starved and died, and no help have been sent them. It seems hard that they should have struggled on, performing heroic deeds, with little or no hope of victory. But such is war; some must fail in order that others may triumph. In beleaguered Genoa, at the bridge of Arcole, amid the snows of Russia, men must die. But do they die in vain? Perhaps so: and yet, who shall say?
Victory was Bonaparte's object; and to obtain it, he would, if necessary, sacrifice the Army of Italy. He had an eye for great results. His glance penetrated the most complicated military problems. It was his merit that he knew how, with the forces at hand, to do great things. He did not fritter away his strength by sending useless detachments here and there. The four thousand men under Thurreau were a necessity in the Mont Cenis Pass; the Army of Italy, with Masséna at its head, was large enough, but not too large, to do the work expected of it; and the Army of Reserve, re-enforced by a corps of Moreau's army, was of sufficient strength to produce the desired effect at the vital point. Even Genoa, the Alps, and the Apennines were made to serve Bonaparte. Nature was his re-enforcement. Like a mighty tide he moved on, neither deterred by the sufferings of the Army of Italy, nor stopped by the great chain of the Alps.
He who would censure Bonaparte for not marching to the relief of Masséna must remember that such a course would have prolonged the struggle and ultimately would have led to a greater destruction of life. Yet humane considerations probably did not influence his decisions one iota. Let us not, then, attribute to him the virtues of a Lincoln; but let us set forth with fairness what he did and why he did it. We may not admire the man who can thus sacrifice an army to attain his ends; butwe must admire the soldier who penetrates the future, who sees what to do and how to do it, who bends every energy to the accomplishment of the task, and with relentless purpose, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, marches on to victory.