FOOTNOTES:[7]SeeMap 3.
FOOTNOTES:
[7]SeeMap 3.
[7]SeeMap 3.
CHAPTER IV.
MARENGO.[8]
AnxiouslyBonaparte at Paris awaited the success of the Army of the Rhine. Matters were urgent and time was precious, for Masséna could hold out but a few days longer at Genoa. Until the French should be victorious in Germany, the First Consul could not expect Moreau to send a detachment across Switzerland into Italy. As soon as word should be brought that this re-enforcement was on its way, Bonaparte purposed to lead the Army of Reserve across the Alps against Melas, who was fighting the French so vigorously at Genoa and along the Var.
On the 6th of May Bonaparte left Paris to direct the operations of the Army of Reserve. He had already assembled the several parts of that army near Lake Geneva, and had collected vast supplies there, which were to be used by the army in its march into Italy. On his arrival at Dijon, he reviewed the few thousand conscripts and old soldiers at that place. After this review,which was intended to confirm the spies still further in their belief that the Army of Reserve was purely imaginary, he proceeded to Geneva, and thence to Lausanne, at which places the greater part of the army was assembled. On his arrival there, Bonaparte began the final preparations for crossing the Alps. At first, he thought of leading the Army of Reserve into Switzerland, in order to unite it with Moncey's corps, which had been detached from the Army of the Rhine, and thence march through the St. Gothard Pass into Italy. He also considered the plan of marching into Switzerland, and thence of descending into Italy by way of the Simplon Pass. But after receiving the report of General Marescot, who had been sent to examine the several passes of the Alps, he decided to conduct the greater part of his forces over the Great St. Bernard Pass. By taking this route, which was much the shortest, he could reach Milan earlier, and thus gain the great advantage of time.
The plan of Bonaparte was to conduct thirty-five thousand men of the Army of Reserve over this pass into Italy, and to send the remaining five thousand over the Little St. Bernard Pass, which lies in the Alps but a few miles south of the Great St. Bernard. At the same time a small detachment was to proceed from Switzerland into Italy by way of the Simplon Pass; and Thurreau's division of four thousand, which formed the left of theArmy of Italy, was to descend from the Mont Cenis Pass and attack the Austrians in the vicinity of Turin. These movements having been accomplished, Bonaparte intended to direct the greater part of the Army of Reserve on Milan, where it was to unite with Moncey's corps, which was marching over the St. Gothard into Italy. Should this part of the plan be successfully executed, Bonaparte then purposed to march south with a strong force, cross the Po near Placentia, and occupy the Stradella Pass. This pass, which is enclosed on the north by the Po and on the south by the spurs that shoot northward from the main chain of the Apennines, is a strong position on the direct road between Alessandria and Mantua. While holding the pass, Bonaparte expected to debouch westward therefrom against Melas, who, he calculated, would advance eastward from Alessandria and meet him in the plains of the Scrivia.
It is clear, from the histories of this campaign, that the plan as here set forth had not been determined on in all its details before the movements began. In fact, until Bonaparte descended the eastern slope of the Alps, he had not fully decided whether he would march directly on Milan, or on Alessandria and the fortress of Tortona, in order thus to bring relief more quickly to Masséna. Circumstances would then determine the matter. But there is little doubt that before leaving Paris he had mapped out in his own mind the essentialfeatures of the plan as here set forth. Upon this point Bourrienne, in his "Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte," writes as follows:—
"On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humor, he (Bonaparte) desired me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy. He lay down upon it and desired me to do likewise. He then stuck into it pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax, some red and some black. I silently observed him, and awaited with no little curiosity the result of this plan of campaign. When he had stationed the enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with the red heads on the points where he hoped to bring his own troops, he said to me, 'Where do you think I shall beat Melas?'—'How the devil should I know?'—'Why, look here, you fool; Melas is at Alessandria with his headquarters. There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has in Alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his reserves. Crossing the Alps here' (pointing to the Great Mont St. Bernard) 'I shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and meet him here in the plains of the Scrivia' (placing a red pin at San Giuliano). Finding that I looked on this manœuvre of pins as mere pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such as fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more clearly on the map."
"On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humor, he (Bonaparte) desired me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy. He lay down upon it and desired me to do likewise. He then stuck into it pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax, some red and some black. I silently observed him, and awaited with no little curiosity the result of this plan of campaign. When he had stationed the enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with the red heads on the points where he hoped to bring his own troops, he said to me, 'Where do you think I shall beat Melas?'—'How the devil should I know?'—'Why, look here, you fool; Melas is at Alessandria with his headquarters. There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has in Alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his reserves. Crossing the Alps here' (pointing to the Great Mont St. Bernard) 'I shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and meet him here in the plains of the Scrivia' (placing a red pin at San Giuliano). Finding that I looked on this manœuvre of pins as mere pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such as fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more clearly on the map."
The correspondence of Bonaparte at this time shows that he had a full knowledge of the positions and condition of the Austrian forces in Italy. From information sent him by Suchet, he learned that the Austrian army was greatly scattered; that but a small portion of it was occupying that partof northern Italy between the Po and Switzerland; and that as yet General Melas did not believe in the existence of the Army of Reserve. It was this knowledge which caused the First Consul to believe that he could execute successfully this bold and hazardous undertaking.
From Villeneuve, at the east end of Lake Geneva, the road across the Alps into Italy passes through the towns of Martigny and Saint Pierre, thence over the Great St. Bernard, through the village of Saint Remy, into the valley of the Aosta, and thence it continues along the Dora Baltea River, through the towns of Aosta, Châtillon, Bard, and Ivrea, into the plains of Piedmont. Not far south of the Great St. Bernard lies the Little St. Bernard Pass, which opens also into the valley of the Aosta. In 1800 these two roads were much more difficult of passage than they are at the present time. When Bonaparte crossed the Alps, the road from Saint Pierre to Saint Remy was simply a bridle path over which no vehicle could pass. Even now it would be a hazardous undertaking to conduct a large army into Italy over the Great St. Bernard. Crossing the Alps at an elevation of more than eight thousand feet, the pass lies in a region of perpetual snow and ice, where the glaciers, the shock of avalanches, and the frequent and blinding storms make the passage of troops difficult and dangerous.
Having once reached the fertile valley of thePo, Bonaparte expected to find food and forage there in abundance; but during the march from Villeneuve to Ivrea it was necessary to provide supplies in advance for the army. For this purpose he had collected them at Lake Geneva. He now caused them to be distributed at different points along this route. He also sent money to the monks in charge of the Great St. Bernard Hospital, in order that they should purchase bread, cheese, and wine for the soldiers. At Villeneuve, Martigny, Saint Pierre, and Saint Remy, he established hospitals for the sick and injured. To the foot of the defile at Saint Pierre he sent forward a company of mechanics to dismount the guns and to divide the gun-carriages and caissons into numbered parts for transportation on pack mules. The ammunition too was carried in this way. But the cannon themselves could not be thus transported. For this purpose sledges with rollers had been made, but they were found to be of no use. Finally, the cannon were enclosed within the trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose. Thus protected, they were dragged across the Alps by the soldiers themselves. A second company of mechanics was ordered to march with the first division and to establish itself at Saint Remy, in order to put together the carriages and caissons, to remount the pieces, and to make the necessary repairs.
On the 14th of May Bonaparte was ready to begin the movement. The Army of Reservenumbered forty thousand soldiers and forty cannon; about four thousand were cavalry. Four corps of the army, numbering thirty-five thousand men, commanded by Murat, Victor, Duhesme, and Lannes, had taken position from Villeneuve to Saint Pierre. A fifth corps, of five thousand men, commanded by Chabran, was in Savoy at the foot of the Little St. Bernard Pass. Bonaparte himself was at Martigny, at which place he issued the orders for the movement. He had sent Berthier forward to receive the divisions on the Italian side of the Alps.
On the 15th of May the movement began. Lannes crossed first. He began his march from Saint Pierre at two o'clock in the morning, in order to avoid as much as possible the danger from the avalanches, which are less frequent in the cool of the day. He reached the summit safely, and his soldiers were pleasantly surprised to find there the bread, cheese, and wine which Bonaparte had provided for them. Lannes halted but a moment at the Great St. Bernard Hospital; he then began the descent and arrived at Saint Remy on the same day. He was followed in turn by the corps in his rear. At the same time Chabran crossed the Little St. Bernard Pass, and Thurreau began to advance over the Mont Cenis Pass. The entire Army of Reserve crossed between the 15th and 20th of May. During this famous passage of the Alps the soldiers were filled withenergy and enthusiasm. Though heavily laden, they themselves, by sheer strength, dragged their cannon over the rough and slippery paths. No exertion seemed to tire them. As they pressed on, all were gay and cheerful. As they climbed the mountain side, their spirits rose. With shouts and cheers and songs, they made that Alpine region ring. In that cold, clear air they felt their blood quicken. They felt, too, the energy, the enthusiasm, the magnetism, of their commander. They not only hoped for, but they expected victory. Were they not imitating the daring deeds of the great Hannibal? Were they not about to enter that Italy where their comrades had fought so gloriously before? Were they not commanded by the "Little Corporal," their idol, whose deeds of desperate daring at the bridges of Lodi and Arcole had won their everlasting admiration?
Thus the Army of Reserve crossed the Alps. By the 20th of May all five corps had reached the valley of the Aosta. Owing to the careful preparations made, there had been scarcely any accidents and no serious delays during the passage. But the greatest difficulty was yet to be met. Some distance down the valley of the Aosta, upon a perpendicular rock commanding a narrow defile, Fort Bard had been constructed. Though this fort was garrisoned by only two or three hundred Austrians, it was impregnable and controlled the whole valley. After descending the Great St. Bernard Pass, Lannes had pushed on down the valley, but was stopped by the fire of the fort. At once he made an effort to capture the place, but was repulsed. He soon saw that it could not be taken by force. Though he gained the road that led past the fort, the deadly fire of the Austrians prevented him from advancing. For a time it seemed that this small but formidable fort would stop the progress of the whole army. Lannes was greatly disturbed. He reported the matter to Berthier, and Berthier sent at once a courier to inform Bonaparte of the situation. The First Consul was still at Martigny, where he had remained for the purpose of hastening forward all the artillery and the rear divisions of the army. This news was a complete surprise to Bonaparte. The effect which it produced upon him is thus described by Thiers:—
"This announcement of an obstacle, considered insurmountable at first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that, if one of the loftiest mountains of the globe had failed to arrest his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be turned. Besides, if the infantry and cavalry could pass it, with but a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns couldfollow them. And if the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if, in order to get any, those of the enemy had to be taken, the French infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and take their cannon."Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number of Italian officers, and learning from them that many other roads led from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and pointing out to him with wonderful precision what reconnoissances should be made around the fort of Bard."
"This announcement of an obstacle, considered insurmountable at first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that, if one of the loftiest mountains of the globe had failed to arrest his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be turned. Besides, if the infantry and cavalry could pass it, with but a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns couldfollow them. And if the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if, in order to get any, those of the enemy had to be taken, the French infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and take their cannon.
"Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number of Italian officers, and learning from them that many other roads led from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and pointing out to him with wonderful precision what reconnoissances should be made around the fort of Bard."
Having sent these instructions to Berthier and having seen the last division well on its way, the First Consul hurried across the Alps towards Fort Bard. Meanwhile a foot-path, leading along the mountain side around the fort, was discovered by Lannes. By a few repairs the path was soon rendered passable for the men and horses, but not for the artillery. How to get the cannon past the fort was the question. Finally, the following method was adopted. During a dark night the road in front of the fort was strewn with manure and straw, and, to deaden the sound of the artillery wheels, they were wrapped with tow and straw; then the soldiers themselves quietly hauled the guns past the fort. The stratagem succeeded; all the artillery was thus transported. In this way the Army of Reserve surmounted this obstacle, which for a time gave Bonaparte greater anxiety than the passage of the Great St. Bernard itself.
At this time the lower valley of the Aosta was guarded by three thousand Austrians under General Haddick. On the 20th of May Lannes arrived at Ivrea, which was occupied by the enemy. He attacked the Austrian garrison there, defeated it, and captured the place. Thence, continuing his march towards Chivasso, he again attacked the Austrians on the Chiusella, defeated them, drove them from position to position, and finally, having forced them back towards Turin, captured Chivasso. Meanwhile Bonaparte, having left Chabran's corps to blockade Fort Bard, followed Lannes with the remainder of the army.
During these operations, General Thurreau descended the Mont Cenis Pass and attacked General Kaim, who, with five thousand men, was at Susa guarding the Mont Cenis route into Italy. Before the spirited attacks of Thurreau, Kaim was obliged to abandon Susa and fall back to Busseleno on the road to Turin.
On the 27th of May Bonaparte with the greater part of the Army of Reserve was near Chivasso, Thurreau was at Susa, a French detachment, under Bethencourt, was descending the Simplon Pass, and Moncey's corps was struggling heroically towards Milan over the St. Gothard. Thus far the plans of the First Consul had been successful. He had crossed the Alps, forced his way past Fort Bard, and driven the enemy out of the valley of the Aosta. Now, the thunder of his cannon couldbe heard on the plains of Piedmont. But what of the Austrians! Where were they? Where was Melas?
Still incredulous as to the existence of an army of reserve, Melas was bending every energy to capture Genoa and to force the crossings of the Var. In the engagements and battles with Masséna and Suchet, the army of Melas, which originally numbered one hundred and twenty thousand, had been reduced to one hundred thousand men. These troops were greatly scattered. On the 13th of May they were thus stationed: thirty thousand under General Ott were besieging Genoa; twenty-five thousand under General Elsnitz were fighting Suchet along the Var; ten thousand under General Vukassovich were watching the Italian entrances of the St. Gothard and Simplon passes; three thousand, commanded by General Haddick, were in the lower valley of the Aosta, watching the St. Bernard passes; five thousand, commanded by General Kaim, were occupying Susa at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass; and two thousand were scattered along the Maritime Alps near the Tenda Pass. In addition, six thousand were on their way from Tuscany to re-enforce Melas; three thousand remained in Tuscany, and sixteen thousand more occupied Alessandria, the fortresses of Tortona and Mantua, and various other garrisons of northern Italy.
Such was the situation of the Austrians when,on the 21st of May, Melas received information of the passage of French troops over the Great St. Bernard. Immediately he collected ten thousand soldiers from the Austrian forces in front of Suchet and in the vicinity of the Tenda Pass, and marched on Turin. At first, he believed that the French troops appearing in Italy were merely a detachment sent thither to harass his rear; but at Coni, where he arrived on the 22d of May, he learned to a certainty that Bonaparte himself was in Italy; that the French soldiers were already issuing into the plains of Piedmont; and that the First Consul had with him both cannon and cavalry. Melas was surprised. He knew not what to do. Having been repeatedly informed by his own spies, and even by the Aulic Council, that the Army of Reserve was a mere fiction, he could now hardly bring himself to believe that it was a reality. It might, after all, be but a large detachment; for how could Bonaparte cross the Alps with an army? How could he pass Fort Bard with cannon and cavalry? It must be remembered, too, that at this time Melas had not learned that Moncey was marching on Milan. As yet, therefore, he was not completely undeceived. He knew that a French force was at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass, and that French troops were issuing from the valley of the Aosta into the plains of Piedmont; but he did not know the number of the French forces nor did he know the intentions of Bonaparte. Consequently he delayed issuing the orders for the concentration of his scattered troops.
Having reached Turin with ten thousand men, Melas was joined by General Haddick's command, which had been driven from the valley of the Aosta by Lannes, and by General Kaim's division, which had been driven from Susa by Thurreau. But this junction gave Melas only sixteen or seventeen thousand Austrians to oppose the thirty-five thousand French near Chivasso under Bonaparte.
At this time Melas expected the French to cross the Po and attack him near Turin; but such was not the intention of Bonaparte. In order to deceive Melas, the First Consul ordered Lannes to make preparations as if the French intended to cross the Po at Chivasso, then to march rapidly down the river, through Crescentino and Candia, on Pavia. At the same time Bonaparte himself, with the corps of Victor, Duhesme, and Murat, set out for Milan by way of Vercelli and Novara. On the 31st of May Bonaparte arrived at the Ticino River. To oppose the passage of the French, Vukassovich had collected a considerable force on the east bank. Bonaparte crossed the river, attacked and defeated the Austrians, thence, continuing his march eastward, entered Milan on the 2d of June. Vukassovich, having left a garrison in the castle of Milan, fell back behind the Adda. At Milan Bonapartedelayed several days to await the arrival of Moncey's corps, the advance guard of which was just beginning to appear in Italy. During the delay Bonaparte directed a part of his forces on Brescia, Lodi, and Cremona. As a result of these movements, Vukassovich retired behind the Mincio and sought safety under the guns of Mantua. Bonaparte also directed Murat on Placentia in order to seize the crossings of the Po there.
Meanwhile the detachment under Bethencourt, marching by way of the Simplon Pass, had reached Arona at the lower end of Lake Maggiore. On the 1st of June Fort Bard surrendered to Chabran. Having left a garrison in this place, and one also in Ivrea, he then took up a position with the remainder of his corps along the Po from Chivasso to the Sesia River. From the Sesia to Pavia the corps of Lannes occupied the line of the Po. On the 1st of June Lannes had captured this place, and had seized the large magazines there, which contained provisions, several pieces of artillery, and a number of pontoon boats.
Thus it will be seen that the French were in possession of the whole of northern Italy lying between the Po and Switzerland. Looking south from Milan, Bonaparte had in his front the line of the Po, which he held from Chivasso to Cremona. Far away to his right was the Great St. Bernard Pass, which he had just crossed, andwhich was now guarded by the French garrisons of Fort Bard and Ivrea. To his left, at a distance of eighty miles, was the Mincio, which formed on that side the dividing line between the French and the Austrians; and in his rear were the St. Gothard and Simplon passes, which offered him a safe retreat into Switzerland in case he should meet with a reverse. Already, within this territory, he had seized all the Austrian communications, captured several Austrian garrisons, occupied several cities, and taken possession of immense quantities of provisions and munitions of war.
Thus situated, Bonaparte was almost ready to strike the blow that should decide the fate of Italy. In a few days he would cross the Po, march through the Stradella Pass, and encounter Melas on the bloody field of Marengo. The delay at Milan was but the lull before the storm. While Bonaparte remained there, completing his arrangements and awaiting the arrival of Moncey, Melas was beginning to appreciate the situation, and, though still somewhat confused and undecided, was destined shortly to make an heroic effort to save his army.
For several days after Melas reached Turin, he remained in doubt as to the intentions of Bonaparte. In fact, he was deceived by the preparations that Lannes had made to cross the Po at Chivasso. Again: in descending the rivertowards Pavia, Lannes so masked the main part of the Army of Reserve, that Melas did not immediately become aware of the movement on Milan. But on the 29th of May he learned that Bonaparte was marching on Milan; and, on the 31st, he learned that Moreau had defeated Kray, and that Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. Gothard into Italy. At once he comprehended the vast plan of Bonaparte. He saw that nothing could now prevent the Army of Reserve from uniting with Moncey's corps; and that, with these combined forces, Bonaparte would doubtless march south from Milan, cross the Po, and sever the Austrian communications. Thus he saw himself being rapidly enclosed in a net from which there would soon be little or no hope of escape. Being now completely undeceived as to the intentions of Bonaparte, Melas had no further cause for delay. He must concentrate his troops at once, in order to break through the French forces rapidly closing in upon him. He must, if possible, preserve his communications, and thus save his army from capture or annihilation.
Accordingly, he determined to concentrate at Placentia and the Stradella Pass all the available Austrian troops that were fighting the French near Genoa. By this means he hoped to seize and hold the crossings of the Po from Pavia to Cremona, and thus to retain possession of the great highway leading from Alessandria throughthe Stradella Pass to Mantua. He also determined to unite at Alessandria all the available Austrian troops in Piedmont and along the Var. By this means he expected to assemble there an army of at least thirty thousand men, and thence to proceed eastward through the Stradella Pass to Mantua. By following this plan, he hoped to make his escape with the greater part of his army. Having once reached the Mincio, he could unite his forces with those of Vukassovich; and, perhaps, in this strong position, flanked on one side by Lake Garda, and on the other by the fortress of Mantua, he might be able to make a successful stand against Bonaparte.
In accordance with this plan, he sent imperative orders to General Elsnitz to quit the Var and march on Alessandria, and to General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to seize Placentia and the crossings of the Po near that point. Meanwhile he himself, having left a sufficient force to hold Thurreau in check, hastened with the remainder of his army to march on Alessandria.
Upon receiving the orders of Melas, General Elsnitz, whose command then numbered but seventeen thousand, began to withdraw his forces from the Var. He directed his columns towards the Tenda Pass, expecting to cross the Apennines at that point, and thence to march on Alessandria by way of Coni, Alba, and Asti. But Suchet,being well aware of the desperate situation of Melas, was anticipating the recall of Elsnitz and was prepared for it. Suchet's forces numbered fourteen thousand men. By skilful manœuvring and by a rapid march across the foothills of the Apennines, he succeeded in reaching the Tenda Pass ahead of his adversary. Having thus turned the flank of the Austrians, and obtained possession of their line of retreat, he fell upon them, defeated them, cut them in two, and killed, wounded, or captured more than half of their army. As a result General Elsnitz was compelled to retreat eastward and cross the Apennines over the Ormea Pass. With only eight thousand men he arrived at Ceva on the 7th of Juneen routeto Alessandria. Meanwhile Suchet, having proceeded eastward to Savona, was joined by a part of Masséna's command, which had marched out of Genoa on the 5th of June. With these combined forces, Suchet marched to Acqui, and there, still acting under the orders of Masséna, awaited the results of Bonaparte's operations.
When, on the 2d of June, General Ott received the orders of Melas, the negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa were pending. He delayed until the 4th of June to receive the surrender of Masséna. On the 6th, having left a sufficient force to garrison the city, he sent a brigade towards Placentia by way of Bobbio; and with the remainder of his forces, numbering sixteenthousand soldiers, he himself marched towards the same place by way of Novi, Tortona, and the Stradella Pass.
During these operations, Bonaparte remained at Milan, perfecting his arrangements and issuing the orders for the movements of his troops. He had already sent forward Berthier to direct the operations along the Po. On the 6th of June Moncey's corps arrived. This re-enforcement of fifteen thousand men increased the effective forces under the immediate command of Bonaparte to about sixty thousand. Immediately upon the arrival of Moncey, thirty-two thousand soldiers under Lannes, Victor, and Murat, began to cross the Po. The remainder of the army were thus stationed: four thousand, under Thurreau, were at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass; two small detachments were occupying Fort Bard and Ivrea; ten thousand were posted at Vercelli and along the Ticino from the foot of Lake Maggiore to Pavia; three thousand were at Milan; and ten thousand were along the Adda, and at Cremona and Placentia. All these troops, except the division of Thurreau, which was isolated and held in check by an Austrian force near Turin, were available for the operations about Milan and along the Po.
On the 6th of June Lannes and Victor crossed the Po near Belgiojoso, a few miles below Pavia, and marched thence to the Stradella Pass. Onthe following day Murat crossed at Placentia. In these passages the French met with considerable opposition from small detachments of cavalry and infantry that Melas had directed thither from Alessandria and elsewhere to hold the crossings of the Po until General Ott should arrive; but these detachments having been defeated and driven back, the French occupied Placentia and the Stradella Pass. At the latter place a fortified camp was constructed, and between Pavia and Placentia five bridges were built for the use of the French in case they should be forced to retreat.
During these operations two Austrian couriers were captured. One was carrying despatches from Melas to Vienna; the other, from the Aulic Council to Melas. The despatches of the former told of the surrender of Genoa, and of the plans and movements of Melas. Those of the latter informed the Austrian commander that the Army of Reserve was a mere myth, and that he should pay no attention to the rumors concerning it, but should make every effort to capture Genoa and force the crossings of the Var.
The news that Genoa had surrendered was discouraging to Bonaparte, for he at once appreciated the fact that he must now fight the forces of General Ott in addition to those which Melas was assembling at Alessandria. There was, however, a compensating advantage in knowing the plansof his adversary, for, having learned that General Ott was marching on Placentia, he at once saw that he might defeat this corps, and perhaps destroy it, before it could reach Placentia or unite with Melas. Accordingly, he sent to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat the following instructions: "Concentrate yourselves at the Stradella. On the 8th or 9th at the latest, you will have upon your hands fifteen or eighteen thousand Austrians, coming from Genoa. Meet them and cut them to pieces. It will be so many enemies less upon our hands on the day of the decisive battle which we are to expect with the entire army of Melas."
In accordance with these instructions, Lannes and Victor faced about their columns and proceeded westward towards Tortona. Lannes, commanding the vanguard, preceded Victor by a distance of five miles. The remainder of the French forces on the south bank of the Po marched to the Stradella Pass. On the 9th of June Lannes with nine thousand men encountered the sixteen thousand under Ott at Montebello. Immediately a furious battle began. For several hours both sides fought desperately. The Austrian superiority in numbers would have crushed an ordinary soldier, but Lannes was of uncommon mould. Impetuous, stubborn, brave, fierce, and terrible on the battle-field, he would not yield. In the face of a deadly fire he encouraged his soldiers, and by his presence and heroic action held themfirm before the repeated onslaughts of the Austrians. Nevertheless, he would eventually have been defeated had not Victor arrived opportunely on the battle-field with six thousand men. This re-enforcement turned the tide of battle in favor of the French. The Austrians were defeated, cut to pieces, and compelled finally to retreat. They lost in killed, wounded, and captured five thousand men; the French, three thousand. With the remnants of his corps General Ott fell back across the Scrivia, and thence proceeded to Alessandria. This battle secured for Lannes the title of "Duke of Montebello." It covered him with glory, and brought to his name an imperishable renown.
The First Consul, who had left Milan on the morning of the 9th of June, arrived at Montebello just at the termination of the battle. Expecting that Melas would at once advance with all the troops that he had collected at Alessandria, Bonaparte began on the 10th of June to rearrange his troops, and to make preparations for battle. Being deficient in both cavalry and artillery, while Melas was well supplied with both, Bonaparte decided to fall back to a position near Casteggio, in front of the Stradella Pass, where his flanks would be protected by the Po on one side, and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. With the corps of Lannes and Victor he made a retrograde movement to this point. Here he collected all his forces south of the Po, nownumbering twenty-nine thousand men. In this strong position he remained for several days, expecting hourly that the Austrians would push forward from Alessandria and attack him. But they failed to appear.
On the 11th of June General Desaix, who had served under Bonaparte in Egypt, arrived at the French headquarters. He was a distinguished general, and a warm friend of the First Consul. At once Bonaparte gave him the command of a corps, consisting of two divisions.
On the following day Bonaparte, surprised at the non-appearance of the Austrians, began to fear that they were trying to escape. He thought that Melas might attempt to evade him, either by marching directly on Genoa, or by crossing the Po at Valenza, and thence marching on Pavia and Milan. Finally, he could bear the suspense no longer. He decided to advance and seek Melas. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 12th of June, having left a force to occupy the intrenched camp at the Stradella Pass, he advanced towards Alessandria. At Tortona he left a force to blockade the fortress. On the 13th of June he crossed the Scrivia and debouched into the plain of Marengo, which lies between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers. Thus far he had met with no Austrians. His anxiety increased. He had but few cavalry, and, consequently, was unable to make a thorough reconnoissance of the surrounding country. During the afternoon of that day, he directed Victor on Marengo. Here the French found only a small detachment, which was quickly driven across the Bormida. A party sent forward to reconnoitre the crossings of the Bormida, reported that no Austrians were to be found there in force.
From all these indications, Bonaparte came to the conclusion that the Austrians had left Alessandria. He reasoned that, if Melas intended to attack the French and force his way through the Stradella Pass, he would neither have given up the plain without a struggle, nor have failed to occupy in force the village of Marengo. Moreover, he thought that Melas would surely not neglect to hold the Bormida with a strong force so long as he remained at Alessandria. But if he had gone, what route had he taken?
On that day Bonaparte received word that no Austrians had appeared at Pavia or along the Ticino. It seemed probable, therefore, that Melas might be marching on Genoa; and that he would attempt either to make a stand there, where he could be supported by the British fleet, or else to march thence through Bobbio, Placentia, and Cremona to Mantua. With this thought in his mind, Bonaparte directed Desaix with one division of his corps, numbering six thousand men, on Novi, in order to intercept Melas, should he be attempting to escape by this route.
Thus it happened that on the evening of the 13th of June Bonaparte was unprepared for the battle of the next day. His forces were scattered. Desaix was on his way to Novi; Victor was at Marengo; Lannes and Murat were on the plain in rear of Victor; the Consular Guard, two regiments of cavalry, and Monnier's division, which belonged to the corps of Desaix, were along the Scrivia near Tortona. These forces numbered twenty-eight thousand men, of whom three thousand and five hundred were cavalry. Bonaparte had about forty cannon. That night he slept in a small town about two miles east of San Giuliano. He expected to receive on the next day some information that would enlighten him as to the movements and intentions of Melas; but he had no thought of a battle on the morrow.
Meanwhile, at Alessandria there was much confusion. By the defeat of General Ott at Montebello, Melas had lost possession of the direct road from Alessandria through the Stradella Pass to Mantua. He could not, therefore, make his escape by this route without first defeating the French. He hardly knew what to do. Already his communications were severed. Doubtless the French would soon advance towards Alessandria. Perhaps, in a few days, they would force the crossings of the Bormida, and attempt to shut him up within the city. In this uncertainState of mind Melas called a council of war. To the officers composing the council three plans suggested themselves. Should they cross the Po at Valenza, march to Pavia, and attempt to make their escape by forcing their way across the Ticino; or should they march to Genoa, and in that place, supported by the British fleet, make preparations to stand a siege; or, lastly, should they cross the Bormida, meet the French face to face, and fight to recover their communications and save their army?
The third plan was adopted. The Austrian officers reasoned that it was doubtful whether either of the first two plans would succeed; that the false position that they now occupied was due neither to Melas nor to themselves, but to the Aulic Council, which had repeatedly misinformed them as to the actual state of affairs; and that now the only honorable course was to fight, and, if possible, cut their way through the French forces. "If we succeed," said they, "victory will regain for us the road to Placentia and Mantua; if not, we shall have done our duty, and the responsibility of any disaster that may befall us will rest upon other heads than ours."
Melas concurred in the views of his officers. Though seventy years old, age had not dimmed his courage. His army at Alessandria numbered thirty-two thousand men, and contained two hundred pieces of artillery and seven thousand cavalry.On the 13th of June he decided that on the next day he would cross the Bormida and attack Bonaparte.
The plain of Marengo lies between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers, which rise in the Apennines and flow northward towards the Po. The town of Marengo, from which this battle takes its name, is situated near the east bank of the Bormida on the great highway leading from Alessandria to Mantua. About two miles north of Marengo is the village of Castel-ceriolo. On the main road, just east of Alessandria, two bridges span the Bormida. They were held by the Austrians, and were defended by a single bridge-head on the right bank. The surrounding country is generally quite flat, but towards the village of San Giuliano, which lies on the main road about three miles east of Marengo, several hillocks thereabout render the ground uneven.
At daybreak on the morning of the 14th of June, the Austrians began to cross the Bormida and to issue from the bridge-head on the right bank. Three thousand soldiers under General O'Reilly crossed first. They drove back the French outposts and advanced towards Marengo. This vanguard was followed by a division under Haddick, and that in turn by another under Kaim. At eight o'clock these forces, having deployed, began the battle. Being well supplied with cannon, they opened the attack with aheavy artillery fire, then pressed forward towards Marengo.
Meanwhile, word was sent to Bonaparte that the whole Austrian army was advancing. During the deployment of the Austrians, Victor at Marengo had taken up a position in front of the village along the muddy stream of Fontanone. Here he received the attacks of the Austrians, and finally succeeded in driving them back. But the Austrian line was soon strongly re-enforced. Melas directed two more divisions on Marengo, and, having detached Ott's division, directed it on Castel-ceriolo, in order to take the French in flank on that side.
About ten o'clock Lannes brought his corps into line on the right of Victor. He was supported by a cavalry brigade under Champeaux. Kellerman's brigade of cavalry supported Victor. Meanwhile General Ott, having arrived near Castel-ceriolo, began to threaten the French right, which movement obliged Lannes to form front in that direction with a part of his corps. The French line of battle, numbering about fifteen thousand men, was about two miles long. It followed the general direction of the Fontanone northward from Marengo towards Castel-ceriolo, and westward from Marengo towards the Bormida. Facing this line were the Austrian troops, numbering twenty-nine thousand five hundred men. General Ott formed the left, and the reserveunder General Elsnitz was in the rear. Having been informed that Suchet had reached Acqui, Melas had, during the morning, sent two thousand five hundred of his reserve cavalry to reconnoitre in that direction.
At ten o'clock Melas attacked with fury the whole French line. He made a determined effort to drive back Victor's corps and to gain possession of Marengo. Along the stream in front of the village the struggle was fierce and bloody. Both sides fought desperately. Melas felt that hemustconquer. Knowing that his situation was critical, and that nothing short of victory could save his army, he fought with the courage of despair. The French, too, fought like demons. Their victory at Montebello had encouraged them; and now, having sought and found their enemy, they expected to be again triumphant. With determination they resisted the onsets of Melas. Before the furious attacks of superior numbers, in the face of cannon, sabre, and steel, they stood to their work like men. But all their efforts were unavailing. Against so fierce an attack Victor could not long hold his position. He was compelled to fall back to Marengo, where he again made a desperate effort to stop the advance of the Austrians. For a time he held on to the village, but was finally forced to give way. His corps was routed; his soldiers became demoralized. In disorder they retired towards San Giuliano, followedby the victorious Austrians. Meanwhile, Lannes had held his position against the attacks of Melas in his front and of Ott on his right. But when Victor gave way, Lannes found himself in a desperate situation. This movement uncovered the left of his corps and threatened it with destruction. Thus outflanked on both wings and hard pressed in front, he saw defeat near at hand. In fact the Austrians were on the point of sweeping everything before them. Though the French were still fighting bravely, it was evident that they must soon fall back into the plain, or else be routed and destroyed.
Such was the situation at eleven o'clock when Bonaparte arrived. Having received word early in the morning that the whole Austrian army was advancing towards Marengo, he immediately sent Desaix orders to return, then hurried to the front with all the troops that he could collect. He brought with him the Consular Guard, Monnier's division, and two regiments of cavalry,—in all about seven thousand men. A single glance sufficed to show Bonaparte what should be done. He formed the Consular Guard into squares to hold the Austrian cavalry in check, directed a column on Castel-ceriolo, sent the greater part of Monnier's division to re-enforce Lannes, and ordered Murat with the reserve cavalry to protect as best he could the retreat of Victor's corps. Again the struggle was renewed with increasedfury; but all the efforts of Bonaparte and of Lannes could not now turn the tide of battle in favor of the French. With an almost resistless momentum, Melas pressed forward. Seeing victory just within his grasp, he strained every nerve to crush and annihilate his adversary. He ordered his reserves to the front and threw them into the fight. Repeatedly his cavalry charged the French, cut in on their flanks, and threatened them with destruction; and, while the left of his line was resisting bravely the heroic efforts of Lannes, he himself issued from Marengo with his victorious troops, and directed them upon the flank of the French.
It was no longer possible for Bonaparte to hold his ground. He ordered a retreat. Again the heroism of Lannes displayed itself on that sanguinary field. Fighting as he retired, he fell back slowly and in admirable order. For more than two hours he prolonged the conflict, while being forced back from position to position over a distance of nearly two miles. But, finally, his indomitable spirit was compelled to yield. His corps was driven from the field. At length, shattered, crushed, almost demoralized, it retired behind the hillocks near San Giuliano, where the remnants of Victor's corps had assembled.
The Austrians had conquered. On the plain of Marengo Melas had defeated Bonaparte. Thevictory seemed complete. There appeared to be no longer any hope for Bonaparte. The French had been driven three miles beyond Marengo. The greater part of their cavalry had been destroyed. More than two thirds of their cannon had been captured. Fragments only of their infantry organizations remained. On that bloody field six thousand French soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured. Such was the result of the struggle at Marengo on the morning of the 14th of June, 1800. Who would have thought that before the close of that eventful day the vanquished would become the victors?
Thus far Melas had exhibited great energy and courage; but when the French had been driven from the field, and the excitement of the conflict had ended, he felt deeply the effects of his exertion. The weight of years, too, bore heavily upon him. Fully convinced that he had gained a complete victory over Bonaparte, he left the command of the army to his chief of staff, General Zach, and, having sent despatches to his government announcing the result, returned to Alessandria exhausted with fatigue.
General Zach now rearranged his troops for the purpose of following the French, whom he believed to be completely routed. But the Austrians were not in a condition to pursue the enemy promptly and vigorously. Their cavalry, in particular, had been roughly handled by Victorand Lannes during the morning; and, moreover, it was much weakened by the two thousand five hundred men that Melas had detached towards Acqui to observe Suchet. Considerable time was therefore spent in perfecting the arrangements of Zach. In fact, it was near four o'clock when he began to advance. At the head of about five thousand Austrians he pushed forward along the high-road leading from Marengo to San Giuliano. He was followed at a distance of three quarters of a mile by the corps of Kaim, and it in turn by the Hungarian infantry. At the same time General Ott marched eastward from Castel-ceriolo towards Ghilina. The Austrian troops were only partially deployed. Not expecting great resistance, they were moving forward in marching order rather than in order of battle.
Meanwhile the French, not being vigorously pursued, had halted, and, unperceived by the Austrians, had begun to rally behind the hillocks near San Giuliano. At this time Bonaparte was awaiting anxiously the arrival of Desaix. Early in the morning he had sent him an order to return; but before it reached its destination Desaix, having heard the sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, halted his division. Judging from the thunder of the guns that a battle had begun between the French and Austrians on the plain of Marengo, he hurriedly despatched several cavalry troops to Novi, in order to assure himselfthat no Austrians were in that vicinity, then faced about his troops and marched to the sound of the cannon. Hour after hour he pushed eagerly forward. At about four o'clock in the afternoon the head of his column appeared near San Giuliano.
Upon the arrival of Desaix Bonaparte's spirits rose. Though most of the French officers favored a retreat, Bonaparte was opposed to this course. Desaix, too, concurred in the views of the First Consul. In fact, Desaix was anxious to renew the struggle. Though he saw that the battle was lost, he did not despair of yet gaining another.
Accordingly, Bonaparte at once formed Desaix's division, and the French troops about San Giuliano, into line of battle. Desaix's division was placed across the highway along which the Austrians were advancing. On his right were Lannes, Monnier, and the Consular Guard; in his rear was Victor. Kellerman's brigade of cavalry took a position to the left and rear of Desaix, and Champeaux's brigade to the right and rear of Lannes. Bonaparte had only twelve guns remaining. He placed them on the right of Desaix towards the front of the battle-line.
Such were the positions of the French, when suddenly there appeared from behind the rising ground in their front the column of Zach. Though this column was preceded by an advanceguard with cavalry on each flank, the greater part of the Austrian troops were marching somewhat carelessly, and were surprised when they came thus unexpectedly upon the whole French army in position for battle. Immediately, the French guns opened upon Zach; at the same time Desaix made a furious assault upon him. Kellerman, too, having been directed towards the right and rear of Desaix's division during the early stages of the battle, then moved forward past the right of Desaix and attacked vigorously the Austrian cavalry. Having routed it, he wheeled his troopers to the left and struck in flank the Austrian column, which was already much shaken by the assault of Desaix. Everywhere the Austrians were overwhelmed; two thousand were captured, among whom was General Zach himself. Bonaparte now pushed eagerly forward with his entire force, and in turn attacked and defeated the corps of Kaim and the Hungarian infantry. Continuing to advance, he forced the Austrians back to Marengo. Here they attempted to make a stand, but were again defeated and routed. In disorder they retired towards Alessandria.
Meanwhile General Ott, hearing the firing towards Marengo, marched in that direction; but he only arrived in time to cover the retreat of the main body across the Bormida. By ten o'clock that night all the Austrian troops had recrossed the river. Thus Bonaparte won in the afternoonthe battle that he had lost in the morning. Thus a great disaster was turned into a great victory. Once more the Austrians were crushed; once more the French were triumphant.
On the following morning, Bonaparte made preparations to assault the bridge-head and to cross the Bormida, in order to attack the Austrians in Alessandria. But in the meantime Melas sent an officer to the French headquarters to propose terms of surrender. On the same day, the 15th of June, the negotiations were completed, and an armistice between Melas and Bonaparte was signed. By the terms of surrender Melas was allowed to march out of Alessandria with the honors of war, and to proceed thence to Mantua; in return, he was to evacuate the whole of northern Italy as far as the Mincio, to surrender the fortresses of Coni, Alessandria, Genoa, and Tortona, and the fortified cities of Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, and Arona.
In proportion to the number of combatants at Marengo the losses on both sides were large. Seven thousand Austrians were killed or wounded, and three thousand were captured. The French loss in killed and wounded was equal to that of the Austrians, but only one thousand were captured. Among the first of the French soldiers killed in the battle of the afternoon was Desaix. While gallantly leading his division against theAustrians he was shot through the body and fell dead on the battle-field. His loss was deeply felt by the First Consul and by the French nation.
On the 15th of May Bonaparte had begun the passage of the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve. On the 15th of June he received the surrender of the Austrian army in Italy. In one month, he had crossed the Alps, entered Milan, severed the Austrian communications, fought and won a great battle, and, as a result, obtained possession of the greater part of northern Italy.
Thus ended the campaign of Marengo. It brought about a temporary peace between France and Austria; it excited to a high pitch the military spirit of the French people; and it fixed ultimately upon the head of Bonaparte an emperor's crown. Upon the political history of Europe it produced far-reaching results. It precipitated a contest between England and France, between France and Europe, which, at irregular intervals for fifteen years, was destined to continue, until, finally, on the field of Waterloo, Napoleon's cannon were silenced forever.
COMMENTS.
At the outset one hundred thousand Austrians were occupying northern Italy. Fifty-five thousand were at Genoa and along the Var; two thousand along the Maritime Alps; five thousand atthe foot of the Mont Cenis Pass; three thousand in the valley of the Aosta; and ten thousand in the vicinity of Milan. The remaining twenty-five thousand were scattered throughout northern Italy. They were engaged mostly in garrisoning the fortresses and fortified cities, and in holding possession of the country.
It will be seen that Melas had so stationed his troops that he was weak at all points. Except at Genoa and along the Var, the Austrian army may be said to have been composed of a number of detachments scattered throughout northern Italy. Melas seemed to think that he must occupy every fortress, and guard every road and pass, in order to make secure his position in Italy. Herein lay his great fault; for, his forces being thus scattered, he could not unite them readily to oppose Bonaparte. Though Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on Milan more than two weeks before the battle of Marengo, yet he was able to assemble only thirty-two thousand men at Alessandria to oppose the French.
The main cause, however, of the defeat of Melas was the fact that he was completely deceived as to the intentions of the First Consul. He had no expectation that Bonaparte would cross the Alps; in fact, he did not believe in the existence of an army of reserve. Having reached this conclusion from the reports of his own spies, and from the instructions sent him by the AulicCouncil, he was utterly confounded when the French descended into Italy from the Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard, the Simplon, and St. Gothard passes. Not knowing by which route the strongest column was entering Italy, he knew not where to strike. Consequently, he hesitated and was lost.
Had he fathomed the designs of his adversary in time, he might have rapidly united his forces, and have defeated the several French columns in succession before they could have united in Italy; for, inasmuch as Bonaparte's object was to unite his columns within the Austrian theatre of operations, Melas could concentrate there more quickly than Bonaparte.
On the 29th of May Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on Milan. He then had a splendid opportunity to strike Bonaparte a telling blow. His command at Turin numbered sixteen or seventeen thousand men. In his front at Chivasso and along the Po was Lannes with six or seven thousand. On his left was Thurreau with four thousand. Had Melas left four or five thousand men to hold Thurreau in check, and boldly attacked Lannes with the remainder of his forces, he could easily have defeated Lannes, and have immediately thereafter obtained possession of Bonaparte's communications with France. Such a master stroke would have greatly embarrassed Bonaparte; for he would then have beenobliged either to turn back and fight Melas, in order to recover his communications with France, or to push on and fight Vukassovich, in order to establish his communications with Switzerland. Had Bonaparte adopted the former course, Vukassovich could have closed in on the French rear and have thus aided Melas; had he adopted the latter course, Melas could have aided Vukassovich.
That Melas did not carry out this course was due to the fact that no sooner had he learned of the destination of the Army of Reserve than he began to tremble for the safety of his own army. He at once perceived that it was the intention of Bonaparte to sever the Austrian communications. He therefore abandoned any intention which he may have had of attacking Lannes and of seizing the communications of Bonaparte, in order to take the necessary measures for the preservation of his own communications.
Consider now the operations of Bonaparte; they are worthy of careful study. No one who stops to consider the smallness of the means with which he defeated the Austrians in this campaign can fail to appreciate his genius.
At the outset an Austrian army of one hundred thousand men, led by a courageous commander, was in possession of northern Italy. Everywhere Melas had defeated the French. Masséna at Genoa was about to surrender; and Suchet along the Var was fighting desperately to prevent theinvasion of France. Melas, encouraged by these successes, looked hopefully forward to new triumphs. Such was the situation when Bonaparte entered Italy with his columns, numbering in all a little less than sixty thousand men. With these forces he plunged into the Austrian theatre of operations, and in a month ended the campaign. He so manœuvred that a victory of twenty-eight thousand Frenchmen over twenty-nine thousand five hundred Austrians decided the fate of one hundred thousand Austrians and gained for him the greater part of northern Italy.
How, in so short a time and with so few forces, did Bonaparte accomplish such results? In these comments an attempt will be made to answer this question. It is our purpose to analyze somewhat critically the strategical manœuvres of Bonaparte, to compare the things he did with what he might have done, and to show why the whole of northern Italy fell into his possession as a result of the victory at Marengo. It is our purpose, also, to discuss the battle of Marengo from a tactical point of view, and to set forth some of the reasons why the battle, lost in the morning, was won in the afternoon.
The portion of northern Italy then occupied by the Austrians is divided by the Po and Apennines into three unequal parts, through all which roads pass eastwardly from the French frontier to Mantua. Bonaparte, having decided to lead theArmy of Reserve into Italy, might have adopted any one of three plans. He might have marched into the southern part of the Austrian theatre of operations, lying between the Apennines and the Gulf of Genoa; or into the middle part between the Apennines and the Po; or into the northern part between the Po and Switzerland. Let us examine each of these plans, in order to determine, if possible, which would have procured him the greatest advantages.
Inasmuch as the mountainous and narrow strip of country lying between the Apennines and the sea was peculiarly fitted for the operations of an inferior army, composed mostly of infantry, and inasmuch as the Army of Reserve was deficient in both cavalry and artillery, it might seem that Bonaparte should have united his army with Suchet's forces on the Var for an attack against Melas. But other considerations deterred Bonaparte from doing so. His objections to this course were that even if he succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Var, the Austrians, as they fell back from position to position, would be constantly re-enforced, and could maintain the siege of Genoa. And again: if he succeeded in driving them across the Apennines and in defeating them at Genoa, they could still fall back along their communications to their base of operations on the Mincio, where they would be protected by Lake Garda on one side and by the fortress ofMantua on the other. Even should the Army of Reserve and all the undefeated portions of the Army of Italy be united into one army, Bonaparte's total strength would not exceed seventy thousand men. With this force he could hardly expect to defeat one hundred thousand Austrians flushed by their recent successes. Furthermore, by adopting this plan, no opportunity would be offered him of severing the Austrian communications.
"An ordinary general," says Jomini, "alarmed by the victorious attitude of the Austrians in Piedmont, would have gone in all haste by Dauphiné toward Provence, and made the Alps the theatre of operations. But Bonaparte appreciated too well the difficulties of a frontal attack. He preferred to cross the mountains upon the rear of the imperial forces and gain the Ticino unopposed, where his presence could not fail to recall his adversaries, and compel them to accept battle with all the chances of success against them."
In order to accomplish this result, Bonaparte had purposely led Melas to believe that the Army of Reserve was intended to re-enforce the Army of Italy. Though Melas did not believe in the existence of an army of reserve, he knew that an effort was being made to organize troops in France, and he believed that they would eventually be sent to join Suchet. But the FirstConsul had no intention of doing what Melas expected him to do. It was necessary to the success of Bonaparte that he should conceal as much as possible his own purposes, in order to be able to surprise his adversary. In war it is always wise to lead the enemy to believe that an attack will be made in a different direction from that intended. "In whatever way strategy is employed," says Colonel Maurice, "surprise and concealment are essential to success. On this account it will continually happen, in selecting a line of operations or a scheme of campaign, that the most important point of all is to carry out just what an enemy does not expect. Very often successful campaigns, the method of which has been subsequently much criticised, have owed their success to the fact that, from a nice calculation of time and distance, the successful general has seen that he could carry through an operation dangerous in itself, but sure not to be the one expected by his opponent. For the same reason, in all the brilliant and successful efforts of strategic skill, steps have been taken beforehand to carry out the preliminary movements of an army in such a way as to leave an enemy up to the last moment uncertain in what direction the blow would be struck."
Had Bonaparte marched into the middle part of the Austrian theatre of operations, it would have been necessary to cross the Alps over the MontCenis Pass. The objections to this plan were that the country lying between the Apennines and the Po contained the strong fortifications of Turin, Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona, which would enable the Austrians to hold Bonaparte in check long enough for Melas to concentrate his scattered forces. Furthermore, by entering Italy over this pass, Bonaparte would approach the centre of the Austrian line, which would enable the Austrians to concentrate against him more rapidly than if he moved against either flank of their position. Again: since the Austrians held the passes of the Apennines, they could delay the advance of the French on Genoa and continue the siege; or, if defeated, could fall back along the great highway leading from Piedmont through the Stradella Pass to Mantua.
Though the great chain of the Alps seemed to present an almost impassable barrier to an army attempting to enter the extreme northern part of Italy from France or Switzerland, Bonaparte did not allow this fact to deter him from his great undertaking. There were several reasons why he adopted this plan.
First: He knew that Melas was not expecting the French to enter this part of Italy.
Second: He knew that the country lying between the Po and Switzerland contained but few fortifications, and was occupied by only a few thousand Austrians.
Third: Owing to the fact that he had deceived Melas as to the existence and destination of the Army of Reserve, Bonaparte believed that he could cross the Alps with this army, march to Milan, and there be joined by Moncey's corps before Melas should discover his plan.
Fourth: Inasmuch as all the roads leading from the French frontier to the Austrian base of operations on the Mincio passed through the country lying between Milan and Placentia, he hoped that, by adopting this plan, he would be able to assemble his forces in this space, seize the roads there, and thus completely sever the Austrian communications and place Melas in a position where he must fight under a great disadvantage. With the French in possession of these roads, Melas would be compelled to concentrate and fight in order to recover his communications and save his army. In doing so he would be forced to raise the siege of Genoa and to abandon the attempted invasion of France.
Fifth: Should Bonaparte succeed in concentrating his forces as here set forth, the advantages of his position would be immense. The St. Gothard and Simplon routes in his rear would give him a safe retreat into the great stronghold of Switzerland in case of defeat; the Ticino would protect his right flank, the Adda his left; and the fertile plains of the Po would furnish the necessary supplies for his men and animals, while he was making ready to fight the Austrians or awaiting their attack.
Such are the principal reasons that decided Bonaparte to march the Army of Reserve into that part of Italy lying between the Po and Switzerland. But, having decided on this course, he had yet to determine whether he would lead the Army of Reserve across the Great St. Bernard, or march it into Switzerland and thence descend into Italy by way of the St. Gothard or the Simplon. It will be remembered that for a time he was undecided as to what course to take, and did not fully make up his mind until some time after the Army of Reserve had assembled at Lake Geneva.
In several respects the safest course that Bonaparte could have taken was to conduct his army into Switzerland, unite it with Moncey's corps, and march on Milan by way of the St. Gothard Pass. Had he adopted this course, he would have entered Italy with united forces along a single line of operations, and would have avoided the dangerous flank march from Ivrea to Milan within the enemy's territory. At this time his objective was Milan. His purpose was to assemble his army and the corps of Moncey in that vicinity. By crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard Pass, Bonaparte gave Melas the opportunity of concentrating the Austrian forcesbetween the Army of Reserve and Moncey's corps, and of crushing each in turn with superior numbers.
In the comments on Moreau's operations in Germany, it has already been remarked that it is always a dangerous operation to attempt a concentration upon some designated place within the enemy's lines, for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there more rapidly than the commander of an invading army; that in fact many a campaign has failed because the commanding general has attempted to concentrate his scattered forces upon some point within the territory held by the enemy. By so doing he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Yet in these operations Bonaparte not only committed this error, not only did what he had condemned Moreau for doing, but he also violated the principle which he himself had so often set forth and had so often exemplified, namely,not to invade a country with a double line of operations.
Why then did Bonaparte take this course? To answer satisfactorily this question it is necessary to bear in mind that, at this time, Suchet was fighting greatly superior forces on the Var, and that Masséna was in desperate straits at Genoa. The problem before Bonaparte was not merely toassemble his forces in the vicinity of Milan, but so to assemble them there as to stop the projected invasion of France and bring speedy relief to Masséna.
The most direct route from Lake Geneva to Milan is by way of the Great St. Bernard Pass, and thence through northern Italy. Had, therefore, Bonaparte taken the longer route through Switzerland by way of the St. Gothard, the Austrians, in the meantime, could have forced the crossings of the Var, and have compelled Masséna to surrender. Indeed, these events were the more likely to happen, inasmuch as the Army of Reserve, during its march through Switzerland, would not threaten in the least the Austrian communications.
The importance of crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve is seen in the fact that no sooner had French troops appeared in the valley of the Aosta than Melas at once withdrew ten thousand men from Suchet's front and ordered them to march on Turin. Thus, by the mere crossing of the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, the projected invasion of France was brought to an end. It was inevitable that such should be the case; for as soon as the French appeared in the extreme northern part of Italy, their mere presence there threatened the communications of the Austrians. It was therefore necessary that Melas should abandon theinvasion of France, in order to destroy, if possible, the French troops that were threatening his rear. In war, it will ever be thus. No commander can afford to take the risk of pushing forward to new conquests so long as his communications are seriously threatened by his enemy.
Again: it will be remembered that no sooner had Melas learned that the Army of Reserve was marching on Milan than he sent orders to General Elsnitz to abandon the Var and to General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa. Even the mere knowledge of Bonaparte's destination, before the movement on Milan had actually been completed, was of itself sufficient to cause Melas to change immediately his entire plan of campaign. Had not Masséna, at the time, been just on the point of giving up Genoa, General Ott would not have delayed there two or three days to await the capitulation. In fact, had Masséna known of the exact state of affairs, he doubtless would have held out a day or two longer, and saved himself the humiliation of a surrender. Even without a battle, the concentration of the French forces between Milan and Placentia would, in a short time, have set free Masséna's soldiers; for Melas would then have been obliged to concentrate and fight, in order to recover his communications and connect with his base of supplies. Bonaparte saw clearly this fact. Though he did not know howlong Masséna could hold out at Genoa, he realized that matters there were rapidly approaching a crisis, and that it was of the utmost importance that the Army of Reserve should reach Milan at the earliest possible moment. He realized that upon the direction given his columns and upon the rapidity of their movements depended the fate of Suchet on the Var and of Masséna at Genoa.
Other reasons, too, deterred Bonaparte from marching the Army of Reserve through Switzerland. In this rough and mountainous country, supplies could not be easily obtained. Especially was this true of the St. Gothard route, which had been overrun by the French during the two previous years. Besides, this route was reserved for Moncey's corps, which, of itself, would tax to the utmost the resources of the country. Moreover, this road, a mere bridle path in places, passes through narrow defiles and across lofty and rugged mountains. Evidently a large army issuing into Italy by this route would be so stretched out that the advance divisions could be defeated before the rear divisions could re-enforce them.